Refuse an IPv6 address that holds an internal IPv4 address (closes #297)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s

The check that keeps pixa from fetching internal addresses read an
IPv6 address as IPv4 only in the mapped form (::ffff:a.b.c.d), so the
IPv4-compatible form, such as ::127.0.0.1, was judged as IPv6 and
passed. An address in ::/96 is now judged by the IPv4 address it holds,
so one holding a private, loopback or link-local address is refused on
both image routes before any upstream request. The NAT64 range
64:ff9b::/96 stays blocked whole, as it was on next.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #298.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-16 05:31:55 +02:00
parent 08d6c3c459
commit 3a6b3bc202
4 changed files with 96 additions and 0 deletions
+8
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@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
addresses judges an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`), such
as `::127.0.0.1` or `::10.0.0.1`, by the IPv4 address in its last four bytes
(closes #297). It read only the mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) as IPv4, so a
source host such as `[::127.0.0.1]` was checked as a public IPv6 address and
fetched, which on a network that routes it reaches the internal IPv4 host; it
is now refused with 403. The NAT64 form (`64:ff9b::/96`) was already refused
as a whole, as one of the built-in blocked ranges, and still is.
- 2026-10-16 a source host that is an IPv6 address in brackets with no port, - 2026-10-16 a source host that is an IPv6 address in brackets with no port,
such as `[2001:db8::a]`, is fetched like one with a port, through `/v1/image/` such as `[2001:db8::a]`, is fetched like one with a port, through `/v1/image/`
and through an encrypted URL (closes #295). The fetcher's check of the source and through an encrypted URL (closes #295). The fetcher's check of the source
+7
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@@ -543,6 +543,13 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return true return true
} }
// An IPv4-compatible IPv6 address (in ::/96, such as ::127.0.0.1) holds
// an IPv4 address in its last four bytes and is judged as that address
if addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip); ok &&
netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96").Contains(addr) {
return isPrivateIP(ip[12:])
}
// Check for loopback // Check for loopback
if ip.IsLoopback() { if ip.IsLoopback() {
return true return true
@@ -186,6 +186,44 @@ func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address checks IPv6 addresses that hold an
// IPv4 address in their last four bytes: the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and
// the NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96). One holding a loopback, private or
// link-local IPv4 address is refused as that address is, and one holding a
// public IPv4 address in the IPv4-compatible form passes.
func TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
ip string
want bool
}{
{"::127.0.0.1", true}, // loopback
{"::10.0.0.1", true}, // private
{"::169.254.169.254", true}, // link-local
{"64:ff9b::7f00:1", true}, // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
{"::8.8.8.8", false}, // public
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
t.Logf("isPrivateIP(%s) = %v", ip, got)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) { func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -543,3 +543,46 @@ func encryptedImageURL(t *testing.T, sourceHost string) string {
return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.png" return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.png"
} }
// TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address requests
// ipv6SourcePath on IPv6 source hosts that hold a loopback or private IPv4
// address in their last four bytes, in the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) or the
// NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96), through a /v1/image/ URL with a signature and
// through an encrypted URL. Each answers 403, and the upstream receives no
// request: the test's fetcher connects every address to the test upstream, so
// only the fetcher's check of the source URL can refuse it.
func TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
sourceHosts := []string{
"[::127.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a loopback address
"[::10.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a private address
"[64:ff9b::7f00:1]", // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
}
for _, sourceHost := range sourceHosts {
imageURLs := []string{
signedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
encryptedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
}
for _, imageURL := range imageURLs {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s (source host %s): %d", imageURL, sourceHost, rec.Code)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("source host %s: status = %d, want %d; body %s",
sourceHost, rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
}
}
}
if got := upstream.requestTargets(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want no request", got)
}
}