fix: floor the persisted fields a restore dereferences, and make each field's floor an executable claim (closes #362)

A persisted container was checked while its ENTRIES were dereferenced
unchecked. A stored `{"0x…": "notalist"}` in allowedSites passes the state
gate, renders a working popup, and then throws inside saveState()'s per-
hostname merge, so every save from that moment on fails while the UI looks
entirely healthy. deniedSites has the identical shape; fraudContracts is the
same class with a milder consequence.

The sweep for that class found four more:

- selectedToken, dereferenced as text behind a truthiness-only restore gate.
- rpcUrl, handed whole to `new JsonRpcProvider()` by getProvider(), which
  throws SYNCHRONOUSLY for a non-string — from txStatus.js and addWallet.js,
  neither inside a try, and the first reachable from a stored
  `currentView: "wait-tx"` through the unguarded restoreView().
- The ENTRIES of viewData. Four restore branches gate on one truthy field and
  hand the rest to a renderer that calls address.toLowerCase(): a stored
  `{"currentView":"success-tx","viewData":{"hash":"0x1"}}` throws out of
  restoreView(), skipping the rest of popup init.
- selectedWallet / selectedAddress. `wallets` is a real Array, so a stored
  "map", "length", "constructor" or "__proto__" is TRUTHY: hasValidAddress()'s
  `&&` does not short-circuit and `.addresses[…]` throws. A stale INTEGER index
  is the safe case.

Floors, in src/shared/persistedState.js: allowedSites/deniedSites through
siteMap(), fraudContracts and each hostname list through textList(),
selectedToken and activeAddress as text-or-null, rpcUrl and blockscoutUrl as
non-empty text, selectedWallet and selectedAddress as a non-negative integer
or null, and each networkEndpoints pair's two URL fields — which
applyChainSwitchFields() assigns straight onto s.rpcUrl on the next switch.

Guards, in src/popup/viewRouter.js: the four restore branches that gate on one
truthy field now check the entries their renderer dereferences, as
txStatus.restoreWait() has always done for wait-tx. "confirm-tx" joins
ADDRESS_VIEWS, because its Sign button dereferences
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] behind no guard of its own.

A stored own "__proto__" key is dropped by siteMap(): it can never be a wallet
address, so it grants nothing, and keeping it only keeps a value the next save
would hand to the prototype setter. networkEndpoints keeps unknown keys by
design, so mergeMapByKey() in src/shared/state.js now writes with
defineProperty as well — the guard in the floor was being undone one layer
downstream.

A save that fails is also told, not merely repaired: onSaveFailure() reports
every failed save, awaited or not (the save queue's own rejection handler is
what made a failure vanish), and the popup raises a persistent "NOT SAVED"
banner naming the reason. doRefreshAndRender() no longer rejects, since every
one of its call sites fires it and walks away.

The per-field justification in the header of src/shared/stateSchema.js is
replaced by tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js. That comment shipped a false
claim in three consecutive changes; the artifact was the problem. The test is
one row per persisted field, declaring the property that field's floor is
claimed to have and PROVING it by driving the real code with hostile values —
the gate for a field the gate refuses, normalizePersisted() for a field it
floors, the real JsonRpcProvider constructor for rpcUrl, and — for every field
whose only defence is that nothing dereferences it structurally — a boot of the
real popup entry point over that value onto EVERY view the popup can reopen
onto.

That last part is what makes the claim falsifiable, and it is why this defect
class is worth a harness at all: it lives on the RESTORE path and not on Home.
The claim is NARROW, and every artifact now states it that way rather than as
a universal: what those boots prove is no structural dereference on the code
paths a WHOLLY-CORRUPTED PROFILE takes. That is not every path a stored record
takes. Undriven, and said so plainly: any pairing of values the four slots do
not produce; a view only forward navigation opens; anything behind a click; and
everything a healthy profile reaches, which is most of the popup. Proving no
field is dereferenced on any reachable render path would be exhaustive
verification of the popup, which is not what this issue is.

Within that boundary the verdict is unconditional. If one of these boots leaves
the popup unhealthy or off the view it stored, the suite goes red — including
when it takes TWO corrupted fields at once, because the assertion is on the
combined boot itself and the per-field re-boot that names a culprit can only
decorate the message. An earlier version asserted on the per-field list
instead, so a dead popup no single field reproduced was observed and then
reported green. The suite also goes red on a field that gains a floor while its
row still claims it has none, and on a field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS with no
row.

Each swept field is driven at both polarities, or proven unable to be falsy
after the floor: a value nothing in src/ writes is a wrong-typed one and
therefore truthy, so without a falsy slot a dereference behind `if (!state.x)`
is never reached on the very boot that corrupts x, and for three of these
fields the falsy answer is the DEFAULT_STATE default — the branch every
ordinary install takes.

The boots are cheap enough to keep by construction rather than by sampling.
Every field the router itself reads is driven onto each view individually,
since a hostile value in one of those legitimately changes which view renders;
every other unfloored field is corrupted on the SAME boot, and that boot has to
land on the view it stored — so a field that does move the routing cannot hide
in the crowd. That is forty-four boots instead of several hundred; the suite
runs in 12.8s against a 30s cap.

The DOM stub in tests/support/popupBoot.js gained one thing to make any of that
possible: an element's parentElement. Without it success-tx and transaction
threw on the first line that hides a field's wrapper, so neither renderer could
be booted onto at all — every boot aimed at them fell back to Home instead, and
the base profile the sweep starts from is now asserted to render each view
rather than fall back, so that cannot go unnoticed again.

.dockerignore

@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
 node_modules
 .DS_Store
 dist
+release

.gitignore

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ node_modules/
 # Build output
 dist/
 
+# Release artifacts (make package). Derived from dist/, never committed.
+release/
+
 # Yarn
 .yarn-integrity
 package-lock.json

.prettierignore

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 node_modules/
 yarn.lock
 dist/
+release/
 .claude/

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug vendor-blocklist clean dev
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist clean dev
 
 # Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ check:
 check-censored:
 	@script/check-censored
 
+package:
+	@script/package
+
 docker:
 	@script/docker
 
@@ -60,19 +63,31 @@ hooks:
 # scrubbed from the build itself: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, this target
 # compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it, loudly, rather than quietly
 # handing back something other than the release build that was asked for.
+#
+# Every step of this target is wrapped in script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a
+# release build that fails removes dist/ instead of leaving a complete, loadable
+# debug bundle there for whoever runs the build, sees it fail, and loads
+# dist/chrome/ anyway. A step that succeeds removes nothing, and build-debug is
+# deliberately not wrapped.
 build:
 	@echo "Building extension..."
 	@set -eu; \
 	receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
 	trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
-	AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
-	env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
+	script/discard-dist-on-failure \
+		env AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
+	script/discard-dist-on-failure \
+		env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
 		--receipt "$$receipt"
-	@script/check-censored --require-dist
+	@script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored --require-dist
 
 # Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
 # the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
 # distribute the artifacts this produces.
+#
+# No discard-dist-on-failure here, on purpose: a debug build that fails is not
+# producing an artifact anyone could mistake for a release one, and its dist/ is
+# the evidence of what went wrong.
 build-debug:
 	@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
 	@set -eu; \
@@ -90,7 +105,7 @@ vendor-blocklist:
 	@script/vendor-blocklist
 
 clean:
-	@rm -rf dist/
+	@rm -rf dist/ release/
 
 dev:
 	@echo "Building in watch mode..."

README.md

@@ -44,7 +44,107 @@ Load the extension:
 - **Chrome**: Navigate to `chrome://extensions/`, enable "Developer mode", click
   "Load unpacked", and select the `dist/chrome/` directory.
 - **Firefox**: Navigate to `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, click "Load
-  Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`.
+  Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`. Read
+  [Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) before relying on this: a
+  temporary add-on does not survive closing the browser.
+
+### Release Artifacts
+
+`make package` runs `make build` and then writes one self-contained, versioned
+archive per browser into `release/`, plus a `SHA256SUMS` for them:
+
+```bash
+make package
+```
+
+```
+release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip
+release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi
+release/SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+Nothing is published by this. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
+outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone.
+
+The archives are deterministic — entries sorted, timestamps fixed, compression
+level fixed — so two builds of one commit produce byte-identical files and the
+recorded digest is a property of the input rather than of the clock.
+
+**Self-containment is checked, not assumed.** `build.js` writes the compiled
+Tailwind output to `dist/styles.css` at the `dist/` ROOT, outside both browser
+directories, and copies it into each of them as `src/popup/styles.css`; a naive
+`zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only by accident. So the packager
+resolves every path referenced by the manifest and by every HTML document in the
+archive, requires each to be inside the archive, and fails on any reference that
+climbs out of the extension root. Files left at the `dist/` root are printed as
+deliberately not shipped rather than dropped by a glob. The archive is then read
+back off disk and compared member by member against the directory it was built
+from: an archive nobody opened is a claim, not an artifact.
+
+There is one version, and the build enforces it. `package.json`,
+`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json` each declare one and none is
+derived from another — the manifests are copied to `dist/` verbatim, which is
+what `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts — so `script/lib/version.js` requires all
+three to agree and **fails the build when they do not**, naming each file and
+what it said. `tests/version.test.js` covers that rule in `make check`.
+
+### Installing on Chrome
+
+`manifest/chrome.json` carries a fixed `key`: the public half of an RSA keypair,
+base64-encoded DER. It exists for one reason. An unpacked Chrome extension with
+no `key` gets an extension id derived from the **absolute path it was loaded
+from**, and `chrome.storage.local` — which is where the wallet lives — is
+partitioned by that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load a second copy
+from anywhere else, and the extension comes up on a fresh, empty storage
+partition: the wallet is simply gone, with no error and nothing in the UI to say
+so. With the `key` in place the id is derived from the key instead, and follows
+the extension wherever it is loaded from. That id is
+`gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`, pinned in `tests/extensionId.test.js` and
+observed against a real Chrome in `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`.
+
+**Changing `key` changes the extension id, and orphans every wallet stored under
+the old one.** It is a migration, not an edit.
+
+The **private** half is a credential. It is not in this repository, no target
+generates one into the working tree, `*.pem` and `*.key` are gitignored, and
+`tests/extensionId.test.js` fails if such a file is ever committed. It is not
+needed to build, load or test anything here — it signs a CRX, and this repo does
+not pack one. A packer would take it from outside the repo, e.g.
+`chrome --pack-extension=dist/chrome --pack-extension-key=<path to the .pem>`.
+
+### Installing on Firefox
+
+**The XPI this repo produces is UNSIGNED, and release Firefox and Firefox ESR
+will refuse to install it.** Those builds enforce add-on signing with no working
+override — `xpinstall.signatures.required` does nothing on them — so a permanent
+install needs Firefox Developer Edition, Nightly, or an Unbranded build, with
+`xpinstall.signatures.required` set to `false` in `about:config`.
+
+Signing means submitting to AMO (self-distribution is enough, and does not
+require listing), which needs credentials this repository does not have and is
+the owner's decision.
+
+The other route is `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox` -> "Load Temporary
+Add-on", which works on every Firefox including release. **A temporary add-on is
+unloaded when Firefox exits**, so daily use means re-adding it by hand on every
+browser start.
+
+**The wallet survives the restart.** `manifest/firefox.json` declares a fixed
+`browser_specific_settings.gecko.id`, and Firefox keys the extension's storage
+area on that id rather than on the install, so adding the temporary add-on again
+in the same profile finds the vault where it left it. That is asserted, not
+assumed: `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js` installs the packaged XPI in a real
+Firefox, creates a wallet through the UI, quits the browser, starts it again on
+the same profile, adds the add-on again, and decrypts the vault with the
+original password back to the original recovery phrase. The `moz-extension://`
+origin the popup is served from is _not_ stable across installs and does not
+need to be — nothing durable is keyed on it.
+
+**Removing the add-on does not.** An explicit uninstall — about:addons "Remove"
+— destroys the extension's storage, and the vault with it. That is ordinary,
+correct browser behaviour and it is observed in the same suite, but for a wallet
+it is worth saying out loud: **on Firefox, Remove is irreversible, and the
+recovery phrase is the only way back.**
 
 ### Debug Builds
 
@@ -63,8 +163,12 @@ that runs `make build`, that target compiles a debug bundle and then **fails**,
 because it tells `script/verify-build` in so many words that it was supposed to
 produce a release build. It used to be that the verifier read the same variable
 out of its own environment, agreed with itself, and reported a debug artifact as
-verified. The build prints which mode it used. See the
-[DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
+verified. The build prints which mode it used. A release build that fails also
+**removes `dist/`**, and says so: the bundle it had already written is loadable,
+and a loud failure is no protection against someone loading `dist/chrome/`
+anyway. `make build-debug` keeps its `dist/` on failure — that output is not
+mistakable for a release build, and it is the evidence of what went wrong. See
+the [DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
 distribute a debug build** — every wallet it creates gets the same publicly
 known test recovery phrase.
 
@@ -81,17 +185,21 @@ lives.
 one of the bundles containing `src/shared/constants.js` — into a build receipt,
 and `script/verify-build` checks `dist/` against that receipt: every recorded
 file present with exactly the recorded bytes, every audited bundle carrying the
-requested `DEBUG` marker, and nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
-write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per invocation,
-outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
+requested `DEBUG` marker, and no regular file or symlink under `dist/` that the
+build did not write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per
+invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
 
 That is what ties the check to a build rather than to a directory. What it
 establishes is narrow and worth stating exactly: `dist/` is byte for byte the
-output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with nothing added, removed or
-altered in between. It establishes nothing about whether the source tree or
-`build.js` were honest, and it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from
-elsewhere — without the receipt from its own build there is no input to the
-check. Verifiable provenance for a third party is signing, which this is not.
+output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with no regular file or symlink
+added, removed or altered in between. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
+of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories
+under `dist/` are not checked, because a build emits none of them, none can
+carry a shippable payload, and `grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. It
+establishes nothing about whether the source tree or `build.js` were honest, and
+it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from elsewhere — without the
+receipt from its own build there is no input to the check. Verifiable provenance
+for a third party is signing, which this is not.
 
 There is deliberately no target that re-verifies an existing `dist/` on its own.
 The list of files to check has to come from the build that produced them; read
@@ -138,31 +246,45 @@ provide:
   fails anywhere else. Part of `make check`, which inspects `dist/` when there
   is one and says loudly when there is not; `make build` re-runs it with
   `--require-dist`, so a build artifact is always covered
+- `script/package` — produce the release artifacts: `make build` first, so the
+  archives can only ever be made from a `dist/` that has been verified against
+  that build's own receipt as a RELEASE build, then one self-contained,
+  versioned archive per browser into `release/` (see
+  [Release Artifacts](#release-artifacts)). It packages and does not publish
 - `script/vendor-blocklist` — refresh `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` from
   its upstream, pinned to a commit and to the sha256 of the bytes that commit
   serves. Run deliberately, never as part of a build: the output is committed
   and there is no runtime fetch, so the shipped list is as fresh as the last
   vendoring run that was released
-- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that
-  `dist/` is exactly what the build that just ran emitted, and that the compiled
-  `DEBUG` state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both
-  arguments are required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated
-  by the caller rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list
-  comes from the build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
+- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that the
+  regular files and symlinks under `dist/` are exactly what the build that just
+  ran emitted (other file types are out of scope), and that the compiled `DEBUG`
+  state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both arguments are
+  required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated by the caller
+  rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list comes from the
+  build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
   [Build Receipts](#build-receipts)). Run automatically at the end of
   `make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing whenever
   it cannot determine something. Not part of `make check`, which does not depend
   on build artifacts existing.
+- `script/discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]` — run one step of the
+  **release** build and, if it fails, remove `dist/` before returning that
+  step's exit status, saying on stderr that it did and why. Every step of
+  `make build` runs through it; `make build-debug` runs none of them through it.
+  A step that succeeds removes nothing, and a removal that cannot be completed
+  is reported as loudly as one that was
 - `script/test-verify-build` — exercise every failure mode of
   `script/verify-build` against a fixture tree in a temp dir, asserting the exit
-  status and the message of each, and read the `make build` and
+  status and the message of each, assert the state of `dist/` on disk after a
+  failing and a succeeding release build step, and read the `make build` and
   `make build-debug` recipes back out of `make -n` to check that they pass the
-  mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment. Part of `make check`; it reads
-  no build artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on
-  file permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to
-  them, so the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting
-  them, dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it
-  skips those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
+  mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment and wrap only the release path.
+  Part of `make check`; it reads no build artifacts and writes nothing under
+  `dist/`. The cases that depend on file permissions cannot mean anything for a
+  process that is not subject to them, so the harness proves its runner against
+  a mode-000 file before counting them, dropping to an unprivileged user when
+  run as root; if it cannot, it skips those cases and says so in a banner rather
+  than passing them.
 - `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
 - `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
 - `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
@@ -176,10 +298,12 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
   silently rewritten. Use `make setup` for a fresh clone.
 - `make hooks` — shims to `script/install-precommit`
 - `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`,
-  then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build
+  then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build. A
+  failure at any step removes `dist/`
 - `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`, verified as a
-  debug build (see [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
-- `make clean` — remove `dist/`
+  debug build, and keeping its `dist/` on failure (see
+  [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
+- `make clean` — remove `dist/` and `release/`
 - `make dev` — build in watch mode
 
 ## End-to-End Tests
@@ -315,6 +439,23 @@ class before a browser is involved, so this suite is no longer the only thing
 standing between it and a release — but a static rule only sees identifiers, and
 the runtime errors this suite catches are broader than one rule.
 
+`make test-e2e` then runs a second program in the same image,
+`tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`, which answers where `chrome.storage.local`
+lives. It loads the built extension from one temporary directory in a fresh
+profile, writes a sentinel key the extension itself never touches, closes the
+browser, and loads a **copy at a different path into the same profile** — then
+does it again with `key` stripped out of the manifest, and reports what each
+pair actually did rather than what it expected. It needs its own browser
+sessions, four of them, because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads.
+
+The observed behaviour, on the pinned Chromium: **with `key`, both paths get the
+same extension id and the second load reads the first load's storage. Without
+`key`, the two paths get different ids and the second load sees an empty
+partition** — the wallet, silently gone. Loading both keyed copies at once in
+one profile yields a single extension id, not two: Chrome does not load a second
+copy of an id it already has. The assertions are annotated as observations, so a
+Chrome that ever changes this fails the run instead of passing it.
+
 ### Firefox (`make test-e2e-firefox`)
 
 `make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
@@ -332,6 +473,33 @@ runner rather than believed from the extension, and the stub node has to answer
 `eth_sendRawTransaction` with the hash `ethers` computes for the artifact it
 sent, or `provider.broadcastTransaction()` refuses the answer.
 
+`make test-e2e-firefox` then runs a second program in the same image,
+`tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`, and it installs the **packaged XPI** rather
+than the unpacked directory — the only place a real Firefox is asked to load the
+artifact that would actually be handed to someone. It runs two browsers over one
+profile, because it asks two questions that have different answers:
+
+- **Restart.** Install, create a wallet through the UI, record the vault, quit
+  the browser, start it again on the same profile, add the add-on again. The
+  extension must not come up as a fresh install; the vault, xpub and first
+  address must be unchanged; and the vault must still **decrypt** with the
+  original password to the original recovery phrase, through the real Show
+  Recovery Phrase screen. "The ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet
+  still works" are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
+  This is what a user does every day, because a temporary add-on is unloaded
+  when Firefox exits.
+- **Removal.** Then, in the same browser, an explicit uninstall and a fresh
+  install. Observed: **Firefox destroys the extension's storage on uninstall**,
+  so the vault is gone. Recorded as an assertion, so a Firefox that ever changes
+  it fails the run, and stated in
+  [Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) because for a wallet it means
+  Remove is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
+
+It also pins down something worth knowing about the harness: the
+`moz-extension://` uuid the popup is served from is not stable across installs,
+and navigating to a stale one does not fail — it hangs. The program reads the
+live uuid out of `extensions.webextensions.uuids` after every install.
+
 Both suites build their own image, each with the repo and a fresh extension
 build baked in; what differs is the base. The Chrome image layers those on top
 of a published Playwright image, whereas this one is assembled from a `node`
@@ -689,6 +857,72 @@ Both are click-copyable. Truncating to 4 decimals in summary views is acceptable
 for scannability, but the detail view must never discard precision — it is the
 one place the user can always use to verify exact details.
 
+**Specific Exception — nonzero floor on the approval screens:** A nonzero amount
+must never render as zero. Truncating to 4 decimals does exactly that to an
+amount below 0.0001 — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 base units of an
+8-decimal one — and on the dApp approval screen and the wait/success/error
+screens that carry its amount forward, a real transfer or allowance then reads
+as "nothing is being moved". A swap's `Min. received` is the sharper case: a
+slippage floor shown as `0.0000` states that the swap may return nothing.
+
+On those screens, when the truncated string would contain no digit from 1 to 9
+and the value does, the amount is extended to its first significant digit
+instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
+truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000` —
+the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero. A
+genuine zero still renders `0.0000`, and truncation stays truncation: `0.99999`
+shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up.
+
+The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
+`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
+confirmation screens display goes through the floored one — the ERC-20 amount,
+the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), and the swap's
+`Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The history and
+balance lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) use the unfloored one: the
+transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
+precision. The 4-decimal rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for
+amounts at or above the floor on the approval screens.
+
+The floor applies only where the token's scale is known. Where it is not, the
+approval screen states base units instead of a quantity — see Unknown token
+scale below — and no truncation happens at all.
+
+**Specific Exception — unknown token scale:** Calldata carries base units and no
+scale, so every amount on the dApp approval screen needs the token's `decimals`.
+It is resolved from the bundled token list, then from the tokens the user
+tracks, then from what the block explorer reported for the contract
+(`resolveTokenDecimals()` in `src/shared/approvalAmount.js`). Where none of them
+answers, the amount is not formatted: the line reads
+`5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)`. A guessed scale is not an
+approximation but a different number — 1,000 units of a 6-decimal token
+formatted at 18 decimals reads `0.000000001` — on the screen whose only job is
+to state what is being authorized. Both amount paths of that screen take this
+rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
+the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). An
+unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is still shown as
+`Unlimited`.
+
+The rule holds only if nothing invents a scale UPSTREAM of it. Those three
+sources are read as authoritative, so a value written into one of them cannot be
+recognized as a guess afterwards: a fabricated `18` reads exactly like a real
+`18`, and the refusal above then never fires. So `fetchTokenBalances()` in
+`src/shared/balances.js` stores what the explorer reported or `null`, never a
+default, and the same holds for the history list's token transfers in
+`src/shared/transactions.js`. A token whose `decimals()` reverts has no scale
+anywhere, and a holding of it carries no quantity either: its balance is `null`
+— read as unknown, never as zero — and the balance list says so rather than
+printing `0.0000` for money that is really there. `0` is a real scale and is
+never treated as absent.
+
+`tokenBalances[].decimals` is therefore the explorer's own answer and nothing
+else, which is not the same question as the scale a screen should render at.
+Anything that needs the second one calls `resolveTokenDecimals()` — the balance
+list, the approval and swap lines, and the Send screen, which carries the
+resolved scale onto the pending transaction for `transferAmount.js` to encode
+and compare against. Reading the stored field directly instead answers `null`
+for a bundled or tracked token the explorer merely omitted, which is not a
+refusal the wallet has any reason to make.
+
 #### Partial USD totals
 
 Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
@@ -772,6 +1006,87 @@ tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
 and the send-screen token selector, not this list. Tracked tokens with a zero
 balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
 
+#### Stored state and its version
+
+The whole profile lives under a single extension-storage key, `autistmask`, and
+carries a `schemaVersion` — `STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION` in
+`src/shared/stateSchema.js`, currently `1`. Every write stamps it: the popup's
+`saveState()` and the background's `updateState()` both do, so whichever context
+wrote last, the record says which build's shape it is in.
+
+Version 1 is the shape that shipped before versions existed, so a stored record
+with no `schemaVersion` is version 1 rather than a defect: it loads normally and
+is migrated in place by being stamped on the first write. An upgrade never shows
+an existing user a warning about a profile that is perfectly good. The version
+is bumped only when the MEANING of a stored field changes — a new field with a
+sensible absent value is handled by `normalizePersisted()` and is not a bump,
+because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
+nothing.
+
+Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
+bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
+the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
+this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
+list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
+not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
+record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
+never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
+(`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the spec leaves unassigned) saying the
+saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the
+generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
+
+Every other field of the record is floored in `normalizePersisted()` rather than
+gated, and the floor is not the same for every field. Some are type-checked as a
+container AND entry by entry, because `[1, 2]` is a list, `{"0x…": "notalist"}`
+is an object, and the dereference is one level below the container check; a
+malformed entry is dropped, except in `networkEndpoints`, where the entry is
+coerced so an unknown network's endpoints are not lost, and in `viewStack`,
+where the stack is truncated at the first entry the popup will not reopen onto.
+Some are type-checked as a scalar. The rest take the stored value verbatim,
+because nothing dereferences them structurally.
+
+Which field is which is not written in prose anywhere, deliberately.
+`tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` is the list: one row per persisted field,
+naming the property that field's floor is claimed to have and proving it by
+driving the real code with hostile values — and, for every field whose only
+defence is that nothing dereferences it, by booting the real popup entry point
+over that value onto every view the popup can reopen onto. That last part is
+what makes the claim falsifiable, because this defect class lives on the restore
+path rather than on the home screen. Read the claim narrowly, as that file
+states it: what those boots prove is no structural dereference on the code paths
+a WHOLLY-CORRUPTED PROFILE takes, which is not every path a stored record takes.
+Not driven: any pairing of values the four slots do not produce, a view only
+forward navigation opens, anything behind a click, and everything a healthy
+profile reaches. Within that boundary the verdict is unconditional — if one of
+those boots leaves the popup unhealthy or off the view it stored, `make check`
+fails, including when it takes two corrupted fields at once, because the verdict
+is the combined boot and the per-field re-boot that names a culprit can only
+decorate the message. So does a field that gains a floor while its row still
+claims it has none, and so does a field added to `PERSISTED_FIELDS` with no row
+at all. The per-field justification that used to live in the header of
+`src/shared/stateSchema.js` shipped a false claim in three consecutive changes,
+each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
+
+The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
+`{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
+passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
+`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
+the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
+([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
+now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
+`src/shared/state.js` is called for every failed save, awaited or not, and the
+popup puts up a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner (`showSaveFailureBanner()` in
+`src/popup/views/helpers.js`). Storage can still fail for reasons no floor
+covers — a quota, a revoked permission, a record a newer build wrote — and the
+wallet must never look healthy while that is true.
+
+The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
+`state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
+prototype instead of an own key and the user's endpoint would silently not be
+recorded. Every key test in the gate is an own-property test for that reason,
+and `networkById()` throws on an id it does not know rather than quietly
+answering mainnet.
+
 #### Navigation
 
 The main view shows all addresses grouped by wallet, with ETH balances inline.
@@ -798,14 +1113,18 @@ Three elements sit outside the screens and are present on all of them: the title
 bar ("AutistMask by @sneak" plus the Settings gear), the flash message line
 under it, and the red banner at the very top that appears on a debug build, when
 runtime debug mode is on, or when the active network is a testnet. They are not
-repeated in the element lists below.
+repeated in the element lists below. StateRecovery is the one screen they are
+not all present on: it hides the Settings gear, because it is shown precisely
+when there is no profile for the screens behind that gear to render from.
 
 Closing and reopening the popup returns to the screen the user was last on only
-for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/restorableViews.js`).
+for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/shared/restorableViews.js`).
 Every other screen falls back to Home. The screens that display a secret —
 ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
 so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
-of it.
+of it. So are the two that destroy one, DeleteWallet and
+DeleteWalletLostPassword: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a screen
+whose button erases key material.
 
 A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
 and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
@@ -814,6 +1133,14 @@ than only unhiding it, through the same dispatch and data guards as the restore
 (`src/popup/viewRouter.js`), and falls back to Home when the state the target
 would render is gone.
 
+Those data guards check the ENTRIES of the stored `viewData`, not just the one
+field each branch gates on, and the same goes for `selectedWallet` and
+`selectedAddress`. `restoreView()` is not inside a `try`, so a `TypeError` in a
+renderer skips the rest of popup init and leaves the user with no view, no
+message and no control — the same blank popup by a longer route. Anything the
+restore path dereferences is therefore either floored in `normalizePersisted()`
+or refused by the guard, and the screen falls back to Home instead.
+
 It renders only a screen this page load has not rendered yet. Forward navigation
 renders as it goes, and `viewRouter.js` records every screen that reaches
 `showView()`, so "Back" onto a screen already on the page unhides it and nothing
@@ -828,7 +1155,10 @@ exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret
 survives in a hidden view once the user has navigated away by any route. That
 covers the revealed private key and recovery phrase, the recovery phrase,
 private key or extended private key entered on AddWallet, and the password typed
-on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
+on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. DeleteWalletLostPassword
+registers one as well, for the neighbouring reason rather than that one: a
+wallet name is not a secret, but a typed confirmation left standing in a hidden
+view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 #### Welcome (`welcome`)
 
@@ -889,7 +1219,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
         - **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key
           input
     - Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends
-      on the selected tab
+      on the selected tab. Every wording says that the password cannot be
+      recovered or reset and names what the only backup of the wallet is — the
+      recovery phrase, the private key or the extended private key, according to
+      the tab. This is the only warning the user gets before the wallet exists;
+      without it, the lost-password route on DeleteWallet is the first they
+      would hear of it. The hint line reserves its height, so switching tabs
+      cannot move the password fields under the pointer.
     - "Import" button
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
@@ -1244,6 +1580,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Error line
     - Password input
     - "Confirm Delete" button
+    - An underlined "I have lost my password" control
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the
       wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet
@@ -1253,10 +1590,54 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
       wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
       (`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
-    - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line,
-      nothing deleted
+    - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "That password is incorrect. Please
+      try again." on the error line, nothing deleted
+    - "I have lost my password" → **DeleteWalletLostPassword**
     - "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
 
+#### DeleteWalletLostPassword (`delete-wallet-lost-password`)
+
+- **When**: User tapped "I have lost my password" on DeleteWallet.
+- **Why it exists**: without it, a user who has forgotten the password but still
+  holds the recovery phrase has no route back into the product at all. Deletion
+  was password-gated, and importing the phrase again is refused as a duplicate
+  xpub by `findWalletByXpub()` while the wallet is still stored, so the only
+  escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals — which takes
+  every other wallet with it.
+- **Elements**:
+    - "Back" button, "Delete Wallet Without a Password" heading
+    - A statement that the password cannot be recovered or reset, so the wallet
+      cannot be unlocked again, and that no password is needed to delete it
+    - What deletion does and does not do: it erases the copy of the key stored
+      on this device; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved
+    - The route back — adding the wallet again with the recovery phrase and a
+      new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
+      deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
+    - That the other wallets are not touched
+    - The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
+    - Error line
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
+- **Transitions**:
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name typed correctly) → the same two
+      outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
+      the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
+      broadcast are identical on both routes
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
+      of this wallet. Type &lt;name&gt; to confirm." on the error line, nothing
+      deleted
+    - "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
+      selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
+      than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
+      Settings as their Back target.
+- **Deliberately not password-gated.** A password in front of _discarding_ a
+  secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
+  uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
+  forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
+  on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
+  ignored.
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
+  by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
+
 #### DeleteAddress (`delete-address-confirm`)
 
 - **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to an address on Home. Offered only on HD
@@ -1273,13 +1654,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
       refused: "+" derives the next unused index (`nextIndex` is a high-water
       mark), and re-importing the wallet's key material is rejected as a
       duplicate by `findWalletByXpub` while the wallet is still present. What
-      works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — password-gated, and it
-      destroys the stored secret — then importing again, whereupon
-      `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers the address **only if it has on-chain
-      activity**. An address that was never used is not found by that scan. The
-      text is written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in
-      `index.html`, so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an
-      xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import.
+      works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored
+      secret — then importing again, whereupon `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers
+      the address **only if it has on-chain activity**. An address that was
+      never used is not found by that scan. The text is written by
+      `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in `index.html`, so it can name
+      the wallet's own kind of key material: an xprv wallet has no recovery
+      phrase to re-import.
     - A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20,
       followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the
       USD total via `formatAddressTotal()` (see
@@ -1415,6 +1796,48 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
       EIP-1193 code 4001
 
+#### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
+
+- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
+  profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
+  that never appears during ordinary use.
+- **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
+  view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
+  internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
+  The only escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals
+  ([#311](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311)).
+- **Elements**:
+    - "Saved Data Cannot Be Read" heading, and a statement that nothing has been
+      changed or erased and nothing can be signed or sent
+    - The problem, in one sentence naming what is wrong with the record
+    - "Export Saved Data" button, and the read-only text box it fills
+    - What erasing does and does not do, in bold: every wallet stored in this
+      browser is deleted; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved
+    - A text input asking for `ERASE MY WALLET` to be typed back
+    - Error line
+    - "Erase Saved Data" button
+- **Transitions**:
+    - "Export Saved Data" → the raw stored record, verbatim, in the text box on
+      the screen, and a downloaded `autistmask-saved-data.json` where the
+      browser allows one. The box is filled first and never depends on the
+      download: an export that can fail is not an export.
+    - "Erase Saved Data" (phrase typed) → the stored record is removed and the
+      popup reloads into **Welcome**
+    - "Erase Saved Data" (phrase not typed) → "Type ERASE MY WALLET to confirm.
+      Nothing was erased." on the error line
+- **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
+  screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
+  could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
+  reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
+- **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
+  looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
+  no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
+  material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
+  and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
+  is no profile to check one against.
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
+  nothing on this path writes state at all.
+
 ### External Services
 
 AutistMask is not a fully self-contained offline tool. It necessarily

TODO.md

@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ milestone is in flight on `next`; its `next` -> `main` PR is
 [#190](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/190). `make check` verified
 green on `next` at `e9fa8be` on 2026-08-10, and `make build` produces
 `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`, verified against the build's own receipt to
-be exactly what that build emitted with `DEBUG` compiled off.
+hold exactly the regular files and symlinks that build emitted, with `DEBUG`
+compiled off.
 
 The backlog lives on the
 [Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
@@ -44,6 +45,366 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-08-23: Both manifests declare toolbar icons, and real PNGs at
+  16/32/48/128 ship inside both archives
+  ([#371](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/371)). Neither manifest
+  had an `icons` block, so both browsers drew a generic puzzle piece — the first
+  thing the owner sees on every launch, and how a user tells a real extension
+  from a look-alike. The sizes `build.js` copies into each browser directory are
+  read out of the manifest that ships next to them rather than from a second
+  list, so a declared size `icons/` does not hold fails `make build`;
+  `script/lib/package.js` already resolves `.png` references, so an icon that
+  reached a manifest but not the archive fails packaging. The artwork is
+  original: a flat dark-navy rounded field with a teal triangular "A", drawn
+  from geometry and rasterised into PNG, nothing traced or downloaded.
+- 2026-08-23: A persisted container whose ENTRIES were dereferenced unchecked no
+  longer reaches a `.map()` or a `.toLowerCase()`
+  ([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). `allowedSites` was
+  the worst shape available: a stored `{"0x…": "notalist"}` passed the gate,
+  rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside `saveState()`'s
+  per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed silently and the
+  user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing — measured as
+  `chrome.storage.local.set` never being called at all. `deniedSites` has the
+  same shape, `fraudContracts` the same class with a milder consequence, and the
+  sweep for the class turned up `selectedToken`, `rpcUrl` (handed whole to
+  `new JsonRpcProvider()`, which throws synchronously outside any `try`), the
+  entries of `viewData` (four restore branches gate on one truthy field and then
+  dereference an address), and `selectedWallet`/`selectedAddress` (a stored
+  `"map"` is TRUTHY against a real Array, so the restore guard does not
+  short-circuit). All of them are now floored in `src/shared/persistedState.js`
+  or refused by the per-branch guards in `src/popup/viewRouter.js`. Separately,
+  a save that fails is no longer swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
+  `src/shared/state.js` reports every failed save, awaited or not, and the popup
+  raises a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner. The hand-written per-field
+  justification in the header of `src/shared/stateSchema.js` — which had shipped
+  a false claim in three consecutive changes — is replaced by
+  `tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js`, one row per persisted field, each
+  proven by driving the real code with hostile values — and, for a field whose
+  only defence is that nothing dereferences it, by booting the real popup entry
+  point over that value onto every view the popup can reopen onto, since that is
+  the path this whole class of defect lives on. Each such field is driven at
+  both polarities — a value nothing writes is wrong-typed and so truthy, so a
+  falsy slot is driven too, or the field is proven unable to be falsy after the
+  floor. The claim is narrow and stated as such: no structural dereference on
+  the code paths a wholly-corrupted profile takes, which is not every path a
+  stored record takes — a pairing of values the four slots do not produce, a
+  view only forward navigation opens, anything behind a click, and everything a
+  healthy profile reaches are all undriven. Within that boundary the verdict is
+  unconditional, including a dereference that takes two corrupted fields at
+  once, since the assertion is on the combined boot and the per-field re-boot
+  can only decorate the message. A field with no row and a field that gains a
+  floor while its row still claims it has none also fail `make check`.
+- 2026-08-23: A swap amount and the token it is counted in now always come from
+  the same hop, on both sides of the approval screen
+  ([#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359) and
+  [#364](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/364), the output and input
+  halves of one gate, fixed as one unit). `src/shared/uniswap.js` gated the
+  token and the amount on truthiness and independently; an address is never
+  falsy once set but an amount of `0n` is, so a hop supplying a zero amount
+  fixed the token and left the amount open, and the next hop's figure was then
+  rendered against the first hop's token at that token's scale — 0.5 WETH shown
+  as `500000000000.0000 USDT`, and an earlier hop's `Min. received` shown for a
+  final leg that guarantees nothing. Both sides are now set as a pair through
+  explicit presence, a zero slippage floor reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)`,
+  and V4's `OPEN_DELTA` (an `amountIn` of zero, which `V4Router` reads as "swap
+  the whole open credit") reads `All available (V4 open delta)` instead of
+  `0.0000`.
+- 2026-08-23: A swap whose input token the calldata never named is said to be
+  unknown instead of being called ETH
+  ([#357](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/357)), the twin on the
+  input side of [#353](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/353). A null
+  `inputToken` rendered as `Token In: ETH (native)` and titled the swap
+  `Swap ETH -> X`, asserting the user was paying native ETH when nothing in the
+  calldata said so. The null-means-ETH collapse is now gone from `tokenInfo()`
+  itself rather than guarded at each call site: null is refused, and native ETH
+  keeps arriving as the explicit zero address that `WRAP_ETH` and V4's
+  `Currency.wrap(address(0))` both use.
+- 2026-08-23: A swap whose output token the calldata never named is said to be
+  unknown instead of being called ETH
+  ([#353](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/353)). `tokenInfo(null)`
+  answers `{symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18}`, and a V4 step could take the
+  `Min. received` figure while naming no output currency, so the approval screen
+  stated the wrong asset at the wrong scale. Null is not how V4 spells native
+  ETH: v4-core's `type Currency is address` wraps `address(0)` for it, which
+  reaches the decoder as the truthy string
+  `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` and is named ETH there already.
+  `Token Out` now reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` and
+  `Min. received` falls to the base-unit refusal from
+  [#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340).
+
+- 2026-08-23: The stored profile carries a schema version, and a record the
+  wallet cannot read produces a screen instead of a blank popup
+  ([#311](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311)). `saveState()` and
+  `updateState()` both stamp `STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION`
+  (`src/shared/stateSchema.js`), and every read goes through
+  `assertStateUsable()` on the raw bytes before normalization gets a chance to
+  paper over them. Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned, so the
+  profile every existing install holds loads normally and is migrated in place
+  by being stamped on the first write — an upgrade shows nobody a wipe prompt
+  for a wallet that is fine. A record this build cannot vouch for is refused
+  instead: not normalized, not written back, not half-loaded. The popup shows
+  the new StateRecovery screen, which names the problem, exports the raw record
+  verbatim into the page (and downloads it where the browser allows), and offers
+  an erase behind a typed `ERASE MY WALLET` — both controls, because an export
+  with no reset leaves the user stuck and a reset with no export destroys the
+  only copy of possibly recoverable key material. The background refuses the
+  same record and answers dApps `-32007` — a code EIP-1474 leaves unassigned,
+  unlike `-32000`..`-32006` — with a message saying the saved data cannot be
+  read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the generic `-32603`
+  that every request used to get. Fields the gate deliberately does not check
+  produced the same blank popup on their own: `trackedTokens` and
+  `activeAddress` were floored on truthiness rather than on type, and
+  `trackedTokens`' ENTRIES and each address's `tokenBalances` were not floored
+  at all — `[1, 2]` is a list, and the dereference is `t.address.toLowerCase()`
+  one level below the container. All of them are type-checked now, entries
+  included, and the header of `src/shared/stateSchema.js` lists which fields of
+  the record get a type check and which get a `saved.x || default` or a verbatim
+  passthrough, rather than asserting a rule the module does not follow.
+  `networkById()` now throws on an id it does not know instead of quietly
+  answering mainnet, and the gate's key tests are all own-property tests:
+  `networkId` is an object key into `networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated
+  `"__proto__"` used to set that map's prototype and drop the user's endpoint
+  silently. The three corrupt blobs from the issue drive the real popup entry
+  point in `tests/stateRecovery.test.js` and the real worker in
+  `tests/stateUnusableRpc.test.js`; each rendered nothing at all and answered
+  `-32603` before this. `src/popup/restorableViews.js` moved to
+  `src/shared/restorableViews.js`, since `persistedState.js` requires it and
+  that module is in the background bundle.
+
+- 2026-08-23: An explorer that reports no `decimals` for a token no longer has a
+  scale invented for it before storage
+  ([#349](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349)).
+  `fetchTokenBalances()` did `parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10)` on the
+  way in, so a token whose `decimals()` reverts was written to
+  `tokenBalances[].decimals` as a fabricated `18` that no reader could tell from
+  a real one. That is upstream of the resolve-or-refuse rule
+  ([#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306),
+  [#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340)): both approval paths
+  read this stored value as an authoritative source, so the guess walked past
+  refusals that were intact and simply never fired. The stored value is now the
+  explorer's own answer or `null`, and both the ERC-20 amount line and the swap
+  lines reach `unknownDecimalsAmount()` on it. The history list's token
+  transfers carried the same `|| "18"` and now state base units with the scale
+  unknown rather than a quantity. A holding whose scale nothing knows carries
+  `balance: null` — unknown, not zero — and the balance list, the USD total, the
+  Send screen and the confirmation screen each say so instead of printing
+  `0.0000` for money that is really there. The uint8 check is one shared
+  `toDecimals()` rather than three copies, and it answers `0` for a real scale
+  of zero: `|| "18"` collapsed that to eighteen, the trap of
+  [#246](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/246). Existing installs
+  hold `18`s that cannot be told apart retroactively; they display exactly as
+  they do today until the next balance refresh, which rewrites `tokenBalances`
+  wholesale and needs no user action. No `|| 18` or `?? 18` fallback remains
+  anywhere in `src/`; the literal `18`s that do remain are real data, not
+  defaults — 432 per-token `decimals: 18` entries in the bundled
+  `src/shared/tokenList.js`, and, outside that file, only native ETH's
+  protocol-defined scale in `src/shared/uniswap.js` and the fixed-point
+  comparison scale in `src/shared/txValidation.js`. `tokenBalances[].decimals`
+  is the explorer's answer alone and not the scale a screen renders at, so the
+  Send screen resolves through `resolveTokenDecimals()` like every other
+  consumer: reading the stored field raw carried a `null` into `estimateGas()`
+  for a bundled token such as WETH, which reported an unestimable network fee
+  and left Send disabled behind a message no retry could clear. Send resolves
+  with `wallets`, which adds the cross-address disagreement check the balance
+  list does not make, so the two can differ; where they do, the stored quantity
+  was computed at a scale Send has refused, and it is withdrawn with it. An
+  unknown scale is an unknown balance, and the user is told that rather than
+  that the fee could not be estimated.
+
+- 2026-08-23: The background no longer reads or writes the shared `state`
+  singleton ([#324](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324)), which
+  also closes the cold-worker wrong-chain send
+  ([#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320)). One in-memory copy
+  loaded once is the popup's lifetime, not the MV3 worker's: the worker is
+  killed when idle, nothing loaded state at module scope, and an unpopulated
+  read was answered out of `DEFAULT_STATE` in silence. Five defects traced to
+  that, and every point fix added a `loadState()` that created the next one — a
+  load detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding. The background now
+  has its own storage layer (`src/background/state.js`): `getState()` for a
+  detached per-call read, `updateState()` for a queued read-modify-write.
+  `backgroundRefresh()` refreshes a private copy and applies the balances that
+  came back by address, so a wallet added, renamed or deleted during the round
+  trip survives. The transaction attempt takes its chain id and its endpoint
+  from one snapshot, so a committed chain switch can no longer move the endpoint
+  under an artifact already verified against the old chain. `getProvider()` now
+  REQUIRES the network id, which is what closes
+  [#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320) at the shape rather
+  than at the call site. The prohibition is enforced by `build.js`, which fails
+  the build when esbuild's own metafile reports `src/shared/state.js` as an
+  input of either background bundle — the resolution the shipped bundle was
+  actually built from, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip
+  past it, and `make build` runs in CI. A bundled entry point under
+  `src/background/` with no line in the table fails the build too, so a second
+  worker entry point is protected by default rather than only if whoever adds it
+  knows the table exists. The assertion itself is pinned by
+  `tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js`, including every way its table can rot: a
+  key no bundled entry point matched, a forbidden module this build bundled
+  nowhere, and an entry that lists no modules (which would otherwise empty the
+  lint rule's forbidden set as well, and is refused at require time). Its bound
+  is that it is keyed by path, so a COPY of the singleton at another path is
+  outside it — loud for three of the five defects and silent for the other two;
+  the bounds are recorded in full where the table lives
+  (`script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js`). An ESLint rule that walks the require
+  graph textually gives the same answer in the editor, before a full bundle; it
+  reads the same table, and it is fast feedback rather than the guarantee. The
+  shapes it catches are pinned by `tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js`, and
+  so are the two it misses — a computed specifier and a symlink — as asserted
+  non-reports, which the build fails on. Reading an unloaded singleton now
+  throws `StateNotLoadedError` instead of serving defaults. The
+  `chrome.storage.local` stubs in eight test files aliased instead of
+  structured-cloning, which could let an assertion pass on a build that never
+  wrote anything; every test that drives real persistence now goes through
+  `tests/support/storageStub.js`.
+- 2026-08-23: A swap always names its output token
+  ([#346](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/346)). The `Token Out`
+  detail line in `src/shared/uniswap.js` was pushed only when a symbol was
+  known, so a swap whose output token is absent from the bundled list — every
+  newly listed token — showed a `Min. received` figure with nothing saying what
+  was being received. The line is now keyed on the token's address and falls
+  back to it when there is no symbol, exactly as the `Token In` line already
+  did. It composes with the unknown-scale refusal from
+  [#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340): the address says
+  which token, the base-unit figure says how much and states that the scale is
+  unknown.
+- 2026-08-23: The swap approval screen no longer guesses 18 decimals for a token
+  outside the bundled list
+  ([#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340)). `tokenInfo()` in
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js` returned `decimals: 18` for any such token — the same
+  assumption [#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306) removed
+  from the ERC-20 amount line — so a 1,000-unit swap of a 6-decimal token was
+  stated as `0.000000001`, and every newly listed token reached it. The swap's
+  `Amount` and `Min. received` lines now resolve the scale through
+  `resolveTokenDecimals()`, the same bundled-list-then-tracked-then-explorer
+  order the ERC-20 line uses, and where nothing knows it they render
+  `unknownDecimalsAmount()` — base units with the scale stated — instead of a
+  number. No new data source and no network call: the scale comes only from what
+  the wallet already holds. An unbounded permit is still shown as `Unlimited`.
+  `README.md` records the rule as a Display Consistency exception.
+- 2026-08-23: A failed release build no longer leaves a loadable debug bundle in
+  `dist/` ([#333](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/333)). With
+  `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` exported, `make build` compiled a debug bundle and failed
+  on it in `script/verify-build` — but the bundle stayed on disk, loadable, with
+  every wallet it creates using the publicly committed test recovery phrase.
+  Every step of `make build` now runs through `script/discard-dist-on-failure`,
+  which removes `dist/` when a step fails and says on stderr that it did and
+  why; a removal it cannot complete is reported just as loudly.
+  `make build-debug` is deliberately not wrapped: its output is not mistakable
+  for a release build and is the evidence of the failure.
+  `script/test-verify-build` asserts the state of `dist/` on disk after a
+  failing and a succeeding step, not just the exit status, and reads `make -n`
+  to check the wrapper is on the release path and only there.
+- 2026-08-23: `README.md` and `script/verify-build`'s own comments now state the
+  emitted-tree guarantee at the width the code actually enforces
+  ([#331](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/331)). The tree walk is
+  `-type f -o -type l`, so the guarantee covers regular files and symlinks under
+  `dist/`; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories are not checked,
+  because a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable payload, and
+  `grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. The exclusion is deliberate and
+  unchanged — the README said "nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
+  write", which was broader than that. Documentation only; no executable line
+  changed.
+- 2026-08-23: An amount below the 4-decimal display floor no longer reads as
+  zero on the approval screens
+  ([#322](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/322)). With the token's
+  true scale resolved, the 4-decimal truncation still printed a small amount as
+  `0.0000` — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — so a
+  real transfer, allowance or swap was stated as nothing on the one screen whose
+  job is to say what is being authorized, and a swap's `Min. received` claimed
+  the user might receive nothing. Three copies of that truncation existed; they
+  now share `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`. Everything the approval and
+  confirmation screens render (`src/popup/views/approval.js`,
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js`) extends to the first significant digit when the
+  truncated figure would otherwise read as zero, keeping the amount in token
+  units rather than switching to base units mid-line. The history and balance
+  lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) keep the unfloored rule, which is out of
+  scope by the issue's definition of done. `README.md`'s Display Consistency
+  section records the exception.
+- 2026-08-23: The extension can be installed once and kept
+  ([#310](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310)). There was no
+  packaging target anywhere, no artifact, and `manifest/chrome.json` carried no
+  `key` — so an unpacked Chrome load derived its extension id, and therefore its
+  `chrome.storage.local` partition, from the absolute checkout path: moving or
+  re-cloning the checkout presented an empty wallet with no error. The manifest
+  now carries a fixed `key` (public half only; the private half is a credential
+  and is not in this repo, and no target generates one into the tree), pinning
+  the id to `gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`. `make package` produces
+  `release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip` and
+  `release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi` plus `SHA256SUMS`,
+  deterministically and via `make build` so the archives can only be made from a
+  `dist/` already verified against that build's receipt as a release build;
+  every path the manifests and the popup HTML reference is resolved and required
+  to be inside the archive, and the archive is read back off disk and compared
+  member by member — `dist/styles.css` sits at the `dist/` root outside both
+  browser directories and is reported as deliberately not shipped rather than
+  dropped by a glob. One version: `script/lib/version.js` fails the build when
+  `package.json` and the two manifests disagree, instead of reading from one of
+  them. `BUILD_COMMIT` now carries `-dirty` when the working tree does not match
+  `HEAD` (and `-unknown` when git cannot say), while the full hash behind the
+  About screen's commit link stays clean so the link still resolves. Two real
+  browser observations back it: `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js` loads the
+  extension from two different paths in one Chrome profile with and without
+  `key` and records what each does, and `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`
+  installs the packaged XPI in a real Firefox, creates a wallet, restarts the
+  browser on the same profile, adds the add-on again and decrypts the vault back
+  to the original recovery phrase — and then observes that an explicit uninstall
+  DESTROYS that storage, which is correct browser behaviour but means Remove is
+  irreversible for a wallet, now stated in README.md. Deliberately not done: AMO
+  signing, CRX packing, tagging and any upload — the Firefox artifact is
+  UNSIGNED and README.md now states that release Firefox and ESR refuse it, that
+  Developer Edition or an Unbranded build is required, and that a temporary
+  add-on does not survive a browser restart.
+- 2026-08-20: A second extension page can no longer silently delete a wallet
+  ([#304](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304)). `saveState()` wrote
+  the entire state blob, and every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
+  approval window, `backgroundRefresh()` — holds its own in-memory `state`,
+  loaded once, with `showView()` saving on every navigation; a second page that
+  saved after a first had written something new overwrote it, no attacker or
+  unusual input required. `saveState()` is now a read-modify-write: it re-reads
+  storage, diffs the persisted fields against a deep-cloned `baseline` snapshot
+  taken at the last `loadState()`/`saveState()` on that page, and writes only
+  the fields that actually changed — everything else is carried forward from
+  storage in its loaded-and-normalized shape (`normalizePersisted()`, shared
+  with `loadState()`), so a legacy or malformed record a load has always
+  self-healed in memory keeps getting written back even on a save that touched
+  something else entirely. `showView()` fires `saveState()` on every navigation
+  without awaiting it, so two saves from the same page can be in flight at once;
+  a FIFO queue serializes them rather than letting a slow one finish after a
+  later one and re-derive a stale answer. Deliberately not done: the live
+  `state` of a field this page does not own is not rehydrated from what another
+  page wrote, only the persisted record is — adopting a concurrently-written
+  value into `state` reintroduced the same clobber one page later, caught by
+  `tests/txStatus.test.js` red. Two writers of the same field still resolve
+  last-writer-wins, documented at the merge point. `tests/stateMerge.test.js`
+  covers the two-page save and the approval-window reproduction from the issue —
+  add a wallet in one page, force a save from a second page loaded before it,
+  both wallets survive — each demonstrated failing against the unfixed full-blob
+  write.
+- 2026-08-20: A forgotten password no longer wedges the wallet
+  ([#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312)). Deleting a wallet
+  was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase again was refused as a
+  duplicate xpub, so a user who had the phrase but not the password could
+  neither leave nor come back: the only way out was clearing extension storage
+  through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it.
+  DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys the
+  wallet after the user types its name back — no password, because requiring one
+  to _discard_ a secret protects nobody. An attacker at the popup who wants the
+  wallet gone can uninstall the extension; the only person such a gate stopped
+  was the owner who forgot it. That was chosen over allowing a duplicate xpub to
+  re-encrypt in place: re-import would have had to be built three times over
+  (`hd` and `xprv` by xpub, `key` by address), would make the user retype the
+  recovery phrase into a live popup to change a password, and reaches no state
+  that delete-then-import does not already reach through `scanForAddresses()`.
+  Both routes share one `finishDelete()`, so the selection repair, the
+  site-permission cleanup and the `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` broadcast cannot
+  diverge between them, and the new screen is excluded from `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` —
+  a popup reopened by accident must not land on a button that erases key
+  material. AddWallet's password hint now says, per import mode, that the
+  password cannot be recovered or reset and what the only backup is; the hint
+  line reserves its height so switching tabs cannot move the password fields.
+  The test drives the real view against a `chrome.storage.local` stub that
+  structured-clones on both `set` and `get` and asserts against the read-back,
+  so it fails on the deletion of `saveState()` and not only on an in-memory
+  splice.
 - 2026-08-20: `make build` can no longer hand back a debug build, and
   `script/verify-build` can no longer be satisfied by bytes the build did not
   produce ([#309](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/309)). The

build.js

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ const path = require("path");
 const crypto = require("crypto");
 const { execSync } = require("child_process");
 const esbuild = require("esbuild");
+const { resolveVersion } = require("./script/lib/version");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
 
 const DIST = path.join(__dirname, "dist");
 const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
@@ -15,6 +21,18 @@ const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "src");
 // rotting with it.
 const AUDITED_MODULE = "src/shared/constants.js";
 
+// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS — what each entry point's bundle may not contain, and what
+// that covers — lives in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, because the
+// ESLint rule reads the same table and two literal copies of a path drift.
+//
+// This is the authoritative check, and it is here rather than in the linter
+// because it consults the resolution esbuild actually performed. Any specifier
+// syntax, any hop, any resolution rule that puts the module in the bundle fails
+// the build, whether or not a text matcher would have recognized it. A
+// background entry point the table does not name fails as well, so a second
+// worker is protected by default rather than by someone remembering this file.
+// Dockerfile:42 runs `make build`, so it is enforced in CI.
+
 // The build receipt: every file this build emits, with its sha256 and whether
 // it is one of the audited bundles. script/verify-build is handed this and
 // checks dist/ against it, so the file list comes from the build that just ran
@@ -33,6 +51,17 @@ const RECEIPT_ENV = "AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT";
 // rather than writing a receipt that cannot be checked.
 const SAFE_EMITTED_PATH = /^dist\/[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$/;
 
+// Where each browser directory's manifest comes from, and — through its
+// "icons" — which image files ship inside that directory.
+const MANIFEST_SOURCES = new Map([
+    [DIST_CHROME, path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "chrome.json")],
+    [DIST_FIREFOX, path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "firefox.json")],
+]);
+
+// What an "icons" entry may name: a plain file under icons/, so a manifest
+// value is never joined into a path that leaves the repo.
+const ICON_REF_RE = /^icons\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+\.png$/;
+
 function ensureDir(dir) {
     fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
 }
@@ -64,6 +93,164 @@ function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
         .map(([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile));
 }
 
