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Commits
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 sneak
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e0b1e7cf54 |
Restore TODO.md and move TODO content out of README (#58)
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Reviewed-on: #58 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> |
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  clawbotandclawbot
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afe88c601a |
refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
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Closes [issue #50](#50) ## Summary Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage. ## Changes ### Dockerfile - **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage - **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes - **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256) - **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3 - All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest - Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t) ### Linter Config (.golangci.yml) - Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added) - Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2) - Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened ### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade) - Added package comments to all packages - Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods - Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint) - Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`) - Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf` - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch - Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`) - Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt` - Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores) ### README.md - Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+ - Updated Dockerfile description in project structure ## Verification `docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #55 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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d771fe14df |
fix: detect TLS per-request in CSRF middleware to fix login (#54)
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## Problem After the security hardening in PR #42, login fails with `Forbidden - invalid CSRF token` in production deployments. The CSRF middleware tied its `PlaintextHTTPRequest` wrapping and cookie `Secure` flag to the `IsDev()` environment check. This meant production mode always assumed HTTPS via gorilla/csrf's strict mode, which broke login in common deployment scenarios: 1. **Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy**: gorilla/csrf assumed HTTPS but `r.TLS` was nil (the Go server receives HTTP from the proxy). Origin/Referer scheme mismatches caused `referer not supplied` or `origin invalid` errors. 2. **Production over direct HTTP** (testing/staging with prod config): the `Secure` cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF cookie back over HTTP, causing `CSRF token invalid` errors. ## Root Cause gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 defaults to HTTPS-strict mode unless `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` is called. In strict mode it: - Forces `requestURL.Scheme = "https"` for Origin/Referer comparisons - Requires a `Referer` header on POST and rejects `http://` Referer schemes - The `csrf.Secure(true)` option makes the browser refuse to send the CSRF cookie over HTTP The old code only called `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` in dev mode, leaving prod mode permanently stuck in HTTPS-strict mode regardless of the actual transport. ## Fix Detect the actual transport protocol **per-request** using: - `r.TLS != nil` — direct TLS connection to the Go server - `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header — TLS-terminating reverse proxy Two gorilla/csrf middleware instances are maintained (one with `Secure: true`, one with `Secure: false`) since `csrf.Secure()` is a creation-time option. Both use the same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable. | Scenario | Cookie Secure | Origin/Referer Mode | |---|---|---| | Direct TLS (`r.TLS != nil`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Behind TLS proxy (`X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Plaintext HTTP | ❌ Non-Secure | Relaxed (PlaintextHTTPRequest) | CSRF token validation (cookie + form double-submit) is always enforced regardless of mode. ## Testing - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode over plaintext HTTP - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode behind TLS proxy - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode with direct TLS - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken` — token still required - Added `TestIsClientTLS_*` — TLS detection unit tests - All existing CSRF tests pass unchanged - `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`) - Manual verification: built and ran the container in both `dev` and `prod` modes, confirmed login succeeds in both Closes #53 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #54 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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33e2140a5a |
feat: redirect root path based on auth state (#52)
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Closes #51 The root path `/` now checks for an authenticated session and redirects accordingly: - **Authenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/sources` (the webhook dashboard) - **Unauthenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/pages/login` ### Changes - **`internal/handlers/index.go`** — Replaced the template-rendering `HandleIndex()` with a session-checking redirect handler. Removed `formatUptime` helper (dead code after this change). - **`internal/handlers/handlers.go`** — Removed `index.html` from the template map (no longer rendered). - **`internal/handlers/handlers_test.go`** — Replaced the old "handler is not nil" test with two proper redirect tests: - `unauthenticated redirects to login` — verifies 303 to `/pages/login` - `authenticated redirects to sources` — sets up an authenticated session cookie, verifies 303 to `/sources` - Removed `TestFormatUptime` (tested dead code). - **`README.md`** — Updated the API endpoints table to describe the new redirect behavior. ### How it works The handler calls `session.Get(r)` and `session.IsAuthenticated(sess)` — the same pattern used by the `RequireAuth` middleware and `HandleLoginPage`. No new dependencies or session logic introduced. The login flow is unaffected: `HandleLoginSubmit` redirects to `/` after successful login, which now forwards to `/sources` (one extra redirect hop, but correct and clean). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #52 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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f003ec7141 |
fix: use absolute path for dev DATA_DIR default, clarify env docs (#46)
