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Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies (closes #141)
fix: Back after reopening the popup lands on a blank screen, because goBack() never re-renders
Fixed in #272.
The per-view dispatch and data guards move out of restoreView() into src/popup/viewRouter.js; goBack() routes a popped view…
fix: render the view "Back" lands on after the popup is reopened (closes #268)
The receiver rate limit is per-URL-path, so an attacker gets unlimited aggregate rate against /webhook/*
Added an IP-only aggregate limiter in front of the existing per-entrypoint one over /webhook/*, at 10 * RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT per minute…
RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL is not range-checked, so a non-positive value panics two goroutines after startup reports success
Fixed in sneak/webhooker#142.
RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL now goes through a new envPositiveDuration, which wraps envDuration the way envPort wraps envPositiveInt…
Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across /webhook/* (closes #139)
Require a positive RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL (closes #140)
clawbot
pushed to issue-139-aggregate-receiver-ratelimit at sneak/webhooker
2026-08-12 12:38:02 +02:00
clawbot
created branch issue-139-aggregate-receiver-ratelimit in sneak/webhooker
2026-08-12 12:38:02 +02:00
clawbot
pushed to issue-140-retention-sweep-interval-bound at sneak/webhooker
2026-08-12 12:37:55 +02:00
clawbot
created branch issue-140-retention-sweep-interval-bound in sneak/webhooker
2026-08-12 12:37:55 +02:00
Release-readiness accuracy: docs contradict the code, TODO.md omits landed units, debug logging in the production asset
Plan, for the one item with a real choice in it (3):
Redelivery does not exist in the tree (only a comment in internal/delivery/engine.go mentions the word), so the README claim is what is…
Release-readiness accuracy: docs contradict the code, TODO.md omits landed units, debug logging in the production asset
RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL is not range-checked, so a non-positive value panics two goroutines after startup reports success
The receiver rate limit is per-URL-path, so an attacker gets unlimited aggregate rate against /webhook/*
Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on (closes #119)