34 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 141a84fd0d Wait for the interrupted operation to clean up before exit (closes #159)
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On SIGINT/SIGTERM the process could exit before the interrupted command's
cleanup defers ran, leaving decrypted data in the temp directory: the blob
cache (vaultik-blobcache-*) and the decrypted snapshot database
(vaultik-restore-*).

RunApp now mirrors fx's run sequence: start, block on app.Wait(), then
app.Stop(), returning only after Stop completes. fx delivers both an OS
interrupt and the finished operation's Shutdowner.Shutdown() on that one
channel. Stop runs the OnStop hooks; the operation's hook cancels the command
and waits for its goroutine to return (bounded by shutdownTimeout) before
exit. The old code returned as soon as app.Done fired, without Stop, so on a
real interrupt it unwound to os.Exit while cleanup still ran and the wait
never blocked exit.

Restore's loops check the context between chunks and blobs so the wait ends
promptly. A cli test drives RunApp through the OnStop hook and asserts the
scratch file is gone before RunApp returns.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:41:41 +00:00
clawbot 548a7ae156 Give the local index and its export copy an explicit 0600 mode (closes #168)
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The local index lists every backed-up path and chunk hash, but its file mode was left to the SQLite driver and the umask, so under a typical 022 umask a fresh index (and its -wal/-shm side files) landed world-readable. The snapshot export copied the index to snapshot.db with a permissive create as well.

provideDatabase now calls ensureIndexFileMode before opening the driver: it creates the index 0600 if missing and chmods an existing one to 0600. Doing this before the driver opens the file matters because SQLite gives its -wal and -shm files the mode of the main database file. The export copy is now created 0600. Tests under umask 022 cover a fresh index, an existing 0644 index, and the export copy.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 13:12:07 +02:00
clawbot 3a58377127 Parse age_recipients at config load and never echo the entry (closes #153)
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Config.Validate now parses every age_recipients entry with age.ParseX25519Recipient, so a bad recipient fails at config load instead of deep in a backup after the snapshot row and tree walk. On failure the error names the position (age_recipients[N]) and never the value: a recipient string can itself be a secret key an operator pasted by mistake, and age's own error quotes its input. An entry starting with AGE-SECRET-KEY- gets a specific message.

The remaining parse sites (blobgen.NewWriter, crypto NewEncryptor and UpdateRecipients), reachable by callers that skip config.Load, likewise drop the value and age's wrapped error, naming only the position.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 13:01:00 +02:00
clawbot a6434de57f Open the downloaded snapshot database read-only, on a private temp dir (closes #162)
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Restore and deep verify used to open the decrypted snapshot database read-write through the local-index constructor, which applied migrations against whatever the file carried, and left the decrypted file in the shared temp directory. A forged file could redefine what restore queries return, and an interrupted open left decrypted metadata on disk.

Add database.OpenReadOnly: opens the file read-only (mode=ro) with query_only and trusted_schema=OFF, never applies schema files, and refuses a file whose schema carries a trigger, view or virtual table or lacks an expected table. Restore and deep verify now both use it, each inside its own private (0700) temp directory removed on every return path. pickNextDownload returns (FileID, bool) so a genuine nil-UUID file is not mistaken for "nothing left".

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 12:45:53 +02:00
clawbot b4654f8e52 Abort the run when packing fails, even under --skip-errors (closes #161)
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A chunk is registered as pending (known, scanner-pending, packer pending-row) before it is packed. Under --skip-errors the scanner skipped a file on any processing error, including a failure inside addChunkToPacker (packing, database, encryption, upload). The pending chunk then stayed queued and a later blob finalize inserted it into the chunks table with no blob_chunks row, so a snapshot could complete holding a file whose chunk is in no blob and cannot be restored.

Errors from addChunkToPacker are now marked and abort the run regardless of --skip-errors; only open and read errors are skipped. The bookkeeping order is unchanged. Flag help and comments now say only unreadable files are skipped.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 12:28:44 +02:00
clawbot 39aef1c47c Stop config set echoing secrets; reject credential-bearing storage URLs (closes #166)
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config set now prints only the key name after a write, never the value: a value may be a secret such as s3.secret_access_key, and echoing it leaks into captured stdout and pasted terminals. The set logic moves into writeConfigSet so this is testable.

config set also tightens a pre-existing group- or world-readable config to 0600 after writing; the previous stat-and-preserve-mode block had no effect (os.WriteFile does not change an existing file mode) and is removed.

ParseStorageURL now rejects s3:// and rclone:// URLs that carry credentials in the userinfo or an unknown query parameter, naming s3.access_key_id and s3.secret_access_key as where credentials belong. On a url.Parse failure only the inner cause is wrapped, so the raw URL is not echoed. file:// is unchanged.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 12:28:32 +02:00
clawbot 96ebcd40d7 Reconcile purge against remote by hashed key, not human ID (closes #160)
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syncWithRemote compared human snapshot IDs against the hashed metadata/<key>/ directory names, which never match, so it deleted every local snapshot record; the purge that followed then found nothing to remove remotely. Reconcile via listAllRemoteSnapshotKeys and RemoteSnapshotKey(id), matching CleanupLocalSnapshots, so a row still backed by remote metadata is kept.

The purge tests only passed because their stubs used the human-ID layout production never writes; they now write metadata under the hashed remote key. New tests prove remotely-backed local rows survive the reconcile and that a purge removes the local row and remote metadata together.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 12:11:49 +02:00
clawbot d9f0220f94 Restore files at 0600 and make the blob hash check unskippable (closes #163)
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Regular files are now created with O_EXCL at mode 0600 and given their stored mode only after the content is written and closed, so a file whose stored mode is restrictive is never briefly readable by other local users mid-restore. A file whose write or close fails is removed rather than left partial, and a chmod failure is a user-visible warning instead of a debug line.

hashVerifyReader.Close now errors when closed before EOF, so a short read or early close can never obtain a blob whose hash was not verified; downloadBlobToCache drops the cache entry on any such failure.

verifyFile (--verify) now rejects a restored file with bytes past its last chunk. Tests cover each behaviour under umask 022.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:45:52 +02:00
clawbot 4c83e82543 Reject a blob_size_limit below the largest possible chunk (closes #167)
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Validate only rejected blob_size_limit below chunk_size, but the chunker can emit chunks up to chunk_size times the FastCDC size spread (four times), and the packer puts a single chunk of any size into an otherwise empty blob. A limit between one and four times chunk_size therefore let a blob reach four times the configured maximum, with most blobs holding a single chunk and so exposing individual chunk lengths to anyone who can list the destination.

Validate now rejects blob_size_limit below chunk_size times the spread, reusing the chunker's one constant (now exported as ChunkSizeSpread) instead of a second literal. The rule is stated in the error text, the Validate comment, the README config table, config.example.yml, and the generated config template.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:45:41 +02:00
clawbot 86361c8b50 Fail closed on unreadable manifests instead of losing blobs (closes #157)
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Prune learned which blobs are in use by reading every snapshot's manifest, but merely logged and skipped one it could not download or decode. Blobs referenced only by that snapshot then looked unreferenced and were deleted, with a zero exit -- and snapshot create --prune runs this unattended. collectReferencedBlobs now errors, naming the remote key, so prune deletes nothing and exits non-zero.

Manifest generation likewise skipped a blob whose lookup failed or was missing, yielding a manifest short of what the snapshot needs; it now fails. Deep verify only warned when the manifest omitted a database blob; it now fails on any divergence. Docs corrected.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:45:30 +02:00
clawbot d77663d039 Default a scheme-less s3.* endpoint to TLS (closes #158)
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With the s3.* config form and an endpoint written without a scheme, use_ssl being omitted built an http:// endpoint, while config.example.yml documented use_ssl as defaulting to true. Over plain HTTP a network observer sees manifests, object names, sizes and the access key id, and can alter responses.

use_ssl is now *bool: omitted (nil) means the default, TLS; only an explicit use_ssl: false forces plain HTTP. This matches the s3:// URL form, which already defaults to TLS. The config init template dropped its misleading use_ssl line from the s3:// block (that key is never read for URLs; ?ssl=false controls TLS there) and points at ?ssl=false instead.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:11:34 +02:00
clawbot 3abe9cbd9e Scope the PID lock to mutating commands (closes #150)
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RunWithApp took the process-wide PID lock for every fx-backed command, so read-only commands (info, snapshot list, snapshot verify, remote info) failed with "already running" while a backup held it.

AppOptions now carries a lockMode declared at each call site: only mutating commands (snapshot create, snapshot purge, snapshot remove, prune, remote nuke) acquire the lock; read-only ones run without it. snapshot restore is classified read-only -- it writes only to its target directory, not the local index or remote store. The decision moves to a small acquireLockIfMutating helper, with a test that a read-only command runs while the lock is held and two mutators still exclude. The README locking section is rewritten to match.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:01:29 +02:00
clawbot 76a6917a35 Keep restore writes inside the target directory (closes #154)
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restoreFile and verifyRestoredFiles joined the stored path onto the target with no containment check, so a ".." segment or an absolute path escaped the target, and a restored symlink could redirect a later child write anywhere on disk. Since age decryption proves a snapshot is readable but not honest, and restore usually runs as root, a forged snapshot became an arbitrary file write.

Both call sites now go through containedRestorePath: it rejects a stored path unless filepath.IsLocal accepts it with the leading separator removed (barring "..", absolute, and empty paths), then Lstats each existing ancestor below the target and refuses to descend through a symlink. The target directory itself may be a symlink, and honest symlinks pointing outside the tree are still written verbatim.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 11:01:01 +02:00
clawbot 38ebfd843a Trust only uploaded blobs for deduplication (closes #148)
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An interrupted blob upload left the blob's chunks, blob_chunks, and blobs rows committed before the upload was attempted, so a later run deduplicated against data that never reached storage and produced a snapshot that reported success but could not be restored.

Fix (issue option b): a chunk counts as known only when a blob holding it has uploaded_ts set, and each run drops un-uploaded blob rows and the chunks they orphan at startup, so the affected data is re-chunked and re-uploaded. A blob recorded with no remote backend is marked uploaded so the invariant holds uniformly.

The reproduction is the interrupted-upload test from #72: its t.Skip is removed and it passes against this fix, and this branch's earlier duplicate copy is dropped. The interrupted metadata-export case is split to #177.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 10:29:21 +02:00
clawbot 6b7517a4dc Add fault-injection tests for interruption and corruption (closes #72)
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Adds internal/storage/faultstore, a storage.Storer wrapper that injects faults through the storage seam without patching production code: an upload that dies mid-stream, a backend reporting success while storing nothing, and reads returning corrupt or truncated bytes. Covers all six scenarios from the issue, each asserting the observable end state (index, destination, and what the user is told), not merely that an error returned. Scenario 1b (retry after an interrupted upload) exposed a real dedup defect and is skipped with a pointer to #148, which also owns the half-exported-state repair. Tests run serially because each calls log.Initialize on the global logger. No production behavior changes.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 09:46:46 +02:00
clawbot 994e5de613 Quiet only the stdout UI under --json, not the log level (closes #112)
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Per the decision on the issue (option 1), --json no longer implies Quiet. Folding --json into Quiet pinned the stderr log level to WARN, so prune --json gave a machine consumer no record of the local index rows it deleted. The two effects are now split: a JSON field on log.Options drives only the stdout UI-quiet in setupGlobals, keeping the JSON document clean, while the stderr log level follows --verbose/--debug again (diagnostics have gone to stderr since #82). The same coupling is removed for snapshot verify, snapshot remove and remote info; snapshot list was already decoupled.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 09:05:52 +02:00
clawbot 42f4e648d7 Reconcile docs with code across the accuracy-sweep items (closes #74)
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Docs-only sweep of the accuracy items. Corrected ARCHITECTURE.md chunk sizes and the fx config type; documented the ls/rm aliases, the CPU/MEM profile env vars, the age_secret_key threat-model caveat, the four zstd presets, and a new locking section for the process-wide PID lock. Narrowed the internal/ui output claim to what holds today (refactor deferred to #149); lock-scoping deferred to #150. Added the missing ARCHITECTURE.md and config.example.yml README links. Every claim re-verified against the tree.

Disclosure: a pre-existing gomodguard linter deprecation surfaced during the gate; unrelated.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-22 09:05:36 +02:00
clawbot 343129f891 Accept a remote key for restore and verify, and document it (closes #124)
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A machine restoring after the original is gone has no local index and cannot know a snapshot's human ID; snapshot list shows such snapshots only by their remote key, but restore and verify accepted only the human ID, so recovery could not be done as documented.

Restore and verify now also accept a remote key, or an unambiguous leading part of it as snapshot list prints it, resolved against the store's metadata listing. Human IDs are never pure hex, which tells the two forms apart. Deep verify reads the single snapshot in the downloaded per-snapshot database. A new README section walks the recovery end to end; a test backs up, then lists, restores and deep-verifies with an empty index, another hostname and no age_recipients.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-22 01:01:25 +02:00
clawbot a50e3fa038 Add tests for internal/storage: URL parsing, backends, shared conformance suite (closes #66)
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internal/storage, the package that parses store URLs and selects the backend, had no tests.

Adds table-driven tests for URL parsing (each scheme, query parameters, malformed input, unknown scheme, backend type chosen); one shared conformance suite for the Storer interface, run against the file backend in a temp directory and the s3 backend on the in-process harness internal/s3 already uses, so a new backend inherits it; and rclone construction and argument tests using its in-process local backend. A comment records that rclone data operations need a configured remote and are not unit-tested. No production code changed and no defect surfaced.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-22 00:58:27 +02:00
clawbot 6fcd8e1668 Stamp Docker image version from the host; flush profiles on error exit (closes #75)
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Docker images reported commit unknown because the build ran git inside the container while .dockerignore excludes .git, and VERSION was never overridden. script/docker and script/cibuild now compute version, commit and date on the host and pass them as build args; the Dockerfile runs no git and falls back to dev and unknown, never empty, on a bare docker build.

Profiling a failing command gave a truncated or missing profile: Entry and each command goroutine called os.Exit(1), skipping the deferred profile writers in main. Entry now returns a status that main exits with after its defers run, and command goroutines report failure through one RunOperation helper, which also restores PID-lock release and graceful shutdown on failure.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-09-21 22:01:05 +02:00
clawbot aab6a87f8c Reconcile the schema/migration docs with the code (closes #68)
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Four documents told different stories about the database schema. docs/DATAMODEL.md now owns the explanation and separates two things: the policy, which is unchanged (no supported upgrade path between versions; delete the local index with vaultik database delete and back up again), and the schema bootstrap that does exist (numbered files in internal/database/schema applied to a fresh database and recorded in schema_migrations).

README.md and AGENTS.md are reworded to match and link there. AGENTS.md names the real file to edit, internal/database/schema/001.sql, and notes that the pre-1.0 disposability clause expires on tagging. No code changed.

Judgement call: REPO_POLICIES.md still names a different schema file; it is cross-project policy and was left alone.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 21:58:37 +02:00
clawbot c355ef4d25 Report a prune count that could not be read as unknown, not 0 (closes #96)
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Prune read table row counts before and after to report how many orphaned files, chunks and blobs it removed, and discarded the error from every read. A failed query therefore reported as a count of 0, and the summary showed plausible wrong numbers.

A count that cannot be read is now logged as a warning (on stderr, also under --json) and shown as "unknown"; a difference computed from an unknown count is itself unknown. 0 still means the table was empty. No --json document carries these counts, so none can show a false 0.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 21:41:57 +02:00
clawbot 5927e1aa3d Write file:// blobs atomically via temp file and rename (closes #130)
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The file:// backend streamed each object straight to its final key, so an upload cut off mid-stream left a truncated object there. The next backup saw that Stat succeeded, recorded the blob as complete, and produced a snapshot that reported success but could not be restored.

Writes now go to a temporary file with a .partial suffix in the destination directory, are synced, then renamed onto the key. List and ListStream skip .partial files, so a leftover is never trusted as a blob and is overwritten when the key is written again. S3 PutObject is already atomic.

Disclosure: the containing directory is not synced after the rename, so a host crash right after it could still lose the object on some filesystems.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 21:24:42 +02:00
clawbot 9ca962969a Map s3 not-found to storage.ErrNotFound in Get and Stat (closes #129)
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The Storer interface documents that Get and Stat return storage.ErrNotFound for a missing object. The file and rclone backends did; the s3 backend returned the raw SDK error, so callers testing for ErrNotFound behaved differently on s3.

S3Storer.Get and Stat now wrap ErrNotFound when the SDK reports a missing object and leave every other error untouched. The SDK reports a missing key two ways (NoSuchKey from Get, NotFound from Head); both are recognised in one helper, s3.IsNotFound, which HeadObject now also uses. The mapping lives in the storage package because internal/s3 cannot import it.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 21:07:35 +02:00
clawbot 89ebfc78e2 Use one duration parser and fix the --older-than months example (closes #123)
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Two parseDuration functions existed with different grammars; only the one in internal/vaultik/helpers.go was reachable from a flag. The unused copy in internal/cli/duration.go is deleted, so no flag accepts anything it did not before.

The README gave 6m as the six-months example for snapshot purge --older-than, but m is minutes: that command removed every snapshot older than six minutes. The example is now 6mo, and the help for --older-than and --keep-newer-than states that m is minutes and mo is months.

The parser now rejects negative durations, which it used to accept or silently make positive.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-09-21 20:58:30 +02:00
clawbot 07ef3a1c78 Drop the lint-guard shell scanner, keep the Dockerfile.lint checks (closes #121)
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The guard test in cmd/vaultik/lintdocker_test.go tried to prove that no script runs the linter outside the container by parsing shell scripts with a hand-written scanner. Four reviews each found another spelling it missed; such a parser cannot be complete, and nobody could follow it in one reading.

The scanner, its helpers and their tests are deleted. The plain Dockerfile.lint assertions stay: the linter image is pinned by digest, config verify runs before run, and the per-run value reaches both steps. TODO.md no longer claims a test proves the property; script/lint is the only lint entry point, and keeping it so is a review matter.

Judgement call: this drops a guard two reviewers asked to harden.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (decision, merge)
2026-09-21 20:41:33 +02:00
clawbot c423d13191 Hash the plaintext, not the encrypted bytes, in verify --deep (closes #131)
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The last step of verify --deep hashed the encrypted bytes it downloaded once with SHA256 and compared the result to the blob name. The name is the double SHA256 of the blob plaintext, so the two could never match and deep verification failed on every healthy blob with "blob hash mismatch".

It now hashes the decompressed plaintext as chunk verification streams it and compares the double SHA256 of that to the blob name, the same derivation the writer uses. A new test backs up a real snapshot, runs deep verify on it, then flips one byte in a stored blob and expects failure.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 20:24:37 +02:00
clawbot 75a10d3a22 Hash-verify the Go toolchain in the release workflow (closes #105)
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The release workflow installed Go with actions/setup-go, which pins the action but not the Go archive it downloads, so the compiler that builds the published binaries was verified against nothing in this repo.

New script/install-go, modelled on script/install-goreleaser, downloads the go.dev archive for the version in go.mod and refuses it unless its sha256 matches the value committed in the script. It fails if its version disagrees with go.mod, and on any OS or architecture other than the Linux release runners. GOTOOLCHAIN=local on the release step keeps the verified toolchain from switching itself.

Judgement call: release path only; script/bootstrap still uses the host Go.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 19:48:52 +02:00
clawbot 3d56dd7eb0 VACUUM snapshot metadata through the sqlite driver, not a CLI (closes #120)
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snapshot create compacted the metadata database by running a sqlite3 command-line binary, after every blob had already been uploaded. On a host without that binary, which includes anyone who installed with go install, the backup failed at the last step, and two tests failed the same way.

VACUUM now runs through the Go sqlite driver the program already uses, and its error is returned to the caller. The runtime Docker image no longer installs the sqlite package, since nothing in the binary calls it.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 19:41:28 +02:00
clawbot bdce350041 Delete dead code and stale fixtures, fix config set reindent (closes #70)
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Removes code and fixtures nothing uses: the internal/models package and its test, a second SnapshotInfo type in package cli that had no references (the live one is in internal/vaultik), and two config fixtures, test-config.yml and test/integration-config.yml, whose keys the config loader no longer accepts. test/config.yaml stays; a test uses it.

Also fixes config set, which rewrote the whole file with 4-space indentation on the first set despite the documented promise to preserve formatting. It now encodes with 2-space indent like the default template, and a test asserts comments and indentation survive a set.

Deviation: one commit, not one per deletion as the issue asked.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 19:25:01 +02:00
clawbot 753bc3ef60 Correct remote layout and privacy docs for hashed snapshot keys (closes #67)
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Three documents showed the remote layout with a plaintext snapshot ID as the metadata directory name, and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md blamed those IDs for the observable backup time. The store actually names each metadata directory with a one-way hash of the ID, so hostname and snapshot name are not visible; the backup time is, through the plaintext timestamp in the manifest, which is accepted behaviour.

README, ARCHITECTURE.md, docs/DATAMODEL.md and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md now show the hashed layout, the derivation is documented once, and the privacy section lists what the unencrypted manifest exposes. Two code comments that claimed the timestamp was hidden are corrected. No behaviour change.

Judgement call: docs/DATAMODEL.md was not named in the issue but had the same error.

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation, review); claude-fable-5-1 (merge)
2026-09-21 19:24:44 +02:00
clawbot d2a0510cb4 Trigger CI on next, not only main (closes #122)
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`check.yml` ran only on push to `main` and on pull requests against `main`. Every unit is a PR based on `next`, and `next` is pushed on each squash-merge, so no unit PR and no push to `next` ever ran CI; a broken `next` would first surface on the milestone PR. `next` is added to both branch lists; nothing else in the workflow changes. The README Entrypoints section now says where CI runs.

Disclosure: the CI run on the PR itself fired (the proof the trigger works) but was red because the runner had no disk space left before any check step ran; the local gate was green.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review)
model: claude-fable-5
2026-09-21 14:55:59 +02:00
clawbot 583f65040a Correct --cron flag help to name warnings as unsuppressed (closes #87)
check / check (pull_request) Failing after 0s
`--cron` sets the UI quiet, but `Warningf` and `Errorf` are unconditional, and the snapshot summary is routed through `Warningf` on purpose so cron delivers something on a successful run. The help string said `silent unless error`, so a user could read normal cron output as a failure. It now says `silent unless warning or error`, matching the README. String only; no behavior change.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review)
model: claude-fable-5
2026-09-21 14:55:45 +02:00
sneak d257f8f658 Lint in a container as a build step, via Dockerfile.lint (closes #113)
check / check (pull_request) Successful in 2m58s
Every lint run now happens inside its own container, invoked through
script/lint, and linting is a build step rather than a container
command: a successful build of the new root Dockerfile.lint IS a clean
lint. That shape also works where the docker daemon is remote and bind
mounts are impossible.

Its FROM line -- golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2, pinned by digest -- is
now the only pin of the linter version in this repo.

A container per run has its own lint cache and its own golangci-lint
lock, both discarded with it, so neither cross-worktree contamination
nor lock contention exists any more. The machinery that defended
against them is therefore gone: the per-worktree cache directories, the
lock-retry loop, and script/lint-audit, which existed to catch findings
replayed from a cache that no longer exists. So is the host lint path
in its entirety -- the native escape hatch, its version detection, and
VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER in both script/lint and the Dockerfile.
Nothing lints on the host, at any version.

A cached build lints nothing, so the CHECK_EPOCH mechanism the product
Dockerfile already used is what makes a green mean something:
ARG CHECK_EPOCH with no default, placed below the module layers so
dependency caching survives, a `RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1`
guard so a build that withholds the arg fails instead of replaying, and
the value expanded into the lint command itself. script/lint computes
`epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"` as a bare assignment on its own line, because
inline in the argument a failing substitution does not abort under
`set -eu` and yields a constant empty epoch -- which is exactly the
false green being prevented.

The product Dockerfile loses its lint stage rather than gaining a
second linter pin. That stage ran `make lint`, which is now
`docker build`: docker-in-docker inside a BuildKit step with no daemon.
Calling golangci-lint directly there instead would have meant two
independently bumpable digests for one tool. `make fmt-check` moves
beside `make test` in the builder stage, and script/cibuild now builds
Dockerfile.lint and then Dockerfile, each with its own fresh epoch,
failing on either. Consequence, stated in comments rather than left to
be discovered: script/docker builds the product image only and no
longer lints; script/check and script/cibuild are the gates.