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Closes #45. ## Problem 1. The README didn't clearly explain what `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=dev` vs `prod` actually changes. 2. The dev-mode default for `DATA_DIR` was `./data` — a relative path whose meaning depends on the working directory. There's no reason to use a relative path even in development. ## Changes ### Code (`internal/config/config.go`) - Replace the dev default `DATA_DIR` from `./data` to `$XDG_DATA_HOME/webhooker` (falling back to `$HOME/.local/share/webhooker`). This follows the XDG Base Directory Specification and ensures the data directory is always an absolute path regardless of the working directory. - Add `devDataDir()` helper that resolves the XDG path, with a `/tmp/webhooker` last-resort fallback if `$HOME` can't be determined. ### Tests (`internal/config/config_test.go`) - `TestDevDataDir`: verifies XDG_DATA_HOME is respected, HOME fallback works, and the result is always absolute. - `TestDevDefaultDataDirIsAbsolute`: integration test that creates a full Config via fx and asserts the dev default DataDir is absolute. ### README - Add a table documenting exactly what `dev` vs `prod` changes: DATA_DIR default, CORS policy, and session cookie Secure flag. - Clarify that log format and security headers are independent of the environment setting. - Update the DATA_DIR default in the configuration variable table. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #46 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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60786c5019 |
feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
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## Security Hardening This PR implements three security hardening issues: ### CSRF Protection (closes #35) - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes - Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API) ### SSRF Prevention (closes #36) - `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time - Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed ### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37) - Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate` - 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login` - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes - `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies ### Files Changed **New files:** - `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware - `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter - `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport **Modified files:** - `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware - `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data - `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation - `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production - All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields - `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist `docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #42 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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8d702a16c6 |
feat: add Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
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## Summary Adds a new `slack` target type that sends webhook events as formatted messages to any Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (Slack, Mattermost, and other compatible services). closes #44 ## What it does When a webhook event is received, the Slack target: 1. Formats a human-readable message with event metadata (HTTP method, content type, timestamp, body size) 2. Pretty-prints the payload in a code block — JSON payloads get indented formatting, non-JSON payloads are shown as raw text 3. Truncates large payloads at 3500 characters to keep Slack messages reasonable 4. POSTs the message as a `{"text": "..."}` JSON payload to the configured webhook URL ## Changes - **`internal/database/model_target.go`** — Add `TargetTypeSlack` constant - **`internal/delivery/engine.go`** — Add `SlackTargetConfig` struct, `deliverSlack` method, `FormatSlackMessage` function (exported), `parseSlackConfig` helper. Route slack targets in `processDelivery` switch. - **`internal/handlers/source_management.go`** — Handle `slack` type in `HandleTargetCreate`, building `webhook_url` config from the URL form field - **`templates/source_detail.html`** — Add "Slack" option to target type dropdown with URL field and helper text - **`README.md`** — Document the new target type, update roadmap ## Tests - `TestParseSlackConfig_Valid` / `_Empty` / `_MissingWebhookURL` — Config parsing - `TestFormatSlackMessage_JSONBody` / `_NonJSONBody` / `_EmptyBody` / `_LargeJSONTruncated` — Message formatting - `TestDeliverSlack_Success` / `_Failure` / `_InvalidConfig` — End-to-end delivery - `TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToSlack` — Routing from processDelivery switch All existing tests continue to pass. `docker build .` (which runs `make check`) passes clean. Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #47 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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1fbcf96581 |
security: add headers middleware, session regeneration, and body size limits (#41)
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## Summary This PR implements three security hardening measures: ### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34) Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes: - `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload` - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` - `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()` ### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38) Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks. ### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39) Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`). ## Files Changed - `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware - `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention - `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication - `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups - `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO closes #34, closes #38, closes #39 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #41 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbot
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8e00e40008 |
docs: fix stale references to development mode and retry target type
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- README.md: remove 'in development mode' from admin user creation description (admin user creation is unconditional) - internal/delivery/engine.go: remove 'and retry' from HTTPTargetConfig comment (retry was merged into http target type) - internal/delivery/engine_test.go: remove '/retry' from newHTTPTargetConfig comment for consistency |
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clawbot
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25e27cc57f |
refactor: merge retry target type into http (max_retries=0 = fire-and-forget)
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clawbot
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4dd4dfa5eb |
