Mask the http target's destination URL in the UI (closes #115)

An http target's destination is frequently a Slack, Discord or
Teams incoming-webhook endpoint whose path segments are the
credential — the same property that made the Slack target's
webhook URL a bearer token. The source detail page rendered it
in full, so the leak closed for slack targets stayed reachable
through a different target type.

Render it through the existing MaskURL, which reduces a URL to
scheme and host. The field accepts an arbitrary URL, so no path
segment can be assumed non-secret and none is shown.

.gitea/workflows/check.yml

@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
       - name: Build Docker image (runs make check)
-        run: docker build .
+        run: script/cibuild

.golangci.yml

@@ -1,46 +1,34 @@
+version: "2"
+
+# Config schema uses the golangci-lint v2 layout (settings live under
+# linters.settings, not top-level linters-settings) so that the
+# thresholds below are actually applied by golangci-lint >= v2.
+
 run:
   timeout: 5m
-  tests: true
+  modules-download-mode: readonly
 
 linters:
-  enable:
-    - gofmt
-    - revive
-    - govet
-    - errcheck
-    - staticcheck
-    - unused
-    - gosimple
-    - ineffassign
-    - typecheck
-    - gosec
-    - misspell
-    - unparam
-    - prealloc
-    - copyloopvar
-    - gocritic
-    - gochecknoinits
-    - gochecknoglobals
-
-linters-settings:
-  gofmt:
-    simplify: true
-  revive:
-    confidence: 0.8
-  govet:
-    enable:
-      - shadow
-  errcheck:
-    check-type-assertions: true
-    check-blank: true
+  default: all
+  disable:
+    # Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
+    - exhaustruct      # Requires all struct fields
+    - depguard         # Dependency allow/block lists
+    - godot            # Requires comments to end with periods
+    - wsl              # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
+    - wrapcheck        # Too verbose for internal packages
+    - varnamelen       # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
+  settings:
+    lll:
+      line-length: 88
+    funlen:
+      lines: 80
+      statements: 50
+    cyclop:
+      max-complexity: 15
+    dupl:
+      threshold: 100
 
 issues:
-  exclude-rules:
-    # Exclude globals check for version variables in main
-    - path: cmd/webhooker/main.go
-      linters:
-        - gochecknoglobals
-    # Exclude globals check for version variables in globals package
-    - path: internal/globals/globals.go
-      linters:
-        - gochecknoglobals 
+  max-issues-per-linter: 0
+  max-same-issues: 0

Dockerfile

@@ -1,49 +1,58 @@
-# golang:1.24 (bookworm) — 2026-03-01
-# Using Debian-based image because gorm.io/driver/sqlite pulls in
-# mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO), which does not compile on Alpine musl.
-FROM golang@sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7e60d7d2438a3836ae7d0c847f4888464e7ec9ba3a1339a1ee804 AS builder
+# Lint stage
+# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
+# Using Debian-based image because mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO) does not
+# compile on Alpine musl (off64_t is a glibc type).
+FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS lint
 
-# gcc is pre-installed in the Debian-based golang image
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-WORKDIR /build
+WORKDIR /src
 
-# Install golangci-lint v1.64.8 — 2026-03-01
-# Using v1.x because the repo's .golangci.yml uses v1 config format.
-RUN set -eux; \
-    GOLANGCI_VERSION="1.64.8"; \
-    ARCH="$(uname -m)"; \
-    case "${ARCH}" in \
-        x86_64) \
-            GOARCH="amd64"; \
-            GOLANGCI_SHA256="b6270687afb143d019f387c791cd2a6f1cb383be9b3124d241ca11bd3ce2e54e"; \
-            ;; \
-        aarch64) \
-            GOARCH="arm64"; \
-            GOLANGCI_SHA256="a6ab58ebcb1c48572622146cdaec2956f56871038a54ed1149f1386e287789a5"; \
-            ;; \
-        *) echo "unsupported architecture: ${ARCH}" && exit 1 ;; \
-    esac; \
-    wget -q "https://github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/releases/download/v${GOLANGCI_VERSION}/golangci-lint-${GOLANGCI_VERSION}-linux-${GOARCH}.tar.gz" \
-        -O /tmp/golangci-lint.tar.gz; \
-    echo "${GOLANGCI_SHA256}  /tmp/golangci-lint.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -; \
-    tar -xzf /tmp/golangci-lint.tar.gz -C /tmp; \
-    mv "/tmp/golangci-lint-${GOLANGCI_VERSION}-linux-${GOARCH}/golangci-lint" /usr/local/bin/; \
-    rm -rf /tmp/golangci-lint*; \
-    golangci-lint --version
-
-# Copy go module files and download dependencies
+# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
 RUN go mod download
 
 # Copy source code
 COPY . .
 
-# Run all checks (fmt-check, lint, test, build)
-RUN make check
+# Run formatting check and linter
+RUN make fmt-check
+RUN make lint
 
-# alpine:3.21 — 2026-03-01
-FROM alpine@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
+# Build stage
+# golang:1.26.1-bookworm (Debian-based), 2026-03-17
+# Using Debian-based image because gorm.io/driver/sqlite pulls in
+# mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO), which does not compile on Alpine musl.
+FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a3492282a6c820bf4755fd64a4 AS builder
+
+# Depend on lint stage passing
+COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
+
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+WORKDIR /build
+
+# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching
+COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+RUN go mod download
+
+# Copy source code
+COPY . .
+
+# Run tests and build
+RUN make test
+RUN make build
+
+# Rebuild with static linking for Alpine runtime.
+# make build already verified compilation.
+# The CGO binary from `make build` is dynamically linked against glibc,
+# which doesn't exist on Alpine (musl). Rebuild with static linking so
+# the binary runs on Alpine without glibc.
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags '-extldflags "-static"' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
+
+# Runtime stage
+# alpine:3.21, 2026-03-17
+FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
 
 RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates
 
@@ -54,7 +63,7 @@ RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S webhooker && \
 WORKDIR /app
 
 # Copy binary from builder
-COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker .
+COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker
 
 # Create data directory for all SQLite databases (main app DB +
 # per-webhook event DBs). DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker.
@@ -69,4 +78,4 @@ EXPOSE 8080
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
     CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:8080/.well-known/healthcheck || exit 1
 
-CMD ["./webhooker"]
+CMD ["/app/webhooker"]

Makefile

@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@
-.PHONY: test lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css
 
 # Default target
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := check
 
+bootstrap:
+	@script/bootstrap
+
+setup:
+	@script/setup
+
 test:
-	go test -v -race -timeout 30s ./...
+	@script/test
 
 lint:
-	golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
+	@script/lint
 
 fmt:
-	gofmt -s -w .
-	@command -v goimports >/dev/null 2>&1 && goimports -w . || true
+	@script/fmt
 
 fmt-check:
-	@test -z "$$(gofmt -s -l .)" || { echo "gofmt needed on:"; gofmt -s -l .; exit 1; }
+	@script/fmt-check
 
-check: fmt-check lint test build
+check:
+	@script/check
 
 build:
 	go build -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
@@ -32,15 +38,13 @@ deps:
 	go mod tidy
 
 docker:
-	docker build -t webhooker:latest .
+	@script/docker
 
 clean:
 	rm -rf bin/
 
 hooks:
-	@printf '#!/bin/sh\nmake check\n' > .git/hooks/pre-commit
-	@chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
-	@echo "pre-commit hook installed"
+	@script/install-precommit
 
 css:
 	tailwindcss -i static/css/input.css -o static/css/tailwind.css --minify

README.md

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 
 ### Prerequisites
 
-- Go 1.24+
-- golangci-lint v1.64+
+- Go 1.26+
+- golangci-lint v2.11+
 - Docker (for containerized deployment)
 
 ### Quick Start
@@ -38,14 +38,16 @@ make docker
 ### Development Commands
 
 ```bash
+make bootstrap  # Install all dependencies (idempotent)
+make setup      # Bootstrap + install git pre-commit hook
 make fmt        # Format code (gofmt + goimports)
 make lint       # Run golangci-lint
 make test       # Run tests with race detection
-make check      # fmt-check + lint + test + build (CI gate)
+make check      # test + lint + fmt-check (CI gate)
 make build      # Build binary to bin/webhooker
 make dev        # go run ./cmd/webhooker
 make docker     # Build Docker image
-make hooks      # Install git pre-commit hook that runs make check
+make hooks      # Install git pre-commit hook that runs script/precommit
 ```
 
 ### Configuration
@@ -62,6 +64,21 @@ or `prod` (default: `dev`). The setting controls several behaviors:
 | CORS                  | Allows any origin (`*`)          | Disabled (no-op)                |
 | Session cookie Secure | `false` (works over plain HTTP)  | `true` (requires HTTPS)         |
 
+The CSRF cookie's `Secure` flag and Origin/Referer validation mode are
+determined per-request based on the actual transport protocol, not the
+environment setting. The middleware checks `r.TLS` (direct TLS) and the
+`X-Forwarded-Proto` header (TLS-terminating reverse proxy) to decide:
+
+- **Direct TLS or `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`**: Secure cookies, strict
+  Origin/Referer validation.
+- **Plaintext HTTP**: Non-Secure cookies, relaxed Origin/Referer
+  checks (token validation still enforced).
+
+This means CSRF protection works correctly in all deployment scenarios:
+behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, with direct TLS, or over plain
+HTTP during development. When running behind a reverse proxy, ensure it
+sets the `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header.
+
 All other differences (log format, security headers, etc.) are
 independent of the environment setting — log format is determined by
 TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
@@ -72,9 +89,98 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | `PORT`                  | HTTP listen port                    | `8080`   |
 | `DATA_DIR`              | Directory for all SQLite databases  | `/var/lib/webhooker` |
 | `DEBUG`                 | Enable debug logging                | `false`  |
+| `MAINTENANCE_MODE`      | Serve the maintenance page          | `false`  |
 | `METRICS_USERNAME`      | Basic auth username for `/metrics`  | `""`     |
 | `METRICS_PASSWORD`      | Basic auth password for `/metrics`  | `""`     |
 | `SENTRY_DSN`            | Sentry error reporting DSN          | `""`     |
+| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`  | Idle session timeout (Go duration)  | `24h`    |
+| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`   | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint | `120` |
+| `TRUSTED_PROXIES`       | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted | `""` (none) |
+
+#### Trusted proxies
+
+`TRUSTED_PROXIES` is a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (a bare
+address such as `192.168.1.7` is accepted and treated as a single
+host), for example `192.168.1.7, 2001:db8::5`. It decides whose
+`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should name
+the addresses of your reverse proxies and nothing else.
+
+`X-Forwarded-For` is honoured **only** when the connecting peer is
+inside one of these blocks; for every other peer the client identity is
+the connection's own address and the header is ignored. The default is
+the empty list, which trusts nobody — anything else would let any
+client pick its own rate limit bucket, minting a fresh one per request
+or draining someone else's. Set it to the address of your reverse
+proxy, and to nothing wider. A set but unparseable value aborts
+startup.
+
+`X-Real-IP` and `True-Client-IP` are **never** read, from any peer.
+Reverse proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For` but forward other client
+headers verbatim, so a single-valued header is client-controlled even
+behind a trusted proxy.
+
+Within a trusted request, `X-Forwarded-For` is read right to left,
+because the rightmost entry is the one the nearest proxy appended and
+everything left of it may have been written by the client. The first
+hop that is not itself a trusted proxy is taken as the client. A hop
+that is not a bare IP address — `ip:port`, a bracketed IPv6 literal,
+the token `unknown` — ends the walk and the peer address is used
+instead, since past such an entry the chain is not the shape assumed
+here. The peer address is likewise used when the header is absent or
+every hop in it is a trusted proxy.
+
+Two operator requirements follow:
+
+- Your proxy must **append** the peer address to `X-Forwarded-For`
+  (nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy `option forwardfor`,
+  Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a bare address with
+  no port.
+- List proxy hosts **only**. Any address inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
+  chooses its own rate-limit key: its `X-Forwarded-For` is walked, so
+  it can name a different address on every request to get a fresh
+  bucket each time, or name another client's address to drain that
+  client's bucket. Never list a block that also covers clients — a
+  broad `10.0.0.0/8` on a network where clients live in the same range
+  makes all three limits, including the unauthenticated webhook
+  receiver, silently bypassable by every client in the block.
+
+Sessions are bounded by two independent clocks, and end at whichever
+one runs out first:
+
+- **Idle expiry** (`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) is a sliding
+  window. Every authenticated request pushes it forward, so a session
+  in continuous use never hits it, while an abandoned one expires a day
+  after its last use. Set it to `0` to disable idle expiry entirely;
+  the absolute cap below still applies. A set-but-unparseable value
+  aborts startup rather than silently falling back to the default.
+- **Absolute expiry** is a fixed 7 days from login. Activity does
+  **not** extend it: after a week, every session ends and the user
+  authenticates again.
+
+Only requests that authenticate with the session count as activity, so
+an unauthenticated request carrying the cookie cannot keep a session
+alive. The idle timestamp is rewritten at most once per tenth of the
+idle window rather than on every request, which means a session may
+expire up to 10% early relative to the user's true last request, but
+never late.
+
+#### Invalid values abort startup
+
+The defaults above apply **only** to variables that are unset (or set
+to an empty string). A variable that is set but cannot be parsed is a
+fatal configuration error: webhooker logs the offending variable and
+its value and refuses to start, rather than silently running with a
+substituted default. `PORT=eighty`, `DEBUG=ture`, and
+`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL=1 hour` all abort startup. `PORT` must
+additionally be a number in the range 1–65535,
+`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` must be at least 1, and every entry in
+`TRUSTED_PROXIES` must be a CIDR block or a bare IP address.
+
+Boolean variables (`DEBUG`, `MAINTENANCE_MODE`) accept exactly the
+spellings Go's `strconv.ParseBool` accepts — `1`, `t`, `T`, `TRUE`,
+`true`, `True`, `0`, `f`, `F`, `FALSE`, `false`, `False` — and nothing
+else. `yes`, `on`, and `off` are rejected rather than quietly treated
+as false.
 
 On first startup, webhooker automatically generates a cryptographically
 secure session encryption key and stores it in the database. This key
@@ -101,6 +207,31 @@ SQLite databases: the main application database (`webhooker.db`) and
 the per-webhook event databases (`events-{uuid}.db`). Mount this as a
 persistent volume to preserve data across container restarts.
 
+## Entrypoints
+
+This repository adheres to the
+[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
+standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
+development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
+them. We provide:
+
+- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (idempotent)
+- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
+  (bootstrap, then install-precommit)
+- `script/projectname` — output the project name ("webhooker")
+- `script/test` — run the test suite
+- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint
+- `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
+- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
+- `script/check` — run test, lint, and fmt-check
+- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
+- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build .` (the Dockerfile
+  runs the checks, so a green build implies a green repo)
+- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks (`go mod tidy` guard, then
+  `script/check`)
+- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
+  runs `script/precommit`
+
 ## Rationale
 
 Webhook integrations between services are inherently fragile. The
@@ -166,6 +297,10 @@ It uses:
   logging with TTY detection (text for dev, JSON for prod)
 - **[gorilla/sessions](https://github.com/gorilla/sessions)** for
   encrypted cookie-based session management
+- **[gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)** for CSRF
+  protection (cookie-based double-submit tokens)
+- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
+  per-IP login rate limiting (sliding window counter)
 - **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
   `/metrics` behind basic auth
 - **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -261,13 +396,29 @@ event routing.
 | `user_id`        | UUID    | Foreign key → User |
 | `name`           | string  | Human-readable name |
 | `description`    | string  | Optional description |
-| `retention_days` | integer | Days to retain events (default: 30) |
+| `retention_days` | integer | Days to retain events (default: 30; 0 means retain forever) |
 
 **Relations:** Belongs to User. Has many Entrypoints. Has many Targets.
 
 The `retention_days` field controls how long event data is kept in the
 webhook's dedicated database before automatic cleanup.
 
+Setting `retention_days` to `0` means "retain events forever". Because
+the column carries a default of 30, a literal zero cannot survive an
+insert, so a zero is rewritten on save to a sentinel of `365 * 1000`
+days (`database.RetentionForeverDays`). The retention reaper recognises
+that sentinel and skips the webhook entirely, and the web UI displays
+such a webhook's retention as "forever" rather than as a day count.
+
+A *finite* retention is capped at `database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays`
+(106751 days, about 292 years), and a larger one is rejected with a
+400. The cap is not arbitrary: the reaper computes its cutoff as a
+`time.Duration`, an int64 nanosecond count, and a longer period
+overflows it. An overflowed cutoff lands in the future, where it
+matches every row, so the sweep would delete every event the webhook
+has instead of none. The reaper also clamps the value it is given, so a
+row written by an older version cannot trigger that either.
+
 #### Entrypoint
 
 A receiver URL where external services POST webhook events. Each
@@ -317,10 +468,12 @@ events should be forwarded.
   greater than 0, failed deliveries are retried with exponential backoff
   up to `max_retries` attempts, protected by a per-target circuit
   breaker.
-- **`database`** — Confirm the event is stored in the webhook's
-  per-webhook database (no external delivery). Since events are always
-  written to the per-webhook DB on ingestion, this target marks delivery
-  as immediately successful. Useful for ensuring durable event archival.
+- **`database`** — Archive the full event as a row into a separate
+  per-webhook archive database (`archive-{webhookID}.db`) for long-term
+  retention, with an optional creation-validated expiry (default: keep
+  forever). No external delivery and no retries; an archive write
+  failure fails the delivery. See the database target section under
+  "Per-Webhook Event Databases" for the full semantics.
 - **`log`** — Write the event to the application log (stdout). Useful
   for debugging.
 
@@ -461,16 +614,57 @@ This separation provides:
   DB; the event database file is hard-deleted (permanently removed).
 - **Per-webhook retention** — the `retention_days` field on each webhook
   controls automatic cleanup of old events in that webhook's database
-  only.
+  only, or disables cleanup entirely when set to `0` (retain forever).
 - **Performance** — each webhook's database has its own WAL, its own
   page cache, and its own lock, so concurrent event ingestion across
   webhooks won't contend.
 
-The **database target type** leverages this architecture: since events
-are already stored in the per-webhook database by design, the database
-target simply marks the delivery as immediately successful. The
-per-webhook DB IS the dedicated event database — that's the whole point
-of the database target type.
+The **database target type** builds on this architecture to provide
+long-term archiving, separate from the per-webhook event database (which
+may prune events under its own retention). Delivering to a database
+target writes the full event — body, headers, method, content type, and
+webhook/entrypoint/event identifiers — as a row into a dedicated archive
+database, `archive-{webhookID}.db`, stored under the data directory
+beside the event database. After each write the archive handle is closed
+and reopened, debounced to at most once per second, so an operator can
+move the archive file away for offline archiving without stopping the
+service; a moved or removed archive file is recreated automatically on
+the next write. An optional `expiry` in the target's config JSON (e.g.
+`{"expiry":"720h"}`) is validated when the target is created — the
+default (unset or the literal `never`) keeps rows forever — and rows
+older than the expiry are pruned each time the archive is (re)opened. An
+archive write failure is never silent success: the delivery records a
+failed attempt with the error and is marked failed.
+
+Because reopens only happen on writes, an archive belonging to a webhook
+that has stopped receiving events would never be pruned. A background
+**archive sweeper** closes that gap: on the same interval as the event
+retention reaper (`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`) it prunes every archive
+whose database target declares a positive expiry, whether or not the
+webhook is still receiving traffic. The sweep never creates an archive —
+a webhook whose archive file does not yet exist is skipped, not
+initialised — it takes the same per-webhook lock the write path uses, so
+it can never interleave with a write, and it leaves the archive closed
+afterwards so the move-the-file-away workflow keeps working. Archives
+with no expiry, or the expiry `never`, are not touched by the sweep at
+all.
+
+Note that a webhook has one archive file but may carry more than one
+`database` target, each with its own `expiry`. The shortest expiry
+configured on any of them therefore governs the whole archive, and the
+sweep applies it whether or not the webhook is still receiving events.
+Configure a single `database` target per webhook unless you intend that.
+
+Deleting a webhook releases its archive: the delivery engine's cached
+archive writer is dropped and its file handle closed, so nothing lingers
+after the webhook is gone. The archive **file itself is deliberately
+left on disk**. Unlike the event database — per-webhook working storage
+that is hard-deleted with the webhook — an archive is long-term storage
+an operator may still want to keep or move away for offline retention,
+and destroying it as a side effect of deleting a webhook would be
+unrecoverable. Removing `archive-{webhookID}.db` is the operator's call.
+Deleting a webhook's last `database` target releases the writer the same
+way, and for the same reason leaves the file alone.
 
 The **Slack target type** sends webhook events as formatted messages to
 any Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (works with Slack, Mattermost,
@@ -577,6 +771,18 @@ This means:
    durable fallback that ensures no retry is permanently lost, even under
    extreme backpressure.
 
+**Changing a target's type does not migrate in-flight deliveries.** Only
+`http` and `slack` targets own durable retries; `database` and `log`
+targets are fire-and-forget and never produce a `retrying` delivery. If a
+target's `type` is edited from a retrying type to a non-retrying (or
+unknown) one while one of its deliveries is still `retrying`, both
+recovery paths above terminally mark that delivery `failed` and record a
+`DeliveryResult` naming the current target type as the reason, logging it
+at warn level. The delivery is not re-dispatched under the new type — the
+operator never asked for that delivery — and the event itself remains
+stored in the per-webhook event database, so it can be redelivered
+manually.
+
 ### Circuit Breaker (HTTP Targets with Retries)
 
 HTTP targets with `max_retries` > 0 are protected by a **per-target circuit breaker** that
@@ -630,17 +836,34 @@ just delayed until the target is healthy again.
 
 ### Rate Limiting
 
-Global rate limiting middleware (e.g., per-IP throttling applied at the
-router level) **must not** apply to webhook receiver endpoints. Webhook
-endpoints receive automated traffic from external services at
-unpredictable rates, and blanket rate limits would cause legitimate
-deliveries to be dropped.
+Global blanket rate limiting middleware (e.g., a per-IP throttle shared
+with the web UI) **must not** apply to webhook receiver endpoints.
+Webhook endpoints receive automated traffic from external services at
+unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
+cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
 
-Instead, each webhook has its own individually configurable rate limit,
-applied within the webhook handler itself. By default, no rate limit is
-applied — webhook endpoints accept traffic as fast as it arrives. Rate
-limits can be configured per-webhook when needed (e.g., to protect
-against a misbehaving sender).
+The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
+`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per entrypoint: one
+misbehaving sender is throttled without affecting other senders of the
+same entrypoint or the same sender's other entrypoints. The limit is
+`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` requests per minute (default 120, generous for
+legitimate webhook senders). Requests over the limit receive HTTP 429
+with a `Retry-After` header. A set-but-invalid `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
+value aborts startup rather than silently falling back to the default.
+
+Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
+the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
+connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
+`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is used
+instead. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
+variable set, a client behind a reverse proxy shares one bucket with
+every other client behind the same proxy, which is the safe direction
+to be wrong in: set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address to get
+per-client limits back.
+
+Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
+enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
+abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 
 ### API Endpoints
 
@@ -648,7 +871,7 @@ against a misbehaving sender).
 
 | Method | Path                        | Description |
 | ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/`                         | Web UI index page (server-rendered) |
+| `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
 | `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: status, uptime, version) |
 | `GET`  | `/s/*`                      | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS) |
 | `ANY`  | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint (accepts all methods) |
@@ -729,7 +952,8 @@ webhooker/
 │   │   └── globals.go         # Build-time variables (appname, version, arch)
 │   ├── delivery/
 │   │   ├── engine.go          # Event-driven delivery engine (channel + timer based)
-│   │   └── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
+│   │   ├── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
+│   │   └── ssrf.go            # SSRF prevention (IP validation, safe HTTP transport)
 │   ├── handlers/
 │   │   ├── handlers.go        # Base handler struct, JSON helpers, template rendering
 │   │   ├── auth.go            # Login, logout handlers
@@ -743,7 +967,9 @@ webhooker/
 │   ├── logger/
 │   │   └── logger.go          # slog setup with TTY detection
 │   ├── middleware/
-│   │   └── middleware.go      # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
+│   │   ├── middleware.go      # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
+│   │   ├── csrf.go            # CSRF protection middleware (gorilla/csrf)
+│   │   └── ratelimit.go       # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
 │   ├── server/
 │   │   ├── server.go          # Server struct, fx lifecycle, signal handling
 │   │   ├── http.go            # HTTP server setup with timeouts
@@ -755,7 +981,7 @@ webhooker/
 │   ├── css/style.css          # Custom stylesheet (system font stack, card effects, layout)
 │   └── js/app.js              # Client-side JavaScript (minimal bootstrap)
 ├── templates/                 # Go HTML templates (base, index, login, etc.)
-├── Dockerfile                 # Multi-stage: build + check, then Alpine runtime
+├── Dockerfile                 # Multi-stage: lint, build+test, then Alpine runtime
 ├── Makefile                   # fmt, lint, test, check, build, docker targets
 ├── go.mod / go.sum
 └── .golangci.yml              # Linter configuration
@@ -805,9 +1031,17 @@ Applied to all routes in this order:
 8. **Sentry** — Error reporting to Sentry (if `SENTRY_DSN` is set;
    configured with `Repanic: true` so panics still reach Recoverer)
 
-Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
-**MaxBodySize** middleware that limits POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to
-1 MB using `http.MaxBytesReader`, preventing oversized form submissions.
+Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
+`/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
+POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
+CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
+gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
+parsing would run under net/http's 10 MB default and the 1 MB limit
+would never apply. A request that declares a `Content-Length` over the
+limit is answered with `413 Request Entity Too Large` before any other
+middleware or handler runs; a chunked request, or one that lies about
+its length, is hard-capped by `http.MaxBytesReader` and fails
+downstream at form-parse time.
 
 ### Authentication
 
@@ -829,7 +1063,23 @@ Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
 - Production security headers on all responses: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options
   (`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`), Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy,
   and Permissions-Policy
-- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints
+- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints, enforced
+  by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
+- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
+  on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
+  HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
+  `/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
+  `/api` (stateless API). The middleware auto-detects TLS status
+  per-request (via `r.TLS` and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) to set appropriate
+  cookie security flags and Origin/Referer validation mode
+- **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
+  ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
+  both at target creation time (URL validation) and at delivery time
+  (custom HTTP transport with SSRF-safe dialer that validates resolved
+  IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
+- **Login rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
+  per-IP sliding-window rate limiter on the login endpoint (5 POST
+  attempts per minute per IP) to prevent brute-force attacks
 - Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
 - Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
   runtime)
@@ -856,90 +1106,7 @@ linted, tested, and compiled.
 
 ## TODO
 
-### Completed: Code Quality (Phase 1 of MVP)
-- [x] Rename Processor → Webhook, Webhook → Entrypoint in code
-      ([#12](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/12))
-- [x] Embed templates via `//go:embed`
-      ([#7](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/7))
-- [x] Use `slog.LevelVar` for dynamic log level switching
-      ([#8](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/8))
-- [x] Simplify configuration to prefer environment variables
-      ([#10](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/10))
-- [x] Remove redundant `godotenv/autoload` import
-      ([#11](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/11))
-- [x] Implement authentication middleware for protected routes
-      ([#9](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/9))
-- [x] Replace Bootstrap with Tailwind CSS + Alpine.js
-      ([#4](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/4))
-
-### Completed: Core Webhook Engine (Phase 2 of MVP)
-- [x] Implement webhook reception and event storage at `/webhook/{uuid}`
-- [x] Build event processing and target delivery engine
-- [x] Implement HTTP target type (fire-and-forget with max_retries=0,
-      retries with exponential backoff when max_retries>0)
-- [x] Implement database target type (store events in per-webhook DB)
-- [x] Implement log target type (console output)
-- [x] Implement Slack target type (Slack/Mattermost incoming webhook
-      notifications with pretty-printed payloads)
-- [x] Webhook management pages (list, create, edit, delete)
-- [x] Webhook request log viewer with pagination
-- [x] Entrypoint and target management UI
-
-### Completed: Per-Webhook Event Databases
-- [x] Split into main application DB + per-webhook event DBs
-- [x] Per-webhook database lifecycle management (create on webhook
-      creation, delete on webhook removal)
-- [x] `WebhookDBManager` component with lazy connection pooling
-- [x] Event-driven delivery engine (channel notifications + timer-based retries)
-- [x] Self-contained delivery tasks: in the ≤16KB happy path, the engine
-      delivers without reading from any database — target config, event
-      headers, and body are all carried inline in the channel notification.
-      The engine only touches the DB to record results (success/failure).
-      Large bodies (≥16KB) are fetched from the per-webhook DB on demand.
-- [x] Database target type marks delivery as immediately successful
-      (events are already in the per-webhook DB)
-- [x] Parallel fan-out: all targets for an event are delivered via
-      the bounded worker pool (no goroutine-per-target)
-- [x] Circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries: tracks consecutive
-      failures per target, opens after 5 failures (30s cooldown),
-      half-open probe to test recovery
-
-### Completed: Security Hardening
-- [x] Security headers middleware (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options,
-      X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
-      ([#34](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/34))
-- [x] Session regeneration on login to prevent session fixation
-      ([#38](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/38))
-- [x] Request body size limits on form endpoints
-      ([#39](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/39))
-
-### Remaining: Core Features
-- [ ] Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler
-- [ ] Webhook signature verification (GitHub, Stripe formats)
-- [ ] CSRF protection for forms
-- [ ] Session expiration and "remember me"
-- [ ] Password change/reset flow
-- [ ] API key authentication for programmatic access
-- [ ] Manual event redelivery
-- [ ] Analytics dashboard (success rates, response times)
-- [ ] Delivery status and retry management UI
-
-### Remaining: Event Maintenance
-- [ ] Automatic event retention cleanup based on `retention_days`
-
-### Remaining: REST API
-- [ ] RESTful CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
-- [ ] Event viewing and filtering endpoints
-- [ ] Event redelivery endpoint
-- [ ] OpenAPI specification
-
-### Future
-- [ ] Email delivery target type
-- [ ] SNS, S3, Slack delivery targets
-- [ ] Data transformations (e.g., webhook-to-Slack message formatting)
-- [ ] JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
-- [ ] Webhook event search and filtering
-- [ ] Multi-user with role-based access
+See [TODO.md](TODO.md).
 
 ## License
 

REPO_POLICIES.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Repository Policies
-last_modified: 2026-02-22
+last_modified: 2026-07-06
 ---
 
 This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -34,10 +34,46 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   every file before committing. There are zero exceptions to this rule.
 
 - Every repo with software must have a root `Makefile` with these targets:
-  `make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes), `make fmt-check` (read-only),
-  `make check` (prereqs: `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`), `make docker`, and
-  `make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile is at
-  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
+  `make bootstrap`, `make setup`, `make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes),
+  `make fmt-check` (read-only), `make check` (runs `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`),
+  `make docker`, and `make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile
+  is at `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
+
+- Repos follow the
+  [Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
+  pattern: the implementation of each Makefile target lives in an executable
+  script in `script/` (`script/bootstrap`, `script/setup`, `script/test`,
+  `script/lint`, `script/fmt`, `script/fmt-check`, `script/check`,
+  `script/docker`), and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call them. The
+  scripts must be POSIX sh (`#!/bin/sh`, `set -eu`, no bashisms) so they run in
+  minimal containers (e.g. alpine images have no bash); locate the repo root
+  with `$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)` and `cd` there before acting. From
+  the standard's canonical set we use `bootstrap`, `setup` (make the repo ready
+  for development after a fresh clone: runs `bootstrap`, then
+  `install-precommit`, plus any repo-specific initialization), `test`, and
+  `cibuild`. `script/bootstrap` installs all dependencies idempotently and
+  assumes nothing is present: base tools come from nix, apt, brew, or apk
+  (detected in that order; apt runs noninteractive). For node it uses the
+  installed node if present; otherwise it installs a PINNED node version via
+  nvm, first installing nvm itself if missing — from a hash-verified GitHub
+  release archive (never `curl | sh`), with bash installed as an explicit
+  prerequisite since nvm requires bash. yarn is then pinned via
+  `corepack prepare yarn@<version> --activate`. Never install "latest" or "lts";
+  always exact versions. `script/cibuild` runs the CI build: it changes to the
+  repo root and runs `docker build .`; the Gitea workflow calls it. Four further
+  scripts are our own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs
+  `script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is
+  what the git pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`;
+  `script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks`
+  target shims to it); and `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply
+  outputs the project's name. Scripts that need the name call
+  `script/projectname` — e.g. `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it —
+  so those scripts stay byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific
+  pre-commit extras (e.g. `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in
+  `script/precommit`, not in the hook itself. Model scripts are at
+  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/script/<name>`. The README
+  must document the provided scripts in an **Entrypoints** section (see the
+  README requirements below).
 
 - Always use Makefile targets (`make fmt`, `make test`, `make lint`, etc.)
   instead of invoking the underlying tools directly. The Makefile is the single
@@ -57,11 +93,83 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   as a build step so the build fails if the branch is not green. For non-server
   repos, the Dockerfile should bring up a development environment and run
   `make check`. For server repos, `make check` should run as an early build
-  stage before the final image is assembled.
+  stage before the final image is assembled. Dockerfiles install development
+  prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating installs
+  inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency manifests (`package.json` +
+  `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it so the bootstrap
+  layer stays cached until dependencies change.
+
+- **Dockerfiles must use a separate lint stage for fail-fast feedback.** Go
+  repos use a multistage build where linting runs in an independent stage based
+  on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by hash). This stage runs
+  `make fmt-check` and `make lint` before the full build begins. The build stage
+  then declares an explicit dependency on the lint stage via
+  `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`, which forces BuildKit to complete
+  linting before proceeding to compilation and tests. This ensures lint failures
+  surface in seconds rather than minutes, without blocking on dependency
+  download or compilation in the build stage.
+
+    The standard pattern for a Go repo Dockerfile is:
+
+    ```dockerfile
+    # Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
+    # golangci/golangci-lint:v2.x.x, YYYY-MM-DD
+    FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:... AS lint
+    WORKDIR /src
+    COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+    RUN go mod download
+    COPY . .
+    RUN make fmt-check
+    RUN make lint
+
+    # Build stage
+    # golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
+    FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
+    WORKDIR /src
+
+    # Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding
+    COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
+
+    COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+    RUN go mod download
+    COPY . .
+    RUN make test
+
+    ARG VERSION=dev
+    RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
+        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
+        -o /app ./cmd/app/
+
+    # Runtime stage
+    FROM alpine@sha256:...
+    COPY --from=builder /app /usr/local/bin/app
+    ENTRYPOINT ["app"]
+    ```
+
+    Key points:
+    - The lint stage uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it
+      includes both Go and the linter), so there is no need to install the
+      linter separately.
+    - `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op file copy that creates
+      a stage dependency. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default; without
+      this line, the build stage would not wait for lint to finish and a lint
+      failure might not fail the overall build.
+    - If the project uses `//go:embed` directives that reference build artifacts
+      (e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint stage must
+      create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
+      `RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
+      The lint stage should not depend on the actual build output — it exists to
+      fail fast.
+    - If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
+      `vips-dev`), install them in the lint stage with `apk add`.
+    - The build stage runs `make test` after compilation setup. Tests run in the
+      build stage, not the lint stage, because they may require compiled
+      artifacts or heavier dependencies.
 
 - Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
-  runs `docker build .` on push. Since the Dockerfile already runs `make check`,
-  a successful build implies all checks pass.
+  runs `script/cibuild` (which runs `docker build .`) on push. Since the
+  Dockerfile already runs `make check`, a successful build implies all checks
+  pass.
 
 - Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
   JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -69,9 +177,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   Markdown (hard-wrap at 80 columns). Documentation and writing repos (Markdown,
   HTML, CSS) should also have `.prettierrc` and `.prettierignore`.
 
-- Pre-commit hook: `make check` if local testing is possible, otherwise
-  `make lint && make fmt-check`. The Makefile should provide a `make hooks`
-  target to install the pre-commit hook.
+- Pre-commit hook: runs `script/precommit`, which calls `script/check`. If local
+  testing is not possible in the repo, `script/precommit` may skip `script/test`
+  and run only `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`. The hook is installed by
+  `script/install-precommit`; the Makefile must provide a `make hooks` target
+  that shims to it.
 
 - All repos with software must have tests that run via the platform-standard
   test framework (`go test`, `pytest`, `jest`/`vitest`, etc.). If no meaningful
@@ -82,6 +192,42 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 - `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
   Makefile.
 
+- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
+  without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
+  show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean on
+  success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic detail
+  on failure (every test case, every assertion). The general shell pattern:
+
+    ```makefile
+    test:
+    	@<test-command> || \
+    		{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
+    		  <test-command-with-v>; exit 1; }
+    ```
+
+    Go example:
+
+    ```makefile
+    test:
+    	@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
+    		{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
+    		  go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
+    ```
+
+    Python example:
+
+    ```makefile
+    test:
+    	@python -m pytest || \
+    		{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
+    		  python -m pytest -v; exit 1; }
+    ```
+
+    The `exit 1` ensures the target always fails after a rerun — the first run
+    already proved the tests are broken, so the build must not pass even if a
+    flaky test happens to succeed on the second attempt. The rerun exists solely
+    for diagnostic output.
+
 - Docker builds must complete in under 5 minutes.
 
 - `make check` must not modify any files in the repo. Tests may use temporary
@@ -98,6 +244,13 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when setting up
   a new repo.
 
+- **No build artifacts in version control.** Code-derived data (compiled
+  bundles, minified output, generated assets) must never be committed to the
+  repository if it can be avoided. The build process (e.g. Dockerfile, Makefile)
+  should generate these at build time. Notable exception: Go protobuf generated
+  files (`.pb.go`) ARE committed because repos need to work with `go get`, which
+  downloads code but does not execute code generation.
+
 - Never use `git add -A` or `git add .`. Always stage files explicitly by name.
 
 - Never force-push to `main`.
@@ -121,12 +274,76 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 - Dockerized web services listen on port 8080 by default, overridable with
   `PORT`.
 
+- **HTTP/web services must be hardened for production internet exposure before
+  tagging 1.0.** This means full compliance with security best practices
+  including, without limitation, all of the following:
+    - **Security headers** on every response:
+        - `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) with `max-age` of at least one year
+          and `includeSubDomains`.
+        - `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) with a restrictive default policy
+          (`default-src 'self'` as a baseline, tightened per-resource as
+          needed). Never use `unsafe-inline` or `unsafe-eval` unless
+          unavoidable, and document the reason.
+        - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` (or `SAMEORIGIN` if framing is required).
+          Prefer the `frame-ancestors` CSP directive as the primary control.
+        - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+        - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).
+        - `Permissions-Policy` restricting access to browser features the
+          application does not use (camera, microphone, geolocation, etc.).
+    - **Request and response limits:**
+        - Maximum request body size enforced on all endpoints (e.g. Go
+          `http.MaxBytesReader`). Choose a sane default per-route; never accept
+          unbounded input.
+        - Maximum response body size where applicable (e.g. paginated APIs).
+        - `ReadTimeout` and `ReadHeaderTimeout` on the `http.Server` to defend
+          against slowloris attacks.
+        - `WriteTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
+        - `IdleTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
+        - Per-handler execution time limits via `context.WithTimeout` or
+          chi/stdlib `middleware.Timeout`.
+    - **Authentication and session security:**
+        - Rate limiting on password-based authentication endpoints. API keys are
+          high-entropy and not susceptible to brute force, so they are exempt.
+        - CSRF tokens on all state-mutating HTML forms. API endpoints
+          authenticated via `Authorization` header (Bearer token, API key) are
+          exempt because the browser does not attach these automatically.
+        - Passwords stored using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2 — never plain-text,
+          MD5, or SHA.
+        - Session cookies set with `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite=Lax` (or
+          `Strict`) attributes.
+    - **Reverse proxy awareness:**
+        - True client IP detection when behind a reverse proxy
+          (`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`). The application must accept
+          forwarded headers only from a configured set of trusted proxy
+          addresses — never trust `X-Forwarded-For` unconditionally.
+    - **CORS:**
+        - Authenticated endpoints must restrict `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to
+          an explicit allowlist of known origins. Wildcard (`*`) is acceptable
+          only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs.
+    - **Error handling:**
+        - Internal errors must never leak stack traces, SQL queries, file paths,
+          or other implementation details to the client. Return generic error
+          messages in production; detailed errors only when `DEBUG` is enabled.
+    - **TLS:**
+        - Services never terminate TLS directly. They are always deployed behind
+          a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. The service itself listens on plain
+          HTTP. However, HSTS headers and `Secure` cookie flags must still be
+          set by the application so that the browser enforces HTTPS end-to-end.
+
+    This list is non-exhaustive. Apply defense-in-depth: if a standard security
+    hardening measure exists for HTTP services and is not listed here, it is
+    still expected. When in doubt, harden.
+
 - `README.md` is the primary documentation. Required sections:
     - **Description**: First line must include the project name, purpose,
       category (web server, SPA, CLI tool, etc.), license, and author. Example:
       "µPaaS is an MIT-licensed Go web application by @sneak that receives
       git-frontend webhooks and deploys applications via Docker in realtime."
     - **Getting Started**: Copy-pasteable install/usage code block.
+    - **Entrypoints**: Opens by stating that the repo adheres to the
+      [Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
+      standard (with that link), then documents each provided `script/`
+      entrypoint and its purpose.
     - **Rationale**: Why does this exist?
     - **Design**: How is the program structured?
     - **TODO**: Update meticulously, even between commits. When planning, put
@@ -145,11 +362,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 
 - Database migrations live in `internal/db/migrations/` and must be embedded in
   the binary.
-  - `000_migration.sql` — contains ONLY the creation of the migrations tracking
-    table itself. Nothing else.
+    - `000_migration.sql` — contains ONLY the creation of the migrations
+      tracking table itself. Nothing else.
     - `001_schema.sql` — the full application schema.
-  - **Pre-1.0.0:** never add additional migration files (002, 003, etc.). There
-    is no installed base to migrate. Edit `001_schema.sql` directly.
+    - **Pre-1.0.0:** never add additional migration files (002, 003, etc.).
+      There is no installed base to migrate. Edit `001_schema.sql` directly.
     - **Post-1.0.0:** add new numbered migration files for each schema change.
       Never edit existing migrations after release.
 
@@ -181,6 +398,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     - `README.md`, `.git`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`
     - `LICENSE`, `REPO_POLICIES.md` (copy from the `prompts` repo)
     - `Makefile`
+    - `script/` entrypoints (`bootstrap`, `setup`, `projectname`, `test`,
+      `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `docker`, `cibuild`, `precommit`,
+      `install-precommit`)
     - `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`
     - `.gitea/workflows/check.yml`
     - Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`

TODO.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Workflow
+
+* branch (from `main`)
+* do the work in Next Step
+* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
+* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
+* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
+* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
+* push
+
+# Status
+
+pre-1.0. No git tags exist. main (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
+with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
+event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
+password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
+(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80). Note: TODO.md was
+deliberately deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its
+content was folded into the README TODO section, which this draft
+reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.
+
+# Next Step
+
+Manual event redelivery from the web UI (replay is a core promised
+capability in the README rationale).
+
+# Completed Steps
+
+- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the
+  Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
+  button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
+  actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
+- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
+  (`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
+  requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
+  backstop that activity never extends (#66)
+- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
+  orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
+  retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
+  leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
+- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention
+  reaper's sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx
+  `OnStart` hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and
+  killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently
+  stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a
+  single sweep under its default one-hour interval
+- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its
+  last `database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes
+  its handle while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on
+  disk, and a new `ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
+  `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
+- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
+  environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt`
+  plus a `PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with
+  `strconv.ParseBool`, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
+- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on
+  `retention_days`, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery
+  results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
+- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
+  `Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
+  adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
+  `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
+  all newly surfaced lint findings
+- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
+  Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
+- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
+- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over
+  plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
+- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
+- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
+  with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
+- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
+- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49);
+  absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
+- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
+  login, request body size limits (#41)
+- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
+  (#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
+- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
+  delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
+  parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
+- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded
+  into README (#6)
+
+# Future Steps
+
+- Delivery status and retry management UI
+- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
+  plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
+  endpoints)
+- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
+- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
+  Bearer token middleware does not)
+- REST API v1
+    - CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
+    - event viewing and filtering endpoints
+    - event redelivery endpoint
+    - OpenAPI specification
+- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
+- A remember-me option at login
+- Password change and reset flow
+- Later, nice to have
+    - email delivery target type
+    - SNS and S3 delivery targets
+    - data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
+    - JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
+    - webhook event search and filtering
+    - multi-user with role-based access control

cmd/webhooker/main.go

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// Package main is the entry point for the webhooker application.
 package main
 
 import (
@@ -15,6 +16,8 @@ import (
 )
 
 // Build-time variables set via -ldflags.
+//
+//nolint:gochecknoglobals // Build-time variables injected by the linker.
 var (
 	version = "dev"
 	appname = "webhooker"
@@ -31,16 +34,31 @@ func main() {
 			config.New,
 			database.New,
 			database.NewWebhookDBManager,
+			database.NewRetentionReaper,
 			healthcheck.New,
 			session.New,
 			handlers.New,
 			middleware.New,
 			delivery.New,
+			delivery.NewArchiveSweeper,
 			// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.Notifier so the
 			// webhook handler can notify the engine of new deliveries.
 			func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.Notifier { return e },
+			// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.WebhookEvictor so
+			// deleting a webhook releases its archive writer.
+			func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
+				return e
+			},
 			server.New,
 		),
-		fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server, *delivery.Engine) {}),
+		fx.Invoke(
+			func(
+				*server.Server,
+				*delivery.Engine,
+				*database.RetentionReaper,
+				*delivery.ArchiveSweeper,
+			) {
+			},
+		),
 	).Run()
 }

go.mod

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 module sneak.berlin/go/webhooker
 
-go 1.23.0
-
-toolchain go1.24.1
+go 1.26.1
 
 require (
 	github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8
 	github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.25.0
 	github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
 	github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
+	github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
+	github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3
 	github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0
 	github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1
 	github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.18.0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
 	github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51 // indirect
+	github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
 	github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17 // indirect
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/prometheus/common v0.45.0 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.12.0 // indirect
 	github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
+	github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/multierr v1.9.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5 h1:vOB/HbEMt9QqBqErz07QehcOKHaWFtuj87tTDVz2qXE=
 github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5/go.mod h1:C9JqLr3tIYjDOZpzn+BCuxY8z8vmca43EeMgyZt7irw=
 github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1 h1:xEC8UT3Rlp2QuWNEr4Fs/c2EAGVKBwy/1vHx3bppil4=
 github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=
+github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0 h1:j54xcWV9KGmPf/X4H32/aTH+wBlrvxL7P+SdnRqxh5g=
+github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0/go.mod h1:rzGHhVrsBn3IMLYDOZQsSU4fJNWcjui4fWKJcCId1R4=
 github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2 h1:J6MZopCL4uSllY1OfXM374weqZFFItUbrImctkmUxIA=
 github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2/go.mod h1:sIVyrIiJhuEF+Pj9Ebtd6P/rEYROXFi3BopGUQ5a5Og=
 github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.0/go.mod h1:FsONVRAS9T7sI+LIUmWTfcYkHO4aIWwzhcaSAoJOfIk=
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20221118152302-e6195bd50e26 h1:Xim43kblpZXfIBQsbu
 github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20221118152302-e6195bd50e26/go.mod h1:dDKJzRmX4S37WGHujM7tX//fmj1uioxKzKxz3lo4HJo=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
+github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 h1:BHWt6FTLZAb2HtWT5KDBf6qgpZzvtbp9QWDRKZMXJC0=
+github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3/go.mod h1:F1Fj3KG23WYHE6gozCmBAezKookxbIvUJT+121wTuLk=
 github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kXD8ePA=
 github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
 github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0 h1:kpIYOp/oi6MG/p5PgxApU8srsSw9tuFbt46Lt7auzqQ=
@@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1 h1:7eLL/+HRGLY0ldzfGMeQkb7vMd0as4CfYvUVzLqw0N0=
 github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1/go.mod h1:f4LDr5Voq0i2e/R5DDNOoa2zzDfwtkZa6DnEwAbqwq4=
 github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51 h1:Z9n2FFNUXsshfwJMBgNA0RU6/i7WVaAegv3PtuIHPMs=
 github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51/go.mod h1:CzGEWj7cYgsdH8dAjBGEr58BoE7ScuLd+fwFZ44+/x8=
+github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 h1:tBs3QSyvjDyFTq3uoc/9xFpCuOsJQFNPiAhYdw2skhE=
+github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10/go.mod h1:hqwkgyIinND0mEev00jJYCxPNVRVXFQeu1XKlok6oO0=
 github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
 github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
 github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
@@ -80,6 +86,10 @@ github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1/go.mod h1:/iHQpkQwBD6DLUmQ4pE+s1TXdob1mORJ4/UFdr
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
+github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
+github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
+github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
+github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:5NWz9Sef7zIDm2JHfFlcQvNekmcEl9ekUZQQKCYaDcA=
 go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 h1:ECmE8Bn/WFTYwEW/bpKD3M8VtR/zQVbavAoalC1PYyE=
 go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0/go.mod h1:fEN4uk6kAWBTFdckzkM89CLk9XfWZrxpCo0nPH17wJc=
 go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 h1:5Chju+tUvcC+N7N6EV08BJz41UZuO3BmHcN4A287ZLI=

internal/config/config.go

@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
+// Package config loads application configuration from environment variables.
 package config
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
+	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
@@ -17,19 +21,66 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	// EnvironmentDev represents development environment
+	// EnvironmentDev represents development environment.
 	EnvironmentDev = "dev"
-	// EnvironmentProd represents production environment
+	// EnvironmentProd represents production environment.
 	EnvironmentProd = "prod"
+
+	// defaultPort is the default HTTP listen port.
+	defaultPort = 8080
+
+	// defaultRetentionSweepInterval is how often the retention
+	// reaper deletes events older than each webhook's RetentionDays.
+	defaultRetentionSweepInterval = time.Hour
+
+	// defaultSessionIdleTimeout is how long a session may go without
+	// authenticated activity before it expires.
+	defaultSessionIdleTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
+
+	// defaultReceiverRateLimit is the default number of requests
+	// per minute each client IP may send to a single webhook
+	// receiver entrypoint. Generous for legitimate webhook
+	// senders while bounding abuse of the one unauthenticated,
+	// internet-exposed endpoint.
+	defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
+
+	// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
+	// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
+	maxPort = 65535
+
+	// mappedV4Offset is the number of leading bits an IPv4-mapped
+	// IPv6 prefix spends on the ::ffff:0:0/96 wrapper, so a /104
+	// covers the same addresses as an IPv4 /8.
+	mappedV4Offset = 96
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // ConfigParams is a standard fx naming convention
+// ErrInvalidEnvironment is returned when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT
+// contains an unrecognised value.
+var ErrInvalidEnvironment = errors.New("invalid environment")
+
+// ErrNonPositiveValue is returned when an environment variable that
+// requires a positive integer is set to zero or a negative number.
+var ErrNonPositiveValue = errors.New("value must be positive")
+
+// ErrInvalidPort is returned when an environment variable holding a
+// TCP port number is set above the valid port range.
+var ErrInvalidPort = errors.New("invalid port")
+
+// ErrInvalidCIDR is returned when an environment variable holding a
+// list of CIDR blocks contains an entry that is neither a CIDR block
+// nor a bare IP address.
+var ErrInvalidCIDR = errors.New("invalid CIDR")
+
+//nolint:revive // ConfigParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type ConfigParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Globals *globals.Globals
 	Logger  *logger.Logger
 }
 
+// Config holds all application configuration loaded from
+// environment variables.
 type Config struct {
 	DataDir         string
 	Debug           bool
@@ -39,79 +90,328 @@ type Config struct {
 	MetricsUsername string
 	Port            int
 	SentryDSN       string
+
+	// RetentionSweepInterval is how often the retention reaper runs.
+	RetentionSweepInterval time.Duration
+
+	// SessionIdleTimeout is the sliding inactivity window after
+	// which a session expires. Non-positive disables idle expiry.
+	SessionIdleTimeout time.Duration
+
+	// ReceiverRateLimit is the number of requests per minute each
+	// client IP may send to a single webhook receiver entrypoint.
+	ReceiverRateLimit int
+
+	// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
+	// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
+	// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
+	// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
+	// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
+	// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
+	// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
+	// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
+	// clients.
+	TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
+
 	params *ConfigParams
 	log    *slog.Logger
 }
 
-// IsDev returns true if running in development environment
+// IsDev returns true if running in development environment.
 func (c *Config) IsDev() bool {
 	return c.Environment == EnvironmentDev
 }
 
-// IsProd returns true if running in production environment
+// IsProd returns true if running in production environment.
 func (c *Config) IsProd() bool {
 	return c.Environment == EnvironmentProd
 }
 
-// envString returns the value of the named environment variable, or
-// an empty string if not set.
+// envString returns the value of the named environment variable,
+// or an empty string if not set.
 func envString(key string) string {
 	return os.Getenv(key)
 }
 
-// envBool returns the value of the named environment variable parsed as a
-// boolean. Returns defaultValue if not set.
-func envBool(key string, defaultValue bool) bool {
-	if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
-		return strings.EqualFold(v, "true") || v == "1"
-	}
-	return defaultValue
+// envBool returns the value of the named environment variable
+// parsed as a boolean. Returns defaultValue if not set. If the
+// variable is set but cannot be parsed, it returns a wrapped error
+// naming the key and the bad value, so startup fails loudly rather
+// than silently falling back to the default.
+//
+// Parsing is strconv.ParseBool, which accepts 1, t, T, TRUE, true,
+// True, 0, f, F, FALSE, false and False. Anything else — "yes",
+// "on", or a typo like "ture" — is an error rather than a silent
+// false.
+func envBool(key string, defaultValue bool) (bool, error) {
+	v := os.Getenv(key)
+	if v == "" {
+		return defaultValue, nil
 	}
 
