Enforce and document exact-match-only for signature verification (#40)
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Closes #27

Signatures are per-URL only — this PR adds explicit tests and documentation enforcing that HMAC-SHA256 signatures verify against exact URLs only. No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.

## What this does NOT touch

**The host whitelist code (`whitelist.go`) is not modified.** This PR is exclusively about signature verification, per sneak's instructions on [issue #27](#27), [PR #32](#32), and [PR #35](#35).

## Changes

### `internal/imgcache/signature.go`
- Added documentation comments on `Verify()` and `buildSignatureData()` explicitly specifying that signatures are exact-match only — no suffix, wildcard, or partial matching

### `internal/imgcache/signature_test.go`
- **`TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly`**: 14 tamper cases verifying that modifying any signed component (host, path, query, dimensions, format) causes verification to fail. Host-specific cases include:
  - Parent domain (`example.com`) does not match subdomain signature (`cdn.example.com`)
  - Sibling subdomain (`images.example.com`) does not match
  - Deeper subdomain (`images.cdn.example.com`) does not match
  - Evil suffix domain (`cdn.example.com.evil.com`) does not match
  - Prefixed host (`evilcdn.example.com`) does not match
- **`TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData`**: Verifies that suffix-related hosts (`cdn.example.com`, `example.com`, `images.example.com`, etc.) all produce distinct signatures

### `internal/imgcache/service_test.go`
- **`TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch`**: Integration test through `ValidateRequest` verifying that a valid signature for `cdn.example.com` is rejected when presented with a different host (parent domain, sibling subdomain, deeper subdomain, evil suffix, prefixed host)

### `README.md`
- Updated Signature Specification section to explicitly document exact-match-only semantics

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #40
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
This commit was merged in pull request #40.
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-20 23:56:45 +01:00
committed by Jeffrey Paul
parent e85b5ff033
commit a50364bfca
4 changed files with 251 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -152,6 +152,178 @@ func TestSigner_Verify(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly verifies that signatures enforce exact
// matching on every URL component. No suffix matching, wildcard matching,
// or partial matching is supported.
func TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
// Base request that we'll sign, then tamper with individual fields.
baseReq := func() *ImageRequest {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "token=abc",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
return req
}
tests := []struct {
name string
tamper func(req *ImageRequest)
}{
{
name: "parent domain does not match subdomain",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try example.com
req.SourceHost = "example.com"
},
},
{
name: "subdomain does not match parent domain",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.cdn.example.com
req.SourceHost = "images.cdn.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "sibling subdomain does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.example.com
req.SourceHost = "images.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "host with suffix appended does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try cdn.example.com.evil.com
req.SourceHost = "cdn.example.com.evil.com"
},
},
{
name: "host with prefix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try evilcdn.example.com
req.SourceHost = "evilcdn.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "different path does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/photos/dog.jpg"
},
},
{
name: "path suffix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/photos/cat.jpg/extra"
},
},
{
name: "path prefix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/other/photos/cat.jpg"
},
},
{
name: "different query does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = "token=xyz"
},
},
{
name: "added query does not match empty query",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = "extra=1"
},
},
{
name: "removed query does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = ""
},
},
{
name: "different width does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Size.Width = 801
},
},
{
name: "different height does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Size.Height = 601
},
},
{
name: "different format does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Format = FormatPNG
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := baseReq()
tt.tamper(req)
err := signer.Verify(req)
if err != ErrSignatureInvalid {
t.Errorf("Verify() = %v, want %v", err, ErrSignatureInvalid)
}
})
}
// Verify the unmodified base request still passes
t.Run("unmodified request passes", func(t *testing.T) {
req := baseReq()
if err := signer.Verify(req); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify() unmodified request failed: %v", err)
}
})
}
// TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData verifies that Sign uses the exact host
// string in the signature data, producing different signatures for
// suffix-related hosts.
func TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
hosts := []string{
"cdn.example.com",
"example.com",
"images.example.com",
"images.cdn.example.com",
"cdn.example.com.evil.com",
}
sigs := make(map[string]string)
for _, host := range hosts {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Unix(1704067200, 0),
}
sig := signer.Sign(req)
if existing, ok := sigs[sig]; ok {
t.Errorf("hosts %q and %q produced the same signature", existing, host)
}
sigs[sig] = host
}
}
func TestSigner_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
signer1 := NewSigner("secret-key-1")
signer2 := NewSigner("secret-key-2")