harden: show a personal message's hex and mark control characters in its text (closes #403)

The signature screen showed only the text a personal message decodes
to, with bidirectional and zero-width characters acting on it, so a
site could make the message read differently from the bytes that are
signed, and a message that was not hex was decoded into NUL
characters. The screen now shows the hex as "Raw data" alongside the
decoded text, and each control or format character in the text as a
U+XXXX mark. Signing takes the bytes from the hex, so a message that
is not hex cannot be signed: it is shown as plain text, with the error
line saying so and "Sign" disabled.

Model: opus-5-5

Dockerfile

@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # image sets it.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE=1
 
-# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure, against a suite that
-# runs in about 8s there. In here the same suite starts on a cold jest cache
-# and shares the runner with the rest of the build, so 30s is marginal rather
-# than a bound — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache. 180s
-# still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite that
-# is merely running on contended hardware.
+# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure. In here the same suite
+# starts on a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build,
+# so 30s is too tight — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache.
+# 180s still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite
+# that is merely running on contended hardware.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=180
 
 # script/bootstrap installs all prerequisites (make via apt here; node

README.md

@@ -949,6 +949,13 @@ and compare against. Reading the stored field directly instead answers `null`
 for a bundled or tracked token the explorer merely omitted, which is not a
 refusal the wallet has any reason to make.
 
+The Send screen also consults every address's explorer reports, so a contract
+two addresses report different `decimals` for has no scale there, and the stored
+balance, formatted at one of those scales, is withdrawn with it. The Send
+screen's `Current balance` and the confirmation screen's balance line then both
+read `unknown (SYMBOL)`. The balance list formats each explorer row as it is
+fetched, without that cross-address check, and shows the row's figure.
+
 **Decoded amount lines on the transaction approval screen:** the `Amount` line
 of a decoded ERC-20 call, and the `Amount` and `Min. received` lines of a
 decoded swap (see TxApproval below), do not always read as a number. They can
@@ -1150,7 +1157,7 @@ each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
 The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
 `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
 passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
-`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
+`saveState()`'s per-origin merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
 the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
 ([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
 now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
@@ -1409,7 +1416,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - What to send: token dropdown (or static display with contract address when
       locked from AddressToken)
     - To: address or ENS name input, with an inline validation message
-    - Amount input with current balance display
+    - Amount input with current balance display, which reads
+      `Current balance: unknown (SYMBOL)` for a token whose scale is unknown, as
+      ConfirmTx's balance line does (see Unknown token scale)
     - "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
@@ -1427,7 +1436,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
     - Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
-    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
+    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses), or `unknown (SYMBOL)`
+      for a token whose scale is unknown
     - Network fee: "Estimating..." then two lines, or "Unable to estimate",
       fetched async. The first line is what the transfer is expected to cost,
       `gasLimit * gasPrice` (USD in parentheses); the second is the
@@ -1443,7 +1453,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       amount plus the fee exceeds the balance (ETH transfers), not enough ETH to
       pay the fee for the transfer (ERC-20 transfers), and the fee could not be
       estimated. The first two are mutually exclusive per transfer type, so only
-      the applicable one holds space
+      the applicable one holds space. The last names its cause: for a token
+      whose scale is unknown the fee can never be estimated, and it says the
+      wallet does not know how many decimal places the token uses and that the
+      transaction cannot be sent; for any other failure it asks the user to go
+      back and try again
     - Password: an inline field on this screen, not a modal, with its own error
       line
     - "Sign & Send" button (disabled if errors, and while the network fee
@@ -1617,13 +1631,13 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
           a value carrying its unit, hex (`0x10`) or exponent (`1e3`) notation —
           is refused with a flash message and the field snaps back to the stored
           threshold, so a number the user did not type is never stored.
-    - Allowed Sites: the hostnames remembered as allowed, under any address,
-      with remove buttons
-    - Connected Sites: the hostnames of the sites allowed without "Remember my
+    - Allowed Sites: the origins (scheme, host and port) remembered as allowed,
+      under any address, with remove buttons
+    - Connected Sites: the origins of the sites allowed without "Remember my
       choice" that are still connected, with remove buttons. Only the background
       holds these, in memory, and Settings asks it for them with
       `AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`
-    - Denied Sites: the hostnames remembered as denied, under any address, with
+    - Denied Sites: the origins remembered as denied, under any address, with
       remove buttons
     - About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
       commit, which links to the commit in the repository
@@ -1637,10 +1651,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on a tracked token → removes it in place (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on an allowed or connected site → disconnects that site, in place:
-      its hostname is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
+      its origin is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
       `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` has the background end every connection approved
-      without "Remember" from an origin with that hostname, under any address,
-      and send `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the site's open tabs.
+      without "Remember" from that origin, under any address, and send
+      `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the open tabs of that origin. The
+      same host under another scheme or port is another site and is left alone.
       Only the extension's own pages may send either message
     - `[x]` on a denied site → forgets the refusal, in place; it connects
       nothing and tells the background nothing
@@ -1824,14 +1839,18 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
   `wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
-  The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
-  falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
+  A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
+  connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
+  says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
+  background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
+  back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
   `requestApproval()`).
 - **Elements**:
     - "Connection Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to connect to your
+      wallet"
     - Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
     - "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
     - "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
@@ -1850,18 +1869,22 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
   transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
   opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
-  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
-  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
-  failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
-  populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
-  one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
-  populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
-  site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
+  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
+  ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
+  cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
+  behind a gap. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
+  gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
+  transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
+  `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
+  EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being populated at the same nonce. It opens
+  no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
+  one is answered.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to send a
+      transaction"
     - Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
       amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
@@ -1892,12 +1915,18 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - "Signature Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
+      message"
     - Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
     - Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
-      message fields (EIP-712 typed data). The primary type shown is the one
+    - Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
+      decode to as UTF-8, with each control or format character (zero-width and
+      bidirectional characters among them) shown as a bordered `U+XXXX` mark
+      instead of acting on the text, so it reads in the order of the bytes that
+      are signed; a line feed is shown as a line break. Bytes that are not UTF-8
+      are shown as "This message is not text." For typed data, formatted
+      domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary type shown is the one
       ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`, not the type the site
       states.
     - Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
@@ -1911,12 +1940,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       domain's `verifyingContract`; any those fields do not give is shown as
       `Unknown`, and the domain, type and message lines still follow. Only typed
       data that cannot be read at all is shown as raw text.
+    - Raw data (`personal_sign` and `eth_sign`): the message's hex exactly as
+      the site sent it. The bytes it encodes are what is signed, as an EIP-191
+      personal message.
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
     - Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
       would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
       saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
+    - A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` and an even
+      number of hex digits) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This
+      message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed." and "Sign"
+      disabled; signing takes the bytes from the hex, so such a message has none
+      to sign
     - "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
       signature)
     - "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen

