feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
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## Security Hardening

This PR implements three security hardening issues:

### CSRF Protection (closes #35)

- Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation
- Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks
- CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes
- Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates
- Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API)

### SSRF Prevention (closes #36)

- `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time
- Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges
- SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks)
- Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed

### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37)

- Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate`
- 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login`
- GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected
- Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes
- `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies

### Files Changed

**New files:**
- `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware
- `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter
- `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport

**Modified files:**
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware
- `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data
- `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation
- `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production
- All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields
- `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist

`docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build).

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #42
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
This commit was merged in pull request #42.
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-17 12:38:45 +01:00
committed by Jeffrey Paul
parent 8d702a16c6
commit 60786c5019
22 changed files with 760 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ It uses:
logging with TTY detection (text for dev, JSON for prod)
- **[gorilla/sessions](https://github.com/gorilla/sessions)** for
encrypted cookie-based session management
- **[gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)** for CSRF
protection (cookie-based double-submit tokens)
- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
per-IP login rate limiting (sliding window counter)
- **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
`/metrics` behind basic auth
- **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -720,7 +724,8 @@ webhooker/
│ │ └── globals.go # Build-time variables (appname, version, arch)
│ ├── delivery/
│ │ ├── engine.go # Event-driven delivery engine (channel + timer based)
│ │ ── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
│ │ ── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
│ │ └── ssrf.go # SSRF prevention (IP validation, safe HTTP transport)
│ ├── handlers/
│ │ ├── handlers.go # Base handler struct, JSON helpers, template rendering
│ │ ├── auth.go # Login, logout handlers
@@ -734,7 +739,9 @@ webhooker/
│ ├── logger/
│ │ └── logger.go # slog setup with TTY detection
│ ├── middleware/
│ │ ── middleware.go # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
│ │ ── middleware.go # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
│ │ ├── csrf.go # CSRF protection middleware (gorilla/csrf)
│ │ └── ratelimit.go # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
│ ├── server/
│ │ ├── server.go # Server struct, fx lifecycle, signal handling
│ │ ├── http.go # HTTP server setup with timeouts
@@ -821,6 +828,19 @@ Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
(`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`), Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy,
and Permissions-Policy
- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints
- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
`/api` (stateless API)
- **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
both at target creation time (URL validation) and at delivery time
(custom HTTP transport with SSRF-safe dialer that validates resolved
IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
- **Login rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
per-IP sliding-window rate limiter on the login endpoint (5 POST
attempts per minute per IP) to prevent brute-force attacks
- Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
- Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
runtime)
@@ -907,7 +927,12 @@ linted, tested, and compiled.
### Remaining: Core Features
- [ ] Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler
- [ ] Webhook signature verification (GitHub, Stripe formats)
- [ ] CSRF protection for forms
- [x] CSRF protection for forms
([#35](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/35))
- [x] SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
([#36](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/36))
- [x] Login rate limiting (per-IP brute-force protection)
([#37](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/37))
- [ ] Session expiration and "remember me"
- [ ] Password change/reset flow
- [ ] API key authentication for programmatic access