`golangci-lint config verify` runs as its own epoch-keyed layer, above
the lint. It is not belt-and-braces: `golangci-lint run` rejects a
config it cannot PARSE but silently IGNORES an unknown top-level KEY.
Renaming .golangci.yml's `linters:` to `linterz:` -- one character --
discards `default: all`, the disable list and every threshold, leaves
only the small default linter set running, and exits 0 reporting
`0 issues.` on a tree the real config fails with an lll finding, in a
run whose lint layer demonstrably executed. That is a set-but-
ineffective config falling back to defaults instead of failing loudly,
sitting in the gate's own configuration. `config verify` catches it and
does so with the network genuinely off at this pin: under
`docker run --network none` against the pinned digest it exits 0 on
this repo's config and exits 3 on the `linterz:` variant. It is keyed
on CHECK_EPOCH like the lint itself, because a cached validation
validates nothing.

script/lint-fix is kept, reimplemented as a bind-mounted
docker run against the image parsed out of Dockerfile.lint -- a build
step cannot write fixes back to the worktree -- and its header states
outright that it is a developer convenience, never a gate, and needs a
local daemon.

cmd/vaultik/lintdocker_test.go parses both Dockerfiles and both scripts
and fails if any part of the mechanism is dropped: the digest pin, the
defaultless ARG below `go mod download`, the emptiness guard, the
expansion of the epoch into each check command, the bare per-invocation
epoch assignment in both scripts, cibuild building both files, the
config verification running before the lint, and -- structurally, not
by searching for one retired variable name -- that no script invokes
golangci-lint except through docker. Every one of those losses is
silent: the build still exits 0 and nothing is checked, which is why
they are asserted rather than trusted. The scanner behind the last of
those has its own test, because a structural check that goes blind
passes on every tree, including a broken one.