chore: consolidate DBURL into DATA_DIR, codebase audit for 1.0.0
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DBURL → DATA_DIR consolidation:
- Remove DBURL env var entirely; main DB now lives at {DATA_DIR}/webhooker.db
- database.go constructs DB path from config.DataDir, ensures dir exists
- Update DATA_DIR prod default from /data/events to /data
- Update all tests to use DataDir instead of DBURL
- Update Dockerfile: /data (not /data/events) for all SQLite databases
- Update README configuration table, Docker examples, architecture docs
Dead code removal:
- Remove unused IndexResponse struct (handlers/index.go)
- Remove unused TemplateData struct (handlers/handlers.go)
Stale comment cleanup:
- Remove TODO in server.go (DB cleanup handled by fx lifecycle)
- Fix nolint:golint → nolint:revive on ServerParams for consistency
- Clean up verbose middleware/routing comments in routes.go
- Fix TODO fan-out description (worker pool, not goroutine-per-target)
.gitignore fixes:
- Add data/ directory to gitignore
- Remove stale config.yaml entry (env-only config since rework)
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clawbot
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49852e7506 |
refactor: remove file-based configuration, use env vars only
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Remove the entire pkg/config package (Viper-based YAML config file loader) and simplify internal/config to read all settings directly from environment variables via os.Getenv(). This eliminates the spurious "Failed to load config" log messages that appeared when no config.yaml file was present. - Delete pkg/config/ (YAML loader, resolver, manager, tests) - Delete configs/config.yaml.example - Simplify internal/config helper functions to use os.Getenv() with defaults instead of falling back to pkgconfig - Update tests to set env vars directly instead of creating in-memory YAML config files via afero - Remove afero, cloud.google.com/*, aws-sdk-go dependencies from go.mod - Update README: document env-var-only configuration, remove YAML/Viper references - Keep godotenv/autoload for .env file convenience in local development closes #27 |
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clawbot
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10db6c5b84 |
refactor: bounded worker pool with DB-mediated retry fallback
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Replace unbounded goroutine-per-delivery fan-out with a fixed-size worker pool (10 workers). Channels serve as bounded queues (10,000 buffer). Workers are the only goroutines doing HTTP delivery. When retry channel overflows, timers are dropped instead of re-armed. The delivery stays in 'retrying' status in the DB and a periodic sweep (every 60s) recovers orphaned retries. The database is the durable fallback — same path used on startup recovery. Addresses owner feedback on circuit breaker recovery goroutine flood. |
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clawbot
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9b4ae41c44 |
feat: parallel fan-out delivery + circuit breaker for retry targets
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- Fan out all targets for an event in parallel goroutines (fire-and-forget) - Add per-target circuit breaker for retry targets (closed/open/half-open) - Circuit breaker trips after 5 consecutive failures, 30s cooldown - Open circuit skips delivery and reschedules after cooldown - Half-open allows one probe delivery to test recovery - HTTP/database/log targets unaffected (no circuit breaker) - Recovery path also fans out in parallel - Update README with parallel delivery and circuit breaker docs |
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clawbot
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32bd40b313 |
refactor: self-contained delivery tasks — engine delivers without DB reads in happy path
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The webhook handler now builds DeliveryTask structs carrying all target config and event data inline (for bodies ≤16KB) and sends them through the delivery channel. In the happy path, the engine delivers without reading from any database — it only writes to record delivery results. For large bodies (≥16KB), Body is nil and the engine fetches it from the per-webhook database on demand. Retry timers also carry the full DeliveryTask, so retries avoid unnecessary DB reads. The database is used for crash recovery only: on startup the engine scans for interrupted pending/retrying deliveries and re-queues them. Implements owner feedback from issue #15: > the message in the <=16KB case should have everything it needs to do > its delivery. it shouldn't touch the db until it has a success or > failure to record. |
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clawbot
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9b9ee1718a |
refactor: auto-generate session key and store in database
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Remove SESSION_KEY env var requirement. On first startup, a cryptographically secure 32-byte key is generated and stored in a new settings table. Subsequent startups load the key from the database. - Add Setting model (key-value table) for application config - Add Database.GetOrCreateSessionKey() method - Session manager initializes in OnStart after database is connected - Remove DevSessionKey constant and SESSION_KEY env var handling - Remove prod validation requiring SESSION_KEY - Update README: config table, Docker instructions, security notes - Update config.yaml.example - Update all tests to remove SessionKey references Addresses owner feedback on issue #15. |
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clawbot
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5e683af2a4 |
refactor: event-driven delivery engine with channel notifications and timer-based retries
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Replace the polling-based delivery engine with a fully event-driven architecture using Go channels and goroutines: - Webhook handler notifies engine via buffered channel after creating delivery records, with inline event data for payloads < 16KB - Large payloads (>= 16KB) use pointer semantics (Body *string = nil) and are fetched from DB on demand, keeping channel memory bounded - Failed retry-target deliveries schedule Go timers with exponential backoff; timers fire into a separate retry channel when ready - On startup, engine scans DB once to recover interrupted deliveries (pending processed immediately, retrying get timers for remaining backoff) - DB stores delivery status for crash recovery only, not for inter-component communication during normal operation - delivery.Notifier interface decouples handlers from engine; fx wires *Engine as Notifier No more periodic polling. No more wasted cycles when idle. |
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clawbot
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43c22a9e9a |
feat: implement per-webhook event databases
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Split data storage into main application DB (config only) and
per-webhook event databases (one SQLite file per webhook).