-// envInt returns the value of the named environment variable parsed as an
-// integer. Returns defaultValue if not set or unparseable.
-func envInt(key string, defaultValue int) int {
-	if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
-		if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
-			return i
-		}
-	}
-	return defaultValue
+	b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf(
+			"invalid boolean for %s: %q: %w", key, v, err,
+		)
 	}
 
-// nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
-	log := params.Logger.Get()
+	return b, nil
+}
 
-	// Determine environment from WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT env var, default to dev
+// envPositiveInt returns the value of the named environment variable
+// parsed as a positive integer. Returns defaultValue if not set. If
+// the variable is set but cannot be parsed, or parses to less than
+// one, it returns a wrapped error naming the key and the bad value,
+// so startup fails loudly rather than silently falling back to the
+// default.
+func envPositiveInt(
+	key string,
+	defaultValue int,
+) (int, error) {
+	v := os.Getenv(key)
+	if v == "" {
+		return defaultValue, nil
+	}
+
+	i, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"invalid integer for %s: %q: %w", key, v, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if i < 1 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %s must be at least 1, got %q",
+			ErrNonPositiveValue, key, v,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return i, nil
+}
+
+// envPort returns the value of the named environment variable parsed
+// as a TCP port number. Returns defaultValue if not set. A set value
+// that is unparseable, below 1, or above maxPort is a hard error
+// naming the key and the bad value.
+func envPort(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
+	port, err := envPositiveInt(key, defaultValue)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	if port > maxPort {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %s must be at most %d, got %d",
+			ErrInvalidPort, key, maxPort, port,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return port, nil
+}
+
+// envDuration returns the value of the named environment variable
+// parsed as a Go duration (e.g. "1h", "30m"). Returns defaultValue if
+// not set. If the variable is set but cannot be parsed, it returns a
+// wrapped error naming the key and the bad value, so startup fails
+// loudly rather than silently falling back to the default.
+func envDuration(
+	key string,
+	defaultValue time.Duration,
+) (time.Duration, error) {
+	v := os.Getenv(key)
+	if v == "" {
+		return defaultValue, nil
+	}
+
+	d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"invalid duration for %s: %q: %w", key, v, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return d, nil
+}
+
+// parseCIDR parses one trusted-proxy list entry, which may be a
+// CIDR block ("10.0.0.0/8") or a bare address ("10.0.0.1", treated
+// as a single-host block).
+//
+// Both forms are unmapped, because peer addresses are unmapped
+// before they are matched against the list: an IPv4-mapped prefix
+// left in that form would silently never match.
+func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
+	if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
+		prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Prefix{}, err //nolint:wrapcheck // wrapped by caller
+		}
+
+		if addr := prefix.Addr(); addr.Is4In6() &&
+			prefix.Bits() >= mappedV4Offset {
+			prefix = netip.PrefixFrom(
+				addr.Unmap(), prefix.Bits()-mappedV4Offset,
+			)
+		}
+
+		return prefix.Masked(), nil
+	}
+
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry)
+	if err != nil {
+		return netip.Prefix{}, err //nolint:wrapcheck // wrapped by caller
+	}
+
+	return netip.PrefixFrom(addr.Unmap(), addr.Unmap().BitLen()), nil
+}
+
+// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
+// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
+// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
+// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
+// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
+// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
+func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
+	v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
+	if v == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	var prefixes []netip.Prefix
+
+	for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(v, ",") {
+		entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
+		if entry == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		prefix, err := parseCIDR(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"%w: %s: %q: %w", ErrInvalidCIDR, key, entry, err,
+			)
+		}
+
+		prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
+	}
+
+	return prefixes, nil
+}
+
+// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
+// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
+func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
 	environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
 	if environment == "" {
 		environment = EnvironmentDev
 	}
 
-	// Validate environment
-	if environment != EnvironmentDev && environment != EnvironmentProd {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT must be either '%s' or '%s', got '%s'",
-			EnvironmentDev, EnvironmentProd, environment)
+	if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
+		environment != EnvironmentProd {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT must be '%s' or '%s', got '%s'",
+			ErrInvalidEnvironment,
+			EnvironmentDev, EnvironmentProd, environment,
+		)
 	}
 
-	// Load configuration values from environment variables
-	s := &Config{
+	return environment, nil
+}
+
+// loadFromEnv builds a Config from the environment. Every value that
+// needs parsing fails loudly when it is set but unparseable: the
+// documented defaults apply only to variables that are unset (or
+// empty), never as a substitute for a value the operator actually
+// provided.
+func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
+	environment, err := resolveEnvironment()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	port, err := envPort("PORT", defaultPort)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	debug, err := envBool("DEBUG", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	maintenanceMode, err := envBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	retentionSweepInterval, err := envDuration(
+		"RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL",
+		defaultRetentionSweepInterval,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	sessionIdleTimeout, err := envDuration(
+		"SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
+		defaultSessionIdleTimeout,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	receiverRateLimit, err := envPositiveInt(
+		"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
+		defaultReceiverRateLimit,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &Config{
 		DataDir:                envString("DATA_DIR"),
-		Debug:           envBool("DEBUG", false),
-		MaintenanceMode: envBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE", false),
+		Debug:                  debug,
+		MaintenanceMode:        maintenanceMode,
 		Environment:            environment,
 		MetricsUsername:        envString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
 		MetricsPassword:        envString("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
-		Port:            envInt("PORT", 8080),
+		Port:                   port,
 		SentryDSN:              envString("SENTRY_DSN"),
-		log:             log,
-		params:          &params,
+		RetentionSweepInterval: retentionSweepInterval,
+		SessionIdleTimeout:     sessionIdleTimeout,
+		ReceiverRateLimit:      receiverRateLimit,
+		TrustedProxies:         trustedProxies,
+	}, nil
 }
 
-	// Set default DataDir. All SQLite databases (main application DB
-	// and per-webhook event DBs) live here. The same default is used
-	// regardless of environment; override with DATA_DIR if needed.
+// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
+//
+//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
+func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
+	log := params.Logger.Get()
+
+	// A set-but-unparseable value anywhere in the environment is a
+	// hard error, so fx aborts startup rather than running with a
+	// silently substituted default.
+	s, err := loadFromEnv()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	s.log = log
+	s.params = &params
+
+	// Set default DataDir. All SQLite databases (main application
+	// DB and per-webhook event DBs) live here. The same default is
+	// used regardless of environment; override with DATA_DIR if
+	// needed.
 	if s.DataDir == "" {
 		s.DataDir = "/var/lib/webhooker"
 	}
@@ -127,8 +427,12 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
 		"debug", s.Debug,
 		"maintenanceMode", s.MaintenanceMode,
 		"dataDir", s.DataDir,
+		"retentionSweepInterval", s.RetentionSweepInterval.String(),
+		"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
+		"trustedProxies", len(s.TrustedProxies),
 		"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",
-		"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsUsername != "" && s.MetricsPassword != "",
+		"hasMetricsAuth",
+		s.MetricsUsername != "" && s.MetricsPassword != "",
 	)
 
 	return s, nil

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -1,17 +1,31 @@
-package config
+package config_test
 
 import (
 	"os"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
+// Shared subtest names for the env-parsing tables below, which all
+// exercise the same three cases against different variables.
+const (
+	caseUnsetUsesDefault = "unset uses default"
+	caseValidValueParsed = "valid value is parsed"
+	caseUnparseableFails = "unparseable value fails startup"
+
+	// cidrPrivateV4 is the sample trusted-proxy block the
+	// TRUSTED_PROXIES cases are built from.
+	cidrPrivateV4 = "10.0.0.0/8"
+)
+
 func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name        string
@@ -23,120 +37,550 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{
 			name:   "default is dev",
-			envValue:    "",
-			envVars:     map[string]string{},
-			expectError: false,
 			isDev:  true,
 			isProd: false,
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "explicit dev",
 			envValue: "dev",
-			envVars:     map[string]string{},
-			expectError: false,
 			isDev:    true,
 			isProd:   false,
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "explicit prod",
 			envValue: "prod",
-			envVars:     map[string]string{},
-			expectError: false,
 			isDev:    false,
 			isProd:   true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:        "invalid environment",
 			envValue:    "staging",
-			envVars:     map[string]string{},
 			expectError: true,
 		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			// Set environment variable if specified
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
 			if tt.envValue != "" {
-				os.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.envValue)
-				defer os.Unsetenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
+				t.Setenv(
+					"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.envValue,
+				)
 			} else {
-				os.Unsetenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT",
+				))
 			}
 
-			// Set additional environment variables
 			for k, v := range tt.envVars {
-				os.Setenv(k, v)
-				defer os.Unsetenv(k)
+				t.Setenv(k, v)
 			}
 
 			if tt.expectError {
-				// Use regular fx.New for error cases since fxtest doesn't expose errors the same way
-				var cfg *Config
-				app := fx.New(
-					fx.NopLogger, // Suppress fx logs in tests
-					fx.Provide(
-						globals.New,
-						logger.New,
-						New,
-					),
-					fx.Populate(&cfg),
-				)
-				assert.Error(t, app.Err())
+				testEnvironmentConfigError(t)
 			} else {
-				// Use fxtest for success cases
-				var cfg *Config
-				app := fxtest.New(
-					t,
-					fx.Provide(
-						globals.New,
-						logger.New,
-						New,
-					),
-					fx.Populate(&cfg),
+				testEnvironmentConfigSuccess(
+					t, tt.isDev, tt.isProd,
 				)
-				require.NoError(t, app.Err())
-				app.RequireStart()
-				defer app.RequireStop()
-
-				assert.Equal(t, tt.isDev, cfg.IsDev())
-				assert.Equal(t, tt.isProd, cfg.IsProd())
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 
+func testEnvironmentConfigError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+
+	assert.Error(t, app.Err())
+}
+
+func testEnvironmentConfigSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	isDev, isProd bool,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, isDev, cfg.IsDev())
+	assert.Equal(t, isProd, cfg.IsProd())
+}
+
+func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		expected    time.Duration
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
+			set:      false,
+			expected: time.Hour,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "15m",
+			expected: 15 * time.Minute,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-duration",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv("RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL", tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL",
+				))
+			}
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				expectStartupError(t)
+			} else {
+				testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(t, tt.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// startupError builds the app config.New belongs to and returns
+// the error fx reports, which is non-nil whenever an environment
+// value is set but invalid.
+func startupError(t *testing.T) error {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+
+	return app.Err()
+}
+
+// expectStartupError asserts that fx refuses to build the app,
+// which is what a set-but-invalid environment value must cause.
+func expectStartupError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	assert.Error(t, startupError(t))
+}
+
+// expectStartupErrorFor asserts that startup fails, that the error
+// names the offending variable so an operator can find it, and,
+// when sentinel is non-nil, that it wraps that sentinel.
+func expectStartupErrorFor(
+	t *testing.T,
+	key string,
+	sentinel error,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	err := startupError(t)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, err, key)
+
+	if sentinel != nil {
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, sentinel)
+	}
+}
+
+func testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	expected time.Duration,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.RetentionSweepInterval)
+}
+
+func TestSessionIdleTimeout(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		expected    time.Duration
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
+			set:      false,
+			expected: 24 * time.Hour,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "30m",
+			expected: 30 * time.Minute,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-duration",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
+				))
+			}
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				expectStartupError(t)
+			} else {
+				testSessionIdleTimeoutSuccess(t, tt.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func testSessionIdleTimeoutSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	expected time.Duration,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.SessionIdleTimeout)
+}
+
 func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
-	// Verify that when DATA_DIR is unset, the default is /var/lib/webhooker
-	// regardless of the environment setting.
 	for _, env := range []string{"", "dev", "prod"} {
 		name := env
 		if name == "" {
 			name = "unset"
 		}
-		t.Run("env="+name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if env != "" {
-				os.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", env)
-				defer os.Unsetenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
-			} else {
-				os.Unsetenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
-			}
-			os.Unsetenv("DATA_DIR")
 
-			var cfg *Config
+		t.Run("env="+name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			if env != "" {
+				t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", env)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT",
+				))
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("DATA_DIR"))
+
+			var cfg *config.Config
+
 			app := fxtest.New(
 				t,
 				fx.Provide(
 					globals.New,
 					logger.New,
-					New,
+					config.New,
 				),
 				fx.Populate(&cfg),
 			)
 			require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
 			app.RequireStart()
+
 			defer app.RequireStop()
 
-			assert.Equal(t, "/var/lib/webhooker", cfg.DataDir)
+			assert.Equal(
+				t, "/var/lib/webhooker", cfg.DataDir,
+			)
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		// sentinel, when set, must be wrapped by the startup
+		// error; every error case must additionally name the
+		// variable in its message.
+		sentinel error
+		expected int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
+			set:      false,
+			expected: 120,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "30",
+			expected: 30,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-number",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "zero fails startup",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "0",
+			expectError: true,
+			sentinel:    config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "negative fails startup",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "-5",
+			expectError: true,
+			sentinel:    config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv("RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT", tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
+				))
+			}
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				expectStartupErrorFor(
+					t, "RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT", tt.sentinel,
+				)
+			} else {
+				testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(t, tt.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	expected int,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.ReceiverRateLimit)
+}
+
+func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		expected    []string
+	}{
+		{
+			// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
+			// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
+			// every peer may speak for the client.
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
+			set:      false,
+			expected: []string{},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "blank value trusts nothing",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "  ",
+			expected: []string{},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  caseValidValueParsed,
+			set:   true,
+			value: cidrPrivateV4 + ", 192.168.1.7 ,2001:db8::/32",
+			expected: []string{
+				cidrPrivateV4, "192.168.1.7/32", "2001:db8::/32",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "host bits are masked off",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "10.1.2.3/8",
+			expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
+		},
+		{
+			// Peer addresses are unmapped before they are
+			// matched, so an IPv4-mapped prefix kept in that
+			// form could never match anything.
+			name:     "IPv4-mapped prefix is unmapped",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "::ffff:10.0.0.0/104",
+			expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
+			set:         true,
+			value:       cidrPrivateV4 + ",not-an-address",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "out-of-range prefix length fails startup",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "10.0.0.0/33",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"))
+			}
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				expectStartupErrorFor(
+					t, "TRUSTED_PROXIES", config.ErrInvalidCIDR,
+				)
+			} else {
+				testTrustedProxiesSuccess(t, tt.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	expected []string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.TrustedProxies))
+	for _, prefix := range cfg.TrustedProxies {
+		got = append(got, prefix.String())
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, got)
+}

internal/config/env_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+package config_test
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+)
+
+// testEnvKey is a throwaway variable name used only by the helper
+// tables below, so they cannot disturb real configuration.
+const testEnvKey = "WEBHOOKER_TEST_VALUE"
+
+// Real configuration variables exercised by the config.New tests.
+const (
+	envKeyPort            = "PORT"
+	envKeyDebug           = "DEBUG"
+	envKeyMaintenanceMode = "MAINTENANCE_MODE"
+)
+
+// envBoolCase is one row of the envBool table.
+type envBoolCase struct {
+	name         string
+	set          bool
+	value        string
+	defaultValue bool
+	expectError  bool
+	expected     bool
+}
+
+// envBoolCases is the envBool table, kept out of the test body so
+// the test itself stays readable.
+func envBoolCases() []envBoolCase {
+	return []envBoolCase{
+		{
+			name:         "unset uses default false",
+			defaultValue: false,
+			expected:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "unset uses default true",
+			defaultValue: true,
+			expected:     true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "empty uses default true",
+			set:          true,
+			value:        "",
+			defaultValue: true,
+			expected:     true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "true is parsed",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "true",
+			expected: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "one is parsed",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "1",
+			expected: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "False is parsed",
+			set:          true,
+			value:        "False",
+			defaultValue: true,
+			expected:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "zero is parsed",
+			set:          true,
+			value:        "0",
+			defaultValue: true,
+			expected:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "yes is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "yes",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "on is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "on",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "typo is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "ture",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tt := range envBoolCases() {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
+			}
+
+			got, err := config.EnvBoolForTest(
+				testEnvKey, tt.defaultValue,
+			)
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnvPositiveInt(t *testing.T) {
+	const defaultValue = 7
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		errIs       error
+		expected    int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "unset returns the default integer",
+			expected: defaultValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "empty returns the default integer",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "",
+			expected: defaultValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "positive value is parsed",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "42",
+			expected: 42,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unparseable value is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-number",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "zero is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "0",
+			expectError: true,
+			errIs:       config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "negative is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "-5",
+			expectError: true,
+			errIs:       config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
+			}
+
+			got, err := config.EnvPositiveIntForTest(
+				testEnvKey, defaultValue,
+			)
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
+
+				if tt.errIs != nil {
+					require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
+				}
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
+	const defaultValue = 8080
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		errIs       error
+		expected    int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "unset returns the default port",
+			expected: defaultValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "valid port is parsed",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "9000",
+			expected: 9000,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "highest port is accepted",
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "65535",
+			expected: 65535,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unparseable value is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-port",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "zero is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "0",
+			expectError: true,
+			errIs:       config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "above the port range is rejected",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "65536",
+			expectError: true,
+			errIs:       config.ErrInvalidPort,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
+			}
+
+			got, err := config.EnvPortForTest(
+				testEnvKey, defaultValue,
+			)
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
+
+				if tt.errIs != nil {
+					require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
+				}
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// buildConfig constructs a Config through fx exactly as the
+// application does, returning the config and any construction error.
+func buildConfig(t *testing.T) (*config.Config, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+
+	return cfg, app.Err()
+}
+
+func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		key         string
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		check       func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config)
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "valid PORT is used",
+			key:   envKeyPort,
+			value: "9001",
+			check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.Equal(t, 9001, cfg.Port)
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unparseable PORT aborts startup",
+			key:         envKeyPort,
+			value:       "eighty-eighty",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "out-of-range PORT aborts startup",
+			key:         envKeyPort,
+			value:       "70000",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "valid DEBUG is used",
+			key:   envKeyDebug,
+			value: "true",
+			check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.True(t, cfg.Debug)
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unparseable DEBUG aborts startup",
+			key:         envKeyDebug,
+			value:       "ture",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unparseable MAINTENANCE_MODE aborts startup",
+			key:         envKeyMaintenanceMode,
+			value:       "sometimes",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+			t.Setenv(tt.key, tt.value)
+
+			cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.key)
+				assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.NotNil(t, cfg)
+			tt.check(t, cfg)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset proves the fail-loud behaviour did not
+// break the legitimate unset case: absent variables still get their
+// documented defaults.
+func TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+	for _, key := range []string{
+		envKeyPort, envKeyDebug, envKeyMaintenanceMode,
+	} {
+		require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(key))
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 8080, cfg.Port)
+	assert.False(t, cfg.Debug)
+	assert.False(t, cfg.MaintenanceMode)
+}

internal/config/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package config
+
+// This file exposes the unexported environment parsing helpers to
+// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
+// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
+
+// EnvBoolForTest exposes envBool.
+func EnvBoolForTest(key string, defaultValue bool) (bool, error) {
+	return envBool(key, defaultValue)
+}
+
+// EnvPositiveIntForTest exposes envPositiveInt.
+func EnvPositiveIntForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
+	return envPositiveInt(key, defaultValue)
+}
+
+// EnvPortForTest exposes envPort.
+func EnvPortForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
+	return envPort(key, defaultValue)
+}

internal/database/base_model.go

@@ -11,15 +11,16 @@ import (
 // This replaces gorm.Model but uses UUID instead of uint for ID
 type BaseModel struct {
 	ID        string         `gorm:"type:uuid;primary_key" json:"id"`
-	CreatedAt time.Time      `json:"created_at"`
-	UpdatedAt time.Time      `json:"updated_at"`
-	DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index" json:"deleted_at,omitempty"`
+	CreatedAt time.Time      `json:"createdAt"`
+	UpdatedAt time.Time      `json:"updatedAt"`
+	DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index"                 json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
 }
 
-// BeforeCreate hook to set UUID before creating a record
-func (b *BaseModel) BeforeCreate(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+// BeforeCreate hook to set UUID before creating a record.
+func (b *BaseModel) BeforeCreate(_ *gorm.DB) error {
 	if b.ID == "" {
 		b.ID = uuid.New().String()
 	}
+
 	return nil
 }

internal/database/database.go

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// Package database provides SQLite persistence for webhooks, events, and users.
 package database
 
 import (
@@ -19,30 +20,42 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // DatabaseParams is a standard fx naming convention
+const (
+	dataDirPerm       = 0750
+	randomPasswordLen = 16
+	sessionKeyLen     = 32
+)
+
+//nolint:revive // DatabaseParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type DatabaseParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Config *config.Config
 	Logger *logger.Logger
 }
 
+// Database manages the main SQLite connection and schema migrations.
 type Database struct {
 	db     *gorm.DB
 	log    *slog.Logger
 	params *DatabaseParams
 }
 
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params DatabaseParams) (*Database, error) {
+// New creates a Database that connects on fx start and disconnects on stop.
+func New(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params DatabaseParams,
+) (*Database, error) {
 	d := &Database{
 		params: &params,
 		log:    params.Logger.Get(),
 	}
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error { // nolint:revive // ctx unused but required by fx
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			return d.connect()
 		},
-		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error { // nolint:revive // ctx unused but required by fx
+		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			return d.close()
 		},
 	})
@@ -50,21 +63,92 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params DatabaseParams) (*Database, error) {
 	return d, nil
 }
 
+// DB returns the underlying GORM database handle.
+func (d *Database) DB() *gorm.DB {
+	return d.db
+}
+
+// GetOrCreateSessionKey retrieves the session encryption key from the
+// settings table. If no key exists, a cryptographically secure random
+// 32-byte key is generated, base64-encoded, and stored for future use.
+func (d *Database) GetOrCreateSessionKey() (string, error) {
+	var setting Setting
+
+	result := d.db.Where(
+		&Setting{Key: "session_key"},
+	).First(&setting)
+	if result.Error == nil {
+		return setting.Value, nil
+	}
+
+	if !errors.Is(result.Error, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf(
+			"failed to query session key: %w",
+			result.Error,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Generate a new cryptographically secure 32-byte key
+	keyBytes := make([]byte, sessionKeyLen)
+
+	_, err := rand.Read(keyBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf(
+			"failed to generate session key: %w",
+			err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyBytes)
+
+	setting = Setting{
+		Key:   "session_key",
+		Value: encoded,
+	}
+
+	err = d.db.Create(&setting).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf(
+			"failed to store session key: %w",
+			err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	d.log.Info(
+		"generated new session key and stored in database",
+	)
+
+	return encoded, nil
+}
+
 func (d *Database) connect() error {
 	// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
 	dataDir := d.params.Config.DataDir
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0750); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("creating data directory %s: %w", dataDir, err)
+
+	err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, dataDirPerm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"creating data directory %s: %w",
+			dataDir,
+			err,
+		)
 	}
 
 	// Construct the main application database path inside DATA_DIR.
 	dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "webhooker.db")
-	dbURL := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc", dbPath)
+	dbURL := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
+		dbPath,
+	)
 
 	// Open the database with the pure Go SQLite driver
 	sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
 	if err != nil {
-		d.log.Error("failed to open database", "error", err)
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to open database",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
@@ -73,7 +157,11 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
 		Conn: sqlDB,
 	}, &gorm.Config{})
 	if err != nil {
-		d.log.Error("failed to connect to database", "error", err)
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to connect to database",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
@@ -86,34 +174,62 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
 
 func (d *Database) migrate() error {
 	// Run GORM auto-migrations
-	if err := d.Migrate(); err != nil {
-		d.log.Error("failed to run database migrations", "error", err)
+	err := d.Migrate()
+	if err != nil {
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to run database migrations",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
+
 	d.log.Info("database migrations completed")
 
 	// Check if admin user exists
 	var userCount int64
-	if err := d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error; err != nil {
-		d.log.Error("failed to count users", "error", err)
+
+	err = d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to count users",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
 	if userCount == 0 {
-		// Create admin user
+		return d.createAdminUser()
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (d *Database) createAdminUser() error {
 	d.log.Info("no users found, creating admin user")
 
 	// Generate random password
-		password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(16)
+	password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(
+		randomPasswordLen,
+	)
 	if err != nil {
-			d.log.Error("failed to generate random password", "error", err)
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to generate random password",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
 	// Hash the password
 	hashedPassword, err := HashPassword(password)
 	if err != nil {
-			d.log.Error("failed to hash password", "error", err)
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to hash password",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
@@ -123,17 +239,22 @@ func (d *Database) migrate() error {
 		Password: hashedPassword,
 	}
 
-		if err := d.db.Create(adminUser).Error; err != nil {
-			d.log.Error("failed to create admin user", "error", err)
+	err = d.db.Create(adminUser).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		d.log.Error(
+			"failed to create admin user",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
 		return err
 	}
 
 	d.log.Info("admin user created",
 		"username", "admin",
 		"password", password,
-			"message", "SAVE THIS PASSWORD - it will not be shown again!",
+		"message",
+		"SAVE THIS PASSWORD - it will not be shown again!",
 	)
-	}
 
 	return nil
 }
@@ -144,43 +265,9 @@ func (d *Database) close() error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+
 		return sqlDB.Close()
 	}
+
 	return nil
 }
-
-func (d *Database) DB() *gorm.DB {
-	return d.db
-}
-
-// GetOrCreateSessionKey retrieves the session encryption key from the
-// settings table. If no key exists, a cryptographically secure random
-// 32-byte key is generated, base64-encoded, and stored for future use.
-func (d *Database) GetOrCreateSessionKey() (string, error) {
-	var setting Setting
-	result := d.db.Where(&Setting{Key: "session_key"}).First(&setting)
-	if result.Error == nil {
-		return setting.Value, nil
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(result.Error, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to query session key: %w", result.Error)
-	}
-
-	// Generate a new cryptographically secure 32-byte key
-	keyBytes := make([]byte, 32)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(keyBytes); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session key: %w", err)
-	}
-	encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyBytes)
-
-	setting = Setting{
-		Key:   "session_key",
-		Value: encoded,
-	}
-	if err := d.db.Create(&setting).Error; err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to store session key: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	d.log.Info("generated new session key and stored in database")
-	return encoded, nil
-}

internal/database/database_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package database
+package database_test
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -6,37 +6,51 @@ import (
 
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
-func TestDatabaseConnection(t *testing.T) {
-	// Set up test dependencies
+const (
+	// testAppname is the Globals.Appname used in tests.
+	testAppname = "webhooker-test"
+	// testVersion is the Globals.Version used in tests.
+	testVersion = "test"
+	// testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
+	testContentType = "application/json"
+	// testWebhookName is the Webhook.Name used in tests.
+	testWebhookName = "test-webhook"
+	// testForeverLabel is Webhook.RetentionLabel for a retain-forever
+	// webhook.
+	testForeverLabel = "forever"
+)
+
+func setupTestDB(
+	t *testing.T,
+) (*database.Database, *fxtest.Lifecycle) {
+	t.Helper()
+
 	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
 
-	// Create globals
-	globals.Appname = "webhooker-test"
-	globals.Version = "test"
-
-	g, err := globals.New(lc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Failed to create globals: %v", err)
+	g := &globals.Globals{
+		Appname: testAppname,
+		Version: testVersion,
 	}
 
-	// Create logger
-	l, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g})
+	l, err := logger.New(
+		lc,
+		logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g},
+	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to create logger: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Create config with DataDir pointing to a temp directory
 	c := &config.Config{
 		DataDir:     t.TempDir(),
 		Environment: "dev",
 	}
 
-	// Create database
-	db, err := New(lc, DatabaseParams{
+	db, err := database.New(lc, database.DatabaseParams{
 		Config: c,
 		Logger: l,
 	})
@@ -44,31 +58,45 @@ func TestDatabaseConnection(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to create database: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Start lifecycle (this will trigger the connection)
+	return db, lc
+}
+
+func TestDatabaseConnection(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	db, lc := setupTestDB(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
-	err = lc.Start(ctx)
+
+	err := lc.Start(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to connect to database: %v", err)
 	}
+
 	defer func() {
-		if stopErr := lc.Stop(ctx); stopErr != nil {
-			t.Errorf("Failed to stop lifecycle: %v", stopErr)
+		stopErr := lc.Stop(ctx)
+		if stopErr != nil {
+			t.Errorf(
+				"Failed to stop lifecycle: %v",
+				stopErr,
+			)
 		}
 	}()
 
-	// Verify we can get the DB instance
 	if db.DB() == nil {
 		t.Error("Expected non-nil database connection")
 	}
 
-	// Test that we can perform a simple query
 	var result int
+
 	err = db.DB().Raw("SELECT 1").Scan(&result).Error
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to execute test query: %v", err)
 	}
 
 	if result != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("Expected query result to be 1, got %d", result)
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Expected query result to be 1, got %d",
+			result,
+		)
 	}
 }

internal/database/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+)
+
+// NewTestRetentionReaper builds a RetentionReaper backed by the given
+// main database and per-webhook database manager, without the fx
+// lifecycle. Intended for tests.
+func NewTestRetentionReaper(
+	db *Database,
+	mgr *WebhookDBManager,
+) *RetentionReaper {
+	return &RetentionReaper{
+		db:        db,
+		dbManager: mgr,
+		log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+			os.Stderr,
+			&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+		)),
+		interval: time.Hour,
+	}
+}
+
+// ExportSweep runs a single retention sweep synchronously for tests.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
+	r.sweep(ctx)
+}
+
+// ExportRegisterHooks registers the reaper's real fx lifecycle hooks
+// on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive the exact
+// OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and hand OnStart the
+// kind of context fx actually supplies.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
+	r.registerHooks(lc)
+}
+
+// ExportStart starts the reaper's background loop for tests.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportStart() {
+	r.start()
+}
+
+// ExportStop stops the reaper's background loop for tests.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportStop() {
+	r.stop()
+}
+
+// ExportSetInterval overrides the sweep interval for tests.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
+	r.interval = d
+}

internal/database/model_apikey.go

@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ import "time"
 type APIKey struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	UserID      string     `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"user_id"`
+	UserID      string     `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"   json:"userId"`
 	Key         string     `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"key"`
 	Description string     `json:"description"`
-	LastUsedAt  *time.Time `json:"last_used_at,omitempty"`
+	LastUsedAt  *time.Time `json:"lastUsedAt,omitempty"`
 
 	// Relations
-	User User `json:"user,omitempty"`
+	User User `json:"user,omitzero"`
 }

internal/database/model_delivery.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package database
 // DeliveryStatus represents the status of a delivery
 type DeliveryStatus string
 
+// Delivery status values.
 const (
 	DeliveryStatusPending   DeliveryStatus = "pending"
 	DeliveryStatusDelivered DeliveryStatus = "delivered"
@@ -14,12 +15,12 @@ const (
 type Delivery struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	EventID  string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"event_id"`
-	TargetID string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"target_id"`
+	EventID  string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"         json:"eventId"`
+	TargetID string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"         json:"targetId"`
 	Status   DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending'" json:"status"`
 
 	// Relations
-	Event           Event            `json:"event,omitempty"`
-	Target          Target           `json:"target,omitempty"`
-	DeliveryResults []DeliveryResult `json:"delivery_results,omitempty"`
+	Event           Event            `json:"event,omitzero"`
+	Target          Target           `json:"target,omitzero"`
+	DeliveryResults []DeliveryResult `json:"deliveryResults,omitempty"`
 }

internal/database/model_delivery_result.go

@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ package database
 type DeliveryResult struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	DeliveryID   string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"delivery_id"`
-	AttemptNum   int    `gorm:"not null" json:"attempt_num"`
+	DeliveryID   string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"   json:"deliveryId"`
+	AttemptNum   int    `gorm:"not null"             json:"attemptNum"`
 	Success      bool   `json:"success"`
-	StatusCode   int    `json:"status_code,omitempty"`
-	ResponseBody string `gorm:"type:text" json:"response_body,omitempty"`
+	StatusCode   int    `json:"statusCode,omitempty"`
+	ResponseBody string `gorm:"type:text"            json:"responseBody,omitempty"`
 	Error        string `json:"error,omitempty"`
-	Duration     int64  `json:"duration_ms"` // Duration in milliseconds
+	Duration     int64  `json:"durationMs"` // Duration in milliseconds
 
 	// Relations
-	Delivery Delivery `json:"delivery,omitempty"`
+	Delivery Delivery `json:"delivery,omitzero"`
 }

internal/database/model_entrypoint.go

@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ package database
 type Entrypoint struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	WebhookID   string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhook_id"`
-	Path        string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"path"` // URL path for this entrypoint
+	WebhookID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
+
+	// Path is the URL path for this entrypoint.
+	Path string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"path"`
+
 	Description string `json:"description"`
 	Active      bool   `gorm:"default:true" json:"active"`
 
 	// Relations
-	Webhook Webhook `json:"webhook,omitempty"`
+	Webhook Webhook `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
 }

internal/database/model_event.go

@@ -4,17 +4,17 @@ package database
 type Event struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	WebhookID    string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhook_id"`
-	EntrypointID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"entrypoint_id"`
+	WebhookID    string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
+	EntrypointID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"entrypointId"`
 
 	// Request data
 	Method      string `gorm:"not null"    json:"method"`
 	Headers     string `gorm:"type:text"   json:"headers"` // JSON
 	Body        string `gorm:"type:text"   json:"body"`
-	ContentType string `json:"content_type"`
+	ContentType string `json:"contentType"`
 
 	// Relations
-	Webhook    Webhook    `json:"webhook,omitempty"`
-	Entrypoint Entrypoint `json:"entrypoint,omitempty"`
+	Webhook    Webhook    `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
+	Entrypoint Entrypoint `json:"entrypoint,omitzero"`
 	Deliveries []Delivery `json:"deliveries,omitempty"`
 }

internal/database/model_target.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package database
 // TargetType represents the type of delivery target
 type TargetType string
 
+// Target type values.
 const (
 	TargetTypeHTTP     TargetType = "http"
 	TargetTypeDatabase TargetType = "database"
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ const (
 type Target struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	WebhookID string     `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhook_id"`
+	WebhookID string     `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
 	Name      string     `gorm:"not null"           json:"name"`
 	Type      TargetType `gorm:"not null"           json:"type"`
 	Active    bool       `gorm:"default:true"       json:"active"`
@@ -22,11 +23,12 @@ type Target struct {
 	// Configuration fields (JSON stored based on type)
 	Config string `gorm:"type:text" json:"config"` // JSON configuration
 
-	// For HTTP targets (max_retries=0 means fire-and-forget, >0 enables retries with backoff)
-	MaxRetries   int `json:"max_retries,omitempty"`
-	MaxQueueSize int `json:"max_queue_size,omitempty"`
+	// For HTTP targets (max_retries=0 means fire-and-forget,
+	// >0 enables retries with backoff)
+	MaxRetries   int `json:"maxRetries,omitempty"`
+	MaxQueueSize int `json:"maxQueueSize,omitempty"`
 
 	// Relations
-	Webhook    Webhook    `json:"webhook,omitempty"`
+	Webhook    Webhook    `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
 	Deliveries []Delivery `json:"deliveries,omitempty"`
 }

internal/database/model_user.go

@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ type User struct {
 
 	// Relations
 	Webhooks []Webhook `json:"webhooks,omitempty"`
-	APIKeys  []APIKey  `json:"api_keys,omitempty"`
+	APIKeys  []APIKey  `json:"apiKeys,omitempty"`
 }

internal/database/model_webhook.go

@@ -1,16 +1,125 @@
 package database
 
+import (
+	"math"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+const (
+	// DefaultRetentionDays is the event retention period applied to a
+	// webhook created without an explicit retention value. It is the
+	// single source of truth for that policy and must stay in sync
+	// with the `gorm:"default:30"` column default on
+	// Webhook.RetentionDays below; a struct tag cannot reference a
+	// constant, so a test asserts the two agree.
+	DefaultRetentionDays = 30
+
+	// RetentionForeverDays is the sentinel RetentionDays value meaning
+	// "retain events forever". Users express that intent as 0, which
+	// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites to this value: the column default
+	// substitutes DefaultRetentionDays for a zero value at insert
+	// time, so a zero can never survive a round trip to the database.
+	// Nothing outside this file may hardcode the number.
+	RetentionForeverDays = 365 * 1000
+
+	// MaxFiniteRetentionDays is the largest finite retention period the
+	// reaper's cutoff arithmetic can represent, and therefore the
+	// largest one a caller may request. It is derived from that
+	// arithmetic rather than picked: retentionCutoff computes
+	// retentionDays * hoursPerDay * time.Hour, and a time.Duration is
+	// an int64 nanosecond count, so math.MaxInt64 nanoseconds divided
+	// by an hour and then by a day is the exact ceiling — 106751 days,
+	// a little over 292 years.
+	//
+	// One day more overflows int64, wraps the product negative, and
+	// turns the cutoff into a timestamp in the far future that matches
+	// every row in the webhook's database. That is why this bound is
+	// enforced on input and why retentionCutoff saturates underneath
+	// it. Note that RetentionForeverDays deliberately sits above this
+	// ceiling: such webhooks are skipped before any cutoff is
+	// computed, and never reach the arithmetic at all.
+	MaxFiniteRetentionDays = int(
+		math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Hour) / hoursPerDay,
+	)
+)
+
 // Webhook represents a webhook processing unit that groups entrypoints and targets
+//
+// Every method below takes a pointer receiver. BeforeSave has to,
+// because it mutates the record and GORM only invokes hooks declared
+// that way; the display helpers follow suit so the receiver kinds do
+// not mix. Handlers therefore put a *Webhook into template data:
+// html/template cannot call a pointer method on a value held in a map,
+// because a map element is not addressable.
 type Webhook struct {
 	BaseModel
 
-	UserID        string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"user_id"`
+	UserID      string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"userId"`
 	Name        string `gorm:"not null"           json:"name"`
 	Description string `json:"description"`
-	RetentionDays int    `gorm:"default:30" json:"retention_days"` // Days to retain events
+
+	// RetentionDays is the number of days to retain events. A value of
+	// RetentionForeverDays means retain forever. The column default
+	// must equal DefaultRetentionDays.
+	RetentionDays int `gorm:"default:30" json:"retentionDays"`
 
 	// Relations
-	User        User         `json:"user,omitempty"`
+	User        User         `json:"user,omitzero"`
 	Entrypoints []Entrypoint `json:"entrypoints,omitempty"`
 	Targets     []Target     `json:"targets,omitempty"`
 }
+
+// BeforeSave normalises RetentionDays on every insert and update. A
+// non-positive value is the user's way of asking for "retain forever",
+// which is stored as the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
+//
+// This has to happen in a hook rather than at the call sites. GORM
+// substitutes the column default (DefaultRetentionDays) for a zero
+// value while building the insert statement, which runs after
+// BeforeSave; rewriting any later than this loses that race and the
+// row lands at 30 days. Living on the model also means a future call
+// site — a REST API, a fixture, a migration — cannot bypass it.
+func (w *Webhook) BeforeSave(_ *gorm.DB) error {
+	if w.RetentionDays <= 0 {
+		w.RetentionDays = RetentionForeverDays
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// retainsForever reports whether a stored RetentionDays value means
+// "keep events indefinitely". It is the single definition of that
+// question, shared by Webhook.RetainsForever and by the reaper's
+// cutoff computation so the two cannot disagree about which webhooks
+// are exempt from reaping.
+//
+// It accepts the RetentionForeverDays sentinel written by BeforeSave
+// and, defensively, the non-positive values that rows written before
+// the sentinel existed may still carry.
+func retainsForever(retentionDays int) bool {
+	return retentionDays <= 0 ||
+		retentionDays >= RetentionForeverDays
+}
+
+// RetainsForever reports whether this webhook's events are kept
+// indefinitely.
+func (w *Webhook) RetainsForever() bool {
+	return retainsForever(w.RetentionDays)
+}
+
+// RetentionLabel returns the webhook's retention policy as display
+// text, so that no template has to know about the sentinel value.
+func (w *Webhook) RetentionLabel() string {
+	if w.RetainsForever() {
+		return "forever"
+	}
+
+	if w.RetentionDays == 1 {
+		return "1 day"
+	}
+
+	return strconv.Itoa(w.RetentionDays) + " days"
+}

internal/database/model_webhook_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+package database_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"reflect"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// startedTestDB returns a started main database for model-level tests.
+func startedTestDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	db, lc := setupTestDB(t)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) })
+
+	return db.DB()
+}
+
+// storedRetention reads the retention_days column straight out of the
+// row, so the assertion is about what was persisted rather than about
+// whatever the in-memory struct happens to hold.
+func storedRetention(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, id string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var got int
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Model(&database.Webhook{}).
+			Where("id = ?", id).
+			Pluck("retention_days", &got).Error,
+	)
+
+	return got
+}
+
+// newWebhookWithRetention creates a webhook through the ordinary Create
+// path, so the BeforeSave hook and the GORM column default both apply
+// exactly as they do in production.
+func newWebhookWithRetention(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	wh *database.Webhook,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh.UserID = uuid.New().String()
+	wh.Name = testWebhookName
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+
+	return wh.ID
+}
+
+func TestWebhookBeforeSave_ZeroBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	db := startedTestDB(t)
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 0}
+	id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetention(t, db, id),
+		"a zero retention must be stored as the sentinel, "+
+			"not replaced by the column default",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestWebhookBeforeSave_NegativeBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	db := startedTestDB(t)
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: -5}
+	id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetention(t, db, id),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestWebhookBeforeSave_PositiveIsPreserved(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	db := startedTestDB(t)
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 7}
+	id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 7, storedRetention(t, db, id))
+}
+
+// TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel proves the hook
+// fires on update as well as insert, via the same Save call the edit
+// handler makes.
+func TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	db := startedTestDB(t)
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 30}
+	id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
+	require.Equal(t, 30, storedRetention(t, db, id))
+
+	wh.RetentionDays = 0
+	require.NoError(t, db.Omit(clause.Associations).Save(wh).Error)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetention(t, db, id),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant guards the one place
+// the default lives twice: a struct tag cannot reference a constant, so
+// this asserts the tag and DefaultRetentionDays agree.
+func TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	field, ok := reflect.TypeFor[database.Webhook]().
+		FieldByName("RetentionDays")
+	require.True(t, ok, "Webhook.RetentionDays must exist")
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		"default:"+strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays),
+		field.Tag.Get("gorm"),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling asserts that the
+// constant is exactly where the cutoff arithmetic stops working, which
+// is what makes it a derived bound rather than a round number someone
+// liked. One day more wraps the int64 nanosecond count negative, and a
+// negative span is precisely what turned a cutoff into a future
+// timestamp that matched — and deleted — every row.
+//
+// The multiplications are done through variables on purpose: as
+// constant expressions the overflowing one would not compile.
+func TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const hoursPerDay = 24
+
+	atCeiling := database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays
+	overCeiling := database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays + 1
+
+	assert.Positive(
+		t,
+		time.Duration(atCeiling*hoursPerDay)*time.Hour,
+		"the ceiling itself must still be representable",
+	)
+	assert.Negative(
+		t,
+		time.Duration(overCeiling*hoursPerDay)*time.Hour,
+		"one day past the ceiling must overflow",
+	)
+
+	assert.Less(
+		t,
+		database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		"the sentinel sits above the ceiling and is only safe "+
+			"because retain-forever webhooks skip the arithmetic",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestWebhookRetainsForeverAndLabel(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		days    int
+		forever bool
+		label   string
+	}{
+		{
+			"sentinel",
+			database.RetentionForeverDays, true, testForeverLabel,
+		},
+		{
+			"above sentinel",
+			database.RetentionForeverDays + 1, true, testForeverLabel,
+		},
+		{"legacy zero", 0, true, testForeverLabel},
+		{"legacy negative", -1, true, testForeverLabel},
+		{"default", database.DefaultRetentionDays, false, "30 days"},
+		{"one day", 1, false, "1 day"},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			wh := database.Webhook{RetentionDays: tc.days}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.forever, wh.RetainsForever())
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.label, wh.RetentionLabel())
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/database/password.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/subtle"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
 	"strings"
@@ -20,6 +21,23 @@ const (
 	argon2SaltLen = 16
 )
 
+// hashParts is the expected number of $-separated segments
+// in an encoded Argon2id hash string.
+const hashParts = 6
+
+// minPasswordComplexityLen is the minimum password length that
+// triggers per-character-class complexity enforcement.
+const minPasswordComplexityLen = 4
+
+// Sentinel errors returned by decodeHash.
+var (
+	errInvalidHashFormat    = errors.New("invalid hash format")
+	errInvalidAlgorithm     = errors.New("invalid algorithm")
+	errIncompatibleVersion  = errors.New("incompatible argon2 version")
+	errSaltLengthOutOfRange = errors.New("salt length out of range")
+	errHashLengthOutOfRange = errors.New("hash length out of range")
+)
+
 // PasswordConfig holds Argon2 configuration
 type PasswordConfig struct {
 	Time    uint32
@@ -46,26 +64,44 @@ func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
 
 	// Generate a salt
 	salt := make([]byte, config.SaltLen)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
+
+	_, err := rand.Read(salt)
+	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 
 	// Generate the hash
-	hash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, config.Time, config.Memory, config.Threads, config.KeyLen)
+	hash := argon2.IDKey(
+		[]byte(password),
+		salt,
+		config.Time,
+		config.Memory,
+		config.Threads,
+		config.KeyLen,
+	)
 
 	// Encode the hash and parameters
 	b64Salt := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt)
 	b64Hash := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(hash)
 
 	// Format: $argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=1,p=4$salt$hash
-	encoded := fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
-		argon2.Version, config.Memory, config.Time, config.Threads, b64Salt, b64Hash)
+	encoded := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
+		argon2.Version,
+		config.Memory,
+		config.Time,
+		config.Threads,
+		b64Salt,
+		b64Hash,
+	)
 
 	return encoded, nil
 }
 
 // VerifyPassword checks if the provided password matches the hash
-func VerifyPassword(password, encodedHash string) (bool, error) {
+func VerifyPassword(
+	password, encodedHash string,
+) (bool, error) {
 	// Extract parameters and hash from encoded string
 	config, salt, hash, err := decodeHash(encodedHash)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -73,60 +109,119 @@ func VerifyPassword(password, encodedHash string) (bool, error) {
 	}
 
 	// Generate hash of the provided password
-	otherHash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, config.Time, config.Memory, config.Threads, config.KeyLen)
+	otherHash := argon2.IDKey(
+		[]byte(password),
+		salt,
+		config.Time,
+		config.Memory,
+		config.Threads,
+		config.KeyLen,
+	)
 
 	// Compare hashes using constant time comparison
 	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hash, otherHash) == 1, nil
 }
 
-// decodeHash extracts parameters, salt, and hash from an encoded hash string
-func decodeHash(encodedHash string) (*PasswordConfig, []byte, []byte, error) {
+// decodeHash extracts parameters, salt, and hash from an
+// encoded hash string.
+func decodeHash(
+	encodedHash string,
+) (*PasswordConfig, []byte, []byte, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(encodedHash, "$")
-	if len(parts) != 6 {
-		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid hash format")
+	if len(parts) != hashParts {
+		return nil, nil, nil, errInvalidHashFormat
 	}
 
 	if parts[1] != "argon2id" {
-		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid algorithm")
+		return nil, nil, nil, errInvalidAlgorithm
 	}
 
-	var version int
-	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); err != nil {
+	version, err := parseVersion(parts[2])
+	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, nil, err
 	}
+
 	if version != argon2.Version {
-		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("incompatible argon2 version")
+		return nil, nil, nil, errIncompatibleVersion
 	}
 
-	config := &PasswordConfig{}
-	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &config.Memory, &config.Time, &config.Threads); err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, err
-	}
-
-	salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[4])
+	config, err := parseParams(parts[3])
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, nil, err
 	}
-	saltLen := len(salt)
-	if saltLen < 0 || saltLen > int(^uint32(0)) {
-		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("salt length out of range")
-	}
-	config.SaltLen = uint32(saltLen) // nolint:gosec // checked above
 
-	hash, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[5])
+	salt, err := decodeSalt(parts[4])
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, nil, err
 	}
-	hashLen := len(hash)
-	if hashLen < 0 || hashLen > int(^uint32(0)) {
-		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("hash length out of range")
+
+	config.SaltLen = uint32(len(salt)) //nolint:gosec // validated in decodeSalt
+
+	hash, err := decodeHashBytes(parts[5])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
 	}
-	config.KeyLen = uint32(hashLen) // nolint:gosec // checked above
+
+	config.KeyLen = uint32(len(hash)) //nolint:gosec // validated in decodeHashBytes
 
 	return config, salt, hash, nil
 }
 
-// GenerateRandomPassword generates a cryptographically secure random password
+func parseVersion(s string) (int, error) {
+	var version int
+
+	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(s, "v=%d", &version)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("parsing version: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return version, nil
+}
+
+func parseParams(s string) (*PasswordConfig, error) {
+	config := &PasswordConfig{}
+
+	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(
+		s, "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d",
+		&config.Memory, &config.Time, &config.Threads,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing params: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return config, nil
+}
+
+func decodeSalt(s string) ([]byte, error) {
+	salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding salt: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	saltLen := len(salt)
+	if saltLen < 0 || saltLen > int(^uint32(0)) {
+		return nil, errSaltLengthOutOfRange
+	}
+
+	return salt, nil
+}
+
+func decodeHashBytes(s string) ([]byte, error) {
+	hash, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding hash: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	hashLen := len(hash)
+	if hashLen < 0 || hashLen > int(^uint32(0)) {
+		return nil, errHashLengthOutOfRange
+	}
+
+	return hash, nil
+}
+
+// GenerateRandomPassword generates a cryptographically secure
+// random password.
 func GenerateRandomPassword(length int) (string, error) {
 	const (
 		uppercase = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
@@ -141,27 +236,27 @@ func GenerateRandomPassword(length int) (string, error) {
 	// Create password slice
 	password := make([]byte, length)
 
-	// Ensure at least one character from each set for password complexity
-	if length >= 4 {
-		// Get one character from each set
+	// Ensure at least one character from each set
+	if length >= minPasswordComplexityLen {
 		password[0] = uppercase[cryptoRandInt(len(uppercase))]
 		password[1] = lowercase[cryptoRandInt(len(lowercase))]
 		password[2] = digits[cryptoRandInt(len(digits))]
 		password[3] = special[cryptoRandInt(len(special))]
 
 		// Fill the rest randomly from all characters
-		for i := 4; i < length; i++ {
+		for i := minPasswordComplexityLen; i < length; i++ {
 			password[i] = allChars[cryptoRandInt(len(allChars))]
 		}
 
 		// Shuffle the password to avoid predictable pattern
-		for i := len(password) - 1; i > 0; i-- {
-			j := cryptoRandInt(i + 1)
-			password[i], password[j] = password[j], password[i]
+		for i := range len(password) - 1 {
+			j := cryptoRandInt(len(password) - i)
+			idx := len(password) - 1 - i
+			password[idx], password[j] = password[j], password[idx]
 		}
 	} else {
 		// For very short passwords, just use all characters
-		for i := 0; i < length; i++ {
+		for i := range length {
 			password[i] = allChars[cryptoRandInt(len(allChars))]
 		}
 	}
@@ -169,16 +264,17 @@ func GenerateRandomPassword(length int) (string, error) {
 	return string(password), nil
 }
 
-// cryptoRandInt generates a cryptographically secure random integer in [0, max)
-func cryptoRandInt(max int) int {
-	if max <= 0 {
-		panic("max must be positive")
+// cryptoRandInt generates a cryptographically secure random
+// integer in [0, upperBound).
+func cryptoRandInt(upperBound int) int {
+	if upperBound <= 0 {
+		panic("upperBound must be positive")
 	}
 
-	// Calculate the maximum valid value to avoid modulo bias
-	// For example, if max=200 and we have 256 possible values,
-	// we only accept values 0-199 (reject 200-255)
-	nBig, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(max)))
+	nBig, err := rand.Int(
+		rand.Reader,
+		big.NewInt(int64(upperBound)),
+	)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(fmt.Sprintf("crypto/rand error: %v", err))
 	}

internal/database/password_test.go

@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-package database
+package database_test
 
 import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 )
 
 func TestGenerateRandomPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	tests := []struct {
 		name   string
 		length int
@@ -18,109 +22,172 @@ func TestGenerateRandomPassword(t *testing.T) {
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(tt.length)
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			password, err := database.GenerateRandomPassword(
+				tt.length,
+			)
 			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v", err)
+				t.Fatalf(
+					"GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v",
+					err,
+				)
 			}
 
 			if len(password) != tt.length {
-				t.Errorf("Password length = %v, want %v", len(password), tt.length)
+				t.Errorf(
+					"Password length = %v, want %v",
+					len(password), tt.length,
+				)
 			}
 
-			// For passwords >= 4 chars, check complexity
-			if tt.length >= 4 {
-				hasUpper := false
-				hasLower := false
-				hasDigit := false
-				hasSpecial := false
-
-				for _, char := range password {
-					switch {
-					case char >= 'A' && char <= 'Z':
-						hasUpper = true
-					case char >= 'a' && char <= 'z':
-						hasLower = true
-					case char >= '0' && char <= '9':
-						hasDigit = true
-					case strings.ContainsRune("!@#$%^&*()_+-=[]{}|;:,.<>?", char):
-						hasSpecial = true
-					}
-				}
-
-				if !hasUpper || !hasLower || !hasDigit || !hasSpecial {
-					t.Errorf("Password lacks required complexity: upper=%v, lower=%v, digit=%v, special=%v",
-						hasUpper, hasLower, hasDigit, hasSpecial)
-				}
-			}
+			checkPasswordComplexity(
+				t, password, tt.length,
+			)
 		})
 	}
 }
 
+func checkPasswordComplexity(
+	t *testing.T,
+	password string,
+	length int,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	// For passwords >= 4 chars, check complexity
+	if length < 4 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	flags := classifyChars(password)
+
+	if !flags[0] || !flags[1] || !flags[2] || !flags[3] {
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Password lacks required complexity: "+
+				"upper=%v, lower=%v, digit=%v, special=%v",
+			flags[0], flags[1], flags[2], flags[3],
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+func classifyChars(s string) [4]bool {
+	var flags [4]bool // upper, lower, digit, special
+
+	for _, char := range s {
+		switch {
+		case char >= 'A' && char <= 'Z':
+			flags[0] = true
+		case char >= 'a' && char <= 'z':
+			flags[1] = true
+		case char >= '0' && char <= '9':
+			flags[2] = true
+		case strings.ContainsRune(
+			"!@#$%^&*()_+-=[]{}|;:,.<>?",
+			char,
+		):
+			flags[3] = true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return flags
+}
+
 func TestGenerateRandomPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	// Generate multiple passwords and ensure they're different
 	passwords := make(map[string]bool)
+
 	const numPasswords = 100
 
-	for i := 0; i < numPasswords; i++ {
-		password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(16)
+	for range numPasswords {
+		password, err := database.GenerateRandomPassword(16)
 		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v", err)
+			t.Fatalf(
+				"GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v",
+				err,
+			)
 		}
 
 		if passwords[password] {
-			t.Errorf("Duplicate password generated: %s", password)
+			t.Errorf(
+				"Duplicate password generated: %s",
+				password,
+			)
 		}
+
 		passwords[password] = true
 	}
 }
 
 func TestHashPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	password := "testPassword123!"
 
