Enforce and document exact-match-only for signature verification (#40)
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Closes #27 Signatures are per-URL only — this PR adds explicit tests and documentation enforcing that HMAC-SHA256 signatures verify against exact URLs only. No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported. ## What this does NOT touch **The host whitelist code (`whitelist.go`) is not modified.** This PR is exclusively about signature verification, per sneak's instructions on [issue #27](#27), [PR #32](#32), and [PR #35](#35). ## Changes ### `internal/imgcache/signature.go` - Added documentation comments on `Verify()` and `buildSignatureData()` explicitly specifying that signatures are exact-match only — no suffix, wildcard, or partial matching ### `internal/imgcache/signature_test.go` - **`TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly`**: 14 tamper cases verifying that modifying any signed component (host, path, query, dimensions, format) causes verification to fail. Host-specific cases include: - Parent domain (`example.com`) does not match subdomain signature (`cdn.example.com`) - Sibling subdomain (`images.example.com`) does not match - Deeper subdomain (`images.cdn.example.com`) does not match - Evil suffix domain (`cdn.example.com.evil.com`) does not match - Prefixed host (`evilcdn.example.com`) does not match - **`TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData`**: Verifies that suffix-related hosts (`cdn.example.com`, `example.com`, `images.example.com`, etc.) all produce distinct signatures ### `internal/imgcache/service_test.go` - **`TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch`**: Integration test through `ValidateRequest` verifying that a valid signature for `cdn.example.com` is rejected when presented with a different host (parent domain, sibling subdomain, deeper subdomain, evil suffix, prefixed host) ### `README.md` - Updated Signature Specification section to explicitly document exact-match-only semantics Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #40 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
This commit was merged in pull request #40.
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@@ -152,6 +152,178 @@ func TestSigner_Verify(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly verifies that signatures enforce exact
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// matching on every URL component. No suffix matching, wildcard matching,
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// or partial matching is supported.
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func TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly(t *testing.T) {
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signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
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// Base request that we'll sign, then tamper with individual fields.
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baseReq := func() *ImageRequest {
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req := &ImageRequest{
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SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
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SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
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SourceQuery: "token=abc",
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Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
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Format: FormatWebP,
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Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
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}
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req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
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return req
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}
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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tamper func(req *ImageRequest)
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}{
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{
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name: "parent domain does not match subdomain",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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// Signed for cdn.example.com, try example.com
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req.SourceHost = "example.com"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "subdomain does not match parent domain",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.cdn.example.com
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req.SourceHost = "images.cdn.example.com"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "sibling subdomain does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.example.com
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req.SourceHost = "images.example.com"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "host with suffix appended does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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// Signed for cdn.example.com, try cdn.example.com.evil.com
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req.SourceHost = "cdn.example.com.evil.com"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "host with prefix does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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// Signed for cdn.example.com, try evilcdn.example.com
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req.SourceHost = "evilcdn.example.com"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "different path does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourcePath = "/photos/dog.jpg"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "path suffix does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourcePath = "/photos/cat.jpg/extra"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "path prefix does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourcePath = "/other/photos/cat.jpg"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "different query does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourceQuery = "token=xyz"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "added query does not match empty query",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourceQuery = "extra=1"
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},
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},
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{
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name: "removed query does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.SourceQuery = ""
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},
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},
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{
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name: "different width does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.Size.Width = 801
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},
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},
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{
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name: "different height does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.Size.Height = 601
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},
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},
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{
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name: "different format does not match",
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tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
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req.Format = FormatPNG
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},
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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req := baseReq()
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tt.tamper(req)
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err := signer.Verify(req)
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if err != ErrSignatureInvalid {
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t.Errorf("Verify() = %v, want %v", err, ErrSignatureInvalid)
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}
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})
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}
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// Verify the unmodified base request still passes
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t.Run("unmodified request passes", func(t *testing.T) {
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req := baseReq()
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if err := signer.Verify(req); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("Verify() unmodified request failed: %v", err)
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}
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})
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}
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// TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData verifies that Sign uses the exact host
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// string in the signature data, producing different signatures for
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// suffix-related hosts.
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func TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData(t *testing.T) {
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signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
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hosts := []string{
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"cdn.example.com",
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"example.com",
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"images.example.com",
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"images.cdn.example.com",
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"cdn.example.com.evil.com",
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}
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sigs := make(map[string]string)
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for _, host := range hosts {
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req := &ImageRequest{
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SourceHost: host,
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SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
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SourceQuery: "",
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Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
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Format: FormatWebP,
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Expires: time.Unix(1704067200, 0),
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}
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sig := signer.Sign(req)
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if existing, ok := sigs[sig]; ok {
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t.Errorf("hosts %q and %q produced the same signature", existing, host)
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}
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sigs[sig] = host
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}
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}
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func TestSigner_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
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signer1 := NewSigner("secret-key-1")
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signer2 := NewSigner("secret-key-2")
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