script/lint takes no arguments now, and says so instead of dropping
them: a build step has no command line to pass linter flags to.
2026-08-10 13:38:45 +00:00
105 changed files with 7576 additions and 2063 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
name: check
on:
push:
branches: [main]
branches: [main, next]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
branches: [main, next]
jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+18 -25
View File
@@ -20,33 +20,21 @@ jobs:
# check.yml runs script/cibuild, which does all of its work inside
# the digest-pinned Dockerfile images -- so without this step the
# release either fails at the before-hook or, worse, ships binaries
# built by whatever unpinned Go the runner happens to carry.
# REPO_POLICIES.md requires every external reference to be pinned,
# and script/release already refuses a goreleaser that is not the
# pinned build; the compiler that actually produces the artifacts
# is the last thing that should be exempt from that.
# built by whatever Go the runner happens to carry.
#
# go-version-file rather than a literal: go.mod's `go 1.26.1` is
# the single source of truth for the toolchain, the same way the
# Dockerfile FROM line is the single source of truth for the
# linter version that script/lint enforces. It is a three-component
# version, so setup-go resolves it exactly -- no silent drift onto
# a newer patch release.
#
# actions/setup-go v5.6.0, 2025-12-15. Pinned by commit sha, like
# the checkout above. v5.x is a node20 action, matching the node20
# actions/checkout v4 already in use here; the v6/v7 line requires
# a node24 runner, which this Gitea runner has never been asked
# for and cannot be assumed to provide.
# actions/setup-go would pin the action by commit sha, but the Go
# tarball it downloads at runtime is verified against no value in
# this repo, and the action exposes no checksum input.
# REPO_POLICIES.md requires every external reference to be pinned
# by hash with no exceptions, and this is the compiler that
# produces the published binaries -- the input where a substituted
# artifact matters most. So Go is installed the way goreleaser is:
# script/install-go downloads the exact archive for go.mod's `go`
# directive and refuses it unless its sha256 matches the value
# committed in the script, then puts .tool/go/bin on PATH for the
# steps below.
- name: Install Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
# setup-go's module cache needs a runner-side cache backend.
# A release is cut rarely and a cold module download costs
# seconds; a release failing because a cache service is absent
# costs a re-tag. Off, deliberately.
cache: false
run: script/install-go
- name: Install goreleaser
run: script/install-goreleaser
- name: Release
@@ -58,3 +46,8 @@ jobs:
# It is deliberately not the runner's automatic token, which is
# not guaranteed to carry that scope.
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}
# Build with the toolchain install-go just verified, never a
# different one auto-downloaded from a `toolchain` directive:
# the point of the hash pin is that this exact compiler makes
# the release.
GOTOOLCHAIN: local
+8 -3
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,12 @@ Version: 2025-06-08
13. Pre-1.0: NEVER write database migrations. There are no live databases
anywhere — every user's local index can be rebuilt from a fresh full
backup. When the schema changes, just change `schema.sql` (and any code
that touches the affected tables). The local index is disposable until
1.0 ships and is tagged.
backup. To change the schema, edit `internal/database/schema/001.sql`
(and any code that touches the affected tables) directly; do not add new
numbered schema files. Those numbered files and the `schema_migrations`
table they populate only bootstrap a fresh database — they are not an
upgrade path. The local index is disposable until 1.0 ships and is
tagged; once 1.0 is tagged that clause expires and the question of
upgrading existing indexes returns. See [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)
for the full explanation.
+10 -4
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ A content-addressed unit of data. Files are split into variable-size chunks usin
- `ChunkHash`: SHA256 hash of chunk content (primary key)
- `Size`: Chunk size in bytes
Chunk sizes vary between `avgChunkSize/4` and `avgChunkSize*4` (typically 16KB-256KB for 64KB average).
Chunk sizes vary between `avgChunkSize/4` and `avgChunkSize*4` (2.5MB-40MB for the 10MB default average).
#### FileChunk (`database.FileChunk`)
Maps files to their constituent chunks:
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ The CLI uses fx for dependency injection. Here's the instantiation order:
```go
// cli/app.go: NewApp()
fx.New(
fx.Supply(config.ConfigPath(opts.ConfigPath)), // 1. Config path
fx.Supply(config.Path(opts.ConfigPath)), // 1. Config path
fx.Supply(opts.LogOptions), // 2. Log options
fx.Provide(globals.New), // 3. Globals
fx.Provide(log.New), // 4. Logger config
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ scanner := v.ScannerFactory(snapshot.ScannerParams{
- **Created by**: `chunker.NewChunker(avgChunkSize)`
- **When**: Inside `snapshot.NewScanner()`
- **Configuration**:
- `avgChunkSize`: From config (typically 64KB)
- `avgChunkSize`: From config (default 10MB)
- `minChunkSize`: avgChunkSize / 4
- `maxChunkSize`: avgChunkSize * 4
@@ -366,11 +366,17 @@ bucket/
│ └── {full-hash} # Compressed+encrypted blob
└── metadata/
└── {snapshot-id}/
└── {remote-key}/
├── db.zst.age # Encrypted binary SQLite database
└── manifest.json.zst # Blob list (for pruning/verification)
```
The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the human
snapshot ID, so the human ID (hostname, snapshot name, timestamp) is never
written to the store as a directory name. See
[docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) for the
derivation and a worked example.
## Thread Safety
- `Packer`: Thread-safe via mutex. Multiple goroutines can call `AddChunk()`.
+49 -50
View File
@@ -1,24 +1,30 @@
# Lint stage
# This file has no lint stage, deliberately.
#
# This FROM line is the single source of truth for the linter version:
# script/lint parses the image reference out of it and runs that exact
# image, so a local `make lint` and CI use the same linter. Bump the
# linter here (tag AND digest) and nowhere else.
# Linting lives in Dockerfile.lint, built by script/lint, and
# script/cibuild builds both. A lint stage here would have to either
# shell out to `make lint` -- which is now `docker build`, so
# docker-in-docker inside a BuildKit step with no daemon -- or call
# golangci-lint directly, which would mean a second, independently
# bumpable digest pin for the linter alongside the one in
# Dockerfile.lint. Two pins for one tool is the drift that
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/78 was filed over. See
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113 for the ruling.
#
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine, 2026-08-07
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine@sha256:91b27804074a0bacea298707f016911e60cf0cdbc6c7bf5ccacb5f0606d18d60 AS lint
# Consequence, stated rather than left to be discovered: script/docker
# builds this file only and therefore does not lint. `make fmt-check`
# and `make test` still run here, so what a green build of this file
# means is "formatted, tested, and it compiles" -- the lint verdict
# comes from script/lint or script/cibuild.
# Build stage
# golang:1.26.1-alpine, 2026-03-17
FROM golang:1.26.1-alpine@sha256:2389ebfa5b7f43eeafbd6be0c3700cc46690ef842ad962f6c5bd6be49ed82039 AS builder
# Build tooling: make, plus a C toolchain because `go test -race` needs cgo.
# The sqlite driver is pure Go (modernc.org/sqlite), so no sqlite library or
# CLI is required.
RUN apk add --no-cache make build-base
# The context signal for script/lint's native path. This stage runs
# `make lint` with no docker daemon available, so it is the one place
# that must run the golangci-lint on PATH directly. script/lint takes
# that path only when this is set AND the version matches the pin above;
# version equality alone would also admit a developer's locally
# installed copy on a host, bypassing the digest pin (issue #80).
# Nothing outside this stage sets it.
ENV VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER=1
WORKDIR /src
# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching
@@ -28,7 +34,7 @@ RUN go mod download
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Run formatting check and linter.
# Run the format check and the tests.
#
# CHECK_EPOCH must stay immediately above these RUNs. These layers are
# keyed on its value, so they are cache-eligible only for a value
@@ -47,55 +53,48 @@ COPY . .
# runs the checks and every one after it on an unchanged tree replays
# these layers from cache, executes nothing, and still exits 0. Failed
# steps are never cached, so the guard fails on EVERY invocation rather
# than once -- a bare `docker build .` is now a loud error, not a quiet
# than once -- a bare `docker build .` is a loud error, not a quiet
# green. Do not give CHECK_EPOCH a default value; a default would
# satisfy the guard with a constant and restore the hole.
#
# ARG scope is per-stage, so the builder stage declares its own.
# Everything above this line (apk, go.mod, `go mod download`) is
# deliberately outside the busted range and keeps caching.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && make fmt-check
RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && make lint
# Build stage
# golang:1.26.1-alpine, 2026-03-17
FROM golang:1.26.1-alpine@sha256:2389ebfa5b7f43eeafbd6be0c3700cc46690ef842ad962f6c5bd6be49ed82039 AS builder
# Depend on lint stage passing
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
ARG VERSION=dev
# Install build dependencies for CGO (mattn/go-sqlite3) and sqlite3 CLI (tests)
RUN apk add --no-cache make build-base sqlite
WORKDIR /src
# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Run tests. See the CHECK_EPOCH comment in the lint stage for the
# mechanism; ARG scope is per-stage, so this stage needs its own
# declaration, its own guard, and its own expansion, and they must stay
# immediately above the check RUN.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && make test
# Version, commit and build date are computed on the host by
# script/docker and script/cibuild (where .git exists) and passed in as
# build args. The build context excludes .git (see .dockerignore), so
# the build cannot derive them itself: it used to try, with `git
# rev-parse` inside this stage, and always got "unknown". VERSION comes
# from script/version, the source of truth shared with the Makefile, so
# it carries the same tag / dev-<sha> / -dirty rules and a Docker image
# reports the same string a local build of the same tree would.
#
# The defaults are the fallback for a bare `docker build .` that passes
# none of them: an unset arg would otherwise stamp an empty string and
# produce an image that cannot report its own version, commit or date.
# They match what an out-of-git build reports elsewhere.
#
# These ARGs sit here, after the checks, rather than at the top of the
# stage: every commit changes their values, and a value change
# invalidates all layers below the ARG. Declared up top they would bust
# `go mod download`; here they only rekey this build layer, which the
# COPY of the sources above already rebuilds on any change anyway.
ARG VERSION=dev
ARG COMMIT=unknown
ARG COMMIT_DATE=unknown
# Build (pure Go, no CGO required since we use modernc.org/sqlite)
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags "-X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Version=${VERSION}' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Commit=$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.CommitDate=$(git show -s --format=%cs HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)'" -o /vaultik ./cmd/vaultik
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags "-X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Version=${VERSION}' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Commit=${COMMIT}' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.CommitDate=${COMMIT_DATE}'" -o /vaultik ./cmd/vaultik
# Runtime stage
# alpine:3.21, 2026-02-25
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates sqlite
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
# Copy binary from builder
COPY --from=builder /vaultik /usr/local/bin/vaultik
+104
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
# Lint image.
#
# Every lint run in this repo happens inside this image, invoked through
# script/lint, and linting is a BUILD STEP rather than a container
# command: a successful build of this file IS a clean lint. That shape
# also works where the docker daemon is remote and bind mounts are
# impossible, which `docker run` against a mounted worktree does not.
#
# This FROM line is the single source of truth for the linter version in
# this repo. Nothing else pins golangci-lint: the product Dockerfile has
# no lint stage, deliberately, so there is no second digest to bump and
# no pair of pins that can drift apart. Bump the tag AND the digest here
# and nowhere else.
#
# Note for readers coming from REPO_POLICIES.md: that document still
# describes the older pattern, a lint stage inside the product
# Dockerfile wired up with `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`.
# That pattern is superseded here by the owner's ruling recorded in
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113 -- lint runs in its own
# image, per run, with its own cache and its own lock, which is what
# makes concurrent runs on one host safe. The policy text is org-wide
# and is being amended separately; this file is what this repo does.
#
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2, 2026-08-10
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240
WORKDIR /src
# Copy the dependency manifests first so the module download layer stays
# cached until they change. Everything above the ARG below is cacheable
# on purpose; a cold module download on every lint would make the inner
# loop unusable and buys nothing, because it is not what the gate is
# asserting.
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
# Force the check layers to execute on every invocation.
#
# CHECK_EPOCH must stay immediately above the RUNs below. Those layers
# are keyed on its value, so they are cache-eligible only for a value
# already built against this same tree; script/lint and script/cibuild
# each pass a fresh value on every invocation, which is what makes their
# green mean the linter really ran. Without it, `docker build -f
# Dockerfile.lint .` on an unchanged tree exits 0 in well under a second
# having linted nothing.
#
# The value is expanded into each check command itself rather than left
# to a bare declaration, so the cache miss does not depend on BuildKit's
# unreferenced-ARG handling staying as it is. It also puts the epoch in
# the build log, where a reader can see the layer was keyed fresh.
#
# The guard is what makes a build that omits --build-arg fail instead of
# lie. An unset ARG is an empty string, and an empty string is a
# perfectly stable cache key: without the guard the first such build
# lints and every one after it on an unchanged tree replays this layer,
# executes nothing, and still exits 0. Failed steps are never cached, so
# the guard fails on EVERY invocation rather than once. Do not give
# CHECK_EPOCH a default value; a default would satisfy the guard with a
# constant and restore the hole.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
# Validate .golangci.yml before linting with it.
#
# This is not belt-and-braces; it closes a hole that `golangci-lint run`
# leaves wide open. `run` rejects YAML it cannot PARSE, but it silently
# IGNORES an unknown top-level KEY. Renaming `linters:` to `linterz:` --
# one character -- discards `default: all`, the whole disable list and
# every threshold, leaves only golangci-lint's small default linter set
# running, and exits 0 reporting `0 issues.` on a tree the real config
# fails. Demonstrated on this repo at this pin, recorded on
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/pulls/114: with a planted
# over-length line, `script/lint` exits 1 naming the `revive` finding
# with `linters:` and exits 0 with `linterz:`. A set-but-ineffective
# config quietly falling back to defaults is precisely the false-green
# class this gate exists to eliminate, so it must not sit in the gate's
# own configuration.
#
# `config verify` catches it, and it does so OFFLINE at this pinned
# version -- verified, not assumed. Under `docker run --network none`
# against the pinned digest it exits 0 on this repo's config and exits 3
# on the `linterz:` variant with `additional properties 'linterz' not
# allowed`. An earlier revision of this file asserted the opposite, that
# the schema is fetched over live HTTPS from an unpinned URL, and used
# that to justify omitting this line. That claim was false at v2.12.2;
# the schema is embedded. If a future bump reintroduces a network fetch
# the failure is loud and this comment is where to record it.
#
# It is keyed on CHECK_EPOCH, like the lint run below, so it executes on
# every invocation. Content-addressing alone would arguably be enough --
# .golangci.yml arrives through `COPY . .`, so a cache hit here implies
# a byte-identical config was validated when the layer really ran. That
# argument is exactly the one that would also excuse caching the lint
# layer, and this repo has ruled it insufficient: a cached check layer
# checks nothing, and the cost of being wrong is silent. Forcing it costs
# milliseconds and puts the epoch in the log, where a reader can see that
# this validation ran rather than being replayed.
RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && \
golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && \
golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
+4 -4
View File
@@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ clean:
go clean
# Install dependencies. The linter is deliberately not installed here:
# script/lint runs the digest-pinned golangci-lint image declared by the
# Dockerfile's lint stage, which is the single source of truth for the
# linter version. A second, separately pinned copy on PATH could drift
# from it and make a local `make lint` disagree with CI.
# script/lint lints by building Dockerfile.lint, whose FROM line is the
# single source of truth for the linter version. A second, separately
# pinned copy on PATH could drift from it and make a local `make lint`
# disagree with CI.
deps:
go mod download
+200 -61
View File
@@ -84,6 +84,57 @@ VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' vaultik snapshot restore <snapshot-i
# 0 3 * * * vaultik snapshot create --cron --prune --keep-newer-than 4w
```
## restoring on another machine
Restoring on a host that never ran the backup — a replacement machine
after the original is gone — is the case vaultik is built for. That host
needs only three things: the `vaultik` binary, the age **private** key,
and the storage credentials for the destination. It does **not** need the
local index, the original config file, or the original hostname.
```sh
# install
go install sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/cmd/vaultik@latest
# create a config and point it at the ORIGINAL backup destination
vaultik config init
vaultik config set storage_url "s3://bucket/prefix?endpoint=https://s3.example.com"
vaultik config set s3.access_key_id "..."
vaultik config set s3.secret_access_key "..."
# see what is on the destination store
vaultik snapshot list
```
`snapshot list` reads the destination store without the private key. A
snapshot that is not in this host's (empty) local index is shown as
remote-only: its row is identified by `<remote only:...>` rather than by
a `hostname_name_timestamp` name, because the name lives only in the
local index and the encrypted database and cannot be recovered from the
store. Its timestamp and compressed size are real. (See the `snapshot
list` description under [command details](#command-details) for the full
explanation.)
Use that remote key — the hex printed inside `<remote only:...>`, or the
full `remote_key` from `snapshot list --json` — to restore and verify:
```sh
# restore everything to /tmp/restored, then check every restored file's
# chunk hashes
VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
vaultik snapshot restore --verify <remote-key> /tmp/restored
# optionally, deep-verify the snapshot against the store (downloads and
# cryptographically checks every blob)
VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
vaultik snapshot verify --deep <remote-key>
```
`age_recipients` (the public key) is not needed to restore — only the
private key in `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`. Both the abbreviated key printed
in the table and the full 64-character key from `--json` are accepted; a
leading part of the key is enough as long as it is unambiguous.
---
## cli
@@ -96,10 +147,10 @@ vaultik [--config <path>] config edit
vaultik [--config <path>] config get <key>
vaultik [--config <path>] config set <key> <value>
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot create [snapshot-names...] [--cron] [--prune] [--keep-newer-than <duration>]
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot list [--json]
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot list [--json] # alias: ls
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot verify <snapshot-id> [--deep] [--json]
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot purge [--keep-latest | --older-than <duration>] [--snapshot <name>...] [--force]
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot remove <snapshot-id> [--dry-run] [--force] [--local-only] [--json]
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot remove <snapshot-id> [--dry-run] [--force] [--local-only] [--json] # alias: rm
vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot restore <snapshot-id> <target-dir> [paths...] [--verify]
vaultik [--config <path>] prune [--force] [--json]
vaultik [--config <path>] info
@@ -116,7 +167,24 @@ vaultik version
* `--verbose`, `-v`: Enable verbose output (on stderr — see below)
* `--debug`: Enable debug output (on stderr — see below)
* `--quiet`, `-q`: Suppress non-error output (also suppresses startup banner)
* `--skip-errors`: Continue past per-file errors instead of aborting (applies to `snapshot create` and `restore`)
* `--skip-errors`: Skip files that cannot be read when creating a snapshot, or that cannot be restored when restoring, instead of aborting. Packing and storage errors (which would leave a chunk recorded but not stored) still abort the run.
### locking
Commands that write persistent state — `snapshot create`, `snapshot
purge`, `snapshot remove`, `prune`, and `remote nuke` — take a
process-wide lock at `$XDG_DATA_HOME/vaultik/vaultik.pid`
(`~/.local/share/vaultik/vaultik.pid` on Linux) for the whole run. Only
one of them runs at a time: a second one exits immediately with an
"already running" error rather than waiting, so two writers can never
corrupt the local index or the destination store.
Read-only commands — `info`, `snapshot list`, `snapshot verify`, and
`remote info` — do not take the lock and are never blocked, so they run
even while a backup is in progress. `snapshot restore` does not take the
lock either: it writes only to the target directory you name, not the
local index or the destination store. `config`, `database delete`,
`completion`, and `version` do not take the lock.
### stdout and stderr
@@ -152,6 +220,8 @@ and `vaultik prune --json | jq .` both work as written.
* `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`: Age private key for decryption (required for `snapshot restore` and `snapshot verify --deep`)
* `VAULTIK_CONFIG`: Path to config file (overridden by `--config`)
* `VAULTIK_INDEX_PATH`: Override local SQLite index path
* `VAULTIK_CPUPROFILE`: Write a CPU profile to this path for the duration of the run (development/debugging)
* `VAULTIK_MEMPROFILE`: Write a heap profile to this path when the run exits (development/debugging)
### shell completion
@@ -245,13 +315,16 @@ local index alone, and still exits zero.
* Default (shallow): checks that all blobs referenced in the manifest exist in storage
* `--deep`: Downloads and decrypts each blob, verifies chunk hashes against the
encrypted metadata database
* Accepts the same identifiers as `snapshot restore`: a snapshot ID, or a
remote-only snapshot's remote key (or an unambiguous leading part of it)
* `--json`: Output results as JSON
**`snapshot purge`**: Remove old snapshots based on criteria. Retention is
per-snapshot-name (`--keep-latest` keeps the latest of each name, not the
latest globally).
* `--keep-latest`: Keep only the most recent snapshot of each name
* `--older-than <duration>`: Remove snapshots older than duration (e.g. `30d`, `6m`, `1y`)
* `--older-than <duration>`: Remove snapshots older than duration (e.g. `30d`,
`4w`, `6mo`, `1y`; `m` is minutes, `mo` is months)
* `--snapshot <name>`: Restrict to specific snapshot names (repeat for multiple)
* `--force`: Skip confirmation prompt
@@ -274,6 +347,10 @@ on the destination in one go, use `vaultik remote nuke --force`.
**`snapshot restore`**: Restore files from a backup snapshot.
* Requires `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY` environment variable
* Accepts a snapshot ID, or — for a snapshot only on the destination
store — its remote key (or an unambiguous leading part of it) as shown
by `snapshot list`. See
[restoring on another machine](#restoring-on-another-machine).
* Optional path arguments to restore specific files/directories (default: all)
* Preserves file permissions, timestamps, ownership (ownership requires root),
symlinks, and empty directories
@@ -337,6 +414,10 @@ both are set.
## architecture
For an implementation-level view of the internals — the data model, the
`fx` dependency-injection wiring, and the scanner — see
[`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md).
### remote storage layout
```
@@ -344,7 +425,7 @@ both are set.
├── blobs/
│ └── <aa>/<bb>/<full_blob_hash>
└── metadata/
└── <snapshot_id>/
└── <remote-key>/
├── db.zst.age # Encrypted binary SQLite database
└── manifest.json.zst # Unencrypted blob list (for pruning)
```
@@ -355,8 +436,18 @@ both are set.
* `manifest.json.zst` is an unencrypted compressed JSON blob list, enabling
pruning without the private key
Snapshot IDs follow the format `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>`
(e.g. `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`).
Snapshot IDs follow the human-readable format
`<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>` (e.g.
`server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`), but this ID is never written to the
destination store in plaintext. Each snapshot's metadata directory is named
with its `<remote-key>`, a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the ID, so a listing
of the store reveals no hostname or snapshot name. The backup time is not
hidden: manifest.json.zst carries a plaintext timestamp, and object
modification times are visible at the storage layer regardless. For example,
`server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z` is stored under
`metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`.
See [docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) for the
derivation.
### data flow
@@ -373,7 +464,7 @@ Snapshot IDs follow the format `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>`
**restore:**
1. Download and decrypt `metadata/<snapshot_id>/db.zst.age`
1. Download and decrypt `metadata/<remote-key>/db.zst.age`
2. Open the binary SQLite database
3. Query files (optionally filtered by paths)
4. Download and decrypt required blobs
@@ -404,25 +495,30 @@ Snapshot IDs follow the format `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>`
### compression
* zstd compression at configurable level (1-19, default 3)
* zstd compression at configurable level (1-19, default 3). The level is
accepted as 1-19 but maps onto zstd's four internal speed presets:
1-2 fastest, 3-5 default, 6-9 better, 10-19 best. Levels within the
same band compress identically.
* Applied before encryption at the blob level
---
## configuration reference
Run `vaultik config init` to generate a fully commented config file.
Key fields:
Run `vaultik config init` to generate a fully commented config file; a
complete annotated example also lives in
[`config.example.yml`](config.example.yml). Key fields:
| Field | Default | Description |
|-------|---------|-------------|
| `age_recipients` | (required) | Age public keys for encryption |
| `age_secret_key` | (unset) | Age private key for decryption (`snapshot restore`, `snapshot verify --deep`). Setting it in the config file places the private key on the backed-up host, defeating the public-key-only design (see "why" above). Prefer the `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY` environment variable, supplied only on the machine you restore from. |
| `snapshots` | (required) | Named snapshot definitions with paths and excludes |
| `storage_url` | | Storage backend URL (`s3://`, `file://`, `rclone://`) |
| `s3.*` | | Legacy S3 configuration (endpoint, bucket, credentials) |
| `exclude` | | Global exclude patterns (applied to all snapshots) |
| `chunk_size` | `10MB` | Average chunk size for content-defined chunking |
| `blob_size_limit` | `10GB` | Maximum blob size before splitting |
| `blob_size_limit` | `10GB` | Maximum blob size before splitting. Must be at least four times `chunk_size` (the largest chunk the chunker can emit), otherwise a single-chunk blob could exceed the limit |
| `compression_level` | `3` | zstd compression level (1-19) |
| `hostname` | system hostname | Hostname used in snapshot IDs |
| `index_path` | platform data dir | Local SQLite index path |
@@ -446,9 +542,13 @@ Key fields:
sequentially. Restore speed is bound by single-stream throughput.
* **Device nodes, named pipes, and sockets are silently skipped.** Only
regular files, directories, and symlinks are backed up.
* **No database migrations.** If the local SQLite schema changes between
versions, delete the local database (`vaultik database delete`) and run
a full backup. Remote storage is unaffected.
* **No upgrade path between versions.** There is no supported way to carry
an existing local index across a schema change; if the local SQLite
schema changes between versions, delete the local database (`vaultik
database delete`) and run a full backup. Remote storage is unaffected.
(The binary does embed numbered schema files and a `schema_migrations`
table to bootstrap a fresh database — see [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)
— but that is not an upgrade path.)
* **Files that change during backup may be inconsistent.** There is no
filesystem snapshot or freeze. If a file is modified between the scan
and chunk phases, the backed-up copy may reflect a partial write.
@@ -514,14 +614,12 @@ priority.
### infrastructure
* **Cross-machine restore documentation.** The "restore from
another host" workflow works but isn't documented as a
first-class operation in this README. Worth a dedicated section
once it's settled.
* **Schema migrations.** Currently nonexistent — pre-1.0 schema
changes are handled by `vaultik database delete` plus a full
re-scan. Post-1.0 we'll need a migration story to keep existing
index databases usable across upgrades.
* **Cross-version schema upgrades.** There is no upgrade path between
released versions — pre-1.0 schema changes are handled by `vaultik
database delete` plus a full re-scan (see
[`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)). Post-1.0 we'll need a
migration story to keep existing index databases usable across
upgrades.
* **Storage backend coverage tests.** S3, file://, and rclone://
all share the Storer interface but the rclone path is the least
exercised in CI.
@@ -530,9 +628,17 @@ priority.
## output style
All user-facing output goes through helpers in `internal/ui` and conforms
to a uniform style. Color is enabled when stdout is a TTY and the
`NO_COLOR` environment variable is unset (https://no-color.org/).
The operational narration of the long-running commands — the Begin,
Complete, Progress, and status lines of `snapshot create`, `prune`,
`snapshot restore`, and the like — goes through helpers in `internal/ui`
and conforms to the uniform style below. Some commands instead write
plain text straight to stdout (`version`, `info`, `config`, the
`database delete` prompt, and the `snapshot list` table); that output is
unstyled and does not honor `--quiet`. Routing it through `internal/ui`
is tracked in
[issue #149](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/149). Color is
enabled when stdout is a TTY and the `NO_COLOR` environment variable is
unset (https://no-color.org/).
`internal/ui` writes to stdout; it is the output the user asked for.
Structured log records are a different thing and go through
@@ -598,11 +704,11 @@ regardless of color setting (emoji are not color).
* Go 1.26 or later
* Docker, with a reachable daemon, to lint, check, or commit:
`script/lint` runs the digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image declared by
the `Dockerfile` lint stage, and `make check` and the pre-commit hook
both run it. A `golangci-lint` installed on `PATH` is not a substitute
and is never used on a host, whatever its version.
* `sqlite3` CLI, which the test suite shells out to
`script/lint` lints by building `Dockerfile.lint`, which runs the
digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image as a build step, and `make check`
and the pre-commit hook both run it. A `golangci-lint` installed on
`PATH` is not a substitute and is never used on a host, whatever its
version.
* S3-compatible object storage (or local filesystem, or rclone remote)
## development workflow
@@ -633,8 +739,8 @@ standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
them. We provide:
* `script/bootstrap` — install all development dependencies (go, sqlite3,
Go module download). It deliberately does not install `golangci-lint`;
* `script/bootstrap` — install all development dependencies (go, Go
module download). It deliberately does not install `golangci-lint`;
see `script/lint` below.
* `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: runs
`script/bootstrap`, then `script/install-precommit`
@@ -648,6 +754,14 @@ them. We provide:
called by `script/bootstrap`; the release workflow calls it directly
because it needs `goreleaser` but not the Docker daemon
`script/bootstrap` insists on.
* `script/install-go` — install the Go toolchain named by `go.mod`'s
`go` directive into `.tool/go` from a sha256-verified `go.dev`
archive, and put it on `PATH`. Idempotent. Called only by the release
workflow, which needs a host Go for `goreleaser` to shell out to;
nothing else on the release runner does. `actions/setup-go` is not
used because it verifies the downloaded toolchain against no value in
this repo. Bumping Go edits `go.mod`, the checksum in this script, and
the `Dockerfile` `golang` digest together.
* `script/release` — cross-compile and publish the release artifacts
with the pinned `goreleaser`. Refuses a `goreleaser` on `PATH` whose
version is not the pinned one, on the same reasoning as `script/lint`.
@@ -671,46 +785,71 @@ them. We provide:
diverges from the 30s `REPO_POLICIES.md` mandates; the reasoning is in
the comment in the script, and issue #101 proposes amending the policy
text.
* `script/lint`run `golangci-lint run ./...` at the exact version CI
uses, by running the digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image declared by
the `Dockerfile` lint stage (requires Docker; it fails loudly rather
than falling back to a differently versioned `golangci-lint` on
`PATH`). That `FROM` line is the single source of truth for the linter
version — bump it there and nowhere else.
* `script/lint`lint by building `Dockerfile.lint`, which runs
`golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...` as a build step
inside the digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image, so a successful build
*is* a clean lint. Nothing lints on the host, at any version, ever;
the script requires Docker and fails loudly rather than falling back
to a `golangci-lint` on `PATH`. That `FROM` line is the single source
of truth for the linter version — bump it there and nowhere else.
It takes no arguments, because a build step has no command line to
pass flags to, and it passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` on
every invocation so the lint layer cannot be replayed from cache (see
`script/cibuild` below for what that mechanism defends against). To
watch the linter execute, run it as
`BUILDKIT_PROGRESS=plain script/lint` and check that the lint layer
says `RUN … golangci-lint` rather than `CACHED`.
One container per run means one lint cache and one `golangci-lint`
lock per run, both private to it and discarded with it, so concurrent
runs on one host cannot contaminate or block each other.
* `script/lint-fix` — apply the linter's autofixes (rewrites files),
using the same pinned linter
using the same pinned image, parsed out of `Dockerfile.lint`. It
cannot be a build step, because fixes have to land in the worktree, so
it bind-mounts the tree into a `docker run` and therefore needs a
*local* daemon. It is a developer convenience and never a gate: no
gate reads its exit status. Run `make lint` afterwards to find out
whether the tree is clean.
* `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
* `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
* `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and
`script/fmt-check`. This is authoritative *because* `script/lint` uses
the pinned linter: a local `make check` and CI cannot disagree about
lint findings.
`script/fmt-check`. This is authoritative *because* `script/lint`
builds `Dockerfile.lint`: a local `make check` and CI cannot disagree
about lint findings.
* `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via
`script/projectname`. Passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` for the
same reason `script/cibuild` does, so a local image build cannot be
green on checks it replayed from cache.
* `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build` (the `Dockerfile`
runs `make fmt-check` and `make lint` in its lint stage and `make
test` in its builder stage). This is the full CI-equivalent gate — it
runs the checks in the same containers CI does, from a clean copy of
the tree, so it also catches anything that depends on host state. It
passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH`, unique per invocation, which
the `Dockerfile` declares immediately above the check `RUN`s in both
stages and expands into each check command. Those layers are keyed on
green on checks it replayed from cache. It builds the *product* image
only, and the product `Dockerfile` has no lint stage, so it does not
lint: a green here means formatted, tested, and it compiles.
* `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint, and the full gate. Two builds, in
order: `Dockerfile.lint` (the linter, as a build step) and then
`Dockerfile` (`make fmt-check` and `make test` in its builder stage,
then the product image). Either failing fails the script. It runs the
checks in the same containers CI does, from a clean copy of the tree,
so it also catches anything that depends on host state.
`.gitea/workflows/check.yml` runs it on every push to `main` and
`next` and on every pull request against either.
It passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` to each build, unique per
invocation, which both files declare immediately above their check
`RUN`s and expand into each check command. Those layers are keyed on
that value, so a new value re-runs them even on a byte-identical tree,
and a green from this script means the checks executed. Dependency and
module layers sit above the `ARG` and still cache, so a build is not
cold.
A build that supplies no `CHECK_EPOCH` — a bare `docker build .`
fails rather than lying. An unset `ARG` is an empty string and an
empty string is a stable cache key, so without a guard such a build
would serve all three check layers from cache, execute nothing, and
still exit 0. Each check stage therefore asserts the value is
non-empty before running anything, and because failed steps are never
cached that assertion fires on every invocation rather than once. Use
`script/cibuild` (or `script/docker`, which passes the same arg); a
bare `docker build .` is now a loud error.
A build that supplies no `CHECK_EPOCH` — a bare `docker build .` or
`docker build -f Dockerfile.lint .` — fails rather than lying. An
unset `ARG` is an empty string and an empty string is a stable cache
key, so without a guard such a build would serve every check layer
from cache, execute nothing, and still exit 0. Each file therefore
asserts the value is non-empty before running anything, and because
failed steps are never cached that assertion fires on every
invocation rather than once. Use `script/lint`, `script/docker` or
`script/cibuild`, which pass the arg; a bare `docker build` is a loud
error.
* `script/precommit` — pre-commit gate: `go mod tidy` + `go fmt` (must
not change files), then `script/check`
* `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
+170 -1
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,175 @@ release" is exactly the contradiction
# Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21: Stopped an interrupted blob upload from making a later
backup deduplicate against data that was never stored
([issue #148](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/148)). The
packer commits a blob's `chunks`, `blob_chunks`, and `blobs` rows
before the upload is attempted, so a failed upload left chunk rows
behind and the next run skipped re-uploading them, producing a
snapshot that reported success but could not be restored. A run now
deduplicates only against chunks held by a blob whose `uploaded_ts` is
set, and at startup drops any un-uploaded blob rows (and the chunks
they orphan) so the affected data is re-chunked and re-uploaded. Blobs
recorded with no remote backend are marked uploaded so this invariant
holds uniformly.
- 2026-09-22: Made restore refuse any snapshot path that would write
outside the target directory
([issue #154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/154)).
`restoreFile` and `verifyRestoredFiles` joined the stored path onto the
target with no containment check, so a `..` segment or an absolute path
escaped the target and a restored symlink could redirect a later child
write anywhere on disk. Every stored path is now rejected unless
`filepath.IsLocal` accepts it with the leading separator removed, and
each existing ancestor directory below the target is `Lstat`ed to refuse
descending through a symlink; honest symlinks pointing outside the tree
are still written verbatim. age decryption proves a snapshot is
readable, not honest, and restore usually runs as root.
- 2026-09-21: Stopped `--json` from silencing stderr diagnostics
([issue #112](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/112)). `--json`
used to be folded into `Quiet`, which pinned the log level to `WARN`,
so `prune --json` gave a machine consumer no record of the local index
rows it deleted even under `--verbose`. `--json` now quiets only the
stdout UI (the JSON document must stay clean, per
[issue #108](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/108)); the stderr
log level follows `--verbose`/`--debug` again. The coupling was
removed the same way for `snapshot verify`, `snapshot remove`, and
`remote info`, which carried it for the same outdated reason.
- 2026-09-21: Stopped `prune` from reporting a failed row count as 0
([issue #96](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/96)). The seven
`getTableCount` reads in `PruneDatabase` discarded their error, so a
query that could not run became a plausible `0` and the before/after
delta computed from it looked like real work. Each read now logs at
warn on failure and renders as `unknown`, never `0`, so an empty table
is distinguishable from one that could not be queried. The counts have
no `--json` representation — under `--json` the summary is suppressed
entirely — so nothing there can show a false `0`.
- 2026-09-21: Made the s3 storage backend report a missing object as
`storage.ErrNotFound`, like the `file` and `rclone` backends and as the
`Storer` interface documents. `S3Storer.Get` and `Stat` returned the raw
AWS SDK error, so `errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound)` was false on s3
and callers branched differently per backend. Added a small `s3.IsNotFound`
helper (reused by `HeadObject`) and a test that a missing key maps to
`ErrNotFound`
([issue #129](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/129)).
- 2026-09-21: Fixed `verify --deep` reporting healthy snapshots as
corrupt. Its final blob-integrity check hashed the encrypted
downloaded bytes with a single SHA256 and compared that to the blob
ID, which is the double SHA256 of the plaintext, so the two could
never match. It now hashes the decompressed plaintext and compares the
double SHA256. Added a test that backs up a real snapshot, deep-verifies
it, then flips a byte in one stored blob and confirms deep verification
then fails
([issue #131](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/131)).
- 2026-09-21: Made `snapshot create` VACUUM the per-snapshot metadata
database through the `modernc.org/sqlite` driver instead of shelling
out to the external `sqlite` command-line binary (issue #120). A
backup no longer needs that binary on `PATH`, so `make check` passes
on a stock `go install` host; `script/bootstrap` and the `Dockerfile`
(both the test-build and the shipped runtime stage) no longer install
it, and a new test asserts the uploaded database keeps no pages from
deleted rows. Dropped the now-false note on the 2026-08-07 entry below
that said bootstrap installs it.
- 2026-09-21: Made `.gitea/workflows/check.yml` run on pushes to `main`
and `next` and on pull requests against either, so unit PRs (whose
base is `next`) and `next` itself get a CI run instead of relying on a
local `make check`
([issue #122](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/122)).
- 2026-09-21: Hash-verified the Go toolchain in the release workflow
([issue #105](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/105)). New
`script/install-go` downloads the exact `go.dev` archive for `go.mod`'s
`go` directive and refuses it unless its sha256 matches a value
committed in the script; `.gitea/workflows/release.yml` calls it
instead of `actions/setup-go`, which verified the downloaded toolchain
against nothing in the repo. `GOTOOLCHAIN: local` on the release step
keeps that exact compiler from auto-switching. Bumping Go now touches
`go.mod`, the checksum, and the `Dockerfile` `golang` digest together.
- 2026-09-21: Collapsed the two duration parsers into one and fixed the
`--older-than` months example
([issue #123](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/123)). Two
functions named `parseDuration` existed with different grammars;
`snapshot purge --older-than` and `--keep-newer-than` both already went
through the one in `internal/vaultik`, while the richer copy in
`internal/cli/duration.go` was reachable only from its own test. Kept
the live-path parser and deleted the unused one, so no flag's accepted
grammar changes. The trap the issue was filed over: `README.md`
documented `6m` as the months example for `--older-than`, but `m` is
minutes, so the documented command deleted every snapshot older than
six minutes on a destructive flag. Corrected the doc to `6mo` and put
both flags' help text on one example list that states `m` is minutes
and `mo` is months. The surviving parser now rejects negatives, which
it previously accepted (`-5h`) or silently made positive (`-5d`).
Table-driven tests cover every unit, `6m` as six minutes, `6mo` as 180
days, and rejection of a bare number, an unknown unit, and a negative.
- 2026-08-10: Moved every lint run into its own container, as a build
step ([issue #113](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113)).
New root `Dockerfile.lint`, built by `script/lint`, runs
`golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...` as a `RUN`
instruction in the digest-pinned `golangci/golangci-lint` image: a
successful build of that file *is* a clean lint, and it works even
where the daemon is remote and bind mounts are impossible. That
`FROM` line is now the only pin of the linter version in the repo.
This supersedes the per-worktree cache isolation landed for
[issue #99](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/99). Isolation
fixed cross-worktree contamination but not lock contention — two
concurrent runs with entirely separate cache directories still
collided. A container per run has its own cache and its own lock, so
the whole class is gone, and with it the per-worktree cache
machinery, the lock-retry loop, and `script/lint-audit`, which
existed to catch replayed findings from a cache that no longer
exists. The host lint path went too: no escape hatch, no
`VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER`, no version detection. Nothing lints on
the host at any version.
A cached build lints nothing, so the same `CHECK_EPOCH` mechanism the
product `Dockerfile` already used is what makes the green mean
something: `ARG CHECK_EPOCH` with no default below the module layers,
a `RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1` guard, the value expanded
into each check command, and a fresh `$(date +%s%N)$$` per invocation
computed as a bare assignment. `cmd/vaultik/lintdocker_test.go`
parses both Dockerfiles and both scripts and fails if any part of
that is dropped, because every way of losing it is silent. No test
asserts that no script runs the host linter: `script/lint` is the one
lint entry point and runs `golangci-lint` only inside the container,
and keeping it that way is a review matter, not something a test
proves.
The product `Dockerfile` lost its lint stage rather than gaining a
second linter pin: `make lint` is now `docker build`, so the stage
would have been docker-in-docker with no daemon, and calling
`golangci-lint` directly there would have restored the two-pins drift
of [issue #78](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/78).
`make fmt-check` moved beside `make test` in the builder stage, and
`script/cibuild` now builds `Dockerfile.lint` and then `Dockerfile`,
each with its own fresh epoch. Consequence, stated rather than left
to be found: `script/docker` builds the product image only and no
longer lints; the gates are `script/check` and `script/cibuild`.
`golangci-lint config verify` runs as its own epoch-keyed layer,
above the lint. `golangci-lint run` rejects a config it cannot parse
but silently ignores an unknown top-level *key*: renaming `linters:`
to `linterz:` discarded `default: all` and every threshold and still
exited 0 on a tree the real config fails. `config verify` catches
that, and it does so with the network off at this pin — checked under
`docker run --network none`, not assumed. An earlier revision omitted
it on the claim that it fetches its schema over live HTTPS; that
claim was false at v2.12.2.
`script/lint-fix` is kept, reimplemented as a
bind-mounted `docker run` against the image parsed out of
`Dockerfile.lint` — it cannot be a build step, because fixes have to
land in the worktree — and marked in its header as a developer
convenience that no gate reads.
- 2026-08-09: Finished the `--json` stdout contract and gave `make build`
a rule ([issue #108](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/108),
[issue #110](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/110)). Two
@@ -463,7 +632,7 @@ release" is exactly the contradiction
was green was wrong.
- 2026-08-07: Added the standard `.golangci.yml` and `.editorconfig`
(issue #59); lint findings under the new config are tracked in issue
#61. `script/bootstrap` now installs sqlite3 (needed by tests).
#61.
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-07-02: Consolidated CLI verbs, retired overlapping commands; bound
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
package main_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// This file guards the version stamping of the product image (issue
// #75). The failure it protects against is silent: the image still
// builds and runs, but `vaultik version` inside it reports "commit:
// unknown", so an operator cannot tell which source produced a given
// backup. .dockerignore excludes .git, so the build cannot derive the
// commit itself; the values must be computed on the host and passed in.
//
// These are parses of the committed files, for the same reason the lint
// guards next door are: shelling out to docker would nest a build
// inside `make test`. That `vaultik version` in the built image really
// prints the host's version is verified by hand and recorded on the
// pull request.
// dockerScript is script/docker, relative to the repository root.
const dockerScript = "script/docker"
// versionArgs are the ldflag targets the build stamps and, matching
// them, the build args the host must supply. The names line up so the
// same list checks both files.
func versionArgs() []string {
return []string{"VERSION", "COMMIT", "COMMIT_DATE"}
}
// TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArgs fails unless the build
// declares each version arg and stamps it into the binary by ldflag
// reference, rather than computing it in the container.
func TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArgs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
found := instructions(t, productDockerfile)
for _, arg := range versionArgs() {
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, "ARG "+arg), 0,
"%s must declare `ARG %s` so the host can pass it in",
productDockerfile, arg)
assertLdflagReferences(t, found, arg)
}
}
// TestProductDockerfileDoesNotDeriveVersionItself is the anti-regression
// for the original defect: the container ran `git rev-parse`, but .git
// is not in the build context, so it always resolved to "unknown". No
// git command may reach into a build that cannot see the history.
func TestProductDockerfileDoesNotDeriveVersionItself(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
text := instructionText(readRepoFile(t, productDockerfile))
assert.NotContains(t, text, "git ",
"%s must not run git: .git is excluded from the build context, so"+
" any value it derives is wrong. Pass version, commit and date"+
" in as build args instead.", productDockerfile)
}
// TestDockerScriptComputesVersionOnTheHost fails unless script/docker
// derives each value where .git exists and passes it as a build arg,
// with VERSION coming from script/version so a Docker build reports the
// same string a local build of the same tree would.
func TestDockerScriptComputesVersionOnTheHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
script := readRepoFile(t, dockerScript)
for _, arg := range versionArgs() {
assert.Contains(t, script, "--build-arg "+arg+"=",
"%s must pass --build-arg %s to the build", dockerScript, arg)
}
assert.Contains(t, script, "/version",
"%s must take VERSION from script/version, the source of truth"+
" shared with the Makefile", dockerScript)
}
// assertLdflagReferences fails unless some build instruction stamps the
// named variable from the ARG (a ${arg} reference), not from a value
// computed inside the container.
func assertLdflagReferences(t *testing.T, found []string, arg string) {
t.Helper()
for _, instruction := range found {
if strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "RUN ") &&
strings.Contains(instruction, "go build") &&
strings.Contains(instruction, "${"+arg+"}") {
return
}
}
assert.Fail(t, "version arg is declared but never stamped",
"the go build in %s must reference ${%s} in its ldflags, or the"+
" arg is passed and discarded", productDockerfile, arg)
}
+367
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
package main_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// This file guards the shape of the lint gate. Every property asserted
// here is one whose loss is SILENT: the build still exits 0, the gate
// still looks green, and nothing was linted or tested.
//
// The gate is a build step. script/lint builds Dockerfile.lint, which
// runs golangci-lint as a RUN instruction, so a successful build is a
// clean lint. BuildKit will happily replay that RUN from cache on an
// unchanged tree in well under a second, which is why the check layers
// are keyed on a CHECK_EPOCH build arg that the calling script
// regenerates per invocation, and why an empty value is a hard error
// rather than a stable cache key.
//
// These are parses rather than invocations. Shelling out to docker from
// the test suite would nest a build inside `make test`, which itself
// runs inside a build in CI. The one property a parse cannot establish
// -- that a real finding actually fails the build -- is verified by
// hand against a deliberately broken tree, recorded on the pull
// request.
//
// One property is deliberately NOT tested here: that no script runs the
// linter on the host. script/lint is the only lint entry point, and it
// runs golangci-lint only inside the container; keeping it that way is a
// review matter, not something a test in this file establishes.
// The files under guard, relative to the repository root.
const (
lintDockerfile = "Dockerfile.lint"
productDockerfile = "Dockerfile"
lintScript = "script/lint"
cibuildScript = "script/cibuild"
)
// linterBinary is the linter's command name, used to locate the
// config-verify and lint steps in Dockerfile.lint.
const linterBinary = "golangci-lint"
// checkEpochARG is the declaration, with no default value. A default
// would satisfy the non-empty guard with a constant, and a constant is
// a stable cache key: the checks would be replayed from cache forever
// after the first build.
const checkEpochARG = "ARG CHECK_EPOCH"
// checkEpochGuard is what turns a build that omits --build-arg into a
// loud failure instead of a quiet green. Failed steps are never cached,
// so it fires on every such invocation rather than once.
const checkEpochGuard = `RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1`
// freshEpoch is the epoch computation the calling scripts must use, as
// a bare assignment on its own line. Inline in an argument, a failing
// `date` would not abort under `set -eu`; CHECK_EPOCH would become the
// empty string, and the guard above would be the only thing standing
// between that and a permanently cached green. `$$` is required because
// `date +%s` is second-granular and busybox silently drops `%N`, so
// without the pid two concurrent runs in one second can collide.
const freshEpoch = `epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"`
// TestLintDockerfilePinsTheLinterByDigest fails if the lint image stops
// being pinned. An unpinned tag makes the gate's verdict depend on
// whatever the registry currently serves under that name.
func TestLintDockerfilePinsTheLinterByDigest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
from := ""
for _, instruction := range instructions(t, lintDockerfile) {
if strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "FROM ") {
from = instruction
break
}
}
require.NotEmpty(t, from, "%s declares no FROM", lintDockerfile)
assert.Contains(t, from, "golangci/golangci-lint",
"the lint image must be the golangci-lint image")
assert.Contains(t, from, "@sha256:",
"the lint image must be pinned by digest, not by tag alone")
}
// TestLintDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen pins the whole cache-busting
// mechanism in the file that lints: the declaration with no default,
// the non-empty guard, and the value expanded into the lint command
// itself rather than merely declared.
func TestLintDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
found := instructions(t, lintDockerfile)
argAt := indexOf(found, checkEpochARG)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, argAt, 0,
"%s must declare `%s` with no default value",
lintDockerfile, checkEpochARG)
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, checkEpochGuard), argAt,
"%s must guard against an empty CHECK_EPOCH with `%s`",
lintDockerfile, checkEpochGuard)
assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "golangci-lint run")
// Dependency layers must stay above the ARG, or every lint run
// re-downloads the module cache and the inner loop becomes
// unusable.
download := indexOf(found, "RUN go mod download")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, download, 0,
"%s must download modules in their own layer", lintDockerfile)
assert.Less(t, download, argAt,
"`%s` must come after `go mod download` so dependency layers"+
" still cache", checkEpochARG)
}
// TestLintDockerfileVerifiesTheLinterConfig guards the validation of
// .golangci.yml itself. `golangci-lint run` rejects a config it cannot
// parse but silently IGNORES an unknown top-level key, so renaming
// `linters:` to `linterz:` discards `default: all` and every threshold
// and still exits 0 reporting no issues. `config verify` is what turns
// that into a failure, and it has to run BEFORE the lint, or the lint
// spends a minute reporting a verdict from a config already known to be
// wrong.
func TestLintDockerfileVerifiesTheLinterConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
found := instructions(t, lintDockerfile)
verify := linterBinary + " config verify"
verifyAt := indexContaining(found, verify)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, verifyAt, 0,
"%s must run `%s --config .golangci.yml`: without it a typo'd"+
" top-level key in .golangci.yml is silently ignored and the"+
" gate passes with only the default linter set", lintDockerfile,
verify)
runAt := indexContaining(found, linterBinary+" run")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, runAt, 0, "%s must lint", lintDockerfile)
assert.Less(t, verifyAt, runAt,
"%s must verify the config before linting with it", lintDockerfile)
// Keyed on the epoch like every other check layer, so it executes
// per invocation rather than being replayed. A cached validation
// validates nothing.
assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found, verify)
}
// TestProductDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen holds the same line for the
// checks that remain in the product image build.
func TestProductDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
found := instructions(t, productDockerfile)
argAt := indexOf(found, checkEpochARG)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, argAt, 0,
"%s must declare `%s` with no default value",
productDockerfile, checkEpochARG)
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, checkEpochGuard), argAt,
"%s must guard against an empty CHECK_EPOCH", productDockerfile)
assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "make fmt-check")
assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "make test")
}
// TestProductDockerfileDoesNotLint records the split deliberately: the
// linter lives in Dockerfile.lint and nowhere else, so there is exactly
// one digest pinning it. A lint stage reintroduced here would either be
// docker-in-docker (`make lint` is now `docker build`) or a second,
// independently bumpable pin.
func TestProductDockerfileDoesNotLint(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
contents := readRepoFile(t, productDockerfile)
for _, forbidden := range []string{"golangci", "make lint"} {
assert.NotContains(t, instructionText(contents), forbidden,
"%s must not lint: the linter is pinned once, in %s",
productDockerfile, lintDockerfile)
}
}
// TestLintScriptBuildsTheLintDockerfileWithAFreshEpoch is the other
// half of the mechanism. The Dockerfile's guard only rejects an EMPTY
// epoch; a constant non-empty one would satisfy it and still be served
// from cache forever.
func TestLintScriptBuildsTheLintDockerfileWithAFreshEpoch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
script := readRepoFile(t, lintScript)
assertBareEpochAssignment(t, script, lintScript)
assert.Contains(t, script, `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch"`,
"%s must pass the fresh epoch to the build", lintScript)
assert.Contains(t, script, lintDockerfile,
"%s must build %s", lintScript, lintDockerfile)
}
// TestCibuildBuildsBothDockerfilesWithFreshEpochs guards the CI gate:
// dropping either build silently removes a whole class of check from
// CI while leaving it green.
func TestCibuildBuildsBothDockerfilesWithFreshEpochs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
script := readRepoFile(t, cibuildScript)
assertBareEpochAssignment(t, script, cibuildScript)
assert.Equal(t, 2, strings.Count(script, freshEpoch),
"%s must compute a fresh epoch for each of its two builds",
cibuildScript)
assert.Equal(t, 2,
strings.Count(script, `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch"`),
"%s must pass a fresh epoch to both builds", cibuildScript)
assert.Contains(t, script, "-f Dockerfile.lint",
"%s must build %s", cibuildScript, lintDockerfile)
}
// assertEpochExpandedInto fails unless some instruction runs the named
// command with the epoch expanded into it. Expansion, not mere
// declaration: an ARG that no instruction references is not guaranteed
// to key the layer, and the expansion also puts the value in the build
// log where a reader can see the layer was keyed fresh.
func assertEpochExpandedInto(t *testing.T, found []string, command string) {
t.Helper()
for _, instruction := range found {
if !strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "RUN ") {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(instruction, command) &&
strings.Contains(instruction, "${CHECK_EPOCH}") {
return
}
}
assert.Fail(t, "no epoch-keyed layer runs the command",
"`%s` must run in a layer that expands ${CHECK_EPOCH}, or it"+
" will be replayed from cache without executing", command)
}
// assertBareEpochAssignment fails unless the script computes the epoch
// as a bare assignment on its own line.
func assertBareEpochAssignment(t *testing.T, script, name string) {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(script, "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(line) == freshEpoch {
return
}
}
assert.Fail(t, "no bare epoch assignment",
"%s must compute `%s` as a bare assignment on its own line, so"+
" `set -e` catches a failing date instead of quietly"+
" building with an empty epoch", name, freshEpoch)
}
// instructions returns the Dockerfile's instructions, one per element,
// with comments and blank lines dropped and continuation lines joined,
// so a multi-line RUN is one string.
func instructions(t *testing.T, name string) []string {
t.Helper()
return strings.Split(instructionText(readRepoFile(t, name)), "\n")
}
// instructionText is instructions' parse, before splitting: it is also
// what a "must not contain" assertion should look at, so that a word
// appearing only in a comment is not mistaken for behaviour.
func instructionText(contents string) string {
var (
out []string
continued string
isContinued bool
)
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(contents, "\n") {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if !isContinued && (trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#")) {
continue
}
isContinued = strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
continued += strings.TrimSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
if isContinued {
continue
}
out = append(out, strings.Join(strings.Fields(continued), " "))
continued = ""
}
return strings.Join(out, "\n")
}
// indexOf returns the position of the first instruction equal to, or
// beginning with, want; -1 if there is none. An `ARG NAME=default`
// counts as beginning with `ARG NAME`, so a declared arg is found
// whether or not it carries a default.
func indexOf(found []string, want string) int {
for i, instruction := range found {
if instruction == want ||
strings.HasPrefix(instruction, want+" ") ||
strings.HasPrefix(instruction, want+"=") {
return i
}
}
return -1
}
// indexContaining returns the position of the first instruction
// containing want; -1 if there is none.
func indexContaining(found []string, want string) int {
for i, instruction := range found {
if strings.Contains(instruction, want) {
return i
}
}
return -1
}
// readRepoFile reads a file by its path relative to the repository
// root.
func readRepoFile(t *testing.T, name string) string {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // G304: the path is a constant relative to this repo
contents, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot(t), name))
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(contents)
}
// repoRoot returns the repository root. The test binary runs with its
// package directory as the working directory, so the root is found by
// walking up until the module file appears.
func repoRoot(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
for {
_, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"))
if err == nil {
return dir
}
parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
require.NotEqual(t, dir, parent,
"walked to the filesystem root without finding a go.mod")
dir = parent
}
}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ import (
)
func main() {
os.Exit(run())
}
// run sets up optional profiling, runs the CLI, and returns the process
// exit code. os.Exit lives in main so it fires only after run's deferred
// profile writers have flushed. cli.Entry returns a status code rather
// than calling os.Exit itself: an os.Exit from inside it would skip
// these defers and truncate the profile of a failing command -- exactly
// the command one most often wants to profile.
func run() int {
// CPU profiling: set VAULTIK_CPUPROFILE=/path/to/cpu.prof
if cpuProfile := os.Getenv("VAULTIK_CPUPROFILE"); cpuProfile != "" {
f, err := os.Create(cpuProfile) //nolint:gosec // G304: operator-set path
@@ -46,5 +56,5 @@ func main() {
}()
}
cli.Entry()
return cli.Entry()
}
+2 -20
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
package main_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strings"
@@ -87,27 +85,11 @@ func TestBuildTargetBuildsTheBinary(t *testing.T) {
}
// readMakefile returns the contents of the repository's Makefile. The
// test binary runs with its package directory as the working directory,
// so the root is found by walking up until the Makefile appears.
// root is located by the shared walk in lintdocker_test.go.
func readMakefile(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
for {
//nolint:gosec // G304: the path is this test's own directory walk
contents, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "Makefile"))
if err == nil {
return string(contents)
}
parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
require.NotEqual(t, dir, parent,
"walked to the filesystem root without finding a Makefile")
dir = parent
}
return readRepoFile(t, "Makefile")
}
// phonyTargets returns every name declared phony, across all .PHONY
+2
View File
@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ storage_url: "rclone://las1stor1//srv/pool.2024.04/backups/heraklion"
# Maximum blob size
# Multiple chunks are packed into blobs up to this size
# Must be at least four times chunk_size (the largest chunk the chunker can
# emit); a smaller limit would let a single-chunk blob exceed it.
# Supports: 1GB, 10G, 500MB, 1GiB, etc.
# Default: 10GB
#blob_size_limit: 10GB
+29 -8
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,30 @@
Vaultik uses a local SQLite database to track file metadata, chunk mappings, and blob associations during the backup process. This database serves as an index for incremental backups and enables efficient deduplication.
**Important Notes:**
- **No Migration Support (pre-1.0)**: Vaultik does not support database schema
migrations. The local index is treated as disposable — if the schema changes,
delete the local SQLite database (`vaultik database delete`) and run a full