-	hash, err := HashPassword(password)
+	hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
 	}
 
 	// Check that hash has correct format
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, "$argon2id$") {
-		t.Errorf("Hash doesn't have correct prefix: %s", hash)
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Hash doesn't have correct prefix: %s",
+			hash,
+		)
 	}
 
 	// Verify password
-	valid, err := VerifyPassword(password, hash)
+	valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, hash)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
 	}
+
 	if !valid {
-		t.Error("VerifyPassword() returned false for correct password")
+		t.Error(
+			"VerifyPassword() returned false " +
+				"for correct password",
+		)
 	}
 
 	// Verify wrong password fails
-	valid, err = VerifyPassword("wrongPassword", hash)
+	valid, err = database.VerifyPassword(
+		"wrongPassword", hash,
+	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
 	}
+
 	if valid {
-		t.Error("VerifyPassword() returned true for wrong password")
+		t.Error(
+			"VerifyPassword() returned true " +
+				"for wrong password",
+		)
 	}
 }
 
 func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	password := "testPassword123!"
 
-	// Same password should produce different hashes due to salt
-	hash1, err := HashPassword(password)
+	// Same password should produce different hashes
+	hash1, err := database.HashPassword(password)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
 	}
 
-	hash2, err := HashPassword(password)
+	hash2, err := database.HashPassword(password)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
 	}
 
 	if hash1 == hash2 {
-		t.Error("Same password produced identical hashes (salt not working)")
+		t.Error(
+			"Same password produced identical hashes " +
+				"(salt not working)",
+		)
 	}
 }

internal/database/retention.go

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+)
+
+// hoursPerDay converts a RetentionDays count into hours for cutoff
+// computation.
+const hoursPerDay = 24
+
+// RetentionReaperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
+// RetentionReaper.
+type RetentionReaperParams struct {
+	fx.In
+
+	Config    *config.Config
+	Database  *Database
+	DBManager *WebhookDBManager
+	Logger    *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// RetentionReaper periodically deletes expired events (and their
+// dependent deliveries and delivery results) from each per-webhook
+// database, enforcing every webhook's RetentionDays. Rows are removed
+// permanently so that per-webhook SQLite files do not grow without
+// bound.
+type RetentionReaper struct {
+	db        *Database
+	dbManager *WebhookDBManager
+	log       *slog.Logger
+	interval  time.Duration
+	cancel    context.CancelFunc
+	wg        sync.WaitGroup
+}
+
+// NewRetentionReaper creates the retention reaper and registers its
+// fx lifecycle hooks. The background sweep loop starts on OnStart and
+// stops cleanly on OnStop via context cancellation.
+func NewRetentionReaper(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params RetentionReaperParams,
+) *RetentionReaper {
+	r := &RetentionReaper{
+		db:        params.Database,
+		dbManager: params.DBManager,
+		log:       params.Logger.Get(),
+		interval:  params.Config.RetentionSweepInterval,
+	}
+
+	r.registerHooks(lc)
+
+	return r
+}
+
+// registerHooks wires the reaper's start and stop into the fx
+// lifecycle. The start hook's context is deliberately ignored: see
+// start for why the sweep loop must not inherit it.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) registerHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
+	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
+		//nolint:contextcheck // Not inheriting the hook context is
+		// the point: see start.
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
+			r.start()
+
+			return nil
+		},
+		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
+			r.stop()
+
+			return nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// start launches the background sweep loop.
+//
+// The loop's context is derived from context.Background(), NOT from
+// the fx OnStart hook context. The hook context carries fx's start
+// timeout (15s by default) and is cancelled once the start phase
+// completes, so a loop derived from it dies 45 minutes before its
+// first tick under the default one-hour sweep interval, leaving a
+// reaper that never reaps. A long-lived goroutine must outlive the
+// startup phase, so its lifetime is bounded by OnStop instead: stop
+// cancels this context and waits on the WaitGroup.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) start() {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	r.cancel = cancel
+
+	r.wg.Add(1)
+
+	go r.run(ctx)
+
+	r.log.Info(
+		"retention reaper started",
+		"interval", r.interval.String(),
+	)
+}
+
+func (r *RetentionReaper) stop() {
+	r.log.Info("retention reaper stopping")
+
+	if r.cancel != nil {
+		r.cancel()
+	}
+
+	r.wg.Wait()
+	r.log.Info("retention reaper stopped")
+}
+
+func (r *RetentionReaper) run(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer r.wg.Done()
+
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(r.interval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			r.sweep(ctx)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// sweep lists every webhook from the main database and reaps expired
+// rows from each per-webhook database that has a finite retention
+// policy. Webhooks set to retain forever are skipped entirely.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
+	var webhooks []Webhook
+
+	err := r.db.DB().
+		Model(&Webhook{}).
+		Find(&webhooks).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		r.log.Error(
+			"retention sweep: failed to list webhooks",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := range webhooks {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		default:
+		}
+
+		wh := webhooks[i]
+
+		// Skip retain-forever webhooks before building any query.
+		// RetainsForever covers both the RetentionForeverDays
+		// sentinel and the non-positive values that predate it: the
+		// sentinel is a positive number, so without this the reaper
+		// would compute a cutoff a thousand years in the past and
+		// issue a DELETE matching nothing on every single sweep.
+		if wh.RetainsForever() {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Nothing to reap if the per-webhook database has never
+		// been created.
+		if !r.dbManager.DBExists(wh.ID) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		r.reapWebhook(wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
+	}
+}
+
+// reapWebhook removes every expired event (and its dependents) from a
+// single webhook's database.
+func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
+	webhookID string,
+	retentionDays int,
+) {
+	db, err := r.dbManager.GetDB(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.log.Error(
+			"retention sweep: failed to open webhook database",
+			"webhook_id", webhookID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	cutoff, ok := retentionCutoff(time.Now(), retentionDays)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	deleted, err := reapExpired(db, cutoff)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.log.Error(
+			"retention sweep: failed to reap expired events",
+			"webhook_id", webhookID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	if deleted > 0 {
+		r.log.Info(
+			"retention sweep: reaped expired events",
+			"webhook_id", webhookID,
+			"retention_days", retentionDays,
+			"events_deleted", deleted,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// retentionCutoff returns the timestamp before which a webhook's
+// events have expired, and whether any cutoff applies at all. It
+// reports false for a retain-forever policy, so no DELETE is issued.
+//
+// The day count is clamped to MaxFiniteRetentionDays first. This is
+// defense in depth rather than decoration: a time.Duration is an int64
+// nanosecond count, so an unclamped multiplication overflows above
+// that ceiling and wraps the span negative. Subtracting a negative
+// span moves the cutoff into the far future, where it matches every
+// row in the database: the sweep then deletes every event, delivery,
+// and delivery result, including ones created seconds ago. Rejecting
+// out-of-range input at the form is the primary guard; saturating here
+// means an old row, a migration, or a future call site cannot turn a
+// too-large retention into total data loss.
+func retentionCutoff(
+	now time.Time,
+	retentionDays int,
+) (time.Time, bool) {
+	if retainsForever(retentionDays) {
+		return time.Time{}, false
+	}
+
+	if retentionDays > MaxFiniteRetentionDays {
+		retentionDays = MaxFiniteRetentionDays
+	}
+
+	return now.Add(
+		-time.Duration(retentionDays*hoursPerDay) * time.Hour,
+	), true
+}
+
+// reapExpired hard-deletes, in foreign-key-safe order, the delivery
+// results, deliveries, and events associated with events older than
+// cutoff. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather
+// than soft-deleted, reclaiming disk. It returns the number of events
+// deleted.
+func reapExpired(db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
+	// Fresh subqueries are built per statement to avoid reusing a
+	// mutated builder across executions.
+	expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
+		return db.Model(&Event{}).
+			Select("id").
+			Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
+	}
+	expiredDeliveryIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
+		return db.Model(&Delivery{}).
+			Select("id").
+			Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs())
+	}
+
+	// 1. Delivery results whose delivery belongs to an expired event.
+	res := db.Unscoped().
+		Where("delivery_id IN (?)", expiredDeliveryIDs()).
+		Delete(&DeliveryResult{})
+	if res.Error != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"deleting expired delivery results: %w",
+			res.Error,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// 2. Deliveries belonging to an expired event.
+	del := db.Unscoped().
+		Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
+		Delete(&Delivery{})
+	if del.Error != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"deleting expired deliveries: %w",
+			del.Error,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// 3. The expired events themselves.
+	ev := db.Unscoped().
+		Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
+		Delete(&Event{})
+	if ev.Error != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"deleting expired events: %w",
+			ev.Error,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return ev.RowsAffected, nil
+}

internal/database/retention_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+package database_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+const (
+	// reaperTestInterval is the sweep interval a lifecycle test
+	// runs the reaper at, so a loop that survives startup produces
+	// an observable sweep quickly.
+	reaperTestInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
+
+	// reaperStopTimeout bounds how long a lifecycle test waits for
+	// the reaper's OnStop hook to return before declaring the
+	// shutdown hung.
+	reaperStopTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
+	// reaperTestRetentionDays is the retention policy the lifecycle
+	// tests give their webhook.
+	reaperTestRetentionDays = 30
+)
+
+// recordingLifecycle is a minimal fx.Lifecycle that records the
+// hooks a component registers, so a test can invoke the real
+// OnStart/OnStop functions with a context of its choosing.
+type recordingLifecycle struct {
+	hooks []fx.Hook
+}
+
+func (l *recordingLifecycle) Append(h fx.Hook) {
+	l.hooks = append(l.hooks, h)
+}
+
+// startReaperViaHook drives the genuine fx hooks the application
+// registers for the reaper, handing OnStart a context that is
+// already done. It returns the recorded lifecycle so the caller
+// can drive OnStop too.
+func startReaperViaHook(
+	t *testing.T, r *database.RetentionReaper,
+) *recordingLifecycle {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
+	r.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
+	require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
+
+	// fx hands OnStart a context carrying the application start
+	// timeout, and cancels it when the start phase ends. An
+	// already-cancelled context is that same defect taken to its
+	// limit, and unlike a plain context.Background() it actually
+	// distinguishes a correctly rooted loop from a broken one.
+	hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+
+	require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
+
+	return lc
+}
+
+// eventGone reports whether an event row has been removed. It
+// takes no *testing.T because it is polled from an
+// assert.Eventually condition, which runs off the test goroutine
+// where testify assertions must not be used.
+func eventGone(db *gorm.DB, eventID string) bool {
+	var n int64
+
+	err := db.Unscoped().Model(&database.Event{}).
+		Where("id = ?", eventID).Count(&n).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return n == 0
+}
+
+// seedExpiredWebhook creates a webhook with a finite retention
+// policy plus one long-expired event chain, and returns the
+// webhook's database and the chain's event ID.
+func seedExpiredWebhook(
+	t *testing.T, env *retentionTestEnv,
+) (*gorm.DB, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhookID := createWebhook(
+		t, env.mainDB.DB(), reaperTestRetentionDays,
+	)
+
+	db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	chain := seedEventChain(
+		t, db, webhookID,
+		time.Now().Add(-365*24*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	return db, chain.eventID
+}
+
+// TestRetentionReaper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext is the
+// regression test for a reaper that never reaped. fx calls
+// OnStart with a context carrying the application's start timeout
+// (15s by default) and cancels it when the start phase ends, so a
+// sweep loop rooted in it is dead three quarters of an hour
+// before its first tick under the default one-hour interval, and
+// per-webhook event databases grow without bound exactly as they
+// did before retention existed.
+//
+// Driving OnStart with an already-cancelled context is that
+// defect taken to its limit: a loop that inherits the hook
+// context never ticks once, while a correctly rooted loop keeps
+// sweeping for as long as the process lives.
+func TestRetentionReaper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	db, eventID := seedExpiredWebhook(t, env)
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(reaperTestInterval)
+
+	lc := startReaperViaHook(t, env.reaper)
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
+	})
+
+	assert.Eventually(
+		t,
+		func() bool { return eventGone(db, eventID) },
+		5*time.Second,
+		reaperTestInterval,
+		"the sweep loop must keep running after the start "+
+			"hook's context is done; it reaped nothing, so it "+
+			"inherited the hook context and died",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestRetentionReaper_StopHookStopsLoop proves the fix did not
+// trade a startup bug for a shutdown hang: now that the sweep
+// loop no longer observes the start hook's cancellation, OnStop
+// is the only thing that can stop it, and it must both return
+// promptly and actually leave the loop stopped.
+func TestRetentionReaper_StopHookStopsLoop(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	db, eventID := seedExpiredWebhook(t, env)
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(reaperTestInterval)
+
+	lc := startReaperViaHook(t, env.reaper)
+
+	// Let the loop prove it is running before stopping it, so a
+	// fast OnStop cannot pass by stopping something already dead.
+	require.Eventually(
+		t,
+		func() bool { return eventGone(db, eventID) },
+		5*time.Second,
+		reaperTestInterval,
+	)
+
+	var stopErr error
+
+	stopped := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		defer close(stopped)
+
+		// stop blocks on the loop's WaitGroup, so returning at all
+		// proves the goroutine observed the cancellation.
+		stopErr = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-stopped:
+	case <-time.After(reaperStopTimeout):
+		t.Fatal(
+			"OnStop did not return: the retention reaper's " +
+				"WaitGroup is still waiting on a loop that never " +
+				"observed cancellation",
+		)
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, stopErr)
+
+	// With the loop gone, a newly expired chain must survive.
+	survivor := seedEventChain(
+		t, db, "stopped-webhook",
+		time.Now().Add(-365*24*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * reaperTestInterval)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t,
+		eventGone(db, survivor.eventID),
+		"a stopped reaper must not sweep anything",
+	)
+}

internal/database/retention_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+package database_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+)
+
+// retentionTestEnv bundles the pieces a retention test drives.
+type retentionTestEnv struct {
+	reaper *database.RetentionReaper
+	mainDB *database.Database
+	mgr    *database.WebhookDBManager
+}
+
+func setupRetentionTest(t *testing.T) *retentionTestEnv {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
+
+	g := &globals.Globals{
+		Appname: testAppname,
+		Version: testVersion,
+	}
+
+	l, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{
+		DataDir:     t.TempDir(),
+		Environment: "dev",
+	}
+
+	mainDB, err := database.New(lc, database.DatabaseParams{
+		Config: cfg,
+		Logger: l,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	mgr, err := database.NewWebhookDBManager(
+		lc,
+		database.WebhookDBManagerParams{Config: cfg, Logger: l},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) })
+
+	return &retentionTestEnv{
+		reaper: database.NewTestRetentionReaper(mainDB, mgr),
+		mainDB: mainDB,
+		mgr:    mgr,
+	}
+}
+
+// createWebhook inserts a webhook row into the main database with the
+// given retention policy and returns its ID.
+func createWebhook(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	retentionDays int,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{
+		UserID:        uuid.New().String(),
+		Name:          testWebhookName,
+		RetentionDays: retentionDays,
+	}
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+
+	// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites a non-positive RetentionDays to the
+	// retain-forever sentinel, and the column's GORM default would
+	// otherwise substitute 30. Force the requested value with a
+	// column-level update so tests can plant legacy rows that predate
+	// the sentinel and still carry a literal 0 or negative value.
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Model(wh).
+			Update("retention_days", retentionDays).Error,
+	)
+
+	return wh.ID
+}
+
+// createWebhookNormally inserts a webhook through the ordinary Create
+// path, with no column-level forcing, so Webhook.BeforeSave applies
+// exactly as it does in production. Passing 0 therefore yields a row
+// holding the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
+func createWebhookNormally(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	retentionDays int,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{
+		UserID:        uuid.New().String(),
+		Name:          testWebhookName,
+		RetentionDays: retentionDays,
+	}
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+
+	return wh.ID
+}
+
+// eventChain is the set of row IDs seeded for a single event.
+type eventChain struct {
+	eventID    string
+	deliveryID string
+	resultID   string
+}
+
+// seedEventChain creates an event with one delivery and one delivery
+// result, all stamped with createdAt, and returns their IDs.
+func seedEventChain(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	webhookID string,
+	createdAt time.Time,
+) eventChain {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	event := &database.Event{
+		WebhookID:    webhookID,
+		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
+		Method:       http.MethodPost,
+		Body:         `{"seed": true}`,
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
+	}
+	event.CreatedAt = createdAt
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
+
+	delivery := &database.Delivery{
+		EventID:  event.ID,
+		TargetID: uuid.New().String(),
+		Status:   database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+	}
+	delivery.CreatedAt = createdAt
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(delivery).Error)
+
+	result := &database.DeliveryResult{
+		DeliveryID: delivery.ID,
+		AttemptNum: 1,
+		Success:    true,
+		StatusCode: 200,
+		Duration:   10,
+	}
+	result.CreatedAt = createdAt
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(result).Error)
+
+	return eventChain{
+		eventID:    event.ID,
+		deliveryID: delivery.ID,
+		resultID:   result.ID,
+	}
+}
+
+// countByID returns how many rows of model match the given id,
+// counting even hard-deletable rows via Unscoped.
+func countByID(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	model any,
+	id string,
+) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var n int64
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Unscoped().Model(model).
+			Where("id = ?", id).Count(&n).Error,
+	)
+
+	return n
+}
+
+func assertChainGone(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	chain eventChain,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	assert.Zero(
+		t,
+		countByID(t, db, &database.Event{}, chain.eventID),
+		"expired event should be removed",
+	)
+	assert.Zero(
+		t,
+		countByID(t, db, &database.Delivery{}, chain.deliveryID),
+		"expired delivery should be removed",
+	)
+	assert.Zero(
+		t,
+		countByID(
+			t, db, &database.DeliveryResult{}, chain.resultID,
+		),
+		"expired delivery result should be removed",
+	)
+}
+
+func assertChainPresent(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	chain eventChain,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		int64(1),
+		countByID(t, db, &database.Event{}, chain.eventID),
+		"recent event should be retained",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		int64(1),
+		countByID(t, db, &database.Delivery{}, chain.deliveryID),
+		"recent delivery should be retained",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		int64(1),
+		countByID(
+			t, db, &database.DeliveryResult{}, chain.resultID,
+		),
+		"recent delivery result should be retained",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestRetentionReaper_ReapsExpiredKeepsRecent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	const retentionDays = 30
+
+	webhookID := createWebhook(
+		t, env.mainDB.DB(), retentionDays,
+	)
+
+	db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	old := seedEventChain(
+		t, db, webhookID,
+		now.Add(-40*24*time.Hour),
+	)
+	recent := seedEventChain(
+		t, db, webhookID,
+		now.Add(-1*24*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assertChainGone(t, db, old)
+	assertChainPresent(t, db, recent)
+}
+
+// TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep covers the
+// end-to-end retain-forever path: a webhook created the normal way with
+// a requested retention of 0 lands on the RetentionForeverDays
+// sentinel, and the reaper leaves its ancient events alone while still
+// reaping a finite-retention webhook in the very same sweep.
+func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	foreverID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
+
+	var stored database.Webhook
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		env.mainDB.DB().Where("id = ?", foreverID).
+			First(&stored).Error,
+	)
+	require.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		stored.RetentionDays,
+		"a requested retention of 0 must persist as the sentinel",
+	)
+
+	finiteID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
+
+	foreverDB, err := env.mgr.GetDB(foreverID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	finiteDB, err := env.mgr.GetDB(finiteID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ancient := time.Now().Add(-365 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	kept := seedEventChain(t, foreverDB, foreverID, ancient)
+	doomed := seedEventChain(t, finiteDB, finiteID, ancient)
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assertChainPresent(t, foreverDB, kept)
+	assertChainGone(t, finiteDB, doomed)
+}
+
+// TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents pins the
+// overflow that made a large finite retention destroy everything.
+//
+// The cutoff is a time.Duration, an int64 nanosecond count. A day
+// count above MaxFiniteRetentionDays multiplied out unclamped wraps
+// negative, so subtracting it moves the cutoff into the far future,
+// where "created_at < cutoff" matches every row: an event created a
+// moment ago, and its delivery and delivery result, were all deleted
+// on the first sweep. 200000 is inside that band and below the
+// retain-forever sentinel, so it is treated as a finite policy and
+// really does reach the arithmetic.
+//
+// The row is planted at the column level because such a value can no
+// longer be submitted through the form; the point of the test is that
+// a row from an older version, or a future call site, still cannot
+// trigger the wipe.
+func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	const overflowingRetentionDays = 200000
+
+	require.Greater(
+		t,
+		overflowingRetentionDays,
+		database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
+		"the test value must exceed what the cutoff can represent",
+	)
+	require.Less(
+		t,
+		overflowingRetentionDays,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		"the test value must not be rescued by the forever skip",
+	)
+
+	webhookID := createWebhook(
+		t, env.mainDB.DB(), overflowingRetentionDays,
+	)
+
+	db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	fresh := seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, time.Now())
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assertChainPresent(t, db, fresh)
+}
+
+func TestRetentionReaper_RetainsForeverWhenNonPositive(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupRetentionTest(t)
+
+	// A legacy row written before the sentinel existed still carries a
+	// literal 0; the <= 0 guard must keep honouring it.
+	webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
+
+	db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ancient := seedEventChain(
+		t, db, webhookID,
+		time.Now().Add(-365*24*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assertChainPresent(t, db, ancient)
+}

internal/database/testing.go

@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ import (
 func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
 	return &Database{
 		db: db,
-		log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})),
+		log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+			os.Stderr,
+			&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+		)),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -23,6 +26,9 @@ func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
 func NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir string) *WebhookDBManager {
 	return &WebhookDBManager{
 		dataDir: dataDir,
-		log:     slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})),
+		log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+			os.Stderr,
+			&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+		)),
 	}
 }

internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package database
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
@@ -16,87 +17,82 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // WebhookDBManagerParams is a standard fx naming convention
+// WebhookDBManagerParams holds the fx dependencies for
+// WebhookDBManager.
 type WebhookDBManagerParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Config *config.Config
 	Logger *logger.Logger
 }
 
-// WebhookDBManager manages per-webhook SQLite database files for event storage.
-// Each webhook gets its own dedicated database containing Events, Deliveries,
-// and DeliveryResults. Database connections are opened lazily and cached.
+// errInvalidCachedDBType indicates a type assertion failure
+// when retrieving a cached database connection.
+var errInvalidCachedDBType = errors.New(
+	"invalid cached database type",
+)
+
+// WebhookDBManager manages per-webhook SQLite database files
+// for event storage. Each webhook gets its own dedicated
+// database containing Events, Deliveries, and DeliveryResults.
+// Database connections are opened lazily and cached.
 type WebhookDBManager struct {
 	dataDir string
 	dbs     sync.Map // map[webhookID]*gorm.DB
 	log     *slog.Logger
 }
 
-// NewWebhookDBManager creates a new WebhookDBManager and registers lifecycle hooks.
-func NewWebhookDBManager(lc fx.Lifecycle, params WebhookDBManagerParams) (*WebhookDBManager, error) {
+// NewWebhookDBManager creates a new WebhookDBManager and
+// registers lifecycle hooks.
+func NewWebhookDBManager(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params WebhookDBManagerParams,
+) (*WebhookDBManager, error) {
 	m := &WebhookDBManager{
 		dataDir: params.Config.DataDir,
 		log:     params.Logger.Get(),
 	}
 
 	// Create data directory if it doesn't exist
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, 0750); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating data directory %s: %w", m.dataDir, err)
+	err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, dataDirPerm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"creating data directory %s: %w",
+			m.dataDir,
+			err,
+		)
 	}
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error { //nolint:revive // ctx unused but required by fx
+		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			return m.CloseAll()
 		},
 	})
 
-	m.log.Info("webhook database manager initialized", "data_dir", m.dataDir)
+	m.log.Info(
+		"webhook database manager initialized",
+		"data_dir", m.dataDir,
+	)
+
 	return m, nil
 }
 
-// dbPath returns the filesystem path for a webhook's database file.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) dbPath(webhookID string) string {
-	return filepath.Join(m.dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID))
-}
-
-// openDB opens (or creates) a per-webhook SQLite database and runs migrations.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(webhookID string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
-	path := m.dbPath(webhookID)
-	dbURL := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc", path)
-
-	sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening webhook database %s: %w", webhookID, err)
-	}
-
-	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
-		Conn: sqlDB,
-	}, &gorm.Config{})
-	if err != nil {
-		sqlDB.Close()
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("connecting to webhook database %s: %w", webhookID, err)
-	}
-
-	// Run migrations for event-tier models only
-	if err := db.AutoMigrate(&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{}); err != nil {
-		sqlDB.Close()
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("migrating webhook database %s: %w", webhookID, err)
-	}
-
-	m.log.Info("opened per-webhook database", "webhook_id", webhookID, "path", path)
-	return db, nil
-}
-
-// GetDB returns the database connection for a webhook, creating the database
-// file lazily if it doesn't exist. This handles both new webhooks and existing
-// webhooks that were created before per-webhook databases were introduced.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(webhookID string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
+// GetDB returns the database connection for a webhook,
+// creating the database file lazily if it doesn't exist.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(
+	webhookID string,
+) (*gorm.DB, error) {
 	// Fast path: already open
 	if val, ok := m.dbs.Load(webhookID); ok {
 		cachedDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB)
 		if !castOK {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid cached database type for webhook %s", webhookID)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"%w for webhook %s",
+				errInvalidCachedDBType,
+				webhookID,
+			)
 		}
+
 		return cachedDB, nil
 	}
 
@@ -106,44 +102,61 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(webhookID string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	// Store it; if another goroutine beat us, close ours and use theirs
+	// Store it; if another goroutine beat us, close ours
 	actual, loaded := m.dbs.LoadOrStore(webhookID, db)
 	if loaded {
 		// Another goroutine created it first; close our duplicate
-		if sqlDB, closeErr := db.DB(); closeErr == nil {
-			sqlDB.Close()
+		sqlDB, closeErr := db.DB()
+		if closeErr == nil {
+			_ = sqlDB.Close()
 		}
+
 		existingDB, castOK := actual.(*gorm.DB)
 		if !castOK {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid cached database type for webhook %s", webhookID)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"%w for webhook %s",
+				errInvalidCachedDBType,
+				webhookID,
+			)
 		}
+
 		return existingDB, nil
 	}
 
 	return db, nil
 }
 
-// CreateDB explicitly creates a new per-webhook database file and runs migrations.
-// This is called when a new webhook is created.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) CreateDB(webhookID string) error {
+// CreateDB explicitly creates a new per-webhook database file
+// and runs migrations.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) CreateDB(
+	webhookID string,
+) error {
 	_, err := m.GetDB(webhookID)
+
 	return err
 }
 
-// DBExists checks if a per-webhook database file exists on disk.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) DBExists(webhookID string) bool {
+// DBExists checks if a per-webhook database file exists on
+// disk.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) DBExists(
+	webhookID string,
+) bool {
 	_, err := os.Stat(m.dbPath(webhookID))
+
 	return err == nil
 }
 
-// DeleteDB closes the connection and deletes the database file for a webhook.
-// This performs a hard delete — the file is permanently removed.
-func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(webhookID string) error {
+// DeleteDB closes the connection and deletes the database file
+// for a webhook. The file is permanently removed.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
+	webhookID string,
+) error {
 	// Close and remove from cache
 	if val, ok := m.dbs.LoadAndDelete(webhookID); ok {
 		if gormDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB); castOK {
-			if sqlDB, err := gormDB.DB(); err == nil {
-				sqlDB.Close()
+			sqlDB, err := gormDB.DB()
+			if err == nil {
+				_ = sqlDB.Close()
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -151,12 +164,20 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(webhookID string) error {
 	// Delete the main DB file and WAL/SHM files
 	path := m.dbPath(webhookID)
 	for _, suffix := range []string{"", "-wal", "-shm"} {
-		if err := os.Remove(path + suffix); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			return fmt.Errorf("deleting webhook database file %s%s: %w", path, suffix, err)
+		err := os.Remove(path + suffix)
+		if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return fmt.Errorf(
+				"deleting webhook database file %s%s: %w",
+				path, suffix, err,
+			)
 		}
 	}
 
-	m.log.Info("deleted per-webhook database", "webhook_id", webhookID)
+	m.log.Info(
+		"deleted per-webhook database",
+		"webhook_id", webhookID,
+	)
+
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -164,20 +185,97 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(webhookID string) error {
 // Called during application shutdown.
 func (m *WebhookDBManager) CloseAll() error {
 	var lastErr error
-	m.dbs.Range(func(key, value interface{}) bool {
+
+	m.dbs.Range(func(key, value any) bool {
 		if gormDB, castOK := value.(*gorm.DB); castOK {
-			if sqlDB, err := gormDB.DB(); err == nil {
-				if closeErr := sqlDB.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+			sqlDB, err := gormDB.DB()
+			if err == nil {
+				closeErr := sqlDB.Close()
+				if closeErr != nil {
 					lastErr = closeErr
-					m.log.Error("failed to close webhook database",
+					m.log.Error(
+						"failed to close webhook database",
 						"webhook_id", key,
 						"error", closeErr,
 					)
 				}
 			}
 		}
+
 		m.dbs.Delete(key)
+
 		return true
 	})
+
 	return lastErr
 }
+
+// DBPath returns the filesystem path for a webhook's database
+// file.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) DBPath(
+	webhookID string,
+) string {
+	return m.dbPath(webhookID)
+}
+
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) dbPath(
+	webhookID string,
+) string {
+	return filepath.Join(
+		m.dataDir,
+		fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
+	)
+}
+
+// openDB opens (or creates) a per-webhook SQLite database and
+// runs migrations.
+func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
+	webhookID string,
+) (*gorm.DB, error) {
+	path := m.dbPath(webhookID)
+	dbURL := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
+		path,
+	)
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"opening webhook database %s: %w",
+			webhookID, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
+		Conn: sqlDB,
+	}, &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = sqlDB.Close()
+
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"connecting to webhook database %s: %w",
+			webhookID, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Run migrations for event-tier models only
+	err = db.AutoMigrate(
+		&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = sqlDB.Close()
+
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"migrating webhook database %s: %w",
+			webhookID, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	m.log.Info(
+		"opened per-webhook database",
+		"webhook_id", webhookID,
+		"path", path,
+	)
+
+	return db, nil
+}

internal/database/webhook_db_manager_test.go

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-package database
+package database_test
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
@@ -10,23 +11,29 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
-func setupTestWebhookDBManager(t *testing.T) (*WebhookDBManager, *fxtest.Lifecycle) {
+func setupTestWebhookDBManager(
+	t *testing.T,
+) (*database.WebhookDBManager, *fxtest.Lifecycle) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
 
-	globals.Appname = "webhooker-test"
-	globals.Version = "test"
+	g := &globals.Globals{
+		Appname: testAppname,
+		Version: testVersion,
+	}
 
-	g, err := globals.New(lc)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	l, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g})
+	l, err := logger.New(
+		lc,
+		logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g},
+	)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	dataDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "events")
@@ -35,19 +42,25 @@ func setupTestWebhookDBManager(t *testing.T) (*WebhookDBManager, *fxtest.Lifecyc
 		DataDir: dataDir,
 	}
 
-	mgr, err := NewWebhookDBManager(lc, WebhookDBManagerParams{
+	mgr, err := database.NewWebhookDBManager(
+		lc,
+		database.WebhookDBManagerParams{
 			Config: cfg,
 			Logger: l,
-	})
+		},
+	)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	return mgr, lc
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
@@ -68,44 +81,52 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotNil(t, db)
 
 	// Verify we can write an event
-	event := &Event{
+	event := &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    webhookID,
 		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
-		Method:       "POST",
+		Method:       http.MethodPost,
 		Headers:      `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
 		Body:         `{"test": true}`,
-		ContentType:  "application/json",
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, event.ID)
 
 	// Verify we can read it back
-	var readEvent Event
-	require.NoError(t, db.First(&readEvent, "id = ?", event.ID).Error)
+	var readEvent database.Event
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.First(&readEvent, "id = ?", event.ID).Error,
+	)
 	assert.Equal(t, webhookID, readEvent.WebhookID)
-	assert.Equal(t, "POST", readEvent.Method)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, readEvent.Method)
 	assert.Equal(t, `{"test": true}`, readEvent.Body)
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
 
 	// Create the DB and write some data
 	require.NoError(t, mgr.CreateDB(webhookID))
+
 	db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	event := &Event{
+	event := &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    webhookID,
 		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
-		Method:       "POST",
+		Method:       http.MethodPost,
 		Body:         `{"test": true}`,
-		ContentType:  "application/json",
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
 
@@ -116,15 +137,19 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t, mgr.DBExists(webhookID))
 
 	// Verify the file is actually gone from disk
-	dbPath := mgr.dbPath(webhookID)
+	dbPath := mgr.DBPath(webhookID)
+
 	_, err = os.Stat(dbPath)
 	assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err))
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_LazyCreation(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
@@ -139,9 +164,12 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_LazyCreation(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_DeliveryWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
@@ -150,36 +178,71 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_DeliveryWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
 	db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	// Create an event
-	event := &Event{
+	event, delivery := seedDeliveryWorkflow(
+		t, db, webhookID, targetID,
+	)
+
+	verifyPendingDeliveries(t, db, event)
+	completeDelivery(t, db, delivery)
+	verifyNoPending(t, db)
+}
+
+func seedDeliveryWorkflow(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	webhookID, targetID string,
+) (*database.Event, *database.Delivery) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	event := &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    webhookID,
 		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
-		Method:       "POST",
+		Method:       http.MethodPost,
 		Headers:      `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
 		Body:         `{"payload": "test"}`,
-		ContentType:  "application/json",
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
 
-	// Create a delivery
-	delivery := &Delivery{
+	delivery := &database.Delivery{
 		EventID:  event.ID,
 		TargetID: targetID,
-		Status:   DeliveryStatusPending,
+		Status:   database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, db.Create(delivery).Error)
 
-	// Query pending deliveries
-	var pending []Delivery
-	require.NoError(t, db.Where("status = ?", DeliveryStatusPending).
-		Preload("Event").
-		Find(&pending).Error)
+	return event, delivery
+}
+
+func verifyPendingDeliveries(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	event *database.Event,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var pending []database.Delivery
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Where(
+			"status = ?",
+			database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+		).Preload("Event").Find(&pending).Error,
+	)
 	require.Len(t, pending, 1)
 	assert.Equal(t, event.ID, pending[0].EventID)
-	assert.Equal(t, "POST", pending[0].Event.Method)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, pending[0].Event.Method)
+}
 
-	// Create a delivery result
-	result := &DeliveryResult{
+func completeDelivery(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+	delivery *database.Delivery,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	result := &database.DeliveryResult{
 		DeliveryID: delivery.ID,
 		AttemptNum: 1,
 		Success:    true,
@@ -188,19 +251,40 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_DeliveryWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, db.Create(result).Error)
 
-	// Update delivery status
-	require.NoError(t, db.Model(delivery).Update("status", DeliveryStatusDelivered).Error)
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Model(delivery).Update(
+			"status",
+			database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+		).Error,
+	)
+}
 
-	// Verify no more pending deliveries
-	var stillPending []Delivery
-	require.NoError(t, db.Where("status = ?", DeliveryStatusPending).Find(&stillPending).Error)
+func verifyNoPending(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *gorm.DB,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var stillPending []database.Delivery
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.Where(
+			"status = ?",
+			database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+		).Find(&stillPending).Error,
+	)
 	assert.Empty(t, stillPending)
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
+
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 
 	webhook1 := uuid.New().String()
@@ -212,34 +296,38 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
 
 	db1, err := mgr.GetDB(webhook1)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
+
 	db2, err := mgr.GetDB(webhook2)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// Write events to each webhook's DB
-	event1 := &Event{
+	event1 := &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    webhook1,
 		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
-		Method:       "POST",
+		Method:       http.MethodPost,
 		Body:         `{"webhook": 1}`,
-		ContentType:  "application/json",
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
 	}
-	event2 := &Event{
+	event2 := &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    webhook2,
 		EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
-		Method:       "PUT",
+		Method:       http.MethodPut,
 		Body:         `{"webhook": 2}`,
-		ContentType:  "application/json",
+		ContentType:  testContentType,
 	}
+
 	require.NoError(t, db1.Create(event1).Error)
 	require.NoError(t, db2.Create(event2).Error)
 
 	// Verify isolation: each DB only has its own events
 	var count1 int64
-	db1.Model(&Event{}).Count(&count1)
+
+	db1.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count1)
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count1)
 
 	var count2 int64
-	db2.Model(&Event{}).Count(&count2)
+
+	db2.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count2)
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count2)
 
 	// Delete webhook1's DB, webhook2 should be unaffected
@@ -248,25 +336,31 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, mgr.DBExists(webhook2))
 
 	// webhook2's data should still be accessible
-	var events []Event
+	var events []database.Event
+
 	require.NoError(t, db2.Find(&events).Error)
 	assert.Len(t, events, 1)
 	assert.Equal(t, "PUT", events[0].Method)
 }
 
 func TestWebhookDBManager_CloseAll(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
 
 	// Create a few DBs
-	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
-		require.NoError(t, mgr.CreateDB(uuid.New().String()))
+	for range 3 {
+		require.NoError(
+			t,
+			mgr.CreateDB(uuid.New().String()),
+		)
 	}
 
 	// CloseAll should close all connections without error
 	require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
 
-	// Stop lifecycle (CloseAll already called, but shouldn't panic)
+	// Stop lifecycle (CloseAll already called)
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx))
 }

internal/delivery/archive_sweeper.go

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+)
+
+// ArchiveSweeperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
+// ArchiveSweeper.
+type ArchiveSweeperParams struct {
+	fx.In
+
+	Config   *config.Config
+	Database *database.Database
+	Engine   *Engine
+	Logger   *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// ArchiveSweeper periodically prunes expired rows from
+// per-webhook archive databases whose database target carries a
+// positive expiry.
+//
+// Without it, pruning happens only when an archive is
+// (re)opened, and archives are only ever reopened by writes: an
+// archive belonging to a webhook that has stopped receiving
+// events would keep its expired rows forever. The sweep closes
+// that gap without changing anything for archives whose expiry
+// is unset or "never".
+//
+// It reuses Config.RetentionSweepInterval rather than
+// introducing a second interval: this is a retention sweep with
+// the same semantics as the event retention reaper.
+type ArchiveSweeper struct {
+	db       *database.Database
+	eng      *Engine
+	log      *slog.Logger
+	interval time.Duration
+	cancel   context.CancelFunc
+	wg       sync.WaitGroup
+}
+
+// NewArchiveSweeper creates the archive sweeper and registers
+// its fx lifecycle hooks. The background sweep loop starts on
+// OnStart and stops cleanly on OnStop via context cancellation.
+func NewArchiveSweeper(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params ArchiveSweeperParams,
+) *ArchiveSweeper {
+	s := &ArchiveSweeper{
+		db:       params.Database,
+		eng:      params.Engine,
+		log:      params.Logger.Get(),
+		interval: params.Config.RetentionSweepInterval,
+	}
+
+	s.registerHooks(lc)
+
+	return s
+}
+
+// registerHooks wires the sweeper's start and stop into the fx
+// lifecycle. Both hook contexts are deliberately ignored: see
+// start for why the background loop must not inherit the start
+// hook's context, and stop for why shutdown blocks on the loop
+// rather than on the stop hook's deadline.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) registerHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
+	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
+		//nolint:contextcheck // Not passing the hook context is
+		// the point: see start.
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
+			s.start()
+
+			return nil
+		},
+		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
+			s.stop()
+
+			return nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// start launches the background sweep loop.
+//
+// The loop's context is derived from context.Background(), NOT
+// from the fx OnStart hook context. The hook context carries
+// fx's start timeout (15s by default), so a loop derived from it
+// is cancelled 15 seconds after the application starts — long
+// before the first tick under the default one-hour sweep
+// interval, leaving a sweeper that never sweeps. A long-lived
+// goroutine must outlive the startup phase, so its lifetime is
+// bounded by OnStop instead: stop cancels this context and waits
+// on the WaitGroup.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) start() {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	s.cancel = cancel
+
+	s.wg.Add(1)
+
+	go s.run(ctx)
+
+	s.log.Info(
+		"archive sweeper started",
+		"interval", s.interval.String(),
+	)
+}
+
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) stop() {
+	s.log.Info("archive sweeper stopping")
+
+	if s.cancel != nil {
+		s.cancel()
+	}
+
+	s.wg.Wait()
+	s.log.Info("archive sweeper stopped")
+}
+
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) run(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer s.wg.Done()
+
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(s.interval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			s.sweep(ctx)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// sweep prunes every archive whose database target declares a
+// positive expiry. Targets belonging to a deleted webhook are
+// soft-deleted along with it, so GORM's default scope already
+// excludes them.
+//
+// A failure for one webhook is logged and the sweep continues,
+// matching how the write path already treats a prune error as
+// non-fatal.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
+	var targets []database.Target
+
+	err := s.db.DB().
+		Model(&database.Target{}).
+		Where("type = ?", database.TargetTypeDatabase).
+		Find(&targets).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error(
+			"archive sweep: failed to list database targets",
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := range targets {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		default:
+		}
+
+		s.sweepTarget(&targets[i])
+	}
+}
+
+// sweepTarget prunes the archive of a single database target.
+// A missing, empty, or "never" expiry parses as a zero duration
+// and is skipped entirely, so those archives keep exactly the
+// behaviour they had before the sweep existed.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweepTarget(target *database.Target) {
+	expiry, err := parseArchiveExpiry(target.Config)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error(
+			"archive sweep: invalid database target config",
+			"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
+			"target_id", target.ID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	if expiry <= 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if s.eng == nil || s.eng.dbTarget == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	err = s.eng.dbTarget.sweepWebhook(target.WebhookID, expiry)
+	if err == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// A writer evicted underneath the sweep means the operator
+	// deleted the webhook (or its last database target) while the
+	// sweep was walking the target list. That is an ordinary
+	// interleaving, not a failure, so it must not produce an
+	// error line.
+	if errors.Is(err, errArchiveWriterEvicted) {
+		s.log.Debug(
+			"archive sweep: writer evicted mid-sweep",
+			"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
+			"target_id", target.ID,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.log.Error(
+		"archive sweep: failed to prune archive",
+		"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
+		"target_id", target.ID,
+		"error", err,
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/archive_sweeper_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,930 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+const (
+	// sweepRowOld and sweepRowNew are the event ids
+	// seedArchiveRows assigns to the first and second seeded
+	// rows.
+	sweepRowOld = "ev-0"
+	sweepRowNew = "ev-1"
+
+	// sweepConcurrentWrites is how many deliveries the
+	// concurrent write-plus-sweep test races against the sweep.
+	sweepConcurrentWrites = 20
+)
+
+// sweeperEnv bundles the pieces an archive sweep test drives:
+// a main configuration database holding webhooks and targets, a
+// delivery engine owning the archive writer registry, and the
+// data directory the archive files live in.
+type sweeperEnv struct {
+	sweeper *delivery.ArchiveSweeper
+	eng     *delivery.Engine
+	mainDB  *database.Database
+	dataDir string
+}
+
+func setupSweeperTest(t *testing.T) *sweeperEnv {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dataDir := t.TempDir()
+	log := archiveTestLogger()
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
+		"sqlite",
+		fmt.Sprintf(
+			"file:%s?mode=rwc",
+			filepath.Join(dataDir, "main.db"),
+		),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
+
+	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	mainDB := database.NewTestDatabase(gdb)
+	require.NoError(t, mainDB.Migrate())
+
+	eng := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
+		mainDB,
+		database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
+		log,
+		&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
+		1,
+	)
+
+	return &sweeperEnv{
+		sweeper: delivery.NewTestArchiveSweeper(
+			mainDB, eng, log,
+		),
+		eng:     eng,
+		mainDB:  mainDB,
+		dataDir: dataDir,
+	}
+}
+
+// archivePath returns where the engine keeps a webhook's
+// archive file.
+func (env *sweeperEnv) archivePath(webhookID string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(
+		env.dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
+	)
+}
+
+// seedDatabaseTarget creates a webhook with one database target
+// carrying the given target config JSON, and returns the
+// webhook id.
+func (env *sweeperEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
+	t *testing.T, configJSON string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{
+		UserID: uuid.New().String(),
+		Name:   "sweep-test",
+	}
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		env.mainDB.DB().
+			Omit(clause.Associations).
+			Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+
+	tgt := &database.Target{
+		WebhookID: wh.ID,
+		Name:      "archive",
+		Type:      database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+		Active:    true,
+		Config:    configJSON,
+	}
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		env.mainDB.DB().
+			Omit(clause.Associations).
+			Create(tgt).Error,
+	)
+
+	return wh.ID
+}
+
+// seedArchiveRows creates the archive file for a webhook and
+// inserts one row per supplied archived-at timestamp, returning
+// the archive path. The handle is closed before returning, so
+// the archive is idle exactly as it would be with no traffic.
+func (env *sweeperEnv) seedArchiveRows(
+	t *testing.T, webhookID string, archivedAt ...time.Time,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
+		"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t, gdb.AutoMigrate(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{}),
+	)
+
+	for i, at := range archivedAt {
+		row := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
+			EventID:    fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i),
+			WebhookID:  webhookID,
+			Method:     http.MethodPost,
+			Body:       `{"seeded":true}`,
+			ArchivedAt: at,
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&row).Error)
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
+
+	return path
+}
+
+// archivedEventIDs returns the event ids currently stored in an
+// archive file, read through a separate read-only handle.
+func archivedEventIDs(
+	t *testing.T, path string,
+) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var rows []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
+
+	rdb := openArchiveDBForRead(t, path)
+	require.NoError(t, rdb.Order("event_id").Find(&rows).Error)
+
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(rows))
+	for i := range rows {
+		ids = append(ids, rows[i].EventID)
+	}
+
+	return ids
+}
+
+// countArchivedRows counts the rows in an archive file without
+// asserting anything, so it is safe to poll from an
+// assert.Eventually condition (which runs off the test
+// goroutine, where testify assertions must not be used).
+func countArchivedRows(path string) (int64, error) {
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
+		"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", path),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() }()
+
+	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	var count int64
+
+	err = gdb.Model(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{}).
+		Count(&count).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	return count, nil
+}
+
+// captureLifecycle is a minimal fx.Lifecycle that records the
+// hooks a component registers, so a test can invoke the real
+// OnStart/OnStop functions with a context of its choosing.
+type captureLifecycle struct {
+	hooks []fx.Hook
+}
+
+func (l *captureLifecycle) Append(h fx.Hook) {
+	l.hooks = append(l.hooks, h)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext is the
+// regression test for a sweeper that never swept. fx calls
+// OnStart with a context carrying the application's start
+// timeout (15 seconds by default), so a background loop whose
+// context is derived from it is cancelled 15 seconds into the
+// process — three quarters of an hour before the first tick
+// under the default one-hour sweep interval.
+//
+// The hook context here is already cancelled, which is the same
+// defect taken to its limit: a loop that inherits it never runs
+// a single tick, while a correctly rooted loop keeps sweeping
+// for as long as the process lives. Handing the hook a plain
+// context.Background() would assert nothing at all.
+func TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID,
+		now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
+		now.Add(-time.Minute),
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSetInterval(10 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	// Drive the genuine fx hooks the application registers,
+	// rather than a test-only entry point.
+	lc := &captureLifecycle{}
+	env.sweeper.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
+	require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
+
+	hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+
+	require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
+	})
+
+	assert.Eventually(
+		t,
+		func() bool {
+			count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
+
+			return err == nil && count == 1
+		},
+		5*time.Second,
+		10*time.Millisecond,
+		"the sweep loop must keep running after the start "+
+			"hook's context is done; it pruned nothing, so it "+
+			"inherited the hook context and died",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter covers the
+// interleaving where a sweep tick has already listed a webhook's
+// target when the webhook is deleted and its writer evicted. The
+// sweep must not put a writer back into the registry: nothing
+// would ever evict it again, which is precisely the leak this
+// change exists to close.
+func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	// Prime the registry the way a delivery would, then evict as
+	// the deletion path does. The target row is deliberately left
+	// in place: this is the tick that listed the webhook before
+	// the deletion committed.
+	_, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
+	require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"a sweep must never re-register a writer for a webhook "+
+			"whose registry entry has already been released",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry states the same
+// invariant in its general form: sweeping an archive whose
+// webhook has no cached writer must not leave one behind, so the
+// registry keeps holding only writers a delivery created and an
+// eviction can reach.
+func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID,
+		time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+		time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
+	)
+
+	require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{sweepRowNew}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
+		"the sweep must still prune an idle archive",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"the sweep must release the registry entry it created",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery is the other
+// half of that invariant: an entry the sweep created but a
+// delivery then claimed belongs to the registry and must survive
+// the sweep, or the delivery would be left holding a detached
+// writer with an open handle that no eviction can reach.
+func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
+	event.WebhookID = webhookID
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+	require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
+
+	env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"a delivery's writer must stay registered",
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"a sweep must not drop a writer a delivery owns",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep covers the one
+// interleaving the sweepOwned flag exists for, which
+// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery cannot reach: a
+// delivery adopting the sweep's own entry WHILE that sweep is
+// still running.
+//
+// The registry operations are driven directly, in the order the
+// sweep and a concurrent delivery perform them, so the window is
+// exercised deterministically rather than hoped for:
+//
+//  1. the sweep finds no cached writer and registers one of its
+//     own, marked sweep-owned;
+//  2. a delivery arrives, is handed that very writer, clears the
+//     flag and opens the archive handle;
+//  3. the sweep finishes and releases what it created.
+//
+// Step 3 must leave the entry alone. Dropping it would detach a
+// writer that is holding an open archive handle inside its
+// debounce window, and no eviction could ever reach it again —
+// exactly the process-lifetime handle leak this change exists to
+// close. The eviction at the end proves the entry is still
+// reachable.
+func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	sweepWriter, created, err := env.eng.ExportSweepWriterFor(
+		webhookID,
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(
+		t, created,
+		"the sweep must have created the registry entry itself",
+	)
+
+	// The delivery lands mid-sweep and adopts the entry.
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
+	event.WebhookID = webhookID
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
+	)
+
+	env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	adopted := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(webhookID)
+	require.NotNil(t, adopted)
+	require.True(
+		t, sweepWriter.Same(adopted),
+		"the delivery must have adopted the sweep's writer",
+	)
+	require.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
+		"the delivery leaves the archive handle open",
+	)
+
+	// The sweep finishes.
+	env.eng.ExportReleaseSweepWriter(webhookID, sweepWriter)
+
+	require.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"a writer adopted by a delivery during a sweep must "+
+			"stay registered, or its open handle is unreachable",
+	)
+
+	env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"the adopted writer must still be evictable",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, sweepWriter.HandleOpen(),
+		"eviction must have closed the adopted writer's handle",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure proves a
+// failure for one webhook does not abort the sweep for the
+// others: an unparseable expiry and an unreadable archive both
+// have to be logged and stepped over.
+func TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	// Seeded first so the sweep reaches them before the healthy
+	// webhook: targets come back in insertion order.
+	badConfigID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"!!!"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, badConfigID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	corruptID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(
+		env.archivePath(corruptID),
+		[]byte("this is not a sqlite database"),
+		0o600,
+	))
+
+	healthyID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	healthyPath := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, healthyID,
+		time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+		time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{sweepRowNew},
+		archivedEventIDs(t, healthyPath),
+		"a failure for an earlier webhook must not stop the "+
+			"sweep from pruning the ones after it",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile pins the second
+// of the two no-create guards. The first is the stat in
+// sweepWebhook; this one is the SQLite open mode, which is what
+// protects the window between that stat and the open. Flipping
+// the sweep's mode to create-if-missing makes this fail.
+func TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "archive-absent.db")
+
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	err := w.OpenExisting(time.Hour)
+
+	require.Error(
+		t, err,
+		"opening a missing archive without create permission "+
+			"must fail rather than conjure the file",
+	)
+
+	for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
+		assert.NoFileExists(t, path+suffix)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive is the core regression
+// test for this issue: an archive that receives no further
+// writes must still lose its expired rows. Before the sweeper
+// existed, pruning only ever ran on a write-triggered reopen,
+// so an idle archive kept expired rows forever.
+func TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID,
+		now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
+		now.Add(-time.Minute),
+	)
+
+	require.Equal(
+		t, []string{sweepRowOld, sweepRowNew},
+		archivedEventIDs(t, path),
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{sweepRowNew}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
+		"the sweep should prune rows older than the expiry "+
+			"from an idle archive and keep the rest",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed proves the sweep does
+// not hold the archive open afterwards, so an operator can
+// still move the file away for offline retention.
+//
+// The assertion is made on a writer the test holds a reference
+// to, and the handle is proven OPEN before the sweep runs, so the
+// test observes the sweep closing it rather than a writer that
+// merely never opened anything. Asking the registry instead would
+// be vacuous here: the sweep releases an entry it created, and a
+// missing entry reports "not open" whether or not anything was
+// closed.
+func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.OpenExisting(time.Hour))
+	require.True(
+		t, w.HandleOpen(),
+		"the writer must hold an open handle before the sweep",
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.SweepExpired(time.Hour))
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, w.HandleOpen(),
+		"an idle archive must end the sweep closed",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleOfRegisteredWriter states the same
+// guarantee end to end, through the real sweeper and a writer the
+// registry keeps.
+//
+// The delivery leaves the archive handle open inside its debounce
+// window and makes the entry delivery-owned, so the sweep finds a
+// cached writer (created is false, nothing is released) and the
+// registry query afterwards is answered by a writer that really
+// exists. A handle left open here would be doubly wrong: it also
+// blocks the operator's move-the-file-away workflow.
+func TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleOfRegisteredWriter(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
+	event.WebhookID = webhookID
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
+	)
+
+	env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	require.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
+		"the delivery must leave the archive handle open",
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	require.True(
+		t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"the delivery's registry entry must survive the sweep",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
+		"the sweep must leave the archive closed",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched proves the sweep is a
+// no-op for the default retention policy, so archives with no
+// expiry (or the literal "never") behave exactly as before.
+func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, configJSON := range []string{
+		`{"expiry":"never"}`,
+		`{"expiry":""}`,
+		"",
+	} {
+		env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+		webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, configJSON)
+		path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+			t, webhookID,
+			time.Now().Add(-10000*time.Hour),
+		)
+
+		env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, []string{sweepRowOld}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
+			"config %q must keep rows forever", configJSON,
+		)
+		assert.False(
+			t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+			"config %q must leave no registry entry behind",
+			configJSON,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpirySkipsBeforeOpening pins the
+// expiry <= 0 boundary in sweepTarget, which the row assertions
+// above cannot reach: pruning is separately gated on a positive
+// expiry, so a "never" archive keeps its rows even if the sweep
+// does open it.
+//
+// The spec is stronger than that — a "never" archive is skipped
+// before any file is touched — so the archive here exists but has
+// never been migrated. Opening it at all would run AutoMigrate
+// and create the archive table, which is exactly what must not
+// happen.
+func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpirySkipsBeforeOpening(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`)
+	path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
+
+	seedUnmigratedArchive(t, path)
+	require.False(t, archiveTableExists(t, path))
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, archiveTableExists(t, path),
+		"a never-expiry archive must not be opened at all",
+	)
+}
+
+// seedUnmigratedArchive creates an archive file that exists but
+// carries no archive schema, so any open of it is observable: the
+// archive table appears only if something ran AutoMigrate.
+func seedUnmigratedArchive(t *testing.T, path string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
+		"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = sqlDB.ExecContext(
+		t.Context(), "CREATE TABLE placeholder (id INTEGER)",
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
+}
+
+// archiveTableExists reports whether an archive file has had the
+// archive schema migrated into it.
+func archiveTableExists(t *testing.T, path string) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return openArchiveDBForRead(t, path).
+		Migrator().
+		HasTable(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{})
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile proves the sweep
+// never conjures an archive: a webhook with a database target
+// that has never received an event must still have no archive
+// file (nor SQLite sidecar) after a sweep.
+func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
+
+	require.NoFileExists(t, path)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
+		assert.NoFileExists(
+			t, path+suffix,
+			"the sweep must not create an archive file",
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists covers the
+// same guarantee once a writer is cached in the registry but
+// the file itself is still absent (for instance because the
+// operator moved the archive away).
+func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+
+	path, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoFileExists(t, path)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.NoFileExists(t, path)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets proves that the
+// sweep ignores targets soft-deleted along with their webhook,
+// so a deleted webhook's archive is never reopened.
+func TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	path := env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		env.mainDB.DB().
+			Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
+			Delete(&database.Target{}).Error,
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{sweepRowOld}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
+		"a deleted target's archive must be left alone",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites proves the sweep serialises
+// against writes through the per-webhook writer mutex. Run
+// under -race, an unsynchronised sweep would be caught here.
+func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+
+	// The deliveries are seeded up front, on the test's own
+	// goroutine: the seed helpers assert, and testify assertions
+	// must not run off the test goroutine.
+	deliveries := make(
+		[]*database.Delivery, 0, sweepConcurrentWrites,
+	)
+
+	for range sweepConcurrentWrites {
+		event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
+		event.WebhookID = webhookID
+
+		deliveries = append(
+			deliveries,
+			seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+				t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
+			),
+		)
+	}
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	wg.Add(2)
+
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+
+		for _, d := range deliveries {
+			env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+
+		for range sweepConcurrentWrites {
+			env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
+		}
+	}()
+
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	assert.FileExists(t, env.archivePath(webhookID))
+}
+
+// TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly proves the background loop
+// exits on OnStop rather than leaking a goroutine.
+func TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSweeperTest(t)
+
+	webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
+	env.seedArchiveRows(
+		t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
+	)
+
+	env.sweeper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
+	env.sweeper.ExportStart()
+
+	// stop blocks on the loop's WaitGroup, so returning at all
+	// proves the loop observed the cancellation and exited.
+	env.sweeper.ExportStop()
+}

internal/delivery/circuit_breaker.go

@@ -5,41 +5,32 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// CircuitState represents the current state of a circuit breaker.
+// CircuitState represents the current state of a circuit
+// breaker.
 type CircuitState int
 
 const (
-	// CircuitClosed is the normal operating state. Deliveries flow through.
+	// CircuitClosed is the normal operating state.
 	CircuitClosed CircuitState = iota
-	// CircuitOpen means the circuit has tripped. Deliveries are skipped
-	// until the cooldown expires.
+	// CircuitOpen means the circuit has tripped.
 	CircuitOpen
-	// CircuitHalfOpen allows a single probe delivery to test whether
-	// the target has recovered.
+	// CircuitHalfOpen allows a single probe delivery to
+	// test whether the target has recovered.
 	CircuitHalfOpen
 )
 
 const (
-	// defaultFailureThreshold is the number of consecutive failures
-	// before a circuit breaker trips open.
+	// defaultFailureThreshold is the number of consecutive
+	// failures before a circuit breaker trips open.
 	defaultFailureThreshold = 5
 