TODO.md

@@ -45,6 +45,67 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
+  are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
+  showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
+  acting on it, so a site could make the message read differently from what is
+  signed, and a message that was not hex was shown as NUL characters. The hex is
+  now shown as "Raw data" alongside the decoded text, control and format
+  characters in the text are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that is not
+  hex is shown as plain text with "Sign" disabled, since signing takes the bytes
+  from the hex and such a message has none to sign.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A nonce the site supplies with `eth_sendTransaction` is ignored
+  ([#404](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404)). It was passed on to
+  the transaction, so a site could replace one of the user's pending
+  transactions (same nonce, higher fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap,
+  and the approval screen showed it as a bare number. `nonce` is no longer one
+  of the fields taken from the request in `src/shared/approvalTx.js`, so the
+  transaction always gets the account's next nonce from the node, and that is
+  the nonce the approval screen shows and the popup signs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Remembered site permissions are held by full origin
+  ([#402](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402)). `allowedSites` and
+  `deniedSites` stored the hostname alone, so a grant to `https://dapp.example`
+  also authorised `http://dapp.example` and every port on that host, and the
+  prompts named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the origin
+  (`scheme://host[:port]`), the key the connections approved without "Remember"
+  already used, in `src/background/index.js` and in Settings, whose site lists
+  and `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` carry the origin too. The connection, transaction
+  and signature prompts show the origin. Entries saved by hostname before this
+  change are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site, and Settings lists them
+  until they are removed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A page's request is credited only to the site the browser says
+  sent it ([#407](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407)). Where the
+  browser does not give the sender's origin (Firefox before 126), the background
+  used the tab's page, so a frame from another site would have been treated as
+  the site embedding it, and with no tab it used an origin the page wrote into
+  the message. It now uses the URL of the frame that sent the message, and
+  refuses the request with code 4100 when the browser gives neither. The content
+  script no longer writes an origin into the message.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` takes 8-13s on the shared build host, down from
+  17-25s, measured in alternating runs before and after the change
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). Each popup boot in
+  the tests (`tests/support/popupBoot.js`) resets jest's module registry so that
+  everything under `src/` loads fresh, and that also reloaded `ethers`,
+  `libsodium-wrappers-sumo`, `qrcode` and `ethereum-blockies-base64` every time.
+  Those four libraries are now loaded once per test file and handed to every
+  boot. No test or assertion changed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A token whose scale is unknown reads the same on the Send screen
+  as on the confirmation screen
+  ([#377](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377)). When two addresses'
+  explorer reports disagree on a token's `decimals`, the Send screen showed the
+  stored figure while the confirmation screen it leads to said
+  `unknown (SYMBOL)`; both now say `unknown (SYMBOL)`, from one function in
+  `src/popup/views/send.js`. The confirmation screen's fee-unknown message names
+  its cause: for an unknown scale it says the wallet does not know how many
+  decimal places the token uses and that the transaction cannot be sent, instead
+  of asking the user to go back and try again, which cannot help. For any other
+  cause it is unchanged.
+
 - 2026-10-04: A Uniswap V2 exact-out swap (Universal Router command `0x09`) is
   decoded on the approval screen
   ([#283](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/283)). `decode()` in
@@ -60,6 +121,27 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
   `Token Out` and `Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure.
   V3 exact-out (`0x01`) is still not decoded.
 
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` runs jest in three worker processes
+  ([#426](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/426)). The `test` and
+  `test:verbose` scripts in `package.json` ran `jest --forceExit`, which starts
+  one worker per CPU core: about 47 processes and 7-8 GiB per run on the shared
+  48-core build host. They now pass `--maxWorkers=3`, and the suite takes 23-29s
+  there: inside the 30-second cap in `script/test`, which is unchanged, but not
+  by much, because `tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` alone takes most of it
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). One or two workers
+  went past the cap. `make check`, the pre-commit hook and `script/cibuild` all
+  run the suite through these scripts.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The error container on each dApp approval screen keeps its height
+  when an error appears
+  ([#297](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/297)). `#approve-tx-error`
+  and `#approve-sign-error` reserved 20px, but their border and padding took
+  10px of it, so a one-line error grew them to 26px and pushed the buttons below
+  down 6px. They now reserve 30px. A new test in `tests/e2e/run.js` shows each
+  of the six password error containers on its own screen, empty and then with an
+  error, and fails if one changes height or the element below it moves. Some of
+  the longer messages these two containers can show still take two lines.
+
 - 2026-10-04: A transaction with no `to` says "This transaction creates a new
   contract. It has no recipient." on its recipient line and in its transaction
   history row ([#250](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/250)). The

docs/README.md

@@ -285,11 +285,13 @@ not appear and may be permanently lost.
 AutistMask injects a standard `window.ethereum` provider (EIP-1193) into web
 pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
 
-1. A popup appears showing the site's hostname and the address that will be
-   shared.
+1. A popup appears showing the site's origin (its scheme, host and port, for
+   example `https://app.example`) and the address that will be shared.
 2. Click "Allow" to connect or "Deny" to reject.
 3. Optionally check "Remember my choice for this site" to skip the prompt next
-   time.
+   time. The choice applies to that exact origin only: a choice remembered for
+   `https://app.example` does not cover `http://app.example` or another port of
+   the same host, which ask again.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
 showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and

package.json

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
     "license": "GPL-3.0",
     "private": true,
     "scripts": {
-        "test": "jest --forceExit",
-        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --verbose",
+        "test": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3",
+        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3 --verbose",
         "build": "node build.js",
         "lint": "eslint . && prettier --check .",
         "fmt": "prettier --write .",

script/test

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test: run the test suite.
 #
-# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On a
-# developer host the suite finishes in about 8s and REPO_POLICIES' 30s cap is
-# the bound. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold jest cache and
-# shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what that budget
-# describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
+# jest runs three worker processes (package.json), not one per CPU core: on a
+# many-core shared host one per core took gigabytes of RAM per run.
+#
+# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On the busy
+# shared build host the suite takes 8-13s with three workers, inside
+# REPO_POLICIES' 20s budget. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold
+# jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what
+# that budget describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
 # AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a cold cache
 # produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
 set -eu

src/background/index.js

@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ const windowsNs = windowsApi();
 const actionNs = actionApi();
 
 // Connected sites (in-memory, non-persisted): { "origin:address": true }
+//
+// A site is its full origin (scheme://host[:port]), here and in the
+// remembered allowedSites/deniedSites lists alike: a grant to
+// https://dapp.example says nothing about http://dapp.example or another port.
 const connectedSites = {};
 
-// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
+// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
 const pendingApprovals = {};
 
 // One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
@@ -459,10 +463,10 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
 
 // Open an approval popup and return a promise that resolves with the user decision.
 // Prefers the browser-action popup (anchored to toolbar, no macOS Space switch).
-function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
+function requestApproval(origin) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
-        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
+        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve };
 
         if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
             actionNs.setPopup({
@@ -495,13 +499,12 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // screen never named.
 // `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
 // approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
+function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -517,13 +520,12 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -601,11 +603,11 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
 // in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
 // gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
 // objects that work was holding.
-async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, origin) {
     await updateState((s) => {
         if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
-        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
-            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(origin)) {
+            s[field][address].push(origin);
         }
     });
 }
@@ -618,12 +620,11 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     const denied = s.deniedSites[activeAddress] || [];
 
     // Check denied list
-    if (denied.includes(hostname)) {
+    if (denied.includes(origin)) {
         return {
             error: {
                 code: 4001,
@@ -634,25 +635,25 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     // Check allowed list or in-memory connected
     if (
-        allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+        allowed.includes(origin) ||
         connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     }
 
     // Open approval popup
-    const decision = await requestApproval(origin, hostname);
+    const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -698,10 +699,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { result: [activeAddress] };
@@ -731,10 +731,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -806,10 +805,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress];
         if (!isConnected || !activeAddress) {
             return { result: [] };
@@ -835,10 +833,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -870,7 +867,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -884,10 +880,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -905,7 +900,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -946,10 +940,9 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     if (
-        !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+        !allowed.includes(origin) &&
         !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -1023,7 +1016,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
 
         const decision = await requestTxApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             activeAddress,
             slot,
@@ -1097,10 +1089,9 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
         const origin = tab.url ? new URL(tab.url).origin : "";
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const hasPermission =
             activeAddress &&
-            (allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            (allowed.includes(origin) ||
                 connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]);
         // Same as chainChanged above: a tab without our content script
         // rejects, and that is expected rather than a fault.
@@ -1113,7 +1104,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
 }
 
 // Tell every open tab of a site Settings removed that it has no account.
-async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
+async function broadcastSiteRemoved(origin) {
     let tabs;
     try {
         tabs = await tabsQuery({});
@@ -1121,7 +1112,7 @@ async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
         return;
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
-        if (!tab.url || extractHostname(tab.url) !== hostname) continue;
+        if (!tab.url || new URL(tab.url).origin !== origin) continue;
         tabsSendMessage(tab.id, {
             type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
             eventName: "accountsChanged",
@@ -1288,18 +1279,29 @@ if (windowsNs && windowsNs.onRemoved) {
 // Listen for messages from content scripts and popup
 runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_RPC") {
-        // Derive origin from trusted sender info to prevent origin spoofing.
-        // Chrome MV3 provides sender.origin; Firefox MV2 fallback uses sender.tab.url.
-        let trustedOrigin = msg.origin; // fallback only if sender info unavailable
-        if (sender.origin) {
-            trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
-        } else if (sender.tab && sender.tab.url) {
+        // The origin is the one the browser reports for the sender, never one
+        // the message carries. Firefox before 126 gives no sender.origin, so
+        // the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
+        // not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
+        // frame. With neither, the request is refused.
+        let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
+        if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
             try {
-                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.tab.url).origin;
+                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.url).origin;
             } catch {
-                // keep fallback
+                // an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
             }
         }
+        if (!trustedOrigin) {
+            sendResponse({
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+                },
+            });
+            return false;
+        }
         handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin)
             .then((response) => {
                 sendResponse(response);
@@ -1337,10 +1339,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (approval) {
-            const resp = {
-                hostname: approval.hostname,
-                origin: approval.origin,
-            };
+            const resp = { origin: approval.origin };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
                 // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
@@ -1355,7 +1354,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
-            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
+            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
+                extractHostname(approval.origin),
+            );
             sendResponse(resp);
         } else {
             sendResponse(null);
@@ -1689,23 +1690,22 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES") {
         sendResponse(
             Object.keys(connectedSites).map((key) =>
-                extractHostname(key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"))),
+                key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")),
             ),
         );
         return false;
     }
 
-    // Settings removed this site and has already dropped its remembered
-    // entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end here, under
-    // every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
+    // Settings removed this site (msg.origin) and has already dropped its
+    // remembered entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end
+    // here, under every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE") {
         for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
-            const origin = key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"));
-            if (extractHostname(origin) === msg.hostname) {
+            if (key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")) === msg.origin) {
                 delete connectedSites[key];
             }
         }
-        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.hostname);
+        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
         return false;
     }
 });

src/content/index.js

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         id,
         method,
         params,
-        origin: location.origin,
     })
         .then((response) => {
             if (response) {

src/popup/index.html

@@ -698,15 +698,13 @@
                     You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
                     transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
+                so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-fee-unknown-error"
                     class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
-                    The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction
-                    cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and
-                    try again.
-                </div>
+                ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -1563,7 +1561,7 @@
                     with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-tx-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-tx-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants to send a transaction.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1633,7 +1631,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-tx-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@
                     funds. Proceed with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-sign-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-sign-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants you to sign a message.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1700,6 +1698,15 @@
                     ></div>
                 </div>
 
+                <div id="approve-sign-hex-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
+                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-sign-hex"
+                        class="text-xs break-all"
+                        style="max-height: 6rem; overflow-y: auto"
+                    ></div>
+                </div>
+
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -1710,7 +1717,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-sign-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1742,7 +1749,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <p class="mb-2">
-                        <span id="approve-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                        <span id="approve-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                         wants to connect to your wallet.
                     </p>
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const {
     getBigInt,
     getBytes,
     Interface,
+    isHexString,
     MaxUint256,
     toUtf8String,
     TypedDataEncoder,
@@ -306,7 +307,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         };
     }
 
-    $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-tx-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
@@ -380,20 +381,28 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     );
 }
 
+// The text the hex message's bytes decode to as UTF-8, or null when they are
+// not UTF-8. The caller has checked that the message is hex.
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
     try {
-        const bytes = Uint8Array.from(
-            hex
-                .slice(2)
-                .match(/.{1,2}/g)
-                .map((b) => parseInt(b, 16)),
-        );
-        return toUtf8String(bytes);
+        return toUtf8String(getBytes(hex));
     } catch {
         return null;
     }
 }
 