backup. The remote storage is unaffected; the new index will re-deduplicate
against existing remote blobs.
This section is the authoritative explanation of the schema/migration story;
other documents (the README and `AGENTS.md`) link here.
- **No upgrade path between versions (pre-1.0)**: Vaultik has no supported way to
carry an existing local index across a schema change. The index is disposable
— if the on-disk schema changes between versions, delete the local SQLite
database (`vaultik database delete`) and run a full backup. Remote storage is
unaffected; the new index re-deduplicates against existing remote blobs. This
is the standing project policy, and it is separate from the schema bootstrap
described next.
- **Schema bootstrap**: a fresh database is populated from numbered SQL files
embedded in the binary under `internal/database/schema/`. `000.sql` creates the
`schema_migrations` table; `001.sql` creates the application tables. On opening
a database the code applies each numbered file that has not yet run and records
its version in `schema_migrations`. This bootstraps a new database; it does not
upgrade an existing one between released versions.
- **Changing the schema (pre-1.0)**: edit `internal/database/schema/001.sql` (and
the code that touches the affected tables) directly. Do not add new numbered
files — there is no installed base to migrate.
- **Disposability expires at 1.0**: the index is treated as disposable only until
1.0 ships and is tagged. Once 1.0 is tagged that clause expires and the
question of upgrading existing indexes returns. It is deliberately left open
here.
- **Version Compatibility**: In rare cases, you may need to use the same version
of Vaultik to restore a backup as was used to create it. This ensures
compatibility with the metadata format stored in S3.
@@ -192,10 +211,12 @@ Tracks blob upload metrics.
After a snapshot is completed:
1. Copy database to temporary file
2. Clean temporary database to contain only current snapshot data
3. Export to SQL dump using sqlite3
3. VACUUM the trimmed database so deleted rows leave no pages behind
4. Compress with zstd and encrypt with age
5. Upload to S3 as `metadata/{snapshot-id}/db.zst.age`
6. Generate blob manifest and upload as `metadata/{snapshot-id}/manifest.json.zst`
5. Upload to S3 as `metadata/{remote-key}/db.zst.age`
6. Generate blob manifest and upload as `metadata/{remote-key}/manifest.json.zst`
The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way hash of the human snapshot ID, so the ID is never written to the store in plaintext; see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation).
### 4. Restore Process
+40 -20
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,13 @@ Vaultik stores all backup data in an S3-compatible object store. The repository
│ └── <hash[2:4]>/
│ └── <full-hash>
└── metadata/
└── <snapshot-id>/
└── <remote-key>/
├── db.zst.age
└── manifest.json.zst
```
The metadata subdirectory is named with the **remote key**, a one-way hash of the snapshot ID, not with the human-readable snapshot ID itself. See [Remote Key Derivation](#remote-key-derivation).
## Blobs Directory (`blobs/`)
### Structure
@@ -40,9 +42,11 @@ Blobs contain the actual file data from backups and must be encrypted for securi
## Metadata Directory (`metadata/`)
Each snapshot has its own subdirectory named with the snapshot ID.
Each snapshot has its own subdirectory. The directory is **not** named with the human-readable snapshot ID; it is named with the remote key — a one-way hash of that ID. The human ID is never written to the destination store as a directory name (see [Remote Key Derivation](#remote-key-derivation)).
### Snapshot ID Format
The human-readable snapshot ID is used in CLI arguments, log lines, and the local database. It is not written to the destination store.
- **Format**: `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339>` (or `<hostname>_<RFC3339>` if no
name was specified)
- **Example**: `laptop_home_2024-01-15T14:30:52Z`
@@ -51,6 +55,19 @@ Each snapshot has its own subdirectory named with the snapshot ID.
- Snapshot name from the configured `snapshots:` map (optional)
- RFC3339 UTC timestamp
This ID reveals the hostname, the configured snapshot name, and the backup time, so it is never used as the on-disk directory name — the remote key is used instead.
### Remote Key Derivation
The remote key is `hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + snapshot-id)))`: a double SHA-256 over the snapshot ID, with a `vaultik|` domain-separation prefix. The result is a 64-character hex string with no structure a remote observer can reverse. Implemented in `internal/snapshot/remotekey.go`.
Worked example:
- Snapshot ID: `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`
- Remote key: `17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa`
- Directory: `metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`
Because the hash is one-way, a listing of the destination store reveals neither the hostname nor the snapshot name of any backup. The same remote key is stored in the manifest's `snapshot_id` field.
### Files in Each Snapshot Directory
#### `db.zst.age` - Encrypted Database
@@ -68,16 +85,17 @@ Each snapshot has its own subdirectory named with the snapshot ID.
- **Structure**:
```json
{
"snapshot_id": "laptop_home_2024-01-15T14:30:52Z",
"timestamp": "2024-01-15T14:30:52Z",
"snapshot_id": "17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa",
"timestamp": "2025-06-01T12:00:00Z",
"blob_count": 42,
"total_compressed_size": 1048576,
"blobs": [
"cafebabe1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678",
"deadbeef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678",
...
{ "hash": "cafebabe1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", "compressed_size": 24576 },
{ "hash": "deadbeef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", "compressed_size": 32768 }
]
}
```
`snapshot_id` is the remote key (a hash), not the human ID; `timestamp` is written in the clear.
### Why Manifest is Unencrypted
The manifest must be readable without the private key to enable:
@@ -86,7 +104,7 @@ The manifest must be readable without the private key to enable:
3. **Verification** - Checking blob existence without decryption
4. **Cross-snapshot deduplication analysis** - Finding shared blobs between snapshots
The manifest only contains blob hashes, not file names or any other sensitive information.
The manifest contains the remote key, the backup timestamp, the blob count and total compressed size, and each blob's hash and compressed size. It contains no file names, paths, or other decrypted metadata.
## Security Considerations
@@ -96,19 +114,21 @@ The manifest only contains blob hashes, not file names or any other sensitive in
- **File-to-chunk mappings** (in db.zst.age)
### What's Not Encrypted
- **Blob hashes** (in manifest.json.zst)
- **Snapshot IDs** (directory names)
- **Blob count per snapshot** (in manifest.json.zst)
- **The remote key** — directory names and the manifest `snapshot_id`, a one-way hash of the snapshot ID (see [Remote Key Derivation](#remote-key-derivation))
- **The backup timestamp** (in manifest.json.zst)
- **Blob hashes and their compressed sizes** (in manifest.json.zst)
- **Blob count and total compressed size per snapshot** (in manifest.json.zst)
### Privacy Implications
From the unencrypted data, an observer can determine:
- When backups were taken (from snapshot IDs)
- Which hostname created backups (from snapshot IDs)
- How many blobs each snapshot references
- Which blobs are shared between snapshots (deduplication patterns)
- The size of each encrypted blob
From the unencrypted data, an observer of the destination store can determine:
- **When each backup was taken** — not from the directory name, which is a one-way hash, but from the plaintext `timestamp` field in manifest.json.zst, which is published in the clear
- How many blobs each snapshot references, and the total compressed size
- The compressed size of each blob, and which blobs are shared between snapshots (deduplication patterns)
Together these give an observer a timing-and-size profile of every snapshot. This is an accepted, documented property of the format, not a defect: the manifest is unencrypted so that pruning can run without the private key, and the timing channel could not be closed by encrypting it anyway — object creation times and per-object sizes stay visible at the storage layer on both `s3://` and `file://` destinations regardless.
An observer cannot determine:
- The hostname or snapshot name of any backup (the directory name and the manifest `snapshot_id` are one-way hashes of the human ID)
- File names or paths
- File contents
- File permissions or ownership
@@ -125,10 +145,10 @@ An observer cannot determine:
## Pruning Safety
The prune operation is safe because:
1. It only deletes blobs not referenced in any manifest
1. It keeps every blob listed in any snapshot's manifest and deletes only blobs that no manifest references
2. Manifests are unencrypted and can be read without keys
3. The operation compares the latest local DB snapshot with the latest S3 snapshot to ensure consistency
4. Pruning will fail if these don't match, preventing accidental deletion of needed blobs
3. If any manifest cannot be downloaded or decoded, prune deletes nothing and exits with an error, rather than treating that snapshot's blobs as unreferenced
4. Prune requires exclusive access to the destination: running it during a concurrent backup can race a snapshot whose manifest is not yet written, so do not prune while a backup is in progress
## Restoration Requirements
+9 -2
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ const reservedCompressionCPUs = 2
var ErrInvalidCompressionLevel = errors.New(
"invalid compression level: must be between 1 and 19")
// errInvalidRecipient is returned when a recipient string does not parse as
// an X25519 age1... public key. It omits the value, which can be sensitive.
var errInvalidRecipient = errors.New(
"not a valid X25519 age1... recipient")
// Writer wraps compression and encryption with SHA256 hashing.
// Data flows: input -> tee(hasher, compressor -> encryptor -> destination)
// The hash is computed on the uncompressed input for deterministic content-addressing.
@@ -57,10 +62,12 @@ func NewWriter(
// Parse recipients
var ageRecipients []age.Recipient
for _, recipient := range recipients {
for i, recipient := range recipients {
// The recipient string can be sensitive (e.g. a secret key pasted by
// mistake), so the error names its position, never its value.
r, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(recipient)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing recipient %s: %w", recipient, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: recipient %d", errInvalidRecipient, i)
}
ageRecipients = append(ageRecipients, r)
+17
View File
@@ -108,3 +108,20 @@ func TestWriterDeterministicHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("Encrypted size 1: %d bytes", buf1.Len())
t.Logf("Encrypted size 2: %d bytes", buf2.Len())
}
// TestNewWriterSecretKeyNotEchoed verifies that a secret key mistakenly passed
// as a recipient does not appear in the returned error. A recipient string can
// be sensitive, so the error must name only the position, not the value.
func TestNewWriterSecretKeyNotEchoed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
secretKey := "AGE-SECRET-KEY-19CR5YSFW59HM4TLD6GX" +
"VEDMZFTVVF7PPHKUT68TXSFPK7APHXA2QS2NJA5"
var buf bytes.Buffer
_, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 3, []string{secretKey})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secretKey,
"error must not echo the recipient value")
}
+5 -4
View File
@@ -33,9 +33,10 @@ type Chunker struct {
maxChunkSize int
}
// chunkSizeSpread is the FastCDC-recommended factor between the average
// ChunkSizeSpread is the FastCDC-recommended factor between the average
// chunk size and the minimum (avg/spread) and maximum (avg*spread) sizes.
const chunkSizeSpread = 4
// The largest chunk the chunker can emit is therefore avg*ChunkSizeSpread.
const ChunkSizeSpread = 4
// NewChunker creates a new chunker with the specified average chunk size.
// The actual chunk sizes will vary between avgChunkSize/4 and avgChunkSize*4
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ func NewChunker(avgChunkSize int64) *Chunker {
// FastCDC recommends min = avg/4 and max = avg*4
return &Chunker{
avgChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize),
minChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize / chunkSizeSpread),
maxChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize * chunkSizeSpread),
minChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize / ChunkSizeSpread),
maxChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize * ChunkSizeSpread),
}
}
+192 -104
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/adrg/xdg"
@@ -32,14 +30,33 @@ import (
// may take before we give up.
const shutdownTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// AppOptions contains common options for creating the fx application.
// It includes the configuration file path, logging options, and additional
// fx modules and invocations that should be included in the application.
// lockMode says whether a command mutates persistent state — the local
// index database or the remote store — and so must hold the process-wide
// PID lock, or only reads that state and may run alongside a mutator.
type lockMode int
const (
// mutating commands (snapshot create, snapshot purge, snapshot remove,
// prune, remote nuke) write the local index or the remote store. They
// hold the PID lock so that at most one runs at a time.
mutating lockMode = iota
// readOnly commands (info, snapshot list, snapshot verify, remote info,
// snapshot restore) do not write the local index or the remote store,
// so they run without the lock and are never blocked by a running
// mutator. restore writes only to the target directory it is given.
readOnly
)
// AppOptions contains common options for creating and running the fx
// application: the configuration file path, logging options, additional fx
// modules and invocations, and whether the command mutates persistent
// state (which decides whether it takes the PID lock).
type AppOptions struct {
ConfigPath string
LogOptions log.Options
Modules []fx.Option
Invokes []fx.Option
Mode lockMode
}
// setupGlobals records the startup time and, when an output-suppression
@@ -48,6 +65,11 @@ type AppOptions struct {
// silenced — per the documented convention that --quiet suppresses
// non-error output only. The startup banner is printed by Entry
// before cobra parses arguments, gated by the same arg-level check.
//
// --json quiets the UI here too, because stdout then carries a JSON
// document and human narration would corrupt it. Unlike Quiet it does
// not lower the stderr log level (issue #112), so --verbose/--debug
// still surface diagnostics alongside the document.
func setupGlobals(
lc fx.Lifecycle, g *globals.Globals, v *vaultik.Vaultik, opts log.Options,
) {
@@ -55,7 +77,7 @@ func setupGlobals(
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
g.StartTime = time.Now().UTC()
if opts.Cron || opts.Quiet {
if opts.Cron || opts.Quiet || opts.JSON {
v.UI.SetQuiet(true)
}
@@ -136,75 +158,148 @@ func cleanStartupError(err error) error {
return &startupError{msg: msg}
}
// RunApp starts and stops the fx application within the given context.
// It handles graceful shutdown on interrupt signals (SIGINT, SIGTERM) and
// ensures the application stops cleanly. The function blocks until the
// application completes or is interrupted. Returns an error if startup fails.
// RunApp starts the fx application, blocks until it is asked to stop, and
// then stops it. The app is asked to stop either by an OS interrupt
// (SIGINT/SIGTERM — fx installs its own handler when app.Wait is called) or,
// on normal completion, by the finished operation calling
// Shutdowner.Shutdown(); both arrive on the app.Wait channel.
//
// Stopping runs the fx OnStop hooks, and RunApp does not return until Stop
// returns. On an interrupt the operation's OnStop hook cancels the running
// command and waits for it to unwind — removing its decrypted scratch files —
// so the process cannot proceed to exit mid-cleanup (issue #159). Waiting for
// Stop before returning is what makes that hook effective: routing the
// interrupt through app.Stop and not returning until it completes is required,
// because fx also fires the app.Wait channel on the signal, and an earlier
// version returned on that alone — unwinding to os.Exit while the concurrent
// cleanup still ran. The stop is bounded by shutdownTimeout. Returns an error
// if startup fails.
func RunApp(ctx context.Context, app *fx.App) error {
// Set up signal handling for graceful shutdown
sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(sigChan, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
// Create a context that will be cancelled on signal
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
// Start the app
err := app.Start(ctx)
if err != nil {
return cleanStartupError(err)
}
// Handle shutdown
shutdownComplete := make(chan struct{})
// Block until an interrupt or the finished operation's
// Shutdowner.Shutdown() arrives, then stop the app in this goroutine so we
// return only after its OnStop hooks — including the operation's cleanup
// wait — have run. Detach the stop from ctx's cancellation but keep its
// values, and bound it by shutdownTimeout.
<-app.Wait()
go func() {
defer close(shutdownComplete)
<-sigChan
log.Notice("Received interrupt signal, shutting down gracefully...")
// Create a timeout context for shutdown. The parent ctx is being
// cancelled, so detach from its cancellation but keep its values.
shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
context.WithoutCancel(ctx), shutdownTimeout)
defer shutdownCancel()
defer cancel()
err := app.Stop(shutdownCtx)
err = app.Stop(shutdownCtx)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Error during shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
// Wait for the signal handler to complete shutdown or the app to
// request shutdown.
select {
case <-shutdownComplete:
// Shutdown completed via signal
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
// Context cancelled (shouldn't happen in normal operation)
err := app.Stop(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
}
// errReported marks a failure the operation has already shown the user
// (and deliberately withheld under --json). Entry turns it into a
// non-zero exit status without printing anything further, so the error
// line is not doubled. It flows up from RunOperation through cobra to
// Entry.
var errReported = errors.New("operation failed")
// RunOperation runs op against the Vaultik instance inside the fx app
// and turns a failure into a returned error rather than an os.Exit from
// within the goroutine. An os.Exit there skipped main's deferred
// profile writers -- so profiling a failing command yielded a truncated
// profile (issue #75) -- and RunWithApp's PID-lock release, and denied
// the app any graceful shutdown; returning the error to the top runs
// all three.
//
// op runs in a goroutine so OnStart returns promptly and an interrupt
// can still cancel through OnStop; when it finishes, success or failure,
// it triggers shutdown, which is what lets RunWithApp return. On an
// interrupt OnStop cancels op and waits for the goroutine to return, so
// op's cleanup (removing decrypted scratch files) runs before the
// process exits; the wait is bounded by shutdownTimeout. report is
// called with a non-canceled failure so the caller can log it (and
// suppress it under --json) before it becomes errReported. A context
// cancellation is the interrupt path, not a failure: it is neither
// reported nor counted as one.
func RunOperation(
ctx context.Context, opts AppOptions,
op func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error, report func(err error),
) error {
var (
mu sync.Mutex
failed bool
)
opts.Invokes = append(opts.Invokes,
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
var stop func(context.Context) bool
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
stop = v.StartOperation(func() {
err := op(v)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
report(err)
mu.Lock()
failed = true
mu.Unlock()
}
stopErr := v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if stopErr != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", stopErr)
}
})
return nil
},
// On an interrupt, cancel the operation and wait for it to
// unwind so its cleanup defers (which remove decrypted
// scratch files from the temp directory) run before the
// process exits. The wait is bounded by ctx, the existing
// shutdownTimeout.
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
if !stop(ctx) {
log.Warn("Shutdown timed out before the operation " +
"finished; decrypted temporary files may remain")
}
return nil
},
})
}))
err := RunWithApp(ctx, opts)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Error stopping app", "error", err)
return err
}
return ctx.Err()
case <-app.Done():
// App finished running (e.g., backup completed)
return nil
// The goroutine sets failed before triggering the shutdown that lets
// RunWithApp return, so the write is in place by the time we read it.
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if failed {
return errReported
}
return nil
}
// runVaultikApp runs the standard single-operation command lifecycle
// shared by the list/purge/verify/remove/remote-info subcommands:
// resolve the config, start the fx app, run op against the Vaultik
// instance in a goroutine, report a failure prefixed with failMsg
// (suppressed while suppressErrors is true, e.g. under --json), then
// trigger shutdown. The operation is cancelled when the app stops.
// extraQuiet is OR-ed into LogOptions.Quiet (e.g. --json output modes).
// shared by the snapshot list/purge/remove and remote nuke subcommands:
// resolve the config, then run op against the Vaultik instance through
// RunOperation, reporting a failure prefixed with failMsg (suppressed
// while suppressErrors is true, e.g. under --json). mode says whether the
// command takes the PID lock. jsonOutput marks a command whose stdout is a
// JSON document: it quiets the UI but, unlike Quiet, leaves the stderr log
// level alone.
func runVaultikApp(
cmd *cobra.Command, extraQuiet, suppressErrors bool,
cmd *cobra.Command, mode lockMode, jsonOutput, suppressErrors bool,
failMsg string, op func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error,
) error {
configPath, err := ResolveConfigPath()
@@ -214,75 +309,68 @@ func runVaultikApp(
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet || extraQuiet,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
JSON: jsonOutput,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
go func() {
err := op(v)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
if !suppressErrors {
Mode: mode,
}, op, func(err error) {
if suppressErrors {
return
}
log.Error(failMsg, "error", err)
ReportErrorf("%s: %v", failMsg, err)
}
os.Exit(1)
}
}
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
}
// RunWithApp is a helper that creates and runs an fx app with the given options.
// It combines NewApp and RunApp into a single convenient function. This is the
// preferred way to run CLI commands that need the full application context.
// It acquires a PID lock before starting to prevent concurrent instances.
// A mutating command takes the process-wide PID lock before starting so that
// only one runs at a time; a read-only command runs without it and is not
// blocked while a mutator holds the lock (opts.Mode).
func RunWithApp(ctx context.Context, opts AppOptions) error {
// Acquire PID lock to prevent concurrent instances
lockDir := filepath.Join(xdg.DataHome, "vaultik")
lock, err := pidlock.Acquire(lockDir)
release, err := acquireLockIfMutating(opts.Mode,
filepath.Join(xdg.DataHome, "vaultik"))
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot start: %w", err)
return err
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to acquire lock: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
err := lock.Release()
if err != nil {
log.Warn("Failed to release PID lock", "error", err)
}
}()
defer release()
app := NewApp(opts)
return RunApp(ctx, app)
}
// acquireLockIfMutating takes the process-wide PID lock in lockDir for a
// mutating command and returns a function that releases it. A read-only
// command takes no lock, so it returns a no-op release and is never blocked
// while a mutator holds the lock. ErrAlreadyRunning (another mutator holds
// the lock) is surfaced as a "cannot start" error.
func acquireLockIfMutating(mode lockMode, lockDir string) (func(), error) {
if mode != mutating {
return func() {}, nil
}
lock, err := pidlock.Acquire(lockDir)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot start: %w", err)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to acquire lock: %w", err)
}
return func() {
err := lock.Release()
if err != nil {
log.Warn("Failed to release PID lock", "error", err)
}
}, nil
}
+42
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ package cli //nolint:testpackage // needs access to unexported cleanStartupError
import (
"errors"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/pidlock"
)
func TestCleanStartupError(t *testing.T) {
@@ -53,3 +56,42 @@ func TestCleanStartupError(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestLockScopedToMutatingCommands proves the partition the PID lock now
// enforces: a read-only command runs while a mutator holds the lock, and
// two mutating commands still mutually exclude.
func TestLockScopedToMutatingCommands(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lockDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "vaultik")
// A mutating command takes the process-wide lock.
releaseMutator, err := acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mutating command could not acquire lock: %v", err)
}
// A read-only command runs to completion even while the lock is held.
releaseReader, err := acquireLockIfMutating(readOnly, lockDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read-only command was blocked by held lock: %v", err)
}
releaseReader()
// A second mutating command is refused while the first holds the lock.
_, err = acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
if !errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
t.Fatalf("second mutating command was not excluded, got: %v", err)
}
// Once the first mutator releases, another mutating command may run.
releaseMutator()
release, err := acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mutating command could not acquire released lock: %v", err)
}
release()
}
+58 -13
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
@@ -24,6 +26,11 @@ const configSetArgs = 2
// parent config dirs (e.g. ~/.config) are conventionally traversable.
const configDirMode = 0o755
// configYAMLIndent matches the 2-space indentation of defaultConfigTemplate,
// so `config set` writes the file back with the same indentation rather than
// yaml.Marshal's 4-space default.
const configYAMLIndent = 2
var (
errConfigExists = errors.New("config file already exists")
errEmptyConfig = errors.New("empty config file")
@@ -186,8 +193,8 @@ storage_url: ""
# access_key_id: YOUR_ACCESS_KEY
# secret_access_key: YOUR_SECRET_KEY
# # region: us-east-1 # Default: us-east-1
# # use_ssl: true # Default: true
# # part_size: 5MB # Multipart upload part size. Default: 5MB
# # For the s3:// form, disable TLS with ?ssl=false in the URL, not use_ssl.
# OPTIONAL
@@ -206,6 +213,8 @@ storage_url: ""
# chunk_size: 10MB
# Maximum blob size before splitting into a new blob.
# Must be at least four times chunk_size (the largest chunk the chunker can
# emit); a smaller limit would let a single-chunk blob exceed it.
# Accepts: 1GB, 10G, 500MB, etc.
# Default: 10GB
# blob_size_limit: 10GB
@@ -371,38 +380,74 @@ Examples:
return err
}
return writeConfigSet(os.Stdout, path, args[0], args[1])
},
}
}
// writeConfigSet applies key=value to the config at path, writes it back
// owner-only, and confirms the write by printing just the key name to w.
// The value is never echoed: it may be a secret such as
// s3.secret_access_key, and captured stdout or a pasted terminal would
// then leak it.
func writeConfigSet(w io.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
root, err := loadYAMLFile(path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = yamlPathSet(root, strings.Split(args[0], "."), args[1])
err = yamlPathSet(root, strings.Split(key, "."), value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err := yaml.Marshal(root)
out, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marshaling config: %w", err)
}
mode := os.FileMode(configFileMode)
info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
if statErr == nil {
mode = info.Mode().Perm()
}
err = os.WriteFile(path, out, mode)
err = os.WriteFile(path, out, configFileMode)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "%s = %s\n", args[0], args[1])
// os.WriteFile does not change the mode of a file that already exists,
// so a config that was group- or world-readable stays that way. As it
// may hold S3 credentials, tighten it to owner-only after writing.
info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
if statErr == nil && info.Mode().Perm()&0o044 != 0 {
err = os.Chmod(path, configFileMode)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tightening config file permissions: %w", err)
}
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, key)
return nil
},
}
// marshalConfigYAML renders a config document tree with 2-space indentation,
// matching defaultConfigTemplate. yaml.Marshal defaults to 4 spaces, which
// would reindent the whole file on the first `config set` despite the promise
// to preserve formatting.
func marshalConfigYAML(root *yaml.Node) ([]byte, error) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
enc := yaml.NewEncoder(&buf)
enc.SetIndent(configYAMLIndent)
err := enc.Encode(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = enc.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
// loadYAMLFile parses a YAML file into a yaml.Node document tree,
+106
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
package cli //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported yamlPathGet/yamlPathSet
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -188,6 +191,109 @@ func TestYAMLPathSet(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestConfigSetPreservesFormatting asserts the `config set` write path
// (marshalConfigYAML) round-trips a 2-space-indented file without reindenting
// it to yaml.Marshal's 4-space default, and keeps comments.
func TestConfigSetPreservesFormatting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
root := parseTestYAML(t)
err := yamlPathSet(root, splitPath("s3.bucket"), "newbucket")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set s3.bucket: %v", err)
}
out, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
text := string(out)
for _, want := range []string{"# top comment", "# inline comment"} {
if !contains(text, want) {
t.Errorf("round-tripped YAML dropped comment %q:\n%s", want, text)
}
}
// Nested map keys stay at 2-space indent; the bug reindented them to 4.
if !contains(text, "\n bucket: newbucket") {
t.Errorf("expected 2-space indent for s3.bucket, got:\n%s", text)
}
if contains(text, "\n bucket:") {
t.Errorf("s3.bucket reindented to 4 spaces:\n%s", text)
}
// Sequence items under a key also stay at 2 spaces.
if !contains(text, "\n - age1aaa") {
t.Errorf("expected 2-space indent for sequence item, got:\n%s", text)
}
}
// TestWriteConfigSetHidesSecret checks that setting a secret key prints
// only the key name, never the value, to the confirmation output.
func TestWriteConfigSetHidesSecret(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const secret = "SUPERSECRETVALUE"
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yaml")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("version: 1\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
}
var out bytes.Buffer
err = writeConfigSet(&out, path, "s3.secret_access_key", secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(out.String(), secret) {
t.Errorf("output echoed the secret value: %q", out.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(out.String(), "s3.secret_access_key") {
t.Errorf("output did not confirm the key name: %q", out.String())
}
}
// TestWriteConfigSetTightensMode checks that a pre-existing group- or
// world-readable config is tightened to owner-only after a set, since
// os.WriteFile leaves an existing file's mode untouched.
func TestWriteConfigSetTightensMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yaml")
// Seed a world-readable config; the loose mode is the condition under
// test, so gosec's G306 is expected here.
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("version: 1\n"), 0o644) //nolint:gosec // G306
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
}
var out bytes.Buffer
err = writeConfigSet(&out, path, "compression_level", "9")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
}
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat config: %v", err)
}
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
t.Errorf("config mode = %04o, want 0600", info.Mode().Perm())
}
}
func splitPath(s string) []string {
return strings.Split(s, ".")
}
-126
View File
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Approximate lengths of the extended calendar units accepted by
// parseDuration.
const (
durationDay = 24 * time.Hour
durationWeek = 7 * durationDay
durationMonth = 30 * durationDay
durationYear = 365 * durationDay
)
var (
errNegativeDuration = errors.New("negative durations are not supported")
errInvalidDuration = errors.New("invalid duration format")
errUnknownTimeUnit = errors.New("unknown time unit")
)
// parseDuration parses duration strings. Supports standard Go duration format
// (e.g., "3h30m", "1h45m30s") as well as extended units:
// - d: days (e.g., "30d", "7d")
// - w: weeks (e.g., "2w", "4w")
// - mo: months (30 days) (e.g., "6mo", "1mo")
// - y: years (365 days) (e.g., "1y", "2y")
//
// Can combine units: "1y6mo", "2w3d", "1d12h30m"
func parseDuration(s string) (time.Duration, error) {
// First try standard Go duration parsing
d, err := time.ParseDuration(s)
if err == nil {
return d, nil
}
// Extended duration parsing
// Check for negative values
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(s), "-") {
return 0, errNegativeDuration
}
// Pattern matches: number + unit, repeated
re := regexp.MustCompile(`(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*([a-zA-Z]+)`)
matches := re.FindAllStringSubmatch(s, -1)
if len(matches) == 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errInvalidDuration, s)
}
var total time.Duration
for _, match := range matches {
valueStr := match[1]
unit := strings.ToLower(match[2])
value, err := strconv.ParseFloat(valueStr, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid number %q: %w", valueStr, err)
}
d, err := durationForUnit(value, unit)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
total += d
}
return total, nil
}
// durationForUnit converts a value with a (case-normalized) unit suffix
// into a time.Duration, accepting Go's standard units plus the extended
// calendar units.
func durationForUnit(value float64, unit string) (time.Duration, error) {
switch unit {
// Standard time units
case "ns", "nanosecond", "nanoseconds":
return time.Duration(value), nil
case "us", "µs", "microsecond", "microseconds":
return time.Duration(value * float64(time.Microsecond)), nil
case "ms", "millisecond", "milliseconds":
return time.Duration(value * float64(time.Millisecond)), nil
case "s", "sec", "second", "seconds":
return time.Duration(value * float64(time.Second)), nil
case "m", "min", "minute", "minutes":
return time.Duration(value * float64(time.Minute)), nil
case "h", "hr", "hour", "hours":
return time.Duration(value * float64(time.Hour)), nil