+// Shortest import chain from `entryInput` to `target` through the metafile's
+// own input graph, or null when there is none. The message this feeds is the
+// point of the check: "state.js is in the worker bundle" is not actionable on
+// its own, "index.js -> chainSwitchFields.js -> state.js" is.
+function importChain(metafile, entryInput, target) {
+    const graph = new Map(
+        Object.entries(metafile.inputs).map(([input, info]) => [
+            repoRelative(input),
+            (info.imports || []).map((i) => repoRelative(i.path)),
+        ]),
+    );
+    const start = repoRelative(entryInput);
+    const seen = new Set([start]);
+    const queue = [[start]];
+    while (queue.length > 0) {
+        const chain = queue.shift();
+        for (const next of graph.get(chain[chain.length - 1]) || []) {
+            if (next === target) return chain.concat([next]);
+            if (seen.has(next)) continue;
+            seen.add(next);
+            queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+// What the forbidden-input checks accumulate over a whole build: which
+// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS keys were actually bundled, and every input of every output
+// this build emitted. Both are read by assertForbiddenTableCovered() at the
+// end — a table entry naming something that is not there any more enforces
+// nothing, and must fail rather than pass quietly.
+function newForbiddenRecord() {
+    return { entriesChecked: new Set(), bundledInputs: new Set() };
+}
+
+// Note every input of every output of one esbuild run. Deliberately not
+// restricted to the entry points named in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS: it is the POPUP
+// that legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, and that is what makes
+// "the forbidden module still exists at this path" checkable at all.
+function recordBundledInputs(metafile, record) {
+    for (const info of Object.values(metafile.outputs)) {
+        for (const input of Object.keys(info.inputs)) {
+            record.bundledInputs.add(repoRelative(input));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Fail the build when an entry point's bundle contains a module it is
+// prohibited from reaching. The inputs come from esbuild's metafile, so this is
+// the resolution the shipped bundle was built from and not a guess at it.
+//
+// A background entry point with no line in the table fails here too. The five
+// defects this exists to prevent were accidents, and so is adding a second
+// worker entry point without knowing that a table somewhere needs a line: the
+// protection has to be the default for that directory rather than something
+// the next author must opt into.
+function assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+    entryPoint,
+    outfile,
+    metafile,
+    record,
+    table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+) {
+    const entry = repoRelative(entryPoint);
+    const forbidden = table[entry];
+    if (!forbidden) {
+        if (!entry.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)) return;
+        throw new Error(
+            `${entry} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS, so nothing stops its bundle from ` +
+                `containing the shared state singleton. Add it to ` +
+                `script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. The MV3 worker never ` +
+                `populates that singleton, so reading it serves ` +
+                `DEFAULT_STATE; use getState()/updateState() from ` +
+                `src/background/state.js instead.`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    const out = repoRelative(outfile);
+    const entryOutput = Object.entries(metafile.outputs).find(
+        ([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile) === out,
+    );
+    if (!entryOutput) {
+        throw new Error(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${out}`);
+    }
+    const inputs = new Set(
+        Object.keys(entryOutput[1].inputs).map(repoRelative),
+    );
+
+    // Recorded only once the bundle's inputs are actually in hand. Marking the
+    // entry checked any earlier — as this did — means an early return above
+    // satisfies assertForbiddenTableCovered() with a bundle nobody examined,
+    // and the coverage half cannot tell that from a real check. The lookup
+    // above is the fragile step: repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd()
+    // while esbuild's output keys are cwd-relative, so a change to where the
+    // build runs from could miss.
+    record.entriesChecked.add(entry);
+
+    for (const module of forbidden) {
+        if (!inputs.has(module)) continue;
+        const chain = importChain(metafile, entryPoint, module);
+        throw new Error(
+            `${out} bundles ${module}, which ${entry} must not reach` +
+                `${chain ? `: ${chain.join(" -> ")}` : ""}. The MV3 worker ` +
+                `never populates the shared state singleton, so reading it ` +
+                `serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from ` +
+                `src/background/state.js instead.`,
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// Fail the build when the table has rotted away from the tree it describes.
+// Both halves of an entry rot independently, and either one turns the whole
+// prohibition into a pass that checks nothing:
+//
+//   - the KEY, when no bundled entry point matches it: the entry point was
+//     renamed or is no longer built, and no bundle was ever tested against the
+//     list;
+//   - the MODULE, when this build bundled it nowhere: the module was renamed,
+//     moved or deleted, so "is it an input of the background bundle" is asked
+//     about a path nothing resolves to and is answered no forever. The popup
+//     legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, which is what makes this
+//     checkable — and it is stronger than an existsSync(), because it also
+//     fails when the file is still there but has dropped out of every bundle.
+//
+// This matters concretely: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311
+// rewrites this persistence layer, and a rename that quietly disarmed the
+// guarantee would put the singleton back within reach of the worker with every
+// check in the repo still green.
+//
+// The third way — an entry that lists no modules at all — is refused where the
+// table is defined, at require time, because that one also empties the ESLint
+// rule's forbidden set and so has to fail before either layer runs. It is
+// re-checked here so the build's own half does not depend on the table having
+// been loaded from that file.
+function assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS) {
+    assertTableWellFormed(table);
+    for (const [entry, modules] of Object.entries(table)) {
+        if (!record.entriesChecked.has(entry)) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${entry} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled, ` +
+                    `so nothing checked it`,
+            );
+        }
+        for (const module of modules) {
+            if (record.bundledInputs.has(module)) continue;
+            throw new Error(
+                `${module} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for ${entry}, but ` +
+                    `this build bundled it nowhere, so the prohibition names ` +
+                    `a module that is not in this tree at that path and ` +
+                    `nothing enforces it. If the module moved, move it in ` +
+                    `script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js too, which both ` +
+                    `this check and the ESLint rule read.`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 // Every file this build writes under dist/, recorded as it is written. This is
 // the build's own account of what it emitted; it is never recovered by
 // listing dist/, because a file that is in dist/ without this build having put
@@ -81,6 +268,42 @@ function copyEmitted(src, dest) {
     recordEmitted(dest);
 }
 
+// Copy the icons one browser directory ships. The sizes come from the manifest
+// that will sit next to them, not from a second list here: a size the manifest
+// declares and icons/ does not hold fails the build, rather than shipping a
+// manifest whose reference resolves to nothing. Relative to the browser
+// directory, so nothing points up and out of it the way dist/styles.css does.
+function copyIcons(distDir) {
+    const manifestPath = MANIFEST_SOURCES.get(distDir);
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
+    const refs = Object.values(manifest.icons || {});
+    if (refs.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `${repoRelative(manifestPath)} declares no icons, so the browser ` +
+                `renders a generic placeholder for this extension`,
+        );
+    }
+    for (const ref of refs) {
+        if (!ICON_REF_RE.test(ref)) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${repoRelative(manifestPath)} declares icon ` +
+                    `${JSON.stringify(ref)}, which is not a plain file under ` +
+                    `icons/`,
+            );
+        }
+        const src = path.join(__dirname, ref);
+        if (!fs.existsSync(src)) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${repoRelative(manifestPath)} declares ${ref}, which is not ` +
+                    `in this tree`,
+            );
+        }
+        const dest = path.join(distDir, ref);
+        ensureDir(path.dirname(dest));
+        copyEmitted(src, dest);
+    }
+}
+
 function sha256File(absPath) {
     return crypto
         .createHash("sha256")
@@ -160,28 +383,53 @@ function isDebugBuild() {
     return process.env.AUTISTMASK_DEBUG === "1";
 }
 
+// A short git output, or null when git cannot answer. Distinguishing "git said
+// nothing" from "git could not be asked" matters below: a working tree whose
+// state is unknown must not be stamped as clean.
+function git(args) {
+    try {
+        return execSync(`git ${args}`, {
+            encoding: "utf8",
+            stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
+        }).trim();
+    } catch {
+        // not a git repo, or git not available
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+// The working-tree state, as a suffix for the displayed commit: "" when the
+// tree matches HEAD, "-dirty" when it does not, "-unknown" when git answered
+// the hash but not the status. Without this a build from a modified tree
+// stamped a clean hash, so the About screen named a commit whose contents were
+// not what was running — the one thing that stamp exists to establish.
+//
+// git status --porcelain honours .gitignore, so dist/ and node_modules/ do not
+// make every build dirty; an untracked file that is NOT ignored does, and
+// correctly: it may well be in the bundle.
+function worktreeSuffix() {
+    const status = git("status --porcelain");
+    if (status === null) return "-unknown";
+    return status === "" ? "" : "-dirty";
+}
+
 function getBuildInfo() {
     const pkg = JSON.parse(
         fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"),
     );
-    let commitHash = "unknown";
-    try {
-        commitHash = execSync("git rev-parse --short HEAD", {
-            encoding: "utf8",
-        }).trim();
-    } catch {
-        // not a git repo or git not available
-    }
-    let commitHashFull = "unknown";
-    try {
-        commitHashFull = execSync("git rev-parse HEAD", {
-            encoding: "utf8",
-        }).trim();
-    } catch {
-        // not a git repo or git not available
-    }
+    const commitHashFull = git("rev-parse HEAD") || "unknown";
+    const shortHash = git("rev-parse --short HEAD") || "unknown";
+    // The full hash is left clean because it is the href of the commit link in
+    // the About screen, and "abc123-dirty" is not a commit anyone can fetch.
+    // The displayed short hash carries the marker, so the screen says the tree
+    // was modified while still linking somewhere real.
+    const commitHash =
+        shortHash === "unknown" ? shortHash : shortHash + worktreeSuffix();
     return {
-        version: pkg.version,
+        // Fails the build when package.json and the two manifests disagree;
+        // see script/lib/version.js. Called before anything is emitted, so a
+        // tree with no single version never reaches dist/.
+        version: resolveVersion(__dirname),
         license: pkg.license,
         author: pkg.author,
         commitHash,
@@ -226,6 +474,9 @@ async function build() {
     // esbuild run below and recorded in the receipt for script/verify-build.
     const auditedBundles = [];
 
+    // What the forbidden-input checks accumulate across those same runs.
+    const forbiddenRecord = newForbiddenRecord();
+
     // compile tailwind CSS
     console.log("Compiling Tailwind CSS...");
     const tailwindInput = path.join(SRC, "popup", "styles", "main.css");
@@ -267,6 +518,15 @@ async function build() {
             metafile: true,
             define,
         });
+        // Before the output is recorded as emitted: a bundle that violates a
+        // prohibition must abort the build, not be written into a receipt.
+        recordBundledInputs(result.metafile, forbiddenRecord);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+            entryPoint,
+            outfile,
+            result.metafile,
+            forbiddenRecord,
+        );
         recordEmitted(outfile);
         auditedBundles.push(...outputsContainingAuditedModule(result.metafile));
     }
@@ -311,6 +571,8 @@ async function build() {
             tailwindOutput,
             path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "styles.css"),
         );
+
+        copyIcons(distDir);
     }
 
     // copy manifests
@@ -323,6 +585,8 @@ async function build() {
         path.join(DIST_FIREFOX, "manifest.json"),
     );
 
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered(forbiddenRecord);
+
     // Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no receipt at
     // all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than as
     // "nothing to check".
@@ -333,7 +597,27 @@ async function build() {
     console.log("Build complete: dist/chrome/ and dist/firefox/");
 }
 
-build().catch((err) => {
-    console.error(`Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
-    process.exit(1);
-});
+// Run only as a program. Required as a module — which is how
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js reaches the checks below — this file
+// builds nothing and writes nothing.
+if (require.main === module) {
+    build().catch((err) => {
+        console.error(
+            `Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`,
+        );
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+
+// Exported for tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js only. The prohibition these
+// three functions enforce is the guarantee behind
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324, and `make check` does not
+// run `make build` — so they are unit tested against synthetic metafiles
+// rather than being exercised only by CI, where "it ran" is not "it works".
+module.exports = {
+    importChain,
+    newForbiddenRecord,
+    recordBundledInputs,
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs,
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered,
+};

eslint.config.js

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
 
 const js = require("@eslint/js");
 const globals = require("globals");
+const backgroundState = require("./script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
 
 // The extension APIs. MV3 Chrome exposes `chrome`; Firefox exposes both, and
 // the code feature-detects between them.
@@ -78,12 +82,36 @@ module.exports = [
     },
 
     // MV3 background: a service worker, with no window and no document.
+    //
+    // It also may not reach src/shared/state.js. That module's `state` export
+    // is a per-bundle singleton loaded once and mutated in place, which is the
+    // popup's lifetime and not the worker's: the worker is killed when idle,
+    // nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to be
+    // served DEFAULT_STATE silently. Five defects came from background code
+    // reading or writing it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
+    // and each point fix added a loadState() that created the next one. The
+    // rule below checks reachability through the whole require graph, not just
+    // the direct require, because a re-export from any shared module the
+    // background already pulls in would put the singleton back in the bundle
+    // with no background file naming it.
+    //
+    // It is not the guarantee: build.js asserts the same prohibition against
+    // esbuild's own metafile, from the shared table in
+    // script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. This is the early report.
+    //
+    // The glob comes from that same file, because build.js uses the prefix to
+    // decide which entry points must be listed in the table at all: the two
+    // layers must not disagree about which files are "the background".
     {
-        files: ["src/background/**/*.js"],
+        files: [`${BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX}**/*.js`],
+        plugins: { background: backgroundState },
         languageOptions: {
             ...commonjs,
             globals: { ...globals.serviceworker, ...extensionGlobals },
         },
+        rules: {
+            "background/no-state-singleton-in-background": "error",
+        },
     },
 
     // src/shared is bundled into both, so it may only use what both provide:
@@ -107,9 +135,9 @@ module.exports = [
         },
     },
 
-    // Unit tests: jest on node.
+    // Unit tests, and the helpers they require: jest on node.
     {
-        files: ["tests/**/*.test.js"],
+        files: ["tests/**/*.test.js", "tests/support/**/*.js"],
         languageOptions: {
             ...commonjs,
             globals: { ...globals.node, ...globals.jest },

manifest/chrome.json

@@ -3,11 +3,18 @@
     "name": "AutistMask",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
+    "key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUUYzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kLWoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB",
     "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
     "host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
     "content_security_policy": {
         "extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
     },
+    "icons": {
+        "16": "icons/icon16.png",
+        "32": "icons/icon32.png",
+        "48": "icons/icon48.png",
+        "128": "icons/icon128.png"
+    },
     "action": {
         "default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
     },

manifest/firefox.json

@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
     "description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
     "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
     "content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
+    "icons": {
+        "16": "icons/icon16.png",
+        "32": "icons/icon32.png",
+        "48": "icons/icon48.png",
+        "128": "icons/icon128.png"
+    },
     "browser_action": {
         "default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
     },

script/discard-dist-on-failure

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/discard-dist-on-failure: run one step of the RELEASE build, and if that
+# step fails, remove dist/ before returning its exit status. Our own extension
+# to scripts-to-rule-them-all, wrapped around every step of make build.
+#
+# Why: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported in the calling shell, make build
+# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it in script/verify-build — but the
+# bundle is already written. It is loadable, and every wallet it creates gets
+# the publicly committed test recovery phrase from src/shared/constants.js. A
+# failed release build that leaves that behind is a smaller version of the trap
+# the verifier exists to close, and "the failure was loud" only works on an
+# operator who does not load dist/chrome/ anyway. Removing the artifact does not
+# depend on that.
+#
+# Two things this deliberately does not do. It does not wrap make build-debug: a
+# debug build that failed is not a mistakable artifact, and its output is the
+# evidence of what went wrong. And it never removes anything on a step that
+# SUCCEEDS, including the final check-censored --require-dist pass.
+#
+# The removal is never silent: it says dist/ is gone and why, on stderr, above
+# the build's own failure.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+DIST="$ROOT/dist"
+
+usage() {
+    echo "usage: discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]" >&2
+}
+
+# Remove dist/, and say so. A removal that could not be completed is reported as
+# loudly as one that was: the artifact is still on disk, and reporting nothing
+# would leave the operator believing it is not.
+discard_dist() {
+    if [ ! -e "$DIST" ] && [ ! -h "$DIST" ]; then
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed. There was no" \
+            "dist/ to remove." >&2
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    rm -rf "$DIST" || true
+
+    if [ -e "$DIST" ] || [ -h "$DIST" ]; then
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed and dist/" \
+            "COULD NOT BE REMOVED, so it is still on disk. Do not load it:" \
+            "a release build that failed may hold a complete debug bundle," \
+            "whose wallets all use the publicly committed test recovery" \
+            "phrase. Remove it by hand (make clean)." >&2
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed, so dist/ WAS" \
+        "REMOVED and no longer exists. A release build that fails has often" \
+        "already emitted a complete, loadable debug bundle — every wallet it" \
+        "creates gets the publicly committed test recovery phrase — so the" \
+        "failed build is not left behind to be loaded. Fix the failure and" \
+        "re-run make build, or run make build-debug if a debug build is what" \
+        "was wanted; that target keeps its output." >&2
+}
+
+main() {
+    [ "$#" -ge 1 ] || {
+        usage
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: no command given, so no build step ran" \
+            "and nothing was removed." >&2
+        exit 1
+    }
+
+    _status=0
+    "$@" || _status=$?
+
+    [ "$_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
+
+    discard_dist
+    exit "$_status"
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+// ESLint rule: the background bundle may not reach the shared state singleton.
+//
+// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
+// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model. In
+// the MV3 service worker there is no "once": the worker is terminated when
+// idle and revived by the next message, nothing loads state at module scope,
+// and an unpopulated read used to be served DEFAULT_STATE without complaint —
+// five defects, one cause
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The background has its
+// own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js instead.
+//
+// THIS RULE IS NOT THE GUARANTEE, and must not be described as one. The
+// guarantee is in build.js: FORBIDDEN_INPUTS / assertNoForbiddenInputs() fails
+// the build when esbuild's own metafile reports src/shared/state.js as an input
+// of a background bundle. That consults the resolution esbuild actually
+// performed, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip past it,
+// and Dockerfile:42 runs `make build` in CI.
+//
+// What this rule is: fast local feedback, in the editor and in `make lint`,
+// before a full bundle. It reads sources from disk and matches import
+// specifiers TEXTUALLY, so it is a best-effort approximation of module
+// resolution — a hand-rolled matcher will diverge from a real bundler, and two
+// earlier revisions of this file proved it by shipping holes (a template
+// literal, a dynamic `import()`, a comment inside the call, a directory
+// resolved through `package.json` `main`). Those are all covered now, and the
+// next divergence is caught by the build rather than by widening this again.
+//
+// It checks REACHABILITY, not just the direct require: the singleton is one
+// `require()` away from any shared module the background pulls in, and a
+// re-export would put it back in the bundle without any background file naming
+// it. So each background file is the root of a walk over the CommonJS require
+// graph, and the error names the whole chain that brought the singleton in.
+//
+// Matching textually over-approximates — a specifier inside a comment or a
+// string counts — which is the safe direction here: the failure mode is a
+// spurious error naming an exact file and line, not a silent hole.
+//
+// Two shapes this rule does NOT report, both of which the build does fail on
+// (each measured with `make lint` and `make build` on the branch that added
+// this note):
+//
+//   - a computed specifier, `require("../shared/" + "state")` — esbuild
+//     constant-folds it, so it is in the bundle and `make build` is exit 2
+//     naming src/shared/state.js, while `make lint` is exit 0. Same for
+//     `import("../shared/" + variable)`, which esbuild resolves as a glob.
+//   - a symlink to the module — esbuild reports the real path and fails the
+//     build; this rule resolves the link's own path and sees a different file.
+//
+// Both are pinned as non-reports in tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js, so
+// this list is a measured description of the rule rather than a claim about
+// it. They are known divergences, not things that cannot happen. A
+// matcher will keep diverging from a bundler; that is why the guarantee is the
+// build's and this rule is not widened again to chase them.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { FORBIDDEN_INPUTS } = require("../forbiddenBundleInputs");
+
+// The modules to keep out, repo-relative, taken from the same table build.js
+// asserts against so that the two layers cannot name different paths. A second
+// literal copy here is how a rename disarms one of them while the other still
+// looks enforced.
+const FORBIDDEN = [...new Set(Object.values(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).flat())];
+
+// Whatever may sit between a keyword, a paren and a specifier: whitespace and
+// comments. `import(/* webpackChunkName: "x" */ "./x")` is a standard bundler
+// idiom, and an inline `/* eslint-… */` is just as ordinary, so a matcher that
+// allows only \s there is not strict, it is broken. Each alternative starts
+// with a distinct character, so this cannot backtrack quadratically.
+const GAP = "(?:\\s|/\\*[^]*?\\*/|//[^\\n]*)";
+const SPECIFIER = "[\"'`]([^\"'`]+)[\"'`]";
+
+// Both alternatives capture the specifier: call form first
+// (`require(...)`/`import(...)`), then clause form (`from "x"`, and the bare
+// side-effect `import "x"`). Nothing after the specifier is matched, so a
+// trailing comment or a trailing comma cannot break the match either.
+const SPECIFIER_RE = new RegExp(
+    `\\b(?:require|import)${GAP}*\\(${GAP}*${SPECIFIER}` +
+        `|\\b(?:from|import)${GAP}+${SPECIFIER}`,
+    "g",
+);
+
+// The `main` of a directory's package.json, as a specifier relative to that
+// directory, or null. esbuild resolves a directory through it, so a walk that
+// stops at `<dir>/index.js` reports a specifier it matched perfectly well as
+// unresolvable.
+function packageMain(dir) {
+    try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(
+            fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, "package.json"), "utf8"),
+        );
+        return typeof pkg.main === "string" && pkg.main ? pkg.main : null;
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+// Resolve a relative require to a file path, trying what node and esbuild would
+// in the order they would: the path itself, then extensions, then the directory
+// (its package.json `main`, then its index.js).
+function resolveRelative(fromFile, spec) {
+    if (!spec.startsWith(".")) return null; // a package, not our tree
+    const base = path.resolve(path.dirname(fromFile), spec);
+    const main = packageMain(base);
+    for (const candidate of [
+        base,
+        base + ".js",
+        base + ".json",
+        ...(main
+            ? [path.resolve(base, main), path.resolve(base, main) + ".js"]
+            : []),
+        path.join(base, "index.js"),
+    ]) {
+        try {
+            if (fs.statSync(candidate).isFile()) return candidate;
+        } catch {
+            // Not this candidate.
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function requiresOf(file) {
+    let source;
+    try {
+        source = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
+    } catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    for (const match of source.matchAll(SPECIFIER_RE)) {
+        const resolved = resolveRelative(file, match[1] ?? match[2]);
+        if (resolved) out.push(resolved);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// Breadth-first from `entry`, returning the shortest chain of files that ends
+// at one of the forbidden modules, or null when none is reachable.
+function chainToForbidden(entry, forbidden) {
+    const seen = new Set([entry]);
+    const queue = [[entry]];
+    while (queue.length > 0) {
+        const chain = queue.shift();
+        for (const next of requiresOf(chain[chain.length - 1])) {
+            if (forbidden.has(next)) return chain.concat([next]);
+            if (seen.has(next)) continue;
+            seen.add(next);
+            queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+const rule = {
+    meta: {
+        type: "problem",
+        docs: {
+            description:
+                "the background bundle must not be able to reach the" +
+                " module-level state singleton in src/shared/state.js",
+        },
+        schema: [],
+        messages: {
+            reachable:
+                "The background must not reach the shared state singleton:" +
+                " {{chain}}. The MV3 worker never populates it, so reading it" +
+                " serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from" +
+                " src/background/state.js instead.",
+        },
+    },
+
+    create(context) {
+        return {
+            "Program:exit"(node) {
+                const filename = context.filename;
+                // ESLint lints from the repo root, which is also where the
+                // forbidden paths are anchored.
+                const forbidden = new Set(
+                    FORBIDDEN.map((module) =>
+                        path.resolve(context.cwd, module),
+                    ),
+                );
+                const chain = chainToForbidden(
+                    path.resolve(filename),
+                    forbidden,
+                );
+                if (!chain) return;
+                context.report({
+                    node,
+                    messageId: "reachable",
+                    data: {
+                        chain: chain
+                            .map((file) => path.relative(context.cwd, file))
+                            .join(" -> "),
+                    },
+                });
+            },
+        };
+    },
+};
+
+module.exports = {
+    rules: { "no-state-singleton-in-background": rule },
+};

script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// The modules a given entry point's bundle may not contain, keyed by the
+// repo-relative entry point.
+//
+// ONE table, read by both layers that act on it: build.js asserts it against
+// esbuild's own metafile (the guarantee), and
+// script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js reports the same
+// prohibition in the editor (fast feedback). It lives here because a second
+// literal copy of the path is exactly how a rename disarms one layer while the
+// other still looks enforced.
+//
+// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
+// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model:
+// one page, one load at boot, one lifetime. The MV3 service worker has no
+// "once" — it is killed when idle and revived by the next message, nothing
+// loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read was answered out of
+// DEFAULT_STATE in silence. Five defects came from that, one of which
+// destroyed a wallet (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The
+// background has its own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js
+// instead.
+//
+// What build.js's assertion covers, measured rather than assumed:
+//
+//   - Any import of a listed module, at any hop, in any specifier syntax,
+//     however esbuild resolved it. The check reads the input list esbuild
+//     reported for the emitted bundle, so it is the resolution the shipped
+//     file was built from and not a model of it. Measured on a computed
+//     specifier that esbuild constant-folds (`require("../shared/" +
+//     "state")`), on a computed specifier it resolves as a glob
+//     (`import("../shared/" + variable)`), and on a symlink to the module
+//     (esbuild reports the real path): each is `make build` exit 2.
+//
+//   - Every background entry point, whether or not anyone remembered to list
+//     it. A bundled entry point under BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX with no line in
+//     this table fails the build (assertNoForbiddenInputs()), so adding a
+//     second worker entry point is protected by default rather than protected
+//     only if the person adding it knew about this file. Measured: bundling
+//     src/background/worker2.js with no line here is `make build` exit 2.
+//
+//   - NOT covered: a COPY of a listed module at another path. The table is
+//     keyed by path, so `cp src/shared/state.js src/shared/stateCopy.js` plus
+//     a background require of the copy is `make build` exit 0 and `make lint`
+//     exit 0 (measured). The copy carries the singleton's own guard, so
+//     defects 1-3 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 — a read
+//     of a field nothing loaded — become a loud StateNotLoadedError instead of
+//     a silent DEFAULT_STATE. Defects 4 and 5 do NOT: a copy also carries
+//     loadState(), and a stale read several awaits after a load, or a load
+//     detaching the objects an in-flight handler is mutating, are silent over
+//     a LOADED singleton whether it is the original or a copy. So the residual
+//     is wider than "it fails loudly". A newly WRITTEN singleton has no
+//     backstop at all.
+//
+//   - NOT covered: a background-behaving entry point outside
+//     BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX. The default protection above is keyed on that
+//     directory, which is also what eslint.config.js scopes the rule to, so a
+//     worker entry point placed somewhere else is covered by neither layer and
+//     needs its own line here.
+//
+// The ESLint rule's bounds are its own and are narrower: it matches specifiers
+// textually, so a computed specifier and a symlink to a listed module are
+// reported by the build and not by the rule. Both are pinned as non-reports in
+// tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js and are `make build` exit 2 (measured).
+// A second background entry point reached by one of those two shapes is
+// therefore caught by the build and not by the rule — which is the same
+// division of labour as everywhere else here, not an extra hole.
+//
+// Every way the table itself can rot is a failure rather than a quiet pass:
+//
+//   - a KEY no bundled entry point matched, and a listed MODULE this build
+//     bundled nowhere: assertForbiddenTableCovered(), at the end of a build;
+//   - an entry that lists NO modules, and a table with no entries at all:
+//     assertTableWellFormed() below, at require time — so it fails the build
+//     and the lint run alike, because the rule reads the same values and an
+//     empty list leaves it with nothing to look for.
+//
+// All of it is pinned by tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js.
+
+// What counts as a background entry point, and therefore must be listed above.
+// The build has no other notion of one: entry points are the paths handed to
+// bundle(), and this prefix is the narrowest rule that names the worker's
+// directory. eslint.config.js scopes the lint rule with the same prefix, from
+// this constant, so the two layers cannot disagree about what "background"
+// means.
+const BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX = "src/background/";
+
+const FORBIDDEN_INPUTS = {
+    "src/background/index.js": ["src/shared/state.js"],
+};
+
+// Refuse a table that cannot prohibit anything. An entry whose module list is
+// empty passes every check in both layers while enforcing nothing: the build
+// finds no module to look for and records the entry as checked, and the rule's
+// forbidden set — Object.values(...).flat() — comes back empty, so a plain
+// `require("../shared/state")` in the worker is green everywhere. That is a
+// one-character edit, so it fails here, where the table is defined and both
+// layers must load it, rather than in either layer's own checks.
+function assertTableWellFormed(table) {
+    const entries = Object.entries(table);
+    if (entries.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty, so nothing is prohibited anywhere. " +
+                "Removing the last entry disables the guarantee behind " +
+                "https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.",
+        );
+    }
+    for (const [entry, modules] of entries) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(modules) || modules.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${entry}"] lists no modules, so it ` +
+                    `prohibits nothing while still looking enforced. Give it ` +
+                    `the modules that entry point may not reach, or remove ` +
+                    `the entry.`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS);
+
+module.exports = {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+};

script/lib/package.js

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+// Turn a verified dist/ into the two distributable archives.
+//
+// Invoked by script/package, which runs `make build` first so that dist/ has
+// already been checked against the build's own receipt (see the Build Receipts
+// section of README.md). This program does not build anything and does not
+// write into dist/: it reads the emitted tree and writes release/.
+//
+//   release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip   loaded via chrome://extensions
+//   release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi  an UNSIGNED add-on, see README
+//   release/SHA256SUMS
+//
+// Self-containment is checked rather than assumed, because the layout invites
+// exactly one mistake: build.js emits dist/styles.css at the dist/ ROOT,
+// outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
+// src/popup/styles.css. A naive `zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only
+// by accident, and would stop being correct the moment a reference pointed up
+// and out. So every path the manifest and the popup HTML reference is resolved
+// and required to be inside the archive, a reference that escapes the browser
+// directory is a hard failure, and anything sitting at the dist/ root is
+// listed as deliberately not shipped rather than silently dropped.
+//
+// The archive is then read back and compared byte for byte against the
+// directory it was built from. An archive nobody opened is a claim, not an
+// artifact.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { readZip, writeZip } = require("./zip");
+const { resolveVersion } = require("./version");
+
+const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
+const DIST = path.join(ROOT, "dist");
+const RELEASE = path.join(ROOT, "release");
+
+const TARGETS = [
+    { dir: "chrome", ext: "zip" },
+    // .xpi rather than .zip: it is the same container, but Firefox's install
+    // flow keys off the extension.
+    { dir: "firefox", ext: "xpi" },
+];
+
+// Strings in a manifest that name a file the extension loads. Matched by
+// shape, not by a list of manifest keys, so a key added in a later manifest
+// version is covered the day it appears rather than the day someone remembers
+// to extend a list here. Nothing else in either manifest looks like this: the
+// CSP strings, "<all_urls>", the version and the base64 key all fail it.
+const MANIFEST_PATH_RE =
+    /^[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*\.(?:js|css|html|json|png|svg|woff2?)$/;
+
+// Local references out of an HTML document. Enough for what this repo emits —
+// one stylesheet link and one script tag — and anything it does not understand
+// is reported rather than passed over, see htmlReferences().
+const HTML_REF_RE = /(?:src|href)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
+
+function fail(message) {
+    throw new Error(message);
+}
+
+function sha256(buf) {
+    return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
+}
+
+// Every regular file under dir, as archive-root-relative forward-slashed
+// paths. A symlink is refused rather than followed: build.js emits regular
+// files only, so a link under dist/ is not something the build produced, and
+// dereferencing one would put bytes from outside dist/ into the artifact.
+function listFiles(dir, prefix = "") {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+        const rel = prefix ? `${prefix}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
+        if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            fail(
+                `${dir}/${entry.name} is a symlink. The build emits regular ` +
+                    `files only, so this is not something it produced and it ` +
+                    `will not be archived.`,
+            );
+        } else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+            out.push(...listFiles(path.join(dir, entry.name), rel));
+        } else if (entry.isFile()) {
+            out.push(rel);
+        } else {
+            fail(
+                `${dir}/${entry.name} is neither a regular file nor a ` +
+                    `directory, so it is not something the build emitted`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+    return out.sort();
+}
+
+// Collect every string anywhere in the manifest that looks like a file it
+// loads, plus every string that tries to reach outside the extension root.
+// The second half is the point: "../styles.css" never matches
+// MANIFEST_PATH_RE, so without an explicit check an escaping reference would
+// read as "not a path" and the missing file would be found only by a user
+// whose popup rendered unstyled.
+function manifestReferences(value, found = new Set()) {
+    if (typeof value === "string") {
+        if (value.split("/").includes("..")) {
+            fail(
+                `the manifest references ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which ` +
+                    `points outside the extension root. Everything the ` +
+                    `browser loads has to be inside the archive; nothing ` +
+                    `above it is shipped.`,
+            );
+        }
+        if (MANIFEST_PATH_RE.test(value)) found.add(value);
+    } else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        for (const v of value) manifestReferences(v, found);
+    } else if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+        for (const v of Object.values(value)) manifestReferences(v, found);
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+
+// Local references out of one HTML member, resolved against that member's own
+// directory and returned archive-relative. Absolute URLs, data: URIs and
+// in-page anchors are not files and are skipped; a relative reference that
+// climbs out of the archive root is a failure for the same reason as above.
+function htmlReferences(member, text) {
+    const base = path.posix.dirname(member);
+    const out = new Set();
+    for (const match of text.matchAll(HTML_REF_RE)) {
+        const ref = match[1].trim();
+        if (ref === "" || ref.startsWith("#") || ref.startsWith("//")) continue;
+        if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(ref)) continue;
+        if (ref.startsWith("/")) {
+            fail(
+                `${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)} from the ` +
+                    `extension root. Nothing here emits root-absolute ` +
+                    `references and this packager does not resolve them.`,
+            );
+        }
+        const resolved = path.posix.normalize(path.posix.join(base, ref));
+        if (resolved.startsWith("..")) {
+            fail(
+                `${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)}, which resolves ` +
+                    `outside the extension root. build.js copies the ` +
+                    `compiled stylesheet into each browser directory for ` +
+                    `exactly this reason: dist/styles.css lives at the dist/ ` +
+                    `root and is not part of either archive.`,
+            );
+        }
+        out.add(resolved);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// Everything the browser is told to load, and the assertion that all of it is
+// in the archive.
+function checkSelfContained(target, members, read) {
+    if (!members.includes("manifest.json")) {
+        fail(`dist/${target} has no manifest.json at its root`);
+    }
+
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(read("manifest.json").toString("utf8"));
+    const referenced = new Set(manifestReferences(manifest));
+
+    for (const member of members) {
+        if (!member.endsWith(".html")) continue;
+        for (const ref of htmlReferences(
+            member,
+            read(member).toString("utf8"),
+        )) {
+            referenced.add(ref);
+        }
+    }
+
+    const missing = [...referenced].filter((r) => !members.includes(r));
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+        fail(
+            `the ${target} archive would not be self-contained: it is told ` +
+                `to load ${missing.join(", ")}, which ${
+                    missing.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"
+                } not in it`,
+        );
+    }
+    return { manifest, referenced };
+}
+
+function main() {
+    const version = resolveVersion(ROOT);
+
+    if (!fs.existsSync(DIST)) {
+        fail(
+            "there is no dist/ to package. script/package runs make build " +
+                "first; run it rather than this program.",
+        );
+    }
+
+    fs.rmSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true });
+
+    // Files the build emits at the dist/ root, outside both browser
+    // directories. Printed rather than ignored: dist/styles.css is the
+    // Tailwind output that build.js then copies into each browser directory,
+    // so leaving it out is correct — but "correct and stated" and "dropped by
+    // a glob" are different things, and only one of them survives the next
+    // change to the build.
+    const rootOnly = fs
+        .readdirSync(DIST, { withFileTypes: true })
+        .filter((e) => !e.isDirectory())
+        .map((e) => e.name)
+        .sort();
+    if (rootOnly.length > 0) {
+        console.log(
+            `Not shipped (dist/ root, outside every browser directory, and ` +
+                `referenced by nothing inside one): ${rootOnly.join(", ")}`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    const sums = [];
+    for (const { dir, ext } of TARGETS) {
+        const targetDir = path.join(DIST, dir);
+        if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) {
+            fail(`dist/${dir} does not exist; run make build`);
+        }
+
+        const members = listFiles(targetDir);
+        const readFromDir = (member) =>
+            fs.readFileSync(path.join(targetDir, member));
+
+        const { manifest } = checkSelfContained(dir, members, readFromDir);
+        if (manifest.version !== version) {
+            fail(
+                `dist/${dir}/manifest.json says version ${manifest.version} ` +
+                    `but this tree is ${version}. dist/ is stale: run make ` +
+                    `build.`,
+            );
+        }
+
+        const archive = writeZip(
+            members.map((name) => ({ name, data: readFromDir(name) })),
+        );
+        const name = `autistmask-${dir}-${version}.${ext}`;
+        const outPath = path.join(RELEASE, name);
+        fs.writeFileSync(outPath, archive);
+
+        // Read the artifact back off disk, not the buffer that was just
+        // written: what ships is the file.
+        const written = fs.readFileSync(outPath);
+        const entries = readZip(written);
+        const inArchive = entries.map((e) => e.name).sort();
+        if (inArchive.join("\n") !== members.join("\n")) {
+            fail(
+                `${name} does not hold the same members as dist/${dir}: ` +
+                    `archive has ${inArchive.length}, directory has ` +
+                    `${members.length}`,
+            );
+        }
+        for (const entry of entries) {
+            const onDisk = readFromDir(entry.name);
+            if (sha256(entry.data) !== sha256(onDisk)) {
+                fail(`${name} member ${entry.name} differs from dist/${dir}`);
+            }
+        }
+        // Re-run the self-containment check against the ARCHIVE's own
+        // contents. The directory passing it is not the claim being made.
+        const byName = new Map(entries.map((e) => [e.name, e.data]));
+        checkSelfContained(dir, inArchive, (m) => byName.get(m));
+
+        const digest = sha256(written);
+        sums.push(`${digest}  ${name}`);
+        console.log(
+            `${name}: ${entries.length} member(s), ${written.length} bytes, ` +
+                `sha256 ${digest}`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    fs.writeFileSync(
+        path.join(RELEASE, "SHA256SUMS"),
+        sums.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""),
+    );
+    console.log(`Wrote release/ for version ${version}`);
+}
+
+// Only when run as a program. The reference-resolving helpers are what decide
+// whether an archive is self-contained, so tests/packaging.test.js exercises
+// them directly and must be able to require this file without packaging
+// anything.
+if (require.main === module) {
+    try {
+        main();
+    } catch (err) {
+        console.error(`package: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
+        process.exit(1);
+    }
+}
+
+module.exports = { checkSelfContained, htmlReferences, manifestReferences };

script/lib/version.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// The version, and the rule that there is only one of it.
+//
+// Three files declare a version and none of them can be derived from another:
+// Chrome and Firefox each need their own manifest, both are copied to dist/
+// verbatim (tests/manifest.test.js asserts that what is in manifest/ is what
+// ships), and package.json's copy is what build.js compiles into the About
+// screen. So the single source of truth is enforced rather than generated —
+// they must all agree or there is no version and no build.
+//
+// Reading one of the three and ignoring the rest is what this replaces. That
+// shape cannot fail: it silently ships an extension whose About screen and
+// whose browser-reported version disagree, and whose release artifact is named
+// after whichever file the packager happened to read.
+//
+// Required by build.js, script/lib/package.js and tests/version.test.js, so
+// the build, the release artifacts and make check all apply the same rule to
+// the same files.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const VERSION_SOURCES = [
+    "package.json",
+    "manifest/chrome.json",
+    "manifest/firefox.json",
+];
+
+// Every declared version, in VERSION_SOURCES order, as { source, version }.
+// A file that declares nothing usable fails here rather than being skipped:
+// a missing version is not agreement.
+function declaredVersions(root) {
+    return VERSION_SOURCES.map((source) => {
+        const file = path.join(root, source);
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+        } catch (e) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${source} could not be read as JSON: ${e.message}`,
+            );
+        }
+        const version = parsed.version;
+        if (typeof version !== "string" || version.trim() === "") {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${source} declares no usable "version" (found ` +
+                    `${JSON.stringify(version)}). Every artifact is named and ` +
+                    `stamped with it, so there is nothing to build without it.`,
+            );
+        }
+        return { source, version };
+    });
+}
+
+// The one version all three declare, or a failure naming every disagreeing
+// file and what it said.
+function resolveVersion(root) {
+    const declared = declaredVersions(root);
+    const distinct = [...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))];
+    if (distinct.length !== 1) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "the declared versions disagree, so this tree has no version: " +
+                declared.map((d) => `${d.source}=${d.version}`).join(", ") +
+                ". Set all of them to the same value: the manifests are what " +
+                "the browser reports and package.json is what the About " +
+                "screen shows, and a build that picked one of them would " +
+                "ship the disagreement.",
+        );
+    }
+    return distinct[0];
+}
+
+module.exports = { VERSION_SOURCES, declaredVersions, resolveVersion };

script/lib/zip.js

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// A minimal, deterministic ZIP writer and reader.
+//
+// Used by script/lib/package.js to build the distributable archives: a Chrome
+// zip and a Firefox XPI are both ordinary zip files with manifest.json at the
+// root, so one implementation covers both.
+//
+// Why this rather than a package or the zip(1) binary. A dependency would have
+// to be hash-pinned like everything else in REPO_POLICIES.md, and this is
+// about a hundred lines of stdlib zlib for a format the archives use two
+// features of. The binary is worse: the release artifact would then depend on
+// whichever Info-ZIP the machine happens to have, which is the same objection
+// that keeps linting inside a container.
+//
+// Deterministic on purpose. Entries are sorted by name, every timestamp is the
+// same fixed 1980-01-01 the format's epoch starts at, and the compression
+// level is fixed, so building the same dist/ twice produces byte-identical
+// archives and the sha256 in SHA256SUMS is a property of the input rather than
+// of the clock. Two builds of the same commit that disagree are then visible
+// instead of expected.
+//
+// Deliberately NOT implemented: zip64, encryption, data descriptors,
+// directory entries (browsers infer directories from member paths), and
+// anything to do with symlinks. writeZip refuses input it cannot represent
+// rather than emitting an archive that is quietly wrong.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const zlib = require("zlib");
+
+const LOCAL_SIG = 0x04034b50;
+const CENTRAL_SIG = 0x02014b50;
+const EOCD_SIG = 0x06054b50;
+
+const METHOD_STORE = 0;
+const METHOD_DEFLATE = 8;
+
+// 1980-01-01 00:00:00, the earliest the MS-DOS timestamp fields can express.
+const DOS_DATE = (0 << 9) | (1 << 5) | 1;
+const DOS_TIME = 0;
+
+// Unix regular file, mode 0644, in the high 16 bits, which is where the "made
+// by unix" convention puts it.
+// >>> 0 because JS shifts are signed 32-bit and this one sets the top bit.
+const EXTERNAL_ATTRS = (0o100644 << 16) >>> 0;
+const VERSION_MADE_BY = (3 << 8) | 20; // unix, needs zip 2.0
+const VERSION_NEEDED = 20;
+
+// Without zip64 every size and offset is a u32.
+const MAX_U32 = 0xffffffff;
+
+const CRC_TABLE = (() => {
+    const table = new Int32Array(256);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        let c = i;
+        for (let k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
+            c = c & 1 ? 0xedb88320 ^ (c >>> 1) : c >>> 1;
+        }
+        table[i] = c;
+    }
+    return table;
+})();
+
+// Written out rather than taken from zlib.crc32, which only exists from node
+// 22.2: this runs from script/ on whatever node the host has as well as inside
+// the pinned image, and a checksum that silently is not there is worse than
+// twelve lines.
+function crc32(buf) {
+    let c = -1;
+    for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) {
+        c = CRC_TABLE[(c ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (c >>> 8);
+    }
+    return (c ^ -1) >>> 0;
+}
+
+// Member names are stored as raw bytes. Anything outside ASCII would need the
+// UTF-8 flag and interoperability care that nothing this repo emits requires,
+// so it is refused instead of guessed at.
+function encodeName(name) {
+    if (typeof name !== "string" || name === "") {
+        throw new Error(`zip: unusable member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`);
+    }
+    const segments = name.split("/");
+    if (
+        name.startsWith("/") ||
+        name.includes("\\") ||
+        segments.some((s) => s === "" || s === "." || s === "..")
+    ) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `zip: refusing member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}: archive ` +
+                `members must be relative paths under the archive root`,
+        );
+    }
+    if (/[^\x20-\x7e]/.test(name)) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `zip: refusing non-ASCII member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`,
+        );
+    }
+    return Buffer.from(name, "ascii");
+}
+
+function compress(data) {
+    if (data.length === 0) {
+        return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
+    }
+    const deflated = zlib.deflateRawSync(data, { level: 9 });
+    if (deflated.length >= data.length) {
+        return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
+    }
+    return { method: METHOD_DEFLATE, body: deflated };
+}
+
+// entries: [{ name, data }]. Returns the archive as a Buffer.
+function writeZip(entries) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("zip: refusing to write an archive with no members");
+    }
+
+    const sorted = [...entries].sort((a, b) => (a.name < b.name ? -1 : 1));
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const locals = [];
+    const centrals = [];
+    let offset = 0;
+
+    for (const entry of sorted) {
+        const name = encodeName(entry.name);
+        if (seen.has(entry.name)) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: duplicate member ${entry.name}`);
+        }
+        seen.add(entry.name);
+
+        const data = Buffer.from(entry.data);
+        const { method, body } = compress(data);
+        if (data.length > MAX_U32 || body.length > MAX_U32) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `zip: ${entry.name} is too large for a non-zip64 archive`,
+            );
+        }
+        const crc = crc32(data);
+
+        const local = Buffer.alloc(30 + name.length);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(LOCAL_SIG, 0);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 4);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(method, 8);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 10);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 12);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(crc, 14);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 18);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 22);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 26);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(0, 28);
+        name.copy(local, 30);
+
+        const central = Buffer.alloc(46 + name.length);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(CENTRAL_SIG, 0);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_MADE_BY, 4);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 6);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 8);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(method, 10);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 12);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 14);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(crc, 16);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 20);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 24);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 28);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 30);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 32);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 34);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 36);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(EXTERNAL_ATTRS, 38);
+        if (offset > MAX_U32) {
+            throw new Error("zip: archive too large for a non-zip64 archive");
+        }
+        central.writeUInt32LE(offset, 42);
+        name.copy(central, 46);
+
+        locals.push(local, body);
+        centrals.push(central);
+        offset += local.length + body.length;
+    }
+
+    const centralBuf = Buffer.concat(centrals);
+    const eocd = Buffer.alloc(22);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(EOCD_SIG, 0);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 4);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 8);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 10);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(centralBuf.length, 12);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(offset, 16);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 20);
+
+    return Buffer.concat([...locals, centralBuf, eocd]);
+}
+
+// Read an archive back into [{ name, data }], from the central directory
+// rather than by scanning for local headers: the central directory is the
+// authoritative index, and a member reachable only by scanning is one a real
+// unzipper would not extract.
+//
+// Every member's CRC is checked. The point of reading an archive back is to
+// establish that it holds what it was meant to hold, so a member that does not
+// decompress to its recorded checksum is a failure and never a warning.
+function readZip(buf) {
+    if (buf.length < 22) {
+        throw new Error("zip: too short to be an archive");
+    }
+    // No archive this writes has a trailing comment, so the EOCD is the last
+    // 22 bytes. Anything else is not an archive this produced.
+    const eocdAt = buf.length - 22;
+    if (buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt) !== EOCD_SIG) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "zip: no end-of-central-directory record at the end of the " +
+                "archive (a trailing comment, or not a zip at all)",
+        );
+    }
+    const count = buf.readUInt16LE(eocdAt + 10);
+    const centralSize = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 12);
+    let at = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 16);
+    if (at + centralSize > eocdAt) {
+        throw new Error("zip: central directory runs past the archive");
+    }
+
+    const out = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        if (buf.readUInt32LE(at) !== CENTRAL_SIG) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: bad central directory entry ${i}`);
+        }
+        const method = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 10);
+        const crc = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 16);
+        const compSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 20);
+        const rawSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 24);
+        const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 28);
+        const extraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 30);
+        const commentLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 32);
+        const localAt = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 42);
+        const name = buf.toString("ascii", at + 46, at + 46 + nameLen);
+        at += 46 + nameLen + extraLen + commentLen;
+
+        if (buf.readUInt32LE(localAt) !== LOCAL_SIG) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} has no local header`);
+        }
+        // The local header's own name and extra lengths, not the central
+        // directory's: the two are allowed to differ and the data starts after
+        // the local ones.
+        const localNameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 26);
+        const localExtraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 28);
+        const dataAt = localAt + 30 + localNameLen + localExtraLen;
+        const body = buf.subarray(dataAt, dataAt + compSize);
+
+        let data;
+        if (method === METHOD_STORE) {
+            data = Buffer.from(body);
+        } else if (method === METHOD_DEFLATE) {
+            data = zlib.inflateRawSync(body);
+        } else {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} uses compression method ${method}`);
+        }
+
+        if (data.length !== rawSize) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `zip: ${name} decompressed to ${data.length} bytes, not the ` +
+                    `recorded ${rawSize}`,
+            );
+        }
+        if (crc32(data) !== crc) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} fails its recorded CRC32`);
+        }
+        out.push({ name, data });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+module.exports = { crc32, readZip, writeZip };

script/package

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/package: produce the release artifacts — one self-contained,
+# versioned archive per browser — into release/. Our own extension to
+# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
+#
+# It builds first, through `make build` rather than by calling build.js
+# itself. That target is the only audited path to a release build: it creates
+# the build receipt outside the repo, scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG from the
+# verifier's environment, tells script/verify-build in so many words to expect
+# a RELEASE build, and re-runs script/check-censored against dist/.
+# script/test-verify-build asserts that wiring by reading the recipe back out
+# of `make -n`. Re-implementing that sequence here would give the release
+# artifacts a second, unaudited path to dist/ — and it is the release
+# artifacts, above everything else, that must never be built from a debug
+# compile.
+#
+# This packages, it does not publish. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
+# outward-facing acts and are nobody's job but the owner's.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "package: make is required (the release build runs through" \
+            "make build)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    make build
+
+    echo "Packaging release artifacts..."
+    node script/lib/package.js
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/test-e2e

@@ -78,6 +78,22 @@ main() {
         -e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
         "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
         node tests/e2e/run.js
+
+    # Where chrome.storage.local lives, and what moves it: two unpacked loads
+    # from two different paths in one profile, with the shipped manifest and
+    # again with `key` stripped out. Its own browser sessions — four of them —
+    # because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads, which the suite
+    # above cannot express with one.
+    #
+    # No PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS here: this drives no
+    # RPC and installs no route handlers, and the browser is started with
+    # --host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND so nothing it does can leave.
+    echo "Running the extension-id and storage-partition observations..."
+    docker run --rm \
+        --ipc=host \
+        -e HOME=/tmp \
+        "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
+        node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/test-e2e-firefox

@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ main() {
         -e HOME=/tmp \
         "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
         node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
+
+    # The install/uninstall/re-install property, against the packaged XPI
+    # rather than the unpacked directory: it is the artifact a user would be
+    # handed, and this is the only place a real Firefox is asked to load it.
+    # Its own browser session, because it takes the add-on away in the middle
+    # and the suite above shares one session throughout.
+    echo "Running the Firefox re-install suite against the packaged XPI..."
+    docker run --rm \
+        --shm-size=1g \
+        --network none \
+        -e HOME=/tmp \
+        "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
+        node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/test-verify-build

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test-verify-build: exercise every failure mode of
-# script/verify-build. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run
-# from script/check so make check covers it.
+# script/verify-build, and what make build does with dist/ after one of them
+# (script/discard-dist-on-failure). Our own extension to
+# scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from script/check so make check covers it.
 #
 # Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and four separate
 # reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2 conflation,
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
+DISCARD_DIST="$ROOT/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
 
 MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
 MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
@@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ build_fixture() {
 
     mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/script"
     ln -s "$VERIFY_BUILD" "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
+    ln -s "$DISCARD_DIST" "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
 
     mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup" \
         "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content" \
@@ -513,12 +516,125 @@ c_debug_build() {
     write_receipt
 }
 
+c_no_dist() { rm -rf dist; }
+
+# --- dist discard -----------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# make build wraps every step of the release path in
+# script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a release build that fails removes dist/:
+# with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported it has already emitted a complete, loadable
+# debug bundle whose every wallet uses the publicly committed test recovery
+# phrase, and a loud failure alone does not stop someone loading dist/chrome/
+# anyway. make build-debug is deliberately not wrapped.
+#
+# Both directions are asserted against the state of dist/ ON DISK after the run,
+# not against the exit status: a case reading only the status would keep passing
+# if the removal quietly stopped happening, which is the flip this exists to
+# catch. The wrapper runs against the fixture — its ROOT is the fixture, via the
+# symlink in the fixture's script/ — with trivial commands standing in for the
+# build steps, because what is under test is what happens after a step says no,
+# not the step.
+
+# discard_case <name> <setup> <status> <gone|kept> <want> <unwanted> [cmd...]
+discard_case() {
+    _dc_name="$1"
+    _dc_setup="$2"
+    _dc_want_status="$3"
+    _dc_want_dist="$4"
+    _dc_want="$5"
+    _dc_unwanted="$6"
+    shift 6
+
+    build_fixture
+    if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_dc_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_dc_name"
+        echo "    the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    _dc_status=0
+    _dc_out="$(cd "$FIXTURE" &&
+        "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure" "$@" 2>&1)" || _dc_status=$?
+
+    _ok=yes
+    _why=""
+
+    if [ "$_dc_status" -ne "$_dc_want_status" ]; then
+        _ok=no
+        _why="exit status $_dc_status, wanted $_dc_want_status"
+    fi
+
+    # The assertion this case exists for: what is on disk now.
+    if [ -e "$FIXTURE/dist" ] || [ -h "$FIXTURE/dist" ]; then
+        _dc_dist=kept
+    else
+        _dc_dist=gone
+    fi
+    if [ "$_dc_dist" != "$_dc_want_dist" ]; then
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ is $_dc_dist after the run, wanted"
+        _why="$_why $_dc_want_dist"
+    elif [ "$_dc_want_dist" = kept ] &&
+        [ ! -f "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" ]; then
+        # Kept has to mean intact: a dist/ emptied out is not one left alone.
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ survived but its emitted bundle did not"
+    fi
+
+    _dc_check_message "$_dc_want" want
+    _dc_check_message "$_dc_unwanted" unwanted
+
+    if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
+        PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
+        echo "  ok: $_dc_name"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+    echo "  FAIL: $_dc_name"
+    echo "    $_why"
+    echo "    --- discard-dist-on-failure output ---"
+    printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | sed 's/^/    /'
+    echo "    --- end output ---"
+}
+
+# Require ($2 = want) or forbid ($2 = unwanted) a substring in the wrapper's
+# output, updating _ok and _why. An empty substring asserts nothing. Same grep
+# discipline as everywhere else here: 0 and 1 are answers, anything else means
+# the message was never checked.
+_dc_check_message() {
+    [ -n "$1" ] || return 0
+
+    _dcm_g=0
+    printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$1" || _dcm_g=$?
+    case "$_dcm_g" in
+    0)
+        [ "$2" = unwanted ] || return 0
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }message contained: $1"
+        ;;
+    1)
+        [ "$2" = want ] || return 0
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $1"
+        ;;
+    *)
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_dcm_g matching the message, so the
+      message was never checked"
+        ;;
+    esac
+}
+
 # --- Makefile wiring --------------------------------------------------------
 
 # The verifier cases above prove what verify-build does when it is told what to
-# expect. This proves the Makefile tells it — with the mode as an argument, on
-# a scrubbed environment, and identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is
-# exported in the shell that ran make. Read off `make -n`, so no build runs.
+# expect, and the discard cases prove what the wrapper does with dist/. This
+# proves the Makefile wires both up — the mode as an argument, on a scrubbed
+# environment, identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is exported in the
+# shell that ran make, and the wrapper on the release path only. Read off
+# `make -n`, so no build runs.
 check_makefile_wiring() {
     if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
         SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
@@ -537,6 +653,34 @@ check_makefile_wiring() {
         build-debug "verify-build --expect debug"
     _wiring_case "make build-debug scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
         build-debug "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
+
+    # The release path runs its steps through the wrapper, including the final
+    # check-censored pass; the debug path runs none of them through it, which is
+    # what keeps a failed debug build's dist/ on disk.
+    _wiring_case "make build wraps its steps in discard-dist-on-failure" \
+        build "script/discard-dist-on-failure"
+    _wiring_case "make build wraps check-censored --require-dist too" \
+        build "script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored"
+    _wiring_case_absent "make build-debug never discards its dist/" \
+        build-debug "discard-dist-on-failure"
+}
+
+# Run `make -n TARGET` with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, into _wc_out. Returns
+# non-zero, having already reported the failure, when make itself failed: a
+# recipe that could not be printed was never checked.
+_wiring_make_n() {
+    AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
+    export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
+    _wc_status=0
+    _wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
+    unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
+
+    [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
+
+    FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+    echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+    echo "    make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
+    return 1
 }
 
 _wiring_case() {
@@ -544,18 +688,7 @@ _wiring_case() {
     _wc_target="$2"
     _wc_want="$3"
 
-    AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
-    export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
-    _wc_status=0
-    _wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
-    unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
-
-    if [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ]; then
-        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
-        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
-        echo "    make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
-        return 0
-    fi
+    _wiring_make_n || return 0
 
     _wc_g=0
     printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
@@ -577,6 +710,34 @@ _wiring_case() {
     esac
 }
 
+# The inverse: the recipe must NOT run something.
+_wiring_case_absent() {
+    _wc_name="$1"
+    _wc_target="$2"
+    _wc_want="$3"
+
+    _wiring_make_n || return 0
+
+    _wc_g=0
+    printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
+    case "$_wc_g" in
+    1)
+        PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
+        echo "  ok: $_wc_name"
+        ;;
+    0)
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+        echo "    make -n $_wc_target runs: $_wc_want"
+        ;;
+    *)
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+        echo "    grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
+        ;;
+    esac
+}
+
 run_cases() {
     check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
         no release 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
@@ -712,6 +873,18 @@ run_cases() {
         no release 1 "carries a debug marker but the build did not" \
         c_marker_on_plain_file
 
+    discard_case "a failed release build step removes dist/" \
+        c_control 3 gone "dist/ WAS REMOVED" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
+
+    discard_case "a successful release build step leaves dist/ alone" \
+        c_control 0 kept "" "REMOVED" true
+
+    discard_case "a failed release build step with no dist/ says there was none" \
+        c_no_dist 3 gone "There was no dist/ to remove" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
+
+    discard_case "the wrapper given no command removes nothing" \
+        c_control 1 kept "no command given" ""
+
     check_makefile_wiring
 }
 
@@ -740,6 +913,10 @@ main() {
         echo "test-verify-build: $VERIFY_BUILD is missing or not executable" >&2
         exit 1
     }
+    [ -x "$DISCARD_DIST" ] || {
+        echo "test-verify-build: $DISCARD_DIST is missing or not executable" >&2
+        exit 1
+    }
 
     echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
     pick_sha256_tool

script/verify-build

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# script/verify-build: assert that dist/ holds exactly what the build that just
-# ran emitted, and that the compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the
-# caller asked for. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the
-# end of make build / make build-debug.
+# script/verify-build: assert that the regular files and symlinks under dist/
+# are exactly what the build that just ran emitted (other file types are out of
+# scope; see "What that does and does not establish" below), and that the
+# compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the caller asked for. Our own
+# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of make build /
+# make build-debug.
 #
 # Why the DEBUG half exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery
 # phrase the output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live
@@ -29,12 +31,16 @@
 # path fresh per invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
 #
 # What that does and does not establish. It establishes that dist/ is byte for
-# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with nothing added,
-# nothing missing and nothing altered in between, and that the audited bundles
-# in it compiled to the requested mode. It does NOT establish that the source
-# tree or build.js were honest, and it says nothing at all to someone handed a
-# dist/ from elsewhere: without the receipt from its own build they have no
-# input to this check. That is signing, and it is not this control.
+# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with no regular file
+# or symlink added, missing or altered in between, and that the audited bundles
+# in it compiled to the requested mode. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
+# of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty
+# directories under dist/ are not checked, because a build emits none of them,
+# none can carry a shippable payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than
+# fail. It does NOT establish that the source tree or build.js were honest, and
+# it says nothing at all to someone handed a dist/ from elsewhere: without the
+# receipt from its own build they have no input to this check. That is signing,
+# and it is not this control.
 #
 # It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine something. Minified
 # output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither marker" is not evidence
@@ -392,8 +398,10 @@ check_receipt_entries() {
 #     its own command line, so a linked dist/ collapses this walk to one entry
 #     and cross-checks nothing.
 #
-# Types other than regular files and symlinks are left out on purpose: a build
-# emits none of them, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
+# Types other than regular files and symlinks — fifos, sockets, device nodes and
+# empty directories — are left out on purpose, and the guarantee is bounded to
+# what is walked: a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable
+# payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
 check_dist_tree() {
     LISTING="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-build-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
         fail "could not create a temporary file for the dist/ listing, so the

src/background/index.js

@@ -2,19 +2,21 @@
 // Handles EIP-1193 RPC requests from content scripts and proxies
 // non-sensitive calls to the configured Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint.
 