+// The text as HTML, with each control or format character (zero-width and
+// bidirectional characters among them) shown as a bordered U+XXXX mark
+// instead of acting on the text, so it reads in the order of its bytes. Line
+// feeds are shown as line breaks.
+function markControlCharacters(text) {
+    return escapeHtml(text).replace(/[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}]/gu, (c) => {
+        if (c === "\n") return "<br>";
+        const code = c.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase();
+        return `<span class="border border-border">U+${code.padStart(4, "0")}</span>`;
+    });
+}
+
 // The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
 // `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
 // refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
@@ -645,7 +654,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
     pendingSignParams = sp;
     pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
-    $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-sign-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
         details.approvedFrom,
     );
@@ -657,15 +666,29 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
         ? "Typed data (EIP-712)"
         : "Personal message";
 
+    // A personal message is signed as the bytes its hex encodes, so the hex
+    // is shown as well as any text it decodes to. Signing reads the bytes
+    // from the hex, so a message that is not hex cannot be signed: it is
+    // shown as the text it is, and refused.
+    let refusal = null;
+    $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.add("hidden");
     if (isTyped) {
         $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = formatTypedDataHtml(sp.typedData);
-    } else {
+        refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
+    } else if (isHexString(sp.message, true)) {
         const decoded = decodeHexMessage(sp.message);
         if (decoded !== null) {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = decoded;
+            $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML =
+                markControlCharacters(decoded);
         } else {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = sp.message;
+            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = "This message is not text.";
         }
+        $("approve-sign-hex").textContent = sp.message;
+        $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.remove("hidden");
+    } else {
+        $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = markControlCharacters(sp.message);
+        refusal =
+            "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
     }
 
     // Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
@@ -687,7 +710,6 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
-    const refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
     if (refusal) {
         showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
         $("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
@@ -732,7 +754,7 @@ async function show(id) {
         "approve-site-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
-    $("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
     $("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -198,6 +198,19 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     $("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
     $("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
 
+    // The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
+    // Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
+    // the estimate fails every time and going back cannot help; any other
+    // failure may clear on a retry.
+    $("confirm-fee-unknown-error").textContent =
+        isErc20 && txInfo.tokenDecimals == null
+            ? "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+              " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+              " this transaction cannot be sent."
+            : "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+              " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+              " try again.";
+
     renderValidation(txInfo);
 
     // Reset password field and error
@@ -244,7 +257,8 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     });
 
     // Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
-    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html.
+    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
+    // fee-unknown one, which show() sets.
     const messages = [];
     if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
         messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -146,6 +146,50 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     }
 }
 
+// The token balance and scale the Send screen states and hands the
+// confirmation screen, so the two screens describe the holding the same way.
+//
+// The scale is resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
+// DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's tracked
+// tokens, then the explorer. The stored tokenBalances[].decimals is the
+// explorer's own answer alone, so reading it raw carries a null forward for a
+// token the wallet does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
+// inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as an unestimable
+// fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in doubt
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). Still null when nothing
+// knows: no fallback.
+//
+// Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that adds
+// explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two addresses report
+// different scales for answers null rather than picking one. That check has to
+// apply here, because this scale encodes the transfer — it is carried forward
+// so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read rather than with
+// whatever the contract answers at signing time (see
+// src/shared/transferAmount.js). balances.js is formatting one explorer row at
+// fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of replacing.
+//
+// The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the stored
+// `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen has just declined to
+// stand behind. Stating it would leave validateTransfer() checking the amount
+// against a number the wallet does not vouch for, so it is withdrawn: unknown
+// scale means unknown balance. It is null rather than "0": both screens state
+// an unknown balance as unknown, and validateTransfer() treats it as no balance
+// to spend from, which is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
+// Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0" for a token that has no row at
+// all is an absence of holdings, which is true at every scale.
+function tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token) {
+    const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
+        (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
+    );
+    const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
+    if (!tb) return { tokenBalance: "0", tokenDecimals };
+    if (tokenDecimals === null) return { tokenBalance: null, tokenDecimals };
+    return { tokenBalance: tb.balance ?? null, tokenDecimals };
+}
+
 function updateSendBalance() {
     const addr = currentAddress();
     if (!addr) return;
@@ -162,18 +206,16 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
             truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
             " ETH";
     } else {
-        const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-            (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-        );
         const symbol = resolveSymbol(
             token,
             addr.tokenBalances,
             state.trackedTokens,
         );
-        // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows. Saying "0"
-        // for it would be a claim about the amount; the send itself is
+        // A null balance is a holding whose scale is unknown. Saying a figure
+        // for it would be a claim about the amount, so it reads as the
+        // confirmation screen's balance line reads it; the send itself is
         // refused later by transferAmountUnits() for the same missing scale.
-        const bal = tb ? tb.balance : "0";
+        const bal = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token).tokenBalance;
         $("send-balance").textContent =
             bal == null
                 ? "Current balance: unknown (" + symbol + ")"
@@ -240,59 +282,17 @@ function init(_ctx) {
 
         let tokenSymbol = null;
         let tokenBalance = null;
-        // The scale the amount and the balance below are rendered at, carried
-        // forward so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read
-        // rather than with whatever the contract answers at signing time. See
-        // src/shared/transferAmount.js.
         let tokenDecimals = null;
         if (token !== "ETH") {
-            const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-                (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-            );
             tokenSymbol = resolveSymbol(
                 token,
                 addr.tokenBalances,
                 state.trackedTokens,
             );
-            // null carried through rather than flattened to "0": the confirm
-            // screen states an unknown balance as unknown, and
-            // validateTransfer() treats it as no balance to spend from, which
-            // is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
-            tokenBalance = tb ? (tb.balance ?? null) : "0";
-            // Resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
-            // DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's
-            // tracked tokens, then the explorer. The stored
-            // tokenBalances[].decimals is the explorer's own answer alone, so
-            // reading it raw carries a null forward for a token the wallet
-            // does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
-            // inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as
-            // an unestimable fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in
-            // doubt (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
-            // Still null when nothing knows: no fallback.
-            //
-            // Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that
-            // adds explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two
-            // addresses report different scales for answers null rather than
-            // picking one. That check has to apply here, because this value
-            // encodes a transfer; balances.js is formatting one explorer row
-            // at fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of
-            // replacing.
-            tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
-                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-                wallets: state.wallets,
-            });
-            // The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the
-            // stored `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen
-            // has just declined to stand behind. Stating it would leave
-            // validateTransfer() checking the amount against a number the
-            // wallet does not vouch for, and — since the unknown-balance path
-            // is gated on the balance, not on the scale — would leave the
-            // fee-estimate failure as the only thing on the confirmation
-            // screen, which says nothing about decimals. Unknown scale means
-            // unknown balance. Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0"
-            // for a token that has no row at all is an absence of holdings,
-            // which is true at every scale.
-            if (tb && tokenDecimals === null) tokenBalance = null;
+            ({ tokenBalance, tokenDecimals } = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(
+                addr,
+                token,
+            ));
         }
 
         ctx.showConfirmTx({

src/popup/views/settings.js

@@ -34,35 +34,35 @@ const { notify, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
 let versionClickCount = 0;
 let versionClickTimer = null;
 