-	// defaultCooldown is how long a circuit stays open before
-	// transitioning to half-open for a probe delivery.
+	// defaultCooldown is how long a circuit stays open
+	// before transitioning to half-open.
 	defaultCooldown = 30 * time.Second
 )
 
-// CircuitBreaker implements the circuit breaker pattern for a single
-// delivery target. It tracks consecutive failures and prevents
-// hammering a down target by temporarily stopping delivery attempts.
-//
-// States:
-//   - Closed (normal): deliveries flow through; consecutive failures
-//     are counted.
-//   - Open (tripped): deliveries are skipped; a cooldown timer is
-//     running. After the cooldown expires the state moves to HalfOpen.
-//   - HalfOpen (probing): one probe delivery is allowed. If it
-//     succeeds the circuit closes; if it fails the circuit reopens.
+// CircuitBreaker implements the circuit breaker pattern
+// for a single delivery target.
 type CircuitBreaker struct {
 	mu          sync.Mutex
 	state       CircuitState
@@ -49,7 +40,8 @@ type CircuitBreaker struct {
 	lastFailure time.Time
 }
 
-// NewCircuitBreaker creates a circuit breaker with default settings.
+// NewCircuitBreaker creates a circuit breaker with default
+// settings.
 func NewCircuitBreaker() *CircuitBreaker {
 	return &CircuitBreaker{
 		state:     CircuitClosed,
@@ -58,12 +50,7 @@ func NewCircuitBreaker() *CircuitBreaker {
 	}
 }
 
-// Allow checks whether a delivery attempt should proceed. It returns
-// true if the delivery should be attempted, false if the circuit is
-// open and the delivery should be skipped.
-//
-// When the circuit is open and the cooldown has elapsed, Allow
-// transitions to half-open and permits exactly one probe delivery.
+// Allow checks whether a delivery attempt should proceed.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
@@ -73,17 +60,15 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
 		return true
 
 	case CircuitOpen:
-		// Check if cooldown has elapsed
 		if time.Since(cb.lastFailure) >= cb.cooldown {
 			cb.state = CircuitHalfOpen
+
 			return true
 		}
+
 		return false
 
 	case CircuitHalfOpen:
-		// Only one probe at a time — reject additional attempts while
-		// a probe is in flight. The probe goroutine will call
-		// RecordSuccess or RecordFailure to resolve the state.
 		return false
 
 	default:
@@ -91,9 +76,8 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
 	}
 }
 
-// CooldownRemaining returns how much time is left before an open circuit
-// transitions to half-open. Returns zero if the circuit is not open or
-// the cooldown has already elapsed.
+// CooldownRemaining returns how much time is left before
+// an open circuit transitions to half-open.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) CooldownRemaining() time.Duration {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
@@ -106,11 +90,12 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) CooldownRemaining() time.Duration {
 	if remaining < 0 {
 		return 0
 	}
+
 	return remaining
 }
 
-// RecordSuccess records a successful delivery and resets the circuit
-// breaker to closed state with zero failures.
+// RecordSuccess records a successful delivery and resets
+// the circuit breaker to closed state.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordSuccess() {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
@@ -119,8 +104,8 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordSuccess() {
 	cb.state = CircuitClosed
 }
 
-// RecordFailure records a failed delivery. If the failure count reaches
-// the threshold, the circuit trips open.
+// RecordFailure records a failed delivery. If the failure
+// count reaches the threshold, the circuit trips open.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordFailure() {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
@@ -134,20 +119,25 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordFailure() {
 			cb.state = CircuitOpen
 		}
 
+	case CircuitOpen:
+		// Already open; no state change needed.
+
 	case CircuitHalfOpen:
-		// Probe failed — reopen immediately
+		// Probe failed -- reopen immediately.
 		cb.state = CircuitOpen
 	}
 }
 
-// State returns the current circuit state. Safe for concurrent use.
+// State returns the current circuit state.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) State() CircuitState {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
+
 	return cb.state
 }
 
-// String returns the human-readable name of a circuit state.
+// String returns the human-readable name of a circuit
+// state.
 func (s CircuitState) String() string {
 	switch s {
 	case CircuitClosed:

internal/delivery/circuit_breaker_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package delivery
+package delivery_test
 
 import (
 	"sync"
@@ -7,237 +7,304 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 )
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_ClosedState_AllowsDeliveries(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_ClosedState_AllowsDeliveries(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
 
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State())
-	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(), "closed circuit should allow deliveries")
-	// Multiple calls should all succeed
-	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State())
+	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"closed circuit should allow deliveries",
+	)
+
+	for range 10 {
 		assert.True(t, cb.Allow())
 	}
 }
 
 func TestCircuitBreaker_FailureCounting(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
 
-	// Record failures below threshold — circuit should stay closed
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold-1; i++ {
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	for i := range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold - 1 {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
-		assert.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State(),
-			"circuit should remain closed after %d failures", i+1)
-		assert.True(t, cb.Allow(), "should still allow after %d failures", i+1)
+
+		assert.Equal(t,
+			delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State(),
+			"circuit should remain closed after %d failures",
+			i+1,
+		)
+
+		assert.True(t, cb.Allow(),
+			"should still allow after %d failures",
+			i+1,
+		)
 	}
 }
 
 func TestCircuitBreaker_OpenTransition(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
 
-	// Record exactly threshold failures
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
 
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitOpen, cb.State(), "circuit should be open after threshold failures")
-	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(), "open circuit should reject deliveries")
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State(),
+		"circuit should be open after threshold failures",
+	)
+
+	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"open circuit should reject deliveries",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestCircuitBreaker_Cooldown_StaysOpen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	// Use a circuit with a known short cooldown for testing
-	cb := &CircuitBreaker{
-		state:     CircuitClosed,
-		threshold: defaultFailureThreshold,
-		cooldown:  200 * time.Millisecond,
-	}
 
-	// Trip the circuit open
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	require.Equal(t, CircuitOpen, cb.State())
 
-	// During cooldown, Allow should return false
-	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(), "should be blocked during cooldown")
+	require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State())
+
+	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"should be blocked during cooldown",
+	)
 
-	// CooldownRemaining should be positive
 	remaining := cb.CooldownRemaining()
-	assert.Greater(t, remaining, time.Duration(0), "cooldown should have remaining time")
+
+	assert.Greater(t, remaining, time.Duration(0),
+		"cooldown should have remaining time",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_HalfOpen_AfterCooldown(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_HalfOpen_AfterCooldown(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := &CircuitBreaker{
-		state:     CircuitClosed,
-		threshold: defaultFailureThreshold,
-		cooldown:  50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}
 
-	// Trip the circuit open
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	require.Equal(t, CircuitOpen, cb.State())
 
-	// Wait for cooldown to expire
+	require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State())
+
 	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
 
-	// CooldownRemaining should be zero after cooldown
-	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0), cb.CooldownRemaining())
+	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
+		cb.CooldownRemaining(),
+	)
 
-	// First Allow after cooldown should succeed (probe)
-	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(), "should allow one probe after cooldown")
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitHalfOpen, cb.State(), "should be half-open after probe allowed")
+	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"should allow one probe after cooldown",
+	)
 
-	// Second Allow should be rejected (only one probe at a time)
-	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(), "should reject additional probes while half-open")
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		delivery.CircuitHalfOpen, cb.State(),
+		"should be half-open after probe allowed",
+	)
+
+	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"should reject additional probes while half-open",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_ProbeSuccess_ClosesCircuit(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_ProbeSuccess_ClosesCircuit(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := &CircuitBreaker{
-		state:     CircuitClosed,
-		threshold: defaultFailureThreshold,
-		cooldown:  50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}
 
-	// Trip open → wait for cooldown → allow probe
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-	require.True(t, cb.Allow()) // probe allowed, state → half-open
 
-	// Probe succeeds → circuit should close
+	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	require.True(t, cb.Allow())
+
 	cb.RecordSuccess()
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State(), "successful probe should close circuit")
 
-	// Should allow deliveries again
-	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(), "closed circuit should allow deliveries")
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State(),
+		"successful probe should close circuit",
+	)
+
+	assert.True(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"closed circuit should allow deliveries",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_ProbeFailure_ReopensCircuit(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_ProbeFailure_ReopensCircuit(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := &CircuitBreaker{
-		state:     CircuitClosed,
-		threshold: defaultFailureThreshold,
-		cooldown:  50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}
 
-	// Trip open → wait for cooldown → allow probe
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
+
 	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-	require.True(t, cb.Allow()) // probe allowed, state → half-open
 
-	// Probe fails → circuit should reopen
+	require.True(t, cb.Allow())
+
 	cb.RecordFailure()
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitOpen, cb.State(), "failed probe should reopen circuit")
-	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(), "reopened circuit should reject deliveries")
+
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State(),
+		"failed probe should reopen circuit",
+	)
+
+	assert.False(t, cb.Allow(),
+		"reopened circuit should reject deliveries",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_SuccessResetsFailures(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_SuccessResetsFailures(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
 
-	// Accumulate failures just below threshold
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold-1; i++ {
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold - 1 {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	require.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State())
 
-	// Success should reset the failure counter
+	require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State())
+
 	cb.RecordSuccess()
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State())
 
-	// Now we should need another full threshold of failures to trip
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold-1; i++ {
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State())
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold - 1 {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitClosed, cb.State(),
-		"circuit should still be closed — success reset the counter")
 
-	// One more failure should trip it
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitClosed, cb.State(),
+		"circuit should still be closed -- "+
+			"success reset the counter",
+	)
+
 	cb.RecordFailure()
-	assert.Equal(t, CircuitOpen, cb.State())
+
+	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State())
 }
 
 func TestCircuitBreaker_ConcurrentAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
 
 	const goroutines = 100
+
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
 	wg.Add(goroutines * 3)
 
-	// Concurrent Allow calls
-	for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ {
+	for range goroutines {
 		go func() {
 			defer wg.Done()
+
 			cb.Allow()
 		}()
 	}
 
-	// Concurrent RecordFailure calls
-	for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ {
+	for range goroutines {
 		go func() {
 			defer wg.Done()
+
 			cb.RecordFailure()
 		}()
 	}
 
-	// Concurrent RecordSuccess calls
-	for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ {
+	for range goroutines {
 		go func() {
 			defer wg.Done()
+
 			cb.RecordSuccess()
 		}()
 	}
 
 	wg.Wait()
-	// No panic or data race — the test passes if -race doesn't flag anything.
-	// State should be one of the valid states.
+
 	state := cb.State()
-	assert.Contains(t, []CircuitState{CircuitClosed, CircuitOpen, CircuitHalfOpen}, state,
-		"state should be valid after concurrent access")
+
+	assert.Contains(t,
+		[]delivery.CircuitState{
+			delivery.CircuitClosed,
+			delivery.CircuitOpen,
+			delivery.CircuitHalfOpen,
+		},
+		state,
+		"state should be valid after concurrent access",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_ClosedReturnsZero(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_ClosedReturnsZero(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker()
-	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0), cb.CooldownRemaining(),
-		"closed circuit should have zero cooldown remaining")
+
+	cb := delivery.NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
+		cb.CooldownRemaining(),
+		"closed circuit should have zero cooldown remaining",
+	)
 }
 
-func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	cb := &CircuitBreaker{
-		state:     CircuitClosed,
-		threshold: defaultFailureThreshold,
-		cooldown:  50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}
 
-	// Trip open, wait, transition to half-open
-	for i := 0; i < defaultFailureThreshold; i++ {
+	cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
+
+	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-	require.True(t, cb.Allow()) // → half-open
 
-	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0), cb.CooldownRemaining(),
-		"half-open circuit should have zero cooldown remaining")
+	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	require.True(t, cb.Allow())
+
+	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
+		cb.CooldownRemaining(),
+		"half-open circuit should have zero cooldown remaining",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestCircuitState_String(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	assert.Equal(t, "closed", CircuitClosed.String())
-	assert.Equal(t, "open", CircuitOpen.String())
-	assert.Equal(t, "half-open", CircuitHalfOpen.String())
-	assert.Equal(t, "unknown", CircuitState(99).String())
+
+	assert.Equal(t, "closed", delivery.CircuitClosed.String())
+	assert.Equal(t, "open", delivery.CircuitOpen.String())
+	assert.Equal(t, "half-open", delivery.CircuitHalfOpen.String())
+	assert.Equal(t, "unknown", delivery.CircuitState(99).String())
+}
+
+// newShortCooldownCB creates a CircuitBreaker with a short
+// cooldown for testing. We use NewCircuitBreaker and
+// manipulate through the public API.
+func newShortCooldownCB(t *testing.T) *delivery.CircuitBreaker {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return delivery.NewTestCircuitBreaker(
+		delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold,
+		50*time.Millisecond,
+	)
 }

internal/delivery/client_ssrf_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+// newSSRFTestEngine builds an Engine whose shared client
+// carries the SSRF-safe transport, mirroring production.
+func newSSRFTestEngine() *delivery.Engine {
+	log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
+
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Timeout:   30 * time.Second,
+		Transport: delivery.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
+	}
+
+	return delivery.NewTestEngine(log, client, 1)
+}
+
+// TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
+// client returned by clientForConfig for a config with a
+// per-target timeout still refuses connections to
+// private/reserved addresses (the timeout must not drop the
+// SSRF-safe transport).
+func TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
+
+	blocked := []string{
+		"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
+		"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+		"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
+	}
+
+	for _, target := range blocked {
+		t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
+				URL:     target,
+				Timeout: 5,
+			}
+
+			client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
+
+			require.NotSame(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
+				"a per-target timeout must yield a "+
+					"distinct client",
+			)
+
+			assert.Equal(t,
+				5*time.Second, client.Timeout,
+				"the per-target timeout must be applied",
+			)
+
+			assert.Same(t,
+				engine.ExportClient().Transport,
+				client.Transport,
+				"the SSRF-safe transport must be reused, "+
+					"not dropped",
+			)
+
+			req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
+				context.Background(),
+				http.MethodPost, target, nil,
+			)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			resp, doErr := client.Do(req)
+			if resp != nil {
+				_ = resp.Body.Close()
+			}
+
+			require.Error(t, doErr,
+				"request to %s must be blocked", target,
+			)
+
+			assert.Contains(t, doErr.Error(), "blocked",
+				"error must come from the SSRF guard",
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that with
+// no per-target timeout the shared SSRF-safe client is
+// returned unchanged.
+func TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
+
+	cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
+		URL: "https://example.com/hook",
+	}
+
+	client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
+
+	assert.Same(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
+		"without a per-target timeout the shared client "+
+			"must be returned unchanged",
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/engine_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+const (
+	// hookStopTimeout bounds how long a lifecycle test waits for
+	// the engine's OnStop hook to return before declaring the
+	// shutdown hung.
+	hookStopTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
+	// hookSettleDelay is how long startEngineViaHook waits after
+	// OnStart before the caller may enqueue work. A worker pool
+	// wrongly rooted in the already-done hook context has nothing
+	// but ctx.Done() ready in its select, so it is deterministically
+	// gone by the end of this window. Without the wait, Notify would
+	// race the pool's very first select, in which a ready ctx.Done()
+	// and a ready deliveryCh are chosen between at random and a
+	// doomed pool still delivers.
+	hookSettleDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
+)
+
+// recordingLifecycle is a minimal fx.Lifecycle that records the
+// hooks a component registers, so a test can invoke the real
+// OnStart/OnStop functions with a context of its choosing.
+type recordingLifecycle struct {
+	hooks []fx.Hook
+}
+
+func (l *recordingLifecycle) Append(h fx.Hook) {
+	l.hooks = append(l.hooks, h)
+}
+
+// startEngineViaHook drives the genuine fx hooks the application
+// registers for the engine, handing OnStart a context that is
+// already done, and returns only once a pool that inherited that
+// context would have exited. It returns the recorded lifecycle so
+// the caller can drive OnStop too.
+//
+// Callers must not seed pending or retrying deliveries before
+// calling this: restart recovery enqueues those during startup,
+// which would put work in the queue while the pool is still
+// racing its first select.
+func startEngineViaHook(
+	t *testing.T, eng *delivery.Engine,
+) *recordingLifecycle {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
+	eng.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
+	require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
+
+	// fx hands OnStart a context carrying the application start
+	// timeout, and cancels it when the start phase ends. An
+	// already-cancelled context is that same defect taken to its
+	// limit, and unlike a plain context.Background() it actually
+	// distinguishes a correctly rooted loop from a broken one.
+	hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+
+	require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
+
+	time.Sleep(hookSettleDelay)
+
+	return lc
+}
+
+// seedLogTask seeds a pending delivery for a log target and
+// returns its ID together with the task that drives it. The log
+// target needs no network, so a delivery completing proves only
+// that a worker picked the task up.
+func seedLogTask(
+	t *testing.T, s iSetup,
+) (string, delivery.Task) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	event := iSeedEvent(
+		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
+		`{"lifecycle":"hook-context"}`,
+	)
+	targetID := uuid.New().String()
+
+	d := iSeedDelivery(
+		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
+		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+	)
+
+	bodyStr := event.Body
+	task := iTask(
+		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
+		"hook-context-test", "", 0, 1, &bodyStr,
+	)
+	task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeLog
+
+	return d.ID, task
+}
+
+// TestEngine_WorkersOutliveStartHookContext is the regression
+// test for a delivery engine that stopped delivering roughly
+// fifteen seconds after boot. fx calls OnStart with a context
+// carrying the application's start timeout (15s by default) and
+// cancels it when the start phase ends, so a worker pool rooted
+// in it exits shortly after startup: the process keeps accepting
+// and persisting events while nothing at all forwards them.
+//
+// Driving OnStart with an already-cancelled context is that
+// defect taken to its limit. A pool that inherits the hook
+// context is gone before the task is even enqueued; a correctly
+// rooted pool keeps working for as long as the process lives.
+func TestEngine_WorkersOutliveStartHookContext(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := newISetup(t)
+
+	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
+	})
+
+	// Seeded only after the pool has settled, so restart recovery
+	// cannot enqueue it during startup.
+	deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
+
+	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
+
+	iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
+}
+
+// TestEngine_StopHookStopsWorkers proves the fix did not trade a
+// startup bug for a shutdown hang: now that the worker pool no
+// longer observes the start hook's cancellation, OnStop is the
+// only thing that can stop it, and it must both return promptly
+// and actually leave the pool drained.
+func TestEngine_StopHookStopsWorkers(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := newISetup(t)
+
+	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
+
+	// Let the pool prove it is running before stopping it, so a
+	// fast OnStop cannot pass by stopping something already dead.
+	firstID, firstTask := seedLogTask(t, s)
+	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{firstTask})
+	iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, firstID)
+
+	var stopErr error
+
+	stopped := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		defer close(stopped)
+
+		// stop blocks on the workers' WaitGroup, so returning at
+		// all proves every goroutine observed the cancellation.
+		stopErr = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-stopped:
+	case <-time.After(hookStopTimeout):
+		t.Fatal(
+			"OnStop did not return: the delivery engine's " +
+				"WaitGroup is still waiting on a goroutine that " +
+				"never observed cancellation",
+		)
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, stopErr)
+
+	// With every worker gone, a freshly notified task must sit
+	// untouched in the queue rather than being delivered.
+	secondID, secondTask := seedLogTask(t, s)
+	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{secondTask})
+
+	time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	var after database.Delivery
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		s.WebhookDB.First(&after, "id = ?", secondID).Error,
+	)
+	require.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+		after.Status,
+		"a stopped engine must not deliver anything",
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted exposes the sentinel returned by
+// an evicted archive writer. It carries the Err prefix rather
+// than this file's usual Export one because it is a sentinel
+// error.
+var ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted = errArchiveWriterEvicted
+
+// Exported constants for test access.
+const (
+	ExportDeliveryChannelSize     = deliveryChannelSize
+	ExportRetryChannelSize        = retryChannelSize
+	ExportDefaultFailureThreshold = defaultFailureThreshold
+	ExportDefaultCooldown         = defaultCooldown
+)
+
+// ExportIsBlockedIP exposes isBlockedIP for testing.
+func ExportIsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
+	return isBlockedIP(ip)
+}
+
+// ExportBlockedNetworks exposes blockedNetworks.
+func ExportBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
+	return blockedNetworks
+}
+
+// ExportIsForwardableHeader exposes isForwardableHeader.
+func ExportIsForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
+	return isForwardableHeader(name)
+}
+
+// ExportTruncate exposes truncate for testing.
+func ExportTruncate(s string, maxLen int) string {
+	return truncate(s, maxLen)
+}
+
+// ExportDeliverHTTP delivers via the http target for testing.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTP(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+) {
+	e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e)
+}
+
+// ExportDeliverDatabase delivers via the database target.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverDatabase(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery,
+) {
+	e.targets[database.TargetTypeDatabase].Deliver(
+		context.Background(), webhookDB, d, &Task{}, e,
+	)
+}
+
+// ExportDeliverLog delivers via the log target for testing.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverLog(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery,
+) {
+	e.targets[database.TargetTypeLog].Deliver(
+		context.Background(), webhookDB, d, &Task{}, e,
+	)
+}
+
+// ExportDeliverSlack delivers via the slack target for
+// testing.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverSlack(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+) {
+	task := &Task{
+		DeliveryID: d.ID,
+		TargetID:   d.TargetID,
+		AttemptNum: 1,
+	}
+
+	e.targets[database.TargetTypeSlack].Deliver(
+		ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e,
+	)
+}
+
+// ExportProcessNewTask exposes processNewTask.
+func (e *Engine) ExportProcessNewTask(
+	ctx context.Context, task *Task,
+) {
+	e.processNewTask(ctx, task)
+}
+
+// ExportProcessRetryTask exposes processRetryTask.
+func (e *Engine) ExportProcessRetryTask(
+	ctx context.Context, task *Task,
+) {
+	e.processRetryTask(ctx, task)
+}
+
+// ExportProcessDelivery exposes processDelivery.
+func (e *Engine) ExportProcessDelivery(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+) {
+	e.processDelivery(ctx, webhookDB, d, task)
+}
+
+// ExportGetCircuitBreaker exposes the http target's
+// getCircuitBreaker.
+func (e *Engine) ExportGetCircuitBreaker(
+	targetID string,
+) *CircuitBreaker {
+	return e.httpTarget.getCircuitBreaker(targetID)
+}
+
+// ExportParseHTTPConfig exposes parseHTTPConfig.
+func (e *Engine) ExportParseHTTPConfig(
+	configJSON string,
+) (*HTTPTargetConfig, error) {
+	return parseHTTPConfig(configJSON)
+}
+
+// ExportParseSlackConfig exposes parseSlackConfig.
+func (e *Engine) ExportParseSlackConfig(
+	configJSON string,
+) (*SlackTargetConfig, error) {
+	return parseSlackConfig(configJSON)
+}
+
+// ExportDoHTTPRequest exposes the http target's
+// doHTTPRequest.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDoHTTPRequest(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+	event *database.Event,
+) (int, string, int64, error) {
+	return e.httpTarget.doHTTPRequest(ctx, cfg, event)
+}
+
+// ExportClientForConfig exposes the http target's
+// clientForConfig.
+func (e *Engine) ExportClientForConfig(
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+) *http.Client {
+	return e.httpTarget.clientForConfig(cfg)
+}
+
+// ExportClient returns the http target's shared HTTP client.
+func (e *Engine) ExportClient() *http.Client {
+	return e.httpTarget.client
+}
+
+// ExportScheduleRetry exposes ScheduleRetry.
+func (e *Engine) ExportScheduleRetry(
+	task Task, delay time.Duration,
+) {
+	e.ScheduleRetry(task, delay)
+}
+
+// ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries exposes
+// recoverPendingDeliveries.
+func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	webhookID string,
+) {
+	e.recoverPendingDeliveries(
+		ctx, webhookDB, webhookID,
+	)
+}
+
+// ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries exposes
+// recoverWebhookDeliveries.
+func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
+	ctx context.Context, webhookID string,
+) {
+	e.recoverWebhookDeliveries(ctx, webhookID)
+}
+
+// ExportRecoverInFlight exposes recoverInFlight.
+func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverInFlight(
+	ctx context.Context,
+) {
+	e.recoverInFlight(ctx)
+}
+
+// ExportSweepWebhookRetries exposes sweepWebhookRetries.
+func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
+	ctx context.Context, webhookID string,
+) {
+	e.sweepWebhookRetries(ctx, webhookID)
+}
+
+// ExportStart exposes start for testing.
+func (e *Engine) ExportStart() {
+	e.start()
+}
+
+// ExportRegisterHooks registers the engine's real fx lifecycle
+// hooks on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive
+// the exact OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and
+// hand OnStart the kind of context fx actually supplies.
+func (e *Engine) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
+	e.registerHooks(lc)
+}
+
+// ExportStop exposes stop for testing.
+func (e *Engine) ExportStop() {
+	e.stop()
+}
+
+// ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
+func (e *Engine) ExportDeliveryCh() chan Task {
+	return e.deliveryCh
+}
+
+// ExportRetryCh returns the retry channel.
+func (e *Engine) ExportRetryCh() chan Task {
+	return e.retryCh
+}
+
+// NewTestEngine creates an Engine for unit tests without
+// database dependencies.
+func NewTestEngine(
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	client *http.Client,
+	workers int,
+) *Engine {
+	e := &Engine{
+		log:        log,
+		deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
+		retryCh:    make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
+		workers:    workers,
+	}
+	e.initTargets(client)
+
+	return e
+}
+
+// NewTestEngineSmallRetry creates an Engine with a tiny
+// retry channel buffer for overflow testing.
+func NewTestEngineSmallRetry(
+	log *slog.Logger,
+) *Engine {
+	e := &Engine{
+		log:     log,
+		retryCh: make(chan Task, 1),
+	}
+	e.initTargets(nil)
+
+	return e
+}
+
+// NewTestEngineWithDB creates an Engine with a real
+// database and dbManager for integration tests.
+func NewTestEngineWithDB(
+	db *database.Database,
+	dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	client *http.Client,
+	workers int,
+) *Engine {
+	e := &Engine{
+		database:   db,
+		dbManager:  dbMgr,
+		log:        log,
+		deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
+		retryCh:    make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
+		workers:    workers,
+	}
+	e.initTargets(client)
+
+	return e
+}
+
+// NewTestCircuitBreaker creates a CircuitBreaker with
+// custom settings for testing.
+func NewTestCircuitBreaker(
+	threshold int, cooldown time.Duration,
+) *CircuitBreaker {
+	return &CircuitBreaker{
+		state:     CircuitClosed,
+		threshold: threshold,
+		cooldown:  cooldown,
+	}
+}
+
+// ExportArchivedEvent aliases the archive row type so black-box
+// tests can construct and read archive rows.
+type ExportArchivedEvent = archivedEvent
+
+// ExportArchiveWriter wraps an archiveWriter so black-box tests
+// can exercise the per-webhook archive file mechanics.
+type ExportArchiveWriter struct {
+	w *archiveWriter
+}
+
+// NewExportArchiveWriter builds an archive writer for tests,
+// optionally overriding the reopen debounce (a non-positive
+// debounce keeps the production default).
+func NewExportArchiveWriter(
+	path string, log *slog.Logger, debounce time.Duration,
+) *ExportArchiveWriter {
+	w := newArchiveWriter(path, log)
+	if debounce > 0 {
+		w.debounce = debounce
+	}
+
+	return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}
+}
+
+// Write archives a row through the writer.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Write(
+	row ExportArchivedEvent, expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	return e.w.write(row, expiry)
+}
+
+// Open opens the archive file, pruning when expiry is positive.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Open(expiry time.Duration) error {
+	return e.w.open(expiry)
+}
+
+// Reopen closes and reopens the archive file.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopen(
+	expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	return e.w.reopen(expiry)
+}
+
+// Reopens reports how many times the file has been opened.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopens() int {
+	return e.w.reopens
+}
+
+// DB returns the writer's current open handle for row
+// inspection in tests.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) DB() *gorm.DB {
+	return e.w.db
+}
+
+// Path returns the archive file the writer owns.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Path() string {
+	return e.w.path
+}
+
+// OpenExisting opens the archive without permitting creation,
+// the way the idle sweep does.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) OpenExisting(
+	expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	return e.w.openMode(archiveModeExisting, expiry)
+}
+
+// SweepExpired runs an idle sweep of the archive.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) SweepExpired(
+	expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	return e.w.sweepExpired(expiry)
+}
+
+// Evict marks the writer evicted and closes its handle, exactly
+// as leaving the registry does.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Evict() {
+	e.w.evict()
+}
+
+// HandleOpen reports whether the writer currently holds an open
+// archive handle.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) HandleOpen() bool {
+	e.w.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return e.w.db != nil
+}
+
+// Same reports whether both wrappers refer to the very same
+// underlying archive writer, so a test can prove a registry entry
+// is the writer it was handed rather than a replacement.
+func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Same(
+	other *ExportArchiveWriter,
+) bool {
+	return other != nil && e.w == other.w
+}
+
+// ExportArchiveWriterFor returns the archive writer the registry
+// currently caches for a webhook, or nil when none is cached. It
+// never creates one, so a test can hold a reference to the very
+// writer an eviction is about to detach.
+func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveWriterFor(
+	webhookID string,
+) *ExportArchiveWriter {
+	e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
+
+	w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}
+}
+
+// ExportHasArchiveWriter reports whether the database target
+// currently caches an archive writer for a webhook.
+func (e *Engine) ExportHasArchiveWriter(
+	webhookID string,
+) bool {
+	e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
+
+	_, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
+
+	return ok
+}
+
+// ExportArchiveHandleOpen reports whether the cached archive
+// writer for a webhook holds an open database handle. It
+// returns false when no writer is cached.
+func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveHandleOpen(
+	webhookID string,
+) bool {
+	e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
+	w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
+	e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return w.db != nil
+}
+
+// ExportEnsureArchiveWriter creates (if needed) and returns the
+// archive file path of the cached writer for a webhook, so a
+// test can prime the registry the way a delivery would.
+func (e *Engine) ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(
+	webhookID string,
+) (string, error) {
+	w, err := e.dbTarget.writerFor(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	return w.path, nil
+}
+
+// ExportSweepWriterFor takes a webhook's registry writer exactly
+// as the idle sweep does, reporting whether the sweep had to
+// create the entry. It lets a test drive the registry through the
+// sweep's own entry point instead of choreographing goroutines.
+func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWriterFor(
+	webhookID string,
+) (*ExportArchiveWriter, bool, error) {
+	w, created, err := e.dbTarget.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+
+	return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}, created, nil
+}
+
+// ExportReleaseSweepWriter releases a sweep-created registry entry
+// exactly as a finished sweep does.
+func (e *Engine) ExportReleaseSweepWriter(
+	webhookID string, w *ExportArchiveWriter,
+) {
+	e.dbTarget.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w.w)
+}
+
+// NewTestArchiveSweeper builds an ArchiveSweeper backed by the
+// given main database and engine, without the fx lifecycle.
+// Intended for tests.
+func NewTestArchiveSweeper(
+	db *database.Database,
+	eng *Engine,
+	log *slog.Logger,
+) *ArchiveSweeper {
+	return &ArchiveSweeper{
+		db:       db,
+		eng:      eng,
+		log:      log,
+		interval: time.Hour,
+	}
+}
+
+// ExportSweep runs a single archive sweep synchronously for
+// tests.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
+	s.sweep(ctx)
+}
+
+// ExportStart starts the sweeper's background loop for tests.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportStart() {
+	s.start()
+}
+
+// ExportRegisterHooks registers the sweeper's real fx lifecycle
+// hooks on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive
+// the exact OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and
+// hand OnStart the kind of context fx actually supplies.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
+	s.registerHooks(lc)
+}
+
+// ExportStop stops the sweeper's background loop for tests.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportStop() {
+	s.stop()
+}
+
+// ExportSetInterval overrides the sweep interval for tests.
+func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
+	s.interval = d
+}
+
+// ExportParseArchiveExpiry exposes parseArchiveExpiry.
+func ExportParseArchiveExpiry(
+	configJSON string,
+) (time.Duration, error) {
+	return parseArchiveExpiry(configJSON)
+}

internal/delivery/ssrf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	// dnsResolutionTimeout is the maximum time to wait for
+	// DNS resolution during SSRF validation.
+	dnsResolutionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
+)
+
+// Sentinel errors for SSRF validation.
+var (
+	errNoHostname = errors.New("URL has no hostname")
+	errNoIPs      = errors.New(
+		"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
+	)
+	errBlockedIP = errors.New(
+		"blocked private/reserved IP range",
+	)
+	errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
+		"only http and https are allowed",
+	)
+)
+
+// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
+// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks.
+//
+//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
+var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
+
+//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
+func init() {
+	cidrs := []string{
+		"127.0.0.0/8",
+		"10.0.0.0/8",
+		"172.16.0.0/12",
+		"192.168.0.0/16",
+		"169.254.0.0/16",
+		"0.0.0.0/8",
+		"100.64.0.0/10",
+		"192.0.0.0/24",
+		"192.0.2.0/24",
+		"198.18.0.0/15",
+		"198.51.100.0/24",
+		"203.0.113.0/24",
+		"224.0.0.0/4",
+		"240.0.0.0/4",
+		"::1/128",
+		"fc00::/7",
+		"fe80::/10",
+	}
+
+	for _, cidr := range cidrs {
+		_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
+		if err != nil {
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf(
+				"ssrf: failed to parse CIDR %q: %v",
+				cidr, err,
+			))
+		}
+
+		blockedNetworks = append(
+			blockedNetworks, network,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
+// any blocked private/reserved network range.
+func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
+	for _, network := range blockedNetworks {
+		if network.Contains(ip) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
+// ValidateTargetURL checks that an HTTP delivery target
+// URL is safe from SSRF attacks.
+func ValidateTargetURL(
+	ctx context.Context, targetURL string,
+) error {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		// url.Parse embeds the whole URL in its error, and
+		// this one is logged and shown; mask it. Every other
+		// branch below reports only the hostname.
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"invalid URL: %w", maskURLError(err),
+		)
+	}
+
+	err = validateScheme(parsed.Scheme)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	host := parsed.Hostname()
+	if host == "" {
+		return errNoHostname
+	}
+
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+		return checkBlockedIP(ip)
+	}
+
+	return validateHostname(ctx, host)
+}
+
+func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
+	if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
+			scheme, errInvalidScheme,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func checkBlockedIP(ip net.IP) error {
+	if isBlockedIP(ip) {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"target IP %s is in a blocked "+
+				"private/reserved range: %w",
+			ip, errBlockedIP,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validateHostname(
+	ctx context.Context, host string,
+) error {
+	dnsCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
+		ctx, dnsResolutionTimeout,
+	)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(
+		dnsCtx, host,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"failed to resolve hostname %q: %w",
+			host, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if len(ips) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"hostname %q: %w", host, errNoIPs,
+		)
+	}
+
+	for _, ipAddr := range ips {
+		if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
+			return fmt.Errorf(
+				"hostname %q resolves to blocked "+
+					"IP %s: %w",
+				host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
+// custom DialContext that blocks connections to
+// private/reserved IP addresses.
+func NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
+	return &http.Transport{
+		DialContext: ssrfDialContext,
+	}
+}
+
+func ssrfDialContext(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	network, addr string,
+) (net.Conn, error) {
+	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"ssrf: invalid address %q: %w",
+			addr, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(
+		ctx, host,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"ssrf: DNS resolution failed for %q: %w",
+			host, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	for _, ipAddr := range ips {
+		if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"ssrf: connection to %s (%s) "+
+					"blocked: %w",
+				host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	var dialer net.Dialer
+
+	return dialer.DialContext(
+		ctx, network,
+		net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port),
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/ssrf_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		ip      string
+		blocked bool
+	}{
+		{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", true},
+		{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2", true},
+		{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255", true},
+		{"10.0.0.0", "10.0.0.0", true},
+		{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", true},
+		{"10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255", true},
+		{"172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1", true},
+		{"172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255", true},
+		{"172.15.255.255", "172.15.255.255", false},
+		{"172.32.0.0", "172.32.0.0", false},
+		{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
+		{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
+		{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
+		{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
+		{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
+		{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
+		{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
+		{"::1", "::1", true},
+		{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
+		{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
+		{"fe80::1", "fe80::1", true},
+		{
+			"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e",
+			"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e",
+			false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
+
+			require.NotNil(t, ip,
+				"failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip,
+			)
+
+			assert.Equal(t,
+				tt.blocked,
+				delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
+				"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v",
+				tt.ip,
+				delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
+				tt.blocked,
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	blockedURLs := []string{
+		"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
+		"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
+		"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
+		"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
+		"http://172.16.0.1/api",
+		"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+		"http://[::1]/hook",
+		"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
+		"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
+		"http://0.0.0.0/hook",
+	}
+
+	for _, u := range blockedURLs {
+		t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+				context.Background(), u,
+			)
+
+			assert.Error(t, err,
+				"URL %s should be blocked", u,
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	allowedURLs := []string{
+		"https://example.com/hook",
+		"http://93.184.216.34/webhook",
+		"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/xxx",
+	}
+
+	for _, u := range allowedURLs {
+		t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+				context.Background(), u,
+			)
+
+			assert.NoError(t, err,
+				"URL %s should be allowed", u,
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+		context.Background(), "ftp://example.com/hook",
+	)
+
+	require.Error(t, err)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(),
+		"unsupported URL scheme",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+		context.Background(), "http:///path",
+	)
+
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+		context.Background(), "://invalid",
+	)
+
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestBlockedNetworks_Initialized(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	nets := delivery.ExportBlockedNetworks()
+
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, nets,
+		"blockedNetworks should be initialized",
+	)
+
+	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(nets), 8,
+		"should have at least 8 blocked network ranges",
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/target.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// Scheduler re-enqueues a task for a future delivery attempt.
+// The engine provides one to each target so a target can own
+// its retries durably: it records the attempt, marks the
+// delivery retrying, and asks the Scheduler to deliver the
+// next attempt after delay — exactly what the engine does for
+// its own restart recovery.
+type Scheduler interface {
+	ScheduleRetry(task Task, delay time.Duration)
+}
+
+// Target delivers an event to one target type. Each type is
+// an implementation. A Target owns its whole delivery: it
+// makes the attempt, records the DeliveryResult and updates
+// the DeliveryStatus, and — for targets that retry — decides
+// whether to retry, computes its own backoff, gates with its
+// own circuit breaker, and reschedules via the injected
+// Scheduler. Fire-and-forget targets simply record a single
+// attempt.
+type Target interface {
+	Deliver(
+		ctx context.Context,
+		webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+		d *database.Delivery,
+		task *Task,
+		sched Scheduler,
+	)
+}
+
+// rescheduler is implemented by targets that own durable
+// retries. The engine's restart recovery and periodic sweep
+// use it to let the target recompute the schedule for an
+// orphaned retrying delivery, keeping the retry schedule
+// target-owned. Fire-and-forget targets do not implement it
+// and their (never-occurring) retrying deliveries are
+// skipped.
+type rescheduler interface {
+	// remainingBackoff returns how long to wait before the
+	// next attempt of a recovered retrying delivery.
+	remainingBackoff(
+		webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+		deliveryID string,
+		attemptNum int,
+	) time.Duration
+
+	// backoffElapsed reports whether the backoff window for
+	// the last attempt has already passed, so the periodic
+	// sweep can re-enqueue the delivery now.
+	backoffElapsed(
+		webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+		deliveryID string,
+		attemptNum int,
+	) bool
+}
+
+// attemptResult is the outcome of a single delivery attempt,
+// as reported by a target's per-attempt function to the
+// shared retry core.
+type attemptResult struct {
+	statusCode int
+	respBody   string
+	duration   int64
+	success    bool
+	errMsg     string
+}
+
+// initTargets builds the target registry, wiring each target
+// to the engine's persistence helpers and giving the HTTP and
+// Slack targets the shared SSRF-safe client. It is called by
+// both New and the test constructors so the registry is
+// always populated.
+func (e *Engine) initTargets(client *http.Client) {
+	httpT := &httpTarget{
+		httpCore: &httpCore{eng: e},
+		client:   client,
+	}
+
+	slackT := &slackTarget{
+		httpCore: &httpCore{eng: e},
+		client:   client,
+	}
+
+	dbT := &databaseTarget{eng: e}
+
+	e.httpTarget = httpT
+	e.dbTarget = dbT
+
+	e.targets = map[database.TargetType]Target{
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP:     httpT,
+		database.TargetTypeSlack:    slackT,
+		database.TargetTypeDatabase: dbT,
+		database.TargetTypeLog:      &logTarget{eng: e},
+	}
+}

internal/delivery/target_config_view.go

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// configUnavailable is what a target's configuration renders
+// as when it is absent, of an unknown type, or does not
+// parse. The stored blob is never shown as a fallback: it can
+// hold a credential (a Slack incoming webhook URL is a bearer
+// token) and a UI that prints it leaks that credential into
+// browser history, screenshots and screen shares.
+const configUnavailable = "(unavailable)"
+
+// ConfigField is one labelled, display-safe value derived
+// from a target's stored configuration.
+type ConfigField struct {
+	Label string
+	Value string
+}
+
+// TargetView is the display-safe projection of a target for
+// the UI. It deliberately has no raw configuration field, so
+// no template — present or future — can render the stored
+// blob.
+type TargetView struct {
+	ID     string
+	Name   string
+	Type   database.TargetType
+	Active bool
+	Config []ConfigField
+}
+
+// NewTargetViews projects targets for rendering, replacing
+// each stored configuration blob with named, display-safe
+// fields.
+func NewTargetViews(
+	targets []database.Target,
+) []TargetView {
+	views := make([]TargetView, 0, len(targets))
+
+	for i := range targets {
+		t := &targets[i]
+
+		views = append(views, TargetView{
+			ID:     t.ID,
+			Name:   t.Name,
+			Type:   t.Type,
+			Active: t.Active,
+			Config: targetConfigFields(t),
+		})
+	}
+
+	return views
+}
+
+// targetConfigFields returns the display-safe fields for a
+// target's configuration. Anything it cannot parse becomes
+// the neutral placeholder.
+func targetConfigFields(
+	t *database.Target,
+) []ConfigField {
+	switch t.Type {
+	case database.TargetTypeSlack:
+		return slackConfigFields(t.Config)
+	case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
+		return httpConfigFields(t)
+	case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
+		return databaseConfigFields(t.Config)
+	case database.TargetTypeLog:
+		// The log target takes no configuration.
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return unavailableConfigFields()
+	}
+}
+
+// unavailableConfigFields is the neutral placeholder shown
+// for a configuration that could not be presented.
+func unavailableConfigFields() []ConfigField {
+	return []ConfigField{{
+		Label: "Configuration",
+		Value: configUnavailable,
+	}}
+}
+
+// slackConfigFields describes a Slack target. Only the masked
+// webhook URL is shown; the full URL is the credential.
+func slackConfigFields(configJSON string) []ConfigField {
+	cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(configJSON)
+	if err != nil {
+		return unavailableConfigFields()
+	}
+
+	return []ConfigField{{
+		Label: "Webhook URL",
+		Value: cfg.MaskedWebhookURL(),
+	}}
+}
+
+// httpConfigFields describes an HTTP target: its destination
+// and its retry settings. Header values are not shown — they
+// routinely carry authorization tokens — only how many are
+// configured.
+//
+// The destination is masked to scheme and host by the same
+// rule the Slack target uses. An HTTP target's destination is
+// commonly a Slack, Discord or Teams incoming-webhook endpoint
+// whose path segments are the credential, and the field takes
+// an arbitrary URL, so no segment can be assumed non-secret.
+func httpConfigFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
+	cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return unavailableConfigFields()
+	}
+
+	fields := []ConfigField{{
+		Label: "Destination URL",
+		Value: MaskURL(cfg.URL),
+	}}
+
+	if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
+		fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
+			Label: "Timeout",
+			Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Timeout) + "s",
+		})
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.Headers) > 0 {
+		fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
+			Label: "Headers",
+			Value: fmt.Sprintf(
+				"%d configured", len(cfg.Headers),
+			),
+		})
+	}
+
+	return append(fields, retryFields(t)...)
+}
+
+// retryFields describes a target's retry settings, which live
+// on the target row rather than in its configuration blob.
+func retryFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
+	retries := strconv.Itoa(t.MaxRetries)
+	if t.MaxRetries == 0 {
+		retries += " (fire-and-forget)"
+	}
+
+	fields := []ConfigField{{
+		Label: "Max Retries",
+		Value: retries,
+	}}
+
+	if t.MaxQueueSize > 0 {
+		fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
+			Label: "Max Queue Size",
+			Value: strconv.Itoa(t.MaxQueueSize),
+		})
+	}
+
+	return fields
+}
+
+// databaseConfigFields describes an archive target. Its
+// configuration is optional, and an absent or empty expiry
+// means the archive is kept forever. An expiry that is set
+// but not a valid duration is reported as unavailable rather
+// than echoed back.
+func databaseConfigFields(configJSON string) []ConfigField {
+	expiry := archiveExpiryNever
+
+	if configJSON != "" {
+		var cfg databaseTargetConfig
+
+		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
+		if err != nil {
+			return unavailableConfigFields()
+		}
+
+		if cfg.Expiry != "" {
+			if ValidateArchiveExpiry(cfg.Expiry) != nil {
+				return unavailableConfigFields()
+			}
+
+			expiry = cfg.Expiry
+		}
+	}
+
+	return []ConfigField{{
+		Label: "Archive Expiry",
+		Value: expiry,
+	}}
+}
+
+// MaskedWebhookURL returns the Slack webhook URL reduced to
+// its scheme and host, with the path, query and any userinfo
+// elided. The path segments are the credential, so none of
+// them is shown: the field accepts an arbitrary URL, so no
+// segment can be assumed non-secret. A URL that does not
+// parse into a scheme and host yields the neutral
+// placeholder, never the raw string.
+func (c *SlackTargetConfig) MaskedWebhookURL() string {
+	return MaskURL(c.WebhookURL)
+}

internal/delivery/target_config_view_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+const (
+	// slackSecretPath is the credential-bearing part of a
+	// Slack incoming webhook URL: everything after the host.
+	slackSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+	slackWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
+		slackSecretPath
+
+	viewExampleOrigin = "https://example.com"
+	viewExampleHook   = viewExampleOrigin + "/hook"
+	viewMaskedOrigin  = viewExampleOrigin + "/..."
+	viewUnavailable   = "(unavailable)"
+	viewExpiryNever   = "never"
+)
+
+func TestMaskedWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := map[string]struct {
+		url  string
+		want string
+	}{
+		"slack webhook": {
+			url:  slackWebhookURL,
+			want: "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
+		},
+		"query string dropped": {
+			url:  viewExampleOrigin + "/a?token=secret",
+			want: viewExampleOrigin + "/...",
+		},
+		// Fabricated userinfo in a test URL, not a real
+		// credential.
+		//nolint:gosec // G101
+		"userinfo dropped": {
+			url:  "https://user:pw@example.com/a/b",
+			want: viewExampleOrigin + "/...",
+		},
+		"no path": {
+			url:  viewExampleOrigin,
+			want: viewExampleOrigin,
+		},
+		"root path": {
+			url:  viewExampleOrigin + "/",
+			want: viewExampleOrigin,
+		},
+		"not a url": {
+			url:  "definitely not a url",
+			want: viewUnavailable,
+		},
+		"empty": {
+			url:  "",
+			want: viewUnavailable,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for name, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			cfg := &delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
+				WebhookURL: tc.url,
+			}
+
+			assert.Equal(
+				t, tc.want, cfg.MaskedWebhookURL(),
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMaskedWebhookURL_NeverLeaksPath is the direct
+// expression of the rule: whatever the input, the masked
+// value never contains a path segment of it.
+func TestMaskedWebhookURL_NeverLeaksPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := &delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
+		WebhookURL: slackWebhookURL,
+	}
+
+	masked := cfg.MaskedWebhookURL()
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, masked, "T00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(t, masked, "B00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, masked, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(t, masked, slackSecretPath)
+}
+
+// fieldMap turns a view's config fields into a lookup so
+// assertions read by label.
+func fieldMap(fields []delivery.ConfigField) map[string]string {
+	out := make(map[string]string, len(fields))
+	for _, f := range fields {
+		out[f.Label] = f.Value
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
+// viewFor projects a single target and returns its view.
+func viewFor(
+	t *testing.T,
+	target database.Target,
+) delivery.TargetView {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	views := delivery.NewTargetViews(
+		[]database.Target{target},
+	)
+	require.Len(t, views, 1)
+
+	return views[0]
+}
+
+func TestNewTargetViews_Slack(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+		Name:   "slack-target",
+		Type:   database.TargetTypeSlack,
+		Active: true,
+		Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` +
+			slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
+	})
+
+	assert.Equal(t, "slack-target", view.Name)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		map[string]string{
+			"Webhook URL": "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
+		},
+		fieldMap(view.Config),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestNewTargetViews_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+		Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		Config: `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `",` +
+			`"timeout":30,` +
+			`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer sekrit"}}`,
+		MaxRetries:   5,
+		MaxQueueSize: 100,
+	})
+
+	fields := fieldMap(view.Config)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		map[string]string{
+			"Destination URL": viewMaskedOrigin,
+			"Timeout":         "30s",
+			"Headers":         "1 configured",
+			"Max Retries":     "5",
+			"Max Queue Size":  "100",
+		},
+		fields,
+	)
+
+	// Header values can be credentials and are never shown.
+	for _, v := range fields {
+		assert.NotContains(t, v, "sekrit")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPFireAndForget(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+		Type:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		Config: `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `"}`,
+	})
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		map[string]string{
+			"Destination URL": viewMaskedOrigin,
+			"Max Retries":     "0 (fire-and-forget)",
+		},
+		fieldMap(view.Config),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestNewTargetViews_HTTPMasksDestinationURL proves the rule
+// holds for the http target too: an http destination is
+// routinely an incoming-webhook endpoint whose path segments
+// are the credential, so none of them is shown.
+func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPMasksDestinationURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+		Type:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		Config: `{"url":"` + slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
+	})
+
+	fields := fieldMap(view.Config)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		"https://hooks.slack.com/...",
+		fields["Destination URL"],
+	)
+
+	for _, v := range fields {
+		assert.NotContains(t, v, slackSecretPath)
+		assert.NotContains(t, v, "T00000000")
+		assert.NotContains(t, v, "B00000000")
+		assert.NotContains(t, v, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewTargetViews_Database(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := map[string]struct {
+		config string
+		want   string
+	}{
+		"empty config": {config: "", want: viewExpiryNever},
+		"empty expiry": {config: `{}`, want: viewExpiryNever},
+		"explicit": {
+			config: `{"expiry":"720h"}`,
+			want:   "720h",
+		},
+		"never literal": {
+			config: `{"expiry":"` + viewExpiryNever + `"}`,
+			want:   viewExpiryNever,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for name, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+				Type:   database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+				Config: tc.config,
+			})
+
+			assert.Equal(
+				t,
+				map[string]string{"Archive Expiry": tc.want},
+				fieldMap(view.Config),
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewTargetViews_Log(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
+		Type:   database.TargetTypeLog,
+		Config: "",
+	})
+
+	assert.Empty(t, view.Config)
+}
+
+// TestNewTargetViews_Unpresentable proves that no config the
+// view cannot present falls back to the stored blob.
+func TestNewTargetViews_Unpresentable(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const blob = `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.slack.com` +
+		slackSecretPath + `"`
+
+	tests := map[string]database.Target{
+		"unknown target type": {
+			Type:   database.TargetType("carrier-pigeon"),
+			Config: blob,
+		},
+		"unparseable json": {
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeSlack,
+			Config: blob,
+		},
+		"empty slack config": {
+			Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
+		},
+		"slack config without url": {
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeSlack,
+			Config: `{}`,
+		},
+		"unparseable http json": {
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+			Config: `{"url":`,
+		},
+		"unparseable archive json": {
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+			Config: `{"expiry":`,
+		},
+		"invalid archive expiry": {
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+			Config: `{"expiry":"a fortnight"}`,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for name, target := range tests {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			view := viewFor(t, target)
+
+			assert.Equal(
+				t,
+				map[string]string{
+					"Configuration": viewUnavailable,
+				},
+				fieldMap(view.Config),
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/delivery/target_database.go