-const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants");
 const {
     SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
     networkById,
     networkByChainId,
 } = require("../shared/networks");
-const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch");
-const {
-    state,
-    loadState,
-    saveState,
-    currentNetwork,
-} = require("../shared/state");
+const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");
+// The background's own storage layer. src/shared/state.js — the module-level
+// `state` singleton, loadState() and saveState() — is deliberately NOT
+// imported here and must never be: see the header of src/background/state.js.
+// The build enforces it, not review: build.js fails when esbuild's metafile
+// reports that module as an input of this bundle (FORBIDDEN_INPUTS in
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js). The ESLint rule of the same name is
+// the same prohibition reported early, not the guarantee.
+const { getState, updateState } = require("./state");
+const { StateUnusableError } = require("../shared/stateSchema");
 const { refreshBalances, getProvider } = require("../shared/balances");
 const { debugFetch, log } = require("../shared/log");
 const {
@@ -42,7 +44,6 @@ const {
 const {
     actionApi,
     runtimeApi,
-    storageGet,
     tabsQuery,
     tabsSendMessage,
     windowsApi,
@@ -179,21 +180,51 @@ const INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE = -32603;
 const INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE =
     "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal error.";
 
-async function getState() {
-    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
-    return (
-        result.autistmask || {
-            wallets: [],
-            rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
-            activeAddress: null,
-            allowedSites: {},
-            deniedSites: {},
-        }
-    );
+// What the page is told when the wallet's own stored profile cannot be read.
+//
+// This used to be the generic answer above: getActiveAddress() dereferenced
+// the stored wallet list on nearly every method, so a corrupt or
+// newer-than-this-build record turned EVERY request from EVERY page into
+// "internal error", which is also what a failed signing attempt answers. The
+// page cannot tell those apart, and the user is told nothing about the one
+// thing that is actually wrong or where to fix it
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// Its own code rather than -32603, because the condition is specific,
+// diagnosable and has a user action attached — none of which "internal error"
+// conveys.
+//
+// -32007 specifically: EIP-1474 sets aside -32000..-32099 for
+// implementation-defined server errors, but it ASSIGNS meanings to -32000
+// through -32006 (Invalid input, Resource not found, Resource unavailable,
+// Transaction rejected, Method not supported, Limit exceeded, JSON-RPC version
+// not supported). -32007..-32099 are the unassigned ones, and this condition
+// is not any of the seven. Nothing above it is free to be overloaded either:
+// this wallet already answers EIP-1474's -32002 "Resource unavailable" for a
+// pending approval, the conventional way, so a page is entitled to read these
+// codes by that table.
+const STATE_UNUSABLE_CODE = -32007;
+const STATE_UNUSABLE_MESSAGE =
+    "AutistMask cannot read its saved data, so nothing was signed or sent." +
+    " Open the AutistMask extension to export or reset it.";
+
+// The EIP-1193 error for a handler that threw, by cause. Everything that
+// consults the profile goes through getState(), so this one mapping covers
+// every method rather than each one having to know about the condition.
+function failureError(err) {
+    if (err instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+        log.errorf("state is unusable:", err.problem);
+        return { code: STATE_UNUSABLE_CODE, message: STATE_UNUSABLE_MESSAGE };
+    }
+    return { code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE, message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE };
 }
 
-async function getActiveAddress() {
-    const s = await getState();
+// The active address of a profile snapshot. Pure, and taking the snapshot as
+// an argument rather than reading storage itself: a handler that has already
+// read state must not answer "which account is this" from a SECOND, later read
+// — the two can disagree, and the checks that compare them would then be
+// comparing two different moments.
+function activeAddressOf(s) {
     if (s.activeAddress) return s.activeAddress;
     // Fall back to first address
     if (s.wallets.length > 0 && s.wallets[0].addresses.length > 0) {
@@ -202,6 +233,11 @@ async function getActiveAddress() {
     return null;
 }
 
+// For the few call sites that need only the address and hold no snapshot.
+async function getActiveAddress() {
+    return activeAddressOf(await getState());
+}
+
 // Whether a request names a signing address other than the active one. Such a
 // request is refused rather than quietly signed as whichever address happens
 // to be active: the page asked for account A and would otherwise be handed
@@ -210,9 +246,14 @@ function namesAnotherAddress(requested, activeAddress) {
     return !!requested && !sameAddress(requested, activeAddress);
 }
 
+// The endpoint alone, for the one caller that needs nothing else. Anything
+// that also needs the network the endpoint belongs to must take both from ONE
+// snapshot — see handleSendTransaction() — because a chain switch moves them
+// together and a provider built from two different reads can end up pointed at
+// one chain and told it is on another
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
 async function getRpcUrl() {
-    const s = await getState();
-    return s.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_RPC_URL;
+    return (await getState()).rpcUrl;
 }
 
 function extractHostname(origin) {
@@ -553,10 +594,26 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
     }
 });
 
+// Record a remembered site decision under one address.
+//
+// A read-modify-write against storage, not a load-mutate-save of a shared
+// singleton: the user takes seconds to answer the prompt, and everything else
+// in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
+// gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
+// objects that work was holding.
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+    await updateState((s) => {
+        if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
+            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+        }
+    });
+}
+
 // Handle connection requests (eth_requestAccounts, wallet_requestPermissions)
 async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
@@ -588,29 +645,14 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            // Reload state to get latest, add to allowed, persist
-            await loadState();
-            if (!state.allowedSites[activeAddress]) {
-                state.allowedSites[activeAddress] = [];
-            }
-            if (!state.allowedSites[activeAddress].includes(hostname)) {
-                state.allowedSites[activeAddress].push(hostname);
-            }
-            await saveState();
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await loadState();
-            if (!state.deniedSites[activeAddress]) {
-                state.deniedSites[activeAddress] = [];
-            }
-            if (!state.deniedSites[activeAddress].includes(hostname)) {
-                state.deniedSites[activeAddress].push(hostname);
-            }
-            await saveState();
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -654,7 +696,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "eth_accounts") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
@@ -667,22 +709,11 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         return { result: [] };
     }
 
-    // Both answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level state
-    // singleton, and nothing populates that at module scope. A worker revived
-    // by the page's own message therefore held DEFAULT_STATE and told a page
-    // it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
-    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
-    //
-    // Answered from getState() rather than by loading the singleton. Any page
-    // reaches these two — neither is gated on a connection, and the injected
-    // provider sends eth_chainId on every page load — and loadState() replaces
-    // state.wallets wholesale, which would detach the address objects an
-    // in-flight backgroundRefresh() is mutating across its network round trip,
-    // so its saveState() would persist the pre-refresh balances while still
-    // stamping lastBalanceRefresh. getState() is the detached per-call storage
-    // read the other read handlers here already use.
-    // networkById(undefined) falls back to mainnet, matching the default for a
-    // profile with no stored networkId.
+    // Both used to be answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the
+    // module-level state singleton, and nothing populates that at module
+    // scope. A worker revived by the page's own message therefore held
+    // DEFAULT_STATE and told a page it was on mainnet while the user was on
+    // Sepolia (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
     if (method === "eth_chainId" || method === "net_version") {
         const s = await getState();
         const net = networkById(s.networkId);
@@ -699,7 +730,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // not be able to do it. Ungated, any page could clear the
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
@@ -709,24 +740,25 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
         }
 
-        // onChainSwitch() mutates the module-level state singleton and then
-        // saves every field of it, and currentNetwork() reads the same
-        // singleton. This worker may have been started by this very message:
-        // nothing loads state at module scope, so without this the singleton
-        // is DEFAULT_STATE, the same-chain check compares against the wrong
-        // network, and the save writes empty wallets, empty allowedSites and
-        // the default endpoints over the user's stored profile
-        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316). Same precedent
-        // as the transaction path below.
-        await loadState();
-
+        // The chain in force is read from the snapshot above, not from the
+        // singleton: this worker may have been started by this very message,
+        // and the singleton would then be DEFAULT_STATE, so the same-chain
+        // check compared against mainnet whatever the user was on
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316).
         const chainId = params?.[0]?.chainId;
-        if (chainId === currentNetwork().chainId) {
+        if (chainId === networkById(s.networkId).chainId) {
             return { result: null };
         }
         if (SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS.has(chainId)) {
             const target = networkByChainId(chainId);
-            await onChainSwitch(target.id);
+            // Read-modify-write against storage. The old path went through
+            // onChainSwitch(), which mutates the singleton and then persists
+            // every field of it — on an unloaded worker that wrote empty
+            // wallets, empty allowedSites and the default endpoints over the
+            // user's stored profile, encrypted secrets included.
+            await updateState((fresh) =>
+                applyChainSwitchFields(fresh, target.id),
+            );
             broadcastChainChanged(target.chainId);
             return { result: null };
         }
@@ -773,7 +805,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
@@ -799,7 +831,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "personal_sign" || method === "eth_sign") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
@@ -848,7 +880,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" || method === "eth_signTypedData") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
@@ -891,6 +923,11 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             const result = await proxyRpc(method, params);
             return { result };
         } catch (e) {
+            // A node that answered with an error is reported as itself. The
+            // wallet being unable to read its own profile is not that, and it
+            // must not be flattened into a message with no code: it goes back
+            // to the dispatcher, which has the one answer for it.
+            if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) throw e;
             return { error: { message: e.message } };
         }
     }
@@ -904,7 +941,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 // page has its answer.
 async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
     const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
@@ -948,10 +985,19 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
         // user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
         // artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
         // is reported to the requesting page; see approvalTx.js.
+        //
+        // The provider is built from ONE snapshot — the endpoint and the
+        // network name both come from `s`. It used to be
+        // getProvider(await getRpcUrl()) with no network name at all, so
+        // getProvider fell back to the unpopulated singleton's mainnet: the
+        // endpoint was the user's chain and the static hint was 0x1, ethers
+        // fixed chainId at 0x1, and the wallet's own verifySignedTx then
+        // refused every non-mainnet dApp send
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
         let approvedTx;
         try {
             approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
-                getProvider(await getRpcUrl()),
+                getProvider(s.rpcUrl, s.networkId),
                 activeAddress,
                 txParams,
             );
@@ -1039,7 +1085,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     resetPopupUrl();
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     const allowed = activeAddress ? s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [] : [];
     let tabs;
     try {
@@ -1079,20 +1125,60 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
 const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS = BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
 const RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS = Math.floor(BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS / 2);
 
+// The wallets this refresh works on are its OWN, and nothing else in the
+// worker can reach them.
+//
+// refreshBalances() mutates address objects in place across a multi-second
+// network round trip. It used to be handed the module-level singleton's
+// wallets, which meant any concurrent handler that called loadState() replaced
+// state.wallets underneath it: the refreshed balances landed on detached
+// objects, and the save that followed persisted the PRE-refresh values while
+// still stamping lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo. Every point fix for
+// the singleton added such a loadState(), so the next one would have done it
+// again (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// So: read a snapshot, refresh a private copy of its wallets, then apply the
+// balances that came back — by address, onto whatever storage holds NOW.
+// Applying by address rather than writing the array back is what keeps a
+// wallet or address added, renamed or deleted during the round trip.
 async function backgroundRefresh() {
-    await loadState();
+    const s = await getState();
     const now = Date.now();
-    if (now - (state.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS)
-        return;
-    if (state.wallets.length === 0) return;
+    if (now - (s.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS) return;
+    if (s.wallets.length === 0) return;
+
+    const wallets = s.wallets;
     await refreshBalances(
-        state.wallets,
-        state.rpcUrl,
-        state.blockscoutUrl,
-        state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets,
+        s.rpcUrl,
+        s.blockscoutUrl,
+        s.trackedTokens,
+        s.networkId,
     );
-    state.lastBalanceRefresh = now;
-    await saveState();
+
+    const refreshed = new Map();
+    for (const wallet of wallets) {
+        for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+            refreshed.set(String(addr.address).toLowerCase(), addr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    await updateState((fresh) => {
+        for (const wallet of fresh.wallets) {
+            for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+                const got = refreshed.get(String(addr.address).toLowerCase());
+                if (!got) continue;
+                // Only fields the refresh actually produced. refreshBalances()
+                // leaves a field untouched when its lookup failed, so an
+                // undefined here means "no answer", not "the answer is empty",
+                // and must not overwrite what is stored.
+                for (const key of ["balance", "ensName", "tokenBalances"]) {
+                    if (got[key] !== undefined) addr[key] = got[key];
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        fresh.lastBalanceRefresh = now;
+    });
 }
 
 // The recurring job runs off an alarm, not a timer. On Chrome MV3 this file is
@@ -1101,7 +1187,14 @@ async function backgroundRefresh() {
 // module-level state does not outlive it. Alarms are held by the browser and
 // wake the worker to deliver them.
 registerAlarmHandlers({
-    [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: backgroundRefresh,
+    // Caught here rather than left to the alarm dispatcher, which does not
+    // await what it calls: a profile this build cannot read makes every
+    // refresh throw, and an unhandled rejection per alarm tick says less than
+    // one logged line per tick does.
+    [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: () =>
+        backgroundRefresh().catch((e) => {
+            log.errorf("background balance refresh failed:", e);
+        }),
 });
 
 // Everything the background context needs re-established on start. This runs
@@ -1200,12 +1293,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 // "it does not throw today" is not a property anyone is
                 // maintaining.
                 log.errorf("RPC request failed:", msg.method, err);
-                sendResponse({
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                });
+                sendResponse({ error: failureError(err) });
             });
         return true;
     }
@@ -1307,16 +1395,29 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         // so an escape from there must not tell the user it might have.
         let lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_VERIFY;
         (async () => {
-            // The chain this attempt is on, read once. Verification below
-            // refuses an artifact signed for any other chain, and the nonce
-            // record is both consulted and written under this one, so a
-            // network switch part-way through cannot make the check and the
-            // record disagree about which chain the nonce was spent on.
+            // The chain this attempt is on, read once — and the endpoint it
+            // will be broadcast to comes from the SAME read.
+            //
+            // Verification below refuses an artifact signed for any other
+            // chain, and the nonce record is both consulted and written under
+            // this one, so a network switch part-way through cannot make the
+            // check and the record disagree about which chain the nonce was
+            // spent on. The endpoint used to be read separately, several
+            // awaits later (`state.rpcUrl` off the singleton), so a chain
+            // switch committed in that window moved the endpoint out from
+            // under a transaction already verified against the old chain: the
+            // artifact would be sent to the new chain's node, which is
+            // precisely the "signed for a different network" case the
+            // verification exists to prevent.
             let chainId;
+            let rpcUrl;
+            let networkId;
             try {
-                await loadState();
-                chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
-                const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+                const s = await getState();
+                networkId = s.networkId;
+                chainId = networkById(networkId).chainId;
+                rpcUrl = s.rpcUrl;
+                const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
                 // An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
                 // approval named one account; signing from whichever account
                 // is active now would send funds from an account this screen
@@ -1388,7 +1489,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             }
 
             try {
-                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+                const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
                 lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_BROADCAST;
                 const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
                 if (nonce !== null) spent.add(nonce);
@@ -1427,18 +1528,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             // the popup nor the page is ever answered. Settle both, through
             // the same chokepoint as every other retirement.
             log.errorf("transaction approval response failed:", e);
-            settleApproval(
-                msg.id,
-                {
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                },
-                { holdsClaim: true },
-            );
+            const failure = failureError(e);
+            settleApproval(msg.id, { error: failure }, { holdsClaim: true });
             sendResponse({
-                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
+                error: failure.message,
                 retryable: false,
                 stage: lastResortStage,
             });
@@ -1530,18 +1623,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             // Same shape as the transaction path: a throw out of the catch
             // block above would leave the popup and the page both waiting.
             log.errorf("sign approval response failed:", e);
-            settleApproval(
-                msg.id,
-                {
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                },
-                { holdsClaim: true },
-            );
+            const failure = failureError(e);
+            settleApproval(msg.id, { error: failure }, { holdsClaim: true });
             sendResponse({
-                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
+                error: failure.message,
                 retryable: false,
             });
         });

src/background/state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// The background's access to the persisted profile.
+//
+// There is no in-memory copy here, and that is the whole design. The MV3
+// service worker is terminated when idle and revived by the next message, so
+// anything held at module scope is either absent or arbitrarily stale, and
+// src/shared/state.js's module-level `state` singleton — which nothing in the
+// worker ever populates — silently served DEFAULT_STATE to whoever read it.
+// Five defects came out of that (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
+// and every point fix for one of them added a loadState() that created the
+// next: loading detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding.
+//
+// So the background reads per call and writes read-modify-write:
+//
+//   getState()        one storage read, normalized, detached. Nothing else
+//                     holds the object it returns, so a handler may keep it
+//                     across any number of awaits and no concurrent work can
+//                     move it.
+//   updateState(fn)   read fresh, apply fn to that fresh record, write it
+//                     back — all inside a queue, so two background writes
+//                     never interleave, and the read is one storage round trip
+//                     ahead of the write rather than a page lifetime ahead of
+//                     it (which is what made the popup's saveState() need a
+//                     per-field merge against a baseline at all).
+//
+// A handler that must both read and write therefore does its network work
+// against a snapshot it owns, and applies the RESULT inside updateState().
+// It never publishes an object other in-flight work is holding.
+
+const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("../shared/browserApi");
+const { normalizePersisted } = require("../shared/persistedState");
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    assertStateUsable,
+} = require("../shared/stateSchema");
+
+// A fresh, fully-normalized, detached copy of the persisted profile.
+//
+// Normalized rather than raw: a legacy or malformed record is self-healed the
+// same way loadState() heals it for the popup, so the background is never the
+// one context reasoning about a shape the rest of the extension repairs.
+//
+// Throws StateUnusableError for a record this build cannot make sense of,
+// before normalization gets a chance to paper over it — the same gate, in the
+// same place, as the popup's loadState(). Every handler that consults the
+// profile comes through here, so a dApp call against such a record is answered
+// with the specific error the dispatcher maps that to (src/background/index.js)
+// rather than dereferencing its way into a generic -32603.
+async function getState() {
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
+    return normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
+}
+
+// Serializes the read-modify-write turns below. Two of them interleaved would
+// each read before the other wrote, and the second write would carry the first
+// one's fields back to their pre-turn values.
+let updateQueue = Promise.resolve();
+
+async function updateStateOnce(mutate) {
+    const s = await getState();
+    await mutate(s);
+    s.hasWallet = Boolean(s.wallets && s.wallets.length > 0);
+    // Stamped on every write, exactly as the popup's saveState() stamps it:
+    // whichever context writes last, the record in storage is in this build's
+    // shape and says so.
+    s.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+    await storageSet({ autistmask: s });
+    return s;
+}
+
+// Apply `mutate` to a record read fresh from storage and write the result
+// back. `mutate` receives a detached, normalized profile and mutates it in
+// place; it may be async, but it must not do anything slow — the window
+// between the read and the write is the window in which another context's
+// write is lost, and keeping it to one storage round trip is what makes a
+// whole-record write safe here. Concretely: the write is the WHOLE record, so
+// a popup write that lands inside that window is reverted, in every field, by
+// the record this turn read before it. That is accepted because the window is
+// one round trip long and the popup is not writing while the worker is;
+// widening it is what would make it a real hazard.
+//
+// `mutate` must also not call updateState() itself, directly or through
+// anything it awaits: the queue is strictly serial, so the inner turn waits on
+// the outer one, which is waiting on the inner one. That deadlocks the whole
+// background, not just the caller. Mutate the record you were handed.
+//
+// Resolves with the record that was written.
+function updateState(mutate) {
+    const turn = updateQueue.then(() => updateStateOnce(mutate));
+    // The queue must advance even when a turn rejects, or every update after
+    // it queues behind a promise that never settles.
+    updateQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
+    return turn;
+}
+
+module.exports = { getState, updateState };

src/popup/index.html

@@ -153,12 +153,28 @@
                 <!-- Shared password fields -->
                 <div class="mb-2" id="add-wallet-password-section">
                     <label class="block mb-1">Choose a password</label>
+                    <!-- The hint is swapped in place when the import tab
+                         changes, and it sits directly above the password
+                         fields, so a wording that wraps to a different
+                         number of lines would move them under the pointer.
+                         Two things stop that: the three wordings in
+                         PASSWORD_HINTS are kept within a couple of
+                         characters of each other in length, and this floor
+                         matches what each of them needs. All three measure
+                         48px -- 3 lines at the 16px line height, at the
+                         368px width this box has in the 396px popup body.
+                         Do not raise it: the reserve is unused height on
+                         every tab, and at 6rem it pushed
+                         #btn-add-wallet-confirm to bottom=628px in a 600px
+                         viewport, below the fold. -->
                     <p
-                        class="text-xs text-muted mb-1"
+                        class="text-xs text-muted mb-1 min-h-[3rem]"
                         id="add-wallet-password-hint"
                     >
                         This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this
-                        device. You will need it to send funds.
+                        device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be
+                        recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written
+                        down: it is the only backup of this wallet.
                     </p>
                     <input
                         type="password"
@@ -1140,6 +1156,71 @@
                 >
                     Confirm Delete
                 </button>
+                <p class="text-xs mt-3">
+                    <span
+                        id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-password"
+                        class="underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer"
+                        >I have lost my password</span
+                    >
+                </p>
+            </div>
+
+            <!-- ============ DELETE WALLET WITHOUT THE PASSWORD ============ -->
+            <div id="view-delete-wallet-lost-password" class="view hidden">
+                <button
+                    id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-back"
+                    class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer mb-2"
+                >
+                    &lt; Back
+                </button>
+                <h2 class="font-bold mb-3">Delete Wallet Without a Password</h2>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Your password cannot be recovered or reset, so there is no
+                    way to unlock
+                    <strong id="delete-wallet-lost-name"></strong> again. You
+                    can still delete it, and no password is needed to do that.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Deleting it erases the copy of its key that is stored on
+                    this device. Nothing on the blockchain changes, and the
+                    money at its addresses is not moved or destroyed.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    If you have the recovery phrase for this wallet written
+                    down, add the wallet again afterwards with a new password
+                    and you will have it back.
+                    <strong
+                        >If you do not have it written down, deleting this
+                        wallet means losing everything it holds,
+                        forever.</strong
+                    >
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-3">Your other wallets are not touched.</p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-1">
+                    To confirm, type the name of the wallet (<strong
+                        id="delete-wallet-lost-name-echo"
+                    ></strong
+                    >) below.
+                </p>
+                <div class="mb-2">
+                    <input
+                        type="text"
+                        id="delete-wallet-lost-name-input"
+                        class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
+                        placeholder="Type the wallet name"
+                    />
+                </div>
+                <div
+                    id="delete-wallet-lost-flash"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"
+                    class="border border-border text-red-500 px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Delete This Wallet Forever
+                </button>
             </div>
 
             <!-- ============ DELETE ADDRESS CONFIRM ============ -->
@@ -1680,6 +1761,75 @@
                     </button>
                 </div>
             </div>
+
+            <!-- ============ STATE RECOVERY ============ -->
+            <!--
+                Shown when the stored profile cannot be read at all. Every
+                other screen renders from that profile, so this one is reached
+                without one and is the only way out of a wallet that would
+                otherwise be a blank popup.
+            -->
+            <div id="view-state-recovery" class="view hidden">
+                <h2 class="font-bold mb-2">Saved Data Cannot Be Read</h2>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    AutistMask stopped rather than guessing. Nothing has been
+                    changed or erased, and nothing can be signed or sent until
+                    this is resolved.
+                </p>
+                <div
+                    id="state-recovery-problem"
+                    class="text-xs font-bold mb-3 break-words"
+                ></div>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Export the saved data first and keep it. It may hold the
+                    encrypted keys for your wallets, and it is the only copy.
+                </p>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-state-recovery-export"
+                    class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Export Saved Data
+                </button>
+                <textarea
+                    id="state-recovery-blob"
+                    readonly
+                    class="hidden border border-border p-1 w-full h-32 font-mono text-xs bg-bg text-fg mt-2"
+                ></textarea>
+                <p class="text-xs mt-3 mb-2">
+                    <strong
+                        >Erasing the saved data deletes every wallet stored in
+                        this browser.</strong
+                    >
+                    Nothing on the blockchain changes and no money is moved, but
+                    without the exported copy above, or the recovery phrase for
+                    each wallet written down, everything they hold is gone
+                    forever.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-1">
+                    To confirm, type
+                    <strong>ERASE MY WALLET</strong>
+                    below.
+                </p>
+                <div class="mb-2">
+                    <input
+                        type="text"
+                        id="state-recovery-reset-input"
+                        class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
+                        placeholder="Type ERASE MY WALLET"
+                    />
+                </div>
+                <div
+                    id="state-recovery-flash"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-state-recovery-reset"
+                    class="border border-border text-red-500 px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Erase Saved Data
+                </button>
+            </div>
         </div>
 
         <script src="index.js"></script>

src/popup/index.js

@@ -1,8 +1,14 @@
 // AutistMask popup entry point.
 // Loads state, initializes views, triggers first render.
 
-const { state, saveState, loadState } = require("../shared/state");
-const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../shared/log");
+const {
+    state,
+    saveState,
+    onSaveFailure,
+    loadState,
+} = require("../shared/state");
+const { StateUnusableError } = require("../shared/stateSchema");
+const { log, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../shared/log");
 const { refreshPrices } = require("../shared/prices");
 const { refreshBalances } = require("../shared/balances");
 const {
@@ -10,13 +16,14 @@ const {
     showView,
     updateDebugBanner,
     setBackRenderer,
+    showSaveFailureBanner,
     pushCurrentView,
     goBack,
 } = require("./views/helpers");
 const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
 // Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
 // on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
-// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/popup/restorableViews.js) go
+// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/shared/restorableViews.js) go
 // through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent.
 const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
 
@@ -35,6 +42,7 @@ const settings = require("./views/settings");
 const settingsAddToken = require("./views/settingsAddToken");
 const deleteAddress = require("./views/deleteAddress");
 const approval = require("./views/approval");
+const stateRecovery = require("./views/stateRecovery");
 
 function renderWalletList() {
     home.render(ctx);
@@ -53,11 +61,20 @@ async function doRefreshAndRender() {
                 state.rpcUrl,
                 state.blockscoutUrl,
                 state.trackedTokens,
+                state.networkId,
             ),
         ]);
         state.lastBalanceRefresh = Date.now();
         await saveState();
         renderWalletList();
+    } catch (e) {
+        // Every call site fires this and walks away — the boot below, the ten
+        // second interval, and eight views through ctx — so it must never
+        // reject: an unhandled rejection is not a report of anything. The save
+        // inside it reports its own failure through onSaveFailure() (see
+        // src/shared/state.js); what is left here is a failed network round
+        // trip, which the next tick retries.
+        log.errorf("popup: background refresh failed:", e);
     } finally {
         refreshInFlight = false;
     }
@@ -133,7 +150,28 @@ function fallbackView() {
 }
 
 async function init() {
-    await loadState();
+    // First, before anything can save: showView() saves on every navigation
+    // without awaiting, so a save that fails from here on has somewhere to be
+    // reported rather than being swallowed by the save queue
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). Registered ahead of
+    // the approval-window branch below too, since that window saves as well.
+    onSaveFailure(showSaveFailureBanner);
+    try {
+        await loadState();
+    } catch (e) {
+        // A profile this build cannot read is the one failure that must not
+        // fall through to the rest of init(). It used to: the load "succeeded"
+        // on a record nothing had validated, and the first dereference below
+        // threw, leaving a popup with no view, no message and no control on
+        // it, and no way out of the wallet from inside the product
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311). Now the load
+        // refuses, and this is the screen that says so.
+        if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+            stateRecovery.show(e);
+            return;
+        }
+        throw e;
+    }
     applyTheme(state.theme);
 
     // Sync runtime debug flag from persisted state before first render

src/popup/viewRouter.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 // dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
 // cannot be required outside a browser.
 
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../shared/restorableViews");
 
 // The views this page load has rendered.
 //
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ function resetRenderedViews() {
 const ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK = new Set(["main"]);
 
 // Views that render an address the user picked and cannot be rendered
-// without one.
+// without one. "confirm-tx" is here because its Sign button dereferences
+// `state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].encryptedSecret`
+// (src/popup/views/confirmTx.js) behind no guard of its own — a screen that
+// can only throw when the user presses its one button must not be restored
+// onto.
 const ADDRESS_VIEWS = new Set([
     "address",
     "address-token",
     "receive",
     "transaction",
+    "confirm-tx",
 ]);
 
 function needsAddress(view) {
@@ -74,6 +79,73 @@ function hasValidAddress(state) {
     );
 }
 
+// The stored viewData ENTRIES each branch below dereferences, as opposed to
+// the one field it gates on.
+//
+// A gate on a single truthy field checks the container, not the entries, and
+// the dereference is one level below it: a stored `{"currentView":
+// "success-tx","viewData":{"hash":"0x1"}}` passes `data.hash` and then throws
+// on `address.toLowerCase()` inside addressTitle() (src/popup/views/
+// helpers.js), out of restoreView(), which src/popup/index.js does not guard —
+// so the rest of popup init never runs. txStatus.restoreWait() has checked its
+// own branch's fields since it was written; these are the other four.
+//
+// Only what actually throws is required. Fields that are compared,
+// concatenated or escaped coerce (escapeHtml() and displaySymbol() both
+// String() their argument), so requiring them would refuse a restorable screen
+// over a cosmetic value.
+function isText(value) {
+    return typeof value === "string";
+}
+
+function isRecord(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+// An address handed to renderAddressHtml()/addressTitle(): both reach
+// `address.slice()` and `address.toLowerCase()` with no guard.
+function isAddressText(value) {
+    return isText(value);
+}
+
+// Decoded calldata, as decodedDetailsHtml() (src/popup/views/txStatus.js)
+// walks it: `for (const d of decoded.details)` needs an iterable, and each
+// entry's `address` reaches toAddressHtml(). Absent or falsy is the ordinary
+// case and short-circuits before either.
+function isRenderableDecoded(value) {
+    if (!value) return true;
+    if (!isRecord(value)) return false;
+    if (!value.details) return true;
+    if (!Array.isArray(value.details)) return false;
+    return value.details.every(
+        (entry) =>
+            isRecord(entry) && (!entry.address || isAddressText(entry.address)),
+    );
+}
+
+// The pending transaction confirmTx.show() renders: `token` reaches
+// renderAddressHtml() when it is not "ETH", and `from`/`to` reach
+// addressTitle(), makeBlockie() and getLocalWarnings().
+function isRenderablePendingTx(value) {
+    return (
+        isRecord(value) &&
+        isText(value.token) &&
+        isAddressText(value.from) &&
+        isAddressText(value.to)
+    );
+}
+
+// The stored transaction transactionDetail.render() shows. contractAddress is
+// optional on an ETH transfer, and reaches addressDotHtml() when it is there.
+function isRenderableTx(value) {
+    return (
+        isRecord(value) &&
+        isAddressText(value.from) &&
+        isAddressText(value.to) &&
+        (!value.contractAddress || isAddressText(value.contractAddress))
+    );
+}
+
 // Render `view` from persisted state. Each view module shows itself, so a
 // true return means the view is both rendered and on screen.
 //
@@ -107,11 +179,11 @@ function renderView(view, state, views) {
             views.settingsAddToken.show();
             return true;
         case "confirm-tx":
-            if (!data.pendingTx) return false;
+            if (!isRenderablePendingTx(data.pendingTx)) return false;
             views.confirmTx.restore();
             return true;
         case "transaction":
-            if (!data.tx) return false;
+            if (!isRenderableTx(data.tx)) return false;
             views.transactionDetail.render();
             return true;
         case "wait-tx":
@@ -120,10 +192,13 @@ function renderView(view, state, views) {
             return Boolean(views.txStatus.restoreWait());
         case "success-tx":
             if (!data.hash) return false;
+            if (!isAddressText(data.to)) return false;
+            if (!isRenderableDecoded(data.decoded)) return false;
             views.txStatus.renderSuccess();
             return true;
         case "error-tx":
             if (!data.message) return false;
+            if (!isAddressText(data.to)) return false;
             views.txStatus.renderError();
             return true;
         default:

src/popup/views/addToken.js

@@ -49,7 +49,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
         infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
         log.debugf("Looking up token contract", contractAddr);
         try {
-            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(contractAddr, state.rpcUrl);
+            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
+                contractAddr,
+                state.rpcUrl,
+                state.networkId,
+            );
             log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, contractAddr);
             state.trackedTokens.push({
                 address: contractAddr,

src/popup/views/addWallet.js

@@ -42,12 +42,24 @@ let currentMode = "mnemonic";
 
 const MODES = ["mnemonic", "privkey", "xprv"];
 
+// Each hint names what this import mode's own backup is, because a key
+// wallet and an xprv wallet have no recovery phrase to point the user at.
+// All three say the same thing about the password: it is gone for good if
+// it is forgotten. That sentence is the only warning the user gets before
+// the wallet exists, and without it the lost-password route in
+// views/deleteWallet.js is the first they hear of it.
+//
+// Keep the three within a couple of characters of each other in length.
+// The hint sits directly above the password fields and the tabs swap it in
+// place, so a wording that wraps to a different number of lines would move
+// those fields under the pointer; the reserved height on
+// #add-wallet-password-hint is the other half of that guarantee.
 const PASSWORD_HINTS = {
     mnemonic:
-        "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
+        "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written down: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
     privkey:
-        "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
-    xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
+        "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
+    xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your extended private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
 };
 
 function switchMode(mode) {
@@ -167,7 +179,7 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
 
     // Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
     showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
-    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl);
+    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
         wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
             address: a.address,
@@ -286,7 +298,7 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
 
     // Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
     showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
-    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl);
+    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
         wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
             address: a.address,

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
                 ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
                     counterparties,
                     state.rpcUrl,
+                    state.networkId,
                 );
             } catch {
                 ensNameMap = new Map();

src/popup/views/addressToken.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const {
     displaySymbol,
     truncateMiddle,
     balanceLine,
+    unknownableAmount,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
@@ -118,7 +119,9 @@ function show() {
             addr.tokenBalances,
             state.trackedTokens,
         );
-        amount = tb ? parseFloat(tb.balance || "0") : 0;
+        // null when the scale is unknown: no quantity to show, and none to
+        // price. balanceLine() states that rather than printing 0.0000.
+        amount = tb ? unknownableAmount(tb.balance) : 0;
         price = getPrice(symbol);
     }
 
@@ -152,7 +155,7 @@ function show() {
     attachCopyHandlers($("address-token-line"));
 
     // USD total for this token only
-    const usdVal = price ? amount * price : null;
+    const usdVal = price && amount !== null ? amount * price : null;
     const usdStr = formatUsd(usdVal);
     $("address-token-usd-total").innerHTML = usdStr || " ";
 
@@ -268,6 +271,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
                 ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
                     counterparties,
                     state.rpcUrl,
+                    state.networkId,
                 );
             } catch {
                 ensNameMap = new Map();

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
     unknownDecimalsAmount,
 } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
+// Four decimals, with the nonzero floor these screens hold: every amount this
+// view renders — the ERC-20 line, the ETH value, the max fee — and every one
+// it carries forward to the wait/success/error screens goes through it.
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero: formatTxValue,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
 const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
@@ -40,13 +46,6 @@ function approvalAddressHtml(address) {
     return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
 }
 
-function formatTxValue(val) {
-    const parts = val.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
 // The amount line for a decoded ERC-20 call. With a known scale it is the
 // token quantity; with `decimals` null it is the base-unit integer with the
 // unknown scale stated, because formatting it with an assumed scale is what
@@ -74,6 +73,14 @@ function tokenLabel(address) {
 function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
     if (!data || data === "0x" || data.length < 10) return null;
 
+    // Where a token's scale is looked for, for every decoder below: the ERC-20
+    // amount line and the swap's Amount and Min. received lines resolve it the
+    // same way, and refuse to format the same way when it is nowhere.
+    const decimalsSources = {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    };
+
     // Try ERC-20 (approve / transfer)
     try {
         const parsed = erc20Iface.parseTransaction({ data });
@@ -85,10 +92,10 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
             // the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
             // guess it is the wrong number in the direction that reads as
             // zero. See tokenAmountText().
-            const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(toAddress, {
-                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-                wallets: state.wallets,
-            });
+            const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(
+                toAddress,
+                decimalsSources,
+            );
             const contractLabel = tokenSymbol
                 ? tokenSymbol + " (" + toAddress + ")"
                 : toAddress;
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
     }
 
     // Try Uniswap Universal Router
-    const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress);
+    const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress, decimalsSources);
     if (routerResult) return routerResult;
 
     return null;

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -139,12 +139,17 @@ function show(txInfo) {
 
     // Balance (with inline USD)
     if (isErc20) {
-        const bal = txInfo.tokenBalance || "0";
-        const balUsd = tokenPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * tokenPrice : null;
-        $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-            bal + " " + symbol,
-            balUsd,
-        );
+        // null is a balance whose scale nothing knows, not a balance of zero
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). The send is
+        // refused at encode time for the same missing scale; what this line
+        // must not do is state a quantity nobody established.
+        const bal = txInfo.tokenBalance;
+        const balUsd =
+            tokenPrice && bal != null ? parseFloat(bal) * tokenPrice : null;
+        $("confirm-balance").textContent =
+            bal == null
+                ? "unknown (" + symbol + ")"
+                : valueWithUsd(bal + " " + symbol, balUsd);
     } else {
         const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
         const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
@@ -235,17 +240,22 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     }
     if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN)) {
         messages.push(
-            "Insufficient " +
-                symbol +
-                " balance. You have " +
-                txInfo.tokenBalance +
-                " " +
-                symbol +
-                " but are trying to send " +
-                txInfo.amount +
-                " " +
-                symbol +
-                ".",
+            txInfo.tokenBalance == null
+                ? "This token's balance is unknown, because nothing this" +
+                      " wallet can consult reports how many decimal places it" +
+                      " uses, so the amount you are trying to send cannot be" +
+                      " checked against it."
+                : "Insufficient " +
+                      symbol +
+                      " balance. You have " +
+                      txInfo.tokenBalance +
+                      " " +
+                      symbol +
+                      " but are trying to send " +
+                      txInfo.amount +
+                      " " +
+                      symbol +
+                      ".",
         );
     }
     if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH)) {
@@ -304,7 +314,7 @@ function formatFeeEth(wei) {
 
 async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
     try {
-        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
         const feeData = await provider.getFeeData();
         let gasLimit;
 
@@ -386,7 +396,7 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
 
 async function checkRecipientHistory(txInfo) {
     try {
-        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
         const asyncWarnings = await getFullWarnings(txInfo.to, provider, {
             fromAddress: txInfo.from,
         });
@@ -454,7 +464,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
                 state.selectedAddress,
                 decryptedSecret,
             );
-            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
             const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
 
             if (pendingTx.token === "ETH") {

src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js

@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ function setFlash(msg) {
 // wallet.nextIndex is a high-water mark and is deliberately not rewound; and
 // re-importing this wallet's key material is refused as a duplicate by
 // findWalletByXpub() for as long as the wallet is here. What remains is to
-// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which asks for the password and
-// destroys the stored secret — and import again, after which
+// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored secret,
+// with or without the password — and import again, after which
 // scanForAddresses() rediscovers the address only if it has on-chain
 // activity. An address that was never used is not found by that scan, and
 // the copy must not imply otherwise.
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
         "importing this " +
         secret +
         " again is refused while this wallet is still here. The way back is " +
-        "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which asks for your " +
-        "password and destroys the stored " +
+        "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which destroys the stored " +
         secret +
         ", and then import that " +
         secret +

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -14,8 +14,29 @@ const {
 } = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
 
 let deleteWalletIndex = null;
+let lostPasswordIndex = null;
 let ctx = null;
 
+// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
+// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
+// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
+// unusable.
+function displayName(walletIdx) {
+    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
+    return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
+}
+
+// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
+// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
+// "My  Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
+// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
+// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
+// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
+// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
+function confirmKey(name) {
+    return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
+}
+
 // Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
 // closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry,
 // so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user
@@ -27,19 +48,89 @@ function clear() {
     $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
 }
 
+// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
+// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
+// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
+// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
+// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
+function clearLostPassword() {
+    lostPasswordIndex = null;
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
+    const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+    btn.disabled = false;
+    btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
+}
+
 function show(walletIdx) {
     clear();
     deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx;
-    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
-    $("delete-wallet-name").textContent =
-        wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
+    $("delete-wallet-name").textContent = displayName(walletIdx);
     showView("delete-wallet-confirm");
 }
 
+// The two delete screens are siblings, not parent and child: nothing is
+// pushed on the way here, and Back goes to show() rather than goBack().
+// Both then have the same Back target — Settings, the screen that pushed
+// delete-wallet-confirm — and re-entering through show() hands the confirm
+// screen its wallet selection back, which a bare goBack() onto a view
+// whose leave hook has already nulled that selection would not.
+function showLostPassword() {
+    const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex;
+    if (walletIdx === null) {
+        goBack();
+        return;
+    }
+    const name = displayName(walletIdx);
+    clearLostPassword();
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent = name;
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent = name;
+    // showView() runs the leave hook of delete-wallet-confirm, which nulls
+    // deleteWalletIndex, so this screen's own selection is recorded after
+    // it and not before.
+    showView("delete-wallet-lost-password");
+    lostPasswordIndex = walletIdx;
+}
+
+// Remove the wallet and put the user somewhere sensible. Shared by both
+// routes onto this screen, so the selection repair, the site-permission
+// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
+// them.
+async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
+    const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
+
+    deleteWalletIndex = null;
+    lostPasswordIndex = null;
+
+    if (!state.hasWallet) {
+        clearViewStack();
+        await saveState();
+        // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
+        // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
+        if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
+        showView("welcome");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    await saveState();
+    if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
+    // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
+    // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
+    // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
+    clearViewStack();
+    state.viewStack.push("main");
+    ctx.renderWalletList();
+    const settings = require("./settings");
+    settings.show();
+    showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
+}
+
 function init(_ctx) {
     ctx = _ctx;
 
     onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear);
+    onViewLeave("delete-wallet-lost-password", clearLostPassword);
 
     // No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
     // leave hook.
@@ -47,6 +138,60 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         goBack();
     });
 
+    // The escape hatch, and deliberately not gated on anything a user who
+    // has lost the password cannot produce. A password in front of
+    // DISCARDING a secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who
+    // wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only
+    // person such a gate stops is the owner who forgot it — and before
+    // this route existed that owner could neither delete the wallet nor
+    // import its recovery phrase again, because AddWallet refuses the xpub
+    // as a duplicate while the wallet is still stored.
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        showLostPassword();
+    });
+
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        const walletIdx = lostPasswordIndex;
+        if (walletIdx === null) {
+            goBack();
+            return;
+        }
+        show(walletIdx);
+    });
+
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+        if (lostPasswordIndex === null) {
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
+                "No wallet selected for deletion.";
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
+        // of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
+        // user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
+        // refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
+        // distrust the control.
+        const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
+        const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
+        if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
+                "That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
+                expected +
+                " to confirm.";
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
+            return;
+        }
+
+        const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+        btn.disabled = true;
+        btn.classList.add("text-muted");
+
+        // finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
+        // button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
+        await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
+    });
+
     $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const pw = $("delete-wallet-password").value;
         if (!pw) {
@@ -82,34 +227,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
-        // Remove the wallet and repair selection, permissions and hasWallet
-        const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(
-            state,
-            walletIdx,
-        );
-
-        deleteWalletIndex = null;
-
-        if (!state.hasWallet) {
-            clearViewStack();
-            await saveState();
-            // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
-            // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
-            if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
-            showView("welcome");
-        } else {
-            await saveState();
-            if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
-            // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
-            // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
-            // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
-            clearViewStack();
-            state.viewStack.push("main");
-            ctx.renderWalletList();
-            const settings = require("./settings");
-            settings.show();
-            showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
-        }
+        await finishDelete(walletIdx);
     });
 }
 

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "add-token",
     "settings",
     "delete-wallet-confirm",
+    "delete-wallet-lost-password",
     "delete-address-confirm",
     "settings-addtoken",
     "transaction",
@@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "approve-sign",
     "export-privkey",
     "show-phrase",
+    // Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
+    // cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
+    // state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
+    // — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
+    "state-recovery",
 ];
 
 // Cleanup callbacks for views that hold a secret in the DOM. The view
@@ -126,6 +132,38 @@ function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
     }
 }
 
+// The banner shown when a save has failed, registered as the save-failure
+// reporter by src/popup/index.js.
+//
+// Persistent and not dismissable, unlike showFlash(): what it says is true
+// until the popup is closed, and a message that clears itself after two seconds
+// is how the user goes on operating a wallet that is persisting nothing
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). It survives navigation
+// because it hangs off document.body rather than off a view.
+//
+// Created on demand rather than authored in index.html, the same way
+// updateDebugBanner() creates its own: it is absent from a popup where nothing
+// has failed, which is the state that must not need markup to be in.
+//
+// textContent, never innerHTML: `detail` carries an error message, which may
+// come from the browser's storage layer.
+function showSaveFailureBanner(detail) {
+    let banner = document.getElementById("save-failure-banner");
+    if (!banner) {
+        banner = document.createElement("div");
+        banner.id = "save-failure-banner";
+        banner.style.cssText =
+            "background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:2px 4px;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:10000;";
+        document.body.prepend(banner);
+    }
+    const message = (detail && (detail.message || detail.problem)) || detail;
+    banner.textContent =
+        "NOT SAVED — AutistMask could not write to storage, so recent" +
+        " changes are not stored. Close and reopen the popup; if this keeps" +
+        " happening, do not rely on anything you change now." +
+        (message ? " (" + String(message) + ")" : "");
+}
+
 // Callback that renders a view being navigated BACK onto. Set once by
 // index.js via setBackRenderer(), which routes the view through the same
 // per-view render and data guards restoreView() uses.
@@ -191,6 +229,15 @@ function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
     }, duration);
 }
 
+// A stored token balance as a number, or null when there is no number in it.
+// balances.js writes null for a holding whose scale nothing knows, and this
+// keeps that null from becoming a zero one dereference later.
+function unknownableAmount(balance) {
+    if (balance == null) return null;
+    const n = parseFloat(balance);
+    return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+}
+
 // One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
 //
 // `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
@@ -198,9 +245,18 @@ function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
 // attacker-chosen length until it has been through displaySymbol. This is
 // the row that issue #307 was reported against: every screen that lists a
 // holding renders through here.
+//
+// `amount` is null for a holding whose scale nothing knows
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). There is no quantity to
+// print for it and no fiat value to derive from one, and printing 0.0000 for
+// a real holding is the failure this whole rule exists to prevent, so the row
+// says so instead.
 function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
-    const qty = amount.toFixed(4);
-    const usd = price ? formatUsd(amount * price) || " " : " ";
+    const qty = amount === null ? "quantity unknown" : amount.toFixed(4);
+    const usd =
+        price && amount !== null
+            ? formatUsd(amount * price) || " "
+            : " ";
     // tokenId is a contract address out of the same explorer JSON, and it
     // lands inside a quoted attribute.
     const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}"` : "";
@@ -227,7 +283,12 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
     );
     const seen = new Set();
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
-        const bal = parseFloat(t.balance || "0");
+        // A null balance is a holding of an unstatable amount, not a holding
+        // of zero, so the show-zero setting has no say over it: hiding it
+        // would be asserting the zero nobody established. Anything that does
+        // not parse to a finite number is unknown for the same reason — the
+        // `|| "0"` this replaced turned both into a confident zero.
+        const bal = unknownableAmount(t.balance);
         if (bal === 0 && !showZero) continue;
         html += balanceLine(
             t.symbol,
@@ -260,7 +321,12 @@ function addressHoldsFunds(addr) {
     if (!addr) return false;
     if (parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") > 0) return true;
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
-        if (parseFloat(t.balance || "0") > 0) return true;
+        // A null balance is a holding whose amount could not be stated —
+        // balances.js drops a row of zero base units before the scale is
+        // consulted, so a row that survived with no quantity is holding
+        // something. Warning about funds must err towards warning.
+        const bal = unknownableAmount(t.balance);
+        if (bal === null || bal > 0) return true;
     }
     return false;
 }
@@ -510,6 +576,7 @@ module.exports = {
     showView,
     onViewLeave,
     updateDebugBanner,
+    showSaveFailureBanner,
     setBackRenderer,
     pushCurrentView,
     goBack,
@@ -519,6 +586,7 @@ module.exports = {
     balanceLine,
     balanceLinesForAddress,
     addressHoldsFunds,
+    unknownableAmount,
     addressColor,
     addressDotHtml,
     escapeHtml,

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const {
 const { state, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
 let ctx;
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
+const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { isLowHolderCount } = require("../../shared/holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
@@ -159,9 +160,14 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
             addr.tokenBalances,
             state.trackedTokens,
         );
-        const bal = tb ? tb.balance || "0" : "0";
+        // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows. Saying "0"
+        // for it would be a claim about the amount; the send itself is
+        // refused later by transferAmountUnits() for the same missing scale.
+        const bal = tb ? tb.balance : "0";
         $("send-balance").textContent =
-            "Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
+            bal == null
+                ? "Current balance: unknown (" + symbol + ")"
+                : "Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
     }
 }
 
@@ -202,7 +208,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         let ensName = null;
         if (to.includes(".") && !to.startsWith("0x")) {
             try {
-                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
                 const resolved = await provider.resolveName(to);
                 if (!resolved) {
                     showFlash("Could not resolve " + to);
@@ -235,8 +241,45 @@ function init(_ctx) {
                 addr.tokenBalances,
                 state.trackedTokens,
             );
-            tokenBalance = tb ? tb.balance || "0" : "0";
-            tokenDecimals = tb ? tb.decimals : null;
+            // null carried through rather than flattened to "0": the confirm
+            // screen states an unknown balance as unknown, and
+            // validateTransfer() treats it as no balance to spend from, which
+            // is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
+            tokenBalance = tb ? (tb.balance ?? null) : "0";
+            // Resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
+            // DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's
+            // tracked tokens, then the explorer. The stored
+            // tokenBalances[].decimals is the explorer's own answer alone, so
+            // reading it raw carries a null forward for a token the wallet
+            // does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
+            // inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as
+            // an unestimable fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in
+            // doubt (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
+            // Still null when nothing knows: no fallback.
+            //
+            // Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that
+            // adds explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two
+            // addresses report different scales for answers null rather than
+            // picking one. That check has to apply here, because this value
+            // encodes a transfer; balances.js is formatting one explorer row
+            // at fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of
+            // replacing.
+            tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
+                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+                wallets: state.wallets,
+            });
+            // The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the
+            // stored `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen
+            // has just declined to stand behind. Stating it would leave
+            // validateTransfer() checking the amount against a number the
+            // wallet does not vouch for, and — since the unknown-balance path
+            // is gated on the balance, not on the scale — would leave the
+            // fee-estimate failure as the only thing on the confirmation
+            // screen, which says nothing about decimals. Unknown scale means
+            // unknown balance. Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0"
+            // for a token that has no row at all is an absence of holdings,
+            // which is true at every scale.
+            if (tb && tokenDecimals === null) tokenBalance = null;
         }
 
         ctx.showConfirmTx({

src/popup/views/settingsAddToken.js

@@ -133,7 +133,11 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
         log.debugf("Looking up token contract", addr);
         try {
-            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(addr, state.rpcUrl);
+            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
+                addr,
+                state.rpcUrl,
+                state.networkId,
+            );
             log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, addr);
             state.trackedTokens.push({
                 address: addr,

src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+// The screen the popup shows when it cannot read the stored profile.
+//
+// Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
+// writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
+// gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
+// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
+// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
+// the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
+// takes no ctx and needs no init(): whatever the rest of the popup did or did
+// not manage to wire up, this shows.
+//
+// Two controls, and both are required. An export with no reset leaves the user
+// looking at their broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset
+// with no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold key material
+// a later build could read. So the export is offered first, in the page where
+// it cannot fail, and the reset is behind a typed confirmation.
+
+// $ and VIEWS only: nothing else in helpers is safe here, since showView() and
+// everything under it read the state singleton. $ is taken from there rather
+// than written again locally so that tests/popupElementIds.test.js sees these
+// lookups and holds every id below against the markup.
+const { $, VIEWS } = require("./helpers");
+const { storageGet, storageRemove } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
+const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
+
+// Typed in full before anything is erased, in the same spirit as the wallet
+// name on DeleteWalletLostPassword: this button destroys key material and
+// there is no password in front of it, because there is no profile to check a
+// password against. Compared case-insensitively — the phrase is the barrier,
+// not the shift key.
+const RESET_PHRASE = "ERASE MY WALLET";
+
+let wired = false;
+
+function setFlash(message) {
+    const node = $("state-recovery-flash");
+    node.textContent = message;
+    node.style.visibility = message ? "visible" : "hidden";
+}
+
+// The stored record exactly as storage hands it back, however malformed, with
+// no normalization, no defaulting and no repair on it: this is evidence, and
+// the point of the export is that a later build (or a human) sees what is
+// actually there. It is not the raw bytes — storage deserializes, and
+// exportRecord() re-serializes with JSON.stringify — so a value JSON cannot
+// represent is the one thing that does not survive the trip. See there.
+async function rawRecord() {
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    return result.autistmask;
+}
+
+// Best effort, and never the only route. A download from an extension popup
+// depends on the browser, the popup staying open long enough, and the
+// extension's content security policy; the textarea below depends on none of
+// those, and is filled first.
+function offerDownload(text) {
+    try {
+        if (
+            typeof Blob !== "function" ||
+            typeof URL === "undefined" ||
+            typeof URL.createObjectURL !== "function"
+        ) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const url = URL.createObjectURL(
+            new Blob([text], { type: "application/json" }),
+        );
+        const link = document.createElement("a");
+        link.href = url;
+        link.download = "autistmask-saved-data.json";
+        link.click();
+        // Revoked in a later task, not in this one: the download is started
+        // from the click and revoking the URL in the same turn can cancel it
+        // before it has been read. If the popup closes first the URL dies with
+        // the document anyway.
+        if (typeof URL.revokeObjectURL === "function") {
+            setTimeout(() => URL.revokeObjectURL(url), 0);
+        }
+        return true;
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: download failed:", e);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// Residual, stated rather than left to be discovered: structured-clone storage
+// holds values JSON does not have, and no build here writes one, but the export
+// is a funds-recovery path and what it cannot carry has to be written down.
+//
+// Loud: JSON.stringify THROWS on a reference cycle or a BigInt. That lands in
+// the catch below, so the export fails entirely and erase is the only control
+// left on the screen.
+//
+// Silent, and the worse of the two, because the box then looks complete:
+// a Date becomes its ISO string, a Map or a Set becomes {}, a property whose
+// value is undefined is dropped from the output entirely, and NaN and
+// ±Infinity become null. Nothing here can serialize any of it faithfully;
+// recovering such a record needs the browser's own storage inspector.
+async function exportRecord() {
+    let text;
+    try {
+        const record = await rawRecord();
+        text = JSON.stringify(record === undefined ? null : record, null, 2);
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: export failed:", e);
+        setFlash(
+            "The saved data could not be read out of storage. Nothing has" +
+                " been changed.",
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+    // JSON.stringify answers undefined for a value it cannot represent, and
+    // an empty box would read as "there was nothing there".
+    if (typeof text !== "string") text = String(text);
+
+    const box = $("state-recovery-blob");
+    box.value = text;
+    box.classList.remove("hidden");
+    const downloaded = offerDownload(text);
+    setFlash(
+        downloaded
+            ? "Saved data downloaded, and shown below. Keep a copy before" +
+                  " erasing anything."
+            : "Saved data shown below. Copy it and keep it before erasing" +
+                  " anything.",
+    );
+}
+
+async function resetProfile() {
+    const typed = $("state-recovery-reset-input").value || "";
+    if (typed.trim().toUpperCase() !== RESET_PHRASE) {
+        setFlash("Type " + RESET_PHRASE + " to confirm. Nothing was erased.");
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        await storageRemove("autistmask");
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: reset failed:", e);
+        setFlash("The saved data could not be erased. Nothing was changed.");
+        return;
+    }
+    setFlash("Saved data erased. AutistMask is starting fresh.");
+    // Back to a first run, which is what the wallet now is. A popup that
+    // cannot reload says so rather than sitting on a screen describing a
+    // profile that no longer exists.
+    if (
+        typeof window !== "undefined" &&
+        window.location &&
+        typeof window.location.reload === "function"
+    ) {
+        window.location.reload();
+        return;
+    }
+    setFlash("Saved data erased. Close and reopen AutistMask.");
+}
+
+function wire() {
+    if (wired) return;
+    wired = true;
+    $("btn-state-recovery-export").addEventListener("click", exportRecord);
+    $("btn-state-recovery-reset").addEventListener("click", resetProfile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Show the recovery screen, naming `problem`.
+ *
+ * @param {Error|string} problem the StateUnusableError from the read that
+ *     refused, or its sentence.
+ */
+function show(problem) {
+    const sentence =
+        (problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
+
+    // Not showView(): that reads and writes the singleton this screen exists
+    // because nothing could load.
+    for (const view of VIEWS) {
+        const node = document.getElementById("view-" + view);
+        if (node) node.classList.add("hidden");
+    }
+    // The one global control, and it leads to a screen that renders from the
+    // profile. There is nowhere to go from here but out.
+    const gear = $("btn-settings");
+    if (gear) gear.classList.add("hidden");
+
+    $("state-recovery-problem").textContent = sentence;
+    $("state-recovery-blob").value = "";
+    $("state-recovery-blob").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "";
+    setFlash("");
+    wire();
+    $("view-state-recovery").classList.remove("hidden");
+    log.errorf("state is unusable, showing the recovery screen:", sentence);
+}
+
+module.exports = { show, RESET_PHRASE };

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
         renderElapsed();
     }, 1000);
 
-    const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     let consecutiveFailures = 0;
 
     async function poll() {

src/shared/amountDisplay.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// The 4-decimal amount rule from README.md's Display Consistency section, and
+// the one exception to it, in one place. Three call sites had grown their own
+// copy of the truncation — the history and balance lists
+// (`src/shared/transactions.js`), the approval screen's ERC-20 amount line
+// (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and its Uniswap swap detail lines
+// (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
+// two showing a different number for the same value.
+//
+// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
+// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
+// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
+// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
+
+// Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
+// amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
+// 0.9999.
+function truncateAmount(val) {
+    const parts = val.split(".");
+    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
+    return parts[0] + "." + (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
+}
+
+// The same rule, plus the invariant the approval and confirmation screens
+// hold: a nonzero amount never renders as zero. Truncating to four decimals
+// does exactly that to an amount below 0.0001 — one base unit of an 18-decimal
+// token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — and a real transfer or allowance then reads
+// as "nothing is being moved" on the screen whose whole job is to say what is
+// being authorized.
+//
+// When the truncated string carries no significant digit and the value does,
+// the amount is extended to its first significant digit instead. It stays in
+// token units, the same unit as the symbol printed beside it. A genuine zero
+// still renders 0.0000, and anything at or above the floor is untouched.
+function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
+    const truncated = truncateAmount(val);
+    // Tests the whole truncated string, integer part included: 1.00005 has a
+    // significant digit already and stays 1.0000.
+    if (/[1-9]/.test(truncated)) return truncated;
+    const parts = val.split(".");
+    if (parts.length === 1) return truncated;
+    const sig = parts[1].search(/[1-9]/);
+    if (sig === -1) return truncated;
+    return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
+}
+
+module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };

src/shared/approvalAmount.js

@@ -14,38 +14,23 @@
 // them answers, unknownDecimalsAmount() renders the base-unit integer with the
 // unknown scale stated, and no formatUnits() call is reached at all.
 //
+// The Uniswap decoder's Amount and Min. received lines land on this same
+// screen and use these same two functions, so there is one way of resolving a
+// scale and one way of saying there is none.
+//
 // This is the display counterpart to transferAmount.js, which takes the same
 // stance on the wallet's own send path: an amount whose scale is unknown or
 // disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
 
 // Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
-// reporting that call's result.
-const { MAX_DECIMALS } = require("./transferAmount");
+// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, shared with the
+// send path rather than copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the
+// explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the user added by hand
+// carries whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the accepted types are
+// enumerated rather than coerced.
+const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 
-// A decimals value as a number, or null if it is not one. The bundled list
-// stores numbers, the explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the
-// user added by hand can carry whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the
-// accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced: Number([]) is 0 and
-// Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would read an empty array as a scale
-// of zero and format the amount as whole tokens.
-function toDecimals(value) {
-    let n;
-    if (typeof value === "number") {
-        n = value;
-    } else if (typeof value === "bigint") {
-        if (value < 0n || value > BigInt(MAX_DECIMALS)) return null;
-        n = Number(value);
-    } else if (typeof value === "string") {
-        if (!/^[0-9]+$/.test(value)) return null;
-        n = Number(value);
-    } else {
-        return null;
-    }
-    if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > MAX_DECIMALS) return null;
-    return n;
-}
-
 // Every decimals the explorer reported for this contract, across all the
 // addresses whose balances have been fetched. They describe one contract, so
 // they should agree; a set that does not agree is a scale in dispute, and this

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -9,25 +9,49 @@ const {
     formatUnits,
 } = require("ethers");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
 const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
+const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
+const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("./approvalAmount");
 
 // Use a static network to skip auto-detection (which can fail and cause
 // "could not coalesce error" on some RPC endpoints like Cloudflare).
-// Accepts an optional networkName ("mainnet" or "sepolia") for the static
-// network hint so ethers picks the right chain parameters.  When omitted,
-// reads the currently selected network from extension state.
-function getProvider(rpcUrl, networkName) {
-    // Lazy require to avoid circular dependency issues at module scope.
-    const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
-    const name = networkName || currentNetwork().id;
-    const net = Network.from(name);
+//
+// `networkId` is REQUIRED, and is one of the ids in networks.js. It used to be
+// optional, falling back to currentNetwork() — the module-level `state`
+// singleton, which the MV3 service worker never populates. The endpoint then
+// came out right and the static hint came out mainnet, so ethers fixed
+// `chainId` at 0x1 and every non-mainnet dApp send was prepared for the wrong
+// chain and then refused by the wallet's own verifier
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320). Requiring it is what
+// stops that from coming back: a caller that has no network to name has no
+// business constructing a provider, and there is no longer a default for it
+// to get silently wrong.
+//
+// Validated against NETWORKS rather than passed straight to Network.from():
+// ethers knows chains this wallet does not, so an id that is not one of ours
+// is a caller bug and must not resolve to a working provider for some other
+// chain.
+function getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId) {
+    const net = Network.from(requireNetworkId(networkId).id);
     return new JsonRpcProvider(rpcUrl, net, { staticNetwork: net });
 }
 
+function requireNetworkId(networkId) {
+    const net = NETWORKS[networkId];
+    if (!net) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "getProvider requires the id of a supported network; got " +
+                JSON.stringify(networkId),
+        );
+    }
+    return net;
+}
+
 function formatBalance(wei) {
     const eth = formatEther(wei);
     const parts = eth.split(".");
@@ -44,10 +68,28 @@ function formatTokenBalance(raw, decimals) {
     return parts[0] + "." + dec;
 }
 
+// The explorer's reported holding as an exact base-unit integer, or null when
+// it reported nothing usable. Base units carry no scale, so this value is
+// meaningful before the scale is known — which is what lets a holding of zero
+// be recognised as zero without guessing a scale to divide it by.
+function rawUnits(value) {
+    if (typeof value === "bigint") return value >= 0n ? value : null;
+    if (typeof value === "number") {
+        return Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 0 ? BigInt(value) : null;
+    }
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || !/^[0-9]+$/.test(value)) return null;
+    return BigInt(value);
+}
+
 // Fetch token balances for a single address from Blockscout.
-// Returns [{ address, symbol, decimals, balance }].
+// Returns [{ address, name, symbol, decimals, balance, holders }].
 // Filters out spam: only shows tokens that are in the known token list,
 // explicitly tracked by the user, or have >= 1000 holders.
+//
+// `decimals` and `balance` are each null when the answer is unknown, the same
+// way `holders` already is. Absence is never filled in here: this is the
+// upstream of every screen that displays a token amount, so a value invented
+// at this point is indistinguishable from a real one everywhere below it.
 async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
     try {
         const resp = await debugFetch(
@@ -72,11 +114,46 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
             // is unchanged.
             const type = String(item.token?.type || "").toUpperCase();
             if (type !== "ERC-20") continue;
-            const decimals = parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10);
-            const bal = formatTokenBalance(item.value || "0", decimals);
-            if (bal === "0.0") continue;
 
             const tokenAddr = (item.token.address_hash || "").toLowerCase();
+
+            // What the explorer reported, or null. NEVER a default: this
+            // value is written to state and every later reader — the approval
+            // screen's amount line, the swap lines, the Send screen — takes it
+            // as the token's resolved scale. A fabricated 18 reads exactly
+            // like a real 18 at that point, so it does not merely display the
+            // wrong quantity, it walks straight past the refusal those screens
+            // already have for a scale nobody knows
+            // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
+            const decimals = toDecimals(item.token.decimals);
+
+            const raw = rawUnits(item.value);
+            // No usable amount at all is nothing to list, exactly as a
+            // formatted "0.0" was before. Checked on the base-unit integer so
+            // it does not depend on knowing the scale: zero base units is zero
+            // tokens at every scale, and a value the explorer did not report
+            // as an integer is not a holding.
+            if (raw === null || raw === 0n) continue;
+
+            // The scale this row's balance is DISPLAYED at, which is not the
+            // same question as what the explorer said. The bundled list and
+            // the tokens the user tracks both outrank the explorer already
+            // (resolveTokenDecimals), so a token they know keeps showing its
+            // real quantity even when the explorer's entry omits decimals.
+            // Only what neither of them nor the explorer knows is unknown.
+            // The stored `decimals` above stays the explorer's own answer
+            // either way: copying another source into it would make
+            // explorerDecimals()'s disagreement check compare something other
+            // than explorer values.
+            const known = resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddr, { trackedTokens });
+            const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
+            // null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
+            // not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
+            // With a scale, the display filter proper applies: a balance that
+            // rounds to zero at six places is dust and is not listed. Without
+            // one there is no such judgement to make, and the row is kept.
+            const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
+            if (bal === "0.0") continue;
             // null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
             // same as a count of zero.  This gate is not the low-holder
             // display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
@@ -105,7 +182,15 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
                 address: item.token.address_hash,
                 name: item.token.name || "",
                 symbol: item.token.symbol || "???",
+                // null means the explorer reported no usable scale — unknown,
+                // not 18. Distinguishable from a real 18 at read time is the
+                // entire point: resolveTokenDecimals() falls through a null to
+                // its refusal, and takes an 18 as the answer.
                 decimals: decimals,
+                // null means nothing anywhere knows the scale, so there is no
+                // token quantity to state. Not "0.0": a nonzero holding shown
+                // as zero is the same lie in the balance list that the
+                // approval screens refuse to tell.
                 balance: bal,
                 holders: holders,
             });
@@ -118,9 +203,15 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 }
 
 // Fetch ETH balances, ENS names, and ERC-20 token balances for all addresses.
-async function refreshBalances(wallets, rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
+async function refreshBalances(
+    wallets,
+    rpcUrl,
+    blockscoutUrl,
+    trackedTokens,
+    networkId,
+) {
     log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const updates = [];
 
     for (const wallet of wallets) {
@@ -193,9 +284,9 @@ async function refreshBalances(wallets, rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 
 // Look up token metadata from its contract.
 // Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
-async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl) {
+async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
 
     let name, symbol, decimals;
@@ -235,9 +326,9 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl) {
 // Checks gapLimit addresses in parallel per batch.  Stops when an entire
 // batch has no used addresses (i.e. gapLimit consecutive empty addresses).
 // Returns { addresses: [{ address, index }], nextIndex }.
-async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, gapLimit = 5) {
+async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, networkId, gapLimit = 5) {
     log.debugf("scanForAddresses start, gapLimit:", gapLimit);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const used = [];
     let checked = 0;
     let checkUpTo = gapLimit;

src/shared/browserApi.js

@@ -194,6 +194,23 @@ function storageSet(items) {
     return Promise.resolve(storage.set(items));
 }
 
+/**
+ * Erase stored keys. The one caller is the destructive reset on the recovery
+ * screen (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js), which is the only way out of a
+ * profile no build can read; it rejects rather than defaulting for the same
+ * reason the two above do — a reset that silently did nothing would leave the
+ * user in the dead end they were promised an exit from.
+ *
+ * @param {string|string[]} keys
+ * @returns {Promise<void>}
+ * @throws rejects where `storage.local` is absent.
+ */
+function storageRemove(keys) {
+    const storage = storageLocal();
+    if (!storage) return storageUnavailable("remove");
+    return Promise.resolve(storage.remove(keys));
+}
+
 /**
  * @param {Object} queryInfo
  * @returns {Promise<Array>} the matching tabs.
@@ -251,6 +268,7 @@ module.exports = {
     sendMessage,
     storageGet,
     storageLocal,
+    storageRemove,
     storageSet,
     tabsApi,
     tabsQuery,

src/shared/chainSwitch.js

@@ -1,14 +1,23 @@
-// Consolidated chain-switch handler.
+// Consolidated chain-switch handler for the popup.
 //
 // Every state change required when the active network changes is
-// performed here so that callers (settings UI, background
-// wallet_switchEthereumChain, future chain additions) all go
+// performed here so that callers (settings UI, future chain additions) all go
 // through a single code path.
 //
 // Adding a new chain (e.g. ETC) requires only a new entry in
 // networks.js — no per-caller wiring is needed.
+//
+// The background does NOT come through here: this function mutates the
+// module-level `state` singleton, which the MV3 service worker never
+// populates, and a background switch performed on it wrote DEFAULT_STATE over
+// the user's whole profile
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316). The field mutations
+// themselves live in chainSwitchFields.js, which takes the record to mutate as
+// an argument; src/background/state.js applies them inside a read-modify-write
+// against storage, and the singleton is not reachable from the background
+// bundle at all (enforced by the ESLint rule in eslint.config.js).
 
