Harden http.Server: slowloris timeouts and form body limit (closes #92)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
The http.Server now sets ReadHeaderTimeout (10s), which bounds the slow header dribble that ReadTimeout alone does not, and IdleTimeout (120s), which bounds keep-alive reuse. Server construction moved into a small helper so a test can assert the timeouts without binding a listener. POST / and POST /generate bodies are capped at 1 MiB and an oversized body returns 413. What a reader would trip over: the CSRF library reads its token from the form and swallows a parse error, so a cap applied only inside it would surface as 403. The body limit therefore parses the form under the cap before the CSRF check; the parsed form is reused afterwards. A test covers an oversized body that carries a valid token. Judgement call: WriteTimeout stays at 60s; it also bounds how long a large image may take to send over a slow link. Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
This commit was merged in pull request #123.
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package handlers
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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)
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// MaxFormBytes bounds the request body accepted on the HTML form POST
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// routes (POST / and POST /generate). The forms carry a handful of short
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// fields, so 1 MiB is generous while making the bound explicit rather than
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// resting on ParseForm's incidental 10 MB cap.
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const MaxFormBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
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// LimitBody returns middleware that caps the request body on POST requests
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// at maxBytes and rejects an oversized body with 413 Request Entity Too
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// Large.
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//
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// It parses the form here, before the CSRF middleware reads the token from
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// it. The CSRF middleware reads the token with PostFormValue, which
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// swallows a parse error, so if the body were only capped there an
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// oversized body would read as a missing token and be refused as 403. By
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// parsing under the cap first, an oversized body is refused as 413. A
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// successful parse is cached on the request, so the CSRF check and the
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// handler reuse it rather than reading the body again.
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func (s *Handlers) LimitBody(maxBytes int64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
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err := r.ParseForm()
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var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
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if errors.As(err, &tooLarge) {
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http.Error(w, "Request body too large",
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http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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