-// One row per hostname, however many addresses or origins it appears under,
-// each with an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
-function renderSiteList(containerId, hostnames, onRemove) {
+// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
+// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
+function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
     const container = $(containerId);
-    const unique = [...new Set(hostnames)];
+    const unique = [...new Set(origins)];
     if (unique.length === 0) {
         container.innerHTML = '<p class="text-xs text-muted">None</p>';
         return;
     }
     let html = "";
-    unique.forEach((hostname) => {
+    unique.forEach((origin) => {
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
-        // A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
+        // An origin the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
         // this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
         // rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
-        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
-        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
+        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(origin)}</span>`;
+        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-origin="${escapeHtml(origin)}">[x]</button>`;
         html += `</div>`;
     });
     container.innerHTML = html;
     container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-site").forEach((btn) => {
-        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.hostname));
+        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.origin));
     });
 }
 
-// Drop a hostname from a remembered site list under every address.
-function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
+// Drop a site origin from a remembered site list under every address.
+function forgetOrigin(siteMap, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(siteMap)) {
-        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((h) => h !== hostname);
+        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((o) => o !== origin);
         if (siteMap[addr].length === 0) {
             delete siteMap[addr];
         }
@@ -72,16 +72,16 @@ function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
 // Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites disconnects it: it is
 // no longer allowed under any address, and the background ends its
 // connections approved without "Remember" and tells its open tabs.
-async function removeAllowedSite(hostname) {
-    forgetHostname(state.allowedSites, hostname);
+async function removeAllowedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.allowedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
-    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname });
+    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin });
     await renderSiteLists();
 }
 
 // Removing a denied site only forgets the refusal; it connects nothing.
-async function removeDeniedSite(hostname) {
-    forgetHostname(state.deniedSites, hostname);
+async function removeDeniedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.deniedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
     await renderSiteLists();
 }

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
 // passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
 // learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
 // it without this module knowing.
+//
+// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
+// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
+// pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher fee) or leave this one stuck
+// behind a gap (a nonce above the next one).
 const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
     "to",
     "value",
     "data",
-    "nonce",
     "gasLimit",
     "gasPrice",
     "maxFeePerGas",

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ function tokenRefs(value) {
 
 // A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
 // fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
-// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
-// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
+// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's origin list in the site maps
+// below (`o !== origin` filters, `list.includes(origin)` in the background).
 //
 // Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
-// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
+// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in an origin
 // list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
 // is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
 // survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
@@ -116,21 +116,22 @@ function textList(value) {
     return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
 }
 
-// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
+// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }, each origin the
+// full scheme://host[:port] of a site.
 //
 // The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
 // `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
-// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
+// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per origin
 // WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
 // mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
 // rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
 // healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
 // revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
-// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
+// `allowed.includes(origin)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
 // one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
 // could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
 //
-// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
+// An address key whose value is not a list of origins is dropped entirely: it
 // grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
 // "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
 // can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
@@ -143,9 +144,9 @@ function siteMap(value) {
     if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
     for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
         if (address === "__proto__") continue;
-        const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
-        if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
-        defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
+        const origins = textList(value[address]);
+        if (origins.length === 0) continue;
+        defineOwn(out, address, origins);
     }
     return out;
 }

src/shared/state.js

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
 }
 
 // Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
-// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// origin list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
 // same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
 // object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
 // a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
@@ -353,25 +353,25 @@ function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
     return result;
 }
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. The origin
 // list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
-// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
-// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// approved/denied origin to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of it in place, from a
 // different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
-// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// origin itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
 // pick.
-function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+function mergeOriginList(base, ours, theirs) {
     return mergeListByIdentity(
         base,
         ours,
         theirs,
-        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (origin) => origin,
         (b, o, t) => t,
     );
 }
 
 function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
-    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeOriginList);
 }
 
 // networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
 // address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
 //
 // `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
-// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
-// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// by address key and then by origin within each address's list), for the
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied origin
 // to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
 // filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
 // doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can

tests/approvalNonce.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// A nonce the page supplies is not used
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404). With it a page could
+// replace one of the user's pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher
+// fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap, so the transaction is always
+// given the account's next nonce from the network.
+//
+// Driven through the preparation the background runs on a page's
+// eth_sendTransaction (src/shared/approvalTx.js) and the real approval screen,
+// password and Confirm included, against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. The vault is mocked so that no password
+// has to be hashed.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { Network, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// A well-known test phrase, and its first address.
+const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
+const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The account's next nonce, as the network reports it.
+const NETWORK_NONCE = 7;
+
+const network = {
+    getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+    getTransactionCount: async () => NETWORK_NONCE,
+    estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
+    getFeeData: async () => ({
+        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+    }),
+};
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it. Returns every
+// message the screen sends to the background. The background's answer to the
+// signed transaction does not matter here; a retryable refusal keeps the
+// screen where it is.
+async function openTxApproval(approvedTx) {
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            sent.push(msg);
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
+                return reply({ error: "Not sent.", retryable: true });
+            }
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+            encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+    return sent;
+}
+
+test("a page's nonce is replaced by the network's, on screen and in the signed transaction", async () => {
+    // What the background does with the page's request before it opens the
+    // approval window.
+    const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(network, FROM, {
+        from: FROM,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: "0x0",
+        data: "0x",
+        nonce: "0x2",
+    });
+
+    const sent = await openTxApproval(approvedTx);
+    expect(node("approve-tx-nonce").textContent).toBe("7");
+
+    decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(PHRASE);
+    node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+    await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+    const response = sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE");
+    expect(Transaction.from(response.rawSignedTx).nonce).toBe(NETWORK_NONCE);
+});

tests/approvalOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
+// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
+// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
+// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// The site asking, in cleartext and on a port, which is what the hostname
+// alone, dapp.example, used to hide.
+const ORIGIN = "http://dapp.example:8080";
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the prompt the background describes with `details`, the way the popup
+// does: it asks for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openApproval(details) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                origin: ORIGIN,
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                ...details,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({});
+    expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "tx",
+        approvedTx: {
+            type: 2,
+            from: FROM,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x5208",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0x0",
+            data: "0x",
+            accessList: [],
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-tx-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "sign",
+        // "Hello" as the hex a dApp passes to personal_sign.
+        signParams: {
+            method: "personal_sign",
+            message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+            from: FROM,
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
+    test("keeps a gas limit and fee the request did fix, but not its nonce", async () => {
         const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
             providerWith(),
             signer.address,
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
                 maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
             },
         );
-        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
+        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x7");
         expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
         expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
     });