-const { networkById } = require("./networks");
+const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("./chainSwitchFields");
 const { clearPrices } = require("./prices");
 
 // Switch the active chain and reset all chain-specific cached state.
@@ -16,56 +25,14 @@ const { clearPrices } = require("./prices");
 async function onChainSwitch(newNetworkId) {
     const { state, saveState } = require("./state");
 
-    const net = networkById(newNetworkId);
-
-    // --- core identity ---
-    // Endpoints are remembered per network rather than reset to the
-    // defaults, because a user who points the wallet at their own node has
-    // no way to get that URL back once it is gone: overwriting it moved
-    // every address and every transaction onto a third-party endpoint
-    // silently and permanently.
-    //
-    // state.rpcUrl / state.blockscoutUrl stay the live endpoints of the
-    // active network, so nothing that reads them changes. The invariant is
-    // that for the ACTIVE network those two fields are authoritative and
-    // the map entry may be stale (Settings writes the fields directly);
-    // for every other network the map is authoritative. Snapshotting the
-    // outgoing network here, before the switch, is what reconciles them.
-    state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId] = {
-        rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
-        blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
-    };
-    const remembered = state.networkEndpoints[net.id] || {};
-    state.networkId = net.id;
-    state.rpcUrl = remembered.rpcUrl || net.defaultRpcUrl;
-    state.blockscoutUrl = remembered.blockscoutUrl || net.defaultBlockscoutUrl;
+    const net = applyChainSwitchFields(state, newNetworkId);
 
     // --- price cache ---
     // Prices are chain-specific (testnet tokens are worthless,
-    // ETC has different pricing, etc.).
+    // ETC has different pricing, etc.). In-memory and per bundle, so this is
+    // the popup's own cache — the only context that ever fills it.
     clearPrices();
 
-    // --- balance / refresh state ---
-    // Reset last-refresh timestamp so the next polling cycle
-    // triggers an immediate balance refresh on the new chain.
-    state.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
-
-    // Clear per-address balances and token balances so stale data
-    // from the previous chain is never displayed while the first
-    // refresh on the new chain is in flight.
-    for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
-        for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
-            addr.balance = "0";
-            addr.tokenBalances = [];
-        }
-    }
-
-    // --- chain-specific caches ---
-    // Token holder counts and fraud contract lists are
-    // chain-specific and must not carry over.
-    state.tokenHolderCache = {};
-    state.fraudContracts = [];
-
     await saveState();
 
     return net;

src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// The field mutations a chain switch performs, applied to a state record
+// handed in rather than to the module-level `state` singleton.
+//
+// Split out of chainSwitch.js so the background can perform a chain switch
+// without the singleton being reachable from its bundle at all. The popup
+// still goes through onChainSwitch() (chainSwitch.js), which applies this to
+// the singleton and saves; the background applies it to the detached record of
+// its own read-modify-write (src/background/state.js).
+//
+// Everything here is synchronous and touches nothing but the object it is
+// given: no storage, no caches, no imports beyond the network table. That is
+// what makes it usable on a record that has been read fresh from storage
+// microseconds earlier and is about to be written back.
+
+const { networkById } = require("./networks");
+
+// Switch `s` to `newNetworkId` and reset every piece of chain-specific state
+// it carries. Returns the network configuration object for the new chain.
+function applyChainSwitchFields(s, newNetworkId) {
+    const net = networkById(newNetworkId);
+
+    // --- core identity ---
+    // Endpoints are remembered per network rather than reset to the
+    // defaults, because a user who points the wallet at their own node has
+    // no way to get that URL back once it is gone: overwriting it moved
+    // every address and every transaction onto a third-party endpoint
+    // silently and permanently.
+    //
+    // s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl stay the live endpoints of the active
+    // network, so nothing that reads them changes. The invariant is that for
+    // the ACTIVE network those two fields are authoritative and the map entry
+    // may be stale (Settings writes the fields directly); for every other
+    // network the map is authoritative. Snapshotting the outgoing network
+    // here, before the switch, is what reconciles them.
+    if (!s.networkEndpoints) s.networkEndpoints = {};
+    s.networkEndpoints[s.networkId] = {
+        rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: s.blockscoutUrl,
+    };
+    const remembered = s.networkEndpoints[net.id] || {};
+    s.networkId = net.id;
+    s.rpcUrl = remembered.rpcUrl || net.defaultRpcUrl;
+    s.blockscoutUrl = remembered.blockscoutUrl || net.defaultBlockscoutUrl;
+
+    // --- balance / refresh state ---
+    // Reset last-refresh timestamp so the next polling cycle
+    // triggers an immediate balance refresh on the new chain.
+    s.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
+
+    // Clear per-address balances and token balances so stale data
+    // from the previous chain is never displayed while the first
+    // refresh on the new chain is in flight.
+    for (const wallet of s.wallets || []) {
+        for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+            addr.balance = "0";
+            addr.tokenBalances = [];
+        }
+    }
+
+    // --- chain-specific caches ---
+    // Token holder counts and fraud contract lists are
+    // chain-specific and must not carry over.
+    s.tokenHolderCache = {};
+    s.fraudContracts = [];
+
+    return net;
+}
+
+module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields };

src/shared/ens.js

@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ function setCache(address, name) {
     localStorage.setItem(key, JSON.stringify({ name, ts: Date.now() }));
 }
 
-async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl) {
+async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     const cached = getCached(address);
     if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
 
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     try {
         const name = (await provider.lookupAddress(address)) || null;
         setCache(address, name);
@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl) {
     }
 }
 
-async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl) {
+async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     const results = new Map();
     await Promise.all(
         addresses.map(async (addr) => {
-            results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl));
+            results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl, networkId));
         }),
     );
     return results;

src/shared/networks.js

@@ -31,8 +31,42 @@ const SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS = new Set(
     Object.values(NETWORKS).map((n) => n.chainId),
 );
 
+// Thrown rather than defaulted. An id this build does not know used to answer
+// with MAINNET, so a stored `{networkId:"base"}` rendered the selector as
+// Ethereum Mainnet with no banner and answered eth_chainId 0x1, while rpcUrl
+// still pointed at Base — the wallet telling the user and the page one chain
+// while transacting on another. Nothing in this codebase has an unknown id to
+// offer: stored state is validated against this table before it is loaded
+// (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and every other caller passes an id it took
+// from here. So an unknown id is a defect, and it says so, the same way
+// getProvider() (src/shared/balances.js) already refuses one.
+class UnknownNetworkError extends Error {
+    constructor(id) {
+        super(
+            "AutistMask does not know the network " +
+                JSON.stringify(id) +
+                "; it supports " +
+                Object.keys(NETWORKS).join(", "),
+        );
+        this.name = "UnknownNetworkError";
+        this.networkId = id;
+    }
+}
+
+// Own properties only: NETWORKS inherits from Object.prototype, so
+// NETWORKS["constructor"] and NETWORKS["__proto__"] both answer with something
+// truthy that is not a network. A stored id is untrusted input, and this is
+// the test the validator uses to decide whether it may be adopted at all.
+function isKnownNetworkId(id) {
+    return (
+        typeof id === "string" &&
+        Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(NETWORKS, id)
+    );
+}
+
 function networkById(id) {
-    return NETWORKS[id] || NETWORKS.mainnet;
+    if (!isKnownNetworkId(id)) throw new UnknownNetworkError(id);
+    return NETWORKS[id];
 }
 
 function networkByChainId(chainId) {
@@ -51,6 +85,8 @@ function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
 module.exports = {
     NETWORKS,
     SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
+    UnknownNetworkError,
+    isKnownNetworkId,
     networkById,
     networkByChainId,
     explorerLink,

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+// The shape of the persisted profile, and the normalization every read of it
+// goes through. No singleton, no storage access, no browser API: just the
+// record definition and pure functions over it.
+//
+// Split out of state.js so that a context which must never touch the
+// module-level `state` singleton can still speak the same record format.
+// src/background/state.js is that context — the MV3 service worker never
+// populates the singleton, and every defect in
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 came from background code
+// reaching it anyway and being served DEFAULT_STATE.
+
+const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
+const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
+const { STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION } = require("./stateSchema");
+// Dependency-free constant module. It lives under src/shared/ rather than
+// src/popup/ precisely because this module is in the background bundle: a
+// popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape the prohibition in
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, even when the
+// particular module is harmless.
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+
+const DEFAULT_STATE = {
+    hasWallet: false,
+    wallets: [],
+    trackedTokens: [],
+    networkId: "mainnet",
+    rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
+    blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
+    // Endpoints remembered per network: { [networkId]: { rpcUrl,
+    // blockscoutUrl } }. rpcUrl/blockscoutUrl above are the live endpoints
+    // of the active network; this is what the others are restored from
+    // when the active network changes. See applyChainSwitchFields().
+    networkEndpoints: {},
+    lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
+    activeAddress: null,
+    allowedSites: {},
+    deniedSites: {},
+    rememberSiteChoice: true,
+    showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
+    hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
+    hideLowHolderTokens: true,
+    hideFraudContracts: true,
+    hideDustTransactions: true,
+    dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
+    utcTimestamps: false,
+    fraudContracts: [],
+    tokenHolderCache: {},
+    theme: "system",
+    debugMode: false,
+};
+
+// Every field written to and read from the single "autistmask" storage key.
+// hasWallet is deliberately excluded from the diffing/merge logic in
+// state.js — like loadState() does, it is always derived from `wallets`,
+// never carried as an independent value. schemaVersion is excluded for the
+// same reason and is absent from DEFAULT_STATE for it: it describes the
+// record rather than being part of it, and every write stamps the current
+// value rather than diffing whatever was read.
+const PERSISTED_FIELDS = Object.keys(DEFAULT_STATE)
+    .filter((key) => key !== "hasWallet")
+    .concat([
+        "currentView",
+        "selectedWallet",
+        "selectedAddress",
+        "selectedToken",
+        "viewData",
+        "viewStack",
+    ]);
+
+function isRecord(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+// A list of token references, as everything downstream dereferences them:
+// `t.address.toLowerCase()`, with no guard of its own (src/shared/balances.js,
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js, and every view that shows a balance line).
+//
+// Both the container AND the entries, because they are separate defects. A
+// container check alone leaves a well-formed list of malformed entries walking
+// through to a dereference one level below the check, which is the same blank
+// popup: `[1, 2]` and `[{}]` are lists.
+//
+// A malformed entry is DROPPED rather than repaired: a token reference with no
+// address identifies nothing, so there is no value to repair it to, and the
+// alternative — refusing the whole record — sends a user whose wallets are
+// perfectly readable to an export-or-erase screen over a token list. An entry
+// that is a record with a text address is kept verbatim, extra fields and all.
+//
+// Verbatim is load-bearing for the fields BESIDE the address. A tokenBalances
+// entry carries `decimals: null` and `balance: null` when nothing knows the
+// token's scale (src/shared/balances.js,
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349), and those nulls are the
+// record that the value is unknown. Only `address` decides whether an entry
+// survives, so an unknown-scale holding is kept — flooring a null here to some
+// default would put the guess back one layer down from where it was removed.
+function tokenRefs(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
+    return value.filter(
+        (entry) => isRecord(entry) && typeof entry.address === "string",
+    );
+}
+
+// A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
+// fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
+// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
+// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
+//
+// Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
+// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
+// list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
+// is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
+// survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
+// structure with `saved`.
+function textList(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
+    return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
+}
+
+// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
+//
+// The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
+// `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
+// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
+// WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
+// mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
+// rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
+// healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
+// revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
+// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
+// one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
+// could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
+//
+// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
+// grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
+// "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
+// can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
+// only keeps a value that saveState()'s merge would hand to the prototype
+// setter on the next write. Keys are written with defineProperty so that no key
+// reaching this function can consult a setter at all, whatever the rule above
+// it becomes; mergeMapByKey() in src/shared/state.js writes the same way.
+function siteMap(value) {
+    const out = {};
+    if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
+    for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
+        if (address === "__proto__") continue;
+        const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
+        if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
+        defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// An endpoint URL: non-empty text, or the fallback.
+function url(value, fallback) {
+    return typeof value === "string" && value !== "" ? value : fallback;
+}
+
+// One remembered endpoint pair out of networkEndpoints, floored on the two
+// fields applyChainSwitchFields() (src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js) assigns
+// STRAIGHT ONTO s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl on the next chain switch: flooring
+// the live fields alone would leave a non-string sitting one switch away from
+// them. A field that is not text is deleted rather than replaced, so the
+// switch falls through its own `|| net.defaultRpcUrl`. Anything else the pair
+// carries is kept: a profile that has been on a build storing more per-network
+// fields must not lose them by passing through this one.
+function endpointPair(value) {
+    const pair = { ...(isRecord(value) ? value : {}) };
+    for (const field of ["rpcUrl", "blockscoutUrl"]) {
+        if (typeof pair[field] !== "string" || pair[field] === "") {
+            delete pair[field];
+        }
+    }
+    return pair;
+}
+
+// A list index into wallets / a wallet's addresses: a non-negative integer, or
+// null for "nothing selected".
+//
+// hasValidAddress() (src/popup/viewRouter.js) guards the restore path with
+// `state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] && …addresses[state.selectedAddress]`,
+// which is safe for a stale INTEGER — out of range is undefined, and the `&&`
+// short-circuits — and NOT safe for a string naming an Array.prototype member.
+// `wallets["map"]` is truthy, so the guard does not short-circuit and
+// `.addresses[…]` throws out of restoreView(): the dead popup. "length",
+// "constructor" and "__proto__" answer the same way, and
+// src/popup/views/confirmTx.js dereferences selectedWallet behind no guard at
+// all.
+function listIndex(value) {
+    return Number.isInteger(value) && value >= 0 ? value : null;
+}
+
+// Write `key` as an own data property, never through a setter. Plain
+// assignment of "__proto__" replaces the object's prototype and records no
+// entry; every map built from stored keys goes through this.
+function defineOwn(obj, key, value) {
+    Object.defineProperty(obj, key, {
+        value: value,
+        writable: true,
+        enumerable: true,
+        configurable: true,
+    });
+}
+
+// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
+//
+// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
+// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
+// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
+// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
+// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
+// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
+// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
+//
+// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
+// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
+// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
+// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
+function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
+    // A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
+    // still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
+    // early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
+    // fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
+    const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
+    const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
+    const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
+    // A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
+    if (
+        kept.length === 0 &&
+        currentView !== "main" &&
+        RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
+    ) {
+        return ["main"];
+    }
+    return kept;
+}
+
+// Turn a raw stored (or missing) record into the full, defaulted shape
+// loadState() used to assign directly onto `state`. A pure function so that
+// saveState() can apply it too: the fields THIS page did not change still have
+// to come from storage in their loaded-and-normalized form, not as the raw
+// bytes another page (or an old release) left there — otherwise a legacy shape
+// a load has always self-healed in memory (a missing networkEndpoints map, an
+// out-of-range flag) is dropped right back into storage unfixed every time the
+// page that DID normalize it saves something unrelated, because that field's
+// value never "changed" for that page to notice.
+//
+// The result never shares structure with `saved`, so a caller may mutate it
+// freely: it is the detached record every per-call read in the background is
+// built on.
+function normalizePersisted(saved) {
+    saved = saved || {};
+    const out = {};
+    // Every write goes out at the current version. That IS the migration for
+    // the unversioned records every install in the field holds: version 1 is
+    // the shape that shipped unversioned, so a record that validated is
+    // carried forward simply by being stamped. A record this build does NOT
+    // understand never reaches here — assertStateUsable() refuses it on the
+    // read path first (src/shared/stateSchema.js).
+    out.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+    out.wallets = structuredClone(saved.wallets || []);
+    // Derived, never trusted verbatim off storage — see loadState().
+    out.hasWallet = out.wallets.length > 0;
+    // Each address's token holdings, floored to a list of token records on the
+    // detached copy above. Every reader iterates it behind a `|| []` that only
+    // covers an ABSENT value, and then dereferences `t.address.toLowerCase()`
+    // and `t.balance` — so a stored string iterates as characters, a number
+    // throws on the iterator, and a null entry throws on the field.
+    //
+    // This field specifically, because refreshBalances() writes it WHOLESALE
+    // rather than merging into it: a write that only partly lands is the live
+    // cause https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311 names, and this is
+    // where it lands. The wallet list itself is the gate's (stateSchema.js);
+    // what is below an address record is not, and gets floored here.
+    if (Array.isArray(out.wallets)) {
+        for (const wallet of out.wallets) {
+            if (!isRecord(wallet) || !Array.isArray(wallet.addresses)) continue;
+            for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
+                if (!isRecord(addr)) continue;
+                addr.tokenBalances = tokenRefs(addr.tokenBalances);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // An actual list of token records is required, not merely a truthy value
+    // and not merely a list: everything downstream iterates this and
+    // dereferences `token.address`, so a stored string or object walks through
+    // a `|| []`, and a list of numbers walks through an Array.isArray(), and
+    // both throw on the first read — the blank popup from the issue, for a
+    // profile whose wallets are perfectly fine. An empty list is a legitimate
+    // value and survives.
+    out.trackedTokens = structuredClone(tokenRefs(saved.trackedTokens));
+    // The loud refusal for an unknown id is assertStateUsable(); this is the
+    // floor under it. networkId is an object KEY into networkEndpoints below,
+    // so a value that is not a network in networks.js must never get that far
+    // — "__proto__" would set the map's prototype instead of an own key, and
+    // the user's endpoint would silently not be recorded.
+    out.networkId = isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
+        ? saved.networkId
+        : DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
+    // Non-empty text or the default, never anything else. getProvider()
+    // (src/shared/balances.js) hands rpcUrl straight to `new
+    // JsonRpcProvider()`, which throws SYNCHRONOUSLY for a value that is not a
+    // string — out of src/popup/views/txStatus.js and src/popup/views/
+    // addWallet.js, neither of which is inside a try, and the first of which a
+    // stored `currentView: "wait-tx"` reaches through restoreView(). It is a
+    // scalar, so the type check is the whole fix.
+    out.rpcUrl = url(saved.rpcUrl, DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl);
+    out.blockscoutUrl = url(saved.blockscoutUrl, DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl);
+    // An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the code
+    // below and applyChainSwitchFields() index and ASSIGN INTO this value, and
+    // assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op in
+    // sloppy mode. Copied rather than referenced, nested pairs included, so
+    // normalizing never mutates the object a caller handed in.
+    const rawEndpoints =
+        typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
+        saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
+        !Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
+            ? saved.networkEndpoints
+            : {};
+    out.networkEndpoints = {};
+    for (const netId of Object.keys(rawEndpoints)) {
+        // Keys other than the known network ids are kept rather than dropped,
+        // so a profile that has been on a build with more networks does not
+        // lose their endpoints by passing through this one. That is why an own
+        // "__proto__" key survives here where siteMap() drops it, and why the
+        // write has to go through defineOwn().
+        defineOwn(
+            out.networkEndpoints,
+            netId,
+            endpointPair(rawEndpoints[netId]),
+        );
+    }
+    // A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair of
+    // endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt it as
+    // that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on the old
+    // build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
+    if (!out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId]) {
+        out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId] = {
+            rpcUrl: out.rpcUrl,
+            blockscoutUrl: out.blockscoutUrl,
+        };
+    }
+    out.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
+    // A non-empty address, or null, never anything else: this is passed to
+    // address.slice() and compared against stored addresses, so a stored
+    // number or object walks through a `|| null` and throws on the first
+    // render. The empty string is text but it is not an address, and it must
+    // become null rather than survive: init() auto-selects the first address
+    // only on a STRICT null, so a stored "" would leave the popup with no
+    // address ever selected. Nothing in src/ writes one, and this keeps the
+    // behaviour the `|| null` this check replaced already had.
+    out.activeAddress =
+        typeof saved.activeAddress === "string" && saved.activeAddress !== ""
+            ? saved.activeAddress
+            : null;
+    out.allowedSites = siteMap(saved.allowedSites);
+    out.deniedSites = siteMap(saved.deniedSites);
+    out.rememberSiteChoice =
+        saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
+            ? saved.rememberSiteChoice
+            : true;
+    out.showZeroBalanceTokens =
+        saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
+            ? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
+            : true;
+    // A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it. It
+    // is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
+    out.hideSpoofedSymbols =
+        saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
+            : true;
+    out.hideLowHolderTokens =
+        saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
+            : true;
+    out.hideFraudContracts =
+        saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideFraudContracts
+            : true;
+    out.hideDustTransactions =
+        saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideDustTransactions
+            : true;
+    out.dustThresholdGwei =
+        saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
+            ? saved.dustThresholdGwei
+            : 100000;
+    out.utcTimestamps =
+        saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
+    // A list of contract addresses, floored the same way: send.js builds its
+    // fraud set as `(state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase())`
+    // and filterTransactions() maps the same list through normalizeAddress(),
+    // so a stored string walks through the `|| []` and a stored number walks
+    // through an Array.isArray().
+    out.fraudContracts = textList(saved.fraudContracts);
+    out.tokenHolderCache = structuredClone(saved.tokenHolderCache || {});
+    out.theme = saved.theme || "system";
+    out.debugMode = saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
+    out.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
+    out.selectedWallet = listIndex(saved.selectedWallet);
+    out.selectedAddress = listIndex(saved.selectedAddress);
+    // "ETH", or a contract address, or null — never anything else. The popup
+    // restores onto "address-token" behind a truthiness check on this field and
+    // then dereferences it as text (`tokenId.toLowerCase()` in
+    // src/popup/views/addressToken.js, `state.selectedToken.toLowerCase()` in
+    // src/popup/views/receive.js), so a stored number is truthy, passes the
+    // restore gate, and throws on the screen it restores onto. Found by the
+    // sweep for this same defect class in
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362; floored to null, which
+    // is what the restore gate already treats as "nothing selected". The empty
+    // string was already falsy here and stays null.
+    out.selectedToken =
+        typeof saved.selectedToken === "string" && saved.selectedToken !== ""
+            ? saved.selectedToken
+            : null;
+    out.viewData = structuredClone(saved.viewData || {});
+    out.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, out.currentView);
+    return out;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    DEFAULT_STATE,
+    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
+    normalizePersisted,
+    restorableStack,
+};

src/shared/prices.js

@@ -78,9 +78,18 @@ function getAddressValue(addr) {
     let usd = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") * prices.ETH;
     let partial = false;
     for (const token of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
-        const tokenBal = parseFloat(token.balance || "0");
+        // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows, so it has no
+        // quantity to price — but it is still a holding, and a total that
+        // silently omits it would read as complete. That is exactly what
+        // `partial` is for (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
+        if (token.balance == null) {
+            partial = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        const tokenBal = parseFloat(token.balance);
         // A balance of zero is not a holding: it can neither add to the total
-        // nor make it incomplete.
+        // nor make it incomplete. Anything that is not a number at all is not
+        // a holding this can price either, and is left to the same rule.
         if (!(tokenBal > 0)) continue;
         if (prices[token.symbol]) {
             usd += tokenBal * prices[token.symbol];

src/shared/restorableViews.js

@@ -10,9 +10,20 @@
 // prompt in front of it, on a popup the user may have reopened by accident.
 // That is why "export-privkey" and "show-phrase" are absent.
 //
+// Nor may a view whose button destroys a wallet be listed, for the mirror
+// reason: a popup reopened by accident must not land on the screen that
+// erases key material. That is why "delete-wallet-confirm" and
+// "delete-wallet-lost-password" are absent.
+//
 // Kept in its own module, with no dependencies, so tests can assert the
 // exclusion directly rather than trusting a reading of the popup entry
-// point, which cannot be required outside a browser.
+// point.
+//
+// It sits under src/shared/ rather than src/popup/ because
+// src/shared/persistedState.js needs it and that module is in the BACKGROUND
+// bundle: a popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, whether or not the
+// particular module is harmless.
 const RESTORABLE_VIEWS = new Set([
     "main",
     "address",

src/shared/state.js

@@ -1,45 +1,48 @@
 // State management and extension storage persistence.
+//
+// The `state` export is a module-level singleton: ONE in-memory copy of the
+// profile per bundle, loaded once by loadState() and mutated in place from
+// then on. That is the popup's model — one page, one load at boot, one
+// lifetime.
+//
+// It is NOT the background's model, and the background must not reach it. The
+// MV3 service worker is torn down when idle and revived by the next message,
+// nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to hand
+// back DEFAULT_STATE with no complaint — five defects came out of that one
+// fact (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). Two things close it:
+// this module is unreachable from the background bundle, and reading a
+// persisted field of the singleton before a load now THROWS instead of quietly
+// serving a default.
+//
+// The unreachability is enforced by the BUILD. build.js fails when esbuild's
+// own metafile reports this module as an input of a background bundle — the
+// resolution the shipped file was built from, so no specifier syntax gets past
+// it — from the table in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, which also
+// records what that does and does not cover. The ESLint rule that reports the
+// same thing in the editor is fast feedback in front of the build, not the
+// guarantee.
 
-const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
 const { networkById } = require("./networks");
-// Dependency-free constant module; safe to pull into a background bundle.
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../popup/restorableViews");
+const {
+    DEFAULT_STATE,
+    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
+    normalizePersisted,
+} = require("./persistedState");
+
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+} = require("./stateSchema");
 
 const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("./browserApi");
+const { log } = require("./log");
 
-const DEFAULT_STATE = {
-    hasWallet: false,
-    wallets: [],
-    trackedTokens: [],
-    networkId: "mainnet",
-    rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
-    blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
-    // Endpoints remembered per network: { [networkId]: { rpcUrl,
-    // blockscoutUrl } }. rpcUrl/blockscoutUrl above are the live endpoints
-    // of the active network; this is what the others are restored from
-    // when the active network changes. See onChainSwitch().
-    networkEndpoints: {},
-    lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
-    activeAddress: null,
-    allowedSites: {},
-    deniedSites: {},
-    rememberSiteChoice: true,
-    showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
-    hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
-    hideLowHolderTokens: true,
-    hideFraudContracts: true,
-    hideDustTransactions: true,
-    dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
-    utcTimestamps: false,
-    fraudContracts: [],
-    tokenHolderCache: {},
-    theme: "system",
-    debugMode: false,
-};
-
-const state = {
+// The live record the proxy below guards. Everything inside this module reads
+// and writes THIS object, never the proxy: the guard is for callers.
+const rawState = {
     ...DEFAULT_STATE,
-    // Its own object, not the one DEFAULT_STATE holds: onChainSwitch()
+    // Its own object, not the one DEFAULT_STATE holds: applyChainSwitchFields()
     // mutates this map in place, and a spread copies the reference.
     networkEndpoints: {},
     currentView: null,
@@ -50,175 +53,571 @@ const state = {
     viewStack: [],
 };
 
-// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
+// False until loadState() has completed in this bundle. Until then, a
+// persisted field that has not been assigned in this context cannot be READ:
+// see StateNotLoadedError.
+let loaded = false;
+
+// True once this context has assigned anything into the singleton.
 //
-// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
-// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
-// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
-// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
-// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
-// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
-// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
+// What the guard is for is a context that READS a profile nobody put there —
+// every one of the five defects was a pure read of an untouched singleton,
+// answered out of DEFAULT_STATE. A context that has written into it is
+// managing it deliberately (the popup does, via loadState() at boot and by
+// hand thereafter), and reading back what you yourself put there is not the
+// mistake being caught.
 //
-// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
-// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
-// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
-// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
-function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
-    // A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
-    // still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
-    // early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
-    // fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
-    const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
-    const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
-    const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
-    // A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
-    if (
-        kept.length === 0 &&
-        currentView !== "main" &&
-        RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
-    ) {
-        return ["main"];
+// The cost of that is honest and worth naming: a context that writes one field
+// and then reads a different, untouched one is still served that field's
+// default. Nothing closes that here — what closes it for the background is
+// that the background cannot reach this module at all, which build.js asserts
+// against esbuild's metafile on every build (FORBIDDEN_INPUTS in
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, pinned by
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js).
+let adopted = false;
+
+// Every field whose pre-load value would be a plausible-looking default rather
+// than the user's data. The view scratch fields are guarded too: currentView
+// and viewStack are persisted, and a save that carried their pre-load values
+// would overwrite a real stored stack with an empty one.
+const GUARDED_FIELDS = new Set(PERSISTED_FIELDS.concat(["hasWallet"]));
+
+class StateNotLoadedError extends Error {
+    constructor(field) {
+        super(
+            "state." +
+                field +
+                " was read before loadState(); this context has no profile" +
+                " loaded and must not be served DEFAULT_STATE",
+        );
+        this.name = "StateNotLoadedError";
     }
-    return kept;
 }
 
+// Loud, not defaulted. The whole defect class this guard closes looks exactly
+// like working code at the call site: the read succeeds, the value is
+// well-formed, and it describes a wallet that is not the user's.
+const state = new Proxy(rawState, {
+    get(target, prop, receiver) {
+        if (
+            !loaded &&
+            !adopted &&
+            typeof prop === "string" &&
+            GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)
+        ) {
+            throw new StateNotLoadedError(prop);
+        }
+        return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
+    },
+    set(target, prop, value, receiver) {
+        if (typeof prop === "string" && GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)) {
+            adopted = true;
+        }
+        return Reflect.set(target, prop, value, receiver);
+    },
+});
+
 // Return the network configuration for the currently selected network.
 function currentNetwork() {
     return networkById(state.networkId);
 }
 
-async function saveState() {
-    const persisted = {
-        hasWallet: state.hasWallet,
-        wallets: state.wallets,
-        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-        networkId: state.networkId,
-        rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
-        blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
-        networkEndpoints: state.networkEndpoints,
-        lastBalanceRefresh: state.lastBalanceRefresh,
-        activeAddress: state.activeAddress,
-        allowedSites: state.allowedSites,
-        deniedSites: state.deniedSites,
-        rememberSiteChoice: state.rememberSiteChoice,
-        showZeroBalanceTokens: state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
-        hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
-        hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
-        hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
-        hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
-        dustThresholdGwei: state.dustThresholdGwei,
-        utcTimestamps: state.utcTimestamps,
-        fraudContracts: state.fraudContracts,
-        tokenHolderCache: state.tokenHolderCache,
-        theme: state.theme,
-        debugMode: state.debugMode,
-        currentView: state.currentView,
-        selectedWallet: state.selectedWallet,
-        selectedAddress: state.selectedAddress,
-        selectedToken: state.selectedToken,
-        viewData: state.viewData,
-        viewStack: state.viewStack,
-    };
-    await storageSet({ autistmask: persisted });
+// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
+// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
+// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
+//
+// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
+// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
+// right along with `state`, so the diff would always come out empty.
+let baseline = null;
+
+function snapshotPersisted() {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) out[key] = rawState[key];
+    return out;
 }
 
-async function loadState() {
-    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
-    if (result.autistmask) {
-        const saved = result.autistmask;
-        state.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
-        // Derived, never read from storage: a profile persisted with the flag
-        // out of step with the wallet list would otherwise stay broken on
-        // every load. Nothing depends on the two disagreeing.
-        state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
-        state.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
-        state.networkId = saved.networkId || DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
-        state.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
-        state.blockscoutUrl =
-            saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
-        // An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the
-        // code below and onChainSwitch() index and ASSIGN INTO this value,
-        // and assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op
-        // in sloppy mode. A stored primitive would therefore be re-persisted
-        // unchanged forever, and every switch would fall back to the network
-        // default — the endpoint loss this map exists to prevent, with no
-        // self-healing. The allowedSites/deniedSites guards below are only
-        // read from, which is why they can be looser.
-        state.networkEndpoints =
-            typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
-            saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
-            !Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
-                ? saved.networkEndpoints
-                : {};
-        // A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair
-        // of endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt
-        // it as that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on
-        // the old build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
-        if (!state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId]) {
-            state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId] = {
-                rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
-                blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
-            };
+function deepEqual(a, b) {
+    if (a === b) return true;
+    if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object") return false;
+    if (a === null || b === null) return false;
+    if (Array.isArray(a) !== Array.isArray(b)) return false;
+    const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
+    const bKeys = Object.keys(b);
+    if (aKeys.length !== bKeys.length) return false;
+    for (const key of aKeys) {
+        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, key)) return false;
+        if (!deepEqual(a[key], b[key])) return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+// Stable identity for a wallet, independent of its position in the array
+// (which shifts under a concurrent add/delete elsewhere) and independent of
+// its mutable fields (name is user-editable; addresses gains/loses entries
+// via scanning and deleteAddress.js). An "hd"/"xprv" wallet's xpub never
+// changes for its lifetime and is already enforced unique
+// (findWalletByXpub() in addWallet.js). A "key" wallet has no xpub, exactly
+// one address for its whole lifetime (nothing ever adds to or removes from
+// a key wallet's address list), and that address is already enforced
+// unique (findWalletByAddress()) — so it stands in for identity there.
+// Neither invariant is enforced by this function or by
+// mergeListByIdentity() below — they hold only because every wallet-
+// creation path in addWallet.js happens to populate one or the other before
+// the wallet ever reaches state.wallets, and because canRemoveAddress() in
+// walletDelete.js never lets a wallet's address list go to zero. A wallet
+// with neither (an empty/legacy/corrupt record) falls back to the same
+// "addr:" identity as every other such record, which is a genuine
+// collision, not a proxy for one — see the collision handling in
+// mergeListByIdentity().
+function walletIdentity(wallet) {
+    if (wallet.xpub) return "xpub:" + wallet.xpub;
+    const first = wallet.addresses && wallet.addresses[0];
+    return "addr:" + (first ? String(first.address).toLowerCase() : "");
+}
+
+// Stable identity for an address within one wallet's address list. An
+// address is unique within its wallet and, once derived or imported, never
+// changes — only whether it is present.
+function addressIdentity(addr) {
+    return String(addr.address).toLowerCase();
+}
+
+// Merge one array of identity-bearing objects (wallets, or the addresses
+// inside one wallet) by identity rather than by array index — an index
+// shifts under a concurrent insert/delete elsewhere, which would merge the
+// wrong pair of objects entirely.
+//
+// `theirs` (fresh storage) sets the membership baseline and the order:
+//   - An item this page never had baseline knowledge of, but that is in
+//     `theirs`, was added by someone else — kept as-is.
+//   - An item `base` had and `ours` no longer has was deleted by THIS page
+//     — dropped even though `theirs` still has it (this page's own delete
+//     must win over a background save that only touched leaf fields).
+//   - An item present in both `ours` and `theirs` is merged leaf-by-leaf via
+//     `mergeItem`, so a leaf this page changed (e.g. a renamed wallet) lands
+//     on top of `theirs`' otherwise-current copy (e.g. a refreshed balance).
+// Anything left in `ours` that `base` never had and `theirs` does not have
+// yet is this page's own new addition — appended.
+//
+// `identityOf` is not guaranteed collision-free (walletIdentity() falls
+// back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet with neither an xpub nor
+// a populated first address). Two records that collide under it must never
+// silently collapse into one — that is exactly how this function used to
+// drop a wallet, encryptedSecret included, with no error and no log. Two
+// defenses:
+//   - `ours` is indexed into GROUPS, not a single item per identity, so two
+//     colliding live items on this page can't overwrite each other in the
+//     index before the merge below even runs.
+//   - A matched pair with no shared `base` entry (neither page ever agreed
+//     on this identity) is only merged leaf-by-leaf when the two sides are
+//     already equal. If they differ, that is not "the same record edited
+//     twice", it is two different records that happen to share an identity
+//     — both are kept, unmerged, rather than guessing which one is real.
+function mergeListByIdentity(base, ours, theirs, identityOf, mergeItem) {
+    base = base || [];
+    ours = ours || [];
+    theirs = theirs || [];
+    const baseIndex = new Map(base.map((item) => [identityOf(item), item]));
+    const oursIndex = new Map();
+    for (const item of ours) {
+        const id = identityOf(item);
+        if (!oursIndex.has(id)) oursIndex.set(id, []);
+        oursIndex.get(id).push(item);
+    }
+
+    const result = [];
+    const seen = new Set();
+
+    for (const theirItem of theirs) {
+        const id = identityOf(theirItem);
+        seen.add(id);
+        const oursGroup = oursIndex.get(id);
+        if (baseIndex.has(id) && !oursGroup) continue;
+        if (oursGroup) {
+            const baseItem = baseIndex.get(id);
+            if (!baseItem && !deepEqual(oursGroup[0], theirItem)) {
+                log.errorf(
+                    "state: identity collision merging",
+                    JSON.stringify(id),
+                    "- keeping both records instead of dropping one",
+                );
+                result.push(theirItem, ...oursGroup);
+            } else {
+                result.push(mergeItem(baseItem, oursGroup[0], theirItem));
+                for (let i = 1; i < oursGroup.length; i++) {
+                    result.push(oursGroup[i]);
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            result.push(theirItem);
         }
-        state.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
-        state.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
-        state.allowedSites =
-            saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
-                ? saved.allowedSites
-                : {};
-        state.deniedSites =
-            saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
-                ? saved.deniedSites
-                : {};
-        state.rememberSiteChoice =
-            saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
-                ? saved.rememberSiteChoice
-                : true;
-        state.showZeroBalanceTokens =
-            saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
-                ? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
-                : true;
-        // A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it.
-        // It is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
-        state.hideSpoofedSymbols =
-            saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
-                : true;
-        state.hideLowHolderTokens =
-            saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
-                : true;
-        state.hideFraudContracts =
-            saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideFraudContracts
-                : true;
-        state.hideDustTransactions =
-            saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideDustTransactions
-                : true;
-        state.dustThresholdGwei =
-            saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
-                ? saved.dustThresholdGwei
-                : 100000;
-        state.utcTimestamps =
-            saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
-        state.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
-        state.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
-        state.theme = saved.theme || "system";
-        state.debugMode =
-            saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
-        state.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
-        state.selectedWallet =
-            saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
-        state.selectedAddress =
-            saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
-        state.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
-        state.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
-        state.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, state.currentView);
+    }
+
+    for (const item of ours) {
+        const id = identityOf(item);
+        if (seen.has(id)) continue;
+        if (!baseIndex.has(id)) result.push(item);
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+// Merge one wallet's scalar/leaf fields (name, encryptedSecret, nextIndex,
+// ...) against base, then recurse into its address list by identity. `base`
+// is null when this page created the wallet itself and no other page has
+// (yet) produced a same-identity record — nothing to merge in that case,
+// this page's own copy wins outright. mergeListByIdentity() only ever calls
+// this with `!base` when `ours` and `theirs` are already equal (a genuine
+// collision between two DIFFERENT same-identity records is caught and kept
+// as two separate entries before this function is reached), so returning
+// `ours` here can't discard a different wallet's data.
+function mergeWallet(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (key === "addresses") continue;
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    merged.addresses = mergeListByIdentity(
+        base.addresses,
+        ours.addresses,
+        theirs.addresses,
+        addressIdentity,
+        mergeAddress,
+    );
+    return merged;
+}
+
+// Merge one address's leaf fields (balance, ensName, tokenBalances, ...).
+// tokenBalances is itself an array, but only a balance refresh ever writes
+// it and always wholesale (refreshBalances() in src/shared/balances.js), so
+// there is no membership to reconcile within it — it is a leaf like balance
+// or ensName, not a list with its own identity.
+function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    return merged;
+}
+
+// Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
+// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
+// object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
+// a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
+// key can't collide with a different logical entry (Object.keys() is
+// already deduplicated), so this needs no collision floor of its own.
+//
+// Every write goes through defineProperty rather than assignment. The keys are
+// whatever the stored record carries, and plain assignment of "__proto__" —
+// which JSON can carry and normalizePersisted() keeps for networkEndpoints —
+// replaces this object's prototype and records no entry. That would undo one
+// layer downstream exactly what defineOwn() does in
+// src/shared/persistedState.js.
+function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
+    base = base || {};
+    ours = ours || {};
+    theirs = theirs || {};
+    const result = {};
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const put = (key, value) =>
+        Object.defineProperty(result, key, {
+            value: value,
+            writable: true,
+            enumerable: true,
+            configurable: true,
+        });
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(theirs)) {
+        seen.add(key);
+        const inBase = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key);
+        const inOurs = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ours, key);
+        if (inBase && !inOurs) continue; // this page deleted the whole entry
+        if (inOurs) {
+            put(key, mergeLeaf(base[key], ours[key], theirs[key]));
+        } else {
+            put(key, theirs[key]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key)) {
+            put(key, ours[key]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
+// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
+// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// pick.
+function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeListByIdentity(
+        base,
+        ours,
+        theirs,
+        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (b, o, t) => t,
+    );
+}
+
+function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+}
+
+// networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
+// applyChainSwitchFields() (src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js) writes
+// networkEndpoints[networkId] in place before saving. No code path ever
+// removes a key from this map, so the membership collision that matters for
+// allowedSites/wallets (an add on one page racing a delete on another) can't
+// happen here — but two pages switching to two different networks
+// concurrently still race a whole-field diff the same way, so it gets the same
+// per-key merge for the leaf edit case (e.g. Settings saving a custom RPC URL
+// for the active network).
+function mergeEndpointEntry(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    return merged;
+}
+
+function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeEndpointEntry);
+}
+
+// Read-modify-write, merged per field, rather than one full-blob write.
+//
+// Every extension page (the toolbar popup, a dApp approval window) holds its
+// own in-memory `state`, loaded once, and showView() saves on every
+// navigation. A full-blob write here clobbers whatever a second page had
+// written since — including, in the worst case, an entire wallet and its
+// encrypted secret with no attacker and no unusual input (see the issue this
+// fixes).
+//
+// Only the fields this page actually changed — those that differ from
+// `baseline`, captured at the last loadState()/saveState() on this page —
+// are written; every other field is carried forward from whatever is in
+// storage right now, which may already be a value another page wrote.
+//
+// `wallets` is merged structurally (mergeListByIdentity(), by wallet
+// identity and then by address identity within each wallet), not as one
+// whole field: a balance refresh mutates wallets IN PLACE (addr.balance /
+// ensName / tokenBalances, via refreshBalances()), so a whole-field diff
+// would mark all of `wallets` "changed" the moment any balance moved and
+// write back that page's own copy — loaded before its multi-second network
+// round trip — clobbering a wallet another page added, or resurrecting one
+// another page deleted, in that window. Merging by identity lets the leaf
+// changes and another page's membership changes (add/delete a wallet or an
+// address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
+//
+// `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
+// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
+// filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
+// doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can
+// resurrect a just-revoked site permission, or silently wipe a permission just
+// granted elsewhere.
+//
+// `networkEndpoints` gets the same treatment too (mergeNetworkEndpoints(),
+// by network id), since applyChainSwitchFields() writes into it in place; the
+// value per key is a small leaf object with no membership of its own; see the
+// comment at mergeEndpointEntry() for why the collision this closes is
+// milder than the other two.
+//
+// Every other persisted field stays a whole-field diff:
+// `trackedTokens`/`fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no
+// per-element identity to merge by; `tokenHolderCache` is a map shaped like
+// the ones above, but nothing in src/ ever writes an entry into it — it is
+// only ever reset wholesale to `{}` (applyChainSwitchFields()) — so there is
+// no in-place mutation for a whole-field diff to collide with; `viewData` is
+// this page's own UI scratch space, not data another page has any reason to
+// share membership of.
+//
+// This does not make two pages that both change the SAME leaf concurrently
+// safe: last write wins on that one leaf, same as before. What it removes
+// is the cross-field (and now cross-membership-vs-leaf) clobber — a page
+// that only navigated, or only refreshed a balance, overwriting a wallet or
+// address list it never touched the membership of.
+//
+// This page's own live `state` is deliberately NOT rehydrated from a field
+// another page changed — only the record written to storage is merged.
+// showView() fires saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it,
+// which is what makes the queue above necessary in the first place, and a
+// save that is slow to come back has no way to tell whether the field it
+// is about to hand back is still the current answer or has since been
+// overtaken by something this very page did in the meantime; writing it
+// into `state` regardless reintroduced exactly the clobber this function
+// exists to remove, just delayed and confined to one page instead of two
+// (caught by tests/txStatus.test.js). A page's live picture of a field it
+// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
+// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
+async function saveStateOnce() {
+    const current = snapshotPersisted();
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    // The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
+    // back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
+    // a page whose own load succeeded would normalize a record it does not
+    // understand — one a NEWER build wrote in the meantime, say — and write
+    // the result back over it, destroying the only copy of whatever that
+    // record held. Refusing is louder than that and loses nothing: the live
+    // state is untouched and the next save retries.
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
+    // Normalized, not raw: a field this page did not change still has to
+    // come from storage in its loaded (self-healed) shape. See
+    // normalizePersisted() in persistedState.js.
+    const fresh = normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
+
+    const merged = { ...fresh };
+    for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) {
+        if (key === "wallets") {
+            merged.wallets = mergeListByIdentity(
+                baseline ? baseline.wallets : [],
+                current.wallets,
+                fresh.wallets,
+                walletIdentity,
+                mergeWallet,
+            );
+        } else if (key === "allowedSites" || key === "deniedSites") {
+            merged[key] = mergeSiteMap(
+                baseline ? baseline[key] : {},
+                current[key],
+                fresh[key],
+            );
+        } else if (key === "networkEndpoints") {
+            merged.networkEndpoints = mergeNetworkEndpoints(
+                baseline ? baseline.networkEndpoints : {},
+                current.networkEndpoints,
+                fresh.networkEndpoints,
+            );
+        } else if (
+            baseline === null ||
+            !deepEqual(current[key], baseline[key])
+        ) {
+            merged[key] = current[key];
+        }
+    }
+    merged.hasWallet = Boolean(merged.wallets && merged.wallets.length > 0);
+    // Stamped on every write, never merged or diffed: the record that goes to
+    // storage is in THIS build's shape whatever shape it was read in, which is
+    // what migrates the unversioned records every install in the field holds.
+    merged.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+
+    await storageSet({ autistmask: merged });
+
+    // Derived from this page's own wallets, never adopted off the wire —
+    // see loadState(). Everything else this page did not change is left
+    // exactly as it stood; see the note above.
+    rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
+
+    baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
+}
+
+// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
+// two saves from the SAME page can be in flight at once — e.g. a screen
+// shown, then immediately replaced before the first save's storageGet()
+// round trip has come back. Left concurrent, the first save's turn would
+// finish after the second's live-state mutation and then re-hydrate `state`
+// from what IT read, stomping the second, later change back to a stale
+// value — the same clobber this function exists to prevent, just between
+// two saves on one page instead of two pages. Queuing makes every save's
+// snapshot-diff-write-rehydrate run start to finish before the next one
+// begins, so each one only ever sees the true live state at its turn.
+let saveQueue = Promise.resolve();
+
+// Where a failed save is REPORTED, set once by the context that has a screen
+// to say it on (src/popup/index.js).
+//
+// A save that fails must not fail silently. showView() fires saveState() on
+// every navigation without awaiting it, and the queue below has to attach a
+// rejection handler to keep advancing — so a failing save was swallowed
+// entirely: no throw, no message, nothing on screen. The wallet kept running
+// against storage that was rejecting every write, which is the data-loss half
+// of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362. The awaited callers were
+// no better off: `await saveState()` inside an unguarded event handler surfaces
+// in the console and nowhere the user looks.
+//
+// This is the "tell the user" half; the other half is the floor in
+// normalizePersisted(), which stops the malformed-record cause from arising in
+// the first place. Both, because a floor only covers the causes it knows about
+// and storage can still fail for reasons of its own (quota, a revoked
+// permission, a record a newer build wrote).
+let saveFailureHandler = null;
+
+function onSaveFailure(fn) {
+    saveFailureHandler = fn;
+}
+
+function reportSaveFailure(err) {
+    log.errorf("state: saving failed, changes were NOT persisted:", err);
+    if (!saveFailureHandler) return;
+    try {
+        saveFailureHandler(err);
+    } catch (e) {
+        // The reporter is the last thing standing between a failed save and
+        // silence; a reporter that throws must not become an unhandled
+        // rejection of its own on top of it.
+        log.errorf("state: the save-failure reporter itself failed:", e);
     }
 }
 