// Extended units
case "d", "day", "days":
return time.Duration(value * float64(durationDay)), nil
case "w", "week", "weeks":
return time.Duration(value * float64(durationWeek)), nil
case "mo", "month", "months":
// Using 30 days as approximation
return time.Duration(value * float64(durationMonth)), nil
case "y", "year", "years":
// Using 365 days as approximation
return time.Duration(value * float64(durationYear)), nil
default:
// Try parsing as standard Go duration unit
testStr := "1" + unit
_, err := time.ParseDuration(testStr)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnknownTimeUnit, unit)
}
// It's a valid Go duration unit, parse the full value
fullStr := fmt.Sprintf("%g%s", value, unit)
d, err := time.ParseDuration(fullStr)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid duration %q: %w", fullStr, err)
}
return d, nil
}
}
-299
View File
@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
package cli //nolint:testpackage // needs access to unexported parseDuration
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type parseDurationCase struct {
name string
input string
expected time.Duration
wantErr bool
}
// runParseDurationCases executes a table of parseDuration cases as
// parallel subtests.
func runParseDurationCases(t *testing.T, tests []parseDurationCase) {
t.Helper()
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := parseDuration(tt.input)
if tt.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err, "expected error for input %q", tt.input)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err, "unexpected error for input %q", tt.input)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got, "duration mismatch for input %q", tt.input)
})
}
}
func TestParseDurationStandard(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runParseDurationCases(t, []parseDurationCase{
{
name: "standard seconds",
input: "30s",
expected: 30 * time.Second,
},
{
name: "standard minutes",
input: "45m",
expected: 45 * time.Minute,
},
{
name: "standard hours",
input: "2h",
expected: 2 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "standard combined",
input: "3h30m",
expected: 3*time.Hour + 30*time.Minute,
},
{
name: "standard complex",
input: "1h45m30s",
expected: 1*time.Hour + 45*time.Minute + 30*time.Second,
},
{
name: "standard with milliseconds",
input: "1s500ms",
expected: 1*time.Second + 500*time.Millisecond,
},
})
}
func TestParseDurationExtendedUnits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runParseDurationCases(t, []parseDurationCase{
// Extended units - days
{
name: "single day",
input: "1d",
expected: 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "multiple days",
input: "7d",
expected: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "fractional days",
input: "1.5d",
expected: 36 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "days spelled out",
input: "3days",
expected: 3 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
// Extended units - weeks
{
name: "single week",
input: "1w",
expected: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "multiple weeks",
input: "4w",
expected: 4 * 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "weeks spelled out",
input: "2weeks",
expected: 2 * 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
// Extended units - months
{
name: "single month",
input: "1mo",
expected: 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "multiple months",
input: "6mo",
expected: 6 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "months spelled out",
input: "3months",
expected: 3 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
// Extended units - years
{
name: "single year",
input: "1y",
expected: 365 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "multiple years",
input: "2y",
expected: 2 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: "years spelled out",
input: "1year",
expected: 365 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
})
}
func TestParseDurationCombinedAndErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runParseDurationCases(t, []parseDurationCase{
// Combined extended units
{
name: "weeks and days",
input: "2w3d",
expected: 2*7*24*time.Hour + 3*24*time.Hour,
},
{
name: "years and months",
input: "1y6mo",
expected: 365*24*time.Hour + 6*30*24*time.Hour,
},
{
name: "days and hours",
input: "1d12h",
expected: 24*time.Hour + 12*time.Hour,
},
{
name: "complex combination",
input: "1y2mo3w4d5h6m7s",
expected: 365*24*time.Hour + 2*30*24*time.Hour +
3*7*24*time.Hour + 4*24*time.Hour +
5*time.Hour + 6*time.Minute + 7*time.Second,
},
{
name: "with spaces",
input: "1d 12h 30m",
expected: 24*time.Hour + 12*time.Hour + 30*time.Minute,
},
// Edge cases
{
name: "zero duration",
input: "0s",
expected: 0,
},
{
name: "large duration",
input: "10y",
expected: 10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
// Error cases
{
name: "empty string",
input: "",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid format",
input: "abc",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "unknown unit",
input: "5x",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid number",
input: "xyzd",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "negative not supported",
input: "-5d",
wantErr: true,
},
})
}
func TestParseDurationSpecialCases(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Test that standard Go durations work exactly as expected
standardDurations := []string{
"300ms",
"1.5h",
"2h45m",
"72h",
"1us",
"1µs",
"1ns",
}
for _, d := range standardDurations {
expected, err := time.ParseDuration(d)
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := parseDuration(d)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, expected, got, "standard duration %q should parse identically", d)
}
}
func TestParseDurationRealWorldExamples(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Test real-world snapshot purge scenarios
tests := []struct {
description string
input string
olderThan time.Duration
}{
{
description: "keep snapshots from last 30 days",
input: "30d",
olderThan: 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
description: "keep snapshots from last 6 months",
input: "6mo",
olderThan: 6 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
description: "keep snapshots from last year",
input: "1y",
olderThan: 365 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
description: "keep snapshots from last week and a half",
input: "1w3d",
olderThan: 10 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
description: "keep snapshots from last 90 days",
input: "90d",
olderThan: 90 * 24 * time.Hour,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.description, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := parseDuration(tt.input)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.olderThan, got)
// Verify the duration makes sense for snapshot purging
assert.Greater(t, got, time.Hour,
"snapshot purge duration should be at least an hour")
})
}
}
+17 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package cli
import (
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
@@ -19,7 +20,11 @@ const shortCommitLen = 12
// flag is present in os.Args — see bannerSuppressedInArgs), executes the
// root cobra command, and routes any returned error through the
// ui.Writer so the user sees a properly formatted "🛑 ERROR:" line.
func Entry() {
//
// It returns the process exit code (0 on success, 1 on error) rather
// than calling os.Exit, so that main's deferred profile writers run
// before the process ends. See run in cmd/vaultik/main.go.
func Entry() int {
emitStartupBanner(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout)
rootCmd := NewRootCommand()
@@ -27,9 +32,19 @@ func Entry() {
err := rootCmd.Execute()
if err != nil {
// An operation that ran inside the fx app has already reported
// its own failure (and suppressed it under --json); errReported
// says so. Printing it again here would double the error line.
// Every other error — bad arguments, a config that would not
// load — reaches Entry unreported, so it is shown here.
if !errors.Is(err, errReported) {
ReportErrorf("%s", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
return 1
}
return 0
}
// emitStartupBanner writes the startup banner to w unless args (the
+1 -1
View File
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ func TestEntryJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
programName, flagConfig, configPath, cmdSnapshot, cmdList, flagJSON,
}
stdout := captureProcessStdout(t, Entry)
stdout := captureProcessStdout(t, func() { _ = Entry() })
requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout)
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
package cli //nolint:testpackage // shares the prune fixtures and capture helpers
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// staleRecordLogMessage is the local-cleanup audit line CleanupLocalSnapshots
// logs for each stale record. It is exactly the signal issue #112 says a
// machine consumer lost under --json: gated off stdout, and pinned below
// the log level on stderr because --json used to force Quiet.
const staleRecordLogMessage = "Removing stale local snapshot record"
// TestEntryPruneJSONStderrHonoursVerbosity is the end-to-end regression
// guard for issue #112. Under --json the log level must still follow
// --verbose/--debug rather than being pinned to WARN, so the
// local-cleanup records reach stderr under --verbose while stdout stays
// exactly one JSON document; without --verbose they stay below the
// level, as they do without --json.
//
// Both halves are asserted together on the same run, because the fix has
// to keep the document clean (issue #108) while freeing stderr.
//
// Not parallel: it replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg
// globals.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg globals
func TestEntryPruneJSONStderrHonoursVerbosity(t *testing.T) {
for _, testCase := range []struct {
name string
verbose bool
wantOnStderr bool
}{
{
name: "verbose json surfaces the cleanup record on stderr",
verbose: true,
wantOnStderr: true,
},
{
name: "json alone keeps the cleanup record below the level",
verbose: false,
wantOnStderr: false,
},
} {
t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
configPath := writeHermeticPruneConfig(t, true)
previousArgs := os.Args
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Args = previousArgs
rootFlags = RootFlags{}
})
args := []string{
programName, flagConfig, configPath, cmdPrune, flagJSON,
}
if testCase.verbose {
args = append(args, "--verbose")
}
os.Args = args
stdout, stderr := captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t,
func() { _ = Entry() })
// The document stays clean in both cases: freeing stderr must
// not regress issue #108.
requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout)
if testCase.wantOnStderr {
assert.Contains(t, stderr, staleRecordLogMessage,
"--verbose --json must emit the cleanup record on stderr")
assert.Contains(t, stderr, stalePruneSnapshotID,
"the record must name the snapshot it removed")
} else {
assert.NotContains(t, stderr, staleRecordLogMessage,
"without --verbose the record stays below the log level")
}
})
}
}
// captureProcessStdoutAndStderr redirects both of the process's own
// standard streams to pipes for the duration of fn and returns what was
// written to each. The redirection is at the file-descriptor level
// because the logger binds os.Stderr when it initializes inside fn, and
// the JSON document reaches os.Stdout independently; the point is to see
// where each actually lands.
//
// Not parallel-safe: os.Stdout and os.Stderr are process-global.
func captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t *testing.T, fn func()) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
outReader, outWriter, err := os.Pipe()
require.NoError(t, err)
errReader, errWriter, err := os.Pipe()
require.NoError(t, err)
previousOut, previousErr := os.Stdout, os.Stderr
os.Stdout, os.Stderr = outWriter, errWriter
capturedOut := drain(outReader)
capturedErr := drain(errReader)
fn()
os.Stdout, os.Stderr = previousOut, previousErr
require.NoError(t, outWriter.Close())
require.NoError(t, errWriter.Close())
out, errOut := <-capturedOut, <-capturedErr
require.NoError(t, outReader.Close())
require.NoError(t, errReader.Close())
return out, errOut
}
// drain copies a reader to a string on a goroutine and delivers the
// result once the writer end is closed.
func drain(reader io.Reader) <-chan string {
captured := make(chan string, 1)
go func() {
var buf bytes.Buffer
_, _ = io.Copy(&buf, reader)
captured <- buf.String()
}()
return captured
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func TestEntryPruneJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
programName, flagConfig, configPath, cmdPrune, flagJSON,
}
stdout := captureProcessStdout(t, Entry)
stdout := captureProcessStdout(t, func() { _ = Entry() })
requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout)
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package cli //nolint:testpackage // shares programName and the capture helpers
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
// TestEntryReturnsStatusCode pins the contract main() relies on for
// issue #75: Entry reports success or failure through its return value
// and never calls os.Exit. An os.Exit from inside Entry would skip
// main's deferred profile writers and truncate the profile of a failing
// command. main turns this code into os.Exit only after those defers
// run, so a failing command must come back with a non-zero code rather
// than ending the process here.
//
// Stdout is captured only to keep the banner and command output off the
// test log; the assertion is on the returned code.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args and rootFlags
func TestEntryReturnsStatusCode(t *testing.T) {
for _, testCase := range []struct {
name string
args []string
want int
}{
{
// version is self-contained: it needs no config and no
// destination store, so it exercises the success path.
name: "successful command returns zero",
args: []string{programName, "version"},
want: 0,
},
{
name: "unknown command returns one",
args: []string{programName, "no-such-command"},
want: 1,
},
} {
t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
previousArgs := os.Args
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Args = previousArgs
rootFlags = RootFlags{}
})
os.Args = testCase.args
var code int
_ = captureProcessStdout(t, func() { code = Entry() })
assert.Equal(t, testCase.want, code)
})
}
}
+5 -35
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -33,44 +28,19 @@ func NewInfoCommand() *cobra.Command {
// Use the app framework
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
go func() {
err := v.ShowInfo()
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
Mode: readOnly,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.ShowInfo()
}, func(err error) {
log.Error("Failed to show info", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Failed to show info: %v", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
},
}
+11 -43
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -41,51 +36,24 @@ work (e.g. after a crashed backup or to reclaim storage).`,
// Use the app framework like other commands
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet || opts.JSON,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
JSON: opts.JSON,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
// Start the prune operation in a goroutine
go func() {
// Run the prune operation
err := v.Prune(opts)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
if !opts.JSON {
Mode: mutating,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.Prune(opts)
}, func(err error) {
if opts.JSON {
return
}
log.Error("Prune operation failed", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Prune failed: %v", err)
}
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// Shutdown the app when prune completes
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
log.Debug("Stopping prune operation")
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
},
}
+12 -38
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -48,7 +45,7 @@ This is destructive and irreversible. Requires --force.`,
return errNukeNeedsForce
}
return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false, "Remote nuke failed",
return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, false, false, "Remote nuke failed",
func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.NukeRemote(true)
})
@@ -83,47 +80,24 @@ func newRemoteInfoCommand() *cobra.Command {
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet || jsonOutput,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
JSON: jsonOutput,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
go func() {
err := v.RemoteInfo(jsonOutput)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
if !jsonOutput {
Mode: readOnly,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.RemoteInfo(jsonOutput)
}, func(err error) {
if jsonOutput {
return
}
log.Error("Failed to get remote info", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Failed to get remote info: %v", err)
}
os.Exit(1)
}
}
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
},
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ on the source system.`,
cmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&rootFlags.Quiet, "quiet", "q", false,
"Suppress non-error output")
cmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&rootFlags.SkipErrors, "skip-errors", false,
"Continue past per-file errors instead of aborting "+
"(applies to snapshot create and restore)")
"Skip files that cannot be read when creating a snapshot, or "+
"that cannot be restored when restoring, instead of aborting "+
"(packing and storage errors still abort)")
// Add subcommands
cmd.AddCommand(
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package cli_test
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/cli"
)
// TestRunAppWaitsForOperationCleanupOnShutdown drives RunApp with an fx app
// wired the way RunOperation wires a command: a single lifecycle hook whose
// OnStart launches the operation in its own goroutine and whose OnStop cancels
// it and blocks until that goroutine returns. The operation stands in for a
// restore blocked mid-download — it holds a decrypted "scratch" file and only
// removes it as it unwinds on cancellation.
//
// The app is asked to stop once the operation is running (standing in for an
// OS interrupt; fx delivers a real signal and Shutdowner.Shutdown() on the
// same app.Wait channel, so both drive the identical shutdown path). RunApp
// must not return until app.Stop has run the OnStop hook, so the scratch file
// must be gone by the time RunApp returns. Before the fix RunApp returned as
// soon as the app.Wait/Done channel fired, without running app.Stop, so the
// cleanup never ran and this file would still be on disk (issue #159).
func TestRunAppWaitsForOperationCleanupOnShutdown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decrypted-scratch")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(scratch, []byte("secret"), 0o600))
// Cancel and reap the operation even if RunApp returns without doing so
// (the buggy path), so the goroutine cannot leak past the test.
opCtx, opCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(opCancel)
var stop func(context.Context) bool
app := fx.New(
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Invoke(func(lc fx.Lifecycle, sh fx.Shutdowner) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
// Blocked mid-operation until cancelled, then run the
// cleanup an interrupted restore would run.
<-opCtx.Done()
_ = os.Remove(scratch)
}()
stop = func(ctx context.Context) bool {
opCancel()
select {
case <-done:
return true
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
}
}
// Ask the app to stop now that the operation is running.
go func() { _ = sh.Shutdown() }()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
stop(ctx)
return nil
},
})
}),
)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- cli.RunApp(context.Background(), app) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
require.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("RunApp did not return after shutdown was requested")
}
_, err := os.Stat(scratch)
require.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err),
"RunApp returned before the operation removed its decrypted scratch file")
}
+29 -79
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -86,7 +83,8 @@ specifying a path using --config or by setting VAULTIK_CONFIG to a path.`,
// Use the backup functionality from cli package
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
// --cron suppression is wired through v.UI by setupGlobals.
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
@@ -94,54 +92,25 @@ specifying a path using --config or by setting VAULTIK_CONFIG to a path.`,
Cron: opts.Cron,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
// Start the snapshot creation in a goroutine
go func() {
// --cron suppression is wired through v.UI by setupGlobals.
err := v.CreateSnapshot(opts)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
Mode: mutating,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.CreateSnapshot(opts)
}, func(err error) {
log.Error("Snapshot creation failed", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Snapshot creation failed: %v", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// Shutdown the app when snapshot completes
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
log.Debug("Stopping snapshot creation")
// Cancel the Vaultik context
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
},
}
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Cron, "cron", false,
"Run in cron mode (silent unless error)")
"Run in cron mode (silent unless warning or error)")
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Prune, "prune", false,
"After backup, drop older snapshots of the same name and remove "+
"orphaned blobs")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.KeepNewerThan, "keep-newer-than", "",
"With --prune: keep snapshots newer than this duration "+
"(e.g. 4w, 30d, 6mo) instead of only the latest")
"(e.g. 30d, 4w, 6mo, 1y; m is minutes, mo is months) "+
"instead of only the latest")
return cmd
}
@@ -157,7 +126,7 @@ func newSnapshotListCommand() *cobra.Command {
Long: "Lists all snapshots with their ID, timestamp, and compressed size",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false,
return runVaultikApp(cmd, readOnly, false, false,
"Failed to list snapshots",
func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.ListSnapshots(jsonOutput)
@@ -193,7 +162,7 @@ restrict the operation to specific snapshot names.`,
return errPurgeCriteriaBoth
}
return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false,
return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, false, false,
"Failed to purge snapshots",
func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.PurgeSnapshotsWithOptions(opts)
@@ -204,7 +173,8 @@ restrict the operation to specific snapshot names.`,
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.KeepLatest, "keep-latest", false,
"Keep only the latest snapshot of each name")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.OlderThan, "older-than", "",
"Remove snapshots older than duration (e.g., 30d, 6m, 1y)")
"Remove snapshots older than duration "+
"(e.g. 30d, 4w, 6mo, 1y; m is minutes, mo is months)")
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Force, "force", false, "Skip confirmation prompt")
cmd.Flags().StringArrayVar(&opts.Names, "snapshot", nil,
"Restrict to snapshots with these names (repeat for multiple)")
@@ -219,7 +189,10 @@ func newSnapshotVerifyCommand() *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "verify <snapshot-id>",
Short: "Verify snapshot integrity",
Long: "Verifies that all blobs referenced in a snapshot exist",
Long: "Verifies that all blobs referenced in a snapshot exist.\n\n" +
"The snapshot may be named by its ID or, on a host with no local\n" +
"index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a\n" +
"remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).",
Args: requireSnapshotIDArg,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
snapshotID := args[0]
@@ -232,47 +205,24 @@ func newSnapshotVerifyCommand() *cobra.Command {
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet || opts.JSON,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
JSON: opts.JSON,
},
Modules: []fx.Option{},
Invokes: []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
go func() {
err := v.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(snapshotID, opts)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
if !opts.JSON {
Mode: readOnly,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(snapshotID, opts)
}, func(err error) {
if opts.JSON {
return
}
log.Error("Verification failed", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Verification failed: %v", err)
}
os.Exit(1)
}
}
err = v.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
v.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
},
})
},
}
@@ -311,7 +261,7 @@ To wipe the entire destination store and start over, use 'vaultik remote
nuke --force' it is the single supported entry point for that.`,
Args: requireSnapshotIDArg,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return runVaultikApp(cmd, opts.JSON, opts.JSON,
return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, opts.JSON, opts.JSON,
"Failed to remove snapshot",
func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
_, err := v.RemoveSnapshot(args[0], opts)
+13 -81
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,8 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -25,15 +17,6 @@ type RestoreOptions struct {
Verify bool // Verify restored files after restore
}
// RestoreApp contains all dependencies needed for restore
type RestoreApp struct {
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Storage storage.Storer
Vaultik *vaultik.Vaultik
Shutdowner fx.Shutdowner
}
// newSnapshotRestoreCommand creates the 'snapshot restore' subcommand
func newSnapshotRestoreCommand() *cobra.Command {
opts := &RestoreOptions{}
@@ -48,6 +31,10 @@ target directory.
If no paths are specified, all files are restored.
If paths are specified, only matching files/directories are restored.
The snapshot may be named by its ID or, when restoring on a host with no
local index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a
remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).
Requires the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment variable to be set with
the age private key.
@@ -77,7 +64,8 @@ Examples:
return cmd
}
// runRestore parses arguments and runs the restore operation through the app framework
// runRestore parses arguments and runs the restore operation through the
// app framework.
func runRestore(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, opts *RestoreOptions) error {
snapshotID := args[0]
@@ -86,87 +74,31 @@ func runRestore(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, opts *RestoreOptions) error {
opts.Paths = args[restoreMinArgs:]
}
// Use unified config resolution
configPath, err := ResolveConfigPath()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Use the app framework like other commands
rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
return RunWithApp(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
return RunOperation(cmd.Context(), AppOptions{
ConfigPath: configPath,
LogOptions: log.Options{
Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
Debug: rootFlags.Debug,
Quiet: rootFlags.Quiet,
},
Modules: buildRestoreModules(),
Invokes: buildRestoreInvokes(snapshotID, opts),
})
}
// buildRestoreModules returns the fx.Options for dependency injection in restore
func buildRestoreModules() []fx.Option {
return []fx.Option{
fx.Provide(fx.Annotate(
func(g *globals.Globals, cfg *config.Config,
storer storage.Storer, v *vaultik.Vaultik, shutdowner fx.Shutdowner) *RestoreApp {
return &RestoreApp{
Globals: g,
Config: cfg,
Storage: storer,
Vaultik: v,
Shutdowner: shutdowner,
}
},
)),
}
}
// buildRestoreInvokes returns the fx.Options that wire up the restore lifecycle
func buildRestoreInvokes(snapshotID string, opts *RestoreOptions) []fx.Option {
return []fx.Option{
fx.Invoke(func(app *RestoreApp, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
// Start the restore operation in a goroutine
go func() {
// Run the restore operation
restoreOpts := &vaultik.RestoreOptions{
Mode: readOnly,
}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
return v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: snapshotID,
TargetDir: opts.TargetDir,
Paths: opts.Paths,
Verify: opts.Verify,
SkipErrors: GetRootFlags().SkipErrors,
}
err := app.Vaultik.Restore(restoreOpts)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
SkipErrors: rootFlags.SkipErrors,
})
}, func(err error) {
log.Error("Restore operation failed", "error", err)
ReportErrorf("Restore failed: %v", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// Shutdown the app when restore completes
err = app.Shutdowner.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", err)
}
}()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
log.Debug("Stopping restore operation")
app.Vaultik.Cancel()
return nil
},
})
}),
}
}
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
package cli
import "time"
// SnapshotInfo represents snapshot information for listing
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // snake_case is the established output format
type SnapshotInfo struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
CompressedSize int64 `json:"compressed_size"`
}
+56 -6
View File
@@ -16,11 +16,19 @@ import (
"github.com/adrg/xdg"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/chunker"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
)
const appName = "vaultik"
// secretKeyPrefix marks an age secret (private) key. It is compared
// case-insensitively so a recipient entry that is actually a private key is
// caught and never passed to age or echoed back.
//
//nolint:gosec // G101: marker for detecting a pasted secret key, not a credential
const secretKeyPrefix = "AGE-SECRET-KEY-"
// Defaults and validation bounds for tunable settings.
const (
defaultBlobSizeLimit = Size(10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) // 10GB
@@ -37,11 +45,17 @@ var (
errNoConfigPath = errors.New("config path not provided")
errNoAgeRecipients = errors.New(
"at least one age_recipient is required (generate with: age-keygen)")
errRecipientIsSecretKey = errors.New(
"an age secret key was given where a public key (age1...) belongs")
errRecipientNotX25519 = errors.New(
"not a valid recipient; only X25519 age1... public keys are supported")
errNoSnapshots = errors.New(
"at least one snapshot must be configured (see config.example.yml)")
errSnapshotNoPaths = errors.New("snapshot must have at least one path")
errChunkSizeTooSmall = errors.New("chunk_size must be at least 1MB")
errBlobSizeTooSmall = errors.New("blob_size_limit must be at least chunk_size")
errBlobSizeTooSmall = errors.New(
"blob_size_limit must be at least the largest chunk the chunker can " +
"emit (chunk_size times the FastCDC size spread)")
errBadCompression = errors.New("compression_level must be between 1 and 19")
errBadStorageScheme = errors.New(
"storage_url must start with s3://, file://, or rclone://")
@@ -162,7 +176,9 @@ type S3Config struct {
AccessKeyID string `yaml:"access_key_id"`
SecretAccessKey string `yaml:"secret_access_key"`
Region string `yaml:"region"`
UseSSL bool `yaml:"use_ssl"`
// UseSSL selects HTTPS for a scheme-less endpoint. Omitted (nil) means
// the default, TLS; set it to false only to force plain HTTP.
UseSSL *bool `yaml:"use_ssl"`
PartSize Size `yaml:"part_size"`
}
@@ -285,18 +301,30 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
// Validate checks if the configuration is valid and complete.
// It ensures all required fields are present and have valid values:
// - At least one age recipient must be specified
// - At least one age recipient must be specified, and every recipient must
// parse as an X25519 age1... public key (so a bad entry fails at load, not
// mid-backup); errors name the position, never the value
// - At least one snapshot must be configured with at least one path
// - Storage must be configured (either storage_url or s3.* fields)
// - Chunk size must be at least 1MB
// - Blob size limit must be at least the chunk size
// - Blob size limit must be at least the largest chunk the chunker can emit
// (chunk_size times chunker.ChunkSizeSpread), so a single-chunk blob never
// exceeds the configured limit
// - Compression level must be between 1 and 19
//
// Returns an error describing the first validation failure encountered.
func (c *Config) Validate() error {
if len(c.AgeRecipients) == 0 {
return errNoAgeRecipients
}
for i, recipient := range c.AgeRecipients {
err := validateAgeRecipient(recipient)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("age_recipients[%d]: %w", i, err)
}
}
if len(c.Snapshots) == 0 {
return errNoSnapshots
}
@@ -317,8 +345,13 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
return errChunkSizeTooSmall
}
if c.BlobSizeLimit.Int64() < c.ChunkSize.Int64() {
return errBlobSizeTooSmall
// The chunker can emit chunks up to chunk_size * ChunkSizeSpread, and the
// packer places a single such chunk into an otherwise empty blob. A limit
// below that bound would let a blob exceed it, so reject it.
largestChunk := c.ChunkSize.Int64() * chunker.ChunkSizeSpread
if c.BlobSizeLimit.Int64() < largestChunk {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: need at least %d bytes",
errBlobSizeTooSmall, largestChunk)
}
if c.CompressionLevel < minCompressionLevel ||
@@ -329,6 +362,23 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
return nil
}
// validateAgeRecipient parses one age_recipients entry with the age library
// and returns a value-free error on failure. A recipient string can be
// sensitive (an operator may paste a secret key by mistake), so neither the
// entry nor age's own error (which quotes its input) is ever included.
func validateAgeRecipient(recipient string) error {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToUpper(recipient), secretKeyPrefix) {
return errRecipientIsSecretKey
}
_, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(recipient)
if err != nil {
return errRecipientNotX25519
}
return nil
}
// validateStorage validates storage configuration.
// If StorageURL is set, it takes precedence. S3 URLs require credentials.
// File URLs don't require any S3 configuration.
+155
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
package config //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported extractAgeSecretKey
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/chunker"
)
const (
@@ -101,6 +105,157 @@ func TestConfigFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestValidateBlobSizeLimit checks the blob_size_limit boundary: it must be at
// least the largest chunk the chunker can emit (chunk_size times
// chunker.ChunkSizeSpread), because the packer places a single such chunk into
// an otherwise empty blob. A limit between chunk_size and that bound is rejected.
func TestValidateBlobSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const chunkSize = Size(10 * 1024 * 1024) // 10MB
largestChunk := chunkSize.Int64() * chunker.ChunkSizeSpread
newConfig := func(blobLimit Size) *Config {
return &Config{
AgeRecipients: []string{testSneakAgePublicKey},
Snapshots: map[string]SnapshotConfig{"test": {Paths: []string{"/tmp/src"}}},
StorageURL: "file:///tmp/vaultik-test-store",
ChunkSize: chunkSize,
BlobSizeLimit: blobLimit,
CompressionLevel: 3,
}
}
tests := []struct {
name string
blobLimit Size
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "at chunk_size but below largest chunk is rejected",
blobLimit: chunkSize,
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "between chunk_size and largest chunk is rejected",
blobLimit: Size(chunkSize.Int64() * 2),