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 // A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
 const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
@@ -199,7 +198,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
@@ -2193,12 +2192,54 @@ describe("removing an address ends a site's connection to it", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A remembered permission belongs to the origin it was granted to, scheme and
+// port included (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). The stored
+// state allows ORIGIN, https://dapp.example. A cleartext page on the same host,
+// which a network attacker can serve, and another port on it are other sites.
+describe("a remembered permission is held by the full origin", () => {
+    for (const origin of ["http://dapp.example", "https://dapp.example:8443"]) {
+        test(`an https grant does not authorise ${origin}`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadBackground();
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+                result: [signer.address],
+            });
+
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, origin)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+            const send = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, origin);
+            await settle();
+            expect(send.result()).toEqual({
+                error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
+            });
+            expect(send.id()).toBeNull();
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("Remember stores the origin, so the cleartext page on that host is asked again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const granted = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const grantedId = granted.id();
+        bg.connectApproval(grantedId).decide(true, true);
+        await settle();
+        expect(granted.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+        expect(
+            bg.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites[signer.address],
+        ).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+
+        const cleartext = bg.requestSite("http://fresh.example");
+        await settle();
+        // Unanswered: it is waiting on a prompt of its own.
+        expect(cleartext.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(cleartext.id()).not.toBe(grantedId);
+    });
+});
+
 // Settings lists the sites allowed without "Remember", which only the
 // background holds, and removing a site there, from either list, disconnects
 // it. These drive the real Settings view against the real background and
 // click the [x] the user clicks.
 describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
-    // FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, so its hostname is FRESH_ORIGIN's.
+    // The host of FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, which makes it another site.
     const FRESH_OTHER_PORT = "https://fresh.example:8443";
 
     // A site list's container. Its [x] buttons, data attributes and all, are
@@ -2226,9 +2267,9 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         return list;
     }
 
-    // The hostnames a site list shows.
+    // The origins a site list shows.
     function listed(list) {
-        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-hostname="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
+        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-origin="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
             (match) => match[1],
         );
     }
@@ -2259,10 +2300,10 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
             allowed: element("settings-allowed-sites"),
             connected: element("settings-connected-sites"),
             // Click the [x] beside a site, and let what it sends run.
-            remove: async (list, hostname) => {
-                expect(listed(list)).toContain(hostname);
+            remove: async (list, origin) => {
+                expect(listed(list)).toContain(origin);
                 const button = list.buttons.find(
-                    (b) => b.dataset.hostname === hostname,
+                    (b) => b.dataset.origin === origin,
                 );
                 await button.click();
                 await settle();
@@ -2274,14 +2315,15 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         delete global.document;
     });
 
-    test("Settings lists a site connected without Remember", async () => {
+    test("Settings lists each site by its origin", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
 
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual(["fresh.example"]);
-        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([HOSTNAME]);
+        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_OTHER_PORT]);
     });
 
     test("removing a site connected without Remember disconnects it and tells its tabs", async () => {
@@ -2293,6 +2335,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
                 cb([
                     { id: 1, url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/app" },
                     { id: 2, url: ORIGIN + "/app" },
+                    { id: 3, url: FRESH_OTHER_PORT + "/app" },
                 ]),
             sendMessage: (tabId, msg, cb) => {
                 sentToTabs.push({ tabId, msg });
@@ -2301,7 +2344,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         };
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.connected, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.connected, FRESH_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
         expect(sentToTabs).toEqual([
@@ -2321,20 +2364,45 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         });
     });
 
-    // The same hostname can hold both kinds of connection: one origin allowed
-    // without Remember, then another, on a different port, allowed with it.
+    // One origin can hold both kinds of connection under two addresses:
+    // remembered for one, allowed without Remember for the other.
     test("removing a remembered site also ends its connection made without Remember", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: other.address,
+            balance: "0",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        });
+        bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, true);
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const pending = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [other.address] });
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("removing a remembered site leaves the same host on another port connected", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
         await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_OTHER_PORT);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT)).toEqual({
             result: [],
         });
-        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+            result: [signer.address],
+        });
     });
 
     test("a page can neither remove a site nor list the connected ones", async () => {
@@ -2343,7 +2411,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         const page = { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" };
 
         const remove = bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname: "fresh.example" },
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin: FRESH_ORIGIN },
             page,
         );
         const list = bg.send({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }, page);

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         lastBalanceRefresh: 0,

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
         tokenHolderCache: {},
         fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
     const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });

tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
         blockscoutUrl: CUSTOM_BLOCKSCOUT,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 }],
         theme: "dark",
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ describe("a chain switch on a worker that never loaded state", () => {
         expect(after.wallets).toEqual(walletFixture());
         expect(after.hasWallet).toBe(true);
         expect(after.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] });
+        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] });
         expect(after.trackedTokens).toEqual([
             { address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 },
         ]);

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/contractCreation.test.js

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ async function openTxApproval(to, data) {
             if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
             reply({
                 type: "tx",
-                hostname: "dapp.example",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
                 isPhishingDomain: false,
                 approvedFrom: FROM,
                 approvedTx: {

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -140,8 +140,14 @@ function load() {
     state.selectedWallet = 0;
     state.selectedAddress = 0;
     state.activeAddress = A0;
-    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
-    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+    state.allowedSites = {
+        [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+        [B0]: ["https://b.example"],
+    };
+    state.deniedSites = {
+        [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        [C0]: ["https://d.example"],
+    };
     state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
     state.currentView = "settings";
 
@@ -388,8 +394,8 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
         await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
 
         const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://d.example"] });
     });
 
     // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
@@ -437,7 +443,7 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
         const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
         state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
-        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] };
         state.deniedSites = {};
 
         await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);

tests/e2e/firefox/run.js

@@ -438,11 +438,10 @@ step(
         await d.switchToWindow(popup);
         await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await d.text("#approve-hostname");
+        const origin = await d.text("#approve-origin");
         assert(
-            hostname === "127.0.0.1",
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === env.server.origin,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
         const shown = await d.text("#approve-address");
         assert(
@@ -494,16 +493,16 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
              type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
              message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
              to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
              value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -582,9 +581,9 @@ step(
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.address.toLowerCase()),

tests/e2e/run.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const {
 const {
     DAPP_ORIGIN,
     DAPP_URL,
+    PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
     PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
     FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
     FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
@@ -1449,6 +1450,81 @@ test("an over-long flash message keeps to one line (#252)", async (env) => {
     }
 });
 