+function saveState() {
+    const turn = saveQueue.then(saveStateOnce);
+    // The queue must advance even when a save rejects, or every save after
+    // it queues behind a promise that never settles.
+    saveQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
+    // Every failed save is reported, whether or not the caller awaited this
+    // one. The returned promise still rejects, so a caller that DOES await
+    // keeps its own error handling.
+    turn.catch(reportSaveFailure);
+    return turn;
+}
+
+// Rejects with StateUnusableError for a stored record this build cannot make
+// sense of. Nothing is assigned and `loaded` stays false in that case, so a
+// caller that ignores the rejection gets StateNotLoadedError on the first
+// read rather than a half-populated profile. The caller that does NOT ignore
+// it is the popup entry point, which shows the recovery screen
+// (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js) instead of proceeding.
+async function loadState() {
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    // Before normalization, on the raw bytes: normalizing first would paper
+    // over the very shapes this refuses, which is how a corrupt record used to
+    // reach the popup and blank it (issue #311).
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
+    if (migrationNeeded(result.autistmask)) {
+        log.infof(
+            "state: migrating an unversioned profile to schema version",
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+    }
+    if (result.autistmask) {
+        Object.assign(rawState, normalizePersisted(result.autistmask));
+    }
+    // Whether storage had a profile or was empty, this context has now read
+    // it, and the defaults standing in for an empty profile are the right
+    // answer rather than a stand-in for one nobody looked for.
+    loaded = true;
+    // The point of comparison every saveState() on this page diffs against.
+    // See PERSISTED_FIELDS in persistedState.js for why a reference here
+    // would be wrong.
+    baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
+}
+
+// Through the guarded proxy, not rawState: a caller asking which address is
+// selected before anything was loaded gets the same loud failure it would get
+// reading the fields itself.
 function currentAddress() {
     if (state.selectedWallet === null || state.selectedAddress === null) {
         return null;
@@ -229,7 +628,9 @@ function currentAddress() {
 module.exports = {
     state,
     saveState,
+    onSaveFailure,
     loadState,
     currentAddress,
     currentNetwork,
+    StateNotLoadedError,
 };

src/shared/stateSchema.js

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+// The version stamped on the stored profile, and the shape check every read
+// of one goes through.
+//
+// Storage is the one input to this extension that nobody validated. A profile
+// carried no version at all, so there was no way to tell a record this build
+// understands from one a later build wrote, and loadState() coerced scalars
+// while trusting the structure — so a `wallets` that was a string, or an array
+// of nulls, or a later schema's wallet records, reached the popup and threw on
+// the first dereference. The popup rendered NOTHING: no view, no message, no
+// control, and no way out from inside the product
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// Two separate jobs, deliberately not merged:
+//
+//   stateProblem() / assertStateUsable()  refuse a record this build cannot
+//                     safely reason about, loudly, naming the problem in a
+//                     sentence that goes on screen. This is the gate.
+//   normalizePersisted() (persistedState.js)  self-heal a record that IS
+//                     usable: absent fields, legacy shapes, out-of-range flags.
+//
+// The gate runs FIRST, on the raw stored bytes, before normalization has a
+// chance to paper over a record whose meaning nobody can vouch for. A blob
+// that fails it is left in storage untouched — it is the user's only copy of
+// whatever it holds, and the recovery screen exports it before offering to
+// erase it.
+//
+// What is checked HERE is what nothing downstream can floor: the wallet list,
+// the version, and the network id that keys an object. Every other field is
+// normalizePersisted()'s to make safe, and what that function does is NOT
+// uniform across the record.
+//
+// WHICH FLOOR A GIVEN FIELD HAS IS NOT WRITTEN HERE. It is
+// tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js: one row per persisted field, naming
+// the property that field's floor is claimed to have, and PROVING it by
+// driving the real code with hostile values — the gate for a field the gate
+// refuses, normalizePersisted() for a field it floors, and, for a field whose
+// only defence is that nothing dereferences it structurally, a boot of the
+// real popup entry point onto EVERY view the popup can reopen onto.
+//
+// That last part is the whole point, because this defect class lives on the
+// RESTORE path and not on Home. Take the claim NARROWLY, exactly as that file
+// states it: what those boots prove is no structural dereference on the code
+// paths a WHOLLY-CORRUPTED PROFILE takes — which is not every path a stored
+// record takes. Not driven: any pairing of values the four slots do not
+// produce, a view only forward navigation opens, anything behind a click, and
+// everything a healthy profile reaches. Within that boundary the verdict is
+// unconditional, including a dereference that takes two corrupted fields at
+// once. That suite also goes red on a field that gains a floor while its row
+// still claims it has none, and on a field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS with no
+// row at all.
+//
+// That test exists because this comment did not work. It carried a
+// hand-written justification per field, and it shipped a false one in three
+// consecutive changes — a different field each time, each caught only by a
+// reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand. A claim nobody can execute is
+// worse than no claim, because it is believed.
+//
+// The trap is worth stating here, since it is what all three got wrong: a
+// check on a CONTAINER is not a check on its ENTRIES, and the dereference is
+// one level below the container. `[1, 2]` is a list, `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is
+// a record, and `{"currentView":"success-tx","viewData":{"hash":"0x1"}}`
+// passes the restore gate and throws on the address the renderer below it
+// reads. A field added to the record needs a decision about its entries as
+// well as its shape — and then a row in that test.
+
+const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
+
+// Bump this when the MEANING of a stored field changes, and add the migration
+// that carries the older version forward. Adding a field with a defaulted
+// absent value is not a bump: normalizePersisted() already handles that, and
+// bumping for it would send every older install to the recovery screen for no
+// reason.
+//
+// Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned. An unversioned record is
+// therefore version 1, not a defect — see migrationNeeded() below.
+const STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+
+// Thrown by every read path that finds a record it cannot use. `problem` is
+// the sentence shown to the user; `message` carries the same text so a log
+// line or a rethrow is not empty.
+class StateUnusableError extends Error {
+    constructor(problem) {
+        super(problem);
+        this.name = "StateUnusableError";
+        this.problem = problem;
+    }
+}
+
+function isPlainObject(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+// Own properties only, everywhere in this file. `saved` comes from storage as
+// parsed JSON, so `saved.constructor` and `saved.__proto__` answer from the
+// prototype chain for a record that carries neither — a check written as a
+// plain truthiness test can be satisfied by Object.prototype rather than by
+// anything the user's profile actually contains.
+function has(obj, key) {
+    return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
+}
+
+function ordinal(index) {
+    return String(index + 1);
+}
+
+function describeType(value) {
+    if (value === null) return "null";
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) return "a list";
+    return "a " + typeof value;
+}
+
+// One address record, as every screen dereferences it.
+function addressProblem(addr, walletIndex, addrIndex) {
+    const where =
+        "address " +
+        ordinal(addrIndex) +
+        " of wallet " +
+        ordinal(walletIndex) +
+        " in the saved data";
+    if (!isPlainObject(addr)) {
+        return "The " + where + " is " + describeType(addr) + ", not a record.";
+    }
+    if (typeof addr.address !== "string" || addr.address === "") {
+        return "The " + where + " has no address.";
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function walletProblem(wallet, index) {
+    const where = "Wallet " + ordinal(index) + " in the saved data";
+    if (!isPlainObject(wallet)) {
+        return where + " is " + describeType(wallet) + ", not a wallet record.";
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(wallet.addresses)) {
+        return where + " has no list of addresses.";
+    }
+    if (has(wallet, "name") && typeof wallet.name !== "string") {
+        return where + " has a name that is not text.";
+    }
+    for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
+        const problem = addressProblem(wallet.addresses[i], index, i);
+        if (problem) return problem;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function versionProblem(saved) {
+    // No version field at all is the shape every install in the field has:
+    // no build ever wrote one. It is version 1, and it is migrated in place.
+    if (!has(saved, "schemaVersion")) return null;
+    const version = saved.schemaVersion;
+    if (
+        typeof version !== "number" ||
+        !Number.isInteger(version) ||
+        version < 1
+    ) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data carries a schema version AutistMask does not" +
+            " recognize (" +
+            JSON.stringify(version) +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+    if (version > STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data was written by a newer version of AutistMask" +
+            " (schema version " +
+            version +
+            "; this build understands version " +
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The reason this build cannot use `saved`, as a sentence for the user, or
+ * null when it can.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved the raw record from storage, or undefined for a fresh
+ *     install.
+ * @returns {string|null}
+ */
+function stateProblem(saved) {
+    // Nothing stored is a first run, not a defect.
+    if (saved === undefined || saved === null) return null;
+    if (!isPlainObject(saved)) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data is " +
+            describeType(saved) +
+            ", not the record AutistMask stores."
+        );
+    }
+
+    const version = versionProblem(saved);
+    if (version) return version;
+
+    // Read once, from an OWN property or not at all, so that a polluted
+    // prototype cannot decide whether a profile is refused. Note that
+    // normalizePersisted() reads the same field plainly, and so WOULD consult
+    // the prototype chain: the two halves agree only because a record arriving
+    // from storage has been through structuredClone and always carries
+    // Object.prototype. Nothing reachable from storage can put them at odds,
+    // but a caller that hands either one a hand-built object with an unusual
+    // prototype is not covered by that.
+    const wallets =
+        has(saved, "wallets") && saved.wallets !== undefined
+            ? saved.wallets
+            : [];
+    if (!Array.isArray(wallets)) {
+        return (
+            "The list of wallets in the saved data is " +
+            describeType(wallets) +
+            ", not a list."
+        );
+    }
+    for (let i = 0; i < wallets.length; i++) {
+        const problem = walletProblem(wallets[i], i);
+        if (problem) return problem;
+    }
+
+    // networkId is not merely displayed: it is an object KEY into
+    // state.networkEndpoints. A corrupt "__proto__" would set that map's
+    // prototype instead of an own key, so the user's endpoint would silently
+    // not be recorded and a switch away and back would return the public
+    // default. isKnownNetworkId() is an own-property test against the network
+    // table for exactly that reason.
+    if (
+        has(saved, "networkId") &&
+        saved.networkId !== undefined &&
+        !isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
+    ) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data selects a network AutistMask does not know (" +
+            JSON.stringify(saved.networkId) +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+
+    return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refuse a record this build cannot use.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved the raw record from storage.
+ * @throws {StateUnusableError}
+ */
+function assertStateUsable(saved) {
+    const problem = stateProblem(saved);
+    if (problem) throw new StateUnusableError(problem);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether `saved` is a usable record written before versions existed, and so
+ * gets the current version stamped on it the next time anything writes. Purely
+ * informational — the migration itself is that stamp, since version 1 IS the
+ * unversioned shape.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function migrationNeeded(saved) {
+    return (
+        isPlainObject(saved) &&
+        !has(saved, "schemaVersion") &&
+        stateProblem(saved) === null
+    );
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    StateUnusableError,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+    stateProblem,
+};

src/shared/transactions.js

@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
+// The uint8 test every scale in this wallet goes through. Shared, not copied:
+// a scale is either reported or it is unknown, and "unknown" must mean the
+// same thing here as it does on the screens that refuse to format one.
+const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
+// The plain 4-decimal rule. The history and balance lists deliberately keep
+// truncation without the approval screens' nonzero floor: the transaction
+// detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
+const { truncateAmount: formatTxValue } = require("./amountDisplay");
 
 // Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
 // over the address, not part of its identity.  Every address comparison in
@@ -20,13 +28,6 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
-function formatTxValue(val) {
-    const parts = val.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
 function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
     const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tx.to?.hash || "";
@@ -95,21 +96,37 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
 function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
     const from = tt.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
-    const decimals = parseInt(tt.total?.decimals || "18", 10);
+    // The explorer's own answer, or null. Never a default: a transfer of
+    // 5000000000 units formatted at a guessed 18 reads as 0.000000005, and
+    // nothing downstream can tell that from a real 18-decimal transfer of
+    // that size. `parseInt(x || "18", 10)` also collapsed a genuine scale of
+    // ZERO into 18 (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/246).
+    const decimals = toDecimals(tt.total?.decimals);
     const rawVal = tt.total?.value || "0";
     const direction =
         normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
     const sym = tt.token?.symbol || "?";
+    // Without a scale there is no token quantity, so none is stated: the list
+    // row falls back to the symbol alone and the detail screen to its
+    // direction label, exactly as the contract-call rows above already do.
+    // The exact figure is not lost — it is the base-unit line below, which is
+    // the one number that needs no scale to be true.
+    const formatted =
+        decimals === null ? "" : formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawVal, decimals));
+    const exact = decimals === null ? "" : formatUnits(rawVal, decimals);
     return {
         hash: tt.transaction_hash,
         blockNumber: tt.block_number,
         timestamp: Math.floor(new Date(tt.timestamp).getTime() / 1000),
         from: from,
         to: to,
-        value: formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawVal, decimals)),
-        exactValue: formatUnits(rawVal, decimals),
+        value: formatted,
+        exactValue: exact,
         rawAmount: rawVal,
-        rawUnit: sym + " base units (10^-" + decimals + ")",
+        rawUnit:
+            decimals === null
+                ? sym + " base units (decimals unknown)"
+                : sym + " base units (10^-" + decimals + ")",
         valueGwei: null,
         symbol: sym,
         direction: direction,

src/shared/transferAmount.js

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ function mismatchMessage(displayed, onChain) {
     );
 }
 
-// A decimals value from either source as a number, or null if it is not one.
+// A decimals value from any source as a number, or null if it is not one.
 // decimals() comes back from ethers as a bigint and the explorer's copy arrives
 // as a string, so both of those are accepted alongside a plain number; anything
 // fractional, negative, out of uint8 range, or of any other type at all is not.
@@ -60,7 +60,16 @@ function mismatchMessage(displayed, onChain) {
 // The types are enumerated rather than coerced because Number() is far too
 // willing: Number([]) is 0 and Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would
 // admit an empty array as a scale of zero and encode a whole-token transfer
-// against it.
+// against it. Absence answers null and never a default, and a real scale of
+// ZERO answers 0 — the two are different answers, which is the whole point:
+// a falsy-collapsing `value || 18` cannot tell them apart, and neither can a
+// reader of what it wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/246).
+//
+// Exported because every module that has to decide whether it knows a token's
+// scale needs exactly this test, and three separate copies of it is three
+// places for the answer to drift: approvalAmount.js resolves the scale the
+// approval screens display at, and balances.js decides what the explorer
+// actually reported before it is stored.
 function toDecimals(value) {
     let n;
     if (typeof value === "number") {
@@ -110,6 +119,7 @@ module.exports = {
     displayedDecimals,
     transferAmountUnits,
     mismatchMessage,
+    toDecimals,
     MAX_DECIMALS,
     UNKNOWN_DISPLAYED_DECIMALS_MESSAGE,
     UNREADABLE_CONTRACT_DECIMALS_MESSAGE,

src/shared/uniswap.js

@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
 
 const { Interface, AbiCoder, getBytes, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
+const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("./amountDisplay");
+const {
+    resolveTokenDecimals,
+    unknownDecimalsAmount,
+} = require("./approvalAmount");
 
 const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
 
@@ -34,20 +39,112 @@ const COMMAND_NAMES = {
     0x21: "Execute Sub-Plan",
 };
 
+// The swap's Amount and Min. received lines land on the same approval screen,
+// and Amount is carried to the wait/success/error screens as the ERC-20 line
+// is, so they take the same nonzero floor: a swap of an amount below 0.0001 is
+// not "0.0000", and a slippage floor of one base unit does not read as "you may
+// receive nothing".
 function formatAmount(raw, decimals) {
-    const parts = formatUnits(raw, decimals).split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return parts[0] + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
+    return truncateAmountNeverZero(formatUnits(raw, decimals));
 }
 
-function tokenInfo(address) {
-    if (!address || address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
+// One wording for either side of the screen: a currency the calldata never
+// named. It reads as a refusal, the same stance unknownDecimalsAmount() takes
+// on a scale — not as a token name, and not as a quantity.
+const UNNAMED_CURRENCY = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
+
+// Explicit presence, never truthiness. Every gate in this file that guards a
+// decoded value goes through here: an address is never falsy once set, but an
+// amount of 0n is, and a gate that cannot tell a genuine zero from an absent
+// value is the trap this decoder has now been bitten by five times.
+function present(value) {
+    return value !== null && value !== undefined;
+}
+
+// Uniswap V4 spells "use the whole open delta" as an amount of zero:
+// v4-periphery `src/libraries/ActionConstants.sol` declares
+// `uint128 internal constant OPEN_DELTA = 0` ("used to signal that an action
+// should use the input value of the open delta on the pool manager or of the
+// balance that the contract holds"), and `src/V4Router.sol` substitutes the
+// full open credit whenever an exact-in swap action's `amountIn` equals it:
+//
+//     uint128 amountIn = params.amountIn;
+//     if (amountIn == ActionConstants.OPEN_DELTA) {
+//         amountIn = _getFullCredit(...).toUint128();
+//     }
+//
+// in both `_swapExactInputSingle` and `_swapExactInput`. Sentinel and literal
+// zero are the same uint128 word, so the encoding CANNOT distinguish them —
+// and the router does not try: it reads every zero as the sentinel, so in V4
+// there is no such thing as an exact-in swap of literally zero. The amount is
+// therefore not stated by the calldata at all; it is whatever credit is open
+// at execution time. It is carried as this sentinel rather than as 0n because
+// printing "0.0000" would state the exact inverse of what will happen —
+// "nothing is being swapped" for a step that swaps the entire balance.
+//
+// `amountOutMinimum` gets no such mapping: V4Router compares it directly
+// (`if (amountOut < params.amountOutMinimum) revert V4TooLittleReceived`), so
+// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor do
+// the V2/V3 paths have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
+// special-cases only `ActionConstants.CONTRACT_BALANCE` (1<<255), never zero —
+// so a zero `amountIn` there is a literal zero and is displayed as one.
+const OPEN_DELTA = Symbol("v4-open-delta");
+
+// The two amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register
+// as UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread
+// as a number — and deliberately not a third phrasing of "not named": these
+// say different things.
+const OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT = "All available (V4 open delta)";
+const NO_MINIMUM = "None (no minimum guaranteed)";
+
+// Permit2 amounts are uint160; the maximum is Permit2's "unbounded".
+const MAX_UINT160 = BigInt("0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff");
+
+// `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
+// defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
+// ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
+// 0.000000000001. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as they are
+// on `state`; resolveTokenDecimals() reads the bundled list, then those.
+//
+// A null `address` means UNDETERMINED — the calldata named no currency for
+// that side — and is refused rather than named. It is not native ETH: Uniswap
+// V4 spells native ETH as `Currency.wrap(address(0))` (v4-core
+// `type Currency is address`), and a Currency is ABI-encoded as a plain
+// address word, so every decode site here gets back the truthy string
+// "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" for it — never null. WRAP_ETH
+// sets that same explicit zero address, and an UNWRAP_WETH output is caught by
+// its caller before this is consulted, so nothing that genuinely is ETH
+// arrives null. Naming a null ETH states the wrong asset and formats its
+// amount at the wrong scale.
+function tokenInfo(address, sources) {
+    if (!address) {
+        return { symbol: null, decimals: null, address: null };
+    }
+    if (address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
         return { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null };
     }
     const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
-    if (t) return { symbol: t.symbol, decimals: t.decimals, address };
-    return { symbol: null, decimals: 18, address };
+    return {
+        symbol: t ? t.symbol : null,
+        decimals: resolveTokenDecimals(address, sources),
+        address,
+    };
+}
+
+// A swap amount line. With a scale it is the token quantity; with none it is
+// the base-unit integer with the unknown scale stated, the same refusal the
+// ERC-20 amount line makes, so the screen has one way of saying it. `display`
+// is the line on the screen, `raw` is what the status screens carry.
+function amountText(raw, info) {
+    if (info.decimals === null) {
+        const unknown = unknownDecimalsAmount(raw);
+        return { raw: unknown, display: unknown };
+    }
+    const formatted = formatAmount(raw, info.decimals);
+    return {
+        raw: formatted,
+        display: formatted + (info.symbol ? " " + info.symbol : ""),
+    };
 }
 
 // Decode PERMIT2_PERMIT (command 0x0a) input bytes.
@@ -174,6 +271,14 @@ const V4_SWAP_EXACT_OUT = 0x09;
 const V4_SETTLE = 0x0b;
 const V4_TAKE = 0x0e;
 
+// A V4 exact-in `amountIn`, read the way V4Router reads it: zero is
+// ActionConstants.OPEN_DELTA, not a quantity of zero. See the OPEN_DELTA
+// comment above. The exact-OUT actions below decode no amounts at all, so
+// their own OPEN_DELTA mapping on `amountOut` never reaches the screen.
+function v4ExactInAmount(raw) {
+    return raw === 0n ? OPEN_DELTA : raw;
+}
+
 // Decode V4_SWAP (command 0x10) input bytes.
 // The input is ABI-encoded as (bytes actions, bytes[] params).
 // We extract token addresses from SETTLE (input) and TAKE (output) sub-actions,
@@ -222,13 +327,17 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
                                 ],
                                 params[i],
                             );
-                            if (!settleToken) settleToken = s[0][0];
+                            if (!present(settleToken)) settleToken = s[0][0];
                             const path = s[0][1];
-                            if (path.length > 0 && !takeToken) {
+                            if (path.length > 0 && !present(takeToken)) {
                                 takeToken = path[path.length - 1][0];
                             }
-                            if (!amountIn) amountIn = s[0][2];
-                            if (!amountOutMin) amountOutMin = s[0][3];
+                            if (!present(amountIn)) {
+                                amountIn = v4ExactInAmount(s[0][2]);
+                            }
+                            if (!present(amountOutMin)) {
+                                amountOutMin = s[0][3];
+                            }
                         } catch {
                             // Fall through — SETTLE/TAKE will provide tokens
                         }
@@ -244,16 +353,20 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
                             );
                             const poolKey = s[0][0];
                             const zeroForOne = s[0][1];
-                            if (!settleToken)
+                            if (!present(settleToken))
                                 settleToken = zeroForOne
                                     ? poolKey[0]
                                     : poolKey[1];
-                            if (!takeToken)
+                            if (!present(takeToken))
                                 takeToken = zeroForOne
                                     ? poolKey[1]
                                     : poolKey[0];
-                            if (!amountIn) amountIn = s[0][2];
-                            if (!amountOutMin) amountOutMin = s[0][3];
+                            if (!present(amountIn)) {
+                                amountIn = v4ExactInAmount(s[0][2]);
+                            }
+                            if (!present(amountOutMin)) {
+                                amountOutMin = s[0][3];
+                            }
                         } catch {
                             // Fall through
                         }
@@ -270,9 +383,9 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
                                 ],
                                 params[i],
                             );
-                            if (!takeToken) takeToken = s[0][0];
+                            if (!present(takeToken)) takeToken = s[0][0];
                             const path = s[0][1];
-                            if (path.length > 0 && !settleToken) {
+                            if (path.length > 0 && !present(settleToken)) {
                                 settleToken = path[path.length - 1][0];
                             }
                         } catch {
@@ -288,11 +401,11 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
                             );
                             const poolKey = s[0][0];
                             const zeroForOne = s[0][1];
-                            if (!settleToken)
+                            if (!present(settleToken))
                                 settleToken = zeroForOne
                                     ? poolKey[0]
                                     : poolKey[1];
-                            if (!takeToken)
+                            if (!present(takeToken))
                                 takeToken = zeroForOne
                                     ? poolKey[1]
                                     : poolKey[0];
@@ -320,7 +433,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
 // Try to decode a Universal Router execute() call.
 // Returns { name, description, details } matching the format used by
 // the approval UI, or null if the calldata is not a recognised execute().
-function decode(data, toAddress) {
+function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
     try {
         const parsed = ROUTER_IFACE.parseTransaction({ data });
         if (!parsed) return null;
@@ -331,11 +444,44 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
 
         let inputToken = null;
         let inputAmount = null;
+        let inputEstablished = false;
         let outputToken = null;
         let minOutput = null;
         let hasUnwrapWeth = false;
         const commandNames = [];
 
+        // THE INVARIANT: an amount and the token it is counted in always come
+        // from the same hop. A figure is never rendered against a token that
+        // did not supply it.
+        //
+        // Both sides are therefore set as a PAIR — never field by field, and
+        // never on truthiness. An address is never falsy once set but an
+        // amount of 0n is, so gating the two halves independently let a hop
+        // with a zero amount fix the token and leave the amount open; the next
+        // hop's figure was then displayed against the first hop's token, at the
+        // first hop's scale. A V3 USDT->WETH hop with amountIn 0 followed by a
+        // V2 WETH->USDC hop of 0.5e18 rendered "500000000000.0000 USDT".
+        //
+        // The input side is fixed by the first hop that states either half, the
+        // output side by the last, because the final leg is what the user
+        // receives. A half the establishing hop did not state stays null and
+        // the line says so, rather than being filled in from a different hop.
+        const setInput = (token, amount) => {
+            inputToken = present(token) ? token : null;
+            inputAmount = present(amount) ? amount : null;
+            inputEstablished = true;
+        };
+        const setInputOnce = (token, amount) => {
+            if (inputEstablished) return;
+            if (!present(token) && !present(amount)) return;
+            setInput(token, amount);
+        };
+        const setOutput = (token, amount) => {
+            if (!present(token) && !present(amount)) return;
+            outputToken = present(token) ? token : null;
+            minOutput = present(amount) ? amount : null;
+        };
+
         for (let i = 0; i < commandsBytes.length; i++) {
             const cmdId = commandsBytes[i] & 0x1f;
             commandNames.push(
@@ -346,61 +492,61 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
             try {
                 if (cmdId === 0x0a) {
                     const p = decodePermit2(inputs[i]);
-                    if (p) {
-                        inputToken = p.token;
-                        inputAmount = p.amount;
-                    }
+                    // A permit states both halves itself, so it may replace an
+                    // input side an earlier hop established without breaking
+                    // the invariant.
+                    if (p) setInput(p.token, p.amount);
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x0e) {
                     const b = decodeBalanceCheck(inputs[i]);
-                    if (b) {
-                        outputToken = b.token;
-                        minOutput = b.minBalance;
-                    }
+                    if (b) setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x00) {
                     const s = decodeV3SwapExactIn(inputs[i]);
                     if (s) {
-                        if (!inputToken) inputToken = s.tokenIn;
-                        if (!inputAmount) inputAmount = s.amountIn;
+                        setInputOnce(s.tokenIn, s.amountIn);
                         // Always update output: in multi-step swaps (V3 → V4),
                         // the last swap step determines the final output token
                         // and minimum received amount.
-                        outputToken = s.tokenOut;
-                        minOutput = s.amountOutMin;
+                        setOutput(s.tokenOut, s.amountOutMin);
                     }
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x08) {
                     const s = decodeV2SwapExactIn(inputs[i]);
                     if (s) {
-                        if (!inputToken) inputToken = s.tokenIn;
-                        if (!inputAmount) inputAmount = s.amountIn;
-                        outputToken = s.tokenOut;
-                        minOutput = s.amountOutMin;
+                        setInputOnce(s.tokenIn, s.amountIn);
+                        setOutput(s.tokenOut, s.amountOutMin);
                     }
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x0b) {
                     const w = decodeWrapEth(inputs[i]);
-                    if (w && !inputToken) {
-                        inputToken =
-                            "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
-                        inputAmount = w.amount;
+                    if (w) {
+                        setInputOnce(
+                            "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+                            w.amount,
+                        );
                     }
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x10) {
                     const v4 = decodeV4Swap(inputs[i]);
                     if (v4) {
-                        if (!inputToken && v4.tokenIn) inputToken = v4.tokenIn;
-                        if (!inputAmount && v4.amountIn)
-                            inputAmount = v4.amountIn;
-                        // Always update output: last swap step wins
-                        if (v4.tokenOut) outputToken = v4.tokenOut;
-                        if (v4.amountOutMin) minOutput = v4.amountOutMin;
+                        setInputOnce(v4.tokenIn, v4.amountIn);
+                        // Always update output: last swap step wins. A step
+                        // that carries the Min. received figure but decoded no
+                        // output currency makes the output *undetermined* — it
+                        // is neither ETH nor whatever an earlier step named,
+                        // and that figure is no longer counted in that token.
+                        // Equally, a step that names an output currency but no
+                        // minimum leaves Min. received unstated rather than
+                        // keeping an earlier step's figure beside the new
+                        // token. setOutput() is both rules; a step that states
+                        // neither half leaves the output alone.
+                        setOutput(v4.tokenOut, v4.amountOutMin);
                     }
                 }
 
@@ -412,11 +558,14 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
             }
         }
 
-        // Resolve token info
-        const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken);
+        // Resolve token info. A null token on either side means the calldata
+        // named no currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it
+        // ETH. UNWRAP_WETH is the one output that is ETH without a currency to
+        // decode, and it is answered here rather than left to that rule.
+        const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
         const outInfo = hasUnwrapWeth
             ? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
-            : tokenInfo(outputToken);
+            : tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
 
         const inSymbol = inInfo.symbol;
         const outSymbol = outInfo.symbol;
@@ -434,7 +583,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
             address: toAddress,
         });
 
-        if (inputToken && inInfo.address) {
+        if (present(inputToken) && present(inInfo.address)) {
             const label = inSymbol
                 ? inSymbol + " (" + inputToken + ")"
                 : inputToken;
@@ -446,47 +595,74 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
             });
         } else if (inSymbol === "ETH") {
             details.push({ label: "Token In", value: "ETH (native)" });
+        } else {
+            // Nothing established the input token, so the line says that
+            // rather than going missing or naming a token by default. Same
+            // wording as the Token Out refusal below: the two sides of this
+            // screen must not describe the same condition in two ways.
+            details.push({ label: "Token In", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
         }
 
-        if (inputAmount !== null && inputAmount !== undefined) {
-            const maxUint160 = BigInt(
-                "0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
-            );
-            const isUnlimited = inputAmount >= maxUint160;
-            const amountRaw = isUnlimited
-                ? "Unlimited"
-                : formatAmount(inputAmount, inInfo.decimals);
-            const amountStr = isUnlimited
-                ? "Unlimited"
-                : amountRaw + (inSymbol ? " " + inSymbol : "");
+        if (present(inputAmount)) {
+            // Two amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather than
+            // formatted: V4's open delta, which is not a quantity at all (see
+            // OPEN_DELTA), and an unbounded permit. The open-delta test comes
+            // first — the sentinel is not a bigint and cannot be compared with
+            // one.
+            let amount;
+            if (inputAmount === OPEN_DELTA) {
+                amount = { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
+            } else if (inputAmount >= MAX_UINT160) {
+                amount = { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
+            } else {
+                amount = amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
+            }
             details.push({
                 label: "Amount",
-                value: amountStr,
-                rawValue: amountRaw,
+                value: amount.display,
+                rawValue: amount.raw,
             });
         }
 
-        if (outSymbol) {
-            if (outInfo.address) {
-                const label = outSymbol
-                    ? outSymbol + " (" + outputToken + ")"
-                    : outputToken;
-                details.push({
-                    label: "Token Out",
-                    value: label,
-                    address: outputToken,
-                    isToken: true,
-                });
-            } else {
-                details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: outSymbol });
-            }
+        // Keyed on the address, not the symbol: a token absent from the
+        // bundled list has no symbol, and gating the line on one dropped it
+        // entirely, leaving a Min. received figure with nothing saying what is
+        // being received. The Token In line above already falls back to the
+        // address; this does the same.
+        if (present(outInfo.address)) {
+            const label = outSymbol
+                ? outSymbol + " (" + outInfo.address + ")"
+                : outInfo.address;
+            details.push({
+                label: "Token Out",
+                value: label,
+                address: outInfo.address,
+                isToken: true,
+            });
+        } else if (outSymbol) {
+            details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: outSymbol });
+        } else {
+            // Nothing established the output token, so the line says that
+            // rather than going missing or naming a token by default, and a
+            // Min. received figure below it is never attached to a token the
+            // calldata did not state.
+            details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
         }
 
-        if (minOutput !== null && minOutput !== undefined) {
-            const minStr =
-                formatAmount(minOutput, outInfo.decimals) +
-                (outSymbol ? " " + outSymbol : "");
-            details.push({ label: "Min. received", value: minStr });
+        if (present(minOutput)) {
+            // A zero floor is the one case the user most needs stated: the
+            // swap guarantees nothing back. It is said in words, in the same
+            // register as UNNAMED_CURRENCY, because "0.0000 WETH" reads as an
+            // artifact of the four-decimal rule rather than as "this may
+            // return nothing" — and because it is true at every scale, so it
+            // holds even when the output token's decimals are unknown.
+            details.push({
+                label: "Min. received",
+                value:
+                    minOutput === 0n
+                        ? NO_MINIMUM
+                        : amountText(minOutput, outInfo).display,
+            });
         }
 
         details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });

tests/alarms.test.js

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 // A controllable clock plus a stubbed balance refresh, so a cadence test can
 // measure the interval between refreshes that actually happened rather than
 // asserting the interval someone intended.
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 let mockNow = 0;
 const mockBalanceRefreshAt = [];
 
@@ -247,32 +249,17 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
 // Loads the background worker against stubbed browser APIs. The returned
 // store is the extension storage the worker sees, so a test can seed wallet
 // state and read back what the worker persisted.
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does,
+// and carries the latency simulation above on every operation. It used to
+// alias, which for this file meant the worker's in-memory wallets and the
+// "stored" ones were one object — see tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
-    const storageStore = initialStore;
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(initialStore, mockStorageTick);
     const alarmsStub = makeAlarmsStub();
     const listeners = { onInstalled: [], onStartup: [] };
     global.chrome = {
         alarms: alarmsStub,
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: async (key) => {
-                    mockStorageTick();
-                    return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(
-                        storageStore,
-                        key,
-                    )
-                        ? { [key]: storageStore[key] }
-                        : {};
-                },
-                set: async (items) => {
-                    mockStorageTick();
-                    Object.assign(storageStore, items);
-                },
-                remove: async (key) => {
-                    delete storageStore[key];
-                },
-            },
-        },
+        storage,
         runtime: {
             onMessage: { addListener: jest.fn() },
             onConnect: { addListener: jest.fn() },
@@ -301,7 +288,7 @@ function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
     }));
     jest.resetModules();
     require("../src/background/index");
-    return { alarmsStub, listeners, store: storageStore };
+    return { alarmsStub, listeners, storage };
 }
 
 // Flush the promise chains the startup path and the alarm handlers run on.
@@ -410,8 +397,23 @@ describe("balance refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
         return {
             autistmask: {
                 hasWallet: true,
+                // A whole wallet record, not a bare address: a stored profile
+                // is validated against the schema on every read now
+                // (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a wallet with no address
+                // list is one of the shapes that refuses to load.
                 wallets: [
-                    { address: "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001" },
+                    {
+                        name: "Wallet 1",
+                        type: "hd",
+                        addresses: [
+                            {
+                                address:
+                                    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+                                balance: "0",
+                                tokenBalances: [],
+                            },
+                        ],
+                    },
                 ],
                 lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
             },
@@ -476,12 +478,16 @@ describe("balance refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
         // The guard's actual job, and the reason it is shortened rather than
         // removed: while the popup is open it refreshes every 10 seconds and
         // stamps the same field, and the background job has nothing to add.
-        const store = seededStore();
-        const { alarmsStub } = loadBackground(store);
+        const { alarmsStub, storage } = loadBackground(seededStore());
         await settle();
 
         mockNow += PERIOD_MS;
-        store.autistmask.lastBalanceRefresh = mockNow - 10 * 1000;
+        // As the open popup's own refresh would leave it: written to storage,
+        // not poked into an object the worker happens to share.
+        storage.write("autistmask", {
+            ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+            lastBalanceRefresh: mockNow - 10 * 1000,
+        });
         alarmsStub.fire(BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
         await settle();
 

tests/approvalDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// The floor of the approval screen's amount line.
+//
+// Amounts are truncated to four decimal places for scannability (README.md,
+// Display Consistency). With the token's true scale resolved, that truncation
+// can still take a real amount below the floor and print it as `0.0000`: one
+// base unit of an 18-decimal token, or a few hundred of an 8-decimal one. On
+// the one screen whose job is to state what is being authorized, a nonzero
+// transfer or allowance then reads as nothing.
+//
+// The invariant asserted here is narrow: a nonzero amount never renders as
+// zero. The four-decimal rule itself is unchanged, and the string the
+// confirmation screens carry as `txInfo.amount` is the same one, so it is
+// asserted on `rawValue` alongside the displayed line.
+//
+// Both amount paths of that screen are covered: the ERC-20 line decoded by
+// `src/popup/views/approval.js`, and the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received`
+// lines decoded by `src/shared/uniswap.js`.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
+const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const {
+    truncateAmount,
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+} = require("../src/shared/amountDisplay");
+
+const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
+
+// Bundled tokens, so the scale and the symbol both come from the list.
+const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"; // 6 decimals
+const WBT = "0x925206b8a707096Ed26ae47C84747fE0bb734F59"; // 8 decimals
+const DAI = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F"; // 18 decimals
+// Outside the list, so the scale comes from what the user tracks and the line
+// carries no symbol.
+const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
+
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+// The Uniswap swap lines land on this same approval screen.
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7"; // 6 decimals
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2"; // 18 decimals
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call: `amountIn` of USDT for at
+// least `amountOutMin` of WETH.
+function swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [USDT, WETH], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function swapDetail(amountIn, amountOutMin, label) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin), ROUTER);
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+function transferData(amount) {
+    return iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
+}
+
+function approveData(amount) {
+    return iface.encodeFunctionData("approve", [SPENDER, amount]);
+}
+
+// The Amount detail as the approval screen renders it: `value` is the line on
+// the screen, `rawValue` is what is carried to the wait/success/error screens.
+function amount(data, token) {
+    const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, token);
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("a nonzero amount never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("500 base units of a 6-decimal token", () => {
+        const detail = amount(transferData(500n), USDC);
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.0005 USDC");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.0005");
+    });
+
+    test("1 base unit of an 18-decimal token", () => {
+        const detail = amount(transferData(1n), DAI);
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.000000000000000001 DAI");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.000000000000000001");
+    });
+
+    test("500 base units of an 8-decimal token", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(500n), WBT).rawValue).toBe("0.000005");
+    });
+
+    test("an allowance below the floor is not rendered as zero either", () => {
+        expect(amount(approveData(1n), DAI).value).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001 DAI",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The floor holds at any scale, not only the three above: for every
+    // decimals a token can declare, one base unit has to show a digit.
+    test("one base unit shows a significant digit at every scale", () => {
+        for (let decimals = 0; decimals <= 30; decimals++) {
+            state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL, decimals }];
+            expect(amount(transferData(1n), NOVEL).rawValue).toMatch(/[1-9]/);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+// The swap decoder formats its own amounts, so the same floor has to hold on
+// the swap lines of the same screen. `Min. received` is the sharper of the
+// two: the slippage floor rendered as `0.0000` states that the swap may return
+// nothing.
+describe("a swap's amounts never render as zero either", () => {
+    test("a swap input below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
+        // 50 base units of a 6-decimal token is 0.00005.
+        const detail = swapDetail(50n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.00005 USDT");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.00005");
+    });
+
+    test("a min-received below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
+        // 1 wei of an 18-decimal token.
+        expect(swapDetail(10n ** 6n, 1n, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001 WETH",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("swap amounts at or above the floor are still truncated", () => {
+        expect(swapDetail(1000000n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
+            "1.0000",
+        );
+        expect(
+            swapDetail(1000000n, 999999999999999999n, "Min. received").value,
+        ).toBe("0.9999 WETH");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the four-decimal rule is otherwise unchanged", () => {
+    test("a whole amount keeps exactly four decimals", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(5000000000n), USDC).rawValue).toBe(
+            "5000.0000",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("precision beyond four decimals is still truncated", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(1234567890123456789n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
+            "1.2345",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an amount at the floor is not extended", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(100000000000000n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
+            "0.0001",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine zero still renders as zero", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(0n), DAI).rawValue).toBe("0.0000");
+    });
+
+    // The three truncators now share one module. The floor is a policy of the
+    // approval and confirmation screens only: the history and balance lists
+    // keep plain truncation, because the transaction detail view is the
+    // authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
+    test("the list rule stays unfloored", () => {
+        expect(truncateAmount("0.000000000000000001")).toBe("0.0000");
+        expect(truncateAmountNeverZero("0.000000000000000001")).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/backNavigation.test.js

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
 
     test("Back onto the transaction detail renders it", () => {
         reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"], {
-            viewData: { tx: { hash: "0xdead" } },
+            viewData: { tx: { hash: "0xdead", from: ADDRESS, to: ADDRESS } },
         });
         goBack();
         expect(calls).toEqual(["transactionDetail"]);
@@ -162,7 +162,14 @@ describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
 
     test("Back onto the transaction confirmation restores it", () => {
         reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"], {
-            viewData: { pendingTx: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" } },
+            viewData: {
+                pendingTx: {
+                    token: "ETH",
+                    from: ADDRESS,
+                    to: ADDRESS,
+                    amount: "1",
+                },
+            },
         });
         goBack();
         expect(calls).toEqual(["confirmTx"]);
@@ -171,7 +178,7 @@ describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
 
     test("Back onto the success screen renders it", () => {
         reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"], {
-            viewData: { hash: "0xdead" },
+            viewData: { hash: "0xdead", to: ADDRESS },
         });
         goBack();
         expect(calls).toEqual(["successTx"]);
@@ -180,7 +187,7 @@ describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
 
     test("Back onto the failure screen renders it", () => {
         reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"], {
-            viewData: { message: "execution reverted" },
+            viewData: { message: "execution reverted", to: ADDRESS },
         });
         goBack();
         expect(calls).toEqual(["errorTx"]);

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
 // before any jest.doMock() of the module, so the copy assertions below check
 // what the user is actually shown.
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const SIGNER_KEY =
     "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
@@ -137,22 +138,22 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     jest.resetModules();
 
     const broadcastTransaction = jest.fn();
-    const loadState = jest.fn(opts.loadState || (async () => {}));
 
-    // The network the wallet is on, which the tests switch under a pending
-    // approval. The node the transaction is populated against is on the same
-    // one, as it would be: switching networks switches the RPC endpoint too.
-    let chain = MAINNET;
+    // The node the transaction is populated against is on whatever chain the
+    // stored profile says, as it would be: switching networks switches the RPC
+    // endpoint too. The background takes the network from storage per call —
+    // it holds no in-memory copy — so this reads the record rather than a
+    // variable the test keeps alongside it.
+    const chainOf = (networkId) =>
+        networkId === "sepolia" ? SEPOLIA : MAINNET;
 
-    jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
-        state: { rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid", wallets: [] },
-        loadState,
-        saveState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: chain.hex }),
-    }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
-        getProvider: () =>
-            fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider, chain.num),
+        getProvider: (rpcUrl, networkId) =>
+            fakeProvider(
+                broadcastTransaction,
+                opts.provider,
+                chainOf(networkId).num,
+            ),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
@@ -174,15 +175,48 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     }
 
     const persisted = {
+        // Address RECORDS, not bare address strings: a stored profile is
+        // validated against the schema on every read now
+        // (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a bare string where a record
+        // belongs is one of the shapes that refuses to load.
         wallets: [
-            { name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [signer.address] },
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
         ],
+        networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
         allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
+    // The one wallet state there is. The background reads it per call and
+    // writes it read-modify-write; it holds no in-memory copy and cannot reach
+    // the shared singleton. Clones in both directions, as the real API does —
+    // the stub here used to hand back the live record and drop every write on
+    // the floor, so a test could neither see what was persisted nor be sure
+    // what it read had crossed the boundary
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
+
+    // A test that needs the state read itself to misbehave installs a hook —
+    // a stall, a throw — in place of the next reads. Armed after setup so
+    // that raising the approval is not what fails.
+    let storageGetHook = opts.storageGet || null;
+    const realGet = storage.local.get;
+    storage.local.get = jest.fn(async (key) =>
+        storageGetHook ? storageGetHook(key) : realGet(key),
+    );
+
     let messageListener = null;
     let windowRemovedListener = null;
     let connectListener = null;
@@ -194,15 +228,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     const actionPopups = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(
-                    opts.storageGet ||
-                        (async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
-                ),
-                set: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-            },
-        },
+        storage,
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -401,18 +427,32 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
-        loadState,
         created,
         removed,
+        storage,
         // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
         // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
         // approval.
         setActiveAddress: (address) => {
-            persisted.activeAddress = address;
+            storage.write("autistmask", {
+                ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+                activeAddress: address,
+            });
         },
-        // The user switching network in the toolbar popup.
+        // The user switching network in the toolbar popup. It moves the stored
+        // network and the endpoint together, as a real switch does.
         setNetwork: (network) => {
-            chain = network;
+            const networkId = network === SEPOLIA ? "sepolia" : "mainnet";
+            storage.write("autistmask", {
+                ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+                networkId,
+                rpcUrl: "https://rpc-" + networkId + ".invalid",
+            });
+        },
+        // Make the next state reads misbehave — stall, throw — without
+        // touching the reads that raised the approval. Pass null to restore.
+        setStateReadHook: (hook) => {
+            storageGetHook = hook;
         },
         fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
     };
@@ -677,15 +717,16 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
     // page never — and holds the slot for the life of the worker with it.
     test("an approval whose window closed under a failed attempt is answered, and frees the next request", async () => {
         const stalled = deferred();
-        const bg = loadBackground({
-            loadState: async () => {
-                await stalled.promise;
-                throw new Error("The wallet data could not be read.");
-            },
-        });
+        const bg = loadBackground();
 
         const first = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
+        // Armed only now: the approval was raised against a working state
+        // read, and it is the ATTEMPT's read that hangs and then fails.
+        bg.setStateReadHook(async () => {
+            await stalled.promise;
+            throw new Error("The wallet data could not be read.");
+        });
         bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
@@ -709,6 +750,7 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
             error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
         });
 
+        bg.setStateReadHook(null);
         const second = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
         expect(second.result()).toBeNull();
@@ -1226,19 +1268,18 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
 // The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
 describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
     test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {
-        let failNext = true;
-        const bg = loadBackground({
-            loadState: async () => {
-                if (failNext) {
-                    failNext = false;
-                    throw new Error("storage unavailable");
-                }
-            },
-        });
+        const bg = loadBackground();
         const pending = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
         const id = pending.id();
 
+        // The attempt's state read fails once, then works: nothing was
+        // broadcast, so the approval must survive for the retry.
+        bg.setStateReadHook(() => {
+            bg.setStateReadHook(null);
+            throw new Error("storage unavailable");
+        });
+
         const first = bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+// What one background handler's state can do to another's while both are in
+// flight.
+//
+// The background used to read and write the module-level `state` singleton in
+// src/shared/state.js — one object, shared by every handler in the worker,
+// replaced wholesale by any loadState(). Two consequences, both covered here
+// and both from https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324:
+//
+//   - A transaction attempt captured the chain id at its loadState() and then
+//     read the ENDPOINT off the singleton several awaits later. A chain switch
+//     committed in that window moved the endpoint under an artifact already
+//     verified against the old chain, so it would have gone to the new chain's
+//     node — the very thing the verification exists to prevent.
+//
+//   - backgroundRefresh() handed the singleton's wallets to refreshBalances(),
+//     which mutates address objects in place across a multi-second network
+//     round trip. Any concurrent handler that loaded state replaced those
+//     objects, so the refreshed balances landed on detached ones and the save
+//     that followed persisted the pre-refresh values — while still stamping
+//     lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo.
+//
+// Both use the real persistence path over a cloning storage stub. Nothing here
+// asserts the absence of a loadState() call; each asserts the OUTCOME, so it
+// holds against any implementation that gets the outcome right.
+
+const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
+const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const SIGNER_KEY =
+    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
+const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
+
+const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
+const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
+
+const NONCE = 7;
+const REFRESHED_BALANCE = "1.5";
+
+// The transaction the background populates, and the artifact signed from it.
+// Its chain is a parameter because the whole subject here is a chain moving
+// under work already committed to one.
+function populated(chainId) {
+    return {
+        type: 2,
+        chainId,
+        nonce: NONCE,
+        gasLimit: 100000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: 10000000000000000n,
+        data: "0x",
+    };
+}
+
+function storedProfile(networkId) {
+    const net = networkById(networkId);
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                xpub: "xpub-1",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0.0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: signer.address,
+        networkId,
+        rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+        lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
+    };
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+function deferred() {
+    let resolve;
+    const promise = new Promise((res) => {
+        resolve = res;
+    });
+    return { promise, resolve };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+// The background worker over a cloning storage stub, with the network and the
+// clock stubbed out. `opts.refreshBalances` replaces the balance refresh so a
+// test can hold one open across another handler's whole turn.
+function loadWorker(networkId, opts) {
+    const options = opts || {};
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    // Every provider this worker constructs, in order, with the endpoint and
+    // the network id it was given. The subject of the first test is which pair
+    // reaches the broadcast.
+    const providers = [];
+    const broadcastTransaction = jest.fn(async () => ({ hash: "0xfeed" }));
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: (rpcUrl, networkId2) => {
+            const provider = {
+                rpcUrl,
+                networkId: networkId2,
+                broadcastTransaction,
+                getNetwork: async () => ({
+                    chainId: BigInt(networkById(networkId2).networkVersion),
+                }),
+                getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
+                estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
+                getFeeData: async () => ({
+                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+                }),
+            };
+            providers.push(provider);
+            return provider;
+        },
+        refreshBalances:
+            options.refreshBalances || jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    let alarmHandlers = {};
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn((handlers) => {
+            alarmHandlers = handlers;
+        }),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
+    // A hook the tests use to suspend one handler mid-flight, so the other one
+    // runs entirely inside its window.
+    let getHook = null;
+    const realGet = storage.local.get;
+    storage.local.get = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        if (getHook) await getHook();
+        return realGet(key);
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    // Every popup URL the background opened. The approval id is in it, and
+    // that is how the popup learns which approval it is answering.
+    const createdUrls = [];
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (createOpts, cb) => {
+                createdUrls.push(createOpts.url);
+                cb({ id: createdUrls.length });
+            },
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    function send(msg, sender) {
+        let result = null;
+        const kept = messageListener(msg, sender, (r) => {
+            result = r;
+        });
+        return { kept, result: () => result };
+    }
+
+    function rpc(method, params, origin) {
+        return send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params },
+            { origin: origin || CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+        );
+    }
+
+    return {
+        rpc,
+        send,
+        providers,
+        broadcastTransaction,
+        persisted: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
+        setGetHook: (hook) => {
+            getHook = hook;
+        },
+        fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
+        fireBalanceAlarm: () => alarmHandlers.balance(),
+        lastApprovalId: () => {
+            const url = createdUrls[createdUrls.length - 1];
+            if (!url) return null;
+            return new URL(url, EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval");
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () => {
+    // Item 4 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.
+    //
+    // The artifact is verified against the chain read at the top of the
+    // attempt. Whatever endpoint it is then broadcast to has to be that same
+    // chain's — otherwise the wallet checks a transaction against Sepolia and
+    // sends it to a mainnet node. A connected site can switch the chain at any
+    // moment, including this one.
+    test("the artifact is broadcast to the endpoint of the chain it was verified against", async () => {
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia");
+
+        // Raise the approval, then find its id from the popup's own fetch.
+        bg.rpc("eth_sendTransaction", [
+            {
+                from: signer.address,
+                to: RECIPIENT,
+                value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+                data: "0x",
+            },
+        ]);
+        await settle();
+
+        const id = bg.lastApprovalId();
+        expect(id).toBeTruthy();
+
+        // The popup signs what it was shown: Sepolia.
+        const rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction(
+            populated(Number(SEPOLIA.networkVersion)),
+        );
+
+        // A connected site switches the chain while the attempt is running,
+        // and the switch is committed to storage in full before the attempt
+        // goes any further.
+        //
+        // It is fired from inside the attempt's SECOND state read, because
+        // that is where the window used to be: the chain id was captured at
+        // the first read and the endpoint was taken off the singleton several
+        // awaits later, so a switch landing between them moved the endpoint
+        // under an artifact already verified against the old chain. An
+        // implementation that takes both from one read has no second read for
+        // this to fire on, and the switch below runs after the attempt is
+        // done instead — which is the point.
+        let reads = 0;
+        let switched = null;
+        const doSwitch = async () => {
+            switched = bg.rpc("wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
+                { chainId: MAINNET.chainId },
+            ]);
+            await settle();
+        };
+        bg.setGetHook(async () => {
+            reads++;
+            if (reads !== 2) return;
+            bg.setGetHook(null);
+            await doSwitch();
+        });
+
+        const attempt = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        bg.setGetHook(null);
+        if (!switched) await doSwitch();
+        expect(switched.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
+        expect(bg.persisted().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        await settle();
+
+        // It went out, and it went out to Sepolia's node — the chain the
+        // artifact was verified against. Reading the endpoint separately from
+        // the chain id put mainnet's here.
+        expect(attempt.result()).toEqual({ txHash: "0xfeed" });
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        const used = bg.providers[bg.providers.length - 1];
+        expect(used.rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(used.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a balance refresh under another handler's state read", () => {
+    // Item 5 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.
+    //
+    // The trigger is a same-chain wallet_switchEthereumChain from a connected
+    // site: it answers { result: null } and changes nothing, so the ONLY thing
+    // it can do to the refresh is what its state read does. On the singleton
+    // that read replaced state.wallets, detaching the objects the refresh was
+    // mutating.
+    test("a chain read arriving mid-refresh does not discard the refresh", async () => {
+        const roundTrip = deferred();
+        const reachedNetwork = deferred();
+
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia", {
+            refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
+                reachedNetwork.resolve();
+                await roundTrip.promise;
+                // In place, on the objects handed in — as balances.js does.
+                wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
+            },
+        });
+
+        const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
+        await reachedNetwork.promise;
+
+        const answered = bg.rpc("wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
+            { chainId: SEPOLIA.chainId },
+        ]);
+        await settle();
+        expect(answered.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
+
+        roundTrip.resolve();
+        await refresh;
+
+        expect(bg.persisted().wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(
+            REFRESHED_BALANCE,
+        );
+        expect(bg.persisted().lastBalanceRefresh).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+
+    // The other half of "does not publish a shared object": a wallet added
+    // while the refresh was in flight must survive the refresh's own write.
+    test("a wallet added mid-refresh survives the refresh's write", async () => {
+        const roundTrip = deferred();
+        const reachedNetwork = deferred();
+
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia", {
+            refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
+                reachedNetwork.resolve();
+                await roundTrip.promise;
+                wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
+            },
+        });
+
+        const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
+        await reachedNetwork.promise;
+
+        // Another extension page adds a wallet while the round trip is out.
+        const during = bg.persisted();
+        during.wallets.push({
+            name: "Wallet 2",
+            type: "hd",
+            xpub: "xpub-2",
+            addresses: [
+                { address: RECIPIENT, balance: "0.0", tokenBalances: [] },
+            ],
+        });
+        global.chrome.storage.write("autistmask", during);
+
+        roundTrip.resolve();
+        await refresh;
+
+        const after = bg.persisted();
+        expect(after.wallets).toHaveLength(2);
+        expect(after.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(REFRESHED_BALANCE);
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+// The lint rule that keeps src/shared/state.js out of the background bundle
+// (script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js).
+//
+// Five defects, one of which destroyed a wallet, came from background code
+// reaching that singleton, and each point fix created the next site
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// What this file does NOT do is establish that the singleton cannot reach the
+// background bundle. That is build.js's FORBIDDEN_INPUTS assertion, which reads
+// esbuild's metafile and so cannot be evaded by a syntax a matcher does not
+// know; it is pinned by tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js. The rule under test
+// here is fast local feedback in front of that, and these cases pin the shapes
+// it is known to catch, so a regression in the matcher is a failing test rather
+// than a quietly narrower rule.
+//
+// Every shape below was measured against a real `make build`: each one puts
+// state.js in the shipped background bundles, and each one was invisible to
+// some earlier revision of the matcher — the quoted-only regex missed the
+// backtick, the dynamic import and the `from` clause; its successor missed a
+// comment inside the call and a directory resolved through package.json `main`.
+//
+// Two shapes the rule does NOT report are pinned below as non-reports, in
+// "the divergences from the build's answer": a computed specifier such as
+// `require("../shared/" + "state")`, which esbuild constant-folds, and a
+// symlink to the module, whose real path esbuild reports. Both put state.js in
+// the shipped background bundle and both are `make build` exit 2 with
+// `make lint` exit 0 (measured). Pinning them as non-reports is what makes the
+// rule's stated bounds a measured description rather than a claim: if either
+// starts being reported, or the matcher is widened until one is, a test says
+// so. Their catch is the build's, and is pinned in
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js against the metafile that catches it.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+const { Linter } = require("eslint");
+
+const plugin = require("../script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground");
+
+const RULE = "background/no-state-singleton-in-background";
+
+// The three files a fixture tree always has. `src/background/index.js` is
+// supplied per case; the other two stand in for the real modules.
+const SHARED_STATE = "const state = {};\nmodule.exports = { state };\n";
+const SHARED_HOP =
+    "// A shared module the background legitimately imports.\n" +
+    "module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields() {} };\n";
+
+let roots = [];
+
+function fixture(files) {
+    const root = fs.realpathSync(
+        fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-state-rule-")),
+    );
+    roots.push(root);
+    const tree = {
+        "src/shared/state.js": SHARED_STATE,
+        "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js": SHARED_HOP,
+        ...files,
+    };
+    for (const [rel, source] of Object.entries(tree)) {
+        const abs = path.join(root, rel);
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+        fs.writeFileSync(abs, source);
+    }
+    return root;
+}
+
+// Run the rule exactly as eslint.config.js runs it, over a real tree: the walk
+// reads its sources from disk, so a virtual RuleTester would not exercise it.
+// `sourceType` is the fixture's own, not the rule's business: the walk is
+// textual and never parses the files it follows. The two ESM cases below pass
+// "module" only so espree can parse the fixture at all — in this repo those
+// shapes are also a parse error under the commonjs config, but the rule must
+// not be left depending on that.
+function lintBackground(root, { sourceType = "commonjs" } = {}) {
+    const file = path.join(root, "src/background/index.js");
+    const linter = new Linter({ cwd: root });
+    return linter.verify(
+        fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"),
+        {
+            plugins: { background: plugin },
+            languageOptions: { ecmaVersion: 2024, sourceType },
+            rules: { [RULE]: "error" },
+        },
+        file,
+    );
+}
+
+function chainOf(messages) {
+    expect(messages).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(messages[0].ruleId).toBe(RULE);
+    // "...singleton: <chain>. The MV3 worker..." — the chain is what the
+    // message exists to hand the reader, so assert on it rather than on the
+    // fact that something was reported.
+    return messages[0].message.split("singleton: ")[1].split(". The MV3")[0];
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    for (const root of roots) fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    roots = [];
+});
+
+describe("the specifier syntaxes the matcher is known to catch", () => {
+    test("a quoted require", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../shared/state");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a backtick require", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                "const { state } = require(`../shared/state`);\n" +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a dynamic import inside an async function", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                "async function readState() {\n" +
+                '    const m = await import("../shared/state");\n' +
+                "    return m.state;\n" +
+                "}\n" +
+                "module.exports = { readState };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a static import from-clause", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'import { state } from "../shared/state";\n' +
+                "export { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root, { sourceType: "module" }))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // `import(/* webpackChunkName: "x" */ "./x")` is the standard bundler
+    // annotation idiom, and prettier leaves both of these exactly as written,
+    // so nothing else in the repo would object to them either.
+    test("a comment between the paren and the specifier", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require(/* probe */ "../shared/state").state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a comment between the specifier and the closing paren", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/state" /* probe */).state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a bare side-effect import", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js": 'import "../shared/state";\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root, { sourceType: "module" }))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("reachability, not just the direct specifier", () => {
+    // The shape a no-restricted-imports could never see: no background file
+    // names state.js, and the singleton is in the bundle anyway. In a backtick
+    // require, so this fails on the specifier widening as well as on the walk.
+    test("a two-hop re-export through a shared module", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields };\n",
+            "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js":
+                SHARED_HOP +
+                "module.exports.state = require(`./state`).state;\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js" +
+                " -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Resolution, not syntax: the specifier names a directory, and the file it
+    // resolves to is chosen by that directory's package.json `main`. A walk
+    // that only tries `<dir>/index.js` stops on a specifier it matched.
+    test("a directory resolved through its package.json main", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/probepkg").state;\n',
+            "src/shared/probepkg/package.json": '{"main": "./bridge.js"}\n',
+            "src/shared/probepkg/bridge.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../state");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/probepkg/bridge.js" +
+                " -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// These two are holes in the rule, and they are pinned as holes on purpose:
+// the build catches both, the rule is fast feedback in front of it, and a
+// written-down bound that nothing measures is how the previous three rounds of
+// this change ended up with claims that were false.
+describe("the divergences from the build's answer", () => {
+    test("a computed specifier is not reported (esbuild folds it; the build fails)", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/" + "state").state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a symlink to the module is not reported (esbuild reports the real path)", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../shared/stateLink");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        fs.symlinkSync(
+            path.join(root, "src/shared/state.js"),
+            path.join(root, "src/shared/stateLink.js"),
+        );
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the rule must not report", () => {
+    test("a background file that reaches only its own state layer", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { getState } = require("./state");\n' +
+                'const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { getState, applyChainSwitchFields };\n",
+            "src/background/state.js":
+                "async function getState() {}\nmodule.exports = { getState };\n",
+        });
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // The tree as it actually stands. This is the assertion that would catch a
+    // widened matcher that resolves something it should not: it runs the rule
+    // over the real background entrypoint, from the real repo root.
+    test("the repository's own background entrypoint", () => {
+        const root = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});

tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// build.js's FORBIDDEN_INPUTS assertion — the mechanical guarantee that the
+// MV3 background bundle cannot contain src/shared/state.js
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// Why this file exists: `make check` does not run `make build`. CI executes
+// the assertion (Dockerfile runs `make build`), but executing is not testing —
+// invert its condition, or make the table lookup always come back undefined,
+// and every check in this repo stays green while the singleton walks back into
+// the worker. Five defects, one destroyed wallet, and the whole argument for
+// the scoped loud-read guard rest on this assertion, so it is pinned here.
+//
+// The subject is build.js's exported helpers plus the table's own
+// well-formedness check, driven against SYNTHETIC metafiles in esbuild's
+// shape. Nothing here shells out to a build or writes dist/: the assertion's
+// job is to read a metafile correctly, and a metafile is data. That the real
+// shapes reach it is the build's own business and is measured in the PR that
+// introduced it.
+//
+// Every vacuous pass this guarantee has been found to have is pinned below,
+// because each one was a way for `make check`, `make lint` and `make build` to
+// be green over a background bundle containing the singleton: a stale key, a
+// stale module, an entry that lists no modules, an entry recorded as checked
+// before its bundle was in hand, and a background entry point nobody added to
+// the table.
+//
+// Paths are absolute on the way in, because the helpers normalize whatever
+// esbuild gave them to repo-relative and this file should not depend on the
+// working directory jest was started from.
+
+const path = require("path");
+
+const {
+    importChain,
+    newForbiddenRecord,
+    recordBundledInputs,
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs,
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered,
+} = require("../build");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+} = require("../script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
+
+const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
+const abs = (p) => path.join(ROOT, p);
+
+const ENTRY = "src/background/index.js";
+const OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/index.js";
+const STATE = "src/shared/state.js";
+const HOP = "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js";
+const SECOND = "src/background/worker2.js";
+const SECOND_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/worker2.js";
+const POPUP = "src/popup/index.js";
+const POPUP_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js";
+
+// The real table's shape: entry point -> modules its bundle may not contain.
+const TABLE = { [ENTRY]: [STATE] };
+
+// A metafile as esbuild emits one: `outputs[out].inputs` is the flat list of
+// every input that contributed to that output, and `inputs[file].imports` is
+// the edge list, which is what the chain walk follows.
+function metafile({ outputs = {}, imports = {} } = {}) {
+    return {
+        outputs: Object.fromEntries(
+            Object.entries(outputs).map(([out, inputs]) => [
+                abs(out),
+                {
+                    inputs: Object.fromEntries(
+                        inputs.map((input) => [
+                            abs(input),
+                            { bytesInOutput: 1 },
+                        ]),
+                    ),
+                },
+            ]),
+        ),
+        inputs: Object.fromEntries(
+            Object.entries(imports).map(([file, targets]) => [
+                abs(file),
+                { imports: targets.map((target) => ({ path: abs(target) })) },
+            ]),
+        ),
+    };
+}
+
+function check(mf, table = TABLE, record = newForbiddenRecord()) {
+    recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, table);
+    return record;
+}
+
+describe("assertNoForbiddenInputs()", () => {
+    test("a forbidden module in the bundle fails, naming the import chain", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, STATE] },
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: [STATE],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
+            `${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach: ` +
+                `${ENTRY} -> ${HOP} -> ${STATE}.`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a bundle without the forbidden module passes, and is recorded as checked", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
+        });
+
+        const record = check(mf);
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([ENTRY]);
+        expect(record.bundledInputs.has(STATE)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("the failure still names the bundle when no import chain can be shown", () => {
+        // esbuild resolves `import("../shared/" + variable)` as a glob: the
+        // module is an input of the output, but no single edge leads to it.
+        // The message must degrade to no chain rather than crash.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+
+        expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
+            `${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach.`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The lookup this covers is the fragile step in the whole assertion:
+    // repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd() and esbuild's output keys
+    // are cwd-relative, so a change to where the build runs from, or to
+    // outfile vs outdir, makes it miss. It must be loud, and the entry must
+    // NOT already be marked checked when it does — otherwise a later edit
+    // turning this throw into an early return leaves both halves of the
+    // guarantee satisfied by a bundle nothing looked at.
+    test("an output esbuild did not report fails, and records nothing as checked", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { "dist/chrome/src/background/renamed.js": [ENTRY] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE),
+        ).toThrow(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${OUT}`);
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
+
+        // So even if that throw became `return`, the coverage half catches it.
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).toThrow(
+            `${ENTRY} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled`,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// Finding from the fifth review of this change: adding a second worker entry
+// point is exactly the accident this guarantee exists for, and the person
+// adding one has no reason to know a table elsewhere needs a line. So the
+// default for the background directory is protected, not unprotected.
+describe("background entry points are protected by default", () => {
+    test("a bundled background entry point with no line in the table fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [SECOND_OUT]: [SECOND, STATE] },
+            imports: { [SECOND]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+                abs(SECOND),
+                abs(SECOND_OUT),
+                mf,
+                record,
+                TABLE,
+            ),
+        ).toThrow(
+            `${SECOND} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an entry point outside the background directory needs no line", () => {
+        // The popup legitimately bundles the singleton; that is its model.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE] },
+            imports: { [POPUP]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+                abs(POPUP),
+                abs(POPUP_OUT),
+                mf,
+                record,
+                TABLE,
+            ),
+        ).not.toThrow();
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("the prefix is the one the lint rule is scoped to", () => {
+        expect(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX).toBe("src/background/");
+        expect(SECOND.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(true);
+        expect(POPUP.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(false);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("recordBundledInputs()", () => {
+    // The sole data source for the module half of the anti-rot check, and
+    // every other case here hand-seeds what it produces. Driven for real,
+    // across two outputs, and then handed straight to the check that reads it.
+    test("records every input of every output, satisfying the module half", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: {
+                [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP],
+                [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE],
+            },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP], [POPUP]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect([...record.bundledInputs].sort()).toEqual(
+            [ENTRY, HOP, POPUP, STATE].sort(),
+        );
+
+        // Nothing hand-seeded: the covered check passes on what the recorder
+        // actually collected, so a recorder that collects nothing fails here.
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE);
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("importChain()", () => {
+    test("terminates on a cyclic input graph, and still finds the module", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
+                // The cycle: log <-> hop, with the target one hop past it.
+                "src/shared/log.js": [HOP, STATE],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toEqual([
+            ENTRY,
+            HOP,
+            "src/shared/log.js",
+            STATE,
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("terminates and returns null when a cycle cannot reach the module", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
+                "src/shared/log.js": [HOP, ENTRY],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertForbiddenTableCovered()", () => {
+    test("the shipped table is satisfied by a build that checked it", () => {
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        record.entriesChecked.add(ENTRY);
+        // The popup bundle is what legitimately contains the singleton.
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    // The build this drives bundles the popup and no background entry point,
+    // because a stale key AND a bundled background entry point is now the
+    // stronger failure above — the entry point that is there but unlisted is
+    // reported by name, before the end of the build. This case is the rot that
+    // is left after that one: a key naming something this build never bundled.
+    test("a key no bundled entry point matched fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP] },
+            imports: { [POPUP]: [] },
+        });
+        const stale = { "src/background/renamed.js": [STATE] };
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(POPUP), abs(POPUP_OUT), mf, record, stale);
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
+            "src/background/renamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was" +
+                " not bundled, so nothing checked it",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a forbidden module this build bundled nowhere fails", () => {
+        // The other half of the same rot: renaming or moving the singleton
+        // leaves a table that names a path nothing resolves to any more, and
+        // every bundle then passes it vacuously.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+        const stale = { [ENTRY]: ["src/shared/stateRenamed.js"] };
+        const record = check(mf, stale);
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
+            "src/shared/stateRenamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for" +
+                ` ${ENTRY}, but this build bundled it nowhere`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The third rot, and the worst of the three: an entry with an empty list
+    // is checked, is bundled, names no module that could be missing, and
+    // prohibits nothing — in BOTH layers at once, since the rule's forbidden
+    // set is Object.values(table).flat().
+    test("an entry that lists no modules fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const empty = { [ENTRY]: [] };
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, empty);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, empty)).toThrow(
+            `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertTableWellFormed()", () => {
+    // Runs at require time on the shipped table, in script/lib/
+    // forbiddenBundleInputs.js, so an empty list fails the lint run as well as
+    // the build — the build's own re-check cannot help a layer that never
+    // reaches the build.
+    test("the shipped table is well formed", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(Object.entries(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+
+    test("an entry that lists no modules fails, naming the entry", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({ [ENTRY]: [] })).toThrow(
+            `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a table with no entries at all fails", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({})).toThrow(
+            "FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@
 // broadcast — because an error code alone would not distinguish a gate from
 // a switch that happened and then reported a failure.
 //
-// The endpoint half of that issue lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js;
-// this file mocks the state module, which that one exercises for real.
+// The endpoint half of that issue lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js,
+// which covers the popup's chain switch; this file covers the background's,
+// which goes through storage rather than the shared state singleton.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -51,29 +53,11 @@ afterEach(() => {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 // Load the background worker against stubbed browser APIs, with the real
-// chain-switch module behind it, and return the handles to drive it. The
-// wallet state is a plain object so that a switch that DID happen is visible
-// as a mutation of it, and one that did not is visible as its absence.
+// chain-switch and persistence modules behind it, and return the handles to
+// drive it.
 function loadBackground() {
     jest.resetModules();
 