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// databaseTarget is a no-retry target that archives the
+// full inbound event into a per-webhook archive SQLite file,
+// separate from the per-webhook event database. The event is
+// already persisted in the per-webhook event DB by the time
+// delivery runs; the database target additionally writes a
+// durable long-term copy into archive-{webhookID}.db and then
+// records a single attempt whose outcome reflects whether the
+// archive write succeeded. See archiveWriter for the
+// close/reopen, auto-recreate, and expiry semantics.
+type databaseTarget struct {
+	eng *Engine
+
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	writers map[string]*archiveWriter
+}
+
+// Deliver implements Target. It archives the event, then
+// records one successful attempt and marks the delivery
+// delivered. An archiving error fails the delivery: the
+// attempt is recorded as failed with the error and the
+// delivery is marked failed, so a target that could not do
+// its one job (archiving) never reports success. The target
+// does not retry; the event remains durably stored in the
+// per-webhook event database.
+func (t *databaseTarget) Deliver(
+	_ context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	_ *Task,
+	_ Scheduler,
+) {
+	err := t.archive(d)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.eng.log.Error(
+			"failed to archive event to database target",
+			"delivery_id", d.ID,
+			"event_id", d.EventID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		t.eng.recordResult(
+			webhookDB, d, 1, false, 0, "",
+			err.Error(), 0,
+		)
+
+		t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+			webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	t.eng.recordResult(
+		webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
+	)
+
+	t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+	)
+}
+
+// archive writes the full event as a row into the webhook's
+// archive database, honouring the optional per-target expiry
+// parsed from the target config JSON.
+func (t *databaseTarget) archive(d *database.Delivery) error {
+	webhookID := d.Event.WebhookID
+	if webhookID == "" {
+		return errArchiveMissingWebhookID
+	}
+
+	expiry, err := parseArchiveExpiry(d.Target.Config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	w, err := t.writerFor(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	row := archivedEvent{
+		EventID:      d.Event.ID,
+		WebhookID:    webhookID,
+		EntrypointID: d.Event.EntrypointID,
+		Method:       d.Event.Method,
+		Headers:      d.Event.Headers,
+		Body:         d.Event.Body,
+		ContentType:  d.Event.ContentType,
+	}
+
+	return w.write(row, expiry)
+}
+
+// writerFor returns the archiveWriter for a webhook, creating
+// and caching it on first use. Each webhook has one writer so
+// its close/reopen debounce state is shared across concurrent
+// deliveries. The archive file lives beside the per-webhook
+// event database in the data directory.
+func (t *databaseTarget) writerFor(
+	webhookID string,
+) (*archiveWriter, error) {
+	path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	t.mu.Lock()
+	defer t.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if t.writers == nil {
+		t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
+	}
+
+	w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
+	if !ok {
+		w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
+		t.writers[webhookID] = w
+	}
+
+	// A delivery claims the entry: even if the idle sweep created
+	// it moments ago, it now belongs to the registry proper and
+	// the sweep must leave it in place when it finishes.
+	w.sweepOwned = false
+
+	return w, nil
+}
+
+// sweepWriterFor returns the archive writer the idle sweep should
+// prune a webhook through, together with whether the sweep itself
+// created the registry entry.
+//
+// The sweep must route its prune through the registered writer so
+// the writer's mutex orders it against concurrent writes, but it
+// must never leave a registry entry behind: a sweep that ran
+// concurrently with the webhook's deletion would otherwise
+// re-create an entry that nothing will ever evict again, which is
+// exactly the leak eviction exists to prevent. An entry the sweep
+// creates is therefore marked sweep-owned and handed back to
+// releaseSweepWriter when the sweep is done.
+func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWriterFor(
+	webhookID string,
+) (*archiveWriter, bool, error) {
+	path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+
+	t.mu.Lock()
+	defer t.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if t.writers == nil {
+		t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
+	}
+
+	w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
+	if ok {
+		return w, false, nil
+	}
+
+	w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
+	w.sweepOwned = true
+	t.writers[webhookID] = w
+
+	return w, true, nil
+}
+
+// releaseSweepWriter drops a registry entry that the idle sweep
+// created, so a sweep leaves the registry exactly as it found it.
+//
+// The entry is removed only if it is still the very writer the
+// sweep installed and no delivery has claimed it in the meantime
+// (writerFor clears sweepOwned when it hands a writer to the
+// write path). Both conditions are evaluated under the registry
+// lock, so an eviction that raced the sweep — which removes the
+// entry outright — simply finds nothing left to do here, and a
+// delivery that adopted the writer keeps a registered, evictable
+// one.
+func (t *databaseTarget) releaseSweepWriter(
+	webhookID string, w *archiveWriter,
+) {
+	t.mu.Lock()
+	defer t.mu.Unlock()
+
+	cur, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
+	if !ok || cur != w || !cur.sweepOwned {
+		return
+	}
+
+	delete(t.writers, webhookID)
+}
+
+// archivePath returns the archive file path for a webhook: it
+// lives beside the per-webhook event database in the data
+// directory. It does not touch the filesystem.
+func (t *databaseTarget) archivePath(
+	webhookID string,
+) (string, error) {
+	if t.eng.dbManager == nil {
+		return "", errArchiveNoDataDir
+	}
+
+	dir := filepath.Dir(t.eng.dbManager.DBPath(webhookID))
+
+	return filepath.Join(
+		dir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
+	), nil
+}
+
+// evict drops a webhook's archive writer from the registry and
+// closes its handle, so a deleted webhook does not leave a
+// writer (and an open archive handle within its debounce
+// window) alive for the process lifetime.
+//
+// The map entry is removed under the registry lock, which is
+// then released before the handle is closed under the writer's
+// own lock: that ordering keeps the registry available to other
+// webhooks while an in-flight write on this one drains, and
+// closing under the writer's lock means eviction can never race
+// a write.
+//
+// Eviction is idempotent and silent for a webhook with no
+// writer, which is the common case: a webhook with no database
+// target never creates one. It never deletes the archive file.
+func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
+	t.mu.Lock()
+
+	w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
+	if ok {
+		delete(t.writers, webhookID)
+	}
+
+	t.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.evict()
+
+	t.eng.log.Info(
+		"evicted archive writer",
+		"webhook_id", webhookID,
+		"path", w.path,
+	)
+}
+
+// sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
+// expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
+// do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
+// creates an archive for a webhook that has a database target
+// but has never received an event.
+//
+// It also never leaves a registry entry behind: an entry it had
+// to create to reach the writer's mutex is released again once
+// the prune is done, so a sweep racing a webhook deletion cannot
+// resurrect the writer the eviction just dropped.
+func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWebhook(
+	webhookID string, expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Check before taking a writer at all: a webhook whose
+	// archive has never been created gets no writer, no handle,
+	// and no file.
+	if !fileExists(path) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	w, created, err := t.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if created {
+		defer t.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w)
+	}
+
+	return w.sweepExpired(expiry)
+}

internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go

@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+// archiveExpiryNever is the expiry sentinel (and default) that
+// disables pruning so archived rows are kept forever.
+const archiveExpiryNever = "never"
+
+// archiveReopenDebounce bounds how often an archive file is
+// closed and reopened. After each write the handle is closed
+// and reopened so an operator can move the file away for
+// offline archiving, but never more than once per this window.
+const archiveReopenDebounce = time.Second
+
+const (
+	// archiveModeCreate is the SQLite URI mode used by the write
+	// path: open the archive file, creating it if missing, so a
+	// first write (or a write after the operator moved the file
+	// away) recreates it.
+	archiveModeCreate = "rwc"
+
+	// archiveModeExisting is the SQLite URI mode used by the idle
+	// sweep: open read-write but never create. A sweep must never
+	// conjure an empty archive file for a webhook that has a
+	// database target but has never received an event.
+	archiveModeExisting = "rw"
+)
+
+var (
+	// errArchiveMissingWebhookID is returned when an event to
+	// archive has no webhook id to key its archive file on.
+	errArchiveMissingWebhookID = errors.New(
+		"cannot archive event without a webhook id",
+	)
+
+	// errArchiveNoDataDir is returned when the database target
+	// has no webhook database manager and so cannot locate the
+	// data directory for archive files.
+	errArchiveNoDataDir = errors.New(
+		"database target has no data directory",
+	)
+
+	// errArchiveExpiryNotPositive is returned when a
+	// user-supplied archive expiry parses as a duration but is
+	// zero or negative; "never" is the way to disable pruning.
+	errArchiveExpiryNotPositive = errors.New(
+		"expiry must be a positive duration or \"never\"",
+	)
+
+	// errArchiveWriterEvicted is returned when a writer that has
+	// been evicted (its webhook was deleted, or its last database
+	// target was removed) is used again. An evicted writer is no
+	// longer in the registry, so reopening its file would leak a
+	// handle nothing owns.
+	errArchiveWriterEvicted = errors.New(
+		"archive writer has been evicted",
+	)
+)
+
+// databaseTargetConfig is the optional per-target JSON config
+// for a database (archive) target.
+type databaseTargetConfig struct {
+	// Expiry is a Go duration (e.g. "720h") after which
+	// archived rows are pruned, or "never" (the default) to
+	// keep them forever.
+	Expiry string `json:"expiry"`
+}
+
+// archivedEvent is one fully captured webhook event stored in a
+// per-webhook archive database for long-term retention. It is a
+// self-contained copy — independent of the per-webhook event
+// database, which may prune events under its own retention.
+type archivedEvent struct {
+	ID           uint   `gorm:"primaryKey;autoIncrement"`
+	EventID      string `gorm:"index"`
+	WebhookID    string
+	EntrypointID string
+	Method       string
+	Headers      string
+	Body         string
+	ContentType  string
+
+	// ArchivedAt is when the row was archived and is the age
+	// basis for expiry pruning.
+	ArchivedAt time.Time `gorm:"index"`
+}
+
+// parseArchiveExpiry reads the optional expiry from a database
+// target's config JSON. An empty config, an empty expiry, or
+// the literal "never" all mean keep forever, returned as a zero
+// duration. Any other value must parse as a positive Go
+// duration; a set-but-invalid value (unparseable, zero, or
+// negative) is an error rather than a silent default, matching
+// ValidateArchiveExpiry at target creation.
+func parseArchiveExpiry(
+	configJSON string,
+) (time.Duration, error) {
+	if configJSON == "" {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+
+	var cfg databaseTargetConfig
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"parsing database target config: %w", err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Expiry == "" || cfg.Expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+
+	dur, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Expiry)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"parsing archive expiry %q: %w", cfg.Expiry, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if dur <= 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %q", errArchiveExpiryNotPositive, cfg.Expiry,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return dur, nil
+}
+
+// ValidateArchiveExpiry checks a user-supplied archive expiry
+// for a database target at configuration time. Valid values are
+// empty, "never" (both meaning keep forever), or a positive Go
+// duration such as "720h". Anything else is an error, so a bad
+// expiry is rejected when the target is created rather than
+// failing every subsequent delivery.
+func ValidateArchiveExpiry(expiry string) error {
+	if expiry == "" || expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	dur, err := time.ParseDuration(expiry)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"expiry must be %q or a Go duration "+
+				"such as \"720h\": %w",
+			archiveExpiryNever, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if dur <= 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %q", errArchiveExpiryNotPositive, expiry,
+		)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// archiveWriter owns one per-webhook archive SQLite file. It
+// serialises writes, and after each write closes and reopens
+// the file (debounced to at most once per debounce window) so
+// an operator can move the file away for offline archiving. The
+// next write recreates a moved or removed file, because the
+// file is opened create-if-missing and its schema is migrated
+// on every open.
+type archiveWriter struct {
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	path       string
+	log        *slog.Logger
+	debounce   time.Duration
+	db         *gorm.DB
+	lastReopen time.Time
+	reopens    int
+
+	// evicted marks a writer that has been removed from the
+	// per-webhook registry. Its handle is closed and it must
+	// never open the file again: nothing holds it any more, so a
+	// reopen would leak the handle for the process lifetime.
+	evicted bool
+
+	// sweepOwned marks a registry entry that the idle sweep
+	// created because no writer was cached for the webhook. The
+	// sweep removes such an entry again when it is done, so a
+	// sweep can never leave — or resurrect — a registry entry
+	// for a webhook that has been deleted. A delivery that adopts
+	// the writer clears the flag, handing the entry to the
+	// registry proper.
+	//
+	// Unlike every other field here it is guarded by
+	// databaseTarget.mu, not by this writer's mu: it describes the
+	// registry entry rather than the file.
+	sweepOwned bool
+}
+
+// newArchiveWriter builds an archiveWriter for a file path with
+// the default reopen debounce.
+func newArchiveWriter(
+	path string, log *slog.Logger,
+) *archiveWriter {
+	return &archiveWriter{
+		path:     path,
+		log:      log,
+		debounce: archiveReopenDebounce,
+	}
+}
+
+// write appends the event as a row, then applies the debounced
+// close/reopen. It recreates the archive file if it was moved
+// or removed since the last open. A positive expiry prunes rows
+// older than it on each (re)open.
+func (w *archiveWriter) write(
+	row archivedEvent, expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if w.evicted {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %s", errArchiveWriterEvicted, w.path,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if w.db == nil || !fileExists(w.path) {
+		err := w.reopen(expiry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	row.ArchivedAt = time.Now()
+
+	err := w.db.Create(&row).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"archiving event to %s: %w", w.path, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if time.Since(w.lastReopen) >= w.debounce {
+		return w.reopen(expiry)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// open opens (creating if missing) the archive file, migrates
+// its schema, records the reopen time, and prunes expired rows
+// when expiry is positive.
+func (w *archiveWriter) open(expiry time.Duration) error {
+	return w.openMode(archiveModeCreate, expiry)
+}
+
+// openMode opens the archive file with the given SQLite URI
+// mode, migrates its schema, records the reopen time, and
+// prunes expired rows when expiry is positive. The write path
+// passes archiveModeCreate so a missing file is recreated; the
+// idle sweep passes archiveModeExisting so a missing file is an
+// error rather than a newly conjured empty archive.
+func (w *archiveWriter) openMode(
+	mode string, expiry time.Duration,
+) error {
+	dbURL := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=%s", w.path, mode)
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"opening archive database %s: %w", w.path, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = sqlDB.Close()
+
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"connecting to archive database %s: %w",
+			w.path, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	err = gdb.AutoMigrate(&archivedEvent{})
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = sqlDB.Close()
+
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"migrating archive database %s: %w", w.path, err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	w.db = gdb
+	w.lastReopen = time.Now()
+	w.reopens++
+
+	if expiry > 0 {
+		w.prune(expiry)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// reopen closes any open handle and opens the file afresh. The
+// fresh open recreates the file if it was moved away.
+func (w *archiveWriter) reopen(expiry time.Duration) error {
+	w.close()
+
+	return w.open(expiry)
+}
+
+// close closes the underlying handle, if any.
+func (w *archiveWriter) close() {
+	if w.db == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	sqlDB, err := w.db.DB()
+	if err == nil {
+		_ = sqlDB.Close()
+	}
+
+	w.db = nil
+}
+
+// sweepExpired prunes an archive that may have gone idle, with
+// no write to trigger the usual on-reopen prune. It takes the
+// writer's own mutex for the whole operation, so a sweep is
+// ordered against concurrent writes rather than reaching around
+// them to the file.
+//
+// It never creates the archive file: a missing file is skipped,
+// and the reopen uses archiveModeExisting so SQLite itself
+// refuses to create one if the file disappears between the
+// check and the open.
+//
+// The archive is left CLOSED afterwards. An idle archive holding
+// no handle is what keeps the operator's move-the-file-away
+// workflow working; the next write reopens (and recreates) the
+// file as it always has.
+func (w *archiveWriter) sweepExpired(expiry time.Duration) error {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if w.evicted {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"%w: %s", errArchiveWriterEvicted, w.path,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if !fileExists(w.path) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Drop any live handle first so the prune runs against a
+	// freshly opened file, matching the write path's semantics.
+	w.close()
+
+	err := w.openMode(archiveModeExisting, expiry)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	w.close()
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// evict closes the writer's handle and marks it unusable. It is
+// called when the writer leaves the registry, either because the
+// webhook was deleted or because its last database target was
+// removed. The archive FILE is deliberately left on disk: it is
+// long-term storage an operator may still want.
+func (w *archiveWriter) evict() {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	w.evicted = true
+
+	w.close()
+}
+
+// prune deletes archived rows older than expiry, measured from
+// each row's archived time. It runs on every (re)open, so a
+// steadily written archive is swept by its own write traffic. An
+// archive that goes idle receives no further reopens, which is
+// why ArchiveSweeper exists to drive sweepExpired on a timer.
+// Failures are logged, not fatal: a prune error must not stop
+// archiving.
+func (w *archiveWriter) prune(expiry time.Duration) {
+	cutoff := time.Now().Add(-expiry)
+
+	res := w.db.Where("archived_at < ?", cutoff).
+		Delete(&archivedEvent{})
+	if res.Error != nil {
+		w.log.Error(
+			"failed to prune expired archive rows",
+			"path", w.path,
+			"error", res.Error,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	if res.RowsAffected > 0 {
+		w.log.Info(
+			"pruned expired archive rows",
+			"path", w.path,
+			"rows_deleted", res.RowsAffected,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// fileExists reports whether a path currently exists.
+func fileExists(path string) bool {
+	_, err := os.Stat(path)
+
+	return err == nil
+}

internal/delivery/target_database_evict_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+// evictTestEngine builds an engine backed by a temporary data
+// directory and returns it along with that directory.
+func evictTestEngine(t *testing.T) (*delivery.Engine, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dataDir := t.TempDir()
+
+	eng := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
+		nil,
+		database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
+		archiveTestLogger(),
+		&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
+		1,
+	)
+
+	return eng, dataDir
+}
+
+// TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter proves that evicting
+// a webhook drops its archive writer from the registry and
+// closes the open archive handle, rather than leaving both
+// alive for the process lifetime.
+func TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	eng, dataDir := evictTestEngine(t)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
+
+	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	webhookID := event.WebhookID
+
+	require.True(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"a delivery should have cached an archive writer",
+	)
+	require.True(
+		t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
+		"the writer should hold an open handle after a write",
+	)
+
+	eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
+		"eviction should remove the registry entry",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
+		"eviction should close the archive handle",
+	)
+
+	archivePath := filepath.Join(
+		dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
+	)
+	assert.FileExists(
+		t, archivePath,
+		"eviction must not delete the archive file",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp proves eviction is safe
+// for the common case of a webhook that never had a database
+// target, and that repeating it does not panic.
+func TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
+
+	assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
+		eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
+		eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
+	})
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter("no-such-webhook"),
+		"eviction must not create a writer",
+	)
+}
+
+// evictTestRow builds an archive row for the eviction tests.
+func evictTestRow(eventID string) delivery.ExportArchivedEvent {
+	return delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
+		EventID:   eventID,
+		WebhookID: "wh-evict",
+		Method:    http.MethodPost,
+		Body:      `{"seeded":true}`,
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile is the direct test of
+// the evicted guard on the write path. A writer that has left
+// the registry is held by nobody, so a handle it opened could
+// never be closed again: it must refuse the write outright
+// rather than recreate the archive behind the registry's back.
+//
+// The archive file is removed before the eviction, so an
+// unguarded write is unmistakable — it recreates the file.
+func TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-evicted.db")
+
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-1"), 0))
+	require.FileExists(t, path)
+
+	// The operator moves the archive away for offline retention,
+	// which the write path would ordinarily undo on the next
+	// write by recreating the file.
+	require.NoError(t, os.Remove(path))
+
+	w.Evict()
+
+	err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-2"), 0)
+
+	require.ErrorIs(
+		t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
+		"an evicted writer must refuse writes",
+	)
+	assert.NoFileExists(
+		t, path,
+		"an evicted writer must not reopen (or recreate) the "+
+			"archive file",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, w.HandleOpen(),
+		"an evicted writer must hold no handle",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEvictedWriter_SweepDoesNotReopenFile is the same test for
+// the sweep path: an idle sweep that reaches a writer already
+// evicted underneath it must return the sentinel rather than
+// reopen a file nothing owns.
+func TestEvictedWriter_SweepDoesNotReopenFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-evicted.db")
+
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-1"), 0))
+	require.FileExists(t, path)
+
+	w.Evict()
+
+	err := w.SweepExpired(time.Hour)
+
+	require.ErrorIs(
+		t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
+		"an evicted writer must refuse an idle sweep",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, w.HandleOpen(),
+		"a refused sweep must not leave a handle open",
+	)
+}
+
+// racingWrites drives a pack of goroutines writing to one
+// archive writer until each is refused, so an eviction on the
+// test goroutine has to take the writer's mutex away from writes
+// that are already contending for it.
+type racingWrites struct {
+	wg         sync.WaitGroup
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	sawEvicted bool
+	otherErr   error
+	started    chan struct{}
+}
+
+// racingWriteGoroutines is how many goroutines contend for the
+// writer's mutex while the eviction lands.
+const racingWriteGoroutines = 4
+
+// startRacingWrites launches the writing goroutines. Each writes
+// in a loop and stops at its first error, recording whether that
+// error was the eviction sentinel. The deadline is a backstop
+// against a hang, not a timing assumption: the first write after
+// the eviction is refused.
+func startRacingWrites(
+	w *delivery.ExportArchiveWriter,
+) *racingWrites {
+	r := &racingWrites{
+		started: make(chan struct{}, racingWriteGoroutines),
+	}
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
+
+	r.wg.Add(racingWriteGoroutines)
+
+	for i := range racingWriteGoroutines {
+		go func() {
+			defer r.wg.Done()
+
+			first := true
+
+			for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+				err := w.Write(
+					evictTestRow(fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i)), 0,
+				)
+
+				if first {
+					r.started <- struct{}{}
+
+					first = false
+				}
+
+				if err == nil {
+					continue
+				}
+
+				r.record(err)
+
+				return
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+
+	return r
+}
+
+// record classifies the error that stopped one goroutine.
+func (r *racingWrites) record(err error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted) {
+		r.sawEvicted = true
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	r.otherErr = err
+}
+
+// awaitFirstWrite blocks until at least one write has run, so
+// the eviction that follows is a genuine race.
+func (r *racingWrites) awaitFirstWrite() {
+	<-r.started
+}
+
+// wait joins the goroutines and reports whether any write was
+// refused with the eviction sentinel, plus any unexpected error.
+func (r *racingWrites) wait() (bool, error) {
+	r.wg.Wait()
+
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return r.sawEvicted, r.otherErr
+}
+
+// TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle exercises the
+// interleaving the evicted flag exists for: writes already
+// contending for the writer's mutex when the eviction takes it.
+// The write that wins the mutex after the eviction must abandon
+// its work rather than reopen the archive, leaving the writer
+// permanently handle-free. Run under -race.
+func TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
+
+	// Prime the registry so the test can hold the very writer the
+	// eviction is about to detach.
+	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
+	require.NotNil(t, w)
+	require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
+
+	race := startRacingWrites(w)
+
+	// Evict only once writes are genuinely in flight, so the
+	// eviction has to contend for the writer's mutex.
+	race.awaitFirstWrite()
+
+	eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
+
+	sawEvicted, otherErr := race.wait()
+
+	require.NoError(t, otherErr)
+	assert.True(
+		t, sawEvicted,
+		"a write after eviction must be refused",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, w.HandleOpen(),
+		"no write may reopen the archive once the writer has "+
+			"been evicted",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
+		"the registry entry must stay gone",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter proves eviction
+// does not break archiving for a webhook that is still alive: a
+// subsequent delivery gets a brand new writer from the registry.
+// It says nothing about the evicted writer itself — that is what
+// TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile covers.
+func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
+
+	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+	require.True(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
+	)
+
+	eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
+
+	// A fresh delivery for the same webhook gets a brand new
+	// writer from the registry, so archiving keeps working.
+	second := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event, "",
+	)
+	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, second)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
+		"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/target_database_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+func archiveTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
+	return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+		os.Stderr,
+		&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+	))
+}
+
+// openArchiveDBForRead opens an archive file read-only so a
+// test can inspect the rows the writer persisted.
+func openArchiveDBForRead(
+	t *testing.T, path string,
+) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
+		"sqlite",
+		fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", path),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
+
+	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return gdb
+}
+
+// archiveFileSuffixes returns the archive file itself and the
+// SQLite sidecars that accompany an open database. A test that
+// asserts no archive was created has to check all of them.
+func archiveFileSuffixes() []string {
+	return []string{"", "-wal", "-shm"}
+}
+
+// removeArchiveFiles simulates an operator moving the archive
+// away by deleting the SQLite file and its sidecar files.
+func removeArchiveFiles(t *testing.T, path string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, suffix := range []string{
+		"", "-wal", "-shm", "-journal",
+	} {
+		err := os.Remove(path + suffix)
+		if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			t.Fatalf("removing %s%s: %v", path, suffix, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent verifies that delivering to
+// a database target marks the delivery delivered and archives
+// the full event into a separate per-webhook archive file.
+func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dataDir := t.TempDir()
+	dbMgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
+
+	e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
+		nil, dbMgr,
+		archiveTestLogger(),
+		&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
+		1,
+	)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
+
+	e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	var updated database.Delivery
+
+	require.NoError(t, webhookDB.First(
+		&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
+	).Error)
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, updated.Status,
+		"database target should mark the delivery delivered",
+	)
+
+	archivePath := filepath.Join(
+		dataDir,
+		fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
+	)
+	assert.FileExists(t, archivePath)
+
+	rdb := openArchiveDBForRead(t, archivePath)
+
+	var rows []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
+
+	require.NoError(t, rdb.Find(&rows).Error)
+	require.Len(t, rows, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, event.ID, rows[0].EventID)
+	assert.Equal(t, event.WebhookID, rows[0].WebhookID)
+	assert.Equal(t, event.Method, rows[0].Method)
+	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"archived":true}`, rows[0].Body)
+}
+
+func TestArchiveWriter_WritesRow(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	row := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
+		EventID:      "ev-1",
+		WebhookID:    "wh-1",
+		EntrypointID: "ep-1",
+		Method:       "POST",
+		Headers:      `{"X":"Y"}`,
+		Body:         `{"hello":"world"}`,
+		ContentType:  "application/json",
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(row, 0))
+	assert.FileExists(t, path)
+
+	var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
+	require.Len(t, got, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, "ev-1", got[0].EventID)
+	assert.Equal(t, "wh-1", got[0].WebhookID)
+	assert.Equal(t, "ep-1", got[0].EntrypointID)
+	assert.Equal(t, row.Method, got[0].Method)
+	assert.Equal(t, row.ContentType, got[0].ContentType)
+	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"hello":"world"}`, got[0].Body)
+	assert.False(t, got[0].ArchivedAt.IsZero())
+}
+
+func TestArchiveWriter_RecreatesAfterRemoval(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(
+		delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "a"}, 0,
+	))
+	assert.FileExists(t, path)
+
+	// The operator moves the archive away while the handle is
+	// still open.
+	removeArchiveFiles(t, path)
+	require.NoFileExists(t, path)
+
+	// The next write recreates the file with a fresh schema and
+	// only the new row.
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(
+		delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "b"}, 0,
+	))
+	assert.FileExists(t, path)
+
+	var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
+	require.Len(t, got, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, "b", got[0].EventID)
+}
+
+func TestArchiveWriter_ReopenDebounce(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// A generous debounce keeps the two rapid writes inside
+	// the window even on a heavily loaded test machine.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 2*time.Second,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(
+		delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "a"}, 0,
+	))
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(
+		delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "b"}, 0,
+	))
+
+	// Two writes inside the debounce window trigger only the
+	// initial open — no extra close/reopen.
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, w.Reopens())
+
+	time.Sleep(2100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Write(
+		delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "c"}, 0,
+	))
+
+	// A write after the window elapses closes and reopens once.
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, w.Reopens())
+}
+
+func TestArchiveWriter_ExpiryPrune(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
+	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
+		path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.Open(0))
+
+	old := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
+		EventID:    "old",
+		ArchivedAt: time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
+	}
+	fresh := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
+		EventID:    "fresh",
+		ArchivedAt: time.Now(),
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.DB().Create(&old).Error)
+	require.NoError(t, w.DB().Create(&fresh).Error)
+
+	// Reopening with a one-hour expiry prunes the old row.
+	require.NoError(t, w.Reopen(time.Hour))
+
+	var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
+
+	require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
+	require.Len(t, got, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, "fresh", got[0].EventID)
+}
+
+func TestParseArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		in      string
+		want    time.Duration
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{"empty config", "", 0, false},
+		{"explicit never", `{"expiry":"never"}`, 0, false},
+		{"empty expiry", `{"expiry":""}`, 0, false},
+		{"duration", `{"expiry":"1h"}`, time.Hour, false},
+		{"unparseable", `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`, 0, true},
+		{"zero duration", `{"expiry":"0s"}`, 0, true},
+		{"negative duration", `{"expiry":"-5h"}`, 0, true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			got, err := delivery.ExportParseArchiveExpiry(tc.in)
+			if tc.wantErr {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// seedDatabaseTargetDelivery seeds a pending delivery for a
+// database target with the given config JSON and returns the
+// in-memory delivery the target handler is invoked with.
+func seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+	t *testing.T,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	event database.Event,
+	config string,
+) *database.Delivery {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dlv := seedDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
+		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+	)
+
+	d := &database.Delivery{
+		EventID:  event.ID,
+		TargetID: dlv.TargetID,
+		Status:   database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+		Event:    event,
+		Target: database.Target{
+			Name:   "test-db",
+			Type:   database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+			Config: config,
+		},
+	}
+	d.ID = dlv.ID
+
+	return d
+}
+
+// TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery verifies that
+// an archive error (here: an unparseable expiry in the target
+// config) fails the delivery loudly: the attempt is recorded as
+// failed with the error and the delivery is marked failed, not
+// delivered.
+func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dataDir := t.TempDir()
+
+	e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
+		nil, database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
+		archiveTestLogger(),
+		&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
+		1,
+	)
+
+	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
+	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":false}`)
+	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
+		t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`,
+	)
+
+	e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
+
+	var updated database.Delivery
+
+	require.NoError(t, webhookDB.First(
+		&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
+	).Error)
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		database.DeliveryStatusFailed, updated.Status,
+		"archive failure must mark the delivery failed",
+	)
+
+	var results []database.DeliveryResult
+
+	require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Where(
+		"delivery_id = ?", d.ID,
+	).Find(&results).Error)
+	require.Len(t, results, 1)
+	assert.False(t,
+		results[0].Success,
+		"the attempt must be recorded as failed",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(t,
+		results[0].Error, "nonsense",
+		"the archive error must be recorded on the attempt",
+	)
+
+	assert.NoFileExists(t,
+		filepath.Join(
+			dataDir,
+			fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
+		),
+		"no archive file should exist for a failed config",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestValidateArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	valid := []string{"", "never", "1h", "720h", "30m"}
+	for _, in := range valid {
+		require.NoError(t,
+			delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(in),
+			"expiry %q should be accepted", in,
+		)
+	}
+
+	invalid := []string{"nonsense", "7d", "-5h", "0s", "0"}
+	for _, in := range invalid {
+		require.Error(t,
+			delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(in),
+			"expiry %q should be rejected", in,
+		)
+	}
+}

internal/delivery/target_http.go

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// Sentinel errors returned by the config parsers.
+var (
+	errEmptyTargetConfig = errors.New(
+		"empty target config",
+	)
+	errMissingTargetURL = errors.New(
+		"target URL is required",
+	)
+)
+
+// HTTPTargetConfig holds configuration for http target
+// types.
+type HTTPTargetConfig struct {
+	URL     string            `json:"url"`
+	Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
+	Timeout int               `json:"timeout,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// httpCore holds the retry, backoff, and circuit-breaker
+// machinery shared by the HTTP and Slack targets. Each of
+// those targets owns its own httpCore instance (and thus its
+// own circuit breakers); the per-attempt request differs
+// between them and is supplied as a closure.
+type httpCore struct {
+	eng *Engine
+
+	// circuitBreakers stores a *CircuitBreaker per target ID.
+	circuitBreakers sync.Map
+}
+
+// deliver runs one delivery attempt through the retry core.
+// A maxRetries of 0 is fire-and-forget: a single attempt is
+// recorded and no circuit breaker is consulted. A positive
+// maxRetries gates the attempt on the circuit breaker and
+// schedules a backed-off retry on failure.
+func (c *httpCore) deliver(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+	maxRetries int,
+	attempt func() attemptResult,
+) {
+	if maxRetries == 0 {
+		c.fireAndForget(webhookDB, d, attempt())
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.withRetry(
+		webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attempt,
+	)
+}
+
+func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	res attemptResult,
+) {
+	c.eng.recordResult(
+		webhookDB, d, 1, res.success,
+		res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
+		res.duration,
+	)
+
+	if res.success {
+		c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+			webhookDB, d,
+			database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+	)
+}
+
+func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+	maxRetries int,
+	attempt func() attemptResult,
+) {
+	cb := c.getCircuitBreaker(task.TargetID)
+	if c.circuitBreakerBlock(webhookDB, d, task, sched, cb) {
+		return
+	}
+
+	attemptNum := task.AttemptNum
+
+	res := attempt()
+
+	c.eng.recordResult(
+		webhookDB, d, attemptNum, res.success,
+		res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
+		res.duration,
+	)
+
+	if res.success {
+		cb.RecordSuccess()
+
+		c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+			webhookDB, d,
+			database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	cb.RecordFailure()
+
+	c.handleRetry(
+		webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attemptNum,
+	)
+}
+
+func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+	cb *CircuitBreaker,
+) bool {
+	if cb.Allow() {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	remaining := cb.CooldownRemaining()
+
+	c.eng.log.Info(
+		"circuit breaker open, skipping delivery",
+		"target_id", task.TargetID,
+		"target_name", task.TargetName,
+		"delivery_id", d.ID,
+		"cooldown_remaining", remaining,
+	)
+
+	c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d,
+		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
+	)
+
+	retryTask := *task
+	sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, remaining)
+
+	return true
+}
+
+func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+	maxRetries int,
+	attemptNum int,
+) {
+	if attemptNum >= maxRetries {
+		c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+			webhookDB, d,
+			database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
+	)
+
+	backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
+
+	retryTask := *task
+	retryTask.AttemptNum = attemptNum + 1
+	sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, backoff)
+}
+
+func (c *httpCore) getCircuitBreaker(
+	targetID string,
+) *CircuitBreaker {
+	if val, ok := c.circuitBreakers.Load(targetID); ok {
+		cb, _ := val.(*CircuitBreaker)
+
+		return cb
+	}
+
+	fresh := NewCircuitBreaker()
+
+	actual, _ := c.circuitBreakers.LoadOrStore(
+		targetID, fresh,
+	)
+
+	cb, _ := actual.(*CircuitBreaker)
+
+	return cb
+}
+
+// remainingBackoff returns how long remains of the backoff
+// window for the last attempt of a recovered retrying
+// delivery. It implements rescheduler.
+func (c *httpCore) remainingBackoff(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	deliveryID string,
+	attemptNum int,
+) time.Duration {
+	var lastResult database.DeliveryResult
+
+	err := webhookDB.
+		Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
+		Order("created_at DESC").
+		First(&lastResult).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
+	elapsed := time.Since(lastResult.CreatedAt)
+	remaining := backoff - elapsed
+
+	return max(remaining, 0)
+}
+
+// backoffElapsed reports whether the backoff window for the
+// last attempt of a retrying delivery has passed. It
+// implements rescheduler.
+func (c *httpCore) backoffElapsed(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	deliveryID string,
+	attemptNum int,
+) bool {
+	var lastResult database.DeliveryResult
+
+	err := webhookDB.
+		Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
+		Order("created_at DESC").
+		First(&lastResult).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
+
+	return time.Since(lastResult.CreatedAt) >= backoff
+}
+
+func calcBackoff(attemptNum int) time.Duration {
+	shift := max(attemptNum-1, 0)
+	shift = min(shift, maxBackoffShift)
+
+	return time.Duration(1<<uint(shift)) * time.Second
+}
+
+// httpTarget delivers events to http targets. It forwards the
+// event body and (filtered) request headers to the configured
+// URL and owns retry, backoff, and circuit breaking through
+// the shared httpCore.
+type httpTarget struct {
+	*httpCore
+
+	client *http.Client
+}
+
+// Deliver implements Target.
+func (t *httpTarget) Deliver(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+) {
+	cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(d.Target.Config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.eng.log.Error(
+			"invalid HTTP target config",
+			"target_id", d.TargetID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		t.eng.recordResult(
+			webhookDB, d, task.AttemptNum,
+			false, 0, "", err.Error(), 0,
+		)
+
+		t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+			webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	attempt := func() attemptResult {
+		return t.attempt(ctx, cfg, &d.Event)
+	}
+
+	t.deliver(
+		webhookDB, d, task, sched,
+		d.Target.MaxRetries, attempt,
+	)
+}
+
+// attempt performs a single HTTP delivery attempt and derives
+// the success flag and error message the same way the engine
+// did: a non-2xx response is a failure but carries no error
+// string; only a transport-level error does.
+func (t *httpTarget) attempt(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+	event *database.Event,
+) attemptResult {
+	statusCode, respBody, duration, reqErr :=
+		t.doHTTPRequest(ctx, cfg, event)
+
+	success := reqErr == nil &&
+		statusCode >= httpSuccessMin &&
+		statusCode < httpSuccessMax
+
+	errMsg := ""
+	if reqErr != nil {
+		errMsg = reqErr.Error()
+	}
+
+	return attemptResult{
+		statusCode: statusCode,
+		respBody:   respBody,
+		duration:   duration,
+		success:    success,
+		errMsg:     errMsg,
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+	event *database.Event,
+) (int, string, int64, error) {
+	start := time.Now()
+
+	req, reqErr := http.NewRequestWithContext(
+		ctx,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		cfg.URL,
+		bytes.NewReader([]byte(event.Body)),
+	)
+	if reqErr != nil {
+		return 0, "", 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"creating request: %w",
+			maskURLError(reqErr),
+		)
+	}
+
+	applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
+
+	client := t.clientForConfig(cfg)
+
+	resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(client, req)
+
+	dur := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
+	if doErr != nil {
+		return 0, "", dur, fmt.Errorf(
+			"sending request: %w", doErr,
+		)
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+	body, readErr := io.ReadAll(
+		io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBodyLog),
+	)
+	if readErr != nil {
+		return resp.StatusCode, "", dur,
+			fmt.Errorf(
+				"reading response body: %w", readErr,
+			)
+	}
+
+	return resp.StatusCode, string(body), dur, nil
+}
+
+func (t *httpTarget) clientForConfig(
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+) *http.Client {
+	if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
+		// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so
+		// a per-target timeout does not drop the
+		// request-time private-IP guard. Only the timeout
+		// is overridden.
+		return &http.Client{
+			Timeout: time.Duration(
+				cfg.Timeout,
+			) * time.Second,
+			Transport: t.client.Transport,
+		}
+	}
+
+	return t.client
+}
+
+func parseHTTPConfig(
+	configJSON string,
+) (*HTTPTargetConfig, error) {
+	if configJSON == "" {
+		return nil, errEmptyTargetConfig
+	}
+
+	var cfg HTTPTargetConfig
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(
+		[]byte(configJSON), &cfg,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"parsing config JSON: %w", err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.URL == "" {
+		return nil, errMissingTargetURL
+	}
+
+	return &cfg, nil
+}
+
+// isForwardableHeader returns true if the header should
+// be forwarded to targets.
+func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
+	switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) {
+	case "Host", "Connection", "Keep-Alive",
+		"Transfer-Encoding", "Te", "Trailer",
+		"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
+		"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
+		return false
+	default:
+		return true
+	}
+}
+
+func applyRequestHeaders(
+	req *http.Request,
+	event *database.Event,
+	cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
+) {
+	if event.ContentType != "" {
+		req.Header.Set(
+			"Content-Type", event.ContentType,
+		)
+	}
+
+	var originalHeaders map[string][]string
+
+	if event.Headers != "" {
+		jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(
+			[]byte(event.Headers),
+			&originalHeaders,
+		)
+		if jsonErr == nil {
+			for k, vals := range originalHeaders {
+				if isForwardableHeader(k) {
+					for _, v := range vals {
+						req.Header.Add(k, v)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	for k, v := range cfg.Headers {
+		req.Header.Set(k, v)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
+}
+
+// executeHTTPRequest sends an HTTP request using the provided
+// client. URLs are validated by the config parsers and the
+// SSRF-safe transport before reaching here.
+//
+// Transport failures are masked here, at the single point
+// where every target's request errors are born, because the
+// caller stores them in DeliveryResult.Error: an unmasked
+// *url.Error would write the target URL — the credential for
+// a Slack incoming webhook — into the per-webhook database.
+func executeHTTPRequest(
+	client *http.Client, req *http.Request,
+) (*http.Response, error) {
+	resp, err := client.Do(req) //#nosec G704 -- validated URL, SSRF-safe transport
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, maskURLError(err)
+	}
+
+	return resp, nil
+}

internal/delivery/target_log.go

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// logTarget is a fire-and-forget target that logs the entire
+// inbound webhook — the full request body and headers, plus
+// the method, content type, and the webhook and entrypoint
+// ids — then records a single successful attempt.
+type logTarget struct {
+	eng *Engine
+}
+
+// Deliver implements Target.
+func (t *logTarget) Deliver(
+	_ context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	_ *Task,
+	_ Scheduler,
+) {
+	t.eng.log.Info(
+		"webhook event delivered to log target",
+		"delivery_id", d.ID,
+		"event_id", d.EventID,
+		"target_id", d.TargetID,
+		"target_name", d.Target.Name,
+		"webhook_id", d.Event.WebhookID,
+		"entrypoint_id", d.Event.EntrypointID,
+		"method", d.Event.Method,
+		"content_type", d.Event.ContentType,
+		"headers", d.Event.Headers,
+		"body", d.Event.Body,
+	)
+
+	t.eng.recordResult(
+		webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
+	)
+
+	t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+	)
+}

internal/delivery/target_slack.go

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+)
+
+// errMissingWebhookURL is returned when a Slack target config
+// omits its webhook URL.
+var errMissingWebhookURL = errors.New(
+	"webhook_url is required",
+)
+
+// SlackTargetConfig holds configuration for slack target
+// types.
+type SlackTargetConfig struct {
+	WebhookURL string `json:"webhookUrl"`
+}
+
+// slackTarget delivers events to Slack incoming webhooks. It
+// formats the event into a Slack message and posts it as
+// JSON. It shares the retry core with the HTTP target: a
+// MaxRetries of 0 stays single-attempt fire-and-forget
+// (preserving existing Slack targets), while a positive
+// MaxRetries adds backoff and circuit breaking.
+type slackTarget struct {
+	*httpCore
+
+	client *http.Client
+}
+
+// Deliver implements Target.
+func (t *slackTarget) Deliver(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	task *Task,
+	sched Scheduler,
+) {
+	cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(d.Target.Config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.eng.log.Error(
+			"invalid Slack target config",
+			"target_id", d.TargetID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		t.failConfig(webhookDB, d, err)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	msg := FormatSlackMessage(&d.Event)
+
+	payload, err := json.Marshal(
+		map[string]string{"text": msg},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.eng.log.Error(
+			"failed to marshal Slack payload",
+			"target_id", d.TargetID,
+			"error", err,
+		)
+
+		t.failConfig(webhookDB, d, err)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	attempt := func() attemptResult {
+		return t.attempt(ctx, cfg, payload)
+	}
+
+	t.deliver(
+		webhookDB, d, task, sched,
+		d.Target.MaxRetries, attempt,
+	)
+}
+
+// failConfig records a first-attempt failure for a delivery
+// that could not be prepared (bad config or unmarshalable
+// payload) and marks it failed.
+func (t *slackTarget) failConfig(
+	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
+	d *database.Delivery,
+	err error,
+) {
+	t.eng.recordResult(
+		webhookDB, d, 1,
+		false, 0, "", err.Error(), 0,
+	)
+
+	t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
+		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+	)
+}
+
+// attempt performs a single Slack POST and derives its
+// outcome, preserving the engine's original semantics: a
+// non-2xx response records an "HTTP <code>" error string and
+// a transport error records a "sending request" error.
+func (t *slackTarget) attempt(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	cfg *SlackTargetConfig,
+	payload []byte,
+) attemptResult {
+	start := time.Now()
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
+		ctx,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		cfg.WebhookURL,
+		bytes.NewReader(payload),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return attemptResult{
+			success: false,
+			errMsg:  maskURLError(err).Error(),
+		}
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
+
+	resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(t.client, req)
+	durationMs := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
+
+	if doErr != nil {
+		return attemptResult{
+			success:  false,
+			duration: durationMs,
+			errMsg: fmt.Errorf(
+				"sending request: %w", doErr,
+			).Error(),
+		}
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+	return t.readSlackResponse(resp, durationMs)
+}
+
+func (t *slackTarget) readSlackResponse(
+	resp *http.Response,
+	durationMs int64,
+) attemptResult {
+	body, readErr := io.ReadAll(
+		io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBodyLog),
+	)
+	if readErr != nil {
+		t.eng.log.Error(
+			"failed to read Slack response body",
+			"error", readErr,
+		)
+	}
+
+	success := resp.StatusCode >= httpSuccessMin &&
+		resp.StatusCode < httpSuccessMax
+
+	errMsg := ""
+	if !success {
+		errMsg = fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	return attemptResult{
+		statusCode: resp.StatusCode,
+		respBody:   string(body),
+		duration:   durationMs,
+		success:    success,
+		errMsg:     errMsg,
+	}
+}
+
+func parseSlackConfig(
+	configJSON string,
+) (*SlackTargetConfig, error) {
+	if configJSON == "" {
+		return nil, errEmptyTargetConfig
+	}
+
+	var cfg SlackTargetConfig
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(
+		[]byte(configJSON), &cfg,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"parsing config JSON: %w", err,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.WebhookURL == "" {
+		return nil, errMissingWebhookURL
+	}
+
+	return &cfg, nil
+}
+
+// FormatSlackMessage builds a Slack-compatible message
+// string from a webhook event.
+func FormatSlackMessage(
+	event *database.Event,
+) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+
+	b.WriteString("*Webhook Event Received*\n")
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(
+		&b, "*Method:* `%s`\n", event.Method,
+	)
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(
+		&b,
+		"*Content-Type:* `%s`\n",
+		event.ContentType,
+	)
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(
+		&b,
+		"*Timestamp:* `%s`\n",
+		event.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	)
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(
+		&b,
+		"*Body Size:* %d bytes\n",
+		len(event.Body),
+	)
+
+	if event.Body == "" {
+		b.WriteString("\n_(empty body)_\n")
+
+		return b.String()
+	}
+
+	if formatted := formatJSONBody(event.Body); formatted != "" {
+		b.WriteString(formatted)
+
+		return b.String()
+	}
+
+	formatRawBody(&b, event.Body)
+
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func formatJSONBody(body string) string {
+	var parsed json.RawMessage
+	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &parsed) != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	var pretty bytes.Buffer
+	if json.Indent(&pretty, parsed, "", "  ") != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	var b strings.Builder
+
+	b.WriteString("\n```\n")
+
+	prettyStr := pretty.String()
+
+	const maxPayloadDisplay = 3500
+	if len(prettyStr) > maxPayloadDisplay {
+		b.WriteString(prettyStr[:maxPayloadDisplay])
+		b.WriteString("\n... (truncated)")
+	} else {
+		b.WriteString(prettyStr)
+	}
+
+	b.WriteString("\n```\n")
+
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func formatRawBody(b *strings.Builder, body string) {
+	b.WriteString("\n```\n")
+
+	const maxRawDisplay = 3500
+	if len(body) > maxRawDisplay {
+		b.WriteString(body[:maxRawDisplay])
+		b.WriteString("\n... (truncated)")
+	} else {
+		b.WriteString(body)
+	}
+
+	b.WriteString("\n```\n")
+}

internal/delivery/url_mask.go

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package delivery
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/url"
+)
+
+// urlPathElision stands in for a URL's elided path.
+const urlPathElision = "/..."
+
+// MaskURL renders a URL as scheme plus host with everything
+// that can carry a secret removed. A delivery target URL is
+// itself a credential — a Slack incoming webhook URL is a
+// bearer token — so the path, query and userinfo are never
+// reproduced, in a page, a log line or a stored error. A URL
+// that does not parse into a scheme and host yields the
+// neutral placeholder, never the raw string.
+func MaskURL(raw string) string {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" ||
+		parsed.Host == "" {
+		return configUnavailable
+	}
+
+	masked := parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
+
+	if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" {
+		masked += urlPathElision
+	}
+
+	return masked
+}
+
+// maskURLError strips the credential from an error raised
+// against a request URL. The net/http and net/url packages
+// embed the full request URL in every *url.Error they return,
+// so an unmodified transport error persisted into
+// DeliveryResult.Error writes the credential to disk.
+//
+// The masked error keeps the operation and the wrapped cause,
+// so a DNS failure still reads differently from a refused
+// connection, a TLS handshake failure or a timeout, and Is,
+// As, Timeout and Temporary keep working on it. Only the
+// path, query and userinfo of the URL are dropped. Errors
+// that carry no URL are returned unchanged.
+//
+// Call it where the error is raised, before any wrapping: it
+// replaces the *url.Error itself, so any context wrapped
+// around it first would be discarded.
+func maskURLError(err error) error {
+	var urlErr *url.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &urlErr) {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return &url.Error{
+		Op:  urlErr.Op,
+		URL: MaskURL(urlErr.URL),
+		Err: urlErr.Err,
+	}
+}

internal/delivery/url_mask_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+package delivery_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+)
+
+// The path of a Slack incoming webhook URL is the credential:
+// whoever holds these segments can post to the channel
+// forever. None of them may reach a stored delivery error,
+// which lives on disk in the per-webhook database and is
+// serialized by the JSON tag on DeliveryResult.Error.
+const (
+	maskSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+)
+
+// assertNoCredential fails if the whole path or any single
+// segment of it survived into the message, so a partial leak
+// fails the test too.
+func assertNoCredential(t *testing.T, msg string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	segments := []string{
+		maskSecretPath,
+		"services",
+		"T00000000",
+		"B00000000",
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+	}
+
+	for _, segment := range segments {
+		assert.NotContains(t, msg, segment)
+	}
+}
+
+// storedDeliveryError returns the error string persisted for a
+// delivery, which is what an operator and any future API read.
+func storedDeliveryError(
+	t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var result database.DeliveryResult
+
+	require.NoError(t, db.Where(
+		"delivery_id = ?", deliveryID,
+	).First(&result).Error)
+
+	return result.Error
+}
+
+// deliverSlackTo runs a Slack delivery against webhookURL and
+// returns the error string it persisted.
+func deliverSlackTo(
+	t *testing.T, webhookURL string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	db := testWebhookDB(t)
+	e := testEngine(t, 1)
+	targetID := uuid.New().String()
+
+	slackCfg, err := json.Marshal(
+		delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
+			WebhookURL: webhookURL,
+		},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"test":true}`)
+
+	dlv := seedDelivery(
+		t, db, event.ID, targetID,
+		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+	)
+
+	d := buildSlackDelivery(
+		dlv, event, targetID,
+		"test-slack-mask", string(slackCfg),
+	)
+
+	e.ExportDeliverSlack(context.TODO(), db, d)
+
+	assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
+		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
+	)
+
+	return storedDeliveryError(t, db, dlv.ID)
+}
+
+// TestDeliverSlack_TransportErrorMasksWebhookURL is the
+// load-bearing regression test: a transport failure must not
+// persist the webhook URL's credential into the database, and
+// must still say what went wrong and where.
+func TestDeliverSlack_TransportErrorMasksWebhookURL(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// A server closed before use gives a deterministic
+	// transport failure against a known host.
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(http.NewServeMux())
+	host := ts.URL
+
+	ts.Close()
+
+	errMsg := deliverSlackTo(t, host+maskSecretPath)
+
+	require.NotEmpty(t, errMsg)
+	assertNoCredential(t, errMsg)
+
+	// The diagnostic value survives: the operation, the host
+	// and the transport failure are all still reported, and
+	// only the path is elided.
+	assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "sending request")
+	assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "Post")
+	assert.Contains(t, errMsg, host+"/...")
+	assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "connection refused")
+}
+
+// TestDeliverSlack_UnparsableURLMasksWebhookURL covers the
+// other error path out of a Slack attempt: url.Parse also
+// embeds the whole URL in the error it returns.
+func TestDeliverSlack_UnparsableURLMasksWebhookURL(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	errMsg := deliverSlackTo(
+		t,
+		"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
+	)
+
+	require.NotEmpty(t, errMsg)
+	assertNoCredential(t, errMsg)
+	assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "invalid control character")
+}
+
+// TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL proves the HTTP
+// target's transport errors are masked too; its destination
+// URL can carry a token in a query string.
+func TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(http.NewServeMux())
+	host := ts.URL
+
+	ts.Close()
+
+	e := testEngine(t, 1)
+
+	cfg, err := e.ExportParseHTTPConfig(
+		newHTTPTargetConfig(host + maskSecretPath),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	statusCode, _, _, reqErr := e.ExportDoHTTPRequest(
+		context.TODO(), cfg,
+		&database.Event{Body: `{"test":true}`},
+	)
+	require.Error(t, reqErr)
+	assert.Zero(t, statusCode)
+
+	assertNoCredential(t, reqErr.Error())
+	assert.Contains(t, reqErr.Error(), host+"/...")
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, reqErr.Error(), "connection refused",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked proves the SSRF
+// validator's error does not carry the submitted URL, which
+// the handler both logs and shows.
+func TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
+		context.TODO(),
+		"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
+	)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+
+	assertNoCredential(t, err.Error())
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid URL")
+}

internal/globals/globals.go

@@ -1,25 +1,34 @@
+// Package globals provides build-time variables injected via ldflags.
 package globals
 
 import (
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
 
-// these get populated from main() and copied into the Globals object.
+// Build-time variables populated from main() and copied into the
+// Globals object.
+//
+//nolint:gochecknoglobals // Build-time variables set by main().
 var (
 	Appname string
 	Version string
 )
 