+// --------------------------------------- password error containers (#297)
+
+// Every screen that asks for a password reserves room for one line of error.
+// The two on the dApp approval screens also have a border and padding, which
+// that reserved height has to cover too.
+const PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS = [
+    "approve-tx-error",
+    "approve-sign-error",
+    "export-privkey-flash",
+    "show-phrase-flash",
+    "delete-wallet-flash",
+    "confirm-tx-password-error",
+];
+
+// Shows only the screen holding the container, then measures the container
+// and the element below it empty and again filled the way showError() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js fills it. Runs in the page.
+function measurePasswordError(id) {
+    const container = document.getElementById(id);
+    const screen = container.closest(".view");
+    for (const view of document.querySelectorAll(".view")) {
+        view.classList.toggle("hidden", view !== screen);
+    }
+    const below = container.nextElementSibling;
+    const measure = () => ({
+        height: container.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+        belowTop: below.getBoundingClientRect().top + window.scrollY,
+        belowHeight: below.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+    });
+    const empty = measure();
+    container.textContent = "Please enter your password.";
+    container.style.visibility = "visible";
+    const filled = measure();
+    container.textContent = "";
+    container.style.visibility = "hidden";
+    return { empty, filled };
+}
+
+test("a password error moves nothing on any screen (#297)", async (env) => {
+    const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
+    try {
+        await page.setViewportSize(POPUP_VIEWPORT);
+        for (const id of PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS) {
+            const { empty, filled } = await page.evaluate(
+                measurePasswordError,
+                id,
+            );
+            assert(
+                empty.belowHeight > 0,
+                "nothing is shown below #" + id + ", so nothing was measured",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.height === empty.height,
+                "#" +
+                    id +
+                    " is " +
+                    empty.height +
+                    "px empty and " +
+                    filled.height +
+                    "px with an error",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.belowTop === empty.belowTop,
+                "the element below #" +
+                    id +
+                    " moved " +
+                    (filled.belowTop - empty.belowTop) +
+                    "px when the error appeared",
+            );
+        }
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+});
+
 // --------------------------------------------- confirmation screen (#238)
 //
 // The screen that decides what gets signed. The arithmetic underneath it
@@ -2396,8 +2472,6 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
 // dApp, with real funds, against a real network. The RPC is stubbed
 // throughout. That pass stays on the human list before 1.0.0.
 
-const DAPP_HOSTNAME = new URL(DAPP_URL).hostname;
-
 // The personal_sign payload. Sent as hex, which is what dApps send and what
 // the popup requires — it calls getBytes() on the message — and displayed on
 // the approval screen as the decoded text, which is what the user is agreeing
@@ -2941,11 +3015,10 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts rejected at the prompt returns a rejection (#183)", as
     try {
         await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+        const origin = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
         assert(
-            hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
 
         // The control for the phishing test below: this origin is not on the
@@ -3026,7 +3099,6 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
     // check and the real approval screen. Nothing about the list is stubbed —
     // there is nothing left to stub, since the extension no longer fetches it.
     const phishingDapp = await openDapp(env.ctx, PHISHING_DAPP_URL);
-    const hostname = new URL(PHISHING_DAPP_URL).hostname;
     try {
         await reserveApprovalTab(env);
         await startRequest(
@@ -3039,15 +3111,15 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
         try {
             await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
             assert(
-                shown === hostname,
+                shown === PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
                 "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
                     JSON.stringify(shown),
             );
 
             await visible(popup, "#approve-site-phishing-warning");
-            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + hostname);
+            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN);
 
             // Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
             // outlive the test.
@@ -3077,15 +3149,15 @@ test("personal_sign signs, and the signature recovers to the address (#183)", as
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -3170,15 +3242,15 @@ test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").innerText,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the typed data prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Typed data (EIP-712)",
@@ -3276,7 +3348,7 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
         to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
         value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -3286,9 +3358,9 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
             .classList.contains("hidden"),
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),

tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js

@@ -59,24 +59,32 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             }
         });
 
-        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
-            for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
+        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not an origin list is dropped`, () => {
+            for (const bad of [
+                "https://dapp.example",
+                42,
+                null,
+                { a: 1 },
+                true,
+            ]) {
                 expect(
                     normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
                 ).toEqual({});
             }
         });
 
-        test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
+        test(`an origin that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
             expect(
                 normalizePersisted({
-                    [field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
+                    [field]: {
+                        [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "https://dapp.example", {}],
+                    },
                 })[field],
-            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
-            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
+            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] } };
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
 
@@ -87,10 +95,13 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
 
         test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
             const out = normalizePersisted({
-                [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
+                [field]: {
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+                    [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42,
+                },
             });
 
-            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             // saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
             // write.
             const saved = JSON.parse(
-                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
+                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}}',
             );
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
     const MALFORMED = [
         { name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
         { name: "a number", value: 42 },
-        { name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
+        { name: "a record", value: { origins: ["https://dapp.example"] } },
     ];
 
     for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
@@ -231,7 +242,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
         const env = await bootPopup(
             unversionedValidProfile({
                 allowedSites: {
-                    [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
                     [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
                 },
             }),
@@ -239,7 +250,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
 
         expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
         expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
-            [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
         });
     });
 

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },

tests/personalSignDisplay.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+// The signature prompt shows a personal message as the bytes that are signed
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403): the raw data in hex, the
+// text it decodes to with control, zero-width and bidirectional characters
+// marked rather than obeyed, and a message that is not hex as plain text that
+// cannot be signed.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { hexlify, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+
+// Built from their code points so that this file holds none of them.
+const RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE = String.fromCodePoint(0x202e);
+const POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING = String.fromCodePoint(0x202c);
+const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the signature prompt for a personal_sign of `message`, the way the
+// popup does: it asks the background for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openPersonalSign(message) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "sign",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                signParams: { method: "personal_sign", message, from: FROM },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+// The message box's markup as the text a reader sees: tags dropped.
+function shownMessage() {
+    return node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("a right-to-left override is marked, so the text reads in byte order", async () => {
+    // Obeyed, the override shows "0001" as "1000".
+    const text =
+        "Pay " +
+        RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE +
+        "0001" +
+        POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING +
+        " ETH";
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)));
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Pay U+202E0001U+202C ETH");
+});
+
+test("a zero-width character is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("pay" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "pal.com")),
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).not.toContain(
+        ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE,
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("payU+200Bpal.com");
+});
+
+test("a line feed is shown as a line break", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Sign in\nNonce: 7")));
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe("Sign in<br>Nonce: 7");
+});
+
+test("the raw hex is shown alongside the text", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        false,
+    );
+});
+
+test("bytes that are not text are shown only as hex", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0xff00");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is not text.",
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0xff00");
+});
+
+test("a message that is not hex is shown as text and cannot be signed", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("Hello world");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello world");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.",
+    );
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        true,
+    );
+});

