Read a trusted_proxies entry in the IPv4-mapped form as its IPv4 range (closes #303)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s

An entry such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104 in trusted_proxies was accepted
but trusted nothing, because the client address is matched as the IPv4
address an IPv4-mapped address holds. The conversion that blocked_networks
gained in #301 now lives in
parseCIDRList, which reads both settings: such an entry is read as the
IPv4 range it covers, and one shorter than /96 stops startup with an
error naming the setting being read and quoting the entry as written.
README.md says so for trusted_proxies.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #305.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-19 05:29:05 +02:00
parent 9eacfa6406
commit 930e43961e
4 changed files with 78 additions and 42 deletions
+16 -10
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@@ -713,16 +713,22 @@ Key settings in more detail:
omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918 private ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`, omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918 private ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`), since pixa is deployed behind a proxy on a `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`), since pixa is deployed behind a proxy on a
private network; an explicitly empty list (`[]`) trusts no one, and an private network; an explicitly empty list (`[]`) trusts no one, and an
explicit list replaces the default. An invalid CIDR aborts startup. Set this explicit list replaces the default. An invalid CIDR aborts startup. An IPv6
to the address pixa sees for requests that come through your proxy, such as address in the IPv4-mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is matched only as the IPv4
`172.17.0.1/32`, when the defaults do not cover it, or to trust nothing else address it holds, so an IPv6 range such as `::/0` trusts neither it nor a
(see the login limit and `image_requests_per_minute` under Routes). For a plain IPv4 address. An entry written in that form is read as the IPv4 range it
proxy on the Docker host that connects to pixa over `127.0.0.1`, that address covers, so `::ffff:10.0.0.0/104` trusts what `10.0.0.0/8` trusts; such an
is the gateway of the container's Docker network (`172.17.0.1` on the default entry shorter than `/96` covers more than IPv4 addresses and aborts startup.
bridge), not the proxy's own address; a proxy that connects through another of Set this to the address pixa sees for requests that come through your proxy,
the host's addresses is seen with that address. To be sure which address it such as `172.17.0.1/32`, when the defaults do not cover it, or to trust
is, set this to `[]` (or `PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` to empty), send a request nothing else (see the login limit and `image_requests_per_minute` under
through the proxy, and read `remoteIP` in pixa's request log line for it Routes). For a proxy on the Docker host that connects to pixa over
`127.0.0.1`, that address is the gateway of the container's Docker network
(`172.17.0.1` on the default bridge), not the proxy's own address; a proxy
that connects through another of the host's addresses is seen with that
address. To be sure which address it is, set this to `[]` (or
`PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` to empty), send a request through the proxy, and read
`remoteIP` in pixa's request log line for it
- `upstream_fetch_timeout` — time allowed for one fetch from an upstream host, - `upstream_fetch_timeout` — time allowed for one fetch from an upstream host,
as a duration such as `30s` (the default) or `2m` as a duration such as `30s` (the default) or `2m`
- `upstream_max_response_size` — largest upstream response accepted, in bytes; - `upstream_max_response_size` — largest upstream response accepted, in bytes;
+4
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@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-10-19 a `trusted_proxies` entry in the IPv4-mapped form trusted nothing;
it is now read as the IPv4 range it covers by the same code that reads
`blocked_networks`, and such an entry shorter than `/96` aborts startup
(closes #303).
- 2026-10-18 the next reconciliation pass waits at least ten times as long as - 2026-10-18 the next reconciliation pass waits at least ten times as long as
the last one took, so passes on a large cache no longer run back to back the last one took, so passes on a large cache no longer run back to back
(closes #250). (closes #250).
+20 -32
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@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
blockedNetworks, err := parseBlockedNetworks(sc) blockedNetworks, err := parseCIDRList(sc, keyBlockedNetworks)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
@@ -1249,6 +1249,13 @@ func defaultTrustedProxies() []netip.Prefix {
// wrong type, an empty entry, a non-string entry, or an unparseable CIDR // wrong type, an empty entry, a non-string entry, or an unparseable CIDR
// aborts startup naming the key and the offending value; the default // aborts startup naming the key and the offending value; the default
// (an empty list) applies only to an omitted key. // (an empty list) applies only to an omitted key.