-    const walletState = {
-        networkId: "mainnet",
-        rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
-        blockscoutUrl: MAINNET.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        networkEndpoints: {},
-        wallets: walletFixture(),
-        lastBalanceRefresh: 1,
-        tokenHolderCache: {},
-        fraudContracts: [],
-    };
-
-    jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
-        state: walletState,
-        loadState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        saveState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        currentNetwork: () => networkById(walletState.networkId),
-    }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
         getProvider: () => ({}),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
@@ -88,12 +72,24 @@ function loadBackground() {
         registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
     }));
 
+    // Storage is the only wallet state there is. The background reads and
+    // writes it per call — it holds no in-memory copy and cannot reach the
+    // shared singleton — so a switch that happened is visible here as a
+    // written record, and one that did not is visible as its absence.
     const persisted = {
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
+        blockscoutUrl: MAINNET.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        networkEndpoints: {},
         wallets: walletFixture(),
+        lastBalanceRefresh: 1,
+        tokenHolderCache: {},
+        fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
         allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
 
     let messageListener = null;
     // Every message the background pushed at a content script. chainChanged
@@ -102,12 +98,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
     const toTabs = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
-                set: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-            },
-        },
+        storage,
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -157,7 +148,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
 
     return {
         switchChain,
-        walletState,
+        walletState: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
         chainChangedEvents: () =>
             toTabs.filter((m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged"),
     };
@@ -174,8 +165,8 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         // The refusal has to be a refusal to ACT, not just an error string:
         // the wallet is still on mainnet, still on the user's own node, and
         // no page was told the chain moved.
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
         expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
     });
 
@@ -201,7 +192,7 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         const result = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(result).toEqual({ result: null });
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("sepolia");
         expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
@@ -217,16 +208,16 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         const result = await bg.switchChain("0x89", CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(result.error.code).toBe(4902);
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
     });
 
     test("a switch by a connected origin keeps the user's endpoint", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground();
 
         await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
 
         await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
     });
 });

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 // first, so neither can see this.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -64,9 +65,12 @@ afterEach(() => {
     delete global.chrome;
 });
 
-// Load the background worker with the real state and chain-switch modules
-// behind it, over a storage stub that actually keeps what is written — a
-// wipe is only observable against storage that remembers.
+// Load the background worker with the real chain-switch and persistence
+// modules behind it, over a storage stub that actually keeps what is written —
+// a wipe is only observable against storage that remembers — and that clones
+// in both directions, as the real API does. It used to alias, so the record
+// the worker held and the "stored" one were a single object; see
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
     jest.resetModules();
 
@@ -84,20 +88,13 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
         registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
     }));
 
-    const store = { autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) };
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
 
     let messageListener = null;
     const toTabs = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () => ({ autistmask: store.autistmask })),
-                set: jest.fn(async (items) => {
-                    store.autistmask = items.autistmask;
-                }),
-            },
-        },
+        storage,
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
 
     return {
         switchChain,
-        persisted: () => store.autistmask,
+        persisted: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
         chainChangedEvents: () =>
             toTabs.filter((m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged"),
     };

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+// Which chain a dApp transaction is PREPARED for on a worker that has not
+// loaded state.
+//
+// The MV3 service worker is terminated when idle — roughly 30 seconds, which
+// is its normal condition — and revived by the page's own message. Nothing
+// loads state at module scope, so handleSendTransaction() used to build its
+// provider with `getProvider(await getRpcUrl())`: the endpoint came from
+// storage and was right, and the static network hint was omitted, so
+// src/shared/balances.js fell back to currentNetwork() — the unpopulated
+// singleton — and answered mainnet. ethers then fixed `chainId` at 0x1.
+//
+// The transaction was not sent on the wrong chain: verifySignedTx() compares
+// the artifact against the selected chain and refused it. So the guard held
+// and the feature did not — a user on any non-mainnet network could not send
+// from a dApp at all, and the error described the symptom
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
+//
+// This drives the real balances module and the real approval preparation and
+// verification. Only ethers' JsonRpcProvider is replaced, so the static
+// network hint getProvider() computes is the hint the population sees.
+
+const { Network, Wallet, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const SIGNER_KEY =
+    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
+const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
+
+const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
+const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
+
+const NONCE = 7;
+const TX_HASH = "0xfeed";
+
+const TX_PARAMS = {
+    from: signer.address,
+    to: RECIPIENT,
+    value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+    data: "0x",
+};
+
+function storedProfile(networkId) {
+    const net = networkById(networkId);
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                xpub: "xpub-1",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0.0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: signer.address,
+        networkId,
+        rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+    };
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+// A worker whose only wallet state is what is in storage, with ethers'
+// JsonRpcProvider replaced by a stub that answers out of the static network it
+// was constructed with — which is exactly what a real staticNetwork provider
+// does, and what makes the chain id on the approval screen observable here.
+function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    const constructed = [];
+    const broadcast = [];
+
+    jest.doMock("ethers", () => {
+        const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+        class StubJsonRpcProvider {
+            constructor(url, network) {
+                this._network = network;
+                constructed.push({ url, network });
+            }
+            async getNetwork() {
+                return this._network;
+            }
+            async getTransactionCount() {
+                return NONCE;
+            }
+            async estimateGas() {
+                return 100000n;
+            }
+            async getFeeData() {
+                return {
+                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+                };
+            }
+            async broadcastTransaction(raw) {
+                broadcast.push(raw);
+                return { hash: TX_HASH };
+            }
+        }
+        return { ...actual, JsonRpcProvider: StubJsonRpcProvider };
+    });
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    const createdUrls = [];
+
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (opts, cb) => {
+                createdUrls.push(opts.url);
+                cb({ id: createdUrls.length });
+            },
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    function send(msg, sender) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(msg, sender, (r) => {
+            result = r;
+        });
+        return () => result;
+    }
+
+    return {
+        send,
+        constructed,
+        broadcast,
+        fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
+        // The first message this worker ever sees, as the injected provider
+        // sends it.
+        sendTransaction: () =>
+            send(
+                {
+                    type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                    method: "eth_sendTransaction",
+                    params: [TX_PARAMS],
+                },
+                { origin: CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+            ),
+        approvalId: () => {
+            const url = createdUrls[createdUrls.length - 1];
+            return url
+                ? new URL(url, EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval")
+                : null;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// What the approval window does: fetch the approval and sign the transaction
+// it was handed, exactly as given.
+function signApproved(approvedTx) {
+    const tx = {};
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(approvedTx)) {
+        if (key === "from") continue;
+        tx[key] = value;
+    }
+    return signer.signTransaction(tx);
+}
+
+describe("a dApp transaction prepared by a worker that never loaded state", () => {
+    test("a cold send on Sepolia reaches the approval screen and goes out", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
+
+        const answer = bg.sendTransaction();
+        await settle();
+
+        // The provider was built for Sepolia, endpoint and static hint
+        // together. Omitting the hint made this mainnet.
+        expect(bg.constructed).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].url).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].network.chainId).toBe(
+            Network.from("sepolia").chainId,
+        );
+
+        // So the approval the user is shown is a Sepolia transaction.
+        const id = bg.approvalId();
+        expect(id).toBeTruthy();
+        const approval = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        )();
+        expect(approval.type).toBe("tx");
+        expect(approval.approvedTx.chainId).toBe(SEPOLIA.chainId);
+
+        // And it survives the wallet's own verification, which is where a
+        // 0x1-stamped artifact was refused as "for a different network".
+        const rawSignedTx = await signApproved(approval.approvedTx);
+        const response = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(response()).toEqual({ txHash: TX_HASH });
+        expect(bg.broadcast).toEqual([rawSignedTx]);
+        expect(Number(Transaction.from(rawSignedTx).chainId)).toBe(
+            Number(SEPOLIA.networkVersion),
+        );
+        expect(answer()).toEqual({ result: TX_HASH });
+    });
+
+    test("a cold send on mainnet is prepared for mainnet", async () => {
+        // The stored value and the old fallback agree here, so this case
+        // cannot catch the defect; it is what keeps the fix from being a swap.
+        const bg = loadColdWorker("mainnet");
+
+        bg.sendTransaction();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].url).toBe(MAINNET.defaultRpcUrl);
+        const approval = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: bg.approvalId() },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        )();
+        expect(approval.approvedTx.chainId).toBe(MAINNET.chainId);
+    });
+});

tests/deleteAddress.test.js

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ const {
     balanceWarningHtml,
 } = require("../src/popup/views/deleteAddress");
 const { prices, clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+
+// The screen prices holdings, and pricing asks which chain it is on. Reading
+// the singleton's network before anything loaded it now throws rather than
+// answering mainnet by default
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324), so the network this
+// fixture is on is stated instead of assumed.
+state.networkId = "mainnet";
 
 const USDC = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
 

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+// The lost-password route off the delete-wallet screen (issue #312).
+//
+// What is pinned here is that a user who has forgotten the password can
+// still get out — no password is asked for and none is checked — and that
+// the escape hatch destroys exactly the wallet it names and nothing else.
+// The second half is the dangerous one: this is the only control in the
+// product that erases key material without the password that encrypted it,
+// so an off-by-one in the wallet it removes would take a wallet whose
+// owner never asked for it to be touched.
+//
+// The assertions are made against what came back OUT of extension storage,
+// not against the live `state` object. Deleting a wallet in memory and
+// never persisting it looks identical from `state`, and a build that never
+// wrote at all would pass a check that only reads `state` back.
+//
+// That makes the storage stub load-bearing, so it is the shared one from
+// tests/support/storageStub.js, a real store that structured-clones on both
+// `set` and `get`. A stub whose `get` hands back the same object its `set`
+// was given aliases the caller's own array: the test then reads its own
+// in-memory mutation and calls it persistence, and passes against a build
+// that persists nothing
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The aliasing is closed
+// off explicitly by the first test below rather than left as an assumption
+// about `structuredClone`.
+//
+// The view is driven against a minimal DOM stub, in the same shape as
+// tests/exportPrivkey.test.js: the module reads and writes named nodes and
+// needs nothing else from a document.
+
+const mockSettingsShow = jest.fn();
+jest.mock("../src/popup/views/settings", () => ({
+    show: mockSettingsShow,
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const VIEW = "delete-wallet-lost-password";
+
+// Fixed addresses — never used for anything but these tests.
+const A0 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
+const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        appendChild: () => {},
+        remove: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness
+
+function wallet(name, secret, addresses) {
+    return {
+        type: "hd",
+        name,
+        xpub: "xpub-" + name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: addresses.length,
+        addresses: addresses.map((address) => ({
+            address,
+            balance: "0.0000",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        })),
+    };
+}
+
+function load() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    mockSettingsShow.mockClear();
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub();
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: storage.local },
+        runtime: { sendMessage: (msg) => sent.push(msg) },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+
+    const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+    const vault = require("../src/shared/vault");
+    const deleteWallet = require("../src/popup/views/deleteWallet");
+
+    state.hasWallet = true;
+    state.wallets = [
+        wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0, A1]),
+        wallet("Wallet 2", "secret-two", [B0]),
+        wallet("Wallet 3", "secret-three", [C0]),
+    ];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    state.activeAddress = A0;
+    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
+    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+    state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
+    state.currentView = "settings";
+
+    const renderWalletList = jest.fn();
+    deleteWallet.init({ renderWalletList });
+
+    return { helpers, state, vault, deleteWallet, storage, sent };
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    const el = globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+    return Promise.all((el.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// The wallets as the extension would read them back on a cold start.
+async function persistedWallets(storage) {
+    const result = await storage.get("autistmask");
+    return result.autistmask.wallets;
+}
+
+// Open the lost-password screen for a wallet, the way the user does.
+async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
+    deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
+    await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
+
+// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
+// dangerous failure mode is closed off first. An aliasing store passes
+// every other test in this file against a build that never writes.
+describe("the storage stub", () => {
+    test("does not hand back the object it was given", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        const written = { wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] };
+
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: written });
+        written.wallets.push({ name: "Wallet 2" });
+        written.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the write";
+
+        const readBack = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(readBack.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(readBack.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
+
+        // And the other direction: mutating what came out must not reach
+        // back into the store.
+        readBack.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the read";
+        const again = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(again.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("reaching the screen", () => {
+    test("the delete screen offers the route", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent).toBe(
+            "Wallet 2",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Both delete screens hang off Settings. Pushing one onto the other
+    // would leave Back on the confirm screen popping onto itself.
+    test("it does not push the screen it came from", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
+    });
+
+    test("Back returns to the delete screen with its wallet still chosen", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back");
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("delete-wallet-confirm");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
+
+        // The confirm screen is usable, not merely on screen: the wallet
+        // it holds is the one that was chosen, so its own button does not
+        // answer "No wallet selected for deletion."
+        node("delete-wallet-password").value = "some password";
+        const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+        decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("nope"));
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-flash").textContent).toBe(
+            "That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
+    test("a name that is not the wallet's deletes nothing", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 3";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe(
+            "That is not the name of this wallet. Type Wallet 2 to confirm.",
+        );
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
+        // Nothing was destroyed on disk either. Storage is not empty —
+        // showView() persists the current screen on the way in — so what
+        // is asserted is that all three wallets are still in it.
+        const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("an empty field deletes nothing", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+        expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+
+    // Not a secret and not a password: it asks whether the user knows
+    // which wallet they are on. Refusing the name they can plainly read,
+    // over letter case, would only teach them to distrust the control.
+    test("case and surrounding spaces do not matter", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "  wALLet 2 ";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    // A name with a doubled inner space RENDERS with one — HTML collapses
+    // runs of whitespace — so the string the user can see and type is not
+    // the string the name is stored as. Comparing the two raw would make
+    // this wallet's confirmation impossible to satisfy by any typing at
+    // all, wedging the one screen that exists to unwedge people.
+    test("a doubled space inside the name is typed back as one", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        state.wallets[1].name = "My  Wallet";
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        // What the DOM was handed still has both spaces; what the user
+        // reads off the screen, and therefore types, has one.
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("My  Wallet");
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "My Wallet";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("deleting without the password", () => {
+    test("no password is asked for and none is checked", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(vault.decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    // The load-bearing assertion of the whole file, and the one that says
+    // this control is safe to give a user who cannot prove anything: it
+    // removes the wallet it named, and every other wallet survives intact,
+    // key material included.
+    test("exactly the named wallet is destroyed", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const wallets = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1", "Wallet 3"]);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.xpub)).toEqual([
+            "xpub-Wallet 1",
+            "xpub-Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(wallets[0].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([A0, A1]);
+        expect(wallets[1].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([C0]);
+
+        // The deleted wallet's secret is gone from storage entirely, not
+        // merely unreferenced by the wallet list.
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("secret-two");
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("xpub-Wallet 2");
+    });
+
+    test("only the deleted wallet's site permissions are dropped", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+    });
+
+    // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
+    // selection repair and the accountsChanged broadcast are the same on
+    // both. Deleting a wallet that did not own the active address must
+    // leave that address, and the selection, exactly where they were.
+    test("a selection in another wallet is left alone", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(A0);
+        expect(saved.selectedWallet).toBe(0);
+        expect(saved.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([]);
+        // Settings is stubbed, so this is where the route hands over, not
+        // where it renders.
+        expect(mockSettingsShow).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("deleting the wallet holding the active address moves it and says so", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 2",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([{ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" }]);
+    });
+
+    test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.deniedSites = {};
+
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.wallets).toEqual([]);
+        expect(saved.hasWallet).toBe(false);
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBeNull();
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({});
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("welcome");
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("secret-one");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
+    test("the typed confirmation is wiped when the screen is left", async () => {
+        const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        // The Settings gear, which is not this screen's Back button.
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value).toBe("");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "hidden",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
+    test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
+        const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+
+        expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
+    // other reason: reopening the popup must not land the user on a screen
+    // whose button erases key material.
+    test("the popup may not reopen onto it", () => {
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(VIEW)).toBe(false);
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
+    });
+});

tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile

@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ RUN script/bootstrap
 
 COPY . .
 
-RUN make build
+# make package builds (and verifies) dist/ and then writes the release
+# artifacts, so the image carries both: run.js installs the unpacked
+# dist/firefox and reinstall.js installs the packaged .xpi, which is how the
+# artifact that would actually be handed to someone gets exercised in a real
+# Firefox rather than only being produced.
+RUN make package
 
 CMD ["node", "tests/e2e/firefox/run.js", "dist/firefox"]

tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js

@@ -103,7 +103,13 @@ class Driver {
 
     // ------------------------------------------------------------ setup
 
-    async newSession() {
+    // `profileDir` reuses an existing profile directory in place instead of
+    // letting geckodriver make a throwaway one. That is the only way to ask
+    // what survives a browser RESTART, which for a Firefox add-on that can
+    // only be installed temporarily is the question that decides whether the
+    // extension is usable at all: a temporary add-on is unloaded when Firefox
+    // exits, so every session begins by adding it again.
+    async newSession(profileDir) {
         const prefs = {
             // See EXTENSION_UUID above. The pref is a string pref whose
             // value is itself JSON.
@@ -132,26 +138,27 @@ class Driver {
             "extensions.openPopupWithoutUserGesture.enabled": false,
         };
 
+        const args = [
+            "-headless",
+            // Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it, navigating to
+            // moz-extension:// and running chrome-context script both
+            // fail with "unsupported operation".
+            //
+            // It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES over this
+            // browser. Acceptable only because the browser is a
+            // throwaway in a CI container; never point a session with
+            // this flag at anything you care about.
+            "-remote-allow-system-access",
+        ];
+        if (profileDir) args.push("-profile", profileDir);
+
         const value = await this.send("POST", "/session", {
             capabilities: {
                 alwaysMatch: {
                     browserName: "firefox",
                     "moz:firefoxOptions": {
                         binary: FIREFOX_BIN,
-                        args: [
-                            "-headless",
-                            // Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it,
-                            // navigating to moz-extension:// and running
-                            // chrome-context script both fail with
-                            // "unsupported operation".
-                            //
-                            // It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES
-                            // over this browser. Acceptable only because
-                            // the browser is a throwaway in a CI
-                            // container; never point a session with this
-                            // flag at anything you care about.
-                            "-remote-allow-system-access",
-                        ],
+                        args,
                         prefs,
                     },
                 },
@@ -162,16 +169,30 @@ class Driver {
         return value;
     }
 
-    // Installs the unpacked MV2 build straight from a directory.
-    // temporary:true bypasses signature checks, so no XPI and no signing
-    // are involved, and the add-on dies with the profile.
-    async installAddon(dir) {
+    // Installs the MV2 build, either from an unpacked directory or from an
+    // XPI file. temporary:true bypasses signature checks — which is the only
+    // way an UNSIGNED xpi installs at all, and the reason README.md says
+    // release Firefox will refuse the artifact this repo produces — and the
+    // add-on dies with the profile.
+    //
+    // Returns the add-on id Firefox assigned, which is
+    // browser_specific_settings.gecko.id from the manifest and is what
+    // uninstallAddon() takes.
+    async installAddon(pathToAddon) {
         return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/install", {
-            path: dir,
+            path: pathToAddon,
             temporary: true,
         });
     }
 
+    // Removes an installed add-on, the way clicking Remove in about:addons
+    // does. tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js uses it to ask the one question
+    // that decides whether this extension can be used at all on Firefox: does
+    // the vault survive being removed and added again.
+    async uninstallAddon(id) {
+        return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/uninstall", { id });
+    }
+
     // Classic navigation on purpose. BiDi's browsingContext.navigate
     // refuses moz-extension:// URLs outright.
     async navigate(url) {

tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js

@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+// Does the wallet survive being installed again on Firefox?
+//
+// This is the question behind
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310, and it is the one property
+// that has to hold before real money goes into this extension. The only route
+// that works on release Firefox is a TEMPORARY add-on, which is unloaded when
+// the browser exits: daily use means adding it again from about:debugging on
+// every browser start. If extension storage did not survive that, every start
+// would present an empty wallet and the recovery phrase would be the only copy
+// of the money.
+//
+// manifest/firefox.json declares a fixed browser_specific_settings.gecko.id,
+// which is the right SHAPE for storage to survive — Firefox keys the storage
+// area by add-on id — but shape is not observation, and nothing asserted it.
+//
+// Two different things are asked here, because they have different answers and
+// conflating them would be the whole mistake:
+//
+//   RESTART      one profile, two browser runs, the add-on added temporarily
+//                in each. This is what a user does every day, and the vault
+//                has to survive it.
+//   REMOVAL      an explicit uninstall, the way about:addons "Remove" works,
+//                inside one browser run. Firefox destroys an add-on's storage
+//                when it is uninstalled, and the observed result is recorded
+//                here rather than wished away — for a wallet it means Remove
+//                is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
+//
+// The vault is not merely compared as bytes in the restart case. It is
+// DECRYPTED with the original password through the real Show Recovery Phrase
+// screen and the phrase is compared against the one wallet creation produced,
+// because "the ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet still works"
+// are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
+//
+// Run through script/test-e2e-firefox, which builds the artifact and the
+// pinned container. The one argument is what to install — an unpacked
+// directory or an .xpi. With none, the packaged XPI in release/ is used, so
+// this doubles as the check that the release artifact installs in a real
+// Firefox.
+//
+//   node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js release/autistmask-firefox-0.1.0.xpi
+//
+// A separate program from run.js rather than another step in it: every step
+// there shares one browser session with one installed add-on, and this needs
+// two browsers and three installs.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { EXTENSION_ID, EXTENSION_UUID, start } = require("./driver");
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "..");
+const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
+
+const STEP_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
+
+const checks = [];
+let failed = 0;
+
+function check(name, cond, detail) {
+    checks.push(name);
+    if (cond) {
+        console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+    } else {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+        if (detail) console.log("  " + detail);
+    }
+}
+
+// The moz-extension:// uuid Firefox currently serves this add-on from, read
+// out of the pref that holds the mapping. Privileged scope, because that pref
+// is not reachable from content.
+//
+// It has to be read after every install and never assumed. driver.js pins a
+// uuid through extensions.webextensions.uuids at each session start, but an
+// uninstall inside a running session drops that mapping and the next install
+// mints a fresh one — and navigating to the stale origin does not fail, it
+// HANGS until the session times out, which is how this was found.
+async function extensionUuid(d) {
+    const raw = await d.executeChrome(
+        `return Services.prefs.getStringPref(
+             "extensions.webextensions.uuids", "{}");`,
+    );
+    let map;
+    try {
+        map = JSON.parse(raw);
+    } catch (e) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "extensions.webextensions.uuids is not JSON (" +
+                e.message +
+                "): " +
+                raw,
+        );
+    }
+    return map[EXTENSION_ID] || null;
+}
+
+async function openPopup(d) {
+    const uuid = await extensionUuid(d);
+    if (!uuid) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "no uuid for " +
+                EXTENSION_ID +
+                " in extensions.webextensions.uuids, so the popup has no " +
+                "origin to be served from",
+        );
+    }
+    await d.navigate("moz-extension://" + uuid + "/src/popup/index.html");
+    // Whichever screen it lands on, wait for one of the two it can land on.
+    // Waiting for #view-main directly would time out rather than say what
+    // happened, and an empty storage partition is exactly the case where it
+    // lands on the other one.
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "the popup to finish restoring",
+        `const w = document.getElementById("view-welcome");
+         const m = document.getElementById("view-main");
+         if (!w || !m) return false;
+         const shown = (el) => {
+             const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
+             return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;
+         };
+         return shown(w) || shown(m);`,
+        [],
+        STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    );
+    return uuid;
+}
+
+// The persisted record, straight out of extension storage, read from the popup
+// page — the one moz-extension:// document this program opens and therefore
+// the only place the storage API is reachable from.
+async function readVault(d) {
+    const outcome = await d.executeAsync(
+        `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
+         const api = typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser : chrome;
+         Promise.resolve(api.storage.local.get("autistmask"))
+             .then((r) => {
+                 const s = r.autistmask;
+                 if (!s) return done({ present: false });
+                 const w = (s.wallets || [])[0];
+                 if (!w) return done({ present: false });
+                 done({
+                     present: true,
+                     wallets: s.wallets.length,
+                     name: w.name,
+                     xpub: w.xpub,
+                     address: (w.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address)[0],
+                     vault: JSON.stringify(w.encryptedSecret),
+                 });
+             })
+             .catch((e) => done({ error: String((e && e.message) || e) }));`,
+    );
+    if (outcome && outcome.error) {
+        throw new Error("could not read extension storage: " + outcome.error);
+    }
+    return outcome;
+}
+
+async function createWallet(d) {
+    await d.click("#btn-welcome-add");
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-add-wallet");
+    await d.click("#btn-generate-phrase");
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "a generated recovery phrase of at least 12 words",
+        `const el = document.getElementById("wallet-mnemonic");
+         return !!el && el.value.trim().split(/\\s+/).length >= 12;`,
+    );
+    const phrase = (await d.value("#wallet-mnemonic")).trim();
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password", PASSWORD);
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD);
+    await d.click("#btn-add-wallet-confirm");
+    // Argon2id under libsodium, for real.
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-main", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    return phrase;
+}
+
+// The phrase the vault decrypts to, obtained the way a user would: Settings,
+// Show Recovery Phrase, the original password.
+async function revealPhrase(d) {
+    if (!(await d.isVisible("#view-settings"))) {
+        await d.click("#btn-settings");
+    }
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-settings");
+    await d.click("#settings-wallet-list .btn-show-phrase");
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-show-phrase");
+    await d.fill("#show-phrase-password", PASSWORD);
+    await d.click("#btn-show-phrase-reveal");
+    await d.waitVisible("#show-phrase-result", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    return (await d.text("#show-phrase-value")).trim();
+}
+
+// What to install. An explicit argument wins; with none, the packaged XPI in
+// release/ is used, and there is deliberately no fallback to dist/firefox: the
+// point of running this against the artifact is that the artifact is what gets
+// installed, and quietly testing something else instead would leave the XPI
+// unexercised while the run stayed green.
+function resolveArtifact() {
+    if (process.argv[2]) return path.resolve(REPO_ROOT, process.argv[2]);
+
+    const releaseDir = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "release");
+    const xpis = fs.existsSync(releaseDir)
+        ? fs.readdirSync(releaseDir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".xpi"))
+        : [];
+    if (xpis.length !== 1) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "expected exactly one .xpi in release/, found " +
+                xpis.length +
+                " (" +
+                xpis.join(", ") +
+                "). Run make package, or name the artifact as the argument.",
+        );
+    }
+    return path.join(releaseDir, xpis[0]);
+}
+
+async function main() {
+    let artifact;
+    try {
+        artifact = resolveArtifact();
+    } catch (e) {
+        console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + e.message);
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    if (!fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
+        console.error(
+            "e2e-firefox-reinstall: nothing to install at " + artifact,
+        );
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log("# installing: " + artifact);
+
+    // One profile, reused by both browser runs below. geckodriver would
+    // otherwise make a throwaway one per session, and "survives a restart"
+    // cannot be asked of a profile that does not.
+    const profile = fs.mkdtempSync(
+        path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-reinstall-profile-"),
+    );
+
+    let phrase = null;
+    let before = null;
+    let first;
+
+    // --- run one: install, create a wallet, close the browser --------------
+    try {
+        first = await start();
+        await first.newSession(profile);
+    } catch (e) {
+        // A browser we cannot start is a failure of this program, never an
+        // absent one.
+        console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot run: " + e.message);
+        if (first) await first.quit().catch(() => {});
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        const firstId = await first.installAddon(artifact);
+        check(
+            "the artifact installs and reports the manifest's gecko id",
+            firstId === EXTENSION_ID,
+            "installed add-on id is " +
+                JSON.stringify(firstId) +
+                ", expected " +
+                JSON.stringify(EXTENSION_ID) +
+                ". Without a stable id Firefox has no key to hang the " +
+                "storage area on, and nothing below can hold.",
+        );
+
+        const firstUuid = await openPopup(first);
+        await first.waitVisible("#view-welcome", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        phrase = await createWallet(first);
+        before = await readVault(first);
+        check(
+            "a wallet created through the UI is in extension storage",
+            before.present && before.wallets === 1 && !!before.vault,
+            JSON.stringify(before),
+        );
+        console.log(
+            "# run 1 moz-extension uuid: " +
+                firstUuid +
+                (firstUuid === EXTENSION_UUID ? " (the pinned one)" : ""),
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR in run 1: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        await first.quit().catch(() => {});
+    }
+
+    // --- run two: same profile, add-on added again -------------------------
+    //
+    // This is the restart. The temporary add-on died with the previous
+    // browser; the profile, and whatever Firefox kept in it, did not.
+    let second;
+    try {
+        second = await start();
+        await second.newSession(profile);
+    } catch (e) {
+        console.error(
+            "e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot restart the browser: " + e.message,
+        );
+        if (second) await second.quit().catch(() => {});
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        const secondId = await second.installAddon(artifact);
+        check(
+            "the add-on installs again after a browser restart with the " +
+                "same id",
+            secondId === EXTENSION_ID,
+            "re-installed id is " + JSON.stringify(secondId),
+        );
+
+        const secondUuid = await openPopup(second);
+        // The origin the popup is served from is not the thing that carries
+        // the wallet, and the uuid is read live for exactly that reason. In
+        // this run it comes back as the pinned one, because driver.js writes
+        // extensions.webextensions.uuids into the profile at every session
+        // start; an uninstall inside a running session drops the mapping and
+        // the next install mints a fresh uuid instead. Either way the storage
+        // area is keyed on the add-on id, never on this.
+        console.log(
+            "# run 2 moz-extension uuid: " +
+                secondUuid +
+                (secondUuid === EXTENSION_UUID
+                    ? " (the pinned one, re-applied at session start)"
+                    : " (freshly minted)"),
+        );
+
+        const onWelcome = await second.isVisible("#view-welcome");
+        check(
+            "after a restart and re-add, the extension does not come up as " +
+                "a fresh install",
+            !onWelcome,
+            "the popup shows the welcome screen, which is what an empty " +
+                "storage partition looks like: the wallet is gone and only " +
+                "the recovery phrase would get it back.",
+        );
+
+        const after = await readVault(second);
+        check(
+            "the vault, xpub and first address survive the restart unchanged",
+            after.present &&
+                after.wallets === before.wallets &&
+                after.vault === before.vault &&
+                after.xpub === before.xpub &&
+                after.address === before.address,
+            "before: " +
+                JSON.stringify(before) +
+                " after: " +
+                JSON.stringify(after),
+        );
+
+        if (after.present) {
+            const revealed = await revealPhrase(second);
+            check(
+                "the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
+                    "original recovery phrase",
+                revealed === phrase,
+                "the recovery phrase read back after the restart is not the " +
+                    "one the wallet was created with",
+            );
+        } else {
+            check(
+                "the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
+                    "original recovery phrase",
+                false,
+                "there was no vault left to decrypt",
+            );
+        }
+
+        // --- an explicit removal, in the same browser run ------------------
+        //
+        // Leave the popup FIRST. Removing the add-on destroys every document
+        // it serves, and the popup is this session's only window: uninstalling
+        // while it is on screen discards the browsing context, and every
+        // subsequent WebDriver command fails with "no such window" rather than
+        // with anything about the add-on. Observed, not anticipated.
+        await second.navigate("about:blank");
+        await second.uninstallAddon(EXTENSION_ID);
+        await second.installAddon(artifact);
+        await openPopup(second);
+
+        const afterRemoval = await readVault(second);
+        console.log(
+            "# after an explicit uninstall: " + JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
+        );
+        // Recorded as observed behaviour, not as something this repo wants.
+        // Firefox destroys an add-on's storage when it is uninstalled, and
+        // that is correct of a browser — it is stated here, and in README.md,
+        // because for a WALLET it means about:addons "Remove" is irreversible
+        // except from the recovery phrase. If a Firefox ever stops doing it
+        // this fails and the claim gets rewritten from a new observation.
+        check(
+            "an explicit uninstall DESTROYS the vault (observed Firefox " +
+                "behaviour: Remove is irreversible, unlike a restart)",
+            afterRemoval.present === false,
+            "the vault survived an explicit uninstall: " +
+                JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR in run 2: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        await second.quit().catch(() => {});
+        fs.rmSync(profile, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+
+    console.log("1.." + checks.length);
+    if (checks.length === 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log(
+        "# " +
+            (checks.length - failed) +
+            "/" +
+            checks.length +
+            " checks passed",
+    );
+    if (failed > 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+    console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+});

tests/e2e/storagePartition.js

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+// Where does chrome.storage.local live, and what moves it?
+//
+// The finding behind https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310: an
+// unpacked Chrome extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an extension id
+// derived from the ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local
+// is partitioned by that id. README.md documents Load unpacked from
+// dist/chrome/ as the install route, so moving the checkout, re-cloning it, or
+// loading a second copy from anywhere else means a different id, a different
+// storage partition, and a wallet that reads as empty — with no error, no
+// prompt and nothing in the UI to say what happened.
+//
+// So this OBSERVES the behaviour rather than restating it. Two unpacked loads
+// from two different directories, in one profile, with the shipped manifest
+// and again with `key` stripped out, and it reports what each pair actually
+// does. The assertions are on what was seen when this was written and are
+// annotated as such; if Chrome's derivation ever changes, this says so instead
+// of passing.
+//
+// Run through script/test-e2e, which builds the extension and the pinned
+// container.
+//
+//   node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
+//
+// A separate program from run.js because every test there shares one browser
+// and one extension load, and the whole subject here is what happens across
+// two of each.
+//
+// The extension's own UI is deliberately not driven. What is under test is the
+// storage partition, so a sentinel key the extension never reads or writes is
+// written and read back directly: a wallet would prove the same thing more
+// slowly, and would confuse an empty partition with a UI that failed to
+// render.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
+const DIST_CHROME = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
+
+// Never touched by the extension: src/shared/state.js reads and writes the
+// single key "autistmask" and nothing else.
+const SENTINEL_KEY = "e2e-storage-partition-sentinel";
+const SENTINEL_VALUE = "written-by-the-first-load";
+
+const checks = [];
+let failed = 0;
+const scratch = [];
+
+function check(name, cond, detail) {
+    checks.push(name);
+    if (cond) {
+        console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+    } else {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+        if (detail) console.log("  " + detail);
+    }
+}
+
+function tmpdir(tag) {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(
+        path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-" + tag + "-"),
+    );
+    scratch.push(dir);
+    return dir;
+}
+
+// A copy of the built extension at a fresh absolute path. `withKey: false`
+// strips the manifest's `key`, which is the pre-fix state of this repo and the
+// control the whole program is built around.
+function extensionCopy(tag, withKey) {
+    const dir = path.join(tmpdir(tag), "chrome");
+    fs.cpSync(DIST_CHROME, dir, { recursive: true });
+    const manifestPath = path.join(dir, "manifest.json");
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
+    if (withKey) {
+        if (!manifest.key) {
+            throw new Error(
+                "dist/chrome/manifest.json has no `key`, so this program has " +
+                    "nothing to observe. That field is what pins the " +
+                    "extension id; see tests/extensionId.test.js.",
+            );
+        }
+    } else {
+        delete manifest.key;
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 4));
+    return dir;
+}
+
+async function launch(profileDir, extensionDirs) {
+    const ctx = await chromium.launchPersistentContext(profileDir, {
+        // See the note in harness.js: the default headless shell silently
+        // refuses to load extensions.
+        channel: "chromium",
+        headless: true,
+        args: [
+            "--disable-extensions-except=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
+            "--load-extension=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
+            "--no-sandbox",
+            // Nothing here should reach the network; this makes sure it
+            // cannot.
+            "--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND",
+        ],
+    });
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+// Every extension id Chrome ended up with in this context, from the service
+// worker urls. MV3 registers one worker per loaded extension.
+async function extensionIds(ctx, expected) {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 30000;
+    for (;;) {
+        const ids = [
+            ...new Set(ctx.serviceWorkers().map((w) => new URL(w.url()).host)),
+        ].sort();
+        if (ids.length >= expected) return ids;
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) return ids;
+        await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
+    }
+}
+
+// Open one extension's popup and run `fn` in it. The popup page is used rather
+// than the service worker because Chrome stops an idle MV3 worker, and a
+// handle to a stopped worker cannot be evaluated in.
+async function inExtension(ctx, id, fn, arg) {
+    const page = await ctx.newPage();
+    try {
+        await page.goto("chrome-extension://" + id + "/src/popup/index.html");
+        return await page.evaluate(fn, arg);
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+}
+
+const writeSentinel = ([key, value]) =>
+    new Promise((resolve) => {
+        chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: value }, () => resolve(true));
+    });
+
+const readSentinel = (key) =>
+    new Promise((resolve) => {
+        chrome.storage.local.get(key, (r) => resolve(r[key] ?? null));
+    });
+
+// Load `firstDir` in a fresh profile, write the sentinel, close; load
+// `secondDir` in the SAME profile, read it back. Returns both ids and what the
+// second load saw.
+async function acrossTwoPaths(tag, firstDir, secondDir) {
+    const profile = tmpdir(tag + "-profile");
+
+    const first = await launch(profile, [firstDir]);
+    let firstId;
+    try {
+        [firstId] = await extensionIds(first, 1);
+        if (!firstId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + firstDir);
+        await inExtension(first, firstId, writeSentinel, [
+            SENTINEL_KEY,
+            SENTINEL_VALUE,
+        ]);
+    } finally {
+        await first.close();
+    }
+
+    const second = await launch(profile, [secondDir]);
+    let secondId;
+    let seen;
+    try {
+        [secondId] = await extensionIds(second, 1);
+        if (!secondId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + secondDir);
+        seen = await inExtension(second, secondId, readSentinel, SENTINEL_KEY);
+    } finally {
+        await second.close();
+    }
+
+    return { firstId, secondId, seen };
+}
+
+async function main() {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"))) {
+        console.error(
+            "storagePartition: no unpacked build at " +
+                DIST_CHROME +
+                " — run make build first",
+        );
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        // --- the shipped manifest, which carries `key` ----------------------
+        const keyedA = extensionCopy("keyed-a", true);
+        const keyedB = extensionCopy("keyed-b", true);
+        const keyed = await acrossTwoPaths("keyed", keyedA, keyedB);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    " + keyedA + " -> " + keyed.firstId);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    " + keyedB + " -> " + keyed.secondId);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    sentinel read back: " + keyed.seen);
+
+        check(
+            "with `key`, two different paths produce the SAME extension id",
+            keyed.firstId === keyed.secondId,
+            keyed.firstId + " != " + keyed.secondId,
+        );
+        check(
+            "with `key`, the second path reads the first path's storage",
+            keyed.seen === SENTINEL_VALUE,
+            "the second load read " +
+                JSON.stringify(keyed.seen) +
+                " instead of the value the first load wrote. The storage " +
+                "partition did not follow the extension across the move, " +
+                "which is the wallet silently reading as empty.",
+        );
+
+        // --- the same build with `key` removed: the control -----------------
+        const barePath = extensionCopy("bare-a", false);
+        const bareB = extensionCopy("bare-b", false);
+        const bare = await acrossTwoPaths("bare", barePath, bareB);
+        console.log("# without `key`: " + barePath + " -> " + bare.firstId);
+        console.log("# without `key`: " + bareB + " -> " + bare.secondId);
+        console.log("# without `key`: sentinel read back: " + bare.seen);
+
+        // Observed, not assumed. If Chrome ever stops deriving the id from
+        // the load path these two fail, and the right response is to record
+        // what it does now — not to delete them.
+        check(
+            "without `key`, two different paths produce DIFFERENT ids " +
+                "(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
+            bare.firstId !== bare.secondId,
+            "both loads got " +
+                bare.firstId +
+                ", so the id no longer follows the load path on this Chrome",
+        );
+        check(
+            "without `key`, the second path sees an EMPTY partition " +
+                "(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
+            bare.seen === null,
+            "the second load read " +
+                JSON.stringify(bare.seen) +
+                " from a different id's partition",
+        );
+
+        // --- both copies loaded at once, in one profile ---------------------
+        // The literal shape of the question, kept because "two unpacked loads
+        // in one profile" is what a user does when they forget to remove the
+        // old one. With `key`, both copies claim the same id.
+        const profile = tmpdir("simultaneous-profile");
+        const ctx = await launch(profile, [keyedA, keyedB]);
+        let ids = [];
+        try {
+            ids = await extensionIds(ctx, 2);
+        } finally {
+            await ctx.close();
+        }
+        console.log(
+            "# both keyed copies loaded at once: " +
+                ids.length +
+                " extension id(s): " +
+                ids.join(", "),
+        );
+        check(
+            "loading both keyed copies at once yields one id, not two " +
+                "(observed: Chrome does not load a second copy of an id it " +
+                "already has)",
+            ids.length === 1 && ids[0] === keyed.firstId,
+            "saw " + JSON.stringify(ids) + ", expected exactly one id",
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        for (const dir of scratch) {
+            fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+    }
+
+    console.log("1.." + checks.length);
+    if (checks.length === 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log(
+        "# " +
+            (checks.length - failed) +
+            "/" +
+            checks.length +
+            " checks passed",
+    );
+    if (failed > 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+    console.error("storagePartition: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+});

tests/exportPrivkey.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
     getSignerForAddress: jest.fn(() => ({ privateKey: mockPrivateKey })),
 }));
 
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const VIEW = "export-privkey";
 const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery";

tests/extensionId.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// The extension identity on both browsers, pinned.
+//
+// This is the anti-regression check for
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310. An unpacked Chrome
+// extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an id derived from the
+// ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local is partitioned by
+// that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load it from a second directory,
+// and the wallet is silently gone: the extension comes up on a fresh, empty
+// storage partition with no error anywhere. `key` pins the id to the public
+// key instead of to the path, which is what makes the storage survive.
+//
+// So the id is asserted as a literal. A test that merely recomputed the id
+// from whatever `key` happened to be in the manifest would pass after someone
+// replaced the key — and replacing the key is exactly the change that orphans
+// every existing wallet. The value below is the promise; changing it is a
+// migration, not an edit.
+//
+// Firefox needs no key: browser_specific_settings.gecko.id declares the id
+// directly, and it is pinned here for the same reason. The Firefox e2e suite
+// depends on it too (tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js maps it to a fixed uuid), and
+// tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js is the empirical half — it removes the add-on
+// and installs it again and reads the vault back out.
+
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
+
+// The public half of an RSA keypair, DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, base64.
+// The PRIVATE half is not in this repo and is not needed to build, load or
+// test anything here: it is only ever used to sign a CRX, which this repo does
+// not do.
+const CHROME_KEY =
+    "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+" +
+    "5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUU" +
+    "YzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35" +
+    "hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kL" +
+    "WoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW" +
+    "+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB";
+
+// chrome.storage.local for this extension lives under this id, and nowhere
+// else.
+const CHROME_EXTENSION_ID = "gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip";
+
+const FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID = "autistmask@sneak.berlin";
+
+// Chrome's id derivation: sha256 of the DER public key, first 16 bytes, each
+// hex digit mapped 0-f onto a-p. Written out here rather than taken on trust,
+// because the whole claim of this file is that the committed key produces that
+// id.
+function chromeExtensionId(keyBase64) {
+    const der = Buffer.from(keyBase64, "base64");
+    const digest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(der).digest("hex");
+    return [...digest.slice(0, 32)]
+        .map((c) => String.fromCharCode(97 + parseInt(c, 16)))
+        .join("");
+}
+
+function readManifest(name) {
+    return JSON.parse(
+        fs.readFileSync(path.join(MANIFEST_DIR, name + ".json"), "utf8"),
+    );
+}
+
+describe("chrome extension identity", () => {
+    test("the manifest carries the pinned key", () => {
+        expect(readManifest("chrome").key).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
+    });
+
+    test("the key is a well-formed RSA public key", () => {
+        const der = Buffer.from(CHROME_KEY, "base64");
+        // Round-trips: a truncated or re-wrapped base64 blob would still
+        // decode to bytes, and Chrome would then derive an id from garbage.
+        expect(der.toString("base64")).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
+        const key = crypto.createPublicKey({
+            key: der,
+            format: "der",
+            type: "spki",
+        });
+        expect(key.asymmetricKeyType).toBe("rsa");
+        expect(key.asymmetricKeyDetails.modulusLength).toBe(2048);
+    });
+
+    test("the key derives the pinned extension id", () => {
+        expect(chromeExtensionId(CHROME_KEY)).toBe(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID);
+        expect(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID).toMatch(/^[a-p]{32}$/);
+    });
+
+    // The private half is a credential. It has never been in this repo and no
+    // target generates one into the working tree; this fails loudly if that
+    // ever changes, because a committed .pem is a key anyone can sign a CRX
+    // with under this extension's id.
+    test("no private key is committed anywhere in the tree", () => {
+        const tracked = require("child_process")
+            .execSync("git ls-files", {
+                cwd: path.join(__dirname, ".."),
+                encoding: "utf8",
+            })
+            .split("\n")
+            .filter(Boolean);
+        expect(tracked.filter((f) => /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx)$/i.test(f))).toEqual(
+            [],
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("firefox extension identity", () => {
+    test("the manifest declares the pinned gecko id", () => {
+        const gecko = readManifest("firefox").browser_specific_settings.gecko;
+        expect(gecko.id).toBe(FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID);
+    });
+
+    // Firefox derives nothing from the path, so no key field belongs here; one
+    // would be ignored and would only suggest the id came from somewhere else.
+    test("the firefox manifest carries no chrome key field", () => {
+        expect(readManifest("firefox").key).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});

tests/fabricatedDecimals.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+// What the balance fetcher stores when the block explorer reports no decimals
+// for a token, and what the approval screens then display.
+//
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349: `fetchTokenBalances()` did
+// `parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10)` BEFORE writing the row, so a
+// token whose `decimals()` reverts — and which the explorer therefore reports
+// no scale for — was stored with a fabricated 18. Nothing downstream could
+// tell that from a real 18.
+//
+// That matters because it is upstream of two refusals that were already built
+// and already merged. https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306 made the
+// ERC-20 amount line resolve the real scale or refuse to format, and
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340 did the same for the swap
+// lines. Both read this stored value as an authoritative source, so the guess
+// walked straight past them: the refusal was intact and simply never fired.
+//
+// So these tests run a real explorer response through the real fetcher and
+// assert on the real approval screens. A test that hand-writes `decimals: null`
+// onto state would pass on the broken build, because the fabrication is in the
+// writer, not the readers.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = { storage: makeStorageStub() };
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
+const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
+const { fetchTokenBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
+
+const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
+const BLOCKSCOUT = "https://blockscout.example/api/v2";
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+// Outside the bundled list and untracked, so the explorer is the only source
+// of a scale for it — which is the case the fabrication was hiding.
+const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
+// In the bundled list, at 18 decimals, for the other side of a swap.
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+
+// The holding the explorer reports, in base units. Large enough that it does
+// not round to zero even when divided by 10^18, which is what makes it the
+// case the laundering actually REACHED: a smaller holding formatted at the
+// fabricated 18 comes out "0.0", the balance list drops the row as dust, and
+// the approval screens then find no source for the scale and refuse anyway —
+// for the wrong reason, and only by luck.
+const HOLDING = 5000000000000000000n;
+
+// The amount in the dApp's calldata, which is a separate number from the
+// holding. 1,000.00 of a 6-decimal token; formatted at the fabricated 18 it
+// reads 0.000000001, and at a real scale of 0 it reads 1000000000.
+const THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 1000000000n;
+const HALF_WETH = 500000000000000000n;
+
+const erc20Iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// One Blockscout token-balances row. `token` is spread last so a test can
+// override or blank a field; the base row carries no `decimals` at all, which
+// is exactly what a token whose decimals() reverts produces.
+function row(token = {}, value = HOLDING) {
+    return {
+        value: String(value),
+        token: {
+            type: "ERC-20",
+            address_hash: NOVEL,
+            symbol: "NOVEL",
+            name: "Novel Token",
+            // Well clear of the balance list's own spam floor, so the row is
+            // admitted on its holder count alone: neither the bundled list nor
+            // a tracked entry can supply a scale for it.
+            holders_count: "50000",
+            ...token,
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+function respondWith(items) {
+    debugFetch.mockImplementation(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        statusText: "OK",
+        json: async () => items,
+    }));
+}
+
+// Fetch and place the result exactly where refreshBalances() places it, so the
+// approval screens read what a real refresh would have left on state.
+async function fetchOnto(items, trackedTokens = []) {
+    respondWith(items);
+    const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(
+        HOLDER,
+        BLOCKSCOUT,
+        trackedTokens,
+    );
+    state.trackedTokens = trackedTokens;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            addresses: [
+                { address: HOLDER, balance: "1.0", tokenBalances: balances },
+            ],
+        },
+    ];
+    return balances;
+}
+
+// The ERC-20 approval screen's Amount line, and the swap decoder's.
+function erc20AmountLine(data, tokenAddress) {
+    return decodeCalldata(data, tokenAddress).details.find(
+        (d) => d.label === "Amount",
+    ).value;
+}
+
+function swapAmountLine(data) {
+    return decodeCalldata(data, ROUTER).details.find(
+        (d) => d.label === "Amount",
+    ).value;
+}
+
+function transferData(amount) {
+    return erc20Iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
+}
+
+function approveData(amount) {
+    return erc20Iface.encodeFunctionData("approve", [SPENDER, amount]);
+}
+
+function swapData(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [tokenIn, tokenOut], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    debugFetch.mockReset();
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("what fetchTokenBalances stores for an absent scale", () => {
+    test("the token is not in the bundled list, so the explorer is the only source", () => {
+        expect(TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(NOVEL.toLowerCase())).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an absent decimals is stored as null, not as 18", async () => {
+        const balances = await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(balances[0].decimals).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("an explicit null decimals is stored as null too", async () => {
+        const balances = await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: null })]);
+        expect(balances[0].decimals).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    // The same explorer row twice, differing only in whether it reports a
+    // scale of 18. Before the fix both stored 18 and no reader could tell
+    // which one had actually been reported.
+    test("a real 18 is stored as 18, and so is distinguishable from absent", async () => {
+        const real = await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: "18" })]);
+        expect(real[0].decimals).toBe(18);
+        expect(real[0].balance).toBe("5.0");
+        const absent = await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        expect(absent[0].decimals).toBeNull();
+        expect(real[0].decimals).not.toBe(absent[0].decimals);
+    });
+
+    // The falsy-collapse trap of
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/246. `decimals || "18"` reads
+    // a real scale of zero as absent and then as eighteen, which is eighteen
+    // orders of magnitude of error in the direction that displays as nothing.
+    test("a real scale of zero is stored as zero, not collapsed", async () => {
+        for (const reported of ["0", 0]) {
+            const balances = await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: reported })]);
+            expect(balances[0].decimals).toBe(0);
+            expect(balances[0].balance).toBe("5000000000000000000.0");
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("no quantity is stated for a holding whose scale is unknown", async () => {
+        const balances = await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        // Not "0.0": the holding is real and nonzero, and a zero here is the
+        // same lie the approval screens refuse to tell.
+        expect(balances[0].balance).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    // Zero base units is zero tokens at every scale, so this filter never
+    // needed a scale in the first place and does not acquire one now.
+    test("a holding of zero base units is still dropped without a scale", async () => {
+        expect(await fetchOnto([row({}, 0n)])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("the bundled list still supplies a quantity the explorer omitted", async () => {
+        const balances = await fetchOnto([
+            row({ address_hash: WETH, symbol: "WETH" }),
+        ]);
+        // The stored decimals stay the explorer's own answer — absent. Copying
+        // another source in here would make explorerDecimals()'s disagreement
+        // check compare something other than explorer values.
+        expect(balances[0].decimals).toBeNull();
+        // The displayed quantity still comes out right, because the bundled
+        // list knows this token's scale and outranks the explorer anyway.
+        expect(balances[0].balance).toBe("5.0");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the ERC-20 approval line reaches its refusal", () => {
+    test("a transfer of a token the explorer gave no scale for is not formatted", async () => {
+        await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        const line = erc20AmountLine(transferData(THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL);
+        expect(line).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
+        // The defect: a fabricated 18 renders this as 0.000000001, a quantity,
+        // and a wrong one.
+        expect(line).not.toMatch(/^0\./);
+    });
+
+    test("an approve of the same token is not formatted either", async () => {
+        await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        const line = erc20AmountLine(approveData(THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL);
+        expect(line).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
+        expect(line).not.toMatch(/^0\./);
+    });
+
+    test("a scale the explorer did report still formats", async () => {
+        await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: "6" })]);
+        expect(erc20AmountLine(transferData(THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL)).toBe(
+            "1000.0000",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the swap approval line reaches its refusal", () => {
+    test("a swap of a token the explorer gave no scale for is not formatted", async () => {
+        await fetchOnto([row()]);
+        const line = swapAmountLine(
+            swapData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH),
+        );
+        expect(line).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
+        expect(line).not.toMatch(/^0\./);
+    });
+
+    test("a scale the explorer did report still formats", async () => {
+        await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: "6" })]);
+        expect(
+            swapAmountLine(swapData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH)),
+        ).toBe("1000.0000");
+    });
+});
+
+test("no test in this file performed a network request", () => {
+    expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});

tests/manifest.test.js

@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 
 const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
+const ROOT = path.join(__dirname, "..");
+
+// The sizes both stores and both toolbars ask for.
+const EXPECTED_ICON_SIZES = ["16", "32", "48", "128"];
+
+const PNG_SIGNATURE = Buffer.from("89504e470d0a1a0a", "hex");
 
 const EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES = {
     "default-src": ["'self'"],
@@ -115,6 +121,51 @@ function assertPolicy(policy) {
     }
 }
 