+// Globals holds build-time metadata about the application.
 type Globals struct {
 	Appname string
 	Version string
 }
 
-// nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused
+// New creates a Globals instance from the package-level
+// build-time variables.
+//
+//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
 func New(lc fx.Lifecycle) (*Globals, error) {
 	n := &Globals{
 		Appname: Appname,
 		Version: Version,
 	}
+
 	return n, nil
 }

internal/globals/globals_test.go

@@ -1,26 +1,30 @@
-package globals
+package globals_test
 
 import (
 	"testing"
 
-	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 )
 
-func TestNew(t *testing.T) {
-	// Set test values
-	Appname = "test-app"
-	Version = "1.0.0"
+func TestGlobalsFields(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
 
-	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
-	globals, err := New(lc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
+	g := &globals.Globals{
+		Appname: "test-app",
+		Version: "1.0.0",
 	}
 
-	if globals.Appname != "test-app" {
-		t.Errorf("Appname = %v, want %v", globals.Appname, "test-app")
+	if g.Appname != "test-app" {
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Appname = %v, want %v",
+			g.Appname, "test-app",
+		)
 	}
-	if globals.Version != "1.0.0" {
-		t.Errorf("Version = %v, want %v", globals.Version, "1.0.0")
+
+	if g.Version != "1.0.0" {
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Version = %v, want %v",
+			g.Version, "1.0.0",
+		)
 	}
 }

internal/handlers/auth.go

@@ -13,12 +13,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
 		sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
 		if err == nil && h.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
 			http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
+
 			return
 		}
 
 		// Render login page
-		data := map[string]interface{}{
-			"Error": "",
+		data := map[string]any{
+			tmplKeyError: "",
 		}
 
 		h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
@@ -28,10 +29,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
 // HandleLoginSubmit handles the login form submission (POST)
 func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// Parse form data
-		if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
+		err := r.ParseForm()
+		if err != nil {
 			h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
 			http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
+
 			return
 		}
 
@@ -40,85 +44,159 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 
 		// Validate input
 		if username == "" || password == "" {
-			data := map[string]interface{}{
-				"Error": "Username and password are required",
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
-			h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
+			h.renderLoginError(
+				w, r,
+				"Username and password are required",
+				http.StatusBadRequest,
+			)
+
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Find user in database
-		var user database.User
-		if err := h.db.DB().Where("username = ?", username).First(&user).Error; err != nil {
-			h.log.Debug("user not found", "username", username)
-			data := map[string]interface{}{
-				"Error": "Invalid username or password",
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
-			h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// Verify password
-		valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
+		user, err := h.authenticateUser(
+			w, r, username, password,
+		)
 		if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to verify password", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
 
-		if !valid {
-			h.log.Debug("invalid password", "username", username)
-			data := map[string]interface{}{
-				"Error": "Invalid username or password",
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
-			h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// Get the current session (may be pre-existing / attacker-set)
-		oldSess, err := h.session.Get(r)
+		err = h.createAuthenticatedSession(w, r, user)
 		if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Regenerate the session to prevent session fixation attacks.
-		// This destroys the old session ID and creates a new one.
-		sess, err := h.session.Regenerate(r, w, oldSess)
-		if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to regenerate session", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// Set user in session
-		h.session.SetUser(sess, user.ID, user.Username)
-
-		// Save session
-		if err := h.session.Save(r, w, sess); err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to save session", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-
-		h.log.Info("user logged in", "username", username, "user_id", user.ID)
+		h.log.Info(
+			"user logged in",
+			"username", username,
+			"user_id", user.ID,
+		)
 
 		// Redirect to home page
 		http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
 	}
 }
 
+// renderLoginError renders the login page with an error message.
+func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	msg string,
+	status int,
+) {
+	data := map[string]any{
+		tmplKeyError: msg,
+	}
+
+	w.WriteHeader(status)
+	h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
+}
+
+// authenticateUser looks up and verifies a user's credentials.
+// On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns an error.
+func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	username, password string,
+) (database.User, error) {
+	var user database.User
+
+	err := h.db.DB().Where(
+		"username = ?", username,
+	).First(&user).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Debug("user not found", "username", username)
+		h.renderLoginError(
+			w, r,
+			"Invalid username or password",
+			http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		)
+
+		return user, err
+	}
+
+	valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error("failed to verify password", "error", err)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return user, err
+	}
+
+	if !valid {
+		h.log.Debug("invalid password", "username", username)
+		h.renderLoginError(
+			w, r,
+			"Invalid username or password",
+			http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		)
+
+		return user, errInvalidPassword
+	}
+
+	return user, nil
+}
+
+// createAuthenticatedSession regenerates the session and stores
+// user info. On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns
+// an error.
+func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	user database.User,
+) error {
+	oldSess, err := h.session.Get(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return err
+	}
+
+	sess, err := h.session.Regenerate(r, w, oldSess)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error(
+			"failed to regenerate session", "error", err,
+		)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return err
+	}
+
+	h.session.SetUser(sess, user.ID, user.Username)
+
+	err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error("failed to save session", "error", err)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // HandleLogout handles user logout
 func (h *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
 		if err != nil {
 			h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
-			http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
+			http.Redirect(
+				w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
+			)
+
 			return
 		}
 
@@ -126,8 +204,12 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
 		h.session.Destroy(sess)
 
 		// Save the destroyed session
-		if err := h.session.Save(r, w, sess); err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to save destroyed session", "error", err)
+		err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
+		if err != nil {
+			h.log.Error(
+				"failed to save destroyed session",
+				"error", err,
+			)
 		}
 
 		// Redirect to login page

internal/handlers/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package handlers
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// RenderTemplateForTest exposes renderTemplate for use in the
+// handlers_test package.
+func (s *Handlers) RenderTemplateForTest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	pageTemplate string,
+	data any,
+) {
+	s.renderTemplate(w, r, pageTemplate, data)
+}
+
+// BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest exposes buildURLTargetConfig
+// with the Slack target parameters for use in the
+// handlers_test package.
+func (s *Handlers) BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	targetURL string,
+) (string, error) {
+	return s.buildURLTargetConfig(
+		w, r, targetURL, "webhookUrl",
+		"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
+	)
+}
+
+// BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest exposes
+// buildDatabaseTargetConfig for use in the handlers_test
+// package.
+func (s *Handlers) BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	expiry string,
+) (string, error) {
+	return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, expiry)
+}

internal/handlers/handlers.go

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
+// Package handlers provides HTTP request handlers for the
+// webhooker web UI and API.
 package handlers
 
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"html/template"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
@@ -13,13 +16,32 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/templates"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention
+const (
+	// maxBodyShift is the bit shift for 1 MB body limit.
+	maxBodyShift = 20
+	// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
+	recentEventLimit = 20
+	// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
+	paginationPerPage = 25
+
+	// tmplKeyError is the template data key for an error message.
+	tmplKeyError = "Error"
+	// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
+	tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
+)
+
+// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
+var errInvalidPassword = errors.New("invalid password")
+
+//nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type HandlersParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Logger       *logger.Logger
 	Globals      *globals.Globals
 	Database     *database.Database
@@ -27,8 +49,11 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
 	Healthcheck  *healthcheck.Healthcheck
 	Session      *session.Session
 	Notifier     delivery.Notifier
+	Evictor      delivery.WebhookEvictor
 }
 
+// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
+// routes.
 type Handlers struct {
 	params    *HandlersParams
 	log       *slog.Logger
@@ -37,22 +62,33 @@ type Handlers struct {
 	dbMgr     *database.WebhookDBManager
 	session   *session.Session
 	notifier  delivery.Notifier
+	evictor   delivery.WebhookEvictor
 	templates map[string]*template.Template
 }
 
-// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the embedded FS.
-// Each page template is combined with the shared base, htmlheader, and navbar templates.
-// The page file must be listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
-// becomes the template set's entry point. If a shared partial (e.g. htmlheader.html)
-// is listed first, its {{define}} block becomes the root — which is empty — and
-// Execute() produces no output.
+// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
+// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
+// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates. The page file must be
+// listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
+// becomes the template set's entry point.
 func parsePageTemplate(pageFile string) *template.Template {
 	return template.Must(
-		template.ParseFS(templates.Templates, pageFile, "base.html", "htmlheader.html", "navbar.html"),
+		template.ParseFS(
+			templates.Templates,
+			pageFile,
+			"base.html",
+			"htmlheader.html",
+			"navbar.html",
+		),
 	)
 }
 
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params HandlersParams) (*Handlers, error) {
+// New creates a Handlers instance, parsing all page templates at
+// startup.
+func New(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params HandlersParams,
+) (*Handlers, error) {
 	s := new(Handlers)
 	s.params = &params
 	s.log = params.Logger.Get()
@@ -61,10 +97,10 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params HandlersParams) (*Handlers, error) {
 	s.dbMgr = params.WebhookDBMgr
 	s.session = params.Session
 	s.notifier = params.Notifier
+	s.evictor = params.Evictor
 
 	// Parse all page templates once at startup
 	s.templates = map[string]*template.Template{
-		"index.html":         parsePageTemplate("index.html"),
 		"login.html":         parsePageTemplate("login.html"),
 		"profile.html":       parsePageTemplate("profile.html"),
 		"sources_list.html":  parsePageTemplate("sources_list.html"),
@@ -75,17 +111,23 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params HandlersParams) (*Handlers, error) {
 	}
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStart: func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			return nil
 		},
 	})
+
 	return s, nil
 }
 
-//nolint:unparam // r parameter will be used in the future for request context
-func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data interface{}, status int) {
+func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	_ *http.Request,
+	data any,
+	status int,
+) {
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	w.WriteHeader(status)
+
 	if data != nil {
 		err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -94,9 +136,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data inte
 	}
 }
 
-//nolint:unparam,unused // will be used for handling JSON requests
-func (s *Handlers) decodeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v interface{}) error {
-	return json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(v)
+// serverError logs an error and sends a 500 response.
+func (s *Handlers) serverError(
+	w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
+) {
+	s.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
+	http.Error(
+		w, "Internal server error",
+		http.StatusInternalServerError,
+	)
 }
 
 // UserInfo represents user information for templates
@@ -105,52 +153,91 @@ type UserInfo struct {
 	Username string
 }
 
-// renderTemplate renders a pre-parsed template with common data
-func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pageTemplate string, data interface{}) {
-	tmpl, ok := s.templates[pageTemplate]
-	if !ok {
-		s.log.Error("template not found", "template", pageTemplate)
-		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Get user from session if available
-	var userInfo *UserInfo
-	sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
-	if err == nil && s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
-		if username, ok := s.session.GetUsername(sess); ok {
-			if userID, ok := s.session.GetUserID(sess); ok {
-				userInfo = &UserInfo{
-					ID:       userID,
-					Username: username,
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	// If data is a map, merge user info into it
-	if m, ok := data.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
-		m["User"] = userInfo
-		if err := tmpl.Execute(w, m); err != nil {
-			s.log.Error("failed to execute template", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Wrap data with base template data
+// templateDataWrapper wraps non-map data with common fields.
 type templateDataWrapper struct {
 	User      *UserInfo
-		Data interface{}
+	CSRFToken string
+	Data      any
+}
+
+// getUserInfo extracts user info from the session.
+func (s *Handlers) getUserInfo(
+	r *http.Request,
+) *UserInfo {
+	sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
+	if err != nil || !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	username, ok := s.session.GetUsername(sess)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	userID, ok := s.session.GetUserID(sess)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &UserInfo{ID: userID, Username: username}
+}
+
+// renderTemplate renders a pre-parsed template with common
+// data
+func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	pageTemplate string,
+	data any,
+) {
+	tmpl, ok := s.templates[pageTemplate]
+	if !ok {
+		s.log.Error(
+			"template not found",
+			"template", pageTemplate,
+		)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
+	csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
+
+	if m, ok := data.(map[string]any); ok {
+		m["User"] = userInfo
+		m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
+		s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, m)
+
+		return
 	}
 
 	wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
 		User:      userInfo,
+		CSRFToken: csrfToken,
 		Data:      data,
 	}
 
-	if err := tmpl.Execute(w, wrapper); err != nil {
-		s.log.Error("failed to execute template", "error", err)
-		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
+}
+
+// executeTemplate runs the template and handles errors.
+func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	tmpl *template.Template,
+	data any,
+) {
+	err := tmpl.Execute(w, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error(
+			"failed to execute template", "error", err,
+		)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
 	}
 }

internal/handlers/handlers_test.go

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-package handlers
+package handlers_test
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -14,20 +15,49 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 )
 
-// noopNotifier is a no-op delivery.Notifier for tests.
 type noopNotifier struct{}
 
-func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.DeliveryTask) {}
+func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
 
-func TestHandleIndex(t *testing.T) {
-	var h *Handlers
+// recordingEvictor is a delivery.WebhookEvictor that records
+// the webhook ids it was asked to evict, so a test can prove
+// that a deletion path reached the delivery engine.
+type recordingEvictor struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	evicted []string
+}
 
-	app := fxtest.New(
+func (r *recordingEvictor) EvictWebhook(webhookID string) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	r.evicted = append(r.evicted, webhookID)
+}
+
+// Evicted returns a copy of the recorded webhook ids.
+func (r *recordingEvictor) Evicted() []string {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	out := make([]string, len(r.evicted))
+	copy(out, r.evicted)
+
+	return out
+}
+
+func newTestApp(
+	t *testing.T,
+	targets ...any,
+) *fxtest.App {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return fxtest.New(
 		t,
 		fx.Provide(
 			globals.New,
@@ -41,92 +71,205 @@ func TestHandleIndex(t *testing.T) {
 			database.NewWebhookDBManager,
 			healthcheck.New,
 			session.New,
-			func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
-			New,
+			func() delivery.Notifier {
+				return &noopNotifier{}
+			},
+			func() *recordingEvictor {
+				return &recordingEvictor{}
+			},
+			func(r *recordingEvictor) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
+				return r
+			},
+			handlers.New,
 		),
-		fx.Populate(&h),
+		fx.Populate(targets...),
 	)
-	app.RequireStart()
-	defer app.RequireStop()
+}
+
+func TestHandleIndex_Unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
-	// Since we can't test actual template rendering without templates,
-	// let's test that the handler is created and doesn't panic
 	handler := h.HandleIndex()
-	assert.NotNil(t, handler)
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestHandleIndex_Authenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	s, err := sess.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	sess.SetUser(s, "test-user-id", "testuser")
+
+	err = sess.Save(req, w, s)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	for _, cookie := range w.Result().Cookies() {
+		req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+	}
+
+	w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleIndex().ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w2.Code)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "/sources", w2.Header().Get("Location"),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestBuildSlackTargetConfig_AcceptsPublicURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	cfg, err := h.BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
+		w, req, "http://93.184.216.34/services/T00/B00/xxx",
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(t, cfg, "webhookUrl")
+}
+
+func TestBuildSlackTargetConfig_RejectsReservedURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	cfg, err := h.BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
+		w, req, "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+	)
+
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Empty(t, cfg)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
 }
 
 func TestRenderTemplate(t *testing.T) {
-	var h *Handlers
+	t.Parallel()
 
-	app := fxtest.New(
-		t,
-		fx.Provide(
-			globals.New,
-			logger.New,
-			func() *config.Config {
-				return &config.Config{
-					DataDir: t.TempDir(),
-				}
-			},
-			database.New,
-			database.NewWebhookDBManager,
-			healthcheck.New,
-			session.New,
-			func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
-			New,
-		),
-		fx.Populate(&h),
-	)
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
 	app.RequireStart()
-	defer app.RequireStop()
 
-	t.Run("handles missing templates gracefully", func(t *testing.T) {
-		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
-		data := map[string]interface{}{
-			"Version": "1.0.0",
+	data := map[string]any{"Version": "1.0.0"}
+
+	h.RenderTemplateForTest(
+		w, req, "nonexistent.html", data,
+	)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
+	)
 }
 
-		// When a non-existent template name is requested, renderTemplate
-		// should return an internal server error
-		h.renderTemplate(w, req, "nonexistent.html", data)
+func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
 
-		// Should return internal server error when template is not found
-		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
-	})
-}
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
 
-func TestFormatUptime(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		duration string
-		expected string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "minutes only",
-			duration: "45m",
-			expected: "45m",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "hours and minutes",
-			duration: "2h30m",
-			expected: "2h 30m",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "days, hours and minutes",
-			duration: "25h45m",
-			expected: "1d 1h 45m",
-		},
-	}
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
+	app.RequireStart()
 
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			d, err := time.ParseDuration(tt.duration)
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	// Empty expiry: the keep-forever default, empty config.
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	cfg, err := h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Empty(t, cfg)
 
-			result := formatUptime(d)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
-		})
+	// Explicit never is stored as config.
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	cfg, err = h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "never")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`, cfg)
+
+	// A positive duration is stored as config.
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	cfg, err = h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "720h")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"expiry":"720h"}`, cfg)
+}
+
+func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_RejectsBadExpiry(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	for _, bad := range []string{"nonsense", "7d", "-5h"} {
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		cfg, err := h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, bad)
+
+		require.Error(t, err, "expiry %q", bad)
+		assert.Empty(t, cfg)
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code,
+			"expiry %q should be rejected with 400", bad,
+		)
 	}
 }

internal/handlers/healthcheck.go

@@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 )
 
+const httpStatusOK = 200
+
+// HandleHealthCheck returns an HTTP handler that reports
+// application health.
 func (s *Handlers) HandleHealthCheck() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		resp := s.hc.Healthcheck()
-		s.respondJSON(w, req, resp, 200)
+		s.respondJSON(w, req, resp, httpStatusOK)
 	}
 }

internal/handlers/index.go

@@ -1,49 +1,21 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
-	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
-	"time"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 )
 
+// HandleIndex returns a handler for the root path that redirects
+// based on authentication state: authenticated users go to /sources
+// (the dashboard), unauthenticated users go to the login page.
 func (s *Handlers) HandleIndex() http.HandlerFunc {
-	// Calculate server start time
-	startTime := time.Now()
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
+		if err == nil && s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
+			http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
 
-	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
-		// Calculate uptime
-		uptime := time.Since(startTime)
-		uptimeStr := formatUptime(uptime)
-
-		// Get user count from database
-		var userCount int64
-		s.db.DB().Model(&database.User{}).Count(&userCount)
-
-		// Prepare template data
-		data := map[string]interface{}{
-			"Version":   s.params.Globals.Version,
-			"Uptime":    uptimeStr,
-			"UserCount": userCount,
+			return
 		}
 
-		// Render the template
-		s.renderTemplate(w, req, "index.html", data)
+		http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
 	}
 }
-
-// formatUptime formats a duration into a human-readable string
-func formatUptime(d time.Duration) string {
-	days := int(d.Hours()) / 24
-	hours := int(d.Hours()) % 24
-	minutes := int(d.Minutes()) % 60
-
-	if days > 0 {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%dd %dh %dm", days, hours, minutes)
-	}
-	if hours > 0 {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%dh %dm", hours, minutes)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%dm", minutes)
-}

internal/handlers/profile.go

@@ -4,56 +4,201 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 )
 
 // HandleProfile returns a handler for the user profile page
 func (h *Handlers) HandleProfile() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// Get username from URL
+		sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
+			h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+
+		h.renderProfile(w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername, "", "")
+	}
+}
+
+// HandlePasswordChange returns a handler that lets an authenticated
+// user change their own password. It is served by the CSRF- and
+// auth-protected POST /password route under /user/{username}.
+func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
+			h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
+		err := r.ParseForm()
+		if err != nil {
+			h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
+			http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
+
+			return
+		}
+
+		successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
+			w,
+			sessionUsername,
+			r.FormValue("current_password"),
+			r.FormValue("new_password"),
+			r.FormValue("confirm_password"),
+		)
+		if !handled {
+			return
+		}
+
+		h.renderProfile(
+			w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername,
+			successMessage, errorMessage,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
+// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
+// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
+// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
+// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
+// to stop without re-rendering the page.
+func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
+) (string, string, bool) {
+	// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
+	// persist the new hash.
+	var user database.User
+
+	err := h.db.DB().Where(
+		"username = ?", username,
+	).First(&user).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(
+			w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
+		)
+
+		return "", "", false
+	}
+
+	valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
+		currentPassword, user.Password,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
+
+		return "", "", false
+	}
+
+	if !valid {
+		return "", "Current password is incorrect.", true
+	}
+
+	if newPassword == "" {
+		return "", "New password must not be empty.", true
+	}
+
+	if newPassword != confirmPassword {
+		return "", "New password and confirmation do not match.", true
+	}
+
+	hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
+
+		return "", "", false
+	}
+
+	err = h.db.DB().Model(&user).Update(
+		"password", hashedPassword,
+	).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
+
+		return "", "", false
+	}
+
+	h.log.Info("user changed password", "username", username)
+
+	return "Password changed successfully.", "", true
+}
+
+// profileOwnerOrDeny resolves the session identity and enforces that a
+// user may only act on their own profile (the requested username in the
+// URL must equal the session username). On any failure it writes the
+// appropriate HTTP response and returns ok=false; callers must stop
+// when ok is false.
+func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+) (string, string, bool) {
 	requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
 	if requestedUsername == "" {
 		http.NotFound(w, r)
-			return
+
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 
-		// Get session
+	// RequireAuth middleware guarantees an authenticated session
+	// before this handler runs, so we only need to guard against an
+	// unexpected retrieval error.
 	sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
-		if err != nil || !h.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
-			// Redirect to login if not authenticated
-			http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
-			return
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
+
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 
-		// Get user info from session
 	sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
 	if !ok {
 		h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 
 	sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
 	if !ok {
 		h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Internal server error",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 
-		// For now, only allow users to view their own profile
+	// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
 	if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
 		http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
-			return
+
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 
-		// Prepare data for template
-		data := map[string]interface{}{
+	return sessionUserID, sessionUsername, true
+}
+
+// renderProfile renders the profile page for the given user,
+// optionally including a success or error message.
+func (h *Handlers) renderProfile(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	userID, username, successMessage, errorMessage string,
+) {
+	data := map[string]any{
 		"User": &UserInfo{
-				ID:       sessionUserID,
-				Username: sessionUsername,
+			ID:       userID,
+			Username: username,
 		},
+		"SuccessMessage": successMessage,
+		"ErrorMessage":   errorMessage,
 	}
 
-		// Render the profile page
 	h.renderTemplate(w, r, "profile.html", data)
 }
-}

internal/handlers/profile_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// authenticatedCookies creates an authenticated session for the given
+// user and returns the resulting cookies for use on a later request.
+func authenticatedCookies(
+	t *testing.T,
+	sess *session.Session,
+	userID, username string,
+) []*http.Cookie {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	setupReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/setup", nil,
+	)
+	setupW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	s, err := sess.Get(setupReq)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	sess.SetUser(s, userID, username)
+	require.NoError(t, sess.Save(setupReq, setupW, s))
+
+	cookies := setupW.Result().Cookies()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "session cookie should be set")
+
+	return cookies
+}
+
+// profileRequest builds a GET request for the given profile username,
+// attaching the supplied cookies and the chi URL parameter that the
+// handler reads via chi.URLParam.
+func profileRequest(
+	username string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/user/"+username, nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add("username", username)
+
+	return req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestHandleProfile_OwnProfile_OK(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
+
+	req := profileRequest("testuser", cookies)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleProfile().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+}
+
+func TestHandleProfile_OtherProfile_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
+
+	req := profileRequest("otheruser", cookies)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleProfile().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, w.Code)
+}
+
+// TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware exercises the
+// /user/{username} route group's middleware chain (CSRF then
+// RequireAuth, matching setupUserRoutes) and proves that an
+// unauthenticated request is redirected to /pages/login at the
+// middleware layer, never reaching the endpoint handler.
+func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var log *logger.Logger
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &log, &cfg, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	mw := middleware.NewForTest(log.Get(), cfg, sess)
+
+	var handlerReached bool
+
+	router := chi.NewRouter()
+	router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
+		r.Use(mw.CSRF())
+		r.Use(mw.RequireAuth())
+		r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			handlerReached = true
+
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+	})
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/user/testuser", nil,
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, handlerReached,
+		"handler must not be reached for unauthenticated request",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
+}
+
+// passwordChangeRequest builds a POST request to the password-change
+// endpoint for the given username, attaching the supplied cookies, an
+// urlencoded form body, and the chi URL parameter the handler reads.
+func passwordChangeRequest(
+	username string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+	form url.Values,
+) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost,
+		"/user/"+username+"/password",
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	req.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add("username", username)
+
+	return req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestHandlePasswordChange_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	var db *database.Database
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	oldHash, err := database.HashPassword("oldpassword")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := &database.User{Username: "pwuser", Password: oldHash}
+	require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(user).Error)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, user.ID, "pwuser")
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", "newpassword")
+	form.Set("confirm_password", "newpassword")
+
+	req := passwordChangeRequest("pwuser", cookies, form)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandlePasswordChange().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, w.Body.String(), "Password changed successfully.",
+	)
+
+	var updated database.User
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		db.DB().Where("username = ?", "pwuser").First(&updated).Error,
+	)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, oldHash, updated.Password)
+
+	valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
+		"newpassword", updated.Password,
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, valid, "new password should verify against new hash")
+}
+
+func TestHandlePasswordChange_WrongCurrentPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	var db *database.Database
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	oldHash, err := database.HashPassword("oldpassword")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := &database.User{Username: "pwuser2", Password: oldHash}
+	require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(user).Error)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, user.ID, "pwuser2")
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("current_password", "wrongpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", "newpassword")
+	form.Set("confirm_password", "newpassword")
+
+	req := passwordChangeRequest("pwuser2", cookies, form)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandlePasswordChange().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, w.Body.String(), "Current password is incorrect.",
+	)
+
+	var unchanged database.User
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		db.DB().Where(
+			"username = ?", "pwuser2",
+		).First(&unchanged).Error,
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, oldHash, unchanged.Password,
+		"stored hash must be unchanged after a rejected change",
+	)
+}

internal/handlers/source_delete_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+const (
+	deleteTestUserID   = "test-user-id"
+	deleteTestUsername = "testuser"
+
+	// paramSourceID and paramTargetID are the chi URL parameter
+	// names the deletion handlers read.
+	paramSourceID = "sourceID"
+	paramTargetID = "targetID"
+)
+
+// seedWebhook inserts a webhook owned by the test user and
+// returns it.
+func seedWebhook(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+) *database.Webhook {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{
+		UserID: deleteTestUserID,
+		Name:   "delete-me",
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+
+	return wh
+}
+
+// seedTarget inserts a target of the given type for a webhook
+// and returns it.
+func seedTarget(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+	webhookID string,
+	targetType database.TargetType,
+) *database.Target {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	tgt := &database.Target{
+		WebhookID: webhookID,
+		Name:      "t-" + string(targetType),
+		Type:      targetType,
+		Active:    true,
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
+	)
+
+	return tgt
+}
+
+// archivePathFor returns the archive database path the
+// delivery engine would use for a webhook: beside the webhook's
+// event database in the data directory.
+func archivePathFor(
+	t *testing.T,
+	mgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
+	webhookID string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return filepath.Join(
+		filepath.Dir(mgr.DBPath(webhookID)),
+		"archive-"+webhookID+".db",
+	)
+}
+
+// writeArchivePlaceholder creates a stand-in archive file so a
+// test can assert the file survives webhook deletion.
+func writeArchivePlaceholder(path string) error {
+	return os.WriteFile(path, []byte("archive"), 0o600)
+}
+
+// postRequest builds an authenticated POST request carrying the
+// given chi URL parameters.
+func postRequest(
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+	params map[string]string,
+) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	for k, v := range params {
+		rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
+	}
+
+	return req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter proves that
+// deleting a webhook reaches the delivery engine and releases
+// the webhook's archive writer, exercised through the real
+// deletion handler rather than by calling the evictor directly.
+func TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+		ev   *recordingEvictor
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	)
+
+	req := postRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
+		cookies,
+		map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{wh.ID}, ev.Evicted(),
+		"deleting a webhook should evict its archive writer",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile proves that deleting
+// a webhook does not remove its archive database file: the
+// archive is long-term storage the operator owns.
+func TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+		mgr  *database.WebhookDBManager
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &mgr)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+
+	// Place an archive file where the delivery engine would.
+	archivePath := archivePathFor(t, mgr, wh.ID)
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		writeArchivePlaceholder(archivePath),
+	)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	)
+
+	req := postRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
+		cookies,
+		map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.FileExists(
+		t, archivePath,
+		"webhook deletion must not destroy the archive file",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone
+// proves that removing the last database target releases the
+// archive writer.
+func TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+		ev   *recordingEvictor
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	tgt := seedTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+	)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	)
+
+	req := postRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
+		cookies,
+		map[string]string{
+			paramSourceID: wh.ID,
+			paramTargetID: tgt.ID,
+		},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, []string{wh.ID}, ev.Evicted(),
+		"removing the last database target should evict",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains
+// proves that deleting one of several database targets leaves
+// the still-needed archive writer alone: the surviving target
+// keeps archiving to the same file, so the writer must stay.
+func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+		ev   *recordingEvictor
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	doomed := seedTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+	)
+	seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	)
+
+	req := postRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
+		cookies,
+		map[string]string{
+			paramSourceID: wh.ID,
+			paramTargetID: doomed.ID,
+		},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Empty(
+		t, ev.Evicted(),
+		"a second database target still needs the writer",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted proves
+// that deleting a target of an unrelated type leaves a
+// still-needed archive writer alone: the webhook's database
+// target is untouched, so its writer must stay.
+func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+		ev   *recordingEvictor
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
+	other := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	)
+
+	req := postRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
+		cookies,
+		map[string]string{
+			paramSourceID: wh.ID,
+			paramTargetID: other.ID,
+		},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+	assert.Empty(
+		t, ev.Evicted(),
+		"a surviving database target must keep its writer",
+	)
+}

internal/handlers/source_detail_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// The secret path segments of a Slack incoming webhook URL.
+// Holding them is enough to post to the channel forever, so
+// they must never reach the rendered page.
+const (
+	slackSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+	slackWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
+		slackSecretPath
+)
+
+// seedConfiguredTarget inserts a target with a stored config
+// blob and returns it.
+func seedConfiguredTarget(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+	webhookID string,
+	targetType database.TargetType,
+	config string,
+) *database.Target {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	tgt := &database.Target{
+		WebhookID: webhookID,
+		Name:      "t-" + string(targetType),
+		Type:      targetType,
+		Active:    true,
+		Config:    config,
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
+	)
+
+	return tgt
+}
+
+// renderSourceDetailPage runs the real source detail handler
+// for a webhook and returns the rendered HTML.
+func renderSourceDetailPage(
+	t *testing.T,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+	sess *session.Session,
+	webhookID string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet,
+		"/source/"+webhookID,
+		nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	) {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add(paramSourceID, webhookID)
+
+	req = req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(
+			req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
+		),
+	)
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	return w.Body.String()
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL is the
+// load-bearing regression test for the credential leak: the
+// rendered page must show the Slack target without any of the
+// secret path segments of its webhook URL.
+func TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetTypeSlack,
+		`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
+	)
+
+	body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "webhookUrl")
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Webhook URL")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.slack.com/...")
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksHTTPDestinationURL is the
+// regression test for the same leak reached through the http
+// target: its destination is routinely an incoming-webhook
+// endpoint whose path segments are the credential, so the
+// rendered page must not contain them.
+func TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksHTTPDestinationURL(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		`{"url":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
+	)
+
+	body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+	)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Destination URL")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.slack.com/...")
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceDetail_RendersNamedTargetFields proves the
+// other target types render labelled fields rather than the
+// stored blob.
+func TestHandleSourceDetail_RendersNamedTargetFields(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h    *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+
+	seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		`{"url":"https://example.com/hook","timeout":30,`+
+			`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer sekrit"}}`,
+	)
+	seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetTypeDatabase,
+		`{"expiry":"720h"}`,
+	)
+	seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetType("carrier-pigeon"),
+		`{"beak":"sharp"}`,
+	)
+
+	body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Destination URL")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "https://example.com/...")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Timeout")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "1 configured")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "sekrit")
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Archive Expiry")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "720h")
+
+	// An unknown type gets the neutral placeholder, never the
+	// stored blob.
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "(unavailable)")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "beak")
+}

internal/handlers/source_logs_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// seedDeliveredEvent records an event and a delivery for it in
+// the webhook's own database, so the log page has a delivery
+// to render against the target.
+func seedDeliveredEvent(
+	t *testing.T,
+	dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
+	webhookID, targetID string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	event := &database.Event{
+		WebhookID:   webhookID,
+		Method:      http.MethodPost,
+		Body:        `{"test":true}`,
+		ContentType: "application/json",
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
+		clause.Associations,
+	).Create(event).Error)
+
+	dlv := &database.Delivery{
+		EventID:  event.ID,
+		TargetID: targetID,
+		Status:   database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
+		clause.Associations,
+	).Create(dlv).Error)
+}
+
+// renderSourceLogsPage runs the real event log handler for a
+// webhook and returns the rendered HTML.
+func renderSourceLogsPage(
+	t *testing.T,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+	sess *session.Session,
+	webhookID string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet,
+		"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs",
+		nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range authenticatedCookies(
+		t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
+	) {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add(paramSourceID, webhookID)
+
+	req = req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(
+			req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
+		),
+	)
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleSourceLogs().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	return w.Body.String()
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceLogs_MasksSlackWebhookURL proves the event
+// log page is handed a display-safe projection of each target
+// rather than the stored row, so the credential cannot be
+// rendered from its template data.
+func TestHandleSourceLogs_MasksSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h     *handlers.Handlers
+		sess  *session.Session
+		db    *database.Database
+		dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
+	)
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
+		t, db, wh.ID,
+		database.TargetTypeSlack,
+		`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
+	)
+
+	seedDeliveredEvent(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID)
+
+	body := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, "webhookUrl")
+
+	// The page still identifies the delivery's target.
+	assert.Contains(t, body, tgt.Name)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "delivered")
+}

internal/handlers/source_management_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+const (
+	// sourceTestUserID is the session user id used by the webhook
+	// management tests.
+	sourceTestUserID = "source-test-user"
+	// sourceIDParam is the chi URL parameter naming a webhook.
+	sourceIDParam = "sourceID"
+)
+
+// formRequest builds an urlencoded POST to path carrying the given
+// cookies, plus any chi URL parameters the handler reads.
+func formRequest(
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+	form url.Values,
+	urlParams map[string]string,
+) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost,
+		path,
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	req.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	for k, v := range urlParams {
+		rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
+	}
+
+	return req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
+	)
+}
+
+// getRequest builds a GET to path carrying the given cookies, plus any
+// chi URL parameters the handler reads.
+func getRequest(
+	t *testing.T,
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+	urlParams map[string]string,
+) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	for k, v := range urlParams {
+		rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
+	}
+
+	return req.WithContext(
+		context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
+	)
+}
+
+// submitCreate posts the webhook creation form with the given
+// retention_days value (omitted entirely when retention is nil) and
+// returns the recorder.
+func submitCreate(
+	t *testing.T,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+	name string,
+	retention *string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("name", name)
+
+	if retention != nil {
+		form.Set("retention_days", *retention)
+	}
+
+	req := formRequest("/sources/new", cookies, form, nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// onlyWebhook loads the single webhook belonging to the test user.
+func onlyWebhook(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+) database.Webhook {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var webhooks []database.Webhook
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
+			Find(&webhooks).Error,
+	)
+	require.Len(t, webhooks, 1)
+
+	return webhooks[0]
+}
+
+// seedWebhookWithRetention inserts a webhook owned by the test user
+// with an exact stored retention value, bypassing Webhook.BeforeSave
+// via a column-level update so that legacy rows can be planted too.
+func seedWebhookWithRetention(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+	retentionDays int,
+) database.Webhook {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	wh := &database.Webhook{
+		UserID:        sourceTestUserID,
+		Name:          "seeded",
+		RetentionDays: retentionDays,
+	}
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
+	)
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Model(wh).
+			Update("retention_days", retentionDays).Error,
+	)
+
+	wh.RetentionDays = retentionDays
+
+	return *wh
+}
+
+// storedRetentionDays reads the retention_days column for a webhook.
+func storedRetentionDays(
+	t *testing.T,
+	db *database.Database,
+	id string,
+) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var got int
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
+			Where("id = ?", id).
+			Pluck("retention_days", &got).Error,
+	)
+
+	return got
+}
+
+// sourceTestEnv bundles the handler, session, and database a webhook
+// management test drives.
+type sourceTestEnv struct {
+	handlers *handlers.Handlers
+	db       *database.Database
+	cookies  []*http.Cookie
+}
+
+func setupSourceTest(t *testing.T) *sourceTestEnv {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	var db *database.Database
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	return &sourceTestEnv{
+		handlers: h,
+		db:       db,
+		cookies: authenticatedCookies(
+			t, sess, sourceTestUserID, "sourceuser",
+		),
+	}
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever is the core
+// regression test for the bug: the create form's 0 must reach the
+// database as the retain-forever sentinel rather than being replaced by
+// the column's default of 30.
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	zero := "0"
+
+	w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "forever", &zero)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+
+	wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+	)
+	assert.True(t, wh.RetainsForever())
+}
+
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OmittedRetentionUsesDefault(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "defaulted", nil)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+
+	wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.DefaultRetentionDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant keeps the create
+// form's pre-filled retention from becoming a third hardcoded copy of
+// the 30-day policy.
+func TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceCreate().ServeHTTP(
+		w, getRequest(t, "/sources/new", env.cookies, nil),
+	)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	body := w.Body.String()
+
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		`value="`+strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays)+`"`,
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, `max="365"`,
+		"a max below the sentinel would block retain-forever",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, `min="0"`)
+}
+
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_InvalidRetentionIsRejected(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, raw := range []string{"abc", "-1", "3.5"} {
+		t.Run(raw, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+			w := submitCreate(
+				t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "bad", &raw,
+			)
+
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
+			assert.Contains(
+				t, w.Body.String(), "Retention must be",
+			)
+
+			var count int64
+
+			require.NoError(
+				t,
+				env.db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
+					Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
+					Count(&count).Error,
+			)
+			assert.Zero(
+				t, count,
+				"no webhook may be created from a rejected form",
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OverflowingRetentionIsRejected covers
+// the data-loss path directly: a finite retention above the largest one
+// the reaper's cutoff arithmetic can represent must never reach the
+// database, because the sweep would compute a future cutoff and delete
+// every event the webhook has.
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OverflowingRetentionIsRejected(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tooBig := strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays + 1)
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "huge", &tooBig)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, w.Body.String(),
+		strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays),
+		"the form tells the user the actual ceiling",
+	)
+
+	var count int64
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		env.db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
+			Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
+			Count(&count).Error,
+	)
+	assert.Zero(
+		t, count,
+		"no webhook may be created from a rejected form",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever guards the
+// boundary between "too large to represent" and "retain forever": the
+// sentinel is above MaxFiniteRetentionDays, but it is the value the
+// edit form pre-fills, so it must be accepted rather than rejected as
+// out of range.
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
+
+	w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "forever", &sentinel)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+
+	wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput checks that a
+// validation failure hands the user's typing back, matching what the
+// edit form already does. Losing a long description to a mistyped
+// retention value is the kind of thing that makes people give up on a
+// form.
+func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	const (
+		name        = "kept-name"
+		description = "a description worth not losing"
+	)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("name", name)
+	form.Set("description", description)
+	form.Set("retention_days", "nonsense")
+
+	req := formRequest("/sources/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
+
+	body := w.Body.String()
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, `value="`+name+`"`)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, description)
+}
+
+// submitEdit posts the webhook edit form for the given webhook.
+func submitEdit(
+	t *testing.T,
+	env *sourceTestEnv,
+	wh database.Webhook,
+	retention string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("name", wh.Name)
+	form.Set("description", wh.Description)
+	form.Set("retention_days", retention)
+
+	req := formRequest(
+		"/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
+		env.cookies,
+		form,
+		map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceEditSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
+		t, env.db, database.DefaultRetentionDays,
+	)
+
+	w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "0")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+	)
+}
+
+func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_InvalidRetentionIsRejected(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
+		t, env.db, database.DefaultRetentionDays,
+	)
+
+	w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "not-a-number")
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Retention must be")
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.DefaultRetentionDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+		"a rejected form must not change the stored retention",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_EmptyRetentionLeavesValueUnchanged(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 7)
+
+	w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 7, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
+}
+
+// TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips walks the exact path that
+// the removed max="365" cap used to break: render the edit form for a
+// retain-forever webhook, confirm the pre-filled sentinel is not capped
+// by browser validation, then submit that pre-filled value straight
+// back and confirm the retention policy survives untouched.
+func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
+		t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
+	)
+
+	req := getRequest(
+		t, "/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
+		map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceEdit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
+	body := w.Body.String()
+
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body, `value="`+sentinel+`"`,
+		"the edit form pre-fills the stored retention",
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, `max="365"`,
+		"a max below the sentinel would block saving any edit",
+	)
+	// "Currently forever." is the rendered RetentionLabel, not the
+	// static hint below the input, which says "Enter 0 to retain events
+	// forever." A bare Contains of "forever" would pass for any
+	// webhook and would assert nothing about this one.
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body, "Currently forever.",
+		"the form reports this webhook's policy as forever",
+	)
+
+	// Submit the pre-filled value back, exactly as a browser would.
+	post := submitEdit(t, env, wh, sentinel)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, post.Code)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t,
+		database.RetentionForeverDays,
+		storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
+	)
+}
+
+// TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber checks that
+// the retain-forever value is never rendered to the user as a raw day
+// count on either read-only view.
+func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
+		t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
+	)
+	sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
+
+	listW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceList().ServeHTTP(
+		listW, getRequest(t, "/sources", env.cookies, nil),
+	)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, listW.Code)
+	assert.Contains(t, listW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
+	assert.NotContains(t, listW.Body.String(), sentinel)
+
+	detailW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	env.handlers.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(
+		detailW,
+		getRequest(
+			t, "/source/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
+			map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
+		),
+	)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, detailW.Code)
+	assert.Contains(t, detailW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
+	assert.NotContains(t, detailW.Body.String(), sentinel)
+}

internal/handlers/ui_copy_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// Template data keys the page templates read. The handlers package has
+// its own unexported constants for these; this is the external test
+// package, so it needs its own.
+const (
+	dataKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
+	dataKeyError   = "Error"
+)
+
+// testWebhookID is the identifier given to the webhook under test on
+// pages that render one.
+const testWebhookID = "wh-1"
+
+// renderPage renders a page template through the real template set as
+// an authenticated user and returns the resulting HTML.
+func renderPage(
+	t *testing.T,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+	sess *session.Session,
+	page string,
+	data map[string]any,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
+	)
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.RenderTemplateForTest(w, req, page, data)
+
+	return w.Body.String()
+}
+
+// TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology pins the user-visible navigation
+// label to "Webhooks". The /sources route is deliberately unchanged, so
+// the assertion targets the link text rather than the href.
+func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	// One item, so the list body renders too: it calls
+	// WebhookListItem.RetentionLabel, promoted from the embedded
+	// Webhook and therefore a pointer method. An empty list would
+	// skip that call and hide a template error behind the
+	// navigation assertions below.
+	item := handlers.WebhookListItem{}
+	item.Name = "wh"
+	item.ID = testWebhookID
+	item.RetentionDays = 14
+
+	body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "sources_list.html", map[string]any{
+		"Webhooks": []handlers.WebhookListItem{item},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Retention: 14 days")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, `class="btn-text">Webhooks</a>`)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body, `class="btn-text w-full text-left">Webhooks</a>`,
+	)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		`<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Webhooks</h1>`,
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, body, ">Sources<",
+		"no user-visible element may still be labelled Sources",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body, `href="/sources"`,
+		"the /sources route itself must not change",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology pins the edit page's heading and
+// its back link. The link's href still points at /source/{id}, which is
+// intentional: only user-visible copy changes.
+func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	// The webhook goes in as a pointer because source_edit.html calls
+	// Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method: a map element is not
+	// addressable, so a value here renders an error instead of the
+	// page.
+	webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
+	webhook.ID = testWebhookID
+
+	body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
+		dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
+		dataKeyError:   "",
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Edit Webhook")
+	assert.NotContains(t, body, ">Sources<")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/source/wh-1"`)
+}
+
+// TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the create form's
+// retention copy to what the code does: the reaper permanently deletes
+// events past the cutoff, an empty field falls back to
+// DefaultRetentionDays, and 0 is rewritten to the retain-forever
+// sentinel by Webhook.BeforeSave.
+func TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "sources_new.html", map[string]any{
+		"Name":                 "",
+		"Description":          "",
+		"DefaultRetentionDays": database.DefaultRetentionDays,
+		dataKeyError:           "",
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		"permanently deletes events older than this",
+		"the form must say retention is enforced by deletion",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Enter 0 to retain events forever")
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		"leave blank to use the default of "+
+			strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays)+" days",
+		"blank means the default, not forever",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEditFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the edit form's
+// retention copy, including that it states the stored policy via
+// RetentionLabel and that an empty field leaves that policy unchanged
+// rather than meaning forever.
+func TestEditFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	finite := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
+	finite.ID = testWebhookID
+
+	body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
+		dataKeyWebhook: finite,
+		dataKeyError:   "",
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Currently 14 days.")
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		"permanently deletes events older than this",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Enter 0 to retain events forever")
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		"leave blank to keep the current setting",
+		"blank means unchanged, not forever",
+	)
+
+	forever := &database.Webhook{
+		Name:          "wh",
+		RetentionDays: database.RetentionForeverDays,
+	}
+	forever.ID = "wh-2"
+
+	foreverBody := renderPage(
+		t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
+			dataKeyWebhook: forever,
+			dataKeyError:   "",
+		},
+	)
+
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, foreverBody, "Currently forever.",
+		"a retain-forever webhook must not read as a day count",
+	)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, foreverBody,
+		"No events are deleted while retention is set to forever",
+	)
+	assert.NotContains(
+		t, foreverBody,
+		"permanently deletes events older than this",
+		"the reaper skips retain-forever webhooks, so the form "+
+			"must not claim it deletes their events",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement proves the copy
+// affordance degrades: the button ships with the hidden attribute, so a
+// browser that never runs app.js shows no dead control, and the URL is
+// rendered as ordinary selectable text either way.
+func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var h *handlers.Handlers
+
+	var sess *session.Session
+
+	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	entrypoint := database.Entrypoint{Path: "abc123"}
+	entrypoint.ID = "ep-1"
+
+	// The webhook goes in as a pointer because source_detail.html
+	// calls Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method: a map element
+	// is not addressable, so a value here aborts execution partway
+	// down the page, after the copy button has already been flushed
+	// to the response.
+	webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
+	webhook.ID = testWebhookID
+	webhook.CreatedAt = time.Date(
+		2026, time.January, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC,
+	)
+
+	body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
+		dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
+		"Entrypoints":  []database.Entrypoint{entrypoint},
+		// The handler passes delivery.NewTargetViews(targets), never
+		// raw targets, so the test data has to have that same shape.
+		"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(nil),
+		"Events":  []database.Event{},
+		"BaseURL": "https://hooks.example.com",
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		`<code id="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
+	)
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/webhook/abc123")
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body,
+		`hidden data-copy-target="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
+		"the button must start hidden and be revealed by script",
+	)
+
+	// renderTemplate streams to the ResponseWriter, so an abort
+	// midway still leaves everything above it in the body. This pins
+	// content from the last line of the template, which is below the
+	// assertions above: without it, a page that renders the copy
+	// button and then 500s passes.
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, body, "Retention: 14 days",
+		"the page must render to completion, not abort partway",
+	)
+}

internal/handlers/webhook.go

@@ -6,31 +6,36 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 )
 
 const (
-	// maxWebhookBodySize is the maximum allowed webhook request body (1 MB).
-	maxWebhookBodySize = 1 << 20
+	// maxWebhookBodySize is the maximum allowed webhook
+	// request body (1 MB).
+	maxWebhookBodySize = 1 << maxBodyShift
 )
 