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "one byte below largest chunk is rejected",
blobLimit: Size(largestChunk - 1),
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "exactly at largest chunk is accepted",
blobLimit: Size(largestChunk),
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "above largest chunk is accepted",
blobLimit: Size(largestChunk * 100),
wantErr: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := newConfig(tt.blobLimit).Validate()
if tt.wantErr {
if !errors.Is(err, errBlobSizeTooSmall) {
t.Fatalf("Validate() error = %v, want errBlobSizeTooSmall", err)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate() unexpected error: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateAgeRecipients checks that recipients are parsed at config load
// (a bad entry fails immediately, not mid-backup) and that no invalid entry —
// least of all a pasted secret key — is echoed in the error.
func TestValidateAgeRecipients(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
baseConfig := func(recipients []string) *Config {
return &Config{
AgeRecipients: recipients,
Snapshots: map[string]SnapshotConfig{"test": {Paths: []string{"/tmp/src"}}},
StorageURL: "file:///tmp/vaultik-test-store",
ChunkSize: Size(10 * 1024 * 1024),
BlobSizeLimit: Size(10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024),
CompressionLevel: 3,
}
}
tests := []struct {
name string
recipients []string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "config init placeholder is rejected",
recipients: []string{"age1REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY"},
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "ssh-ed25519 recipient is rejected",
recipients: []string{"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIexamplekeydata"},
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "truncated age1 string is rejected",
recipients: []string{"age1short"},
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "secret key passed as recipient is rejected",
recipients: []string{testIntegrationAgePrivateKey},
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "two valid recipients are accepted",
recipients: []string{testSneakAgePublicKey, testIntegrationAgePublicKey},
wantErr: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := baseConfig(tt.recipients).Validate()
if !tt.wantErr {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate() unexpected error: %v", err)
}
return
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil, want error")
}
// The entry itself must never appear in the error, since a
// recipient string can be a secret key.
for _, recipient := range tt.recipients {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), recipient) {
t.Fatalf("Validate() error echoed the recipient value: %v", err)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestExtractAgeSecretKey tests extraction of AGE-SECRET-KEY from various inputs
func TestExtractAgeSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+13 -4
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ import (
// without any recipient public keys.
var ErrNoRecipients = errors.New("at least one recipient is required")
// errInvalidRecipient is returned when a recipient string does not parse as
// an X25519 age1... public key. It omits the value, which can be sensitive.
var errInvalidRecipient = errors.New(
"not a valid X25519 age1... recipient")
// Encryptor provides thread-safe encryption using the age encryption library.
// It supports encrypting data for multiple recipients simultaneously, allowing
// any of the corresponding private keys to decrypt the data. This is useful
@@ -36,10 +41,12 @@ func NewEncryptor(publicKeys []string) (*Encryptor, error) {
}
recipients := make([]age.Recipient, 0, len(publicKeys))
for _, key := range publicKeys {
for i, key := range publicKeys {
// The key string can be sensitive (e.g. a secret key pasted by
// mistake), so the error names its position, never its value.
recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing age recipient %s: %w", key, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: recipient %d", errInvalidRecipient, i)
}
recipients = append(recipients, recipient)
@@ -142,10 +149,12 @@ func (e *Encryptor) UpdateRecipients(publicKeys []string) error {
}
recipients := make([]age.Recipient, 0, len(publicKeys))
for _, key := range publicKeys {
for i, key := range publicKeys {
// The key string can be sensitive (e.g. a secret key pasted by
// mistake), so the error names its position, never its value.
recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(key)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parsing age recipient %s: %w", key, err)
return fmt.Errorf("%w: recipient %d", errInvalidRecipient, i)
}
recipients = append(recipients, recipient)
+20
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package crypto_test
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
@@ -176,3 +177,22 @@ func TestEncryptorUpdateRecipients(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("should not decrypt with identity1")
}
}
// TestNewEncryptorSecretKeyNotEchoed verifies that a secret key mistakenly
// passed as a recipient does not appear in the returned error. A recipient
// string can be sensitive, so the error must name only the position.
func TestNewEncryptorSecretKeyNotEchoed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
secretKey := "AGE-SECRET-KEY-19CR5YSFW59HM4TLD6GX" +
"VEDMZFTVVF7PPHKUT68TXSFPK7APHXA2QS2NJA5"
_, err := crypto.NewEncryptor([]string{secretKey})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("NewEncryptor returned nil, want error")
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secretKey) {
t.Fatalf("error echoed the recipient value: %v", err)
}
}
+24
View File
@@ -208,6 +208,30 @@ func (r *BlobRepository) DeleteOrphaned(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
// DeleteUnuploaded deletes blob rows whose upload never completed
// (uploaded_ts IS NULL) and returns how many were removed. Their
// blob_chunks rows are removed by the ON DELETE CASCADE foreign key.
// A blob is only ever attached to a snapshot once its upload has been
// recorded, so an un-uploaded blob is never referenced by a completed
// snapshot: dropping it discards chunk rows that point at data which
// was never stored remotely, so the affected content is re-chunked and
// re-uploaded on the next run.
func (r *BlobRepository) DeleteUnuploaded(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
query := `DELETE FROM blobs WHERE uploaded_ts IS NULL`
result, err := r.db.ExecWithLog(ctx, query)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("deleting un-uploaded blobs: %w", err)
}
rowsAffected, _ := result.RowsAffected()
if rowsAffected > 0 {
log.Debug("Deleted un-uploaded blobs", "count", rowsAffected)
}
return rowsAffected, nil
}
// getOne fetches a single blob row matched on the given column, or
// (nil, nil) when no row matches.
func (r *BlobRepository) getOne(
+22 -2
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,32 @@ import (
// List returns every chunk in the index, ordered by chunk hash.
func (r *ChunkRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*Chunk, error) {
query := `
return r.list(ctx, `
SELECT chunk_hash, size
FROM chunks
ORDER BY chunk_hash
`
`)
}
// ListInUploadedBlobs returns the chunks that are stored in a blob whose
// upload has completed (uploaded_ts set), ordered by chunk hash. These
// are the only chunks a backup may safely deduplicate against: a chunk
// recorded solely in a blob that was never uploaded refers to data that
// is not in remote storage, so trusting it would silently drop that data
// from later snapshots.
func (r *ChunkRepository) ListInUploadedBlobs(ctx context.Context) ([]*Chunk, error) {
return r.list(ctx, `
SELECT DISTINCT c.chunk_hash, c.size
FROM chunks c
JOIN blob_chunks bc ON c.chunk_hash = bc.chunk_hash
JOIN blobs b ON bc.blob_id = b.id
WHERE b.uploaded_ts IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY c.chunk_hash
`)
}
// list runs a chunk-selecting query and scans the (chunk_hash, size) rows.
func (r *ChunkRepository) list(ctx context.Context, query string) ([]*Chunk, error) {
rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying chunks: %w", err)
+130
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"embed"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
@@ -219,6 +220,135 @@ func openWithRecovery(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
return db, nil
}
// errUntrustedSnapshotSchema is returned when a downloaded snapshot
// database carries schema objects the real schema never defines, or is
// missing a table the restore and deep-verify queries read.
var errUntrustedSnapshotSchema = errors.New(
"downloaded snapshot database has an untrusted schema")
// snapshotReadOnlyDSN builds the driver DSN that opens a materialized
// snapshot database file read-only. mode=ro opens the file read-only at
// the OS level, query_only rejects any write the engine is asked to make,
// and trusted_schema=OFF refuses to run application code named in the
// schema. The file: URI form is required for the driver to honour the
// mode parameter.
func snapshotReadOnlyDSN(path string) string {
u := url.URL{
Scheme: "file",
Path: path,
RawQuery: "mode=ro&_pragma=query_only(true)&_pragma=trusted_schema(false)",
}
return u.String()
}
// OpenReadOnly opens an already-materialized SQLite file for read-only
// querying of a snapshot database downloaded from the store, used by
// restore and deep verify. Unlike New it never applies schema migrations
// and never writes: the connection is opened read-only with query_only
// and trusted_schema=OFF. It refuses any file whose schema carries a
// trigger, view or virtual table, or lacks an expected table, so a forged
// file cannot redefine what the restore queries return. The caller owns
// the file and must remove it.
func OpenReadOnly(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
conn, err := sql.Open("sqlite", snapshotReadOnlyDSN(path))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening read-only database: %w", err)
}
configureConnPool(conn)
err = conn.PingContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening read-only database: %w", err)
}
err = verifySnapshotSchema(ctx, conn)
if err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
return nil, err
}
return &DB{conn: conn, path: path}, nil
}
// verifySnapshotSchema rejects a downloaded database whose schema is not
// the plain table set the real schema defines. Any trigger, view or
// virtual table, or a missing expected table, fails the open.
func verifySnapshotSchema(ctx context.Context, conn *sql.DB) error {
// expectedSnapshotTables are the tables the restore and deep-verify
// queries read. A downloaded database missing any of them is not a
// genuine snapshot database and is refused.
expectedSnapshotTables := []string{
"blob_chunks",
"blobs",
"chunks",
"file_chunks",
"files",
}
rows, err := conn.QueryContext(
ctx, "SELECT type, name, sql FROM sqlite_master")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
present := make(map[string]struct{})
for rows.Next() {
var objType, name string
var objSQL sql.NullString
err = rows.Scan(&objType, &name, &objSQL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
}
switch objType {
case "trigger", "view":
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: unexpected %s %q", errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, objType, name)
case "table":
if isVirtualTableSQL(objSQL.String) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: unexpected virtual table %q",
errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, name)
}
present[name] = struct{}{}
}
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
}
for _, table := range expectedSnapshotTables {
if _, ok := present[table]; !ok {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: missing table %q", errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, table)
}
}
return nil
}
// isVirtualTableSQL reports whether a sqlite_master row's SQL defines a
// virtual table. Virtual tables are recorded with type 'table' but a
// "CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE" definition and can run module code, so they are
// refused alongside triggers and views.
func isVirtualTableSQL(createSQL string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(
strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(createSQL)), "CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE")
}
// NewTestDB creates an in-memory SQLite database for testing purposes.
// The database is automatically initialized with the schema and is ready
// for use. Each call creates a new independent database instance.
+44
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package database
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -15,6 +16,44 @@ import (
// the index describes the backed-up file tree and must stay private.
const indexDirPerm = 0o700
// indexFilePerm restricts the index file to the owning user; it lists every
// backed-up path and chunk hash and must stay private.
const indexFilePerm = 0o600
// ensureIndexFileMode makes the index file owner-only before the SQLite
// driver opens it: it creates the file 0600 if absent, or chmods an existing
// one to 0600. Doing this first matters because SQLite creates its -wal and
// -shm side files with the mode of the main database file, so a private main
// file yields private side files. The driver treats a zero-byte file as an
// empty database, so pre-creating it here is safe.
func ensureIndexFileMode(path string) error {
info, err := os.Stat(path)
switch {
case err == nil:
if info.Mode().Perm() == indexFilePerm {
return nil
}
err = os.Chmod(path, indexFilePerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("restricting index file permissions: %w", err)
}
return nil
case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
//nolint:gosec // G304: the index path is operator-configured by design
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, indexFilePerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating index file: %w", err)
}
return f.Close()
default:
return fmt.Errorf("checking index file: %w", err)
}
}
// Module provides database dependencies
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // fx module definitions are package globals by convention
@@ -34,6 +73,11 @@ func provideDatabase(lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.Config) (*DB, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating index directory: %w", err)
}
err = ensureIndexFileMode(cfg.IndexPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
db, err := New(context.Background(), cfg.IndexPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening database: %w", err)
+100
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package database
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
"testing"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
)
// TestProvideDatabaseFreshIndexMode verifies that provideDatabase creates a
// missing index file owner-only (0600), even under a lenient 022 umask that
// would otherwise leave a freshly created file world-readable.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
func TestProvideDatabaseFreshIndexMode(t *testing.T) {
restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
defer syscall.Umask(restore)
indexPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.sqlite")
openIndex(t, indexPath)
assertPerm(t, indexPath, 0o600)
}
// TestProvideDatabaseExistingIndexMode verifies that provideDatabase tightens
// an existing world-readable index (0644) in a group/other-readable directory
// down to owner-only (0600).
//
//nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
func TestProvideDatabaseExistingIndexMode(t *testing.T) {
restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
defer syscall.Umask(restore)
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "data")
//nolint:gosec // G301: the test intentionally uses a 0755 directory
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating index directory: %v", err)
}
//nolint:gosec // G302: the test intentionally uses a 0755 directory
err = os.Chmod(dir, 0o755)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("relaxing index directory permissions: %v", err)
}
indexPath := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
//nolint:gosec // G306: the test intentionally starts from a 0644 index
err = os.WriteFile(indexPath, nil, 0o644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating pre-existing index: %v", err)
}
//nolint:gosec // G302: the test intentionally starts from a 0644 index
err = os.Chmod(indexPath, 0o644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("relaxing pre-existing index permissions: %v", err)
}
openIndex(t, indexPath)
assertPerm(t, indexPath, 0o600)
}
// openIndex runs provideDatabase against indexPath and closes the resulting
// database before returning.
func openIndex(t *testing.T, indexPath string) {
t.Helper()
cfg := &config.Config{IndexPath: indexPath}
db, err := provideDatabase(fxtest.NewLifecycle(t), cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("provideDatabase: %v", err)
}
err = db.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("closing database: %v", err)
}
}
// assertPerm fails the test unless path has exactly the given permission bits.
func assertPerm(t *testing.T, path string, want os.FileMode) {
t.Helper()
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", path, err)
}
got := info.Mode().Perm()
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("permissions of %s = %#o, want %#o", path, got, want)
}
}
+145
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
//nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported read-only open internals
package database
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// genuineSnapshotDB writes a real snapshot database (the full schema
// applied) to a fresh file and returns its path.
func genuineSnapshotDB(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snapshot.db")
db, err := New(context.Background(), path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating snapshot database: %v", err)
}
err = db.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("closing snapshot database: %v", err)
}
return path
}
// forgedDB creates an empty database file and runs the given statements
// against it read-write, so a test can plant schema objects the real
// schema never defines.
func forgedDB(t *testing.T, stmts ...string) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "forged.db")
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("opening forged database: %v", err)
}
for _, stmt := range stmts {
_, err = db.ExecContext(context.Background(), stmt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executing %q: %v", stmt, err)
}
}
err = db.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("closing forged database: %v", err)
}
return path
}
func TestOpenReadOnlyAcceptsGenuineSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), genuineSnapshotDB(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenReadOnly refused a genuine snapshot database: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
}
func TestOpenReadOnlyRefusesWrites(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), genuineSnapshotDB(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenReadOnly: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
// A schema write depends on no table columns, so the only reason it
// can fail is that the database is open read-only.
_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(context.Background(),
"CREATE TABLE probe_readonly (x)")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a write to a read-only snapshot database to fail")
}
}
func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsView(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := forgedDB(t, "CREATE VIEW files AS SELECT 1 AS path")
_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
t.Fatalf("expected a view named files to be refused, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsTrigger(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := forgedDB(t,
"CREATE TABLE files (path TEXT)",
"CREATE TRIGGER t AFTER INSERT ON files BEGIN SELECT 1; END")
_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
t.Fatalf("expected a trigger to be refused, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsMissingTable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Only one of the expected tables is present.
path := forgedDB(t, "CREATE TABLE files (path TEXT)")
_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
t.Fatalf("expected a missing expected table to be refused, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestIsVirtualTableSQL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
sql string
want bool
}{
{"CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE t USING fts5(x)", true},
{" create virtual table t using fts5(x)", true},
{"CREATE TABLE t (x)", false},
{"CREATE VIEW t AS SELECT 1", false},
{"", false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := isVirtualTableSQL(c.sql); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("isVirtualTableSQL(%q) = %v, want %v", c.sql, got, c.want)
}
}
}
+15 -1
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,18 @@ var Module = fx.Module("log",
)
// New creates a new logger configuration from provided options.
//
// JSON is intentionally not carried into Config: a command emitting a
// JSON document on stdout must keep its stderr log level under
// --verbose/--debug, so --json must not lower it (issue #112). JSON
// silences the stdout UI in setupGlobals instead.
func New(opts Options) Config {
return Config(opts)
return Config{
Verbose: opts.Verbose,
Debug: opts.Debug,
Cron: opts.Cron,
Quiet: opts.Quiet,
}
}
// Options are provided by the CLI.
@@ -24,4 +34,8 @@ type Options struct {
Debug bool
Cron bool
Quiet bool
// JSON marks a command whose stdout carries a machine-readable
// document. It silences the human UI on stdout (see setupGlobals),
// but unlike Quiet it leaves the stderr log level alone.
JSON bool
}
-67
View File
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
// Package models defines shared value types describing files, chunks,
// blobs, and snapshots as they move through the backup pipeline.
package models
import (
"time"
)
// FileInfo represents a file in the backup system
type FileInfo struct {
Path string
MTime time.Time
Size int64
}
// ChunkInfo represents a content-addressed chunk
type ChunkInfo struct {
Hash string // SHA256 hash
Size int64
Offset int64 // Offset within source file
}
// ChunkRef represents a reference to a chunk in a blob or file
type ChunkRef struct {
ChunkHash string
Offset int64
Length int64
}
// BlobInfo represents an encrypted blob containing multiple chunks
type BlobInfo struct {
Hash string // SHA256 hash of the blob content (content-addressable)
CreatedAt time.Time
Size int64
ChunkCount int
}
// Snapshot represents a backup snapshot
type Snapshot struct {
ID string // ISO8601 timestamp
Hostname string
Version string
CreatedAt time.Time
FileCount int64
ChunkCount int64
BlobCount int64
TotalSize int64
MetadataSize int64
}
// SnapshotMetadata contains the full metadata for a snapshot
type SnapshotMetadata struct {
Snapshot *Snapshot
Files map[string]*FileInfo
Chunks map[string]*ChunkInfo
Blobs map[string]*BlobInfo
FileChunks map[string][]*ChunkRef // path -> chunks
BlobChunks map[string][]*ChunkRef // blob hash -> chunks
}
// Chunk represents a data chunk for processing
type Chunk struct {
Data []byte
Hash string
Offset int64
Length int64
}
-58
View File
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
package models_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/models"
)
// TestModelsCompilation ensures all model types can be instantiated
func TestModelsCompilation(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test primarily serves as a compilation test
// to ensure all types are properly defined
// Test FileInfo
fi := &models.FileInfo{
Path: "/test/file.txt",
MTime: time.Now(),
Size: 1024,
}
if fi.Path != "/test/file.txt" {
t.Errorf("FileInfo.Path not set correctly")
}
// Test ChunkInfo
ci := &models.ChunkInfo{
Hash: "abc123",
Size: 512,
Offset: 0,
}
if ci.Hash != "abc123" {
t.Errorf("ChunkInfo.Hash not set correctly")
}
// Test BlobInfo
bi := &models.BlobInfo{
Hash: "blob123",
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
Size: 1024,
ChunkCount: 2,
}
if bi.Hash != "blob123" {
t.Errorf("BlobInfo.Hash not set correctly")
}
// Test Snapshot
s := &models.Snapshot{
ID: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Hostname: "test-host",
Version: "1.0.0",
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}
if s.ID != "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" {
t.Errorf("Snapshot.ID not set correctly")
}
}
+13 -5
View File
@@ -219,11 +219,7 @@ func (c *Client) HeadObject(ctx context.Context, key string) (bool, error) {
Key: aws.String(fullKey),
})
if err != nil {
var (
notFound *s3types.NotFound
noSuchKey *s3types.NoSuchKey
)
if errors.As(err, &notFound) || errors.As(err, &noSuchKey) {
if IsNotFound(err) {
return false, nil
}
@@ -233,6 +229,18 @@ func (c *Client) HeadObject(ctx context.Context, key string) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}
// IsNotFound reports whether err indicates that an object does not exist.
// Head and Get requests surface a missing object as different SDK types,
// so both are checked here.
func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
var (
notFound *s3types.NotFound
noSuchKey *s3types.NoSuchKey
)
return errors.As(err, &notFound) || errors.As(err, &noSuchKey)
}
// ObjectInfo contains information about an S3 object.
// It is used by ListObjectsStream to return object metadata
// along with any errors encountered during listing.
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
//nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported copyFile helper
package snapshot
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
)
// TestCopyFileExportCopyMode verifies that the exported snapshot database
// copy is created owner-only (0600), even under a lenient 022 umask that
// would otherwise leave a fresh file world-readable.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
func TestCopyFileExportCopyMode(t *testing.T) {
restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
defer syscall.Umask(restore)
dir := t.TempDir()
src := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
err := os.WriteFile(src, []byte("index data"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating source index: %v", err)
}
dst := filepath.Join(dir, "snapshot.db")
sm := &SnapshotManager{fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
err = sm.copyFile(src, dst)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("copyFile: %v", err)
}
info, err := os.Stat(dst)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat export copy: %v", err)
}
got := info.Mode().Perm()
if got != 0o600 {
t.Fatalf("export copy permissions = %#o, want %#o", got, 0o600)
}
}
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
//nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported generateBlobManifest
package snapshot
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
)
// TestGenerateBlobManifest_MissingBlobFails is the regression guard for
// issue #157: a blob the snapshot references but that is absent from the
// blobs table used to be logged and skipped, yielding a manifest with
// fewer blobs than the snapshot needs. Since prune trusts the manifest
// alone, that omitted blob would be deleted at the next prune. Manifest
// generation must fail instead.
func TestGenerateBlobManifest_MissingBlobFails(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
dbPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snapshot.db")
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
// A real blob row satisfies the snapshot_blobs foreign key on
// blob_id; the snapshot then references a different, absent hash.
presentBlob := &database.Blob{
ID: types.NewBlobID(),
Hash: types.BlobHash("present-blob-hash"),
CreatedTS: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second),
}
require.NoError(t, repos.Blobs.Create(ctx, nil, presentBlob))
snap := &database.Snapshot{
ID: "testhost_home_2026-05-01T00:00:00Z",
Hostname: "testhost",
}
require.NoError(t, repos.Snapshots.Create(ctx, nil, snap))
require.NoError(t, repos.Snapshots.AddBlob(ctx, nil,
snap.ID.String(), presentBlob.ID, types.BlobHash("absent-blob-hash")))
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
sm := &SnapshotManager{
config: &config.Config{CompressionLevel: 3},
fs: afero.NewOsFs(),
}
_, err = sm.generateBlobManifest(ctx, dbPath, snap.ID.String())
require.Error(t, err, "manifest generation must fail on a missing blob")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "absent-blob-hash")
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ const remoteKeyPrefix = "vaultik|"
//
// - the "metadata/<remote-key>/..." subdirectory on the storage
// backend so a directory listing of the bucket / file:// dest
// doesn't reveal hostnames, configured snapshot names, or backup
// timestamps;
// doesn't reveal hostnames or configured snapshot names. (The
// backup time is not hidden: the manifest.json.zst inside that
// directory carries a plaintext RFC3339 timestamp.)
// - the `snapshot_id` field of the unencrypted manifest.json.zst
// for the same reason;
// - any code path that needs to translate a known local snapshot ID
+92 -9
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ type Scanner struct {
exclude []string // Glob patterns for files/directories to exclude
compiledExclude []compiledPattern // Compiled glob patterns
progress *ProgressReporter
skipErrors bool // Skip file read errors (log loudly but continue)
// skipErrors skips files that cannot be opened or read (logged loudly);
// packer, database, encryption, and upload errors still abort the run.
skipErrors bool
// ui is the user-facing output; never nil (defaults to a discarding writer).
ui *ui.Writer
@@ -121,7 +123,9 @@ type ScannerConfig struct {
EnableProgress bool // Enable the live progress reporter (ETAs, throughput)
UI *ui.Writer // Where user-facing scanner messages go; nil = discard
Exclude []string // Glob patterns for files/directories to exclude
SkipErrors bool // Skip file read errors (log loudly but continue)
// SkipErrors skips files that cannot be opened or read (log loudly but
// continue); packer, database, encryption, and upload errors still abort.
SkipErrors bool
}
// ScanResult contains the results of a scan operation
@@ -220,7 +224,14 @@ func (s *Scanner) Scan(
defer s.progress.Stop()
}
// Phase 0: Load known files and chunks from database into memory for fast lookup
// Phase 0: Repair any state left by an interrupted previous run, then
// load known files and chunks from the database into memory for fast
// lookup.
err := s.repairInterruptedBlobs(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
knownFiles, err := s.loadDatabaseState(ctx, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -317,6 +328,38 @@ func (s *Scanner) loadDatabaseState(
return knownFiles, nil
}
// repairInterruptedBlobs discards blob rows left by a previous run whose
// upload never completed. Such a blob has its chunks, blob_chunks, and
// blobs rows committed to the local index before the upload is attempted,
// so a crash or dropped connection mid-upload leaves them behind while the
// data never reaches remote storage. Deduplicating against those chunks on
// a later run would produce a snapshot that reports success but cannot be
// restored. Dropping the un-uploaded blobs (their blob_chunks cascade) and
// then any chunks left unreferenced forces the affected data to be
// re-chunked and re-uploaded this run. A blob is attached to a snapshot
// only once its upload is recorded, so this never touches a completed
// snapshot's data.
func (s *Scanner) repairInterruptedBlobs(ctx context.Context) error {
removed, err := s.repos.Blobs.DeleteUnuploaded(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("removing un-uploaded blob records: %w", err)
}
if removed == 0 {
return nil
}
log.Warn("Discarded blob records from an interrupted previous run; "+
"their data will be re-uploaded", "blobs", removed)
err = s.repos.Chunks.DeleteOrphaned(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("removing orphaned chunks: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// summarizeScanPhase calculates total size to process, updates progress tracking,
// and prints the scan phase summary with file counts and sizes
func (s *Scanner) summarizeScanPhase(
@@ -392,11 +435,14 @@ func (s *Scanner) loadKnownFiles(
return result, nil
}
// loadKnownChunks loads all known chunk hashes from the database into a
// map for fast lookup. This avoids per-chunk database queries during file
// processing.
// loadKnownChunks loads the chunk hashes safe to deduplicate against into
// an in-memory map for fast lookup, avoiding per-chunk database queries
// during file processing. Only chunks held by a blob whose upload
// completed are loaded: a chunk left behind by an interrupted upload
// refers to data that never reached remote storage, and deduplicating
// against it would silently produce an unrestorable snapshot.
func (s *Scanner) loadKnownChunks(ctx context.Context) error {
chunks, err := s.repos.Chunks.List(ctx)
chunks, err := s.repos.Chunks.ListInUploadedBlobs(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listing chunks: %w", err)
}
@@ -1294,6 +1340,15 @@ func (s *Scanner) processFileWithErrorHandling(
) (bool, error) {
err := s.processFileStreaming(ctx, fileToProcess, result)
if err != nil {
// A packer/database/encryption/upload failure means the chunk's data
// may not have been stored. Skipping the file would let the snapshot
// record a file whose chunk is in no blob and cannot be restored, so
// abort the run even under --skip-errors. Only open and read errors
// are skipped below.
var pErr *packerError
if errors.As(err, &pErr) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("processing file %s: %w", fileToProcess.Path, err)
}
// Handle files that were deleted between scan and process phases
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
log.Warn("File was deleted during backup, skipping",
@@ -1303,7 +1358,7 @@ func (s *Scanner) processFileWithErrorHandling(
return true, nil
}
// Skip file read errors if --skip-errors is enabled
// Skip open/read errors if --skip-errors is enabled
if s.skipErrors {
log.Error("Failed to process file (skipping due to --skip-errors)",
"path", fileToProcess.Path, "error", err)
@@ -1401,7 +1456,17 @@ func (s *Scanner) finalizeProcessPhase(ctx context.Context, result *ScanResult)
return fmt.Errorf("parsing blob ID: %w", err)
}
// With no remote backend the blob's lifecycle ends here, so
// mark it uploaded in the same transaction that attaches it to
// the snapshot. This keeps the invariant that any blob a
// snapshot references has uploaded_ts set, so deduplication and
// interrupted-run repair treat these blobs as trustworthy.
err = s.repos.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
err := s.repos.Blobs.UpdateUploaded(ctx, tx, b.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marking blob uploaded: %w", err)
}
return s.repos.Snapshots.AddBlob(ctx, tx, s.snapshotID, blobID,
types.BlobHash(b.Hash))
})
@@ -1660,6 +1725,20 @@ type streamingChunkInfo struct {
size int64
}
// packerError marks an error that came from adding a chunk to the packer
// (packing, database, encryption, or upload). Such an error means the chunk's
// data may not have been stored, so the run must abort even under --skip-errors:
// skipping the file would leave the chunk recorded as backed up while it lives
// in no blob, and a later snapshot could record a file that cannot be restored.
// Only open and read errors are safe to skip.
type packerError struct {
err error
}
func (e *packerError) Error() string { return e.err.Error() }
func (e *packerError) Unwrap() error { return e.err }
// processFileStreaming processes a file by streaming chunks directly to the packer