+// The declared icons, in both manifests.
+//
+// Without an "icons" block a browser draws a generic puzzle piece in the
+// toolbar for this extension, which is both the first thing the user sees and
+// how a real extension is told apart from a look-alike. Declaring one is not
+// enough on its own: an entry naming a file that is not in the tree ships a
+// reference to nothing, so the referenced bytes are read here and required to
+// be a PNG of the size the entry claims. build.js copies these into each
+// browser directory, relative to it, and script/lib/package.js then refuses to
+// build an archive that does not contain everything the manifest names.
+function assertIcons(target) {
+    const icons = readManifest(target).icons;
+    expect(Object.keys(icons).sort()).toEqual(EXPECTED_ICON_SIZES.sort());
+    for (const size of EXPECTED_ICON_SIZES) {
+        const ref = icons[size];
+        expect([size, ref]).toEqual([size, `icons/icon${size}.png`]);
+
+        const bytes = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, ref));
+        expect(bytes.subarray(0, 8)).toEqual(PNG_SIGNATURE);
+        // IHDR width and height, at fixed offsets right after the signature
+        // and the chunk header.
+        expect([ref, bytes.readUInt32BE(16), bytes.readUInt32BE(20)]).toEqual([
+            ref,
+            Number(size),
+            Number(size),
+        ]);
+    }
+}
+
+describe("declared icons", () => {
+    test("chrome declares real icons at every size", () => {
+        assertIcons("chrome");
+    });
+
+    test("firefox declares real icons at every size", () => {
+        assertIcons("firefox");
+    });
+
+    test("both targets declare the same icons", () => {
+        expect(readManifest("firefox").icons).toEqual(
+            readManifest("chrome").icons,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
 describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
     // MV3 takes an object and applies extension_pages to the popup and the
     // background service worker, which is where libsodium runs.

tests/networkEndpoints.test.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 // happened.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -34,25 +35,19 @@ function walletFixture() {
 // saveState() wrote — so a case can reload a fresh module from the bytes an
 // earlier one persisted, which is what an extension restart does. `state` is
 // a module-level singleton, so the registry has to be reset per load.
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does.
+// It used to alias, and written() then handed the NEXT module load the live
+// in-memory object of the previous one as its "persisted bytes" — an extension
+// restart that never crossed a serialization boundary. See
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadModuleWith(persisted) {
     jest.resetModules();
-    let written = null;
-    global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () =>
-                    persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
-                ),
-                set: jest.fn(async (items) => {
-                    written = items.autistmask;
-                }),
-            },
-        },
-    };
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {});
+    global.chrome = { storage };
     return {
         mod: require("../src/shared/state"),
         chainSwitch: require("../src/shared/chainSwitch"),
-        written: () => written,
+        written: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
     };
 }
 

tests/packaging.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// The release archives: the zip container, and the self-containment rule.
+//
+// script/package produces one archive per browser and script/lib/package.js
+// decides what goes in it. The trap that rule exists for is real and specific:
+// build.js writes the compiled stylesheet to dist/styles.css at the dist/
+// ROOT, outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
+// src/popup/styles.css. A `zip -r dist/chrome` is correct only because of that
+// copy, and would silently start shipping a popup with no stylesheet the
+// moment a reference pointed up and out of the directory.
+//
+// So the packager resolves every reference in the manifest and in every HTML
+// document, and fails on any that leaves the extension root. These are the
+// cases for that, plus the archive format itself — new code, and the thing the
+// artifact is made of.
+
+const {
+    checkSelfContained,
+    htmlReferences,
+    manifestReferences,
+} = require("../script/lib/package");
+const { readZip, writeZip } = require("../script/lib/zip");
+
+function archiveOf(files) {
+    return {
+        members: Object.keys(files).sort(),
+        read: (name) => Buffer.from(files[name] ?? "", "utf8"),
+    };
+}
+
+const MINIMAL_MANIFEST = {
+    manifest_version: 3,
+    name: "AutistMask",
+    version: "0.1.0",
+    action: { default_popup: "src/popup/index.html" },
+    background: { service_worker: "src/background/index.js" },
+};
+
+describe("archive self-containment", () => {
+    test("a complete tree passes", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html":
+                '<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />' +
+                '<script src="index.js"></script>',
+            "src/popup/styles.css": "body{}",
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+            "src/background/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    test("a manifest naming a file that is not in the archive fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /would not be self-contained.*src\/background\/index\.js/s,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The dist/styles.css case, exactly: a popup that reached up out of its
+    // own browser directory for the stylesheet the build leaves at the dist/
+    // root. Nothing would be missing from disk, and the zip would still be
+    // built — the archive would just have no stylesheet in it.
+    test("an HTML reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html":
+                '<link rel="stylesheet" href="../../../styles.css" />',
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+            "src/background/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /resolves outside the extension root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a manifest reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify({
+                ...MINIMAL_MANIFEST,
+                background: { service_worker: "../shared/index.js" },
+            }),
+            "src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /points outside the extension root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Toolbar icons are the other file the manifest names and no bundler
+    // emits, so an archive built without them would carry a manifest whose
+    // "icons" resolve to nothing and a browser would fall back to a generic
+    // placeholder without saying so.
+    test("a manifest naming an icon that is not in the archive fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify({
+                ...MINIMAL_MANIFEST,
+                icons: { 16: "icons/icon16.png", 128: "icons/icon128.png" },
+            }),
+            "src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+            "src/background/index.js": "//",
+            "icons/icon16.png": "PNG",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /would not be self-contained.*icons\/icon128\.png/s,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an archive with no manifest.json at its root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({ "src/popup/index.js": "//" });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /no manifest\.json at its root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("manifest strings that are not paths are not treated as files", () => {
+        const found = manifestReferences({
+            name: "AutistMask",
+            version: "0.1.0",
+            permissions: ["storage", "<all_urls>"],
+            content_security_policy: {
+                extension_pages: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'",
+            },
+            key: "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy",
+        });
+        expect([...found]).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("absolute, data: and anchor HTML references are not files", () => {
+        const refs = htmlReferences(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+            '<a href="https://example.com/x.js">a</a>' +
+                '<img src="" />' +
+                '<a href="#view-main">b</a>' +
+                '<script src="index.js"></script>',
+        );
+        expect([...refs]).toEqual(["src/popup/index.js"]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the zip container", () => {
+    const files = [
+        { name: "manifest.json", data: Buffer.from('{"a":1}') },
+        // Long enough that deflate wins, so both paths through compress() are
+        // exercised by one archive.
+        { name: "src/popup/index.js", data: Buffer.from("x".repeat(5000)) },
+        { name: "empty.txt", data: Buffer.alloc(0) },
+    ];
+
+    test("round-trips every member byte for byte", () => {
+        const entries = readZip(writeZip(files));
+        expect(entries.map((e) => e.name)).toEqual([
+            "empty.txt",
+            "manifest.json",
+            "src/popup/index.js",
+        ]);
+        for (const original of files) {
+            const found = entries.find((e) => e.name === original.name);
+            expect(found.data.equals(original.data)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // The sha256 in release/SHA256SUMS has to be a property of the input. Two
+    // builds of one commit that produce different archives cannot be compared
+    // to each other, which is most of what publishing a digest is for.
+    test("is byte-identical across runs and independent of input order", () => {
+        const a = writeZip(files);
+        const b = writeZip([...files].reverse());
+        expect(a.equals(b)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // Reading an archive back is how script/lib/package.js establishes that
+    // the artifact holds what dist/ holds, so a member whose bytes changed
+    // after it was written has to fail rather than be handed back.
+    test("a corrupted member fails its CRC on read", () => {
+        // One member, incompressible at this size, so it is stored verbatim
+        // and its bytes begin at a known offset: local header (30) + name.
+        const name = "a.js";
+        const archive = writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("hello") }]);
+        expect(readZip(archive)[0].data.toString()).toBe("hello");
+        archive[30 + name.length] ^= 0xff;
+        expect(() => readZip(archive)).toThrow(/fails its recorded CRC32/);
+    });
+
+    test.each([["/abs.js"], ["../up.js"], ["a/../b.js"], ["a\\b.js"], [""]])(
+        "refuses the member name %p",
+        (name) => {
+            expect(() => writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("x") }])).toThrow(
+                /member name/,
+            );
+        },
+    );
+
+    test("refuses an archive with no members", () => {
+        expect(() => writeZip([])).toThrow(/no members/);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses duplicate members", () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            writeZip([
+                { name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("1") },
+                { name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("2") },
+            ]),
+        ).toThrow(/duplicate member/);
+    });
+});

tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+// A persisted container that is checked while its ENTRIES are dereferenced
+// unchecked (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362).
+//
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311 settled the idiom — floor the
+// container AND its entries, dropping anything that cannot be safely
+// dereferenced — and applied it to trackedTokens and tokenBalances. These are
+// the fields it did not reach.
+//
+// allowedSites is the worst shape in the codebase, and it is what the boot
+// tests below measure: a stored `{"0x…": "notalist"}` passes the gate, renders
+// a WORKING popup, and then throws `base.map is not a function` inside
+// saveState()'s merge — so every save from then on fails while the UI looks
+// entirely healthy and the user goes on operating a wallet that is persisting
+// nothing. A blank popup is at least visibly broken; this is not. So the
+// assertion here is never merely "the popup rendered": it is "the popup
+// rendered AND the write actually landed in storage".
+//
+// Observed at ad6aa7b, with the floors below removed:
+//   allowedSites: {"0x…": "notalist"}   -> views=["main"], errors=[], and
+//       storage.set NEVER called: the stored record kept no schemaVersion, so
+//       nothing the user did was persisted.
+//   fraudContracts: "0x…"               -> renderSendTokenSelect() threw
+//       "(state.fraudContracts || []).map is not a function"
+//   fraudContracts: [42]                -> threw "a.toLowerCase is not a
+//       function"
+//   selectedToken: 42 (restoring onto address-token) -> views=[], errors=
+//       ["tokenId.toLowerCase is not a function"] — a blank popup.
+
+const { normalizePersisted } = require("../src/shared/persistedState");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+const {
+    bootPopup,
+    cleanupPopup,
+    unversionedValidProfile,
+    ADDRESS,
+    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+} = require("./support/popupBoot");
+
+// One extension page: a fresh module registry over the given storage. state.js
+// resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to be installed
+// before the module is loaded.
+function loadStateModule(storage) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    globalThis.chrome = { storage: { local: storage.local } };
+    return require("../src/shared/state");
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    cleanupPopup();
+});
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------- the floor itself
+
+describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
+    for (const field of ["allowedSites", "deniedSites"]) {
+        test(`${field} that is not a record becomes an empty record`, () => {
+            for (const bad of ["nope", 42, true, [ADDRESS], null]) {
+                expect(normalizePersisted({ [field]: bad })[field]).toEqual({});
+            }
+        });
+
+        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
+            for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
+                expect(
+                    normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
+                ).toEqual({});
+            }
+        });
+
+        test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({
+                    [field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
+                })[field],
+            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        });
+
+        test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
+            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
+
+            const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual(saved[field]);
+            expect(out[field]).not.toBe(saved[field]);
+            expect(out[field][ADDRESS]).not.toBe(saved[field][ADDRESS]);
+        });
+
+        test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
+            const out = normalizePersisted({
+                [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
+            });
+
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        });
+
+        test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
+            // JSON can carry the key. It can never be a wallet address, so it
+            // grants and denies nothing and goes the way of every other key
+            // whose value is unusable; keeping it would only keep a value that
+            // saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
+            // write.
+            const saved = JSON.parse(
+                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
+            );
+
+            const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+            expect(Object.getPrototypeOf(out[field])).toBe(Object.prototype);
+            expect(Object.keys(out[field])).toEqual([]);
+        });
+    }
+});
+
+describe('a stored own "__proto__" key surviving a save', () => {
+    // The floor writes map keys with defineProperty; saveState()'s merge is one
+    // layer downstream of it and used to write them with plain assignment,
+    // which hands "__proto__" to the prototype setter and records no entry.
+    // networkEndpoints is where a key that is not a known id is deliberately
+    // KEPT, so it is where that undoing shows.
+    test("does not move a prototype or vanish from networkEndpoints", async () => {
+        const profile = unversionedValidProfile();
+        profile.networkEndpoints = JSON.parse(
+            '{"__proto__":{"rpcUrl":"https://kept.invalid"}}',
+        );
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: profile });
+        const { state, loadState, saveState } = loadStateModule(storage);
+
+        await loadState();
+        state.theme = "dark";
+        await saveState();
+
+        // Not compared against Object.prototype by identity: the storage stub
+        // clones through structuredClone, which builds the result in the host
+        // realm, so the two Object.prototypes are different objects.
+        const stored = storage.read("autistmask").networkEndpoints;
+        expect(Object.getPrototypeOf(stored).rpcUrl).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(Object.keys(stored)).toContain("__proto__");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the floor under fraudContracts", () => {
+    test("fraudContracts that is not a list becomes an empty list", () => {
+        for (const bad of ["nope", 42, true, { a: 1 }]) {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({ fraudContracts: bad }).fraudContracts,
+            ).toEqual([]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a fraudContracts entry that is not text is dropped", () => {
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({
+                fraudContracts: [42, null, TOKEN_ADDRESS, {}, []],
+            }).fraudContracts,
+        ).toEqual([TOKEN_ADDRESS]);
+    });
+
+    test("a real fraudContracts list survives, copied not shared", () => {
+        const saved = { fraudContracts: [TOKEN_ADDRESS] };
+
+        const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+        expect(out.fraudContracts).toEqual(saved.fraudContracts);
+        expect(out.fraudContracts).not.toBe(saved.fraudContracts);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the floor under selectedToken", () => {
+    // Found by the sweep for this defect class, not named in the issue: the
+    // restore gate in src/popup/viewRouter.js checks truthiness only, and both
+    // src/popup/views/addressToken.js and src/popup/views/receive.js then
+    // dereference it as text.
+    test("a selectedToken that is not text becomes null", () => {
+        for (const bad of [42, true, { a: 1 }, [TOKEN_ADDRESS]]) {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({ selectedToken: bad }).selectedToken,
+            ).toBeNull();
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a real selectedToken survives; the empty string becomes null", () => {
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({ selectedToken: TOKEN_ADDRESS }).selectedToken,
+        ).toBe(TOKEN_ADDRESS);
+        expect(normalizePersisted({ selectedToken: "ETH" }).selectedToken).toBe(
+            "ETH",
+        );
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({ selectedToken: "" }).selectedToken,
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+// ----------------------------------------- what the user actually gets
+
+describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
+    const MALFORMED = [
+        { name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
+        { name: "a number", value: 42 },
+        { name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
+    ];
+
+    for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
+        test(`whose value is ${name}: a working popup whose writes persist`, async () => {
+            const env = await bootPopup(
+                unversionedValidProfile({
+                    allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: value },
+                }),
+            );
+
+            expect({
+                visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+                errors: env.pageErrors,
+            }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["main"], errors: [] });
+
+            // The half that matters. A popup that renders and never persists
+            // again is worse than one that renders nothing, because nothing
+            // tells the user. The version stamp is proof a write landed: it
+            // is absent from the stored record until saveState() writes one.
+            expect(env.storage.set).toHaveBeenCalled();
+            const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+            expect(stored.schemaVersion).toBe(1);
+            expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe(
+                "encrypted-secret-1",
+            );
+            expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({});
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("the well-formed entries beside it keep working", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({
+                allowedSites: {
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+                    [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
+                },
+            }),
+        );
+
+        expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
+            [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("a later save still lands, not just the first", async () => {
+        // The failure this closes was in the MERGE, which runs on every save
+        // against whatever is in storage at the time. One write landing is not
+        // enough: the field has to stay mergeable.
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({
+            autistmask: unversionedValidProfile({
+                allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: "notalist" },
+            }),
+        });
+        const { state, loadState, saveState } = loadStateModule(storage);
+
+        await loadState();
+        state.theme = "dark";
+        await saveState();
+        state.utcTimestamps = true;
+        await saveState();
+
+        const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.theme).toBe("dark");
+        expect(stored.utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({});
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a malformed fraudContracts", () => {
+    // The send screen, which is where this one lands: the boot path only
+    // reaches fraudContracts through loadHomeTxs(), which catches, so the
+    // consequence is an unusable send screen rather than silent data loss.
+    function stubSendDocument() {
+        const select = { innerHTML: "", children: [] };
+        select.appendChild = (child) => select.children.push(child);
+        globalThis.document = {
+            getElementById: (id) => (id === "send-token" ? select : null),
+            createElement: () => ({ value: "", textContent: "" }),
+        };
+        return select;
+    }
+
+    const HELD = {
+        address: TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+        symbol: "AAA",
+        decimals: 18,
+        balance: "12.5",
+        holders: 50000,
+    };
+
+    async function sendScreenTokens(fraudContracts) {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({
+            autistmask: unversionedValidProfile({ fraudContracts }),
+        });
+        const { loadState } = loadStateModule(storage);
+        await loadState();
+        const select = stubSendDocument();
+        const { renderSendTokenSelect } = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+
+        renderSendTokenSelect({ address: ADDRESS, tokenBalances: [HELD] });
+
+        return select.children.map((opt) => opt.value);
+    }
+
+    for (const bad of ["notalist", 42, { a: 1 }, [42], [null], [{}]]) {
+        test(`${JSON.stringify(bad)}: a usable send screen`, async () => {
+            await expect(sendScreenTokens(bad)).resolves.toEqual([
+                TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+            ]);
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("a real fraud entry beside a malformed one still hides its token", async () => {
+        await expect(
+            sendScreenTokens([42, TOKEN_ADDRESS.toLowerCase()]),
+        ).resolves.toEqual([]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a malformed selectedToken", () => {
+    test("does not blank the popup on restore", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({
+                currentView: "address-token",
+                selectedWallet: 0,
+                selectedAddress: 0,
+                selectedToken: 42,
+                viewStack: ["main", "address"],
+            }),
+        );
+
+        expect({
+            visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+            errors: env.pageErrors,
+        }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["main"], errors: [] });
+    });
+});
+
+// --------------------------------------------- a save that fails is told
+
+describe("a save that fails", () => {
+    function failingStorage(profile) {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: profile });
+        const realSet = storage.local.set;
+        storage.local.set = jest.fn(async () => {
+            throw new Error("QUOTA_BYTES quota exceeded");
+        });
+        storage.restoreWrites = () => {
+            storage.local.set = realSet;
+        };
+        return storage;
+    }
+
+    test("is reported, not swallowed by the save queue", async () => {
+        const storage = failingStorage(unversionedValidProfile());
+        const { state, loadState, saveState, onSaveFailure } =
+            loadStateModule(storage);
+        const failures = [];
+        onSaveFailure((e) => failures.push(String(e && e.message)));
+
+        await loadState();
+        state.theme = "dark";
+        // Not awaited, which is how showView() saves on every navigation and
+        // how the failure used to disappear entirely.
+        saveState();
+        for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+
+        expect(failures).toEqual(["QUOTA_BYTES quota exceeded"]);
+    });
+
+    test("still rejects for a caller that awaits it", async () => {
+        const storage = failingStorage(unversionedValidProfile());
+        const { state, loadState, saveState, onSaveFailure } =
+            loadStateModule(storage);
+        onSaveFailure(() => {});
+
+        await loadState();
+        state.theme = "dark";
+
+        await expect(saveState()).rejects.toThrow("QUOTA_BYTES");
+    });
+
+    test("puts a banner on the popup saying nothing is being saved", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(undefined, {
+            storage: failingStorage(unversionedValidProfile()),
+        });
+
+        // The popup is still usable — the point is that it no longer looks
+        // healthy while silently persisting nothing.
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        const banner = env.node("save-failure-banner");
+        expect(banner).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(banner.textContent).toContain("NOT SAVED");
+        expect(banner.textContent).toContain("QUOTA_BYTES quota exceeded");
+    });
+
+    test("no banner appears on a popup whose saves work", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        expect(env.node("save-failure-banner")).toBeNull();
+    });
+});

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,864 @@
+// What the floor under each persisted field actually guarantees — as a table
+// that RUNS, one row per field.
+//
+// This file replaces a hand-written per-field justification in the header of
+// src/shared/stateSchema.js. That comment shipped a false claim in three
+// consecutive changes: every author wrote plausible prose about thirty fields,
+// every reviewer re-derived it by hand, and it kept being wrong in a different
+// place each time. The artifact was the problem. A claim nobody can execute is
+// worse than no claim, because it is believed.
+//
+// So the claim is a row here instead:
+//
+//   KIND.REFUSED   assertStateUsable() refuses the record outright. Proven by
+//                  stateProblem() naming a problem for every hostile value.
+//   KIND.ENTRIES   normalizePersisted() floors the container AND its entries.
+//                  Proven by holds() over the normalized value.
+//   KIND.SCALAR    normalizePersisted() floors it to one scalar type, or to a
+//                  fixed fallback. Proven the same way.
+//   KIND.LOOSE     `saved.x || default`, no type check at all. The claim is
+//                  that no structural dereference of it is reachable from a
+//                  stored record — which cannot be argued, only driven, so the
+//                  proof is a boot of the REAL popup entry point over a stored
+//                  record carrying the hostile value, ONTO EVERY RESTORABLE
+//                  VIEW. Home is not where this class of defect lives.
+//
+// Every row is driven through a boot regardless of kind, but only a LOOSE row
+// (or a row that sets `alsoSweep`) is swept across the restore path: that is
+// what declaring LOOSE costs. ENTRIES and SCALAR rows are proven by their
+// holds() instead, because a floored value is not hostile by the time a
+// renderer sees it. A LOOSE row must additionally prove it is loose: if
+// someone floors the field — even partially — and leaves the row saying LOOSE,
+// the "survives verbatim" assertion fails. A field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS
+// with no row fails the first test in the file.
+//
+// The sweep is what makes a LOOSE row falsifiable, so read how it is driven
+// before trusting it. A row the ROUTER reads (`routes`) gets its own boot per
+// view, because a hostile value in it legitimately changes which view renders.
+// Every other swept field is corrupted on the SAME boot, one boot per view per
+// slot, and that boot has to land on the view it stored — so a field that does
+// move the routing cannot hide in the crowd. Every swept field is driven at
+// BOTH POLARITIES: a value nothing in src/ writes is a wrong-typed one and so
+// always truthy, which leaves `if (!state.x) { state.y.deref() }` unentered on
+// the very boot that corrupts x. The last slot is the falsy one for that
+// reason, and a field that cannot be falsy after the floor says so in its row
+// and is proven so.
+//
+// READ THE CLAIM NARROWLY. What this file proves is: NO STRUCTURAL
+// DEREFERENCE ON THE CODE PATHS A WHOLLY-CORRUPTED PROFILE TAKES. That is not
+// every path a stored record takes, and the difference is the whole of what
+// this file does not cover:
+//
+//   - Only the values in the table, in the SLOT arrangement below: four value
+//     combinations per view, not the product of twelve fields. A dereference
+//     reached only under a pairing no slot produces is not driven at all.
+//   - Only what a stored record reaches by ITSELF. A view only forward
+//     navigation opens, and anything behind a click, is not driven.
+//   - Nothing about the paths a HEALTHY profile takes, which is most of the
+//     popup. This file is a floor under one defect class, not a proof about
+//     the renderers.
+//
+// Within that boundary it is unconditional: if one of these boots leaves the
+// popup unhealthy or off the view it stored, this file goes red — including
+// when it takes two corrupted fields at once, because the verdict is the
+// combined boot itself and the per-field re-boot below can only decorate the
+// message. That last part is the one thing an earlier version got wrong: it
+// asserted on the per-field list, so an observed dead popup that no single
+// field reproduced was reported green.
+//
+// Booting every field separately at every value would be several hundred boots
+// and most of the suite's budget; this is forty-four. Widening it further is
+// out of scope — proving no field is dereferenced on any reachable render path
+// is exhaustive verification of the popup, not a floor under a stored record.
+//
+// The three claims this replaced, all false, all caught here by construction:
+// rpcUrl reaching `new JsonRpcProvider()` (a synchronous throw, not a caught
+// request); viewData's ENTRIES being dereferenced by four restore branches
+// that gate on one truthy field each; and selectedWallet, where a stale
+// integer index is the SAFE case and `wallets["map"]` is the throwing one.
+
+const {
+    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
+    normalizePersisted,
+} = require("../src/shared/persistedState");
+const { stateProblem } = require("../src/shared/stateSchema");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
+const {
+    bootPopup,
+    cleanupPopup,
+    unversionedValidProfile,
+    ADDRESS,
+    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+} = require("./support/popupBoot");
+
+const KIND = {
+    REFUSED: "refused by the gate",
+    ENTRIES: "container and entries type-checked",
+    SCALAR: "scalar type-checked",
+    LOOSE: "loosely floored; safety proven by driving the popup",
+};
+
+const isText = (v) => typeof v === "string";
+const isRecord = (v) =>
+    typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+const isIndexOrNull = (v) => v === null || (Number.isInteger(v) && v >= 0);
+const isTextOrNull = (v) => v === null || (isText(v) && v !== "");
+const everyEntry = (v, fn) => Array.isArray(v) && v.every(fn);
+
+// A row is SWEPT — driven onto every restorable view rather than only onto
+// Home — when its claim is that no restore path dereferences the field. That
+// is what LOOSE means. The two index rows opt in with `alsoSweep` although
+// they are floored, because the restore path is precisely why they gained a
+// floor and the sweep is the regression guard on it.
+const swept = (row) => row.kind === KIND.LOOSE || Boolean(row.alsoSweep);
+
+// Every value a swept row drives through a boot: the hostile set, plus the
+// falsy slot that gives the field its other polarity. `hostile` values are all
+// TRUTHY by nature — a value nothing in src/ writes is a wrong-typed one, and
+// wrong-typed values are objects, non-empty strings and non-zero numbers. A
+// field that is only ever truthy on the boot that corrupts it cannot falsify
+// `if (!state.x) { state.y.deref() }`, so the falsy slot is not optional.
+const sweptValues = (row) => [...row.hostile, ...(row.falsy || [])];
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------ the table
+//
+// `hostile` is values a stored record can carry that nothing in src/ ever
+// writes. Each one is driven through the floor AND through a real popup boot —
+// and, for a swept row, through one boot per restorable view — so keep the
+// list short and pointed. `floorOnly` is extra values checked against the
+// floor alone, which is pure and free. `hostileRestore` is extra values driven
+// through the restore path only, for a value that means nothing until a
+// particular branch's gate has let it past.
+//
+// `falsy` is the other POLARITY of a swept field, driven for the same reason.
+// It is not a value src/ never writes — for three of these fields it is the
+// DEFAULT_STATE default, which is the branch every ordinary install takes —
+// and that is the point: without it, a dereference behind `if (!state.x)` is
+// unreachable on the one boot that corrupts x. A swept row that cannot supply
+// one says `neverFalsy` instead, which is proven rather than asserted: every
+// falsy value stored under that field comes back TRUTHY from the floor, so no
+// `!state.x` branch is reachable from a stored record at all.
+
+const CONTRACT = [
+    {
+        field: "wallets",
+        kind: KIND.REFUSED,
+        hostile: [42, "notastructure", { a: 1 }, [null], [{ addresses: 1 }]],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "networkId",
+        kind: KIND.REFUSED,
+        hostile: [42, "notanetwork", { a: 1 }, "__proto__"],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "trackedTokens",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notalist", { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[1, 2], [null], [{}], [[TOKEN_ADDRESS]]],
+        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, (t) => isRecord(t) && isText(t.address)),
+    },
+    {
+        field: "allowedSites",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { [ADDRESS]: "notalist" }],
+        floorOnly: [
+            [ADDRESS],
+            { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
+            { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+        ],
+        holds: siteMapHolds,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "deniedSites",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { [ADDRESS]: "notalist" }],
+        floorOnly: [
+            [ADDRESS],
+            { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
+            { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+        ],
+        holds: siteMapHolds,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "fraudContracts",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notalist", { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[42], [null], [{}], [[TOKEN_ADDRESS]]],
+        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, isText),
+    },
+    {
+        field: "viewStack",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notalist", ["main", "show-phrase", "settings"]],
+        floorOnly: [[1, 2], [null], [{}], ["export-privkey"]],
+        // Truncated at the first entry the popup will not reopen onto, rather
+        // than filtered: every surviving entry's Back target has to stay the
+        // one it had. restorableStack() may also substitute ["main"] under a
+        // view restored below the root, so this is the one ENTRIES field whose
+        // result is not always a subset of what was stored.
+        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, (e) => RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(e)),
+    },
+    {
+        field: "networkEndpoints",
+        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
+        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { mainnet: "notapair" }],
+        floorOnly: [
+            [1, 2],
+            { mainnet: { rpcUrl: 42, blockscoutUrl: {} } },
+            { mainnet: { rpcUrl: "", blockscoutUrl: [] } },
+            { sepolia: 42 },
+        ],
+        // Entries are coerced rather than dropped: an unknown network id is
+        // KEPT, so a profile that has been on a build with more networks does
+        // not lose their endpoints here. What is floored is the two URL fields
+        // inside the pair, which applyChainSwitchFields() assigns straight onto
+        // s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl on the next switch.
+        holds: (v) =>
+            isRecord(v) &&
+            Object.keys(v).every((id) => {
+                const pair = v[id];
+                return (
+                    isRecord(pair) &&
+                    (pair.rpcUrl === undefined ||
+                        (isText(pair.rpcUrl) && pair.rpcUrl !== "")) &&
+                    (pair.blockscoutUrl === undefined ||
+                        (isText(pair.blockscoutUrl) &&
+                            pair.blockscoutUrl !== ""))
+                );
+            }),
+    },
+    {
+        field: "rpcUrl",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[], "", null],
+        holds: (v) => isText(v) && v !== "",
+        // The claim this row replaced said a bad value "fails the request on a
+        // path that already catches". It does not: getProvider() hands rpcUrl
+        // to `new JsonRpcProvider()`, which throws SYNCHRONOUSLY, from two call
+        // sites outside any try — and a stored `currentView: "wait-tx"` reaches
+        // one of them through restoreView(). So the row proves the claim
+        // against the real constructor rather than describing it.
+        alsoProven: (normalized, hostile) => {
+            // requireActual: bootPopup() mocks this module out for the boots
+            // above, and a mocked getProvider() would prove nothing at all
+            // about the constructor this row is a claim about.
+            const { getProvider } = jest.requireActual(
+                "../src/shared/balances",
+            );
+            expect(() => getProvider(hostile, "mainnet")).toThrow();
+            const provider = getProvider(normalized, "mainnet");
+            expect(provider).toBeTruthy();
+            provider.destroy();
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        field: "blockscoutUrl",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[], "", null],
+        holds: (v) => isText(v) && v !== "",
+    },
+    {
+        field: "activeAddress",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[ADDRESS], ""],
+        holds: isTextOrNull,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "selectedToken",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: [[TOKEN_ADDRESS], ""],
+        holds: isTextOrNull,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "selectedWallet",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        // The prototype members are the whole point: `wallets["map"]` is
+        // TRUTHY, so hasValidAddress()'s `&&` does not short-circuit and
+        // `.addresses[…]` throws. A stale INTEGER is the safe case.
+        hostile: ["map", "__proto__", { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: ["length", "constructor", "toString", "0", -1, 1.5, true],
+        holds: isIndexOrNull,
+        // SCALAR, and swept anyway: the restore path is precisely why this
+        // field gained a floor, so the sweep is the regression guard on it.
+        alsoSweep: true,
+        routes: true,
+        // A stale INTEGER index, which reaches the restore path by a different
+        // route from the prototype members above — falsy or out of range
+        // rather than truthy — and has to keep being the safe case.
+        hostileRestore: [{ value: "length" }, { value: 5 }],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "selectedAddress",
+        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
+        hostile: ["map", "__proto__", { a: 1 }],
+        floorOnly: ["length", "constructor", "toString", "0", -1, 1.5, true],
+        holds: isIndexOrNull,
+        alsoSweep: true,
+        routes: true,
+        hostileRestore: [{ value: 5 }],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "currentView",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        routes: true,
+        // Compared, and concatenated into the debug banner's textContent
+        // (src/popup/views/helpers.js) with no gate in front of it, which
+        // coerces. Nothing renders FROM it without RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has()
+        // first, and Set.has() answers false for any value.
+        hostile: [42, "no-such-view", { a: 1 }],
+        // `saved.currentView || null`: the falsy polarity is the popup landing
+        // on Home, which every boot in "booting onto Home" below also drives.
+        falsy: [""],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "viewData",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        routes: true,
+        // The container is taken verbatim; what makes its ENTRIES safe is the
+        // per-branch guard in src/popup/viewRouter.js. The sweep drives the
+        // container shapes below onto every restorable view; hostileRestore
+        // adds the records that PASS a branch's gate and then hand its
+        // renderer something it dereferences, which is where the entries are
+        // actually decided.
+        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { a: 1 }, [1, 2]],
+        // `structuredClone(saved.viewData || {})`: the container is never falsy
+        // in state whatever was stored, so no `!state.viewData` branch exists to
+        // drive.
+        neverFalsy: true,
+        hostileRestore: [
+            // success-tx passes on `data.hash`, and renderSuccess() then calls
+            // toAddressHtml(d.to) -> addressTitle() -> address.toLowerCase().
+            { value: { hash: "0x1" }, views: ["success-tx"] },
+            { value: { hash: "0x1", to: 42 }, views: ["success-tx"] },
+            {
+                value: { hash: "0x1", to: ADDRESS, decoded: { details: 7 } },
+                views: ["success-tx"],
+            },
+            {
+                value: {
+                    hash: "0x1",
+                    to: ADDRESS,
+                    decoded: { details: [{ address: 42 }] },
+                },
+                views: ["success-tx"],
+            },
+            // error-tx passes on `data.message`, same dereference.
+            { value: { message: "boom" }, views: ["error-tx"] },
+            { value: { message: "boom", to: 42 }, views: ["error-tx"] },
+            // transaction passes on `data.tx`.
+            { value: { tx: { hash: "0x1" } }, views: ["transaction"] },
+            {
+                value: {
+                    tx: {
+                        hash: "0x1",
+                        from: ADDRESS,
+                        to: ADDRESS,
+                        contractAddress: 42,
+                    },
+                },
+                views: ["transaction"],
+            },
+            // confirm-tx passes on `data.pendingTx`.
+            { value: { pendingTx: { amount: "1" } }, views: ["confirm-tx"] },
+            {
+                value: {
+                    pendingTx: {
+                        token: 42,
+                        from: ADDRESS,
+                        to: ADDRESS,
+                        amount: "1",
+                    },
+                },
+                views: ["confirm-tx"],
+            },
+            // wait-tx passes on `pendingWait.hash`; restoreWait() has checked
+            // the fields below it since it was written, and this is the
+            // regression guard.
+            {
+                value: {
+                    pendingWait: {
+                        hash: "0x1",
+                        txInfo: { to: 42, amount: "1" },
+                    },
+                },
+                views: ["wait-tx"],
+            },
+            // A record that passes EVERY branch's gate at once, driven onto
+            // every restorable view: a branch a view does not read must stay
+            // one it does not read, and each renderer must survive the fields
+            // another branch left behind.
+            {
+                value: {
+                    hash: "0x1",
+                    message: "boom",
+                    tx: { hash: "0x1" },
+                    pendingTx: { amount: "1" },
+                    pendingWait: { hash: "0x1" },
+                },
+            },
+        ],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "lastBalanceRefresh",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        // Arithmetic only: `now - (s.lastBalanceRefresh || 0)` compares false
+        // for a non-number and forces a refresh.
+        hostile: [true, "notatime", { a: 1 }],
+        // `|| 0` collapses every falsy stored value to 0, so 0 IS the whole
+        // falsy polarity of this field — and it is the DEFAULT_STATE default,
+        // the value a profile carries until its first refresh lands.
+        falsy: [0],
+    },
+    {
+        field: "tokenHolderCache",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        // Nothing DEREFERENCES it structurally. It is read by the
+        // field-agnostic snapshotPersisted()/deepEqual() in
+        // src/shared/state.js, which are safe for any value, and otherwise
+        // only reset wholesale in src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js.
+        hostile: [42, "notarecord", [1, 2]],
+        // `structuredClone(saved.tokenHolderCache || {})`.
+        neverFalsy: true,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "theme",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        // Compared against "dark"/"light" in applyTheme() and otherwise falls
+        // to the system branch; assigned into an input .value, which coerces.
+        hostile: [42, "chartreuse", { a: 1 }],
+        // `saved.theme || "system"`.
+        neverFalsy: true,
+    },
+    {
+        field: "dustThresholdGwei",
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        hostile: ["notanumber", true, { a: 1 }],
+        // Survives verbatim, so the falsy slot is also wrong-typed: "" reaches
+        // filterTransactions() as a comparand and a settings input .value.
+        falsy: [""],
+    },
+    ...[
+        "rememberSiteChoice",
+        "showZeroBalanceTokens",
+        "hideSpoofedSymbols",
+        "hideLowHolderTokens",
+        "hideFraudContracts",
+        "hideDustTransactions",
+        "utcTimestamps",
+        "debugMode",
+    ].map((field) => ({
+        field,
+        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
+        // A flag: only ever tested for truthiness, and written back verbatim.
+        hostile: [42, "notabool", { a: 1 }],
+        // Both answers to that truthiness test have to be driven, and 0 is a
+        // value src/ never writes for a flag. For utcTimestamps and debugMode
+        // the falsy answer is also the DEFAULT_STATE default.
+        falsy: [0],
+    })),
+];
+
+function siteMapHolds(v) {
+    return (
+        isRecord(v) &&
+        Object.getPrototypeOf(v) === Object.prototype &&
+        !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(v, "__proto__") &&
+        Object.keys(v).every((key) => everyEntry(v[key], isText))
+    );
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    cleanupPopup();
+});
+
+// -------------------------------------------------------------- exhaustive
+
+describe("the contract covers the record", () => {
+    test("every persisted field has exactly one row, and no row invents one", () => {
+        const rows = CONTRACT.map((row) => row.field);
+
+        expect([...rows].sort()).toEqual([...PERSISTED_FIELDS].sort());
+    });
+
+    test("every row declares a kind this file knows how to prove", () => {
+        const kinds = Object.values(KIND);
+        for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+            expect(kinds).toContain(row.kind);
+            expect(row.hostile.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- the floors
+
+function profileWith(field, value) {
+    return unversionedValidProfile({ [field]: value });
+}
+
+describe("the floor each row claims", () => {
+    // The falsy slot is deliberately NOT in here. `saved.x || default` is a
+    // floor on falsy values and on nothing else, so a falsy value is the one
+    // thing a LOOSE field need not carry through verbatim; what it has to carry
+    // through is being falsy, which "both polarities" below asserts.
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        const values = [...row.hostile, ...(row.floorOnly || [])];
+
+        if (row.kind === KIND.REFUSED) {
+            test(`${row.field}: the gate refuses it`, () => {
+                for (const value of values) {
+                    expect(
+                        typeof stateProblem(profileWith(row.field, value)),
+                    ).toBe("string");
+                }
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        test(`${row.field}: ${row.kind}`, () => {
+            for (const value of values) {
+                const out = normalizePersisted(profileWith(row.field, value));
+                if (row.kind === KIND.LOOSE) {
+                    // The claim IS that there is no floor. A field that grows
+                    // one has to move to another kind rather than keep a row
+                    // saying its readers are what make it safe.
+                    continue;
+                }
+                expect({
+                    value: value,
+                    holds: row.holds(out[row.field]),
+                }).toEqual({ value: value, holds: true });
+            }
+        });
+
+        if (row.kind === KIND.LOOSE) {
+            test(`${row.field}: is genuinely unfloored`, () => {
+                // EVERY value, not some: a PARTIAL floor is still a floor, and
+                // a row that keeps saying LOOSE because one hostile value out
+                // of three still survives is exactly the stale claim this file
+                // exists to stop.
+                for (const value of values) {
+                    const out = normalizePersisted(
+                        profileWith(row.field, value),
+                    );
+                    expect({
+                        value: value,
+                        survived: JSON.stringify(out[row.field]),
+                    }).toEqual({
+                        value: value,
+                        survived: JSON.stringify(value),
+                    });
+                }
+            });
+        }
+    }
+});
+
+// --------------------------------------------- driving the real popup boot
+
+// A booted popup is healthy when nothing threw out of init() and something is
+// on screen. A throw out of restoreView() is neither: init() does not guard it,
+// so the rest of popup init never runs and the user gets a popup with no view,
+// no message and no control on it.
+async function bootHealth(profile) {
+    const env = await bootPopup(profile);
+    return {
+        errors: env.pageErrors,
+        blank: env.visibleViews().length === 0,
+    };
+}
+
+const HEALTHY = { errors: [], blank: false };
+
+// unversionedValidProfile() stores no currentView, so every boot in here lands
+// on Home. That is the cheap half of the proof; the restore path below is the
+// half that matters.
+// Both polarities of every swept field are driven, or the field is proven
+// unable to take one of them. This is the guard on the sweep itself: a hostile
+// set is all-truthy by construction, so without a falsy slot a dereference
+// behind `if (!state.x)` is never reached on the boot that corrupts x — the
+// same falsy-collapse blind spot the fields below were floored for.
+describe("both polarities of every swept field are driven", () => {
+    const FALSY_STORED = [0, "", false, null];
+    const floored = (field, value) =>
+        normalizePersisted(profileWith(field, value))[field];
+
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        if (!swept(row)) continue;
+
+        if (row.neverFalsy) {
+            test(`${row.field}: cannot be falsy in state at all`, () => {
+                for (const value of FALSY_STORED) {
+                    expect({
+                        stored: value,
+                        truthy: Boolean(floored(row.field, value)),
+                    }).toEqual({ stored: value, truthy: true });
+                }
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        test(`${row.field}: truthy and falsy`, () => {
+            // What the boots below actually drive, floored the way a renderer
+            // sees it — not what the row says it drives.
+            const driven = [
+                ...sweptValues(row),
+                ...(row.hostileRestore || []).map((entry) => entry.value),
+            ].map((value) => floored(row.field, value));
+
+            expect({
+                truthy: driven.some((value) => Boolean(value)),
+                falsy: driven.some((value) => !value),
+            }).toEqual({ truthy: true, falsy: true });
+        });
+    }
+});
+
+describe("a hostile value for one field, booting onto Home", () => {
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        for (const value of sweptValues(row)) {
+            test(`${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(value)}`, async () => {
+                await expect(
+                    bootHealth(profileWith(row.field, value)),
+                ).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
+            });
+        }
+    }
+});
+
+describe("a row's extra proof against the real reader", () => {
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        if (!row.alsoProven) continue;
+        test(row.field, () => {
+            for (const value of row.hostile) {
+                const out = normalizePersisted(profileWith(row.field, value));
+                row.alsoProven(out[row.field], value);
+            }
+        });
+    }
+});
+
+// ------------------------------------------------ driving the restore path
+
+// Everything above lands on Home. Home is not where this class of defect
+// lives: all three of the false claims this file replaced were falsified by a
+// RESTORE, through the unguarded restoreView() in src/popup/index.js. So a
+// swept row's hostile values are driven onto EVERY restorable view, one boot
+// each.
+//
+// This is what makes a LOOSE row falsifiable. A field that gains a structural
+// dereference on any restorable view — `state.theme.toLowerCase()` in a view's
+// show(), say — turns the row red here, instead of waiting for a reviewer to
+// re-derive the claim by hand.
+
+// restoreWait() resumes from this, so it has to be a finite number and recent
+// enough that the resumed deadline has not already passed — a wait that has
+// outlived its deadline resolves on the first poll instead of staying on
+// screen. Read once at module load, so every boot in one run shares it.
+const BROADCAST_TIME = Date.now();
+
+// A viewData well formed for every restorable branch at once, so the only
+// thing a swept boot can fail on is the field the row corrupts. "the base
+// profile the sweep corrupts" below proves this really does render each view
+// rather than falling back — without that, a sweep could pass by never
+// reaching a renderer at all.
+const WELL_FORMED_DATA = {
+    hash: "0x1",
+    message: "boom",
+    to: ADDRESS,
+    decoded: { details: [{ address: TOKEN_ADDRESS }] },
+    tx: { hash: "0x1", from: ADDRESS, to: ADDRESS, contractAddress: null },
+    pendingTx: {
+        token: "ETH",
+        from: ADDRESS,
+        to: ADDRESS,
+        amount: "1",
+        balance: "2",
+    },
+    pendingWait: {
+        hash: "0x1",
+        txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" },
+        broadcastTime: BROADCAST_TIME,
+    },
+};
+
+function restoringOnto(view, extra) {
+    return unversionedValidProfile({
+        currentView: view,
+        selectedWallet: 0,
+        selectedAddress: 0,
+        selectedToken: TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+        viewStack: ["main"],
+        viewData: WELL_FORMED_DATA,
+        ...extra,
+    });
+}
+
+// A boot that RESTORED is healthy and landed on the view it stored, rather
+// than falling back to Home — which a healthy boot also does, and which would
+// let a sweep pass by never running the renderer it is aimed at.
+async function restoredHealth(profile, view) {
+    const env = await bootPopup(profile);
+    return {
+        errors: env.pageErrors,
+        restored: env.visibleViews().includes(view),
+    };
+}
+
+const RESTORED = { errors: [], restored: true };
+
+describe("the base profile the sweep corrupts", () => {
+    for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
+        test(`renders ${view} rather than falling back`, async () => {
+            await expect(
+                restoredHealth(restoringOnto(view), view),
+            ).resolves.toEqual(RESTORED);
+        });
+    }
+});
+
+// A field the ROUTER itself reads — the two it gates on and the two
+// hasValidAddress() indexes with. A hostile value in one of these legitimately
+// changes which view renders, so each gets its own boot per view and is held
+// only to "healthy", not to "restored onto the view it stored".
+const routes = (row) => Boolean(row.routes);
+
+// Every routing row × every hostile value × every restorable view. Profiles
+// are deduplicated because a hostile `currentView` REPLACES the view being
+// restored onto, which would otherwise be the same boot eleven times.
+describe("a hostile routing value restoring onto", () => {
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        if (!swept(row) || !routes(row)) continue;
+        const seen = new Set();
+        for (const value of sweptValues(row)) {
+            for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
+                const profile = restoringOnto(view, { [row.field]: value });
+                const key = JSON.stringify(profile);
+                if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+                seen.add(key);
+                test(`${view}: ${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(
+                    value,
+                )}`, async () => {
+                    await expect(bootHealth(profile)).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+});
+
+// Every OTHER swept field, corrupted at once, one boot per view per hostile
+// slot: twelve fields on one boot rather than twelve boots. A field is only in
+// here because it is not one the router reads — and that is ASSERTED, not
+// argued, because the boot has to land on `view`. A field that does move the
+// routing turns this red and has to declare `routes` and take the individual
+// sweep above.
+//
+// Combining hides one thing, and the last slot is what stops it. A hostile
+// value is wrong-typed and therefore TRUTHY, so on a boot where every swept
+// field is hostile, no `if (!state.x)` branch is entered — and a dereference
+// inside such a branch would go unseen however loudly it throws. The last slot
+// is the falsy one: every swept field that CAN be falsy is falsy on it, which
+// is also the state an ordinary install boots in for three of them, while the
+// fields that cannot be falsy stay hostile-truthy. That makes it a MIX, and a
+// deliberate one — the interaction between a falsy flag and a still-hostile
+// theme is a shape a stored record really produces.
+//
+// The verdict is the combined boot, always. When it goes red the same view is
+// re-booted one field at a time, so the failure NAMES a culprit instead of
+// leaving a reader to bisect twelve fields — but that loop only decorates the
+// message. It cannot clear the failure. A dereference that needs two corrupted
+// fields at once is reproduced by neither field alone, and a version of this
+// file that asserted on the named list reported exactly that case green while
+// watching the popup die.
+const UNROUTED = CONTRACT.filter((row) => swept(row) && !routes(row));
+const HOSTILE_SLOTS = Math.max(
+    ...UNROUTED.map((row) => sweptValues(row).length),
+);
+
+function unroutedValues(slot) {
+    const fields = {};
+    for (const row of UNROUTED) {
+        const values = sweptValues(row);
+        fields[row.field] = values[slot % values.length];
+    }
+    return fields;
+}
+
+describe("every field the router does not read, corrupted at once, onto", () => {
+    for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
+        for (let slot = 0; slot < HOSTILE_SLOTS; slot++) {
+            test(`${view}: hostile value ${slot + 1} in all ${
+                UNROUTED.length
+            } of them`, async () => {
+                const fields = unroutedValues(slot);
+                const together = await restoredHealth(
+                    restoringOnto(view, fields),
+                    view,
+                );
+
+                // The per-field re-boot only DECORATES the message. The
+                // verdict is `together`, unconditionally: a dereference that
+                // needs two corrupted fields at once is reproduced by NEITHER
+                // field alone, so an assertion on the named list would report
+                // an observed dead popup as green.
+                const named = [];
+                if (together.errors.length > 0 || !together.restored) {
+                    for (const row of UNROUTED) {
+                        const one = await restoredHealth(
+                            restoringOnto(view, {
+                                [row.field]: fields[row.field],
+                            }),
+                            view,
+                        );
+                        if (one.errors.length === 0 && one.restored) continue;
+                        named.push(
+                            `${row.field}=${JSON.stringify(
+                                fields[row.field],
+                            )}: ` +
+                                (one.errors.join("; ") || `fell off ${view}`),
+                        );
+                    }
+                    if (named.length === 0) {
+                        named.push(
+                            "no single field reproduces it; it takes two or " +
+                                `more of ${JSON.stringify(fields)}`,
+                        );
+                    }
+                }
+
+                expect({
+                    view: view,
+                    together: together,
+                    fields: named,
+                }).toEqual({ view: view, together: RESTORED, fields: [] });
+            });
+        }
+    }
+});
+
+// The values that only mean something on the restore path: a viewData that
+// PASSES a branch's gate and then hands its renderer something dereferenced,
+// and the index values whose route through hasValidAddress() differs from the
+// row's own hostile set.
+describe("a restore-only hostile value onto", () => {
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        for (const entry of row.hostileRestore || []) {
+            for (const view of entry.views || RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
+                test(`${view}: ${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(
+                    entry.value,
+                )}`, async () => {
+                    await expect(
+                        bootHealth(
+                            restoringOnto(view, { [row.field]: entry.value }),
+                        ),
+                    ).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+});

tests/popupElementIds.test.js

@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ const POPUP_HTML_PATH = path.join(POPUP_DIR, "index.html");
 const RUNTIME_CREATED_IDS = new Set([
     // Created by updateDebugBanner() in src/popup/views/helpers.js.
     "debug-banner",
+    // Created by showSaveFailureBanner() in the same file, on the first save
+    // that fails. Absent from the markup on purpose: a popup where nothing has
+    // failed must not have to carry an empty banner
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362).
+    "save-failure-banner",
 ]);
 
 // Every id lookup the popup performs with a literal argument, as

tests/settingsUtcTimestamps.test.js

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,19 +53,17 @@ describe("the UTC Timestamps checkbox placement", () => {
 });
 
 describe("the UTC Timestamps setting round-trips through storage", () => {
-    let store;
+    let storage;
 
+    // The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local
+    // does. It used to alias, which is fatal to a round-trip test in
+    // particular: the object the module holds and the object "storage" holds
+    // are then the same object, so the setting appears to have been persisted
+    // and read back on a build where neither happened. See
+    // tests/support/storageStub.js.
     function loadStateModule() {
-        store = {};
-        global.chrome = {
-            storage: {
-                local: {
-                    get: async (key) =>
-                        key in store ? { [key]: store[key] } : {},
-                    set: async (obj) => Object.assign(store, obj),
-                },
-            },
-        };
+        storage = makeStorageStub();
+        global.chrome = { storage };
         jest.resetModules();
         return require("../src/shared/state");
     }
@@ -86,12 +86,18 @@ describe("the UTC Timestamps setting round-trips through storage", () => {
         // What the change handler in views/settings.js does.
         first.state.utcTimestamps = true;
         await first.saveState();
-        expect(store.autistmask.utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
 
-        // A fresh popup load sees it.
+        // A fresh popup load sees it — and, before that load, refuses to
+        // answer at all rather than reporting the default. That refusal is
+        // what makes the assertion below evidence of a read from storage
+        // instead of a value that was already sitting in memory
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
         jest.resetModules();
         const second = require("../src/shared/state");
-        expect(second.state.utcTimestamps).toBe(false);
+        expect(() => second.state.utcTimestamps).toThrow(
+            second.StateNotLoadedError,
+        );
         await second.loadState();
         expect(second.state.utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
     });

tests/showPhrase.test.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 
 const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const SHOW_PHRASE_VIEW = "show-phrase";
 

tests/state.test.js

@@ -1,26 +1,37 @@
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
+// Address RECORDS, not bare address strings. A stored profile is validated
+// against the schema on every read now (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a bare
+// string where an address record belongs is one of the shapes that refuses to
+// load — as it should, since every screen dereferences addr.address.
 function oneWallet() {
-    return [{ name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [ADDRESS] }];
+    return [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            type: "hd",
+            addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
 }
 
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 // state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to exist
 // before the module is loaded, and the module registry has to be reset between
 // cases because `state` is a module-level singleton.
+//
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does —
+// see tests/support/storageStub.js for why an aliasing one made this file
+// assert less than it appears to.
 function loadModuleWith(persisted) {
     jest.resetModules();
-    const set = jest.fn(async () => {});
-    global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () =>
-                    persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
-                ),
-                set,
-            },
-        },
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {});
+    global.chrome = { storage };
+    return {
+        mod: require("../src/shared/state"),
+        set: storage.set,
+        stored: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
     };
-    return { mod: require("../src/shared/state"), set };
 }
 
 afterEach(() => {

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+// saveState() used to write the entire state blob every time
+// (src/shared/state.js). Every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
+// approval window opened by the background, backgroundRefresh() in
+// src/background/index.js — holds its own in-memory `state`, loaded once,
+// and src/popup/views/helpers.js showView() saves on EVERY navigation. So
+// any second page that saved after a first page had written something new
+// overwrote it, with no attacker and no unusual input: a whole wallet, name,
+// addresses and encrypted secret included, silently gone
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304).
+//
+// Both cases below drive the real state.js module through two independent
+// module registries sharing one storage backend, the way two real extension
+// pages share one chrome.storage.local. The shared stub structured-clones on
+// both get and set — a stub that hands back the object it was given aliases
+// the caller's own mutation and would make this entire defect class invisible
+// (see https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+// One extension page: a fresh module registry over the shared storage.
+// state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to be
+// installed before the module is loaded, and `state` is a module-level
+// singleton, so each page needs its own registry to hold its own copy.
+function loadPage(storage) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    globalThis.chrome = { storage: { local: storage.local } };
+    return {
+        state: require("../src/shared/state"),
+        helpers: require("../src/popup/views/helpers"),
+    };
+}
+
+function wallet(name, secret, address) {
+    return {
+        type: "hd",
+        name,
+        xpub: "xpub-" + name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: 1,
+        addresses: [{ address, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+    };
+}
+
+const W1 = wallet(
+    "Wallet 1",
+    "secret-one",
+    "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a",
+);
+const W2 = wallet(
+    "Wallet 2",
+    "secret-two",
+    "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
+);
+
+// Minimal DOM: showView() toggles view elements, clears the flash line and
+// creates/removes the debug banner. Nothing here is asserted; it only has to
+// answer without throwing, the way the popup's own index.html would.
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        style: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.add(c)),
+            remove: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.delete(c)),
+            toggle: (c, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(c) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(c);
+                else classes.delete(c);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        remove: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    delete globalThis.document;
+});
+
+describe("a save from a page that never saw a wallet another page added", () => {
+    // The first DoD case on the issue: add a wallet in one page, then force
+    // a save from a second page loaded before that wallet existed. Both
+    // wallets must survive.
+    test("both wallets are in storage afterwards", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // Loaded while storage held only Wallet 1, and never reloads —
+        // the approval window in the reproduction, or a second popup that
+        // has been open for a while.
+        const stale = loadPage(storage);
+        await stale.state.loadState();
+        expect(stale.state.state.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        // A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet — the exact sequence
+        // src/popup/views/addWallet.js uses.
+        const fresh = loadPage(storage);
+        await fresh.state.loadState();
+        fresh.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        fresh.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await fresh.state.saveState();
+
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // The stale page saves something that has nothing to do with
+        // wallets — exactly what showView() does on every navigation, and
+        // what backgroundRefresh() does after a balance poll.
+        stale.state.state.currentView = "settings";
+        await stale.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the approval-window reproduction", () => {
+    // approval window open, add a wallet in the popup, confirm the approval
+    // — the exact sequence from the issue. The approval window and the
+    // popup are the same popup code with a different starting view, so
+    // showView() is the real save path in both: src/popup/views/approval.js
+    // showTxApproval() calls showView("approve-tx") when the window opens,
+    // and a successful confirm calls
+    // src/popup/views/txStatus.js showWait() -> startWait(), which calls
+    // showView("wait-tx") — the save that clobbered the second wallet in
+    // the reproduction on the issue.
+    test("the wallet added in the popup survives confirming the approval", async () => {
+        globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // The background opens the approval window on the approve-tx
+        // screen; nothing else has happened yet.
+        const approvalWindow = loadPage(storage);
+        await approvalWindow.state.loadState();
+        approvalWindow.helpers.showView("approve-tx");
+        // showView() does not await its own saveState(); an extra save
+        // joins the same queue and only resolves once that one has too,
+        // which is the black-box way to know it landed.
+        await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
+
+        // The user adds a wallet in the popup — a separate page, loaded
+        // after the approval window.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // The user confirms the approval. The approval window navigates
+        // approve-tx -> wait-tx, saving again from state it loaded before
+        // Wallet 2 ever existed.
+        approvalWindow.helpers.showView("wait-tx");
+        await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+// backgroundRefresh() (src/background/index.js) loads state, spends seconds
+// on network I/O in refreshBalances() (src/shared/balances.js) mutating
+// addr.balance/ensName/tokenBalances IN PLACE on the wallets it already
+// knew about, then saves. Precondition 2 on the issue: that refresh window
+// overlapping a membership change (add or delete) on another page must not
+// clobber or resurrect a wallet — a whole-field diff on `wallets` failed
+// this, because "background changed a balance" and "another page changed
+// membership" collided as the same field.
+describe("background refresh racing a wallet added on another page", () => {
+    test("the wallet added elsewhere survives background's stale balance save", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // "background": loads first, and its save is the one that lands
+        // last, modeling the multi-second network round trip in between.
+        const background = loadPage(storage);
+        await background.state.loadState();
+        background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
+
+        // A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet while background's
+        // refresh is still in flight.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // background's save lands last, carrying only its balance update.
+        await background.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+        // The balance update itself must not be lost either — this is a
+        // merge, not deletion-always-wins.
+        expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
+    test("the wallet deleted elsewhere stays deleted after background's stale balance save", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1, W2] } });
+
+        const background = loadPage(storage);
+        await background.state.loadState();
+        background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
+
+        // A second page deletes Wallet 2 while background's refresh is in
+        // flight — the same splice deleteWallet.js's removeWalletFromState()
+        // does.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.splice(1, 1);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = popup.state.state.wallets.length > 0;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        await background.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1"]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
+    });
+});
+
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
+// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
+// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
+// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
+// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
+// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
+// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
+// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+
+function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
+    }
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+    }
+}
+
+function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+    for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
+            (h) => h !== hostname,
+        );
+        if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
+            delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
+    test("the fresh approval survives Settings revoking an unrelated site", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({
+            autistmask: {
+                wallets: [W1],
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+            },
+        });
+
+        // Settings loads first, and its save lands last — before either has
+        // any idea a dApp approval happened elsewhere in between.
+        const settings = loadPage(storage);
+        await settings.state.loadState();
+
+        // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
+        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        const approval = loadPage(storage);
+        await approval.state.loadState();
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        await approval.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
+        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
+        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
+        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        await settings.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
+    test("the revocation holds even when the stale page approves something else", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({
+            autistmask: {
+                wallets: [W1],
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+            },
+        });
+
+        // A stale page loads while the permission still stands.
+        const stale = loadPage(storage);
+        await stale.state.loadState();
+
+        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
+        // second page.
+        const settings = loadPage(storage);
+        await settings.state.loadState();
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        await settings.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
+        ).toBeUndefined();
+
+        // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
+        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        await stale.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
+// mergeListByIdentity()'s identity function is not guaranteed collision-free
+// — walletIdentity() falls back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet
+// with neither an xpub nor a populated first address (a legacy or corrupt
+// record). Two such records created independently on two different pages
+// must not silently collapse into one, dropping the loser's
+// encryptedSecret with no error and no log.
+function legacyWallet(name, secret) {
+    return {
+        type: "legacy",
+        name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: 0,
+        addresses: [],
+    };
+}
+
+describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
+    test("both survive, encryptedSecret included, instead of one silently replacing the other", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // Both pages load before either has created their malformed wallet,
+        // so neither has baseline knowledge of the other's.
+        const pageA = loadPage(storage);
+        await pageA.state.loadState();
+        const pageB = loadPage(storage);
+        await pageB.state.loadState();
+
+        pageA.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy A", "secret-a"));
+        pageA.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await pageA.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        pageB.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy B", "secret-b"));
+        pageB.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await pageB.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        const secrets = persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret);
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-one");
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-a");
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
+    });
+});