tests/rpcOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Which site a page's request is attributed to.
+//
+// The background takes a request's origin from what the browser says sent the
+// message: sender.origin, or on Firefox before 126, which has no
+// sender.origin, the origin of sender.url — the frame that sent it. It used to
+// fall back to the tab's page and then to an origin the message itself
+// carried, so a request from a frame was credited to the site embedding it,
+// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
+// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
+//
+// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
+// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadBackground() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({
+        autistmask: {
+            networkId: "mainnet",
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    type: "hd",
+                    addresses: [
+                        { address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+            allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
+            deniedSites: {},
+        },
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: { onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} } },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    // Ask for eth_accounts. `claimedOrigin` is an origin written into the
+    // message, as the content script used to send.
+    return async function accounts(sender, claimedOrigin) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_accounts",
+                params: [],
+                origin: claimedOrigin,
+            },
+            sender,
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a request is attributed to the frame that sent it", () => {
+    test("a stranger's frame on a connected site gets no address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("a connected site's frame on a stranger's page gets the address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [ADDRESS] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
+    test("is refused, whatever the tab or the message says", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts(
+            { tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" } },
+            CONNECTED_ORIGIN,
+        );
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message:
+                    "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+            },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/sendDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ async function confirmSend(amount, token = "ETH") {
 async function approveTxWithFeePerGas(maxFeePerGas) {
     approvalDetails = {
         type: "tx",
-        hostname: "dapp.example",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
         approvedFrom: HOLDER,
         approvedTx: {
             to: RECIPIENT,

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -270,31 +270,32 @@ describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
-// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
-// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
-// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
-// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
-// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
-// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
-// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
-// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// from two different contexts — rememberSiteChoice() in
+// src/background/index.js pushes a newly approved origin onto
+// state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (forgetOrigin() in src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of
+// state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key entirely once its list
+// is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field pattern that made the
+// whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a security-relevant field: a stale
+// whole-field save here can resurrect a revoked permission or wipe a freshly
+// granted one.
 const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 
-function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+function approveSite(pageState, address, origin) {
     if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
         pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
     }
-    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
-        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(origin)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(origin);
     }
 }
 
-function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+function revokeSite(pageState, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
         pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
-            (h) => h !== hostname,
+            (o) => o !== origin,
         );
         if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
             delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["https://other.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -318,24 +319,24 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await settings.state.loadState();
 
         // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
-        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
-        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence in
+        // rememberSiteChoice(), src/background/index.js.
         const approval = loadPage(storage);
         await approval.state.loadState();
-        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "https://dapp.example");
         await approval.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
-        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        ).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
 
-        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
-        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
-        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence in
+        // forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js — and saves from state
+        // loaded before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://other.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["https://evil.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -354,23 +355,24 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         const stale = loadPage(storage);
         await stale.state.loadState();
 
-        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
-        // second page.
+        // Settings revokes it — forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js —
+        // from a second page.
         const settings = loadPage(storage);
         await settings.state.loadState();
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://evil.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
         ).toBeUndefined();
 
         // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
-        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
-        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        // for a different address and saves — rememberSiteChoice(),
+        // src/background/index.js.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "https://good.example");
         await stale.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["https://good.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -167,7 +167,9 @@ describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
         expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
         expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
         expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+        });
     });
 });
 

tests/support/popupBoot.js

@@ -20,6 +20,26 @@ const path = require("path");
 
 const { makeStorageStub } = require("./storageStub");
 
+// The four libraries the popup loads from node_modules, loaded once per test
+// file and handed to every boot. jest.resetModules() in bootPopup() empties the
+// module cache but keeps what jest.doMock() registered, so these registrations
+// hold for every boot in the file and the libraries are not loaded again. None
+// of them holds popup state; everything under src/ is still loaded fresh on
+// each boot.
+//
+// A test's own mock of one of them: a jest.doMock() made inside the test
+// replaces the registration here, as it would for any module. A top-of-file
+// jest.mock() is what the require() below gets, so it is kept, but its factory
+// runs once per file and every boot shares the same mock object.
+const ethers = require("ethers");
+const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
+const QRCode = require("qrcode");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
+jest.doMock("ethers", () => ethers);
+jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
+jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
+jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,7 +71,7 @@ function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
         blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         theme: "system",

tests/typedDataPermit.test.js

@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ async function openSignScreen(data) {
             if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
             reply({
                 type: "sign",
-                hostname: "dapp.example",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
                 isPhishingDomain: false,
                 approvedFrom: OWNER,
                 signParams: request(data),

tests/unknownScaleSend.test.js

@@ -382,8 +382,56 @@ describe("a scale the explorer's own rows disagree about", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377. The Send screen read the
+    // stored balance and said "5.0000 NOVEL", the confirmation screen it leads
+    // to said "unknown (NOVEL)", and the fee message asked the user to go back
+    // and try again, which cannot supply a scale.
+    test("reads the same on the Send screen and the confirmation screen, and the fee message names the scale", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("18", FIVE_WETH)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: unknown (NOVEL)");
+
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+        await settle();
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("unknown (NOVEL)");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+                " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+                " this transaction cannot be sent.",
+        );
+        expect(el("confirm-fee-unknown-error").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("while a fee that fails for any other reason keeps its retry", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        const getFeeData = mockProvider.getFeeData;
+        mockProvider.getFeeData = async () => {
+            throw new Error("the node did not answer");
+        };
+        try {
+            confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+            await settle();
+        } finally {
+            mockProvider.getFeeData = getFeeData;
+        }
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("Unable to estimate");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+                " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+                " try again.",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("while agreeing rows leave the scale usable", async () => {
         await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 5.0000 NOVEL");
         const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
         expect(txInfo.tokenDecimals).toBe(6);
         expect(txInfo.tokenBalance).toBe("5.0");

tests/walletDelete.test.js

@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ function makeState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
         allowedSites: {
-            [A0]: ["a.example"],
-            [A1]: ["b.example"],
-            [B0]: ["c.example"],
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [C0]: ["https://e.example"],
         },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
         const state = makeState({
             wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
-            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
+            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] },
             deniedSites: {},
         });
 
@@ -109,8 +112,8 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
 
         removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://c.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 });
 
@@ -126,8 +129,14 @@ function makeAddressState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedWallet: 0,
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
-        allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"], [A1]: ["b.example"] },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [B0]: ["e.example"] },
+        allowedSites: {
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://e.example"],
+        },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -273,8 +282,8 @@ describe("removeAddressFromState", () => {
 
         removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 
     // The derivation counter is a high-water mark, never rewound: "+" derives