-// HandleWebhook handles incoming webhook requests at entrypoint URLs.
-// Only POST requests are accepted; all other methods return 405 Method Not Allowed.
-// Events and deliveries are stored in the per-webhook database. The handler
-// builds self-contained DeliveryTask structs with all target and event data
-// so the delivery engine can process them without additional DB reads.
+// HandleWebhook handles incoming webhook requests at entrypoint
+// URLs.
 func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
 			w.Header().Set("Allow", "POST")
-			http.Error(w, "Method Not Allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+			http.Error(
+				w,
+				"Method Not Allowed",
+				http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
+			)
+
 			return
 		}
 
 		entrypointUUID := chi.URLParam(r, "uuid")
 		if entrypointUUID == "" {
 			http.NotFound(w, r)
+
 			return
 		}
 
@@ -40,69 +45,241 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
 			"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
 		)
 
-		// Look up entrypoint by path (from main application DB)
-		var entrypoint database.Entrypoint
-		result := h.db.DB().Where("path = ?", entrypointUUID).First(&entrypoint)
-		if result.Error != nil {
-			h.log.Debug("entrypoint not found", "path", entrypointUUID)
-			http.NotFound(w, r)
+		entrypoint, ok := h.lookupEntrypoint(
+			w, r, entrypointUUID,
+		)
+		if !ok {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Check if active
 		if !entrypoint.Active {
 			http.Error(w, "Gone", http.StatusGone)
+
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Read body with size limit
-		body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxWebhookBodySize+1))
-		if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to read request body", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
-			return
+		h.processWebhookRequest(w, r, entrypoint)
 	}
-		if len(body) > maxWebhookBodySize {
-			http.Error(w, "Request body too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+}
+
+// processWebhookRequest reads the body, serializes headers,
+// loads targets, and delivers the event.
+func (h *Handlers) processWebhookRequest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	entrypoint database.Entrypoint,
+) {
+	body, ok := h.readWebhookBody(w, r)
+	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
 
-		// Serialize headers as JSON
 	headersJSON, err := json.Marshal(r.Header)
 	if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to serialize headers", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to serialize headers", err)
+
 		return
 	}
 
-		// Find all active targets for this webhook (from main application DB)
-		var targets []database.Target
-		if targetErr := h.db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ? AND active = ?", entrypoint.WebhookID, true).Find(&targets).Error; targetErr != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to query targets", "error", targetErr)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// Get the per-webhook database for event storage
-		webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(entrypoint.WebhookID)
+	targets, err := h.loadActiveTargets(entrypoint.WebhookID)
 	if err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to get webhook database",
-				"webhook_id", entrypoint.WebhookID,
-				"error", err,
-			)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
+
 		return
 	}
 
-		// Create the event and deliveries in a transaction on the per-webhook DB
+	h.createAndDeliverEvent(
+		w, r, entrypoint, body, headersJSON, targets,
+	)
+}
+
+// loadActiveTargets returns all active targets for a webhook.
+func (h *Handlers) loadActiveTargets(
+	webhookID string,
+) ([]database.Target, error) {
+	var targets []database.Target
+
+	err := h.db.DB().Where(
+		"webhook_id = ? AND active = ?",
+		webhookID, true,
+	).Find(&targets).Error
+
+	return targets, err
+}
+
+// lookupEntrypoint finds an entrypoint by UUID path.
+func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	entrypointUUID string,
+) (database.Entrypoint, bool) {
+	var entrypoint database.Entrypoint
+
+	result := h.db.DB().Where(
+		"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
+	).First(&entrypoint)
+	if result.Error != nil {
+		h.log.Debug(
+			"entrypoint not found",
+			"path", entrypointUUID,
+		)
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+
+		return entrypoint, false
+	}
+
+	return entrypoint, true
+}
+
+// readWebhookBody reads and validates the request body size.
+func (h *Handlers) readWebhookBody(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+) ([]byte, bool) {
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(
+		io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxWebhookBodySize+1),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error(
+			"failed to read request body", "error", err,
+		)
+		http.Error(
+			w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
+		)
+
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	if len(body) > maxWebhookBodySize {
+		http.Error(
+			w,
+			"Request body too large",
+			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
+		)
+
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	return body, true
+}
+
+// createAndDeliverEvent creates the event and delivery records
+// then notifies the delivery engine.
+func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	entrypoint database.Entrypoint,
+	body, headersJSON []byte,
+	targets []database.Target,
+) {
+	tx, err := h.beginWebhookTx(w, entrypoint.WebhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	event := h.buildEvent(r, entrypoint, headersJSON, body)
+
+	err = tx.Create(event).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		tx.Rollback()
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to create event", err)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	bodyPtr := inlineBody(body)
+
+	tasks := h.buildDeliveryTasks(
+		w, tx, event, entrypoint, targets, bodyPtr,
+	)
+	if tasks == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	err = tx.Commit().Error
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(w, "failed to commit transaction", err)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	h.finishWebhookResponse(w, event, entrypoint, tasks)
+}
+
+// beginWebhookTx opens a transaction on the per-webhook DB.
+func (h *Handlers) beginWebhookTx(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	webhookID string,
+) (*gorm.DB, error) {
+	webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.serverError(
+			w, "failed to get webhook database", err,
+		)
+
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	tx := webhookDB.Begin()
 	if tx.Error != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to begin transaction", "error", tx.Error)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
+		h.serverError(
+			w, "failed to begin transaction", tx.Error,
+		)
+
+		return nil, tx.Error
 	}
 
-		event := &database.Event{
+	return tx, nil
+}
+
+// inlineBody returns a pointer to body as a string if it fits
+// within the inline size limit, or nil otherwise.
+func inlineBody(body []byte) *string {
+	if len(body) < delivery.MaxInlineBodySize {
+		s := string(body)
+
+		return &s
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// finishWebhookResponse notifies the delivery engine, logs the
+// event, and writes the HTTP response.
+func (h *Handlers) finishWebhookResponse(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	event *database.Event,
+	entrypoint database.Entrypoint,
+	tasks []delivery.Task,
+) {
+	if len(tasks) > 0 {
+		h.notifier.Notify(tasks)
+	}
+
+	h.log.Info("webhook event created",
+		"event_id", event.ID,
+		"webhook_id", entrypoint.WebhookID,
+		"entrypoint_id", entrypoint.ID,
+		"target_count", len(tasks),
+	)
+
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
+	_, err := w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		h.log.Error(
+			"failed to write response", "error", err,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// buildEvent creates a new Event struct from request data.
+func (h *Handlers) buildEvent(
+	r *http.Request,
+	entrypoint database.Entrypoint,
+	headersJSON, body []byte,
+) *database.Event {
+	return &database.Event{
 		WebhookID:    entrypoint.WebhookID,
 		EntrypointID: entrypoint.ID,
 		Method:       r.Method,
@@ -110,44 +287,49 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
 		Body:         string(body),
 		ContentType:  r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
 	}
-
-		if err := tx.Create(event).Error; err != nil {
-			tx.Rollback()
-			h.log.Error("failed to create event", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
 }
 
-		// Prepare body pointer for inline transport (≤16KB bodies are
-		// included in the DeliveryTask so the engine needs no DB read).
-		var bodyPtr *string
-		if len(body) < delivery.MaxInlineBodySize {
-			bodyStr := string(body)
-			bodyPtr = &bodyStr
-		}
+// buildDeliveryTasks creates delivery records in the
+// transaction and returns tasks for the delivery engine.
+// Returns nil if an error occurred.
+func (h *Handlers) buildDeliveryTasks(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	tx *gorm.DB,
+	event *database.Event,
+	entrypoint database.Entrypoint,
+	targets []database.Target,
+	bodyPtr *string,
+) []delivery.Task {
+	tasks := make([]delivery.Task, 0, len(targets))
 
-		// Create delivery records and build self-contained delivery tasks
-		tasks := make([]delivery.DeliveryTask, 0, len(targets))
 	for i := range targets {
 		dlv := &database.Delivery{
 			EventID:  event.ID,
 			TargetID: targets[i].ID,
 			Status:   database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 		}
-			if err := tx.Create(dlv).Error; err != nil {
+
+		err := tx.Create(dlv).Error
+		if err != nil {
 			tx.Rollback()
-				h.log.Error("failed to create delivery",
+			h.log.Error(
+				"failed to create delivery",
 				"target_id", targets[i].ID,
 				"error", err,
 			)
-				http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-				return
+			http.Error(
+				w, "Internal server error",
+				http.StatusInternalServerError,
+			)
+
+			return nil
 		}
 
-			tasks = append(tasks, delivery.DeliveryTask{
+		tasks = append(tasks, delivery.Task{
 			DeliveryID:   dlv.ID,
 			EventID:      event.ID,
 			WebhookID:    entrypoint.WebhookID,
+			EntrypointID: entrypoint.ID,
 			TargetID:     targets[i].ID,
 			TargetName:   targets[i].Name,
 			TargetType:   targets[i].Type,
@@ -161,31 +343,5 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
 		})
 	}
 
-		if err := tx.Commit().Error; err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to commit transaction", "error", err)
-			http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// Notify the delivery engine with self-contained delivery tasks.
-		// Each task carries all target config and event data inline so
-		// the engine can deliver without touching any database (in the
-		// ≤16KB happy path). The engine only writes to the DB to record
-		// delivery results after each attempt.
-		if len(tasks) > 0 {
-			h.notifier.Notify(tasks)
-		}
-
-		h.log.Info("webhook event created",
-			"event_id", event.ID,
-			"webhook_id", entrypoint.WebhookID,
-			"entrypoint_id", entrypoint.ID,
-			"target_count", len(targets),
-		)
-
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		if _, err := w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`)); err != nil {
-			h.log.Error("failed to write response", "error", err)
-		}
-	}
+	return tasks
 }

internal/healthcheck/healthcheck.go

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// Package healthcheck provides application health status reporting.
 package healthcheck
 
 import (
@@ -12,55 +13,51 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // HealthcheckParams is a standard fx naming convention
+//nolint:revive // HealthcheckParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type HealthcheckParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Globals  *globals.Globals
 	Config   *config.Config
 	Logger   *logger.Logger
 	Database *database.Database
 }
 
+// Healthcheck tracks application uptime and reports health status.
 type Healthcheck struct {
 	StartupTime time.Time
 	log         *slog.Logger
 	params      *HealthcheckParams
 }
 
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params HealthcheckParams) (*Healthcheck, error) {
+// New creates a Healthcheck that records the startup time on fx
+// start.
+func New(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params HealthcheckParams,
+) (*Healthcheck, error) {
 	s := new(Healthcheck)
 	s.params = &params
 	s.log = params.Logger.Get()
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error { // nolint:revive // ctx unused but required by fx
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			s.StartupTime = time.Now()
+
 			return nil
 		},
-		OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			return nil
 		},
 	})
+
 	return s, nil
 }
 
-// nolint:revive // HealthcheckResponse is a clear, descriptive name
-type HealthcheckResponse struct {
-	Status        string `json:"status"`
-	Now           string `json:"now"`
-	UptimeSeconds int64  `json:"uptime_seconds"`
-	UptimeHuman   string `json:"uptime_human"`
-	Version       string `json:"version"`
-	Appname       string `json:"appname"`
-	Maintenance   bool   `json:"maintenance_mode"`
-}
-
-func (s *Healthcheck) uptime() time.Duration {
-	return time.Since(s.StartupTime)
-}
-
-func (s *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *HealthcheckResponse {
-	resp := &HealthcheckResponse{
+// Healthcheck returns the current health status of the
+// application.
+func (s *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
+	resp := &Response{
 		Status:        "ok",
 		Now:           time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
 		UptimeSeconds: int64(s.uptime().Seconds()),
@@ -69,5 +66,21 @@ func (s *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *HealthcheckResponse {
 		Version:       s.params.Globals.Version,
 		Maintenance:   s.params.Config.MaintenanceMode,
 	}
+
 	return resp
 }
+
+// Response contains the JSON-serialised health status.
+type Response struct {
+	Status        string `json:"status"`
+	Now           string `json:"now"`
+	UptimeSeconds int64  `json:"uptimeSeconds"`
+	UptimeHuman   string `json:"uptimeHuman"`
+	Version       string `json:"version"`
+	Appname       string `json:"appname"`
+	Maintenance   bool   `json:"maintenanceMode"`
+}
+
+func (s *Healthcheck) uptime() time.Duration {
+	return time.Since(s.StartupTime)
+}

internal/logger/logger.go

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// Package logger provides structured logging with dynamic level
+// control.
 package logger
 
 import (
@@ -10,19 +12,25 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // LoggerParams is a standard fx naming convention
+//nolint:revive // LoggerParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type LoggerParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Globals *globals.Globals
 }
 
+// Logger wraps slog with dynamic level control and structured
+// output.
 type Logger struct {
 	logger   *slog.Logger
 	levelVar *slog.LevelVar
 	params   LoggerParams
 }
 
-// nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused
+// New creates a Logger that outputs text (TTY) or JSON (non-TTY)
+// to stdout.
+//
+//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
 func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params LoggerParams) (*Logger, error) {
 	l := new(Logger)
 	l.params = params
@@ -37,17 +45,22 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params LoggerParams) (*Logger, error) {
 		tty = true
 	}
 
-	replaceAttr := func(_ []string, a slog.Attr) slog.Attr { // nolint:revive // groups unused
+	//nolint:revive // groups param unused but required by slog ReplaceAttr signature.
+	replaceAttr := func(_ []string, a slog.Attr) slog.Attr {
 		// Always use UTC for timestamps
 		if a.Key == slog.TimeKey {
 			if t, ok := a.Value.Any().(time.Time); ok {
 				return slog.Time(slog.TimeKey, t.UTC())
 			}
+
+			return a
 		}
+
 		return a
 	}
 
 	var handler slog.Handler
+
 	opts := &slog.HandlerOptions{
 		Level:       l.levelVar,
 		ReplaceAttr: replaceAttr,
@@ -69,15 +82,18 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params LoggerParams) (*Logger, error) {
 	return l, nil
 }
 
+// EnableDebugLogging switches the log level to debug.
 func (l *Logger) EnableDebugLogging() {
 	l.levelVar.Set(slog.LevelDebug)
 	l.logger.Debug("debug logging enabled", "debug", true)
 }
 
+// Get returns the underlying slog.Logger.
 func (l *Logger) Get() *slog.Logger {
 	return l.logger
 }
 
+// Identify logs the application name and version at startup.
 func (l *Logger) Identify() {
 	l.logger.Info("starting",
 		"appname", l.params.Globals.Appname,
@@ -85,7 +101,8 @@ func (l *Logger) Identify() {
 	)
 }
 
-// Helper methods to maintain compatibility with existing code
+// Writer returns an io.Writer suitable for standard library
+// loggers.
 func (l *Logger) Writer() io.Writer {
 	return os.Stdout
 }

internal/logger/logger_test.go

@@ -1,63 +1,59 @@
-package logger
+package logger_test
 
 import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
+func testGlobals() *globals.Globals {
+	return &globals.Globals{
+		Appname: "test-app",
+		Version: "1.0.0",
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNew(t *testing.T) {
-	// Set up globals
-	globals.Appname = "test-app"
-	globals.Version = "1.0.0"
+	t.Parallel()
 
 	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
-	g, err := globals.New(lc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("globals.New() error = %v", err)
+
+	params := logger.LoggerParams{
+		Globals: testGlobals(),
 	}
 
-	params := LoggerParams{
-		Globals: g,
-	}
-
-	logger, err := New(lc, params)
+	l, err := logger.New(lc, params)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if logger.Get() == nil {
+	if l.Get() == nil {
 		t.Error("Get() returned nil logger")
 	}
 
 	// Test that we can log without panic
-	logger.Get().Info("test message", "key", "value")
+	l.Get().Info("test message", "key", "value")
 }
 
 func TestEnableDebugLogging(t *testing.T) {
-	// Set up globals
-	globals.Appname = "test-app"
-	globals.Version = "1.0.0"
+	t.Parallel()
 
 	lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
-	g, err := globals.New(lc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("globals.New() error = %v", err)
+
+	params := logger.LoggerParams{
+		Globals: testGlobals(),
 	}
 
-	params := LoggerParams{
-		Globals: g,
-	}
-
-	logger, err := New(lc, params)
+	l, err := logger.New(lc, params)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
 	}
 
 	// Enable debug logging should not panic
-	logger.EnableDebugLogging()
+	l.EnableDebugLogging()
 
 	// Test debug logging
-	logger.Get().Debug("debug message", "test", true)
+	l.Get().Debug("debug message", "test", true)
 }

internal/middleware/csrf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
+)
+
+// CSRFToken retrieves the CSRF token from the request context.
+// Returns an empty string if the gorilla/csrf middleware has not run.
+func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
+	return csrf.Token(r)
+}
+
+// isClientTLS reports whether the client-facing connection uses TLS.
+// It checks for a direct TLS connection (r.TLS) or a TLS-terminating
+// reverse proxy that sets the standard X-Forwarded-Proto header.
+func isClientTLS(r *http.Request) bool {
+	return r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
+}
+
+// CSRF returns middleware that provides CSRF protection using the
+// gorilla/csrf library. The middleware uses the session authentication
+// key to sign a CSRF cookie and validates a masked token submitted via
+// the "csrf_token" form field (or the "X-CSRF-Token" header) on
+// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests. Requests with an invalid or missing
+// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
+//
+// The middleware detects the client-facing transport protocol per-request
+// using r.TLS and the X-Forwarded-Proto header. This allows correct
+// behavior in all deployment scenarios:
+//
+//   - Direct HTTPS: strict Referer/Origin checks, Secure cookies.
+//   - Behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy: strict checks (the
+//     browser is on HTTPS, so Origin/Referer headers use https://),
+//     Secure cookies (the browser sees HTTPS from the proxy).
+//   - Direct HTTP: relaxed Referer/Origin checks via PlaintextHTTPRequest,
+//     non-Secure cookies so the browser sends them over HTTP.
+//
+// Two gorilla/csrf instances are maintained — one with Secure cookies
+// (for TLS) and one without (for plaintext HTTP) — because the
+// csrf.Secure option is set at creation time, not per-request.
+func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	csrfErrorHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		m.log.Warn("csrf: token validation failed",
+			"method", r.Method,
+			"path", r.URL.Path,
+			"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
+			"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
+		)
+		http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
+	})
+
+	key := m.session.GetKey()
+	baseOpts := []csrf.Option{
+		csrf.FieldName("csrf_token"),
+		csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteLaxMode),
+		csrf.Path("/"),
+		csrf.ErrorHandler(csrfErrorHandler),
+	}
+
+	// Two middleware instances with different Secure flags but the
+	// same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable between them.
+	tlsProtect := csrf.Protect(key, append(baseOpts, csrf.Secure(true))...)
+	httpProtect := csrf.Protect(key, append(baseOpts, csrf.Secure(false))...)
+
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		tlsCSRF := tlsProtect(next)
+		httpCSRF := httpProtect(next)
+
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			if isClientTLS(r) {
+				// Client is on TLS (directly or via reverse proxy).
+				// Use Secure cookies and strict Origin/Referer checks.
+				tlsCSRF.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+			} else {
+				// Plaintext HTTP: use non-Secure cookies and tell
+				// gorilla/csrf to use "http" for scheme comparisons,
+				// skipping the strict Referer check that assumes TLS.
+				httpCSRF.ServeHTTP(w, csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest(r))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/middleware/csrf_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+package middleware_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+// csrfCookieName is the gorilla/csrf cookie name.
+const csrfCookieName = "_gorilla_csrf"
+
+// csrfGetToken performs a GET request through the CSRF middleware
+// and returns the token and cookies.
+func csrfGetToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+	csrfMW func(http.Handler) http.Handler,
+	getReq *http.Request,
+) (string, []*http.Cookie) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var token string
+
+	getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			token = middleware.CSRFToken(r)
+		},
+	))
+
+	getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
+
+	cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "CSRF cookie should be set")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, token, "CSRF token should be set")
+
+	return token, cookies
+}
+
+// csrfPostWithToken performs a POST request with the given CSRF
+// token and cookies through the middleware. Returns whether the
+// handler was called and the response code.
+func csrfPostWithToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+	csrfMW func(http.Handler) http.Handler,
+	postReq *http.Request,
+	token string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) (bool, int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var called bool
+
+	postHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			called = true
+		},
+	))
+
+	form := url.Values{"csrf_token": {token}}
+	postReq.Body = http.NoBody
+	postReq.Body = nil
+
+	// Rebuild the request with the form body
+	rebuilt := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		postReq.Method, postReq.URL.String(),
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	rebuilt.Header = postReq.Header.Clone()
+	rebuilt.TLS = postReq.TLS
+	rebuilt.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		rebuilt.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, rebuilt)
+
+	return called, postW.Code
+}
+
+func TestCSRF_GETSetsToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	var gotToken string
+
+	handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			gotToken = middleware.CSRFToken(r)
+		},
+	))
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.NotEmpty(
+		t, gotToken,
+		"CSRF token should be set in context on GET",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestCSRF_POSTWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/form", nil,
+	)
+	token, cookies := csrfGetToken(t, csrfMW, getReq)
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/form", nil,
+	)
+	called, _ := csrfPostWithToken(
+		t, csrfMW, postReq, token, cookies,
+	)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, called,
+		"handler should be called with valid CSRF token",
+	)
+}
+
+// csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest is a shared helper for testing POST
+// requests without a CSRF token in both dev and prod modes.
+func csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest(
+	t *testing.T,
+	env string,
+	msg string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, env)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
+	getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
+	))
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
+	getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
+
+	cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
+
+	// POST without CSRF token
+	var called bool
+
+	postHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			called = true
+		},
+	))
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/form", nil,
+	)
+	postReq.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		postReq.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, postReq)
+
+	assert.False(t, called, msg)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, postW.Code)
+}
+
+func TestCSRF_POSTWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest(
+		t,
+		config.EnvironmentDev,
+		"handler should NOT be called without CSRF token",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestCSRF_POSTWithInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
+	getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
+	))
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
+	getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
+
+	cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
+
+	// POST with wrong CSRF token
+	var called bool
+
+	postHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			called = true
+		},
+	))
+
+	form := url.Values{"csrf_token": {"invalid-token-value"}}
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/form",
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	postReq.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		postReq.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, postReq)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, called,
+		"handler should NOT be called with invalid CSRF token",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, postW.Code)
+}
+
+func TestCSRF_GETDoesNotValidate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	var called bool
+
+	handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			called = true
+		},
+	))
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, called,
+		"GET requests should pass through CSRF middleware",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestCSRFToken_NoMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	assert.Empty(
+		t, middleware.CSRFToken(req),
+		"CSRFToken should return empty string when "+
+			"middleware has not run",
+	)
+}
+
+// --- TLS Detection Tests ---
+
+func TestIsClientTLS_DirectTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	r.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, middleware.IsClientTLS(r),
+		"should detect direct TLS connection",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsClientTLS_XForwardedProto(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, middleware.IsClientTLS(r),
+		"should detect TLS via X-Forwarded-Proto",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsClientTLS_PlaintextHTTP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, middleware.IsClientTLS(r),
+		"should detect plaintext HTTP",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsClientTLS_XForwardedProtoHTTP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http")
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, middleware.IsClientTLS(r),
+		"should detect plaintext when X-Forwarded-Proto is http",
+	)
+}
+
+// --- Production Mode: POST over plaintext HTTP ---
+
+func TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/form", nil,
+	)
+	token, cookies := csrfGetToken(t, csrfMW, getReq)
+
+	// Verify cookie is NOT Secure (plaintext HTTP in prod)
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		if c.Name == csrfCookieName {
+			assert.False(t, c.Secure,
+				"CSRF cookie should not be Secure "+
+					"over plaintext HTTP")
+		}
+	}
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/form", nil,
+	)
+	called, code := csrfPostWithToken(
+		t, csrfMW, postReq, token, cookies,
+	)
+
+	assert.True(t, called,
+		"handler should be called -- prod mode over "+
+			"plaintext HTTP must work")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusForbidden, code,
+		"should not return 403")
+}
+
+// --- Production Mode: POST with X-Forwarded-Proto ---
+
+func TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/form", nil,
+	)
+	getReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+
+	token, cookies := csrfGetToken(t, csrfMW, getReq)
+
+	// Verify cookie IS Secure (X-Forwarded-Proto: https)
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		if c.Name == csrfCookieName {
+			assert.True(t, c.Secure,
+				"CSRF cookie should be Secure behind "+
+					"TLS proxy")
+		}
+	}
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "http://example.com/form", nil,
+	)
+	postReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+	postReq.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com")
+
+	called, code := csrfPostWithToken(
+		t, csrfMW, postReq, token, cookies,
+	)
+
+	assert.True(t, called,
+		"handler should be called -- prod mode behind "+
+			"TLS proxy must work")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusForbidden, code,
+		"should not return 403")
+}
+
+// --- Production Mode: direct TLS ---
+
+func TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
+	csrfMW := m.CSRF()
+
+	getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "https://example.com/form", nil,
+	)
+	getReq.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
+
+	token, cookies := csrfGetToken(t, csrfMW, getReq)
+
+	// Verify cookie IS Secure (direct TLS)
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		if c.Name == csrfCookieName {
+			assert.True(t, c.Secure,
+				"CSRF cookie should be Secure over "+
+					"direct TLS")
+		}
+	}
+
+	postReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "https://example.com/form", nil,
+	)
+	postReq.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
+	postReq.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com")
+
+	called, code := csrfPostWithToken(
+		t, csrfMW, postReq, token, cookies,
+	)
+
+	assert.True(t, called,
+		"handler should be called -- direct TLS must work")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusForbidden, code,
+		"should not return 403")
+}
+
+// --- Production Mode: POST without token still rejects ---
+
+func TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest(
+		t,
+		config.EnvironmentProd,
+		"handler should NOT be called without CSRF token "+
+			"even in prod+plaintext",
+	)
+}

internal/middleware/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+)
+
+// NewLoggingResponseWriterForTest wraps newLoggingResponseWriter
+// for use in external test packages.
+func NewLoggingResponseWriterForTest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+) *loggingResponseWriter {
+	return newLoggingResponseWriter(w)
+}
+
+// LoggingResponseWriterStatusCode returns the status code
+// captured by the loggingResponseWriter.
+func LoggingResponseWriterStatusCode(
+	lrw *loggingResponseWriter,
+) int {
+	return lrw.statusCode
+}
+
+// IPFromHostPort exposes ipFromHostPort for testing.
+func IPFromHostPort(hp string) string {
+	return ipFromHostPort(hp)
+}
+
+// IsClientTLS exposes isClientTLS for testing.
+func IsClientTLS(r *http.Request) bool {
+	return isClientTLS(r)
+}
+
+// LoginRateLimitConst exposes the loginRateLimit constant.
+const LoginRateLimitConst = loginRateLimit
+
+// PasswordChangeRateLimitConst exposes the
+// passwordChangeRateLimit constant.
+const PasswordChangeRateLimitConst = passwordChangeRateLimit

internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// Package middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, auth,
+// CORS, and metrics.
 package middleware
 
 import (
@@ -19,26 +21,42 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // MiddlewareParams is a standard fx naming convention
+const (
+	// corsMaxAge is the maximum time (in seconds) that a
+	// preflight response can be cached.
+	corsMaxAge = 300
+)
+
+//nolint:revive // MiddlewareParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type MiddlewareParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Logger  *logger.Logger
 	Globals *globals.Globals
 	Config  *config.Config
 	Session *session.Session
 }
 
+// Middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, CORS, auth, and
+// metrics.
 type Middleware struct {
 	log     *slog.Logger
 	params  *MiddlewareParams
 	session *session.Session
 }
 
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params MiddlewareParams) (*Middleware, error) {
+// New creates a Middleware from the provided fx parameters.
+//
+//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
+func New(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params MiddlewareParams,
+) (*Middleware, error) {
 	s := new(Middleware)
 	s.params = &params
 	s.log = params.Logger.Get()
 	s.session = params.Session
+
 	return s, nil
 }
 
@@ -50,19 +68,24 @@ func ipFromHostPort(hp string) string {
 	if err != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
+
 	if len(h) > 0 && h[0] == '[' {
 		return h[1 : len(h)-1]
 	}
+
 	return h
 }
 
 type loggingResponseWriter struct {
 	http.ResponseWriter
+
 	statusCode int
 }
 
-// nolint:revive // unexported type is only used internally
-func NewLoggingResponseWriter(w http.ResponseWriter) *loggingResponseWriter {
+// newLoggingResponseWriter wraps w and records status codes.
+func newLoggingResponseWriter(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+) *loggingResponseWriter {
 	return &loggingResponseWriter{w, http.StatusOK}
 }
 
@@ -71,23 +94,30 @@ func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 	lrw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
 }
 
-// type Middleware func(http.Handler) http.Handler
-// this returns a Middleware that is designed to do every request through the
-// mux, note the signature:
+// Logging returns middleware that logs each HTTP request with
+// timing and metadata.
 func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
 			start := time.Now()
-			lrw := NewLoggingResponseWriter(w)
+			lrw := newLoggingResponseWriter(w)
 			ctx := r.Context()
+
 			defer func() {
 				latency := time.Since(start)
 				requestID := ""
-				if reqID := ctx.Value(middleware.RequestIDKey); reqID != nil {
+
+				if reqID := ctx.Value(
+					middleware.RequestIDKey,
+				); reqID != nil {
 					if id, ok := reqID.(string); ok {
 						requestID = id
 					}
 				}
+
 				s.log.Info("http request",
 					"request_start", start,
 					"method", r.Method,
@@ -107,20 +137,29 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	}
 }
 
+// CORS returns middleware that sets CORS headers (permissive in
+// dev, no-op in prod).
 func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	if s.params.Config.IsDev() {
 		// In development, allow any origin for local testing.
 		return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
 			AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
-			AllowedMethods:   []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"},
-			AllowedHeaders:   []string{"Accept", "Authorization", "Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token"},
+			AllowedMethods: []string{
+				"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS",
+			},
+			AllowedHeaders: []string{
+				"Accept", "Authorization",
+				"Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
+			},
 			ExposedHeaders:   []string{"Link"},
 			AllowCredentials: false,
-			MaxAge:           300,
+			MaxAge:           corsMaxAge,
 		})
 	}
-	// In production, the web UI is server-rendered so cross-origin
-	// requests are not expected. Return a no-op middleware.
+
+	// In production, the web UI is server-rendered so
+	// cross-origin requests are not expected. Return a no-op
+	// middleware.
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return next
 	}
@@ -130,37 +169,78 @@ func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 // Unauthenticated users are redirected to the login page.
 func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
 			sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
 			if err != nil {
-				s.log.Debug("auth middleware: failed to get session", "error", err)
-				http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
+				s.log.Debug(
+					"auth middleware: failed to get session",
+					"error", err,
+				)
+				http.Redirect(
+					w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
+				)
+
 				return
 			}
 
+			// IsAuthenticated also enforces both session expiry
+			// deadlines, so an idle-expired or absolutely-expired
+			// session lands here and is sent back to the login
+			// page.
 			if !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
-				s.log.Debug("auth middleware: unauthenticated request",
+				s.log.Debug(
+					"auth middleware: unauthenticated request",
 					"path", r.URL.Path,
 					"method", r.Method,
 				)
-				http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
+				http.Redirect(
+					w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
+				)
+
 				return
 			}
 
+			// This request authenticated with the session, so it
+			// counts as activity: push the idle deadline forward.
+			// This is the only place sessions are refreshed, which
+			// is what keeps an unauthenticated request from
+			// extending someone else's session. Touch advances the
+			// idle clock only -- the absolute cap is untouched --
+			// and reports false when nothing changed, so most
+			// requests do not re-issue the cookie. Save before the
+			// handler runs, while the headers are still ours to
+			// write.
+			if s.session.Touch(sess) {
+				err = s.session.Save(r, w, sess)
+				if err != nil {
+					s.log.Error(
+						"auth middleware: failed to refresh session",
+						"error", err,
+					)
+				}
+			}
+
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 		})
 	}
 }
 
+// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics.
 func (s *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	mdlw := ghmm.New(ghmm.Config{
 		Recorder: metrics.NewRecorder(metrics.Config{}),
 	})
+
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return std.Handler("", mdlw, next)
 	}
 }
 
+// MetricsAuth returns middleware that protects metrics endpoints
+// with basic auth.
 func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return basicauth.New(
 		"metrics",
@@ -172,33 +252,126 @@ func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	)
 }
 
-// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets production security headers
-// on every response: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP,
-// Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy.
+// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets production security
+// headers on every response: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options,
+// X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy.
 func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload")
-			w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
+			w.Header().Set(
+				"Strict-Transport-Security",
+				"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload",
+			)
+			w.Header().Set(
+				"X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff",
+			)
 			w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
-			w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'")
-			w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
-			w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()")
+			w.Header().Set(
+				"Content-Security-Policy",
+				"default-src 'self'; "+
+					"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "+
+					"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+			)
+			w.Header().Set(
+				"Referrer-Policy",
+				"strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+			)
+			w.Header().Set(
+				"Permissions-Policy",
+				"camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
+			)
+
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 		})
 	}
 }
 
-// MaxBodySize returns middleware that limits the request body size for POST
-// requests. If the body exceeds the given limit in bytes, the server returns
-// 413 Request Entity Too Large. This prevents clients from sending arbitrarily
-// large form bodies.
-func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(maxBytes int64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+// NoCache returns middleware that instructs browsers and
+// intermediary proxies not to cache the response. It sets
+// Cache-Control: no-store and Pragma: no-cache (the latter for
+// older HTTP/1.0 intermediaries). Apply it to authenticated pages
+// so webhook configuration and captured event data are not stored
+// by caches.
+func (s *Middleware) NoCache() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			if r.Method == http.MethodPost || r.Method == http.MethodPut || r.Method == http.MethodPatch {
-				r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
-			}
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
+			w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+			w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
+
+			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// bodyLimitedMethod reports whether the request method carries a
+// body that the MaxBodySize middleware should cap.
+func bodyLimitedMethod(method string) bool {
+	return method == http.MethodPost ||
+		method == http.MethodPut ||
+		method == http.MethodPatch
+}
+
+// MaxBodySize returns middleware that limits the size of
+// POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to maxBytes. It must be registered
+// before any middleware that parses the body — notably CSRF, which
+// calls r.PostFormValue — so that form parsing happens under this
+// cap rather than net/http's 10 MB default.
+//
+// Two enforcement paths exist, because http.MaxBytesReader alone
+// cannot produce a 413: it reports the overflow as an error from
+// Read, by which point the body parser downstream has already
+// converted that error into its own response.
+//
+//   - Declared oversize: the request announces a Content-Length
+//     greater than maxBytes. The middleware answers 413 Request
+//     Entity Too Large immediately and does not call the next
+//     handler, so neither CSRF nor the endpoint handler runs.
+//   - Undeclared oversize: the request is chunked (Content-Length
+//     of -1) or lies about its Content-Length. There is nothing to
+//     check up front, so http.MaxBytesReader hard-caps the body at
+//     maxBytes and the request fails downstream — the form parse
+//     errors out and CSRF rejects it with 403. The response is less
+//     precise than a 413, but the body is still never buffered
+//     beyond the cap, which is the property that matters.
+func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
+	maxBytes int64,
+) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
+			if !bodyLimitedMethod(r.Method) {
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			if r.ContentLength > maxBytes {
+				s.log.Warn(
+					"request body exceeds limit",
+					"method", r.Method,
+					"path", r.URL.Path,
+					"content_length", r.ContentLength,
+					"limit", maxBytes,
+				)
+				http.Error(
+					w,
+					"Request Entity Too Large",
+					http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
+				)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
+
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 		})
 	}

internal/middleware/ratelimit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
+)
+
+const (
+	// loginRateLimit is the maximum number of login attempts
+	// per interval.
+	loginRateLimit = 5
+
+	// loginRateInterval is the time window for the rate limit.
+	loginRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
+
+	// passwordChangeRateLimit is the maximum number of password
+	// change attempts per interval. Each attempt verifies the
+	// current password, so the endpoint must be rate-limited
+	// like any other password-based authentication endpoint.
+	passwordChangeRateLimit = 5
+
+	// passwordChangeRateInterval is the time window for the
+	// password change rate limit.
+	passwordChangeRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
+
+	// receiverRateInterval is the time window for the webhook
+	// receiver rate limit. The configured limit is expressed in
+	// requests per minute.
+	receiverRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// normalizeAddr strips the IPv4-in-IPv6 wrapper and any zone from
+// addr so that comparisons and bucket keys are canonical.
+func normalizeAddr(addr netip.Addr) netip.Addr {
+	return addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
+}
+
+// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network the
+// operator listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES. The list is empty by default,
+// so by default nothing is trusted.
+func (m *Middleware) isTrustedProxy(addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	for _, prefix := range m.params.Config.TrustedProxies {
+		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
+// forwardedClientAddr returns the client address named by this
+// request's X-Forwarded-For chain. It is consulted only for requests
+// whose direct peer is a trusted proxy.
+//
+// X-Forwarded-For is the only header read. X-Real-IP and
+// True-Client-IP are deliberately ignored: the reverse proxies in
+// common use append to X-Forwarded-For and pass any other header the
+// client sent through untouched, so believing a single-valued header
+// would let a client behind the trusted proxy name its own bucket —
+// the very bypass this gating exists to close.
+//
+// The chain is walked right to left, because the rightmost entry is
+// the one the nearest proxy appended and everything to its left may
+// have been written by the client. The first hop that is not itself
+// a trusted proxy is the client. A hop that cannot be read as a bare
+// address ends the walk: past it the chain is not the shape assumed
+// here, so the caller falls back to the peer address.
+func (m *Middleware) forwardedClientAddr(
+	r *http.Request,
+) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+	hops := strings.Split(
+		strings.Join(r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), ","), ",",
+	)
+
+	for _, hop := range slices.Backward(hops) {
+		hop = strings.TrimSpace(hop)
+		if hop == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hop)
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Addr{}, false
+		}
+
+		if addr = normalizeAddr(addr); !m.isTrustedProxy(addr) {
+			return addr, true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return netip.Addr{}, false
+}
+
+// rateLimitKey is the client identity every rate limiter in this
+// package buckets on. Forwarded headers are honoured only when the
+// direct peer (RemoteAddr) is inside the configured trusted-proxy
+// set; otherwise the peer address itself is the key. Without that
+// gate any client could mint a fresh bucket per request, or starve
+// another client's bucket, by picking an X-Forwarded-For value —
+// which makes every limit here decorative against a deliberate
+// attacker.
+func (m *Middleware) rateLimitKey(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
+	return m.clientKey(r), nil
+}
+
+// clientKey computes the bucket key described on rateLimitKey.
+func (m *Middleware) clientKey(r *http.Request) string {
+	peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr))
+	if err != nil {
+		// Not an address we can reason about; key on the raw
+		// value rather than collapsing such peers into one
+		// shared bucket.
+		return r.RemoteAddr
+	}
+
+	peer = normalizeAddr(peer)
+	if !m.isTrustedProxy(peer) {
+		return peer.String()
+	}
+
+	if addr, ok := m.forwardedClientAddr(r); ok {
+		return addr.String()
+	}
+
+	return peer.String()
+}
+
+// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler shared by every limiter:
+// it logs the rejection with logMessage and answers with
+// responseMessage. httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585).
+func (m *Middleware) tooManyRequests(
+	logMessage, responseMessage string,
+) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		m.log.Warn(logMessage, "path", r.URL.Path)
+		http.Error(w, responseMessage, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+}
+
+// LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate
+// limiting on login attempts using go-chi/httprate. Only POST
+// requests are rate-limited; GET requests (rendering the login
+// form) pass through unaffected. When the rate limit is exceeded,
+// a 429 Too Many Requests response is returned. Clients are
+// identified by rateLimitKey.
+func (m *Middleware) LoginRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return m.postRateLimit(
+		loginRateLimit,
+		loginRateInterval,
+		"login rate limit exceeded",
+		"Too many login attempts. Please try again later.",
+	)
+}
+
+// PasswordChangeRateLimit returns middleware that enforces
+// per-IP rate limiting on password change attempts. The change
+// endpoint verifies the current password, so without a limit a
+// stolen session could be used to brute-force it; the limit
+// matches the login endpoint's.
+func (m *Middleware) PasswordChangeRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return m.postRateLimit(
+		passwordChangeRateLimit,
+		passwordChangeRateInterval,
+		"password change rate limit exceeded",
+		"Too many password change attempts. "+
+			"Please try again later.",
+	)
+}
+
+// postRateLimit builds middleware that enforces a per-IP rate
+// limit on POST requests only; all other methods pass through
+// unaffected. Requests over the limit receive a 429 with the
+// given response message, and each rejection is logged with the
+// given log message. Clients are identified by rateLimitKey.
+func (m *Middleware) postRateLimit(
+	limit int,
+	interval time.Duration,
+	logMessage, responseMessage string,
+) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	limiter := httprate.Limit(
+		limit,
+		interval,
+		httprate.WithKeyFuncs(m.rateLimitKey),
+		httprate.WithLimitHandler(
+			m.tooManyRequests(logMessage, responseMessage),
+		),
+	)
+
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		limited := limiter(next)
+
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			w http.ResponseWriter,
+			r *http.Request,
+		) {
+			// Only rate-limit POST requests.
+			if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			limited.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// ReceiverRateLimit returns middleware that rate-limits the
+// public webhook receiver endpoint per client IP per request
+// path (the path contains the entrypoint UUID, so each sender
+// is limited per entrypoint without affecting other senders or
+// other entrypoints). The limit is Config.ReceiverRateLimit
+// requests per minute. Requests over the limit receive a 429.
+// Clients are identified by rateLimitKey.
+func (m *Middleware) ReceiverRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return httprate.Limit(
+		m.params.Config.ReceiverRateLimit,
+		receiverRateInterval,
+		httprate.WithKeyFuncs(
+			m.rateLimitKey,
+			httprate.KeyByEndpoint,
+		),
+		httprate.WithLimitHandler(m.tooManyRequests(
+			"webhook receiver rate limit exceeded",
+			"Too many requests. Please slow down.",
+		)),
+	)
+}

internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+package middleware_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+func TestLoginRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	var callCount int
+
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			callCount++
+
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	))
+
+	// GET requests should never be rate-limited
+	for i := range 20 {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(),
+			http.MethodGet, "/pages/login", nil,
+		)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:12345"
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"GET request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 20, callCount)
+}
+
+// runPostLimitTest exercises a POST-only rate limit middleware:
+// the first limit POSTs to path from ip must pass, and the next
+// one must be rejected with 429 without reaching the handler.
+func runPostLimitTest(
+	t *testing.T,
+	mw func(http.Handler) http.Handler,
+	limit int,
+	path, ip string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var callCount int
+
+	handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			callCount++
+
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	))
+
+	// The first limit POST requests should succeed
+	for i := range limit {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(),
+			http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+		)
+		req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"POST request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Next POST should be rate-limited
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+	)
+	req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
+		"POST after limit should be 429",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, limit, callCount)
+}
+
+func TestLoginRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	runPostLimitTest(
+		t,
+		m.LoginRateLimit(),
+		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
+		"/pages/login",
+		"10.0.0.1:12345",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestPasswordChangeRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	runPostLimitTest(
+		t,
+		m.PasswordChangeRateLimit(),
+		middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst,
+		"/user/admin/password",
+		"10.0.0.2:12345",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestLoginRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	))
+
+	// Exhaust limit for IP1
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(),
+			http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil,
+		)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:12345"
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	}
+
+	// IP1 should be rate-limited
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil,
+	)
+	req.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:12345"
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
+
+	// IP2 should still be allowed
+	req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil,
+	)
+	req2.RemoteAddr = "5.6.7.8:12345"
+
+	w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w2.Code,
+		"different IP should not be affected",
+	)
+}
+
+// okHandler is the terminal handler the limiter middleware wraps
+// in these tests: it answers 200 to anything that reaches it.
+func okHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	)
+}
+
+// rateLimitMiddleware builds a Middleware around cfg, whose
+// TrustedProxies field is what the rate limit key function gates
+// forwarded-header trust on.
+func rateLimitMiddleware(
+	t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config,
+) *middleware.Middleware {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+		os.Stderr,
+		&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+	))
+
+	return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil)
+}
+
+// trustedProxies parses CIDR strings for a test Config.
+func trustedProxies(cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
+	prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
+	for _, cidr := range cidrs {
+		prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(cidr))
+	}
+
+	return prefixes
+}
+
+// postWithHeaders sends one POST to the handler from peer with the
+// given headers set and returns the recorder.
+func postWithHeaders(
+	handler http.Handler,
+	peer, path string,
+	headers map[string]string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+	)
+	req.RemoteAddr = peer
+
+	for name, value := range headers {
+		req.Header.Set(name, value)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// receiverLimitedHandler builds a ReceiverRateLimit-wrapped
+// handler with the given per-minute limit and no trusted proxies.
+func receiverLimitedHandler(
+	t *testing.T, limit int,
+) http.Handler {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	m := rateLimitMiddleware(
+		t, &config.Config{ReceiverRateLimit: limit},
+	)
+
+	return m.ReceiverRateLimit()(okHandler())
+}
+
+// receiverPost sends one POST to the handler from the given IP
+// and path and returns the recorder.
+func receiverPost(
+	handler http.Handler, ip, path string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+	)
+	req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const limit = 3
+
+	handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
+
+	// The first limit requests from one IP to one entrypoint
+	// pass.
+	for i := range limit {
+		w := receiverPost(
+			handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+		)
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
+	// carrying a Retry-After header.
+	w := receiverPost(
+		handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
+	assert.NotEmpty(
+		t, w.Header().Get("Retry-After"),
+		"429 must carry a Retry-After header",
+	)
+
+	// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
+	w = receiverPost(
+		handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+		"a different entrypoint must not be affected",
+	)
+
+	// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
+	w = receiverPost(
+		handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+		"a different client IP must not be affected",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod proves the receiver
+// limit counts non-POST requests too: a GET shares the bucket
+// with a POST and is itself rejected once over the limit.
+func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		limit = 2
+		ip    = "7.7.7.7:1234"
+		path  = "/webhook/uuid-c"
+	)
+
+	handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
+
+	get := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
+		)
+		req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+		return w
+	}
+
+	// One POST plus one GET fill the bucket, so the GET must
+	// have been counted.
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, receiverPost(handler, ip, path).Code,
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get().Code)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, get().Code,
+		"a GET over the limit must be rate-limited",
+	)
+}
+
+const (
+	loginPath  = "/pages/login"
+	headerXFF  = "X-Forwarded-For"
+	headerReal = "X-Real-IP"
+	headerTrue = "True-Client-IP"
+)
+
+// assertSharedBucket drives the login limiter from peer with the
+// trusted-proxy set proxies, sending one more request than the limit
+// allows and varying the headers on each with headers(i). Every
+// request must land in the same bucket, so the last one is rejected:
+// if any of the varying header values reached the key, the run would
+// have minted fresh buckets and nothing would be rejected.
+func assertSharedBucket(
+	t *testing.T,
+	proxies []netip.Prefix,
+	peer string,
+	headers func(i int) map[string]string,
+	msg string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	m := rateLimitMiddleware(
+		t, &config.Config{TrustedProxies: proxies},
+	)
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
+
+	for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
+		w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, headers(i))
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	w := postWithHeaders(
+		handler, peer, loginPath,
+		headers(middleware.LoginRateLimitConst),
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, msg)
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
+// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
+// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
+// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
+// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
+// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
+func TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, header := range []string{
+		headerXFF, headerReal, headerTrue,
+	} {
+		t.Run(header, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			assertSharedBucket(
+				t, nil, "203.0.113.9:44444",
+				func(i int) map[string]string {
+					return map[string]string{
+						header: fmt.Sprintf(
+							"198.51.100.%d", i+1,
+						),
+					}
+				},
+				"a spoofed "+header+" from an untrusted peer "+
+					"must not mint a fresh bucket",
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitKey_SingleValuedHeadersIgnoredFromTrustedPeer is the
+// regression test for the bypass hiding inside the trusted case.
+// Real reverse proxies (nginx, HAProxy, Caddy, ALB) set only
+// X-Forwarded-For and pass every other client header through
+// verbatim, so a client behind the configured proxy can send its own
+// X-Real-IP or True-Client-IP. Reading either would hand that client
+// a fresh bucket per request from inside exactly the deployment
+// TRUSTED_PROXIES exists to serve, so neither header is read at all.
+func TestRateLimitKey_SingleValuedHeadersIgnoredFromTrustedPeer(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, header := range []string{headerReal, headerTrue} {
+		t.Run(header, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			assertSharedBucket(
+				t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
+				"10.0.0.1:44444",
+				func(i int) map[string]string {
+					return map[string]string{
+						header: fmt.Sprintf(
+							"198.51.100.%d", i+1,
+						),
+					}
+				},
+				header+" from a trusted peer must not mint a "+
+					"fresh bucket: only X-Forwarded-For is read",
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitKey_MalformedRightmostHopFallsBackToPeer covers the
+// other end of the chain walk. The rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry
+// is the one the trusted proxy appended; if it cannot be read as an
+// address the chain is not the shape the walk assumes, and every
+// entry to its left may have come from the client. The walk must
+// stop and fall back to the peer rather than select one of them.
+func TestRateLimitKey_MalformedRightmostHopFallsBackToPeer(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Forms seen in the wild: host:port (Azure Application
+	// Gateway, IIS ARR), a bracketed IPv6 literal, and the
+	// RFC 7239 placeholder token.
+	for _, tail := range []string{
+		"198.51.100.7:1234", "[2001:db8::1]", "unknown",
+	} {
+		t.Run(tail, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			assertSharedBucket(
+				t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
+				"10.0.0.1:44444",
+				func(i int) map[string]string {
+					return map[string]string{
+						headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf(
+							"9.9.9.%d, %s", i+1, tail,
+						),
+					}
+				},
+				"an unparseable rightmost hop must fall back "+
+					"to the peer address, not select a "+
+					"client-controlled entry",
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedHonouredFromTrustedPeer checks the
+// other half: when the direct peer is a configured trusted proxy,
+// the forwarded client address is what buckets are keyed on, so
+// one sender behind the proxy cannot exhaust another's limit.
+func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedHonouredFromTrustedPeer(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
+		TrustedProxies: trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
+	})
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
+
+	const peer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
+
+	first := map[string]string{headerXFF: "198.51.100.7"}
+
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
+		postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, first)
+	}
+
+	w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, first)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
+		"the forwarded client's own bucket must fill up",
+	)
+
+	w = postWithHeaders(
+		handler, peer, loginPath,
+		map[string]string{headerXFF: "198.51.100.8"},
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+		"a forwarded header from a trusted peer must be honoured",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitKey_ChainWalkSkipsClientPrepended covers the
+// residual spoofing route behind a trusted proxy: the client
+// controls the leftmost X-Forwarded-For entries, so the key is the
+// rightmost hop that is not itself trusted. Rotating the prepended
+// entry must not create new buckets.
+func TestRateLimitKey_ChainWalkSkipsClientPrepended(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	assertSharedBucket(
+		t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"), "10.0.0.1:44444",
+		func(i int) map[string]string {
+			return map[string]string{
+				headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf(
+					"9.9.9.%d, 198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.2", i+1,
+				),
+			}
+		},
+		"a client-prepended X-Forwarded-For entry must not "+
+			"mint a fresh bucket",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer proves
+// the receiver limiter uses the same gated key function as the
+// POST limiters.
+func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		limit = 3
+		peer  = "203.0.113.10:44444"
+		path  = "/webhook/uuid-d"
+	)
+
+	handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
+
+	for i := range limit {
+		w := postWithHeaders(
+			handler, peer, path,
+			map[string]string{
+				headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf(
+					"198.51.100.%d", i+1,
+				),
+			},
+		)
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	w := postWithHeaders(
+		handler, peer, path,
+		map[string]string{headerXFF: "198.51.100.200"},
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
+		"a spoofed X-Forwarded-For from an untrusted peer must "+
+			"not mint a fresh receiver bucket",
+	)
+}

internal/middleware/testing.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"log/slog"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// NewForTest creates a Middleware with the minimum dependencies
+// needed for testing. This bypasses the fx lifecycle.
+func NewForTest(
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	sess *session.Session,
+) *Middleware {
+	return &Middleware{
+		log: log,
+		params: &MiddlewareParams{
+			Config: cfg,
+		},
+		session: sess,
+	}
+}

internal/server/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+// MaxFormBodySizeForTest exposes the form body cap so tests can
+// build requests that sit exactly at, below, and above it.
+const MaxFormBodySizeForTest = maxFormBodySize
+
+// NewRouterForTest builds the real route tree via SetupRoutes with
+// the supplied middleware and handlers, bypassing the fx lifecycle
+// and the HTTP listener. Tests use it so that route-group middleware
+// registration order is exercised exactly as it ships, rather than
+// against a hand-rebuilt chain that could drift from routes.go.
+func NewRouterForTest(
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	mw *middleware.Middleware,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+) http.Handler {
+	s := &Server{
+		log:    log,
+		mw:     mw,
+		h:      h,
+		params: ServerParams{Config: cfg},
+	}
+	s.SetupRoutes()
+
+	return s.router
+}

internal/server/http.go

@@ -1,18 +1,36 @@
 package server
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
 )
 