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+// A stored profile the popup cannot read must produce a SCREEN, not a blank
+// popup (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// The three corrupt blobs below are the ones the pre-1.0 audit wrote into
+// storage. Against the build this file was added to, each one rendered nothing
+// at all — no view, no message, no control — because init() dereferenced
+// `state.wallets[0].addresses` on a record nothing had validated and threw
+// before the first showView().
+//
+// So the assertions here are deliberately made through the REAL popup entry
+// point rather than against the recovery view module directly. A recovery
+// screen that renders perfectly when something calls it, and that nothing
+// calls, is exactly the defect: what has to be true is that BOOTING the popup
+// on a bad blob lands on it.
+//
+// The boot harness and its DOM stub — built FROM src/popup/index.html, so
+// "which views are visible" is answered against the real element set — live in
+// tests/support/popupBoot.js, since tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js needs
+// the same boot.
+//
+// The fourth case is the upgrade one, and it is the case that must NOT reach
+// the recovery screen: every install in the field has a valid profile with no
+// version field, and showing those users a wipe prompt would be a worse defect
+// than the one being fixed. It is migrated in place and keeps working.
+
+const {
+    bootPopup,
+    cleanupPopup,
+    unversionedValidProfile,
+    ADDRESS,
+    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+} = require("./support/popupBoot");
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- fixtures
+
+// The three blobs from the issue, each with the error it produced.
+const CORRUPT_BLOBS = [
+    {
+        name: "wallets is a string",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: ADDRESS, activeAddress: ADDRESS },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "wallets is an array of garbage",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            wallets: [null, 42, "wallet"],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "future-schema blob (unknown fields, no version)",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            // A later schema that renamed the field and moved the key
+            // material, written by a build this one knows nothing about, and
+            // stamped with no version because this build never wrote one.
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    id: "wallet-1",
+                    label: "Wallet 1",
+                    accounts: [{ addr: ADDRESS, wei: "0x0" }],
+                    keyring: { kind: "hd", vault: "…" },
+                },
+            ],
+            profileFormat: "am-2",
+            activeAccount: ADDRESS,
+        },
+    },
+];
+
+afterEach(cleanupPopup);
+
+// --------------------------------------------------------------- tests
+
+describe("a stored profile the popup cannot read", () => {
+    for (const { name, blob } of CORRUPT_BLOBS) {
+        test(`${name}: the recovery screen, not a blank popup`, async () => {
+            const env = await bootPopup(blob);
+
+            // Asserted together, and in the audit's own shape: a failure here
+            // prints both what was on screen and what the console said, which
+            // is the pair that identifies this defect.
+            expect({
+                visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+                errors: env.pageErrors,
+            }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["state-recovery"], errors: [] });
+
+            // The screen has to NAME the problem. A blank recovery screen is
+            // the same dead end with a border around it.
+            expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(
+                10,
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("the Settings gear is hidden, since every screen behind it reads the profile", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("it does not write over the record it could not read", async () => {
+        // The blob is evidence, and possibly the only copy of key material in
+        // a shape a later build could recover. A boot that normalized it back
+        // into storage would destroy exactly that.
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        expect(env.storage.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the export on the recovery screen", () => {
+    test("hands back the raw stored record verbatim", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+
+        // Shown in the page, which always works, whatever the browser does
+        // with a download from an extension popup.
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(JSON.parse(env.value("state-recovery-blob"))).toEqual(
+            CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
+    test("erases nothing without the typed confirmation", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "yes";
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-reset");
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        expect(env.text("state-recovery-flash").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
+        expect(env.reloaded()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("erases the stored profile once the phrase is typed", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my wallet";
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-reset");
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(env.reloaded()).toBe(1);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
+    // The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
+    // popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
+    test("boots to the wallet list, not the recovery screen", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("is migrated in place: the version is stamped, the wallet survives", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.schemaVersion).toBe(1);
+        expect(stored.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a first run with nothing in storage", () => {
+    test("boots to Welcome", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(undefined);
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
+        expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a garbage value in a field the gate does not check", () => {
+    // The gate refuses only what nothing can floor: the wallet list, the
+    // version, the network key. Everything else is normalizePersisted()'s job,
+    // and where that job was written as `saved.x || default` rather than a
+    // type check, a TRUTHY value of the wrong type walked straight through and
+    // threw on the first dereference — the same blank popup this issue is
+    // about, measured the same way. Every row below did, at the head named
+    // against it; none has ever been removed from this list.
+    //
+    // These belong on the floor rather than in the gate: none of these values
+    // carries key material, all have a sane default, and sending a user whose
+    // wallets are perfectly readable to an export-or-erase screen over a
+    // broken token list would destroy more than it saves.
+    //
+    // The CONTAINER and its ELEMENTS are separate defects. Round 2 floored the
+    // containers with Array.isArray(), which left every row whose container is
+    // a well-formed list of malformed entries still blanking the popup: the
+    // dereference is `t.address.toLowerCase()`, one level below the check.
+    const CORRUPT_FIELDS = [
+        // Container shapes. Observed at 2e2ecf9, before the round-2 floor:
+        //   trackedTokens: "nope"  ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of
+        //                              undefined (reading 'toLowerCase')"
+        //   trackedTokens: 42      ->  views=[] "trackedTokens is not iterable"
+        //   trackedTokens: {a:1}   ->  views=[] "trackedTokens is not iterable"
+        //   activeAddress: 42      ->  views=[] "address.slice is not a
+        //                              function"
+        //   activeAddress: {a:1}   ->  views=[] "address.slice is not a
+        //                              function"
+        { name: "trackedTokens is a string", patch: { trackedTokens: "nope" } },
+        { name: "trackedTokens is a number", patch: { trackedTokens: 42 } },
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens is an object",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: { a: 1 } },
+        },
+        { name: "activeAddress is a number", patch: { activeAddress: 42 } },
+        {
+            name: "activeAddress is an object",
+            patch: { activeAddress: { a: 1 } },
+        },
+        // Element shapes: a list, holding entries that are not token records.
+        // Observed at a10a984, AFTER the container floor:
+        //   [1,2]           ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of undefined
+        //                       (reading 'toLowerCase')"
+        //   [null]          ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of null
+        //                       (reading 'address')"
+        //   [{}]            ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of undefined
+        //                       (reading 'toLowerCase')"
+        //   [{address:42}]  ->  views=[] "t.address.toLowerCase is not a
+        //                       function"
+        //   ["0xAA…"]       ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of undefined
+        //                       (reading 'toLowerCase')"
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens holds numbers",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: [1, 2] },
+        },
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens holds null",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: [null] },
+        },
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens holds a record with no address",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: [{}] },
+        },
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens holds a record whose address is a number",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: [{ address: 42 }] },
+        },
+        {
+            name: "trackedTokens holds bare address strings",
+            patch: { trackedTokens: [TOKEN_ADDRESS] },
+        },
+    ];
+
+    // The same defect one level deeper, inside a wallet the gate accepted.
+    // tokenBalances is written WHOLESALE by refreshBalances(), so the partial
+    // write https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311 names as the live
+    // cause of a corrupt record lands exactly here. Observed at a10a984:
+    //   "x"     ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading
+    //               'toLowerCase')"   (a string iterates as characters)
+    //   [null]  ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of null (reading
+    //               'balance')"
+    //   [42]    ->  views=[] "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading
+    //               'toLowerCase')"
+    //   42      ->  views=[] "number 42 is not iterable"
+    const CORRUPT_TOKEN_BALANCES = [
+        { name: "a string", value: "x" },
+        { name: "a list holding null", value: [null] },
+        { name: "a list of numbers", value: [42] },
+        { name: "a number", value: 42 },
+    ];
+
+    function profileWithTokenBalances(value) {
+        const profile = unversionedValidProfile();
+        profile.wallets[0].addresses[0].tokenBalances = value;
+        return profile;
+    }
+
+    for (const { name, patch } of CORRUPT_FIELDS) {
+        test(`${name}: a working popup, not a blank one`, async () => {
+            const env = await bootPopup(
+                Object.assign(unversionedValidProfile(), patch),
+            );
+
+            expect({
+                visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+                errors: env.pageErrors,
+            }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["main"], errors: [] });
+        });
+    }
+
+    for (const { name, value } of CORRUPT_TOKEN_BALANCES) {
+        test(`an address whose tokenBalances is ${name}: a working popup, not a blank one`, async () => {
+            const env = await bootPopup(profileWithTokenBalances(value));
+
+            expect({
+                visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+                errors: env.pageErrors,
+            }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["main"], errors: [] });
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("the wallet is intact afterwards, and the bad value is gone", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            Object.assign(unversionedValidProfile(), {
+                trackedTokens: "nope",
+                activeAddress: 42,
+            }),
+        );
+
+        const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
+        expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([]);
+        // Floored to null, then filled in by init()'s auto-default.
+        expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
+    });
+
+    test("an empty activeAddress does not leave the popup with none selected", async () => {
+        // "" is text, so a type check alone lets it through — and init()
+        // auto-selects the first address only on a STRICT null, so it has to
+        // be floored to null rather than kept.
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            Object.assign(unversionedValidProfile(), { activeAddress: "" }),
+        );
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
+    });
+
+    test("a malformed token entry is dropped, and the well-formed ones beside it survive", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            Object.assign(unversionedValidProfile(), {
+                trackedTokens: [
+                    1,
+                    null,
+                    {},
+                    { address: 42 },
+                    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+                    { address: TOKEN_ADDRESS, symbol: "AAA", decimals: 18 },
+                ],
+            }),
+        );
+
+        const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([
+            { address: TOKEN_ADDRESS, symbol: "AAA", decimals: 18 },
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("a malformed tokenBalances entry is dropped, and the wallet and its address survive", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            profileWithTokenBalances([
+                null,
+                42,
+                { address: TOKEN_ADDRESS, symbol: "AAA", balance: "2.0" },
+            ]),
+        );
+
+        const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].tokenBalances).toEqual([
+            { address: TOKEN_ADDRESS, symbol: "AAA", balance: "2.0" },
+        ]);
+    });
+});

tests/stateSchema.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+// The stored-profile version stamp and the shape gate in front of it
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// tests/stateRecovery.test.js covers what the USER sees when a record is
+// refused. This file covers what is refused and what is not, which is the
+// half that decides whether an upgrade brick or a false alarm ever happens:
+// a gate that refuses too much sends a perfectly good wallet to a wipe prompt,
+// and one that refuses too little is the blank popup again.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    StateUnusableError,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+    stateProblem,
+} = require("../src/shared/stateSchema");
+const {
+    NETWORKS,
+    UnknownNetworkError,
+    isKnownNetworkId,
+    networkById,
+} = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { normalizePersisted } = require("../src/shared/persistedState");
+const { RESET_PHRASE } = require("../src/popup/views/stateRecovery");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function validProfile(extra) {
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                type: "hd",
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+                encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+                nextIndex: 1,
+                addresses: [
+                    { address: ADDRESS, balance: "1.5", tokenBalances: [] },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        ...(extra || {}),
+    };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+describe("what the gate accepts", () => {
+    test("nothing stored at all is a first run, not a defect", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem(undefined)).toBeNull();
+        expect(stateProblem(null)).toBeNull();
+        expect(stateProblem({})).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a valid profile with no version field is accepted and migrated", () => {
+        const saved = validProfile();
+
+        expect(stateProblem(saved)).toBeNull();
+        expect(migrationNeeded(saved)).toBe(true);
+        // The migration IS the stamp: version 1 is the shape that shipped
+        // unversioned, so nothing about the record has to change.
+        expect(normalizePersisted(saved).schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+        expect(normalizePersisted(saved).wallets).toEqual(saved.wallets);
+    });
+
+    test("a profile already at the current version needs no migration", () => {
+        const saved = validProfile({ schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION });
+
+        expect(stateProblem(saved)).toBeNull();
+        expect(migrationNeeded(saved)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an empty wallet list is fine", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ hasWallet: false, wallets: [] })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("unknown extra fields alone are not a defect", () => {
+        // Only a change in the MEANING of a stored field is a version bump, so
+        // a field this build does not know must not be a refusal on its own —
+        // otherwise a downgrade would wipe a working wallet.
+        expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ somethingNew: 42 }))).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the gate refuses", () => {
+    test("a record that is not the record AutistMask stores", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem("wallet")).toMatch(/not the record/);
+        expect(stateProblem([1, 2])).toMatch(/not the record/);
+    });
+
+    test("a version from a newer build, naming both versions", () => {
+        const problem = stateProblem(
+            validProfile({ schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1 }),
+        );
+
+        expect(problem).toMatch(/newer version/);
+        expect(problem).toContain(String(STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1));
+        expect(problem).toContain(String(STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION));
+    });
+
+    test("a version that is not a version at all", () => {
+        for (const version of ["1", 1.5, 0, -1, null, {}]) {
+            expect(
+                stateProblem(validProfile({ schemaVersion: version })),
+            ).toMatch(/schema version/);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("wallets that is not a list", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: ADDRESS })).toMatch(/not a list/);
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: { 0: {} } })).toMatch(/not a list/);
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet that is not a wallet record", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [null] })).toMatch(/wallet record/);
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [42] })).toMatch(/wallet record/);
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet whose addresses are missing or not records", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] })).toMatch(
+            /no list of addresses/,
+        );
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ addresses: [ADDRESS] }] })).toMatch(
+            /not a record/,
+        );
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ addresses: [{}] }] })).toMatch(
+            /no address/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("the problem names WHICH wallet, counting from one", () => {
+        const problem = stateProblem({
+            wallets: [validProfile().wallets[0], { name: "Wallet 2" }],
+        });
+
+        expect(problem).toContain("Wallet 2");
+    });
+
+    test("assertStateUsable throws the sentence, not a generic error", () => {
+        let thrown = null;
+        try {
+            assertStateUsable({ wallets: ADDRESS });
+        } catch (e) {
+            thrown = e;
+        }
+
+        expect(thrown).toBeInstanceOf(StateUnusableError);
+        expect(thrown.problem).toMatch(/not a list/);
+        expect(thrown.message).toBe(thrown.problem);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("networkId, which is used as an object key", () => {
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311#issuecomment-67478:
+    // state.networkId keys state.networkEndpoints, so a corrupt "__proto__"
+    // sets that map's prototype instead of an own key and the user's endpoint
+    // is silently not recorded.
+    test("a network this build does not know is refused", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ networkId: "base" }))).toMatch(
+            /does not know/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test('"__proto__" and "constructor" are refused, not resolved', () => {
+        for (const id of ["__proto__", "constructor", "toString"]) {
+            expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ networkId: id }))).toMatch(
+                /does not know/,
+            );
+            expect(isKnownNetworkId(id)).toBe(false);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("the gate reads own properties only", () => {
+        // A record whose PROTOTYPE carries the fields must not be read as
+        // though it carried them itself: that is how a polluted prototype
+        // would decide whether a profile is refused.
+        const inherited = Object.create({
+            schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 99,
+            networkId: "base",
+            wallets: "not a list",
+        });
+
+        expect(stateProblem(inherited)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("normalizing never turns a stored key into a prototype", () => {
+        // JSON can carry an own "__proto__" key, and plain assignment would
+        // treat it as the prototype setter rather than storing an entry.
+        const saved = JSON.parse(
+            '{"networkId":"mainnet","networkEndpoints":' +
+                '{"__proto__":{"rpcUrl":"https://evil.invalid"}}}',
+        );
+
+        const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+        expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(out, "rpcUrl")).toBe(true);
+        expect(out.rpcUrl).not.toBe("https://evil.invalid");
+        expect(Object.getPrototypeOf(out.networkEndpoints)).toBe(
+            Object.prototype,
+        );
+        expect({}.rpcUrl).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("an unknown stored networkId never reaches the endpoint map", () => {
+        // The floor under the gate: normalization alone must not adopt it.
+        const out = normalizePersisted({ networkId: "__proto__" });
+
+        expect(out.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(Object.keys(out.networkEndpoints)).toEqual(["mainnet"]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the floors under the gate, for fields the gate does not check", () => {
+    // The gate's scope is what nothing can floor. Everything it lets through
+    // is normalizePersisted()'s to make safe, and a floor written as
+    // `saved.x || default` is not one: a truthy value of the wrong type walks
+    // through it and throws on the first dereference, which produced the blank
+    // popup from the issue. Nor is a container check on its own: [1, 2] is a
+    // list, and the dereference is `t.address.toLowerCase()` one level below
+    // it. Container AND entries, therefore — an empty list still survives.
+    const TOKEN = "0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+
+    test("trackedTokens that is not a list becomes an empty list", () => {
+        for (const bad of ["nope", 42, true, { a: 1 }]) {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({ trackedTokens: bad }).trackedTokens,
+            ).toEqual([]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a trackedTokens entry that is not a token record is dropped", () => {
+        for (const bad of [1, null, {}, { address: 42 }, TOKEN, [], true]) {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({ trackedTokens: [bad] }).trackedTokens,
+            ).toEqual([]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a real trackedTokens list survives, copied not shared", () => {
+        const saved = { trackedTokens: [{ address: ADDRESS, symbol: "AM" }] };
+
+        const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+        expect(out.trackedTokens).toEqual(saved.trackedTokens);
+        expect(out.trackedTokens).not.toBe(saved.trackedTokens);
+        expect(normalizePersisted({ trackedTokens: [] }).trackedTokens).toEqual(
+            [],
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a good trackedTokens entry beside a malformed one survives", () => {
+        const good = { address: TOKEN, symbol: "AM", decimals: 18 };
+
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({ trackedTokens: [1, null, good, {}] })
+                .trackedTokens,
+        ).toEqual([good]);
+    });
+
+    // Below an address record, which the gate walks but does not descend into.
+    // refreshBalances() writes tokenBalances WHOLESALE, so a write that only
+    // partly lands leaves exactly this field malformed.
+    function walletWith(tokenBalances) {
+        return {
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, tokenBalances }],
+                },
+            ],
+        };
+    }
+
+    function balancesOf(out) {
+        return out.wallets[0].addresses[0].tokenBalances;
+    }
+
+    test("an address's tokenBalances that is not a list becomes an empty list", () => {
+        for (const bad of ["x", 42, true, { a: 1 }, undefined]) {
+            expect(balancesOf(normalizePersisted(walletWith(bad)))).toEqual([]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a tokenBalances entry that is not a token record is dropped", () => {
+        for (const bad of [null, 42, "x", {}, { address: 42 }]) {
+            expect(balancesOf(normalizePersisted(walletWith([bad])))).toEqual(
+                [],
+            );
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a real tokenBalances entry survives, copied not shared", () => {
+        const held = { address: TOKEN, symbol: "AM", balance: "2.0" };
+        const saved = walletWith([held]);
+
+        const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+        expect(balancesOf(out)).toEqual([held]);
+        expect(balancesOf(out)[0]).not.toBe(held);
+    });
+
+    test("activeAddress that is not text becomes null", () => {
+        for (const bad of [42, true, { a: 1 }, [ADDRESS]]) {
+            expect(
+                normalizePersisted({ activeAddress: bad }).activeAddress,
+            ).toBeNull();
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a real activeAddress survives; the empty string becomes null", () => {
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({ activeAddress: ADDRESS }).activeAddress,
+        ).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        // "" is text but it is not an address, and src/popup/index.js
+        // auto-selects the first address only on a STRICT null — so keeping
+        // the empty string would leave the popup with none ever selected.
+        expect(
+            normalizePersisted({ activeAddress: "" }).activeAddress,
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("networkById on an unknown id", () => {
+    test("throws instead of quietly answering mainnet", () => {
+        expect(() => networkById("base")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        expect(() => networkById(undefined)).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        // Both of these used to answer with something truthy off the
+        // prototype chain rather than with a network.
+        expect(() => networkById("constructor")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        expect(() => networkById("__proto__")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+    });
+
+    test("still answers every network it does know", () => {
+        for (const id of Object.keys(NETWORKS)) {
+            expect(networkById(id).id).toBe(id);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the version stamp on the way out", () => {
+    function loadStateModule(persisted) {
+        jest.resetModules();
+        const storage = makeStorageStub(
+            persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
+        );
+        global.chrome = { storage };
+        return { storage, mod: require("../src/shared/state") };
+    }
+
+    test("the popup stamps it on a profile that had none", async () => {
+        const { storage, mod } = loadStateModule(validProfile());
+
+        await mod.loadState();
+        await mod.saveState();
+
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("the background stamps it on a profile that had none", async () => {
+        jest.resetModules();
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: validProfile() });
+        global.chrome = { storage };
+        const { updateState } = require("../src/background/state");
+
+        await updateState((s) => {
+            s.lastBalanceRefresh = 1;
+        });
+
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a save refuses to write over a record it cannot read", async () => {
+        // Another context — a newer build, or something else entirely — wrote
+        // a record this one does not understand while this page was open. That
+        // record is the only copy of whatever it holds, and normalizing it
+        // back into storage would destroy it.
+        const { storage, mod } = loadStateModule(validProfile());
+        await mod.loadState();
+
+        const hostile = { schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1 };
+        storage.write("autistmask", hostile);
+
+        // By name rather than by constructor: jest.resetModules() above gives
+        // the module under test its own copy of the error class, so instanceof
+        // across that boundary would be comparing two identical classes.
+        const thrown = await mod.saveState().then(
+            () => null,
+            (e) => e,
+        );
+        expect(thrown && thrown.name).toBe("StateUnusableError");
+        expect(thrown.problem).toMatch(/newer version/);
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(hostile);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the typed confirmation phrase", () => {
+    test("the markup asks for the phrase the code checks", () => {
+        // The button is behind a phrase typed by hand. A screen that asks for
+        // one phrase while the code compares another is an exit that cannot be
+        // taken, on the one screen that exists to be an exit.
+        const html = fs.readFileSync(
+            path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
+            "utf8",
+        );
+
+        expect(html).toContain(RESET_PHRASE);
+    });
+});

tests/stateUnusableRpc.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+// What a dApp is told when the wallet's stored profile cannot be read
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// The popup is not the only casualty of a bad blob. getActiveAddress()
+// dereferences the stored wallet list on nearly every method, so against the
+// build this file was added to, EVERY request from EVERY page came back as
+// -32603 "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal
+// error" — the code the wallet also answers when a signing attempt blows up,
+// with nothing in it to tell the page or the user what is actually wrong or
+// what to do about it.
+//
+// So what is pinned here is that the answer is SPECIFIC: its own code, and a
+// message that says the saved data cannot be read, that nothing was signed or
+// sent, and where to go to fix it.
+//
+// Same cold-worker shape as tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js: the real state
+// modules, over a storage stub, with no loadState() of the test's own — the
+// handler has to reach storage by itself, as a worker revived by the page's
+// own message does.
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The generic answer, quoted rather than imported: this file's whole point is
+// that the state-unusable path stopped using it.
+const GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE = -32603;
+
+// EIP-1474's assigned non-standard codes, verbatim. The spec sets aside
+// -32000..-32099 for implementation-defined server errors but hands out
+// meanings for the first seven, so those are exactly the codes this condition
+// may NOT take: a page reading -32001 is entitled to read "Resource not
+// found". -32002 is in this table AND in use here, for a pending approval.
+const EIP_1474_ASSIGNED = {
+    "-32000": "Invalid input",
+    "-32001": "Resource not found",
+    "-32002": "Resource unavailable",
+    "-32003": "Transaction rejected",
+    "-32004": "Method not supported",
+    "-32005": "Limit exceeded",
+    "-32006": "JSON-RPC version not supported",
+};
+
+// The three blobs from the issue.
+const CORRUPT_BLOBS = [
+    {
+        name: "wallets is a string",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: ADDRESS },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "wallets is an array of garbage",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: [null, 42, "wallet"] },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "future-schema blob (unknown fields, no version)",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            wallets: [{ id: "wallet-1", accounts: [{ addr: ADDRESS }] }],
+            profileFormat: "am-2",
+        },
+    },
+];
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadColdWorker(stored) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const store = { autistmask: structuredClone(stored) };
+    let messageListener = null;
+    const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
+        store.autistmask = structuredClone(items.autistmask);
+    });
+
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage: {
+            local: {
+                get: jest.fn(async () => structuredClone(store)),
+                set,
+            },
+        },
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + p,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    async function rpc(method, params) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: params || [] },
+            { origin: CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    return { rpc, persisted: () => store.autistmask, storageSet: set };
+}
+
+// Every method a page can reach that has to consult the profile.
+const METHODS = [
+    "eth_accounts",
+    "eth_requestAccounts",
+    "eth_chainId",
+    "personal_sign",
+    "eth_sendTransaction",
+];
+
+describe("a dApp call against a profile the wallet cannot read", () => {
+    for (const { name, blob } of CORRUPT_BLOBS) {
+        test(`${name}: a specific error, not the generic internal one`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadColdWorker(blob);
+
+            const answer = await bg.rpc("eth_accounts");
+
+            expect(answer.error).toBeDefined();
+            expect(answer.error.code).not.toBe(GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE);
+            // The message has to say what is wrong, that nothing was sent,
+            // and where to go. "Internal error" says none of the three.
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/saved data/i);
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/nothing was/i);
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/AutistMask/);
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("every method that consults the profile answers the same way", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        const codes = new Set();
+        for (const method of METHODS) {
+            const answer = await bg.rpc(method, ["0x00", ADDRESS]);
+            expect(answer.error).toBeDefined();
+            codes.add(answer.error.code);
+        }
+
+        // One code for the condition, whatever the method was.
+        expect(codes.size).toBe(1);
+        expect(codes.has(GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE)).toBe(false);
+
+        // And it is a code EIP-1474 has not already given a meaning to, so a
+        // page reading it by the spec's table is not told something false.
+        const code = [...codes][0];
+        expect(EIP_1474_ASSIGNED[String(code)]).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(code).toBeLessThanOrEqual(-32007);
+        expect(code).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(-32099);
+    });
+
+    test("it does not write over the record it could not read", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker(CORRUPT_BLOBS[1].blob);
+
+        await bg.rpc("eth_accounts");
+        await bg.rpc("eth_chainId");
+
+        expect(bg.storageSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(bg.persisted()).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[1].blob);
+    });
+});

tests/support/popupBoot.js

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+// Boot the REAL popup entry point over a stored record, exactly as the browser
+// does: storage already holds the record, the page loads, DOMContentLoaded
+// fires.
+//
+// Written for https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311 inside
+// tests/stateRecovery.test.js and lifted here unchanged in substance when
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362 needed the same boot for a
+// second field. Assertions about a corrupt stored profile have to be made
+// through the entry point rather than against a view module: a screen that
+// renders perfectly when something calls it, and that nothing calls, IS the
+// defect.
+//
+// The DOM stub is built FROM src/popup/index.html — every id in the markup,
+// with the classes the markup gives it — so "which views are visible" is
+// answered against the real element set, and a screen with no markup behind it
+// cannot pass.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./storageStub");
+
+const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
+    "utf8",
+);
+
+// Fixed addresses, never used for anything but these tests.
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const TOKEN_ADDRESS = "0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+
+// A profile in the shape every install in the field has it: complete, valid,
+// and carrying no version field, because no build ever wrote one. The starting
+// point for "and now corrupt exactly one field of it".
+function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                type: "hd",
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+                encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+                nextIndex: 1,
+                addresses: [
+                    { address: ADDRESS, balance: "1.5", tokenBalances: [] },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
+        blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+        theme: "system",
+        ...(extra || {}),
+    };
+}
+
+function makeElement(id, className) {
+    const classes = new Set(
+        (className || "").split(/\s+/).filter((name) => name !== ""),
+    );
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        tagName: "DIV",
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        href: "",
+        download: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        clicked: 0,
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        removeEventListener: () => {},
+        appendChild: () => {},
+        remove: () => {},
+        focus: () => {},
+        select: () => {},
+        setAttribute: (name, value) => {
+            el[name] = value;
+        },
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        // The Receive view draws its QR onto #receive-qr through the qrcode
+        // package, which calls getContext("2d") and then createImageData/
+        // putImageData on the result. Without this the render throws from
+        // inside a promise the view does not await, which takes the whole node
+        // process down rather than failing a test — so a suite that boots onto
+        // Receive could not report anything.
+        getContext: () => ({
+            createImageData: (w, h) => ({
+                width: w,
+                height: h,
+                data: new Uint8ClampedArray(w * h * 4),
+            }),
+            putImageData: () => {},
+            clearRect: () => {},
+        }),
+        click: () => {
+            el.clicked += 1;
+        },
+    };
+    // src/ reaches parentElement only to hide or unhide the wrapper a field
+    // sits in (txStatus.js renderSuccess(), transactionDetail.js render()).
+    // The stub is flat — it is built from the ids in the markup, not from its
+    // tree — so each element gets a wrapper of its own, made on demand so this
+    // does not recurse. It is never registered by id, so nothing can mistake
+    // it for a view. Without it, success-tx and transaction throw on the first
+    // line that touches a wrapper and cannot be booted onto at all.
+    let parent = null;
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get() {
+            if (!parent) parent = makeElement(id + "-parent", "");
+            return parent;
+        },
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+// Every id in the markup, with the classes the markup gives it. A view the
+// popup is supposed to reveal has to exist here, which means it has to exist
+// in src/popup/index.html.
+function idsFromHtml(html) {
+    const out = new Map();
+    const tags = html.match(/<[a-zA-Z][^>]*>/g) || [];
+    for (const tag of tags) {
+        const id = /\bid="([^"]+)"/.exec(tag);
+        if (!id) continue;
+        const cls = /\bclass="([^"]*)"/.exec(tag);
+        out.set(id[1], cls ? cls[1] : "");
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// Ids the popup creates at runtime rather than authoring in the markup, and
+// that must therefore read as ABSENT until something creates them. Answering
+// with a fresh element instead would make "is the banner up?" always true.
+const RUNTIME_IDS = new Set(["debug-banner", "save-failure-banner"]);
+
+function makeDocument(html) {
+    const authored = idsFromHtml(html);
+    const els = new Map();
+    for (const [id, className] of authored) {
+        els.set(id, makeElement(id, className));
+    }
+    const created = [];
+    const prepended = [];
+    const doc = {
+        listeners: {},
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (RUNTIME_IDS.has(id) && !els.has(id)) return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id, ""));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement(tag) {
+            const el = makeElement("created-" + tag, "");
+            el.tagName = String(tag).toUpperCase();
+            created.push(el);
+            return el;
+        },
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            doc.listeners[name] = doc.listeners[name] || [];
+            doc.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        documentElement: makeElement("html", ""),
+        body: {
+            // Recorded, and registered under its id: a banner the popup
+            // prepends is on the page from then on, and a test asking for it
+            // by id has to find it.
+            prepend: (el) => {
+                prepended.push(el);
+                if (el && el.id) els.set(el.id, el);
+            },
+            appendChild: () => {},
+            removeChild: () => {},
+        },
+        elements: els,
+        authoredIds: authored,
+        created,
+        prepended,
+    };
+    return doc;
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Boot the popup over `stored`.
+ *
+ * @param {*} stored the record storage holds, or undefined for a first run.
+ * @param {object} [options]
+ * @param {object} [options.storage] a storage stub from makeStorageStub(), for
+ *     a test that needs to make writes fail or to watch the round trips.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} handles onto the booted page.
+ */
+async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    // The three modules that reach the network. None is on the path under
+    // test; all would make the suite hit the internet.
+    jest.doMock("../../src/shared/prices", () => ({
+        prices: {},
+        refreshPrices: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        clearPrices: jest.fn(),
+        getPrice: () => null,
+        formatUsd: () => "",
+        formatAddressTotal: () => "",
+        getAddressValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+        getWalletValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+        getTotalValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        fetchTokenBalances: jest.fn(async () => []),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        lookupTokenInfo: jest.fn(async () => null),
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
+        fetchRecentTransactions: jest.fn(async () => []),
+        filterTransactions: () => [],
+    }));
+
+    const storage =
+        (options && options.storage) ||
+        makeStorageStub(stored === undefined ? {} : { autistmask: stored });
+    const document = makeDocument(POPUP_HTML);
+    const reloads = [];
+
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: storage.local },
+        runtime: {
+            sendMessage: jest.fn(async () => ({})),
+            getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + p,
+            onMessage: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = document;
+    globalThis.window = {
+        location: {
+            search: "",
+            href: "chrome-extension://autistmask/src/popup/index.html",
+            reload: () => reloads.push(Date.now()),
+        },
+        matchMedia: () => ({
+            matches: false,
+            addEventListener: () => {},
+            removeEventListener: () => {},
+        }),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+    };
+    // The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
+    const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
+    globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
+
+    require("../../src/popup/index");
+
+    const booted = [];
+    for (const fn of document.listeners.DOMContentLoaded || []) {
+        booted.push(fn());
+    }
+
+    // What the browser console would have shown. A throw out of init() is the
+    // blank popup issue 311 is about, so it is captured rather than thrown:
+    // the assertion that matters is what ended up on screen.
+    const pageErrors = [];
+    for (const p of booted) {
+        try {
+            await p;
+        } catch (e) {
+            pageErrors.push(String((e && e.message) || e));
+        }
+    }
+    await settle();
+
+    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
+
+    return {
+        storage,
+        document,
+        pageErrors,
+        reloaded: () => reloads.length,
+        node: (id) => document.getElementById(id),
+        text: (id) => {
+            const el = document.getElementById(id);
+            return el ? el.textContent : null;
+        },
+        value: (id) => document.getElementById(id).value,
+        hidden: (id) =>
+            document.getElementById(id).classList.contains("hidden"),
+        click: async (id) => {
+            const el = document.getElementById(id);
+            const fns = el.listeners.click || [];
+            for (const fn of fns) await fn();
+            await settle();
+        },
+        settle,
+        // The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
+        visibleViews: () => {
+            const out = [];
+            for (const [id, el] of document.elements) {
+                if (!id.startsWith("view-")) continue;
+                if (!el.classList.contains("hidden")) out.push(id.slice(5));
+            }
+            return out;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+function cleanupPopup() {
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    delete globalThis.document;
+    delete globalThis.window;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    bootPopup,
+    cleanupPopup,
+    settle,
+    unversionedValidProfile,
+    ADDRESS,
+    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
+    POPUP_HTML,
+};

tests/support/storageStub.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// A chrome.storage.local stub that behaves like the real one.
+//
+// The real extension storage API is a serialization boundary: `set` writes a
+// structured clone of what it is given, and `get` hands back a structured
+// clone of what is stored. Nothing an extension page holds is ever the object
+// storage holds.
+//
+// A stub that skips the clone aliases them together, and that hides an entire
+// class of defect rather than merely being imprecise. loadState() assigns
+// nested references straight out of the get result, so over an aliasing stub a
+// test can assert "the endpoint was persisted" and pass on a build that never
+// called saveState() at all: the in-memory mutation IS the stored record.
+// Measured, not theorised — with an aliasing `get` restored over the handler
+// fixed in https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/319, the whole suite
+// passed 794/794 (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// So every test that drives real persistence uses this, and nothing rebuilds
+// a storage stub by hand.
+
+// `initial` is the starting contents, keyed as storage is: { autistmask: {...} }.
+// `onOp` runs before each operation, for a test that needs to advance a clock
+// or count round trips.
+function makeStorageStub(initial, onOp) {
+    const store = initial ? structuredClone(initial) : {};
+    const tick = onOp || (() => {});
+
+    const get = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        tick();
+        if (key === undefined || key === null) return structuredClone(store);
+        const keys = Array.isArray(key) ? key : [key];
+        const out = {};
+        for (const k of keys) {
+            if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(store, k)) {
+                out[k] = structuredClone(store[k]);
+            }
+        }
+        return out;
+    });
+
+    const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
+        tick();
+        for (const k of Object.keys(items)) {
+            store[k] = structuredClone(items[k]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    const remove = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        tick();
+        for (const k of Array.isArray(key) ? key : [key]) delete store[k];
+    });
+
+    return {
+        // Drop this straight in as chrome.storage.
+        local: { get, set, remove },
+        get,
+        set,
+        remove,
+        // What is stored, cloned on the way out: a test can neither observe a
+        // later write through an object it read nor reach into the store by
+        // mutating one.
+        read: (key) =>
+            key === undefined
+                ? structuredClone(store)
+                : structuredClone(store[key]),
+        // Seed or replace a record without going through the module under
+        // test — for standing in as "another page wrote this".
+        write: (key, value) => {
+            store[key] = structuredClone(value);
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+module.exports = { makeStorageStub };

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -682,6 +682,7 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
             "https://rpc.example.invalid",
             BLOCKSCOUT,
             [],
+            "mainnet",
         );
         expect(addr.balance).toBe("1.2345");
         expect(addr.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
 });
 
 // state.js reads chrome.storage.local at module load; stub it so the
-// default settings can be asserted against what the README promises.
-global.chrome = { storage: { local: {} } };
+// default settings can be asserted against what the README promises. Empty
+// storage, so a load produces exactly the defaults.
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+global.chrome = { storage: makeStorageStub() };
 
 const {
     fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -745,6 +748,16 @@ describe("dust threshold filtering", () => {
 });
 
 describe("filter defaults promised by the README and Settings", () => {
+    // The defaults are what a load of empty storage produces, so the load is
+    // part of the assertion rather than an incantation before it: reading the
+    // singleton before any load now throws (StateNotLoadedError), because a
+    // context served DEFAULT_STATE without asking for it is the whole subject
+    // of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324. The stub at the top
+    // of this file has storage empty.
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+        await require("../src/shared/state").loadState();
+    });
+
     test("all four toggles default to on and the threshold to 100,000 gwei", () => {
         expect(state.hideSpoofedSymbols).toBe(true);
         expect(state.hideLowHolderTokens).toBe(true);

tests/txStatus.test.js

@@ -96,22 +96,18 @@ global.document = {
 
 global.window = { location: { search: "" } };
 
-const stored = {};
-global.chrome = {
-    storage: {
-        local: {
-            set: (obj) => {
-                Object.assign(stored, obj);
-                return Promise.resolve();
-            },
-            get: () => Promise.resolve(stored),
-        },
-    },
-};
+// Clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does; the stub
+// here used to hand back the live stored object, so an in-memory mutation
+// looked like a write that had reached storage. See
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const storage = makeStorageStub();
+global.chrome = { storage };
 
 const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
 const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const TX_HASH =
     "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";

tests/uniswap.test.js

@@ -94,6 +94,69 @@ function encodeV4Swap(actions, params) {
     return coder.encode(["bytes", "bytes[]"], [actions, params]);
 }
 
+// V4 inner action IDs, as src/shared/uniswap.js names them.
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN = 0x07;
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE_ID = 0x06;
+const V4_SETTLE_ID = 0x0b;
+const V4_TAKE_ID = 0x0e;
+const ZERO_ADDR = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+
+// Helper: V4 SETTLE params — (address currency, uint256 maxAmount, bool payerIsUser)
+function encodeV4Settle(currency) {
+    return coder.encode(["address", "uint256", "bool"], [currency, 0n, true]);
+}
+
+// Helper: V4 TAKE params — (address currency, address recipient, uint256 amount)
+function encodeV4Take(currency) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+        [currency, USER_ADDR, 0n],
+    );
+}
+
+// Helper: V4 ExactInputParams — (address currencyIn,
+//   tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[] path,
+//   uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin)
+function encodeV4ExactIn(currencyIn, pathTokens, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
+        ],
+        [
+            [
+                currencyIn,
+                pathTokens.map((t) => [t, 3000, 60, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]),
+                amountIn,
+                amountOutMin,
+            ],
+        ],
+    );
+}
+
+// Helper: V4 ExactInputSingleParams —
+//   (tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address) poolKey, bool zeroForOne,
+//    uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin, bytes hookData)
+function encodeV4ExactInSingle(currency0, currency1, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
+        ],
+        [
+            [
+                [currency0, currency1, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR],
+                true, // zeroForOne: in = currency0, out = currency1
+                amountIn,
+                amountOutMin,
+                "0x",
+            ],
+        ],
+    );
+}
+
+function detail(result, label) {
+    return result.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
 describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
     test("returns null for non-execute calldata", () => {
         expect(uniswap.decode("0x", ROUTER_ADDR)).toBeNull();
@@ -118,6 +181,18 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(tokenIn.value).toContain("USDT");
         expect(tokenIn.address.toLowerCase()).toBe(USDT_ADDR.toLowerCase());
 
+        // Genuine native ETH on the output side, on a real mainnet fixture:
+        // V4's TAKE names it as Currency.wrap(address(0)), which reaches the
+        // decoder as the explicit zero address and must still read as ETH.
+        const tokenOut = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Token Out");
+        expect(tokenOut.value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "Unlimited",
+        );
+        expect(
+            result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Min. received").value,
+        ).toBe("0.0002 ETH");
+
         const steps = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Steps");
         expect(steps.value).toContain("Permit2 Permit");
         expect(steps.value).toContain("V4 Swap");
@@ -181,8 +256,7 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(tokenIn.value).toBe("ETH (native)");
 
         const amount = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
-        expect(amount.value).toContain("1.0000");
-        expect(amount.value).toContain("ETH");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("1.0000 ETH");
     });
 
     test("decodes UNWRAP_WETH as ETH output", () => {
@@ -338,6 +412,211 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(steps.value).toContain("V4 Swap");
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/364 — the input half.
+    //
+    // Fails against c9ebac8: `if (!inputAmount) inputAmount = s.amountIn`
+    // cannot tell the V3 hop's genuine 0n from "not yet set", so the V2 hop's
+    // 0.5 WETH overwrote it while Token In stayed pinned to the V3 hop's USDT.
+    // Observed there: Amount = "500000000000.0000 USDT".
+    test("a hop's zero amountIn is a real amount, not an opening for the next hop's figure", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x08]),
+            [
+                encodeV3SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 0n, 0n, [USDT_ADDR, WETH_ADDR]),
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(
+                    USER_ADDR,
+                    500000000000000000n, // 0.5 WETH
+                    1000000n,
+                    [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR],
+                ),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        // The amount and the token it is counted in come from the same hop.
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").address.toLowerCase()).toBe(
+            USDT_ADDR.toLowerCase(),
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe("0.0000 USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).not.toContain("500000000000");
+    });
+
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359 — the output half, in
+    // the shape the issue measured: a V4 step that states a minimum of zero
+    // and names no output currency.
+    //
+    // Fails against c9ebac8: `if (v4.amountOutMin) minOutput = ...` and the
+    // `else if` beside it both read 0n as absent, so neither the figure nor
+    // the token moved. Observed there: Token Out = "WETH (0xC02aaA39...)" and
+    // Min. received = "0.5000 WETH" — the V3 hop's guarantee shown for a
+    // transaction whose final leg guarantees nothing.
+    test("a V4 step with a zero amountOutMin states no minimum instead of keeping an earlier hop's", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]),
+            [
+                encodeV3SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, 500000000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN]), [
+                    encodeV4ExactIn(
+                        WETH_ADDR,
+                        [], // no path: this step names no output currency
+                        1000000000000000000n,
+                        0n, // no slippage floor at all
+                    ),
+                ]),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
+            "Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "None (no minimum guaranteed)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).not.toContain("0.5000");
+    });
+
+    // The same zero floor, but with the final leg's output currency named:
+    // the figure must belong to the token beside it. Against c9ebac8 this
+    // rendered Token Out = USDC with Min. received = "500000000000.0000 USDC",
+    // the V3 hop's 0.5e18 WETH figure re-scaled to USDC's six decimals.
+    test("a zero minimum is stated against the token that supplied it", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]),
+            [
+                encodeV3SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, 500000000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeV4Swap(
+                    new Uint8Array([
+                        V4_SETTLE_ID,
+                        V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE_ID,
+                        V4_TAKE_ID,
+                    ]),
+                    [
+                        encodeV4Settle(WETH_ADDR),
+                        encodeV4ExactInSingle(
+                            WETH_ADDR,
+                            USDC_ADDR,
+                            1000000000000000000n,
+                            0n,
+                        ),
+                        encodeV4Take(USDC_ADDR),
+                    ],
+                ),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "None (no minimum guaranteed)",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The other half of the same invariant: a final leg that names an output
+    // currency but no minimum leaves Min. received unstated. Against c9ebac8
+    // the V3 hop's figure stayed on screen beside the new token, rendering
+    // "500000000000.0000 USDC".
+    test("a final leg with no minimum drops the line rather than keeping an earlier hop's figure", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]),
+            [
+                encodeV3SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, 500000000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([V4_SETTLE_ID, V4_TAKE_ID]), [
+                    encodeV4Settle(WETH_ADDR),
+                    encodeV4Take(USDC_ADDR),
+                ]),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    // V4 spells "swap the whole open delta" as an amountIn of zero
+    // (v4-periphery ActionConstants.OPEN_DELTA = 0, applied by V4Router's
+    // _swapExactInputSingle / _swapExactInput). It is not a quantity, and
+    // printing "0.0000 WETH" for it would state the exact inverse of what the
+    // step does. Against c9ebac8 the Amount line was omitted entirely.
+    test("a V4 open-delta amountIn is named, not printed as zero", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x10",
+            [
+                encodeV4Swap(
+                    new Uint8Array([
+                        V4_SETTLE_ID,
+                        V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE_ID,
+                        V4_TAKE_ID,
+                    ]),
+                    [
+                        encodeV4Settle(WETH_ADDR),
+                        encodeV4ExactInSingle(
+                            WETH_ADDR,
+                            USDC_ADDR,
+                            0n, // ActionConstants.OPEN_DELTA
+                            990000n,
+                        ),
+                        encodeV4Take(USDC_ADDR),
+                    ],
+                ),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toContain("WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "All available (V4 open delta)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.9900 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // Pins what https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/356 changed without
+    // testing: a non-swap execute() carrying only PERMIT2_PERMIT names no
+    // output currency, so it says so and titles itself "Uniswap Swap" rather
+    // than inventing "Token Out: ETH".
+    test("a PERMIT2_PERMIT-only execute() invents no output token", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x0a",
+            [encodePermit2(USDT_ADDR, 5000000n, ROUTER_ADDR)],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
+            "Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
     test("handles unknown tokens gracefully", () => {
         const fakeToken = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
         const data = buildExecute(

tests/uniswapTokenOut.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// The output token of a swap, as the dApp approval screen names it.
+//
+// Issue #346: the `Token Out` detail line in `src/shared/uniswap.js` was
+// pushed only `if (outSymbol)`, and a token absent from the bundled list has
+// no symbol. The line was therefore dropped entirely for exactly that
+// population — which is every newly listed token — leaving a `Min. received`
+// figure with nothing on the screen saying what is being received. The
+// `Token In` line already falls back to the address; the rule asserted here is
+// that the output side does too, always.
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface, getAddress } = require("ethers");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// In the bundled list, at 18 decimals.
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+// Outside it, as every newly listed token is. Checksummed, because that is
+// the form the decoder gets back from the ABI decode and puts on the line.
+const NOVEL_OUT = getAddress("0xd0d0000000000000000000000000000000000d0d");
+
+const HALF_WETH = 500000000000000000n;
+// 1,000.00 of a 6-decimal token.
+const THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 1000000000n;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call.
+function swapData(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [tokenIn, tokenOut], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+// An UNWRAP_WETH (command 0x0c) execute() call: the output side is native ETH,
+// which has no contract address to name.
+function unwrapData() {
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x0c",
+        [coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [RECIPIENT, HALF_WETH])],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function detail(data, label, sources) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, sources || {});
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+describe("a swap to a token absent from the bundled list", () => {
+    const data = () => swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
+
+    test("still renders a Token Out line, naming the address", () => {
+        const out = detail(data(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out).toBeDefined();
+        expect(out.value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(out.address).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(out.isToken).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("names the address alongside the unknown-scale refusal", () => {
+        // The same population hits both: no symbol, and no scale either. The
+        // address says which token, the base units say how much and admit the
+        // scale is unknown — neither line silently means something else.
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("names the address when the scale is known but the symbol is not", () => {
+        const sources = {
+            trackedTokens: [
+                { address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
+            ],
+        };
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out", sources).value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received", sources).value).toBe(
+            "1000.0000",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the output tokens that already had a line keep it unchanged", () => {
+    test("a bundled token is named by symbol and address", () => {
+        const data = swapData(NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH);
+        const out = detail(data, "Token Out");
+        expect(out.value).toBe("WETH (" + WETH + ")");
+        expect(out.address).toBe(WETH);
+    });
+
+    test("an unwrap to native ETH is named ETH, with no address", () => {
+        const out = detail(unwrapData(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out.value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(out.address).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});

tests/uniswapUndeterminedTokenIn.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+// What the dApp approval screen says the input token of a swap is when the
+// calldata did not name one.
+//
+// Issue #357, the twin on the input side of
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/353: `tokenInfo(null)` answered
+// `{symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18}`, so a null `inputToken` rendered as
+// `Token In: ETH (native)` and titled the swap `Swap ETH -> X`. An
+// undetermined input was therefore asserted to the user as native ETH — the
+// same class as https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340 and
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306, naming the wrong asset
+// rather than merely mis-scaling it.
+//
+// The determination this file pins is the one #353 established, checked here
+// on the input side: null is NOT how native ETH arrives. v4-core declares
+// `type Currency is address` and wraps `address(0)` for native ETH, and a
+// user-defined value type over `address` carries the plain `address` ABI
+// encoding, so a native-ETH currency reaches the decoder as the truthy string
+// "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000". WRAP_ETH sets that same
+// explicit zero address. Both halves are asserted below: the zero address
+// stays ETH, and null refuses.
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface, solidityPacked } = require("ethers");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const USER = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const ZERO = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+// Both in the bundled list: USDT at 6 decimals, USDC at 6.
+const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+
+// The same wording the output side refuses with — one screen, one vocabulary.
+const REFUSAL = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
+
+const ONE_ETH = 1000000000000000000n;
+
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN = 0x07;
+const V4_SETTLE = 0x0b;
+const V4_TAKE = 0x0e;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+function execute(commands, inputs) {
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        commands,
+        inputs,
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function v4Input(actions, params) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["bytes", "bytes[]"],
+        [new Uint8Array(actions), params],
+    );
+}
+
+// IV4Router.ExactInputParams as the decoder reads it:
+// (Currency currencyIn, PathKey[] path, uint128 amountIn, uint128 minOut).
+function exactInParams(currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
+        ],
+        [[currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin]],
+    );
+}
+
+// BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 (command 0x0e): (address owner, address token,
+// uint256 minBalance). It names the output token and nothing about the input.
+function balanceCheck(token, minBalance) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+        [USER, token, minBalance],
+    );
+}
+
+function detail(data, label) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, {});
+    expect(decoded).not.toBeNull();
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+describe("an execute() whose input currency never decoded", () => {
+    // A V4_SWAP whose sub-action params do not decode — an action encoding
+    // this decoder does not know — leaves every V4 token null. The
+    // BALANCE_CHECK still names the output, so the screen has a Min. received
+    // figure and a Token Out, and previously claimed the user was paying ETH
+    // for them.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute(solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x10, 0x0e]), [
+            coder.encode(["bytes", "bytes[]"], ["0x07", ["0x"]]),
+            balanceCheck(USDC, 2000000n),
+        ]);
+
+    test("says the input token is unknown instead of naming ETH", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+    });
+
+    test("keeps a Token In line, so the screen never omits what is paid", () => {
+        const tokenIn = detail(data(), "Token In");
+        expect(tokenIn).toBeDefined();
+        // A refusal is not a token: nothing to link to an explorer.
+        expect(tokenIn.address).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(tokenIn.isToken).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("does not name ETH in the swap title either", () => {
+        expect(uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {}).name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("an execute() that names only an output token", () => {
+    // A lone BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20: nothing in it says what is being paid.
+    const data = () => execute("0x0e", [balanceCheck(USDT, 2000000n)]);
+
+    test("refuses the input rather than defaulting it to ETH", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+        expect(uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {}).name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
+    });
+
+    test("still states the output it did establish", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("2.0000 USDT");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("native ETH in, which V4 spells as the zero address", () => {
+    test("a Currency of address(0) decodes to a truthy address string", () => {
+        // The fact the whole determination rests on: an absent input currency
+        // and a native-ETH one are distinguishable here, because the ABI
+        // decoder never yields null for an address word.
+        const [currency] = coder.decode(
+            ["address", "uint256", "bool"],
+            coder.encode(["address", "uint256", "bool"], [ZERO, ONE_ETH, true]),
+        );
+        expect(currency).toBe(ZERO);
+        expect(Boolean(currency)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("a V4 SETTLE of the zero address is still ETH at 18 decimals", () => {
+        const data = execute("0x10", [
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SETTLE, V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN, V4_TAKE],
+                [
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "uint256", "bool"],
+                        [ZERO, ONE_ETH, true],
+                    ),
+                    exactInParams(
+                        ZERO,
+                        [[USDT, 500, 10, ZERO, "0x"]],
+                        ONE_ETH,
+                        2000000n,
+                    ),
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+                        [USDT, USER, 0n],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+        expect(detail(data, "Token In").value).toBe("ETH (native)");
+        expect(detail(data, "Amount").value).toBe("1.0000 ETH");
+        expect(uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, {}).name).toBe("Swap ETH → USDT");
+    });
+
+    test("WRAP_ETH is still ETH at 18 decimals", () => {
+        // WRAP_ETH names no currency of its own; the decoder supplies the
+        // explicit zero address for it, which is why it survives this change.
+        const data = execute("0x0b", [
+            coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [ROUTER, ONE_ETH]),
+        ]);
+
+        expect(detail(data, "Token In").value).toBe("ETH (native)");
+        expect(detail(data, "Amount").value).toBe("1.0000 ETH");
+    });
+});

tests/uniswapUndeterminedTokenOut.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// What the dApp approval screen says the output token of a V4 swap is when the
+// calldata did not name one.
+//
+// Issue #353: `src/shared/uniswap.js` took a V4 step's `amountOutMin` while
+// leaving `outputToken` null, and `tokenInfo(null)` answers
+// `{symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18}`. An undetermined output was therefore stated
+// to the user as ETH, with `Min. received` formatted at 18 decimals — the same
+// class as https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340 and
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306, but naming the wrong asset
+// rather than the wrong scale.
+//
+// The determination this file pins: null is NOT how V4 spells native ETH.
+// v4-core declares `type Currency is address` and wraps `address(0)` for
+// native ETH, and a Currency is ABI-encoded as a plain address word, so a
+// native-ETH currency reaches the decoder as the string
+// "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" — truthy, and already named
+// ETH by tokenInfo(). Both cases are asserted below: the zero address stays
+// ETH, and null refuses.
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface, solidityPacked } = require("ethers");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const USER = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const ZERO = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+// Both in the bundled list: USDT at 6 decimals, WETH at 18.
+const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+
+const REFUSAL = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
+
+// The figure whose asset is in question. At 18 decimals it renders as
+// 0.000000000001; in base units it renders as itself.
+const MIN_OUT = 1234567n;
+const HALF_ETH = 500000000000000000n;
+
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE = 0x06;
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN = 0x07;
+const V4_SETTLE = 0x0b;
+const V4_TAKE = 0x0e;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+function execute(commands, inputs) {
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        commands,
+        inputs,
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function v4Input(actions, params) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["bytes", "bytes[]"],
+        [new Uint8Array(actions), params],
+    );
+}
+
+// IV4Router.ExactInputParams as the decoder reads it:
+// (Currency currencyIn, PathKey[] path, uint128 amountIn, uint128 minOut).
+// An empty path names no output currency at all.
+function exactInParams(currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
+        ],
+        [[currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin]],
+    );
+}
+
+// IV4Router.ExactInputSingleParams: (PoolKey, bool zeroForOne, uint128
+// amountIn, uint128 minOut, bytes hookData).
+function exactInSingleParams(currency0, currency1, zeroForOne, min) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
+        ],
+        [
+            [
+                [currency0, currency1, 500, 10, ZERO],
+                zeroForOne,
+                1000000n,
+                min,
+                "0x",
+            ],
+        ],
+    );
+}
+
+// V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x00) input: path is token(20) fee(3) token(20).
+function v3ExactIn(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    const path =
+        "0x" +
+        tokenIn.slice(2).toLowerCase() +
+        "000bb8" +
+        tokenOut.slice(2).toLowerCase();
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "bytes", "bool"],
+        [USER, amountIn, amountOutMin, path, true],
+    );
+}
+
+function detail(data, label) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, {});
+    expect(decoded).not.toBeNull();
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+describe("a V4 step that states a Min. received but no output currency", () => {
+    // SWAP_EXACT_IN with an empty path: amountOutMin decodes, no currency out
+    // does, and there is no TAKE to supply one.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute("0x10", [
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN],
+                [exactInParams(USDT, [], 5000000n, MIN_OUT)],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("says the output token is unknown instead of naming ETH", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+    });
+
+    test("keeps a Token Out line, so the figure is never unattributed", () => {
+        const out = detail(data(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out).toBeDefined();
+        // A refusal is not a token: nothing to link to an explorer.
+        expect(out.address).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(out.isToken).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to scale Min. received rather than assuming 18", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(MIN_OUT),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("does not name ETH in the swap title either", () => {
+        const decoded = uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {});
+        expect(decoded.name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a V4 step whose Min. received supersedes an earlier step's", () => {
+    // V3 USDT -> WETH, then a V4 step that carries the final Min. received but
+    // names no currency. The figure belongs to the V4 step, so it must not be
+    // read against the token the V3 step named.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute(solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]), [
+            v3ExactIn(USDT, WETH, 5000000n, HALF_ETH),
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN],
+                [exactInParams(WETH, [], HALF_ETH, MIN_OUT)],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("does not keep naming the earlier step's output token", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to scale the superseding figure", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(MIN_OUT),
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("native ETH out, which V4 spells as the zero address", () => {
+    // The pin on the other half of the determination. PoolKey currencies are
+    // ordered, so native ETH is currency0; zeroForOne false swaps USDT in for
+    // ETH out. TAKE names the same zero-address currency.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute("0x10", [
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SETTLE, V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, V4_TAKE],
+                [
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "uint256", "bool"],
+                        [USDT, 5000000n, true],
+                    ),
+                    exactInSingleParams(ZERO, USDT, false, HALF_ETH),
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+                        [ZERO, USER, 0n],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("a Currency of address(0) decodes to a truthy address string", () => {
+        // The fact the whole determination rests on: an absent output currency
+        // and a native-ETH one are distinguishable here, because the ABI
+        // decoder never yields null for an address word.
+        const [currency] = coder.decode(
+            ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+            coder.encode(["address", "address", "uint256"], [ZERO, USER, 0n]),
+        );
+        expect(currency).toBe(ZERO);
+        expect(Boolean(currency)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("is still named ETH and still scaled at 18 decimals", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 ETH");
+        expect(uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {}).name).toBe("Swap USDT → ETH");
+    });
+});