//
// An entry written in the IPv4-mapped form (::ffff:a.b.c.d) is kept as the
// IPv4 range it covers: ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104 is kept as 10.0.0.0/8. Both
// blocked_networks and trusted_proxies are matched against an IPv4-mapped
// address as the IPv4 address it holds, so the entry as written would match
// nothing. Such an entry shorter than /96 covers more than the IPv4
// addresses and aborts startup.
func parseCIDRList(sc *smartconfig.Config, key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) { func parseCIDRList(sc *smartconfig.Config, key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
raw, ok := lookupValue(sc, key) raw, ok := lookupValue(sc, key)
if !ok { if !ok {
@@ -1264,6 +1271,10 @@ func parseCIDRList(sc *smartconfig.Config, key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
// An IPv4-mapped address is the 96 bits of ::ffff:0:0/96 followed by
// the 32 bits of the IPv4 address it holds.
const mappedPrefixBits = 96
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(entries)) prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(entries))
for _, entry := range entries { for _, entry := range entries {
@@ -1273,40 +1284,17 @@ func parseCIDRList(sc *smartconfig.Config, key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
settingName(key), entry, errNotAValidCIDR) settingName(key), entry, errNotAValidCIDR)
} }
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix) if prefix.Addr().Is4In6() && prefix.Bits() < mappedPrefixBits {
}
return prefixes, nil
}
// parseBlockedNetworks parses blocked_networks with parseCIDRList, and keeps
// an entry written in the IPv4-mapped form (::ffff:a.b.c.d) as the IPv4
// range it covers: ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104 is kept as 10.0.0.0/8. The fetcher
// matches an IPv4-mapped address as the IPv4 address it holds, so the entry
// as written would match nothing. Such an entry shorter than /96 covers more
// than the IPv4 addresses and aborts startup.
func parseBlockedNetworks(sc *smartconfig.Config) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
prefixes, err := parseCIDRList(sc, keyBlockedNetworks)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// An IPv4-mapped address is the 96 bits of ::ffff:0:0/96 followed by
// the 32 bits of the IPv4 address it holds.
const mappedPrefixBits = 96
for i, prefix := range prefixes {
if !prefix.Addr().Is4In6() {
continue
}
if prefix.Bits() < mappedPrefixBits {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: value %q is %w", return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: value %q is %w",
settingName(keyBlockedNetworks), prefix, errMappedTooShort) settingName(key), entry, errMappedTooShort)
} }
prefixes[i] = netip.PrefixFrom(prefix.Addr().Unmap(), if prefix.Addr().Is4In6() {
prefix.Bits()-mappedPrefixBits) prefix = netip.PrefixFrom(prefix.Addr().Unmap(),
prefix.Bits()-mappedPrefixBits)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
} }
return prefixes, nil return prefixes, nil
@@ -83,3 +83,41 @@ func TestTrustedProxiesInvalidAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
}, },
}) })
} }
// TestTrustedProxiesMappedEntryIsIPv4Range checks that an entry written in
// the IPv4-mapped form (::ffff:a.b.c.d) is kept as the IPv4 range it covers,
// since the client address is matched as the IPv4 address it holds. /96, the
// shortest such entry, covers every IPv4 address.
func TestTrustedProxiesMappedEntryIsIPv4Range(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+
`trusted_proxies: ["::ffff:10.0.0.0/104", "::ffff:0:0/96"]`+"\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IPv4-mapped trusted_proxies entries should load: %v", err)
}
got := make([]string, len(c.TrustedProxies))
for i, p := range c.TrustedProxies {
got[i] = p.String()
}
if joined := strings.Join(got, ","); joined != "10.0.0.0/8,0.0.0.0/0" {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want 10.0.0.0/8 and 0.0.0.0/0", got)
}
}
// TestTrustedProxiesMappedEntryShorterThan96AbortsStartup checks that an
// entry in the IPv4-mapped form shorter than /96, which covers more than the
// IPv4 addresses, aborts startup with an error naming the key and the value.
func TestTrustedProxiesMappedEntryShorterThan96AbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, []abortCase{
{
name: "mapped-95",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `trusted_proxies: ["::ffff:0:0/95"]` + "\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyTrustedProxies, "::ffff:0:0/95"},
},
})
}