Architecture changes:
- New WebhookDBManager component manages per-webhook DB lifecycle
(create, open, cache, delete) with lazy connection pooling via sync.Map
- Main DB (DBURL) stores only config: Users, Webhooks, Entrypoints,
Targets, APIKeys
- Per-webhook DBs (DATA_DIR) store Events, Deliveries, DeliveryResults
in files named events-{webhook_uuid}.db
- New DATA_DIR env var (default: ./data dev, /data/events prod)
Behavioral changes:
- Webhook creation creates per-webhook DB file
- Webhook deletion hard-deletes per-webhook DB file (config soft-deleted)
- Event ingestion writes to per-webhook DB, not main DB
- Delivery engine polls all per-webhook DBs for pending deliveries
- Database target type marks delivery as immediately successful (events
are already in the dedicated per-webhook DB)
- Event log UI reads from per-webhook DBs with targets from main DB
- Existing webhooks without DB files get them created lazily
Removed:
- ArchivedEvent model (was a half-measure, replaced by per-webhook DBs)
- Event/Delivery/DeliveryResult removed from main DB migrations
Added:
- Comprehensive tests for WebhookDBManager (create, delete, lazy
creation, delivery workflow, multiple webhooks, close all)
- Dockerfile creates /data/events directory
README updates:
- Per-webhook event databases documented as implemented (was Phase 2)
- DATA_DIR added to configuration table
- Docker instructions updated with data volume mount
- Data model diagram updated
- TODO updated (database separation moved to completed)
Closes #15
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clawbot
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7f8469a0f2 |
feat: implement core webhook engine, delivery system, and management UI (Phase 2)
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- Webhook reception handler: look up entrypoint by UUID, verify active,
capture full HTTP request (method, headers, body, content-type), create
Event record, queue Delivery records for each active Target, return 200 OK.
Handles edge cases: unknown UUID → 404, inactive → 410, oversized → 413.
- Delivery engine (internal/delivery): fx-managed background goroutine that
polls for pending/retrying deliveries and dispatches to target type handlers.
Graceful shutdown via context cancellation.
- Target type implementations:
- HTTP: fire-and-forget POST with original headers forwarding
- Retry: exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s...) up to max_retries
- Database: immediate success (event already stored)
- Log: slog output with event details
- Webhook management pages with Tailwind CSS + Alpine.js:
- List (/sources): webhooks with entrypoint/target/event counts
- Create (/sources/new): form with auto-created default entrypoint
- Detail (/source/{id}): config, entrypoints, targets, recent events
- Edit (/source/{id}/edit): name, description, retention_days
- Delete (/source/{id}/delete): soft-delete with child records
- Add Entrypoint (/source/{id}/entrypoints): inline form
- Add Target (/source/{id}/targets): type-aware form
- Event Log (/source/{id}/logs): paginated with delivery status
- Updated README: marked completed items, updated naming conventions
table, added delivery engine to package layout and DI docs, updated
column names to reflect entity rename.
- Rebuilt Tailwind CSS for new template classes.