+const (
+	// httpReadTimeout is the maximum duration for reading the
+	// entire request, including the body.
+	httpReadTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
+	// httpWriteTimeout is the maximum duration before timing out
+	// writes of the response. It must stay above the router's
+	// requestTimeout (60s, in routes.go) so the middleware timeout
+	// fires first and returns a clean 503, rather than the transport
+	// cutting the connection at the socket write deadline.
+	httpWriteTimeout = 65 * time.Second
+
+	// httpMaxHeaderBytes is the maximum number of bytes the
+	// server will read parsing the request headers.
+	httpMaxHeaderBytes = 1 << 20
+)
+
 func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
 	listenAddr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.params.Config.Port)
 	s.httpServer = &http.Server{
 		Addr:           listenAddr,
-		ReadTimeout:    10 * time.Second,
-		WriteTimeout:   10 * time.Second,
-		MaxHeaderBytes: 1 << 20,
+		ReadTimeout:    httpReadTimeout,
+		WriteTimeout:   httpWriteTimeout,
+		MaxHeaderBytes: httpMaxHeaderBytes,
 		Handler:        s,
 	}
 
@@ -21,14 +39,21 @@ func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
 	s.SetupRoutes()
 
 	s.log.Info("http begin listen", "listenaddr", listenAddr)
-	if err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
+
+	err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe()
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
 		s.log.Error("listen error", "error", err)
+
 		if s.cancelFunc != nil {
 			s.cancelFunc()
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+// ServeHTTP delegates to the router.
+func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+) {
 	s.router.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 }

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -11,15 +11,24 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
 )
 
-// maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in bytes) for
-// form POST endpoints.  1 MB is generous for any form submission while
-// preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
+// maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in
+// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
+// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
 const maxFormBodySize int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB
 
+// requestTimeout is the maximum time allowed for a single HTTP
+// request.
+const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
+
+// SetupRoutes configures all HTTP routes and middleware on the
+// server's router.
 func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	s.router = chi.NewRouter()
+	s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
+	s.setupRoutes()
+}
 
-	// Global middleware stack — applied to every request.
+func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
 	s.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
 	s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
@@ -31,24 +40,28 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	}
 
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
-	s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(60 * time.Second))
+	s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
 
-	// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is true
-	// so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware above.
+	// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
+	// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware.
 	if s.sentryEnabled {
 		sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
 			Repanic: true,
 		})
 		s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
 	}
+}
 
-	// Routes
+func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 	s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
 
-	s.router.Mount("/s", http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))))
+	s.router.Mount(
+		"/s",
+		http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
+	)
 
 	s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
-		// TODO: Add API routes here
+		// API routes will be added here.
 	})
 
 	s.router.Get(
@@ -60,54 +73,106 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
 		s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
 			r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
-			r.Get("/metrics", http.HandlerFunc(promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP))
+			r.Get(
+				"/metrics",
+				http.HandlerFunc(
+					promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
+				),
+			)
 		})
 	}
 
-	// pages that are rendered server-side
-	s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
+	s.setupPageRoutes()
+	s.setupUserRoutes()
+	s.setupSourceRoutes()
+	s.setupWebhookRoutes()
+}
 
-		// Login page (no auth required)
+func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
+	s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
+		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
+		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
+
+		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
+			r.Use(s.mw.LoginRateLimit())
 			r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
 			r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
+		})
 
-		// Logout (auth required)
 		r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
 	})
+}
 
-	// User profile routes
+func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
-	})
-
-	// Webhook management routes (require authentication)
-	s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
-		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())             // List all webhooks
-		r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())        // Show create form
-		r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit()) // Handle create submission
+		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
+		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
+		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
+		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
+		r.With(s.mw.PasswordChangeRateLimit()).Post(
+			"/password", s.h.HandlePasswordChange(),
+		)
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
+	s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
+		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
+		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
+		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
+		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
+		r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())
+		r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
 	})
 
 	s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
-		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())                                       // View webhook details
-		r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())                                     // Show edit form
-		r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())                              // Handle edit submission
-		r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())                                // Delete webhook
-		r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())                                     // View webhook logs
-		r.Post("/entrypoints", s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate())                       // Add entrypoint
-		r.Post("/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete", s.h.HandleEntrypointDelete()) // Delete entrypoint
-		r.Post("/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle", s.h.HandleEntrypointToggle()) // Toggle entrypoint active
-		r.Post("/targets", s.h.HandleTargetCreate())                               // Add target
-		r.Post("/targets/{targetID}/delete", s.h.HandleTargetDelete())             // Delete target
-		r.Post("/targets/{targetID}/toggle", s.h.HandleTargetToggle())             // Toggle target active
+		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
+		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
+		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
+		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
+		r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
+		r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
+		r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
+		r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
+		r.Post(
+			"/entrypoints",
+			s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate(),
+		)
+		r.Post(
+			"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete",
+			s.h.HandleEntrypointDelete(),
+		)
+		r.Post(
+			"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle",
+			s.h.HandleEntrypointToggle(),
+		)
+		r.Post("/targets", s.h.HandleTargetCreate())
+		r.Post(
+			"/targets/{targetID}/delete",
+			s.h.HandleTargetDelete(),
+		)
+		r.Post(
+			"/targets/{targetID}/toggle",
+			s.h.HandleTargetToggle(),
+		)
 	})
-
-	// Entrypoint endpoint — accepts incoming webhook POST requests only.
-	// Using HandleFunc so the handler itself can return 405 for non-POST
-	// methods (chi's Method routing returns 405 without Allow header).
-	s.router.HandleFunc("/webhook/{uuid}", s.h.HandleWebhook())
+}
+
+func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
+	s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
+		"/webhook/{uuid}",
+		s.h.HandleWebhook(),
+	)
 }

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+package server_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"html"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// csrfCookieName is the cookie gorilla/csrf issues when it runs. Its
+// presence or absence on a response is how these tests tell whether
+// the CSRF middleware executed.
+const csrfCookieName = "_gorilla_csrf"
+
+type noopNotifier struct{}
+
+func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
+
+// noopEvictor satisfies handlers.New's delivery.WebhookEvictor
+// dependency. These tests never delete a webhook, so there is
+// nothing to record.
+type noopEvictor struct{}
+
+func (e *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
+
+// testEnv is the real router from routes.go plus the collaborators
+// tests need to seed users and forge sessions.
+type testEnv struct {
+	router http.Handler
+	sess   *session.Session
+	db     *database.Database
+}
+
+// newTestEnv wires the dependency graph with fx and builds the
+// production route tree, so middleware registration order is
+// exercised exactly as it ships.
+func newTestEnv(t *testing.T) *testEnv {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var (
+		log  *logger.Logger
+		cfg  *config.Config
+		mw   *middleware.Middleware
+		hnd  *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+	)
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			func() *config.Config {
+				return &config.Config{
+					DataDir:     t.TempDir(),
+					Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
+				}
+			},
+			database.New,
+			database.NewWebhookDBManager,
+			healthcheck.New,
+			session.New,
+			func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
+			func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
+			middleware.New,
+			handlers.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&log, &cfg, &mw, &hnd, &sess, &db),
+	)
+	app.RequireStart()
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	return &testEnv{
+		router: server.NewRouterForTest(log.Get(), cfg, mw, hnd),
+		sess:   sess,
+		db:     db,
+	}
+}
+
+// oversizeValue returns a form value one byte past the route-group
+// body cap, so an encoded form containing it is guaranteed oversize.
+func oversizeValue() string {
+	return strings.Repeat("a", int(server.MaxFormBodySizeForTest)+1)
+}
+
+// csrfCookieSet reports whether the response issued a gorilla/csrf
+// cookie, which only happens if the CSRF middleware ran.
+func csrfCookieSet(w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) bool {
+	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
+		if c.Name == csrfCookieName {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
+// get issues a GET through the router with the supplied cookies.
+func (e *testEnv) get(
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// post issues a urlencoded form POST through the router. The body is
+// a strings.Reader, so the request carries an accurate
+// Content-Length — the signal MaxBodySize checks up front.
+func (e *testEnv) post(
+	path string,
+	form url.Values,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path,
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	req.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// csrfFrom renders the page at path and returns the CSRF token from
+// its form together with every cookie needed for the follow-up POST.
+func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
+	t *testing.T,
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) (string, []*http.Cookie) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	w := e.get(path, cookies)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	pattern := regexp.MustCompile(
+		`name="csrf_token" value="([^"]+)"`,
+	)
+
+	match := pattern.FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
+	require.Len(t, match, 2, "form must embed a CSRF token")
+
+	// html/template escapes "+" and "=" in attribute values, and
+	// gorilla/csrf tokens are standard base64, so the value read
+	// out of the markup has to be unescaped before it is submitted.
+	token := html.UnescapeString(match[1])
+
+	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies))
+	combined = append(combined, cookies...)
+	combined = append(combined, w.Result().Cookies()...)
+
+	return token, combined
+}
+
+// authCookies forges an authenticated session for the given user.
+func (e *testEnv) authCookies(
+	t *testing.T,
+	userID, username string,
+) []*http.Cookie {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/setup", nil,
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	s, err := e.sess.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	e.sess.SetUser(s, userID, username)
+	require.NoError(t, e.sess.Save(req, w, s))
+
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "session cookie should be set")
+
+	return cookies
+}
+
+// seedUser creates a user with the given password and returns the
+// stored hash so tests can assert whether it later changed.
+func (e *testEnv) seedUser(
+	t *testing.T,
+	username, password string,
+) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := &database.User{Username: username, Password: hash}
+	require.NoError(t, e.db.DB().Create(user).Error)
+
+	return user.ID, hash
+}
+
+// storedHash reads the current password hash for a username.
+func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var user database.User
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		e.db.DB().Where("username = ?", username).
+			First(&user).Error,
+	)
+
+	return user.Password
+}
+
+// --- /pages group ---
+
+// TestPagesLogin_OversizeBody_RejectedBeforeCSRF proves the cap runs
+// ahead of gorilla/csrf: the response is a clean 413 and no CSRF
+// cookie was issued, so neither the CSRF middleware nor the login
+// handler ran.
+func TestPagesLogin_OversizeBody_RejectedBeforeCSRF(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("username", oversizeValue())
+	form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, nil)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, w.Code,
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, csrfCookieSet(w),
+		"CSRF middleware must not run for an oversized body",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_NoToken_CSRFRejects is the control for
+// the test above: an identically shaped but under-limit POST does
+// reach gorilla/csrf, which rejects it and issues its cookie. Without
+// this, the missing-cookie assertion above would prove nothing.
+func TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_NoToken_CSRFRejects(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("username", "someone")
+	form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, nil)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, w.Code)
+	assert.True(
+		t, csrfCookieSet(w),
+		"CSRF middleware should run for an under-limit body",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_ValidToken_ReachesHandler proves the
+// reorder did not break CSRF token handling: a token harvested from
+// the rendered login form is still accepted and the request lands in
+// the handler.
+func TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_ValidToken_ReachesHandler(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("username", "nosuchuser")
+	form.Set("password", "wrongpassword")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, w.Body.String(), "Invalid username or password",
+		"request should reach the login handler",
+	)
+}
+
+// --- /user/{username} group ---
+
+// TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
+// covers the route that previously had no middleware body cap at
+// all. The request carries a valid session and a valid CSRF token,
+// so the only thing that can stop it is the size cap; the unchanged
+// password hash is the observable proof the handler never ran.
+func TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, originalHash := env.seedUser(t, "pwuser", "oldpassword")
+	cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "pwuser")
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/user/pwuser/", cookies)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", oversizeValue())
+	form.Set("confirm_password", oversizeValue())
+
+	w := env.post("/user/pwuser/password", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, w.Code,
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, originalHash, env.storedHash(t, "pwuser"),
+		"handler must not run, so the password must be unchanged",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds proves that adding the cap
+// to the /user/{username} group did not break the route it guards.
+func TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, originalHash := env.seedUser(t, "okuser", "oldpassword")
+	cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "okuser")
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/user/okuser/", cookies)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", "brandnewpassword")
+	form.Set("confirm_password", "brandnewpassword")
+
+	w := env.post("/user/okuser/password", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	assert.NotEqual(
+		t, originalHash, env.storedHash(t, "okuser"),
+		"an under-limit password change should still apply",
+	)
+}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// Package server wires up HTTP routes and manages the
+// application lifecycle.
 package server
 
 import (
@@ -21,9 +23,20 @@ import (
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // ServerParams is a standard fx naming convention
+const (
+	// shutdownTimeout is the maximum time to wait for the HTTP
+	// server to finish in-flight requests during shutdown.
+	shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
+
+	// sentryFlushTimeout is the maximum time to wait for Sentry
+	// to flush pending events during shutdown.
+	sentryFlushTimeout = 2 * time.Second
+)
+
+//nolint:revive // ServerParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type ServerParams struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Logger     *logger.Logger
 	Globals    *globals.Globals
 	Config     *config.Config
@@ -31,12 +44,13 @@ type ServerParams struct {
 	Handlers   *handlers.Handlers
 }
 
+// Server is the main HTTP server that wires up routes and manages
+// graceful shutdown.
 type Server struct {
 	startupTime   time.Time
 	exitCode      int
 	sentryEnabled bool
 	log           *slog.Logger
-	ctx           context.Context
 	cancelFunc    context.CancelFunc
 	httpServer    *http.Server
 	router        *chi.Mux
@@ -45,6 +59,8 @@ type Server struct {
 	h             *handlers.Handlers
 }
 
+// New creates a Server that starts the HTTP listener on fx start
+// and stops it gracefully.
 func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ServerParams) (*Server, error) {
 	s := new(Server)
 	s.params = params
@@ -53,19 +69,23 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ServerParams) (*Server, error) {
 	s.log = params.Logger.Get()
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStart: func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			s.startupTime = time.Now()
 			go s.Run()
+
 			return nil
 		},
 		OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
-			s.cleanShutdown()
+			s.cleanShutdown(ctx)
+
 			return nil
 		},
 	})
+
 	return s, nil
 }
 
+// Run configures Sentry and starts serving HTTP requests.
 func (s *Server) Run() {
 	s.configure()
 
@@ -75,6 +95,12 @@ func (s *Server) Run() {
 	s.serve()
 }
 
+// MaintenanceMode returns whether the server is in maintenance
+// mode.
+func (s *Server) MaintenanceMode() bool {
+	return s.params.Config.MaintenanceMode
+}
+
 func (s *Server) enableSentry() {
 	s.sentryEnabled = false
 
@@ -84,28 +110,36 @@ func (s *Server) enableSentry() {
 
 	err := sentry.Init(sentry.ClientOptions{
 		Dsn: s.params.Config.SentryDSN,
-		Release: fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", s.params.Globals.Appname, s.params.Globals.Version),
+		Release: fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%s-%s",
+			s.params.Globals.Appname,
+			s.params.Globals.Version,
+		),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		s.log.Error("sentry init failure", "error", err)
 		// Don't use fatal since we still want the service to run
 		return
 	}
+
 	s.log.Info("sentry error reporting activated")
 	s.sentryEnabled = true
 }
 
 func (s *Server) serve() int {
-	s.ctx, s.cancelFunc = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	ctx, cancelFunc := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	s.cancelFunc = cancelFunc
 
 	// signal watcher
 	go func() {
 		c := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+
 		signal.Ignore(syscall.SIGPIPE)
 		signal.Notify(c, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
 		// block and wait for signal
 		sig := <-c
 		s.log.Info("signal received", "signal", sig.String())
+
 		if s.cancelFunc != nil {
 			// cancelling the main context will trigger a clean
 			// shutdown via the fx OnStop hook.
@@ -115,9 +149,9 @@ func (s *Server) serve() int {
 
 	go s.serveUntilShutdown()
 
-	<-s.ctx.Done()
+	<-ctx.Done()
 	// Shutdown is handled by the fx OnStop hook (cleanShutdown).
-	// Do not call cleanShutdown() here to avoid a double invocation.
+	// Do not call cleanShutdown() here to avoid double invocation.
 	return s.exitCode
 }
 
@@ -125,27 +159,29 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupForExit() {
 	s.log.Info("cleaning up")
 }
 
-func (s *Server) cleanShutdown() {
+func (s *Server) cleanShutdown(ctx context.Context) {
 	// initiate clean shutdown
 	s.exitCode = 0
-	ctxShutdown, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+
+	ctxShutdown, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(
+		ctx, shutdownTimeout,
+	)
 	defer shutdownCancel()
 
-	if err := s.httpServer.Shutdown(ctxShutdown); err != nil {
-		s.log.Error("server clean shutdown failed", "error", err)
+	err := s.httpServer.Shutdown(ctxShutdown)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.log.Error(
+			"server clean shutdown failed", "error", err,
+		)
 	}
 
 	s.cleanupForExit()
 
 	if s.sentryEnabled {
-		sentry.Flush(2 * time.Second)
+		sentry.Flush(sentryFlushTimeout)
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *Server) MaintenanceMode() bool {
-	return s.params.Config.MaintenanceMode
-}
-
 func (s *Server) configure() {
 	// identify ourselves in the logs
 	s.params.Logger.Identify()

internal/session/session.go

@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
+// Package session manages HTTP session storage and authentication
+// state.
 package session
 
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
+	"maps"
 	"net/http"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -15,57 +20,126 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	// SessionName is the name of the session cookie
+	// SessionName is the name of the session cookie.
 	SessionName = "webhooker_session"
 
-	// UserIDKey is the session key for user ID
+	// UserIDKey is the session key for user ID.
 	UserIDKey = "user_id"
 
-	// UsernameKey is the session key for username
+	// UsernameKey is the session key for username.
 	UsernameKey = "username"
 
-	// AuthenticatedKey is the session key for authentication status
+	// AuthenticatedKey is the session key for authentication
+	// status.
 	AuthenticatedKey = "authenticated"
+
+	// CreatedAtKey is the session key holding the Unix timestamp at
+	// which the session was authenticated. It anchors the ABSOLUTE
+	// expiry clock and is written exactly once, by SetUser. Nothing
+	// refreshes it: an absolute deadline that moved with activity
+	// would not be a cap at all.
+	CreatedAtKey = "created_at"
+
+	// LastSeenKey is the session key holding the Unix timestamp of
+	// the most recent authenticated request. It anchors the IDLE
+	// expiry clock and is pushed forward by Touch.
+	LastSeenKey = "last_seen"
+
+	// sessionKeyLength is the required length in bytes for the
+	// session authentication key.
+	sessionKeyLength = 32
+
+	// sessionMaxAgeDays is the session cookie lifetime in days.
+	sessionMaxAgeDays = 7
+
+	// secondsPerDay is the number of seconds in a day.
+	secondsPerDay = 86400
+
+	// sessionAbsoluteMaxAge is the hard upper bound on how long a
+	// session may live, measured from CreatedAtKey. Activity never
+	// extends it, so even a continuously used session ends here and
+	// the user has to authenticate again.
+	sessionAbsoluteMaxAge = sessionMaxAgeDays * secondsPerDay * time.Second
+
+	// idleRefreshDivisor rate-limits idle-deadline refreshes. Touch
+	// only rewrites LastSeenKey once the stored value is older than
+	// idleTimeout/idleRefreshDivisor, so an active session is
+	// re-saved at most this many times per idle window instead of
+	// once per request. See Touch for the tradeoff this buys.
+	idleRefreshDivisor = 10
 )
 
-// nolint:revive // SessionParams is a standard fx naming convention
-type SessionParams struct {
+// ErrSessionKeyLength is returned when the decoded session key
+// does not have the expected length.
+var ErrSessionKeyLength = errors.New("session key length mismatch")
+
+// Params holds dependencies injected by fx.
+type Params struct {
 	fx.In
+
 	Config   *config.Config
 	Database *database.Database
 	Logger   *logger.Logger
 }
 
-// Session manages encrypted session storage
+// Session manages encrypted session storage.
 type Session struct {
 	store  *sessions.CookieStore
+	key    []byte // raw 32-byte auth key, also used for CSRF cookie signing
 	log    *slog.Logger
 	config *config.Config
+
+	// idleTimeout is the sliding inactivity window. A session that
+	// sees no authenticated request within this window expires,
+	// independently of the absolute cap. Non-positive disables idle
+	// expiry and leaves sessionAbsoluteMaxAge as the only bound.
+	idleTimeout time.Duration
+
+	// now reads the current time. Injected so expiry can be tested
+	// without sleeping.
+	now func() time.Time
 }
 
-// New creates a new session manager. The cookie store is initialized
-// during the fx OnStart phase after the database is connected, using
-// a session key that is auto-generated and stored in the database.
-func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params SessionParams) (*Session, error) {
+// New creates a new session manager. The cookie store is
+// initialized during the fx OnStart phase after the database is
+// connected, using a session key that is auto-generated and stored
+// in the database.
+func New(
+	lc fx.Lifecycle,
+	params Params,
+) (*Session, error) {
 	s := &Session{
 		log:         params.Logger.Get(),
 		config:      params.Config,
+		idleTimeout: params.Config.SessionIdleTimeout,
+		now:         time.Now,
 	}
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
-		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error { // nolint:revive // ctx unused but required by fx
+		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			sessionKey, err := params.Database.GetOrCreateSessionKey()
 			if err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("failed to get session key: %w", err)
+				return fmt.Errorf(
+					"failed to get session key: %w", err,
+				)
 			}
 
-			keyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sessionKey)
+			keyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(
+				sessionKey,
+			)
 			if err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("invalid session key format: %w", err)
+				return fmt.Errorf(
+					"invalid session key format: %w", err,
+				)
 			}
 
-			if len(keyBytes) != 32 {
-				return fmt.Errorf("session key must be 32 bytes (got %d)", len(keyBytes))
+			if len(keyBytes) != sessionKeyLength {
+				return fmt.Errorf(
+					"%w: want %d, got %d",
+					ErrSessionKeyLength,
+					sessionKeyLength,
+					len(keyBytes),
+				)
 			}
 
 			store := sessions.NewCookieStore(keyBytes)
@@ -73,14 +147,16 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params SessionParams) (*Session, error) {
 			// Configure cookie options for security
 			store.Options = &sessions.Options{
 				Path:     "/",
-				MaxAge:   86400 * 7, // 7 days
+				MaxAge:   secondsPerDay * sessionMaxAgeDays,
 				HttpOnly: true,
-				Secure:   !params.Config.IsDev(), // HTTPS in production
+				Secure:   !params.Config.IsDev(),
 				SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
 			}
 
+			s.key = keyBytes
 			s.store = store
 			s.log.Info("session manager initialized")
+
 			return nil
 		},
 	})
@@ -88,93 +164,195 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params SessionParams) (*Session, error) {
 	return s, nil
 }
 
-// Get retrieves a session for the request
-func (s *Session) Get(r *http.Request) (*sessions.Session, error) {
+// Get retrieves a session for the request.
+func (s *Session) Get(
+	r *http.Request,
+) (*sessions.Session, error) {
 	return s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
 }
 
-// Save saves the session
-func (s *Session) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, sess *sessions.Session) error {
+// GetKey returns the raw 32-byte authentication key used for
+// session encryption. This key is also suitable for CSRF cookie
+// signing.
+func (s *Session) GetKey() []byte {
+	return s.key
+}
+
+// Save saves the session.
+func (s *Session) Save(
+	r *http.Request,
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	sess *sessions.Session,
+) error {
 	return sess.Save(r, w)
 }
 
-// SetUser sets the user information in the session
-func (s *Session) SetUser(sess *sessions.Session, userID, username string) {
+// SetUser sets the user information in the session. It starts both
+// expiry clocks: CreatedAtKey (absolute, never refreshed again) and
+// LastSeenKey (idle, refreshed by Touch).
+func (s *Session) SetUser(
+	sess *sessions.Session,
+	userID, username string,
+) {
+	now := s.now().Unix()
+
 	sess.Values[UserIDKey] = userID
 	sess.Values[UsernameKey] = username
 	sess.Values[AuthenticatedKey] = true
+	sess.Values[CreatedAtKey] = now
+	sess.Values[LastSeenKey] = now
 }
 
-// ClearUser removes user information from the session
+// ClearUser removes user information from the session, including
+// both expiry timestamps.
 func (s *Session) ClearUser(sess *sessions.Session) {
 	delete(sess.Values, UserIDKey)
 	delete(sess.Values, UsernameKey)
 	delete(sess.Values, AuthenticatedKey)
+	delete(sess.Values, CreatedAtKey)
+	delete(sess.Values, LastSeenKey)
+}
+
+// sessionTime reads a Unix-second timestamp stored under key.
+func sessionTime(
+	sess *sessions.Session,
+	key string,
+) (time.Time, bool) {
+	secs, ok := sess.Values[key].(int64)
+	if !ok {
+		return time.Time{}, false
+	}
+
+	return time.Unix(secs, 0), true
 }
 
 // IsAuthenticated checks if the session has an authenticated user
+// whose session has not passed either expiry deadline. Every
+// authentication decision goes through here, so neither clock can
+// be bypassed by a caller that forgets to check it.
 func (s *Session) IsAuthenticated(sess *sessions.Session) bool {
 	auth, ok := sess.Values[AuthenticatedKey].(bool)
-	return ok && auth
+	if !ok || !auth {
+		return false
 	}
 
-// GetUserID retrieves the user ID from the session
-func (s *Session) GetUserID(sess *sessions.Session) (string, bool) {
+	return !s.expired(sess)
+}
+
+// Touch records authenticated activity by pushing the IDLE deadline
+// forward. It writes LastSeenKey only; CreatedAtKey is left alone so
+// the absolute cap keeps counting down even for a user who never
+// stops clicking.
+//
+// Callers must only invoke Touch for a request that authenticated
+// with this session. Refreshing on an unauthenticated request would
+// let anyone holding a stolen or abandoned cookie keep the session
+// alive by polling a public endpoint. Touch enforces that itself by
+// returning false for any session that is not currently
+// authenticated and unexpired.
+//
+// To avoid re-encrypting and re-emitting the session cookie on every
+// single request, the timestamp is advanced only once it is older
+// than idleTimeout/idleRefreshDivisor. The tradeoff is that
+// LastSeenKey lags real activity by up to that much, so a session
+// can expire slightly early relative to the user's true last
+// request -- never late.
+//
+// Touch reports whether it changed the session; only then does the
+// caller need to save it.
+func (s *Session) Touch(sess *sessions.Session) bool {
+	if s.idleTimeout <= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if !s.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	now := s.now()
+
+	lastSeen, ok := sessionTime(sess, LastSeenKey)
+	if ok && now.Sub(lastSeen) < s.idleTimeout/idleRefreshDivisor {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	sess.Values[LastSeenKey] = now.Unix()
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// GetUserID retrieves the user ID from the session.
+func (s *Session) GetUserID(
+	sess *sessions.Session,
+) (string, bool) {
 	userID, ok := sess.Values[UserIDKey].(string)
+
 	return userID, ok
 }
 
-// GetUsername retrieves the username from the session
-func (s *Session) GetUsername(sess *sessions.Session) (string, bool) {
+// GetUsername retrieves the username from the session.
+func (s *Session) GetUsername(
+	sess *sessions.Session,
+) (string, bool) {
 	username, ok := sess.Values[UsernameKey].(string)
+
 	return username, ok
 }
 
-// Destroy invalidates the session
+// Destroy invalidates the session.
 func (s *Session) Destroy(sess *sessions.Session) {
 	sess.Options.MaxAge = -1
 	s.ClearUser(sess)
 }
 
-// Regenerate creates a new session with the same values but a fresh ID.
-// The old session is destroyed (MaxAge = -1) and saved, then a new session
-// is created. This prevents session fixation attacks by ensuring the
-// session ID changes after privilege escalation (e.g. login).
-func (s *Session) Regenerate(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, oldSess *sessions.Session) (*sessions.Session, error) {
+// Regenerate creates a new session with the same values but a
+// fresh ID. The old session is destroyed (MaxAge = -1) and saved,
+// then a new session is created. This prevents session fixation
+// attacks by ensuring the session ID changes after privilege
+// escalation (e.g. login).
+func (s *Session) Regenerate(
+	r *http.Request,
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	oldSess *sessions.Session,
+) (*sessions.Session, error) {
 	// Copy the values from the old session
-	oldValues := make(map[interface{}]interface{})
-	for k, v := range oldSess.Values {
-		oldValues[k] = v
-	}
+	oldValues := make(map[any]any)
+	maps.Copy(oldValues, oldSess.Values)
 
 	// Destroy the old session
 	oldSess.Options.MaxAge = -1
 	s.ClearUser(oldSess)
-	if err := oldSess.Save(r, w); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to destroy old session: %w", err)
+
+	err := oldSess.Save(r, w)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"failed to destroy old session: %w", err,
+		)
 	}
 
 	// Create a new session (gorilla/sessions generates a new ID)
 	newSess, err := s.store.New(r, SessionName)
 	if err != nil {
-		// store.New may return an error alongside a new empty session
-		// if the old cookie is now invalid. That is expected after we
-		// destroyed it above. Only fail on a nil session.
+		// store.New may return an error alongside a new empty
+		// session if the old cookie is now invalid. That is
+		// expected after we destroyed it above. Only fail on a
+		// nil session.
 		if newSess == nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create new session: %w", err)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"failed to create new session: %w", err,
+			)
 		}
 	}
 
 	// Restore the copied values into the new session
-	for k, v := range oldValues {
-		newSess.Values[k] = v
-	}
+	maps.Copy(newSess.Values, oldValues)
 
-	// Apply the standard session options (the destroyed old session had
-	// MaxAge = -1, which store.New might inherit from the cookie).
+	// Apply the standard session options (the destroyed old
+	// session had MaxAge = -1, which store.New might inherit
+	// from the cookie).
 	newSess.Options = &sessions.Options{
 		Path:     "/",
-		MaxAge:   86400 * 7,
+		MaxAge:   secondsPerDay * sessionMaxAgeDays,
 		HttpOnly: true,
 		Secure:   !s.config.IsDev(),
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
@@ -182,3 +360,41 @@ func (s *Session) Regenerate(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, oldSess *se
 
 	return newSess, nil
 }
+
+// expired reports whether the session has passed either of its two
+// independent deadlines. They are deliberately kept apart:
+//
+//   - the ABSOLUTE deadline is CreatedAtKey + sessionAbsoluteMaxAge.
+//     It is fixed at login and no amount of activity moves it.
+//   - the IDLE deadline is LastSeenKey + idleTimeout. Activity moves
+//     it forward via Touch.
+//
+// Whichever comes first ends the session.
+//
+// A session that claims to be authenticated but carries no
+// timestamps predates this check; it is treated as expired so the
+// user re-authenticates rather than being granted an unbounded
+// session.
+func (s *Session) expired(sess *sessions.Session) bool {
+	now := s.now()
+
+	createdAt, ok := sessionTime(sess, CreatedAtKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if !now.Before(createdAt.Add(sessionAbsoluteMaxAge)) {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if s.idleTimeout <= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	lastSeen, ok := sessionTime(sess, LastSeenKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	return !now.Before(lastSeen.Add(s.idleTimeout))
+}

internal/session/session_test.go

@@ -1,25 +1,70 @@
-package session
+package session_test
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 )
 
-// testSession creates a Session with a real cookie store for testing.
-func testSession(t *testing.T) *Session {
+const testKeySize = 32
+
+// testIdleTimeout is the idle window used by the expiry tests.
+const testIdleTimeout = time.Hour
+
+// testAbsoluteMaxAge restates the documented absolute session cap
+// independently of the implementation constant.
+const testAbsoluteMaxAge = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+// fakeClock is a manually advanced clock, so expiry can be tested
+// without sleeping.
+type fakeClock struct {
+	t time.Time
+}
+
+func (c *fakeClock) Now() time.Time {
+	return c.t
+}
+
+func (c *fakeClock) Advance(d time.Duration) {
+	c.t = c.t.Add(d)
+}
+
+// testSession creates a Session with a real cookie store and the
+// real clock.
+func testSession(t *testing.T) *session.Session {
 	t.Helper()
-	key := make([]byte, 32)
+
+	s, _ := testSessionWithClock(t, testIdleTimeout, nil)
+
+	return s
+}
+
+// testSessionWithClock creates a Session with a real cookie store,
+// the given idle timeout, and a manually advanced clock. Passing a
+// nil clock uses the real one.
+func testSessionWithClock(
+	t *testing.T,
+	idleTimeout time.Duration,
+	clock *fakeClock,
+) (*session.Session, *fakeClock) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	key := make([]byte, testKeySize)
+
 	for i := range key {
 		key[i] = byte(i + 42)
 	}
+
 	store := sessions.NewCookieStore(key)
 	store.Options = &sessions.Options{
 		Path:     "/",
@@ -31,35 +76,88 @@ func testSession(t *testing.T) *Session {
 
 	cfg := &config.Config{
 		Environment:        config.EnvironmentDev,
+		SessionIdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
 	}
-	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}))
 
-	return NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+		os.Stderr,
+		&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+	))
+
+	var now func() time.Time
+
+	if clock != nil {
+		now = clock.Now
+	}
+
+	return session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key, now), clock
+}
+
+// newFakeClock returns a clock started at a fixed instant.
+func newFakeClock() *fakeClock {
+	return &fakeClock{
+		t: time.Date(
+			2026, time.January, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC,
+		),
+	}
+}
+
+// authenticatedSession returns a fresh session that has just been
+// logged in, along with its manager and clock.
+func authenticatedSession(
+	t *testing.T,
+	idleTimeout time.Duration,
+) (*session.Session, *sessions.Session, *fakeClock) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	s, clock := testSessionWithClock(
+		t, idleTimeout, newFakeClock(),
+	)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	s.SetUser(sess, "user-123", "alice")
+	require.True(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess))
+
+	return s, sess, clock
 }
 
 // --- Get and Save Tests ---
 
 func TestGet_NewSession(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, sess)
-	assert.True(t, sess.IsNew, "session should be new when no cookie is present")
+	assert.True(
+		t, sess.IsNew,
+		"session should be new when no cookie is present",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestGet_ExistingSession(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
 	// Create and save a session
-	req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req1 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
 	w1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
 	sess1, err := s.Get(req1)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
+
 	sess1.Values["test_key"] = "test_value"
 	require.NoError(t, s.Save(req1, w1, sess1))
 
@@ -68,26 +166,34 @@ func TestGet_ExistingSession(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
 
 	// Make a new request with the session cookie
-	req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	for _, c := range cookies {
 		req2.AddCookie(c)
 	}
 
 	sess2, err := s.Get(req2)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.False(t, sess2.IsNew, "session should not be new when cookie is present")
+	assert.False(
+		t, sess2.IsNew,
+		"session should not be new when cookie is present",
+	)
 	assert.Equal(t, "test_value", sess2.Values["test_key"])
 }
 
 func TestSave_SetsCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
+
 	sess.Values["key"] = "value"
 
 	err = s.Save(req, w, sess)
@@ -98,91 +204,143 @@ func TestSave_SetsCookie(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Verify the cookie has the expected name
 	var found bool
+
 	for _, c := range cookies {
-		if c.Name == SessionName {
+		if c.Name == session.SessionName {
 			found = true
-			assert.True(t, c.HttpOnly, "session cookie should be HTTP-only")
+
+			assert.True(
+				t, c.HttpOnly,
+				"session cookie should be HTTP-only",
+			)
+
 			break
 		}
 	}
-	assert.True(t, found, "should find a cookie named %s", SessionName)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, found,
+		"should find a cookie named %s", session.SessionName,
+	)
 }
 
 // --- SetUser and User Retrieval Tests ---
 
 func TestSetUser_SetsAllFields(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	s.SetUser(sess, "user-abc-123", "alice")
 
-	assert.Equal(t, "user-abc-123", sess.Values[UserIDKey])
-	assert.Equal(t, "alice", sess.Values[UsernameKey])
-	assert.Equal(t, true, sess.Values[AuthenticatedKey])
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "user-abc-123", sess.Values[session.UserIDKey],
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "alice", sess.Values[session.UsernameKey],
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, true, sess.Values[session.AuthenticatedKey],
+	)
+}
+
+// testSessionGetter exercises a session string getter before and
+// after SetUser: it must report false with an empty value on a
+// fresh session, then true with the expected value once
+// SetUser(sess, "user-xyz", "bob") has run.
+func testSessionGetter(
+	t *testing.T,
+	get func(
+		*session.Session, *sessions.Session,
+	) (string, bool),
+	expected string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	s := testSession(t)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Before setting user
+	val, ok := get(s, sess)
+	assert.False(
+		t, ok, "should return false before SetUser",
+	)
+	assert.Empty(t, val)
+
+	// After setting user
+	s.SetUser(sess, "user-xyz", "bob")
+
+	val, ok = get(s, sess)
+	assert.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, val)
 }
 
 func TestGetUserID(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	sess, err := s.Get(req)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// Before setting user
-	userID, ok := s.GetUserID(sess)
-	assert.False(t, ok, "should return false when no user ID is set")
-	assert.Empty(t, userID)
-
-	// After setting user
-	s.SetUser(sess, "user-xyz", "bob")
-	userID, ok = s.GetUserID(sess)
-	assert.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Equal(t, "user-xyz", userID)
+	testSessionGetter(
+		t,
+		func(
+			s *session.Session, sess *sessions.Session,
+		) (string, bool) {
+			return s.GetUserID(sess)
+		},
+		"user-xyz",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestGetUsername(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	sess, err := s.Get(req)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// Before setting user
-	username, ok := s.GetUsername(sess)
-	assert.False(t, ok, "should return false when no username is set")
-	assert.Empty(t, username)
-
-	// After setting user
-	s.SetUser(sess, "user-xyz", "bob")
-	username, ok = s.GetUsername(sess)
-	assert.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Equal(t, "bob", username)
+	testSessionGetter(
+		t,
+		func(
+			s *session.Session, sess *sessions.Session,
+		) (string, bool) {
+			return s.GetUsername(sess)
+		},
+		"bob",
+	)
 }
 
 // --- IsAuthenticated Tests ---
 
 func TestIsAuthenticated_NoSession(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	assert.False(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess), "new session should not be authenticated")
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"new session should not be authenticated",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestIsAuthenticated_AfterSetUser(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
@@ -192,9 +350,12 @@ func TestIsAuthenticated_AfterSetUser(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestIsAuthenticated_AfterClearUser(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
@@ -202,52 +363,71 @@ func TestIsAuthenticated_AfterClearUser(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess))
 
 	s.ClearUser(sess)
-	assert.False(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess), "should not be authenticated after ClearUser")
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"should not be authenticated after ClearUser",
+	)
 }
 
 func TestIsAuthenticated_WrongType(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// Set authenticated to a non-bool value
-	sess.Values[AuthenticatedKey] = "yes"
-	assert.False(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess), "should return false for non-bool authenticated value")
+	sess.Values[session.AuthenticatedKey] = "yes"
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"should return false for non-bool authenticated value",
+	)
 }
 
 // --- ClearUser Tests ---
 
 func TestClearUser_RemovesAllKeys(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	s.SetUser(sess, "user-123", "alice")
 	s.ClearUser(sess)
 
-	_, hasUserID := sess.Values[UserIDKey]
+	_, hasUserID := sess.Values[session.UserIDKey]
 	assert.False(t, hasUserID, "UserIDKey should be removed")
 
-	_, hasUsername := sess.Values[UsernameKey]
+	_, hasUsername := sess.Values[session.UsernameKey]
 	assert.False(t, hasUsername, "UsernameKey should be removed")
 
-	_, hasAuth := sess.Values[AuthenticatedKey]
-	assert.False(t, hasAuth, "AuthenticatedKey should be removed")
+	_, hasAuth := sess.Values[session.AuthenticatedKey]
+	assert.False(
+		t, hasAuth, "AuthenticatedKey should be removed",
+	)
 }
 
 // --- Destroy Tests ---
 
 func TestDestroy_InvalidatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
@@ -255,11 +435,18 @@ func TestDestroy_InvalidatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 
 	s.Destroy(sess)
 
-	// After Destroy: MaxAge should be -1 (delete cookie) and user data cleared
-	assert.Equal(t, -1, sess.Options.MaxAge, "Destroy should set MaxAge to -1")
-	assert.False(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess), "should not be authenticated after Destroy")
+	// After Destroy: MaxAge should be -1 (delete cookie) and
+	// user data cleared
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, -1, sess.Options.MaxAge,
+		"Destroy should set MaxAge to -1",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"should not be authenticated after Destroy",
+	)
 
-	_, hasUserID := sess.Values[UserIDKey]
+	_, hasUserID := sess.Values[session.UserIDKey]
 	assert.False(t, hasUserID, "Destroy should clear user ID")
 }
 
@@ -267,10 +454,12 @@ func TestDestroy_InvalidatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestSessionPersistence_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
 	// Step 1: Create session, set user, save
-	req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req1 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
 	w1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
 	sess1, err := s.Get(req1)
@@ -281,8 +470,13 @@ func TestSessionPersistence_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	cookies := w1.Result().Cookies()
 	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
 
-	// Step 2: New request with cookies — session data should persist
-	req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/profile", nil)
+	// Step 2: New request with cookies -- session data should
+	// persist
+	req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/profile", nil,
+	)
+
 	for _, c := range cookies {
 		req2.AddCookie(c)
 	}
@@ -290,7 +484,10 @@ func TestSessionPersistence_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	sess2, err := s.Get(req2)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	assert.True(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess2), "session should be authenticated after round-trip")
+	assert.True(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess2),
+		"session should be authenticated after round-trip",
+	)
 
 	userID, ok := s.GetUserID(sess2)
 	assert.True(t, ok)
@@ -305,19 +502,280 @@ func TestSessionPersistence_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestSessionConstants(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	assert.Equal(t, "webhooker_session", SessionName)
-	assert.Equal(t, "user_id", UserIDKey)
-	assert.Equal(t, "username", UsernameKey)
-	assert.Equal(t, "authenticated", AuthenticatedKey)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, "webhooker_session", session.SessionName)
+	assert.Equal(t, "user_id", session.UserIDKey)
+	assert.Equal(t, "username", session.UsernameKey)
+	assert.Equal(t, "authenticated", session.AuthenticatedKey)
+	assert.Equal(t, "created_at", session.CreatedAtKey)
+	assert.Equal(t, "last_seen", session.LastSeenKey)
+}
+
+// --- Expiry Tests ---
+
+func TestSetUser_StartsBothClocks(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, clock.Now().Unix(), sess.Values[session.CreatedAtKey],
+		"SetUser should anchor the absolute clock",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, clock.Now().Unix(), sess.Values[session.LastSeenKey],
+		"SetUser should anchor the idle clock",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsAuthenticated_WithinIdleWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout - time.Second)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"session should still be valid just inside the idle window",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsAuthenticated_IdleExpired(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"session should expire once the idle window lapses",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestTouch_DoesNotExtendAbsoluteCap is the regression test for the
+// refresh-the-wrong-clock bug: a session that is used continuously
+// must survive well past the idle window and still die at the
+// absolute cap.
+func TestTouch_DoesNotExtendAbsoluteCap(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	createdAt := sess.Values[session.CreatedAtKey]
+
+	// Stay active: a request every half idle window, right up to
+	// the absolute cap.
+	step := testIdleTimeout / 2
+	steps := int(testAbsoluteMaxAge/step) - 1
+
+	for i := range steps {
+		clock.Advance(step)
+		s.Touch(sess)
+
+		require.True(
+			t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+			"active session should survive the idle window "+
+				"(step %d of %d)", i+1, steps,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// One more step of activity takes the session to exactly the
+	// absolute cap, measured from login. Nothing that happened in
+	// the loop may have moved that deadline.
+	clock.Advance(step)
+	s.Touch(sess)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"activity must not extend the absolute cap",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, createdAt, sess.Values[session.CreatedAtKey],
+		"Touch must never rewrite the absolute-clock anchor",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestTouch_RefreshesIdleDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	// Halfway through the window, activity happens.
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout / 2)
+	assert.True(
+		t, s.Touch(sess),
+		"Touch should refresh once past the lazy-refresh threshold",
+	)
+
+	// Past the original deadline, but inside the refreshed one.
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout - time.Second)
+	assert.True(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"refreshed session should outlive the original deadline",
+	)
+
+	// And it still expires an idle window after that activity.
+	clock.Advance(time.Second)
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"refreshed session should expire one window after activity",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestTouch_LazyBelowRefreshThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	before := sess.Values[session.LastSeenKey]
+
+	// A request arriving almost immediately is not worth a cookie
+	// rewrite.
+	clock.Advance(time.Second)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.Touch(sess),
+		"Touch should not rewrite the session below the threshold",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, before, sess.Values[session.LastSeenKey],
+		"last-seen should be unchanged below the threshold",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestTouch_UnauthenticatedSessionIsNotRefreshed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clock := testSessionWithClock(
+		t, testIdleTimeout, newFakeClock(),
+	)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout / 2)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.Touch(sess),
+		"an unauthenticated session must not be refreshed",
+	)
+
+	_, hasLastSeen := sess.Values[session.LastSeenKey]
+	assert.False(
+		t, hasLastSeen,
+		"Touch must not stamp an unauthenticated session",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestTouch_IdleExpiredSessionIsNotRevived(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	clock.Advance(testIdleTimeout)
+	require.False(t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess))
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.Touch(sess),
+		"an already expired session must not be refreshed",
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"Touch must not revive an expired session",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsAuthenticated_MissingTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _ := testSessionWithClock(
+		t, testIdleTimeout, newFakeClock(),
+	)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// A session from before idle expiry existed: authenticated,
+	// but with no timestamps. Fail closed.
+	sess.Values[session.AuthenticatedKey] = true
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"a session with no timestamps should be rejected",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIsAuthenticated_MissingLastSeen(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, _ := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	delete(sess.Values, session.LastSeenKey)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"a session with no idle anchor should be rejected",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestIdleTimeoutDisabled_AbsoluteCapStillApplies(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, clock := authenticatedSession(t, 0)
+
+	// Idle expiry is off, so an untouched session survives an
+	// arbitrary idle stretch.
+	clock.Advance(testAbsoluteMaxAge - time.Second)
+	assert.True(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"idle expiry should be disabled by a non-positive timeout",
+	)
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.Touch(sess),
+		"Touch should be a no-op when idle expiry is disabled",
+	)
+
+	// The absolute cap still ends it.
+	clock.Advance(time.Second)
+	assert.False(
+		t, s.IsAuthenticated(sess),
+		"the absolute cap must still apply with idle expiry off",
+	)
+}
+
+func TestClearUser_RemovesTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, sess, _ := authenticatedSession(t, testIdleTimeout)
+
+	s.ClearUser(sess)
+
+	_, hasCreatedAt := sess.Values[session.CreatedAtKey]
+	assert.False(t, hasCreatedAt, "CreatedAtKey should be removed")
+
+	_, hasLastSeen := sess.Values[session.LastSeenKey]
+	assert.False(t, hasLastSeen, "LastSeenKey should be removed")
 }
 
 // --- Edge Cases ---
 
 func TestSetUser_OverwritesPreviousUser(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+
 	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
@@ -338,10 +796,12 @@ func TestSetUser_OverwritesPreviousUser(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestDestroy_ThenSave_DeletesCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
+
 	s := testSession(t)
 
 	// Create a session
-	req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req1 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
 	w1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
 	sess, err := s.Get(req1)
@@ -353,10 +813,15 @@ func TestDestroy_ThenSave_DeletesCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
 
 	// Destroy and save
-	req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/logout", nil)
+	req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/logout", nil,
+	)
+
 	for _, c := range cookies {
 		req2.AddCookie(c)
 	}
+
 	w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
 	sess2, err := s.Get(req2)
@@ -364,15 +829,25 @@ func TestDestroy_ThenSave_DeletesCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	s.Destroy(sess2)
 	require.NoError(t, s.Save(req2, w2, sess2))
 
-	// The cookie should have MaxAge = -1 (browser should delete it)
+	// The cookie should have MaxAge = -1 (browser should delete)
 	responseCookies := w2.Result().Cookies()
+
 	var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
+
 	for _, c := range responseCookies {
-		if c.Name == SessionName {
+		if c.Name == session.SessionName {
 			sessionCookie = c
+
 			break
 		}
 	}
-	require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie, "should have a session cookie in response")
-	assert.True(t, sessionCookie.MaxAge < 0, "destroyed session cookie should have negative MaxAge")
+
+	require.NotNil(
+		t, sessionCookie,
+		"should have a session cookie in response",
+	)
+	assert.Negative(
+		t, sessionCookie.MaxAge,
+		"destroyed session cookie should have negative MaxAge",
+	)
 }

internal/session/testing.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package session
 
 import (
 	"log/slog"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
@@ -9,11 +10,31 @@ import (
 
 // NewForTest creates a Session with a pre-configured cookie store for use
 // in tests. This bypasses the fx lifecycle and database dependency, allowing
-// middleware and handler tests to use real session functionality.
-func NewForTest(store *sessions.CookieStore, cfg *config.Config, log *slog.Logger) *Session {
+// middleware and handler tests to use real session functionality. The key
+// parameter is the raw 32-byte authentication key used for session encryption
+// and CSRF cookie signing.
+//
+// The idle timeout is taken from cfg.SessionIdleTimeout, exactly as in
+// production. The now parameter supplies the clock used for expiry
+// checks so tests can advance time without sleeping; pass nil for the
+// real clock.
+func NewForTest(
+	store *sessions.CookieStore,
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	key []byte,
+	now func() time.Time,
+) *Session {
+	if now == nil {
+		now = time.Now
+	}
+
 	return &Session{
 		store:       store,
+		key:         key,
 		config:      cfg,
 		log:         log,
+		idleTimeout: cfg.SessionIdleTimeout,
+		now:         now,
 	}
 }

script/bootstrap

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/bootstrap: install all dependencies needed to build and develop
+# this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already
+# installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
+# or apk (detected in that order); assumes NOTHING is present (not git,
+# make, or go). golangci-lint is packaged in nix, brew, and apk; on apt
+# it is installed from a hash-verified GitHub release archive (never
+# curl | sh).
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+# Pinned versions, 2026-08-07. Never "latest"; exact versions only.
+GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION="2.12.2"
+# sha256 of golangci-lint-2.12.2-linux-<arch>.tar.gz release archives
+GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_AMD64="8df580d2670fed8fa984aac0507099af8df275e665215f5c7a2ae3943893a553"
+GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_ARM64="44cd40a8c76c86755375adfeea52cfd3533cb43d7bd647771e0ae065e166df3a"
+
+PKGMGR=""
+SUDO=""
+
+detect_pkgmgr() {
+    [ -n "$PKGMGR" ] && return 0
+    if command -v nix-env >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        PKGMGR="nix"
+    elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        PKGMGR="apt"
+    elif command -v brew >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        PKGMGR="brew"
+    elif command -v apk >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        PKGMGR="apk"
+    else
+        echo "bootstrap: no supported package manager (nix, apt, brew, apk)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if [ "$PKGMGR" = "apt" ]; then
+        export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+        if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
+            SUDO="sudo"
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+# pkg_install <nix-attr> <apt-pkg> <brew-formula> <apk-pkg>
+pkg_install() {
+    detect_pkgmgr
+    case "$PKGMGR" in
+        nix) nix-env -iA "nixpkgs.$1" ;;
+        apt) $SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y "$2" ;;
+        brew) brew install "$3" ;;
+        apk) apk add --no-cache "$4" ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+missing() {
+    ! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+# verify_sha256 <file> <expected-hash>
+verify_sha256() {
+    if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        actual="$(sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    else
+        actual="$(shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    fi
+    if [ "$actual" != "$2" ]; then
+        echo "bootstrap: sha256 mismatch for $1" >&2
+        echo "  expected: $2" >&2
+        echo "  actual:   $actual" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# apt has no golangci-lint package: install a pinned release archive
+# from GitHub, verified by hardcoded sha256 (never curl | sh).
+install_golangci_lint_release() {
+    case "$(uname -m)" in
+        x86_64) goarch="amd64"; sha="$GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_AMD64" ;;
+        aarch64|arm64) goarch="arm64"; sha="$GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_ARM64" ;;
+        *)
+            echo "bootstrap: unsupported architecture $(uname -m)" >&2
+            exit 1
+            ;;
+    esac
+    if missing curl; then pkg_install curl curl curl curl; fi
+    name="golangci-lint-${GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION}-linux-${goarch}"
+    tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
+    curl -fsSL -o "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" \
+        "https://github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/releases/download/v${GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION}/${name}.tar.gz"
+    verify_sha256 "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" "$sha"
+    tar -xzf "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" -C "$tmp"
+    $SUDO install -m 0755 "$tmp/$name/golangci-lint" /usr/local/bin/golangci-lint
+    rm -rf "$tmp"
+}
+
+ensure_golangci_lint() {
+    if ! missing golangci-lint; then return 0; fi
+    detect_pkgmgr
+    case "$PKGMGR" in
+        apt) install_golangci_lint_release ;;
+        *) pkg_install golangci-lint golangci-lint golangci-lint golangci-lint ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    # Base tooling
+    if missing git; then pkg_install git git git git; fi
+    if missing make; then pkg_install gnumake make make make; fi
+
+    # Go toolchain and linter
+    if missing go; then pkg_install go golang go go; fi
+    ensure_golangci_lint
+
+    go mod download
+
+    echo "bootstrap complete"
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/check

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/check: run all checks (test, lint, fmt-check). Our own
+# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Must not modify any files.
+# Generic: usually needs no adaptation.
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/test"
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/lint"
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/fmt-check"
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/cibuild

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/cibuild: run the CI build. The Dockerfile runs the checks
+# (make fmt-check, lint, test), so a successful build implies a green
+# repo. Generic: needs no adaptation. The Gitea workflow runs this on
+# push.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+    docker build .
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/docker

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
+# Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname.
+# Generic: needs no adaptation.
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
+ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+    docker build -t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/fmt

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/fmt: format all files (writes).
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+    gofmt -s -w .
+    if command -v goimports >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        goimports -w .
+    fi
+}
+
+main "$@"