Part of: #15
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b5cf4c3d2f |
docs: comprehensive README rewrite with complete service specification (#13)
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## Summary Rewrites README.md from a basic scaffold into a comprehensive service description and specification that documents the entire webhooker application. closes #3 ## What Changed ### Naming Scheme Proposes a clear naming scheme for the data model entities: - **Processor → Webhook**: The top-level configuration entity that groups entrypoints and targets - **Webhook → Entrypoint**: The receiver URL (`/hooks/<uuid>`) where external services POST events - **Target**: Unchanged — delivery destinations for events This is documented as the target architecture in the README. The actual code rename is tracked in [issue #12](#12). ### Data Model Documentation Documents all 8 entities with: - Complete field tables (name, type, description) for every entity - Relationship descriptions (belongs-to, has-many) - Enum values for TargetType and DeliveryStatus - Entity relationship diagram (ASCII) - Common fields from BaseModel ### Database Architecture Documents the separate database architecture: - Main application DB: users, webhook configs, entrypoints, targets, API keys - Per-webhook event DBs: events, deliveries, delivery results - Rationale for separation (isolation, lifecycle, clean deletion, per-webhook retention, performance) ### Other Sections - Complete API endpoint tables (current + planned) - Package layout with file descriptions - Request flow diagram - Middleware stack documentation - Authentication design (web sessions + planned API keys) - Security measures - Rate limiting design - Dependency injection order - Docker build pipeline description - Phased TODO roadmap with links to filed issues - License set to MIT ### Code Style Divergence Issues Filed As part of reviewing the code against sneak/prompts standards: - [#7](#7) — Templates should use go:embed - [#8](#8) — Logger should use slog.LevelVar - [#9](#9) — Source management routes lack auth middleware - [#10](#10) — Config should prefer environment variables - [#11](#11) — Redundant godotenv/autoload import - [#12](#12) — Rename Processor → Webhook, Webhook → Entrypoint ## Verification - `make fmt` — ✅ passes - `docker build .` — ✅ passes (README-only change, no code modifications) Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #13 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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f9a9569015 |
feat: bring repo up to REPO_POLICIES standards (#6)
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## Summary This PR brings the webhooker repo into full REPO_POLICIES compliance, addressing both [issue #1](#1) and [issue #2](#2). ## Changes ### New files - **`cmd/webhooker/main.go`** — The missing application entry point. Uses Uber fx to wire together all internal packages (config, database, logger, server, handlers, middleware, healthcheck, globals, session). Minimal glue code. - **`REPO_POLICIES.md`** — Fetched from authoritative source (`sneak/prompts`) - **`.editorconfig`** — Fetched from authoritative source - **`.dockerignore`** — Sensible Go project exclusions - **`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`** — CI workflow that runs `docker build .` on push to any branch (Gitea Actions format, actions/checkout pinned by sha256) - **`configs/config.yaml.example`** — Moved from root `config.yaml` ### Modified files - **`Makefile`** — Complete rewrite with all REPO_POLICIES required targets: `test`, `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `build`, `hooks`, `docker`, `clean`, plus `dev`, `run`, `deps` - **`Dockerfile`** — Complete rewrite: - Builder: `golang:1.24` (Debian-based, pinned by `sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7...`). Debian needed because `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls `mattn/go-sqlite3` (CGO) which fails on Alpine musl. - golangci-lint v1.64.8 installed from GitHub release archive with sha256 verification (v1.x because `.golangci.yml` uses v1 config format) - Runs `make check` (fmt-check + lint + test + build) as build step - Final stage: `alpine:3.21` (pinned by `sha256:c3f8e73fdb79...`) with non-root user, healthcheck, port 8080 - **`README.md`** — Rewritten with all required REPO_POLICIES sections: description line with name/purpose/category/license/author, Getting Started, Rationale, Design, TODO (integrated from TODO.md), License, Author - **`.gitignore`** — Fixed `webhooker` pattern to `/webhooker` (was blocking `cmd/webhooker/`), added `config.yaml` to prevent committing runtime config with secrets - **`static/static.go`** — Removed `vendor` from embed directive (directory was empty/missing) - **`internal/database/database_test.go`** — Fixed to use in-memory config via `afero.MemMapFs` instead of depending on `config.yaml` on disk. Test is now properly isolated. - **`go.mod`/`go.sum`** — `go mod tidy` ### Removed files - **`TODO.md`** — Content integrated into README.md TODO section - **`config.yaml`** — Moved to `configs/config.yaml.example` ## Verification - `docker build .` passes (lint ✅, test ✅, build ✅) - All existing tests pass with no modifications to assertions or test logic - `.golangci.yml` untouched closes #1 closes #2 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #6 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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sneak
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1244f3e2d5 | initial |