func (s *Scanner) processFileStreaming(
ctx context.Context, fileToProcess *FileToProcess, result *ScanResult,
@@ -1710,7 +1789,11 @@ func (s *Scanner) processFileStreaming(
if !chunkExists {
err := s.addChunkToPacker(ctx, chunk)
if err != nil {
return err
// Mark as a packer error so --skip-errors cannot swallow it:
// the chunk was registered as pending before packing, so a
// skipped file here would be recorded as backed up while its
// data was never stored.
return &packerError{err: err}
}
}
+216
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
package snapshot_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
)
// errSimTempFail is the one-time temp-file creation failure blobTempFailFs
// injects, mirroring a full temp filesystem.
var errSimTempFail = errors.New("simulated temp-file creation failure")
// errSimRead is the read failure readFailFile injects for a file that opens
// but cannot be read.
var errSimRead = errors.New("simulated read failure")
// blobTempFailFs fails the first temp-file creation for a packer blob, then
// behaves normally, simulating a one-time failure to start a new blob.
type blobTempFailFs struct {
afero.Fs
mu sync.Mutex
failed bool
}
//nolint:ireturn // afero.Fs.OpenFile is defined to return the interface.
func (f *blobTempFailFs) OpenFile(
name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode,
) (afero.File, error) {
if strings.Contains(name, "vaultik-blob-") {
f.mu.Lock()
firstTime := !f.failed
f.failed = true
f.mu.Unlock()
if firstTime {
return nil, errSimTempFail
}
}
return f.Fs.OpenFile(name, flag, perm)
}
// readFailFile wraps an afero.File whose Read always fails.
type readFailFile struct {
afero.File
}
func (readFailFile) Read([]byte) (int, error) {
return 0, errSimRead
}
// readFailFs fails reads of one target path after a successful open.
type readFailFs struct {
afero.Fs
target string
}
//nolint:ireturn // afero.Fs.Open is defined to return the interface.
func (f *readFailFs) Open(name string) (afero.File, error) {
file, err := f.Fs.Open(name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if name == f.target {
return readFailFile{File: file}, nil
}
return file, nil
}
// writeSkipErrorTestFile writes one file into fs with a fixed mtime.
func writeSkipErrorTestFile(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, path, content string) {
t.Helper()
err := fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0755)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
err = afero.WriteFile(fs, path, []byte(content), 0644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
}
when := time.Date(2024, 1, 1, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
err = fs.Chtimes(path, when, when)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chtimes %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
// runSkipErrorScan scans /source on fs with the given skip-errors setting and
// returns the repositories (for inspection) and the scan error.
func runSkipErrorScan(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, skipErrors bool,
) (*database.Repositories, error) {
t.Helper()
db, err := database.NewTestDB()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create test db: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
cerr := db.Close()
if cerr != nil {
t.Errorf("close db: %v", cerr)
}
})
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
scanner := snapshot.NewScanner(snapshot.ScannerConfig{
FS: fs,
ChunkSize: int64(1024 * 16),
Repositories: repos,
MaxBlobSize: int64(1024 * 1024),
CompressionLevel: 3,
AgeRecipients: []string{testAgePublicKey},
SkipErrors: skipErrors,
})
ctx := context.Background()
snapshotID := "test-snapshot-skip-errors"
createTestSnapshotRecord(ctx, t, repos, snapshotID)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, "/source", snapshotID)
return repos, err
}
// TestScannerPackingFailureAbortsUnderSkipErrors checks that a failure to start
// a new blob aborts the run even with --skip-errors. Otherwise the file would
// be skipped while its chunk had already been registered as pending, letting a
// later blob record that chunk in the chunks table with no blob to back it —
// a snapshot that completes with a file that cannot be restored.
func TestScannerPackingFailureAbortsUnderSkipErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Two files with distinct content so each yields a distinct chunk: the
// first fails to start a blob, and without the fix the second's blob would
// commit the first's orphaned chunk row.
fs := &blobTempFailFs{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
writeSkipErrorTestFile(t, fs, "/source/file1.txt", "first file content")
writeSkipErrorTestFile(t, fs, "/source/file2.txt", "second file content")
repos, err := runSkipErrorScan(t, fs, true)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected scan to abort on the packer error, got nil")
}
// ListUnpacked returns chunks recorded with no blob_chunks row: exactly the
// unrestorable state this fix prevents.
unpacked, err := repos.Chunks.ListUnpacked(context.Background(), 10)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listing unpacked chunks: %v", err)
}
if len(unpacked) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no chunk recorded without a blob, got %d", len(unpacked))
}
}
// TestScannerReadErrorAbortsWithoutSkipErrors checks that a file read error
// aborts the run when --skip-errors is not set.
func TestScannerReadErrorAbortsWithoutSkipErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const target = "/source/unreadable.txt"
fs := &readFailFs{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs(), target: target}
writeSkipErrorTestFile(t, fs, target, "content that cannot be read")
_, err := runSkipErrorScan(t, fs, false)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected scan to fail on the read error, got nil")
}
}
// TestScannerReadErrorSkippedWithSkipErrors checks that a file read error is
// skipped and the run completes when --skip-errors is set.
func TestScannerReadErrorSkippedWithSkipErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const target = "/source/unreadable.txt"
fs := &readFailFs{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs(), target: target}
writeSkipErrorTestFile(t, fs, target, "content that cannot be read")
repos, err := runSkipErrorScan(t, fs, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected scan to complete with --skip-errors, got %v", err)
}
chunks, err := repos.FileChunks.GetByFile(context.Background(), target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getting file chunks: %v", err)
}
if len(chunks) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected unreadable file skipped, got %d chunks", len(chunks))
}
}
+51 -13
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os/exec"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -669,14 +669,31 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) collectCleanupStats(
// vacuumDatabase runs VACUUM on the database to remove deleted data and compact
// This is critical for security - ensures no stale/deleted data pages are uploaded
//
// VACUUM runs through the modernc.org/sqlite driver, on a freshly opened
// connection with no transaction in flight (VACUUM cannot run inside one).
// The database opens in WAL mode, so VACUUM's rewrite lands in the WAL; the
// checkpoint on Close flushes it into the main file, which is the file we
// then compress and upload.
func (sm *SnapshotManager) vacuumDatabase(ctx context.Context, dbPath string) error {
log.Debug("Running VACUUM on database", "path", dbPath)
//nolint:gosec // G204: fixed argv; dbPath is our own temp file path
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "sqlite3", dbPath, "VACUUM;")
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("running VACUUM: %w (output: %s)", err, string(output))
return fmt.Errorf("opening database for VACUUM: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cerr := db.Close()
if cerr != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to close database after VACUUM",
"path", dbPath, "error", cerr)
}
}()
_, err = db.ExecWithLog(ctx, "VACUUM")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("running VACUUM: %w", err)
}
return nil
@@ -747,7 +764,13 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) compressFile(inputPath, outputPath string) error {
return nil
}
// copyFile copies a file from src to dst
// exportCopyPerm restricts the exported snapshot database copy to the owning
// user; it holds the same private index data as the local index file.
const exportCopyPerm = 0o600
// copyFile copies a file from src to dst. The destination is the exported
// snapshot database, so it is created owner-only rather than with the
// umask-dependent default.
func (sm *SnapshotManager) copyFile(src, dst string) error {
log.Debug("Opening source file for copy", "path", src)
@@ -767,7 +790,9 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) copyFile(src, dst string) error {
log.Debug("Creating destination file", "path", dst)
destFile, err := sm.fs.Create(dst)
destFile, err := sm.fs.OpenFile(
dst, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, exportCopyPerm,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -793,6 +818,11 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) copyFile(src, dst string) error {
return nil
}
// errBlobMissingFromDatabase means a snapshot references a blob that is
// absent from the blobs table, so a complete manifest cannot be built.
var errBlobMissingFromDatabase = errors.New(
"blob referenced by snapshot is not in the database")
// generateBlobManifest creates a compressed JSON list of all blobs in the snapshot
func (sm *SnapshotManager) generateBlobManifest(
ctx context.Context, dbPath string, snapshotID string,
@@ -823,25 +853,33 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) generateBlobManifest(
totalCompressedSize := int64(0)
for _, hash := range blobHashes {
// Every blob the snapshot references must appear in the manifest.
// Prune consults only the manifest to decide what is still in use,
// so silently dropping a blob here would let a later prune delete
// it while this snapshot still needs it. A lookup failure or a
// missing blob row therefore fails manifest generation.
blob, err := repos.Blobs.GetByHash(ctx, hash)
if err != nil {
log.Warn("Failed to get blob details", "hash", hash, "error", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting blob details for %s: %w", hash, err)
}
continue
if blob == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: blob %s, snapshot %s",
errBlobMissingFromDatabase, hash, snapshotID)
}
if blob != nil {
blobs = append(blobs, BlobInfo{
Hash: hash,
CompressedSize: blob.CompressedSize,
})
totalCompressedSize += blob.CompressedSize
}
}
// Create manifest. SnapshotID in the unencrypted manifest is the
// double-SHA256 remote key, not the human ID, so the public bytes
// don't reveal hostname/snapshot-name/timestamp metadata.
// double-SHA256 remote key (see RemoteSnapshotKey), not the human ID,
// so neither this field nor the directory name reveals the hostname or
// snapshot name. Timestamp below is written in the clear, so the backup
// time is observable to anyone who can read the manifest.
manifest := &Manifest{
SnapshotID: RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID),
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+92
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
package snapshot
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"io"
@@ -96,6 +97,97 @@ func verifyCleanedDB(
}
}
// TestVacuumDatabaseRemovesDeletedData proves the export path uploads a
// compacted database: after rows carrying a recognizable marker are deleted
// and vacuumDatabase runs, no page holding that marker survives in the file
// on disk (the file compressFile later reads for upload).
func TestVacuumDatabaseRemovesDeletedData(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "snapshot.db")
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create database: %v", err)
}
// A marker distinctive enough that its presence in the raw file can only
// come from the rows inserted below.
marker := []byte("VACUUM_PROBE_DEADBEEF_DELETED_ROW")
payload := bytes.Repeat(marker, 128) // ~4 KiB per row
_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(ctx,
"CREATE TABLE vacuum_probe (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, payload BLOB)")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create probe table: %v", err)
}
for range 512 {
_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(ctx,
"INSERT INTO vacuum_probe (payload) VALUES (?)", payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert probe row: %v", err)
}
}
_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM vacuum_probe")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete probe rows: %v", err)
}
// Close so the deletes reach the main file, mirroring the state
// prepareExportDB hands to vacuumDatabase.
err = db.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to close database: %v", err)
}
beforeInfo, err := fs.Stat(dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to stat database before vacuum: %v", err)
}
beforeBytes, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read database before vacuum: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Contains(beforeBytes, marker) {
t.Fatalf("expected deleted-row data to linger before vacuum")
}
sm := &SnapshotManager{fs: fs}
err = sm.vacuumDatabase(ctx, dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("vacuumDatabase failed: %v", err)
}
afterBytes, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read database after vacuum: %v", err)
}
if bytes.Contains(afterBytes, marker) {
t.Fatalf("deleted-row data survived vacuum in the uploaded file")
}
afterInfo, err := fs.Stat(dbPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to stat database after vacuum: %v", err)
}
if afterInfo.Size() >= beforeInfo.Size() {
t.Fatalf("expected vacuum to shrink the file: before=%d after=%d",
beforeInfo.Size(), afterInfo.Size())
}
}
func TestCleanSnapshotDBEmptySnapshot(t *testing.T) {
// Initialize logger
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+198
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
package storage_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"reflect"
"sort"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// runStorerConformance is the shared Storer contract. Every backend that
// can run in-process is expected to pass it: TestFileStorer runs it against
// file://, TestS3Storer against s3://. A new backend inherits this coverage
// by passing its own constructor, so the contract is defined once.
//
// It exercises the public Storer interface: round-trip, stat, list with
// prefix filtering, overwrite, delete, delete-of-missing, and not-found on
// Get and Stat. Each section takes its own fresh backend instance, so the
// order of sections never matters and no section sees another's objects.
func runStorerConformance(t *testing.T, newStorer func(*testing.T) storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
conformanceRoundTrip(t, newStorer(t))
conformanceOverwrite(t, newStorer(t))
conformanceList(t, newStorer(t))
conformanceDelete(t, newStorer(t))
conformanceNotFound(t, newStorer(t))
}
// conformanceRoundTrip stores a nested key, then reads it back and stats it.
func conformanceRoundTrip(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
key := "blobs/aa/bb/object.bin"
want := []byte("round-trip payload")
err := s.Put(ctx, key, bytes.NewReader(want))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
}
got := getBytes(t, s, key)
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("Get returned %q, want %q", got, want)
}
info, err := s.Stat(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stat: %v", err)
}
if info.Key != key {
t.Errorf("Stat key = %q, want %q", info.Key, key)
}
if info.Size != int64(len(want)) {
t.Errorf("Stat size = %d, want %d", info.Size, len(want))
}
}
// conformanceOverwrite checks that a second Put replaces the first.
func conformanceOverwrite(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
key := "meta/snapshot.json"
err := s.Put(ctx, key, bytes.NewReader([]byte("first")))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Put: %v", err)
}
want := []byte("second and longer payload")
err = s.Put(ctx, key, bytes.NewReader(want))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Put: %v", err)
}
got := getBytes(t, s, key)
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("after overwrite Get returned %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
// conformanceList checks prefix filtering and the empty result for a
// prefix that matches nothing.
func conformanceList(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
keys := []string{"blobs/aa/one", "blobs/bb/two", "meta/three"}
for _, k := range keys {
err := s.Put(ctx, k, bytes.NewReader([]byte("data")))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Put %q: %v", k, err)
}
}
if got := listSorted(t, s, ""); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, keys) {
t.Errorf("List(\"\") = %v, want %v", got, keys)
}
wantBlobs := []string{"blobs/aa/one", "blobs/bb/two"}
if got := listSorted(t, s, "blobs/"); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, wantBlobs) {
t.Errorf("List(\"blobs/\") = %v, want %v", got, wantBlobs)
}
if got := listSorted(t, s, "absent/"); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("List(\"absent/\") = %v, want empty", got)
}
}
// conformanceDelete checks that Delete removes an object and that deleting
// a missing key is not an error.
func conformanceDelete(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
key := "blobs/cc/gone.bin"
err := s.Put(ctx, key, bytes.NewReader([]byte("temporary")))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
}
err = s.Delete(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Delete: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.Get(ctx, key)
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Get after Delete error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
err = s.Delete(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Delete of missing key = %v, want nil", err)
}
}
// conformanceNotFound checks Get and Stat on an absent key.
func conformanceNotFound(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
key := "never/written"
_, err := s.Get(ctx, key)
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Get error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
_, err = s.Stat(ctx, key)
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Stat error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
}
// getBytes reads a key fully and closes the reader.
func getBytes(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer, key string) []byte {
t.Helper()
rc, err := s.Get(context.Background(), key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get %q: %v", key, err)
}
defer func() { _ = rc.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(rc)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %q: %v", key, err)
}
return data
}
// listSorted returns the keys under a prefix in a stable order.
func listSorted(t *testing.T, s storage.Storer, prefix string) []string {
t.Helper()
keys, err := s.List(context.Background(), prefix)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("List %q: %v", prefix, err)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
+209
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
// Package faultstore provides a storage.Storer wrapper that injects
// faults on demand, so tests can reproduce the failure modes a real
// backend exhibits: an upload that fails partway, a backend that reports
// success while storing nothing, and reads that return corrupt or
// truncated bytes. It is the seam called for by the fault-injection
// tests (sneak/vaultik issue 72) and is meant to be reused by future
// tests rather than re-implemented per case.
//
// The wrapper delegates every method to the inner Storer. Two hooks
// change that: OnPut decides the fate of each write, and OnGet decides
// how each read's bytes are returned. Both are keyed by the object key,
// so a test can fault only blobs, only metadata, or a single object.
package faultstore
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// ErrInjectedUpload is returned by a Put the OnPut hook chose to fail.
var ErrInjectedUpload = errors.New("faultstore: injected upload failure")
// PutAction is the disposition OnPut assigns to a write.
type PutAction int
const (
// PutNormal writes through to the inner Storer.
PutNormal PutAction = iota
// PutFail reads part of the stream, then fails without storing the
// object — a network upload that dies partway through.
PutFail
// PutSwallow reports success but stores nothing — a backend that
// lies about durability.
PutSwallow
)
// GetFault is how OnGet chooses to damage a read.
type GetFault int
const (
// GetNormal returns the stored bytes unchanged.
GetNormal GetFault = iota
// GetCorrupt flips a byte so the returned object no longer matches
// what was stored.
GetCorrupt
// GetTruncate returns a short read: the object's bytes cut off
// before the end.
GetTruncate
)
// Storer wraps an inner storage.Storer with fault-injection hooks. A
// zero-valued hook means "no fault": construct with New and set only the
// hook a test needs.
type Storer struct {
inner storage.Storer
// OnPut, when set, is consulted before every Put and
// PutWithProgress with the object key.
OnPut func(key string) PutAction
// OnGet, when set, is consulted for every Get with the object key
// and damages the returned bytes accordingly.
OnGet func(key string) GetFault
}
// New wraps inner. inner must be non-nil.
func New(inner storage.Storer) *Storer {
return &Storer{inner: inner}
}
// midStreamBytes is how far a PutFail reads before failing, enough to be
// past the start of any real blob without depending on the blob's size.
const midStreamBytes = 512
// Put stores data unless OnPut faults the write.
func (f *Storer) Put(ctx context.Context, key string, data io.Reader) error {
handled, err := f.injectPut(key, data)
if handled {
return err
}
return f.inner.Put(ctx, key, data)
}
// PutWithProgress stores data unless OnPut faults the write.
func (f *Storer) PutWithProgress(
ctx context.Context, key string, data io.Reader,
size int64, progress storage.ProgressCallback,
) error {
handled, err := f.injectPut(key, data)
if handled {
return err
}
return f.inner.PutWithProgress(ctx, key, data, size, progress)
}
// Get retrieves data, damaging it if OnGet faults the read.
func (f *Storer) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
rc, err := f.inner.Get(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fault := GetNormal
if f.OnGet != nil {
fault = f.OnGet(key)
}
if fault == GetNormal {
return rc, nil
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(rc)
_ = rc.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(damage(fault, data))), nil
}
// damage returns a faulted copy of the stored bytes. GetCorrupt flips a
// byte in the middle so decryption authentication fails; GetTruncate
// drops the final byte so the read ends short. Both are no-ops on empty
// input, which cannot be damaged into something distinguishable.
func damage(fault GetFault, data []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, len(data))
copy(out, data)
if len(out) == 0 {
return out
}
switch fault {
case GetCorrupt:
out[len(out)/2] ^= 0xff
case GetTruncate:
out = out[:len(out)-1]
case GetNormal:
}
return out
}
// Stat delegates unchanged.
func (f *Storer) Stat(ctx context.Context, key string) (*storage.ObjectInfo, error) {
return f.inner.Stat(ctx, key)
}
// Delete delegates unchanged.
func (f *Storer) Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
return f.inner.Delete(ctx, key)
}
// List delegates unchanged.
func (f *Storer) List(ctx context.Context, prefix string) ([]string, error) {
return f.inner.List(ctx, prefix)
}
// ListStream delegates unchanged.
func (f *Storer) ListStream(
ctx context.Context, prefix string,
) <-chan storage.ObjectInfo {
return f.inner.ListStream(ctx, prefix)
}
// Info delegates unchanged.
func (f *Storer) Info() storage.Info {
return f.inner.Info()
}
func (f *Storer) putAction(key string) PutAction {
if f.OnPut == nil {
return PutNormal
}
return f.OnPut(key)
}
// injectPut handles the non-normal write dispositions. It reports
// whether it handled the write and, if so, with what error.
func (f *Storer) injectPut(key string, data io.Reader) (bool, error) {
switch f.putAction(key) {
case PutFail:
// Consume part of the stream so the failure lands mid-transfer,
// the way a dropped connection would, then error without
// storing anything.
_, _ = io.CopyN(io.Discard, data, midStreamBytes)
return true, fmt.Errorf("%w for %q", ErrInjectedUpload, key)
case PutSwallow:
// A lying backend still drains the request body, then keeps
// nothing.
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, data)
return true, nil
case PutNormal:
return false, nil
default:
return false, nil
}
}
+79 -54
View File
@@ -46,31 +46,18 @@ func (f *FileStorer) SetFilesystem(fs afero.Fs) {
// storage base path.
const storageDirPerm = 0o755
// tempSuffix marks a partially written object. writeAtomic streams into a
// temp file carrying this suffix and only renames it onto the real key once
// the whole object is on disk, so an interrupted write can never leave a
// truncated object at the key a later run would Stat and trust as a complete
// blob. List and ListStream skip these files, so a leftover from an
// interrupted write is never listed or trusted as a blob; it is otherwise
// harmless and is overwritten when the same key is written again.
const tempSuffix = ".partial"
// Put stores data at the specified key.
func (f *FileStorer) Put(_ context.Context, key string, data io.Reader) error {
path := f.fullPath(key)
// Create parent directories
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
err := f.fs.MkdirAll(dir, storageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating directories: %w", err)
}
file, err := f.fs.Create(path)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating file: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = file.Close() }()
_, err = io.Copy(file, data)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing file: %w", err)
}
return nil
return f.writeAtomic(key, data, nil)
}
// PutWithProgress stores data with progress reporting.
@@ -78,35 +65,7 @@ func (f *FileStorer) PutWithProgress(
_ context.Context, key string, data io.Reader,
_ int64, progress ProgressCallback,
) error {
path := f.fullPath(key)
// Create parent directories
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
err := f.fs.MkdirAll(dir, storageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating directories: %w", err)
}
file, err := f.fs.Create(path)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating file: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = file.Close() }()
// Wrap with progress tracking
pw := &progressWriter{
writer: file,
callback: progress,
}
_, err = io.Copy(pw, data)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing file: %w", err)
}
return nil
return f.writeAtomic(key, data, progress)
}
// Get retrieves data from the specified key.
@@ -188,7 +147,7 @@ func (f *FileStorer) List(ctx context.Context, prefix string) ([]string, error)
default:
}
if !info.IsDir() {
if !info.IsDir() && !strings.HasSuffix(info.Name(), tempSuffix) {
// Convert back to key (relative path from basePath)
relPath, err := filepath.Rel(f.basePath, path)
if err != nil {
@@ -245,7 +204,7 @@ func (f *FileStorer) ListStream(ctx context.Context, prefix string) <-chan Objec
return nil //nolint:nilerr // continue walking despite errors
}
if !info.IsDir() {
if !info.IsDir() && !strings.HasSuffix(info.Name(), tempSuffix) {
relPath, err := filepath.Rel(f.basePath, path)
if err != nil {
ch <- ObjectInfo{Err: fmt.Errorf("computing relative path: %w", err)}
@@ -275,6 +234,72 @@ func (f *FileStorer) Info() Info {
}
}
// writeAtomic streams data into a temp file in the destination directory,
// fsyncs it, and renames it onto the final key. The key therefore appears
// only once the whole object has been durably written; a failure part-way
// leaves a temp file (removed here on the failing path) rather than a
// truncated object at the key.
func (f *FileStorer) writeAtomic(
key string, data io.Reader, progress ProgressCallback,
) error {
path := f.fullPath(key)
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
err := f.fs.MkdirAll(dir, storageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating directories: %w", err)
}
tmp, err := afero.TempFile(f.fs, dir, filepath.Base(path)+"-*"+tempSuffix)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmp.Name()
// Remove the temp file unless the rename below claims it. On the success
// path renamed is true, so the deferred Close and Remove are harmless
// no-ops on a name that no longer exists.
renamed := false
defer func() {
_ = tmp.Close()
if !renamed {
_ = f.fs.Remove(tmpPath)
}
}()
var w io.Writer = tmp
if progress != nil {
w = &progressWriter{writer: tmp, callback: progress}
}
_, err = io.Copy(w, data)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing file: %w", err)
}
err = tmp.Sync()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("syncing temp file: %w", err)
}
err = tmp.Close()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("closing temp file: %w", err)
}
err = f.fs.Rename(tmpPath, path)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("renaming temp file: %w", err)
}
renamed = true
return nil
}
// fullPath returns the full filesystem path for a key.
func (f *FileStorer) fullPath(key string) string {
return filepath.Join(f.basePath, key)
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package storage_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// errStreamInterrupted stands in for an upload cut off mid-stream.
var errStreamInterrupted = errors.New("connection reset mid-upload")
// failingReader yields its data once, then fails.
type failingReader struct {
data []byte
done bool
}
func (r *failingReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.done {
return 0, errStreamInterrupted
}
n := copy(p, r.data)
r.done = true
return n, nil
}
// TestFileStorer_InterruptedWriteLeavesNoTrustedObject checks that a write
// cut off mid-stream leaves nothing at the destination key, so a later run
// cannot Stat a truncated object and trust it as a complete blob.
func TestFileStorer_InterruptedWriteLeavesNoTrustedObject(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f, err := storage.NewFileStorer(t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewFileStorer: %v", err)
}
ctx := context.Background()
key := "blobs/aa/bb/aabbccddeeff"
err = f.PutWithProgress(ctx, key, &failingReader{data: []byte("partial")}, 4096, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the interrupted write to fail, got nil")
}
_, err = f.Stat(ctx, key)
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Fatalf("expected key absent after interrupted write, got Stat err %v", err)
}
keys, err := f.List(ctx, "blobs/")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("List: %v", err)
}
if len(keys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no keys listed after interrupted write, got %v", keys)
}
}
// TestFileStorer_ListSkipsPartialFiles checks that a leftover temp file (the
// storage layer names them with a ".partial" suffix) is never surfaced as a
// key by List or ListStream.
func TestFileStorer_ListSkipsPartialFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
base := t.TempDir()
f, err := storage.NewFileStorer(base)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewFileStorer: %v", err)
}
ctx := context.Background()
realKey := "blobs/aa/bb/aabbccddeeff"
err = f.Put(ctx, realKey, strings.NewReader("blob-bytes"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
}
// A stray temp file, as an interrupted write would leave behind.
leftover := filepath.Join(base, "blobs/aa/bb/aabbccddeeff-123456.partial")
err = os.WriteFile(leftover, []byte("half"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writing leftover temp file: %v", err)
}
keys, err := f.List(ctx, "blobs/")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("List: %v", err)
}
if len(keys) != 1 || keys[0] != realKey {
t.Fatalf("List should return only the real key, got %v", keys)
}
var streamed []string
for obj := range f.ListStream(ctx, "blobs/") {
if obj.Err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListStream: %v", obj.Err)
}
streamed = append(streamed, obj.Key)
}
if len(streamed) != 1 || streamed[0] != realKey {
t.Fatalf("ListStream should return only the real key, got %v", streamed)
}
}
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
package storage_test
import (
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// newFileStorer builds a file:// backend rooted at a fresh temp directory.
//
//nolint:ireturn // conformance runs against the Storer interface by design
func newFileStorer(t *testing.T) storage.Storer {
t.Helper()
s, err := storage.NewFileStorer(t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewFileStorer: %v", err)
}
return s
}
// TestFileStorer runs the shared Storer contract against the file:// backend.
func TestFileStorer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runStorerConformance(t, newFileStorer)
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -111,10 +111,11 @@ func storerFromParsedS3URL(parsed *URL, cfg *config.Config) (Storer, error) {
func storerFromLegacyS3Config(cfg *config.Config) (Storer, error) {
endpoint := cfg.S3.Endpoint
// Ensure protocol is present
// Ensure protocol is present. Absent an explicit use_ssl, default to TLS;
// plain HTTP only when use_ssl is written as false.
if !strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "http://") &&
!strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "https://") {
if cfg.S3.UseSSL {
if cfg.S3.UseSSL == nil || *cfg.S3.UseSSL {
endpoint = "https://" + endpoint
} else {
endpoint = "http://" + endpoint
+61
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
package storage_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// legacyS3Config returns a minimal s3.* (no storage_url) configuration with a
// scheme-less endpoint. useSSL mirrors the config file: nil means the key is
// omitted, a pointer means it was written explicitly.
func legacyS3Config(useSSL *bool) *config.Config {
return &config.Config{
S3: config.S3Config{
Endpoint: "s3.example.com",
Bucket: "bucket",
AccessKeyID: "key",
SecretAccessKey: "secret",
Region: "us-east-1",
UseSSL: useSSL,
},
}
}
// endpointScheme builds the storer from cfg and returns the scheme its
// resolved endpoint carries (Info().Location is "endpoint/bucket").
func endpointScheme(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) string {
t.Helper()
storer, err := storage.NewStorer(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStorer: %v", err)
}
location := storer.Info().Location
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(location, "https://"):
return "https"
case strings.HasPrefix(location, "http://"):
return "http"
default:
t.Fatalf("endpoint has no http(s) scheme: %q", location)
return ""
}
}
func TestLegacyS3SchemelessEndpointDefaultsToTLS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if got := endpointScheme(t, legacyS3Config(nil)); got != "https" {
t.Errorf("use_ssl omitted: got %q scheme, want https", got)
}
no := false
if got := endpointScheme(t, legacyS3Config(&no)); got != "http" {
t.Errorf("use_ssl: false: got %q scheme, want http", got)
}
}
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package storage_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// The rclone backend is a thin adapter over the rclone library: it turns a
// (remote, path) pair into rclone's "remote:path" string, hands it to
// rclone, and maps rclone's own results back to the Storer interface. What
// can be tested in-process, without a configured remote or network, is that
// adapter layer — how the arguments are shaped and how construction errors
// are reported. The data-plane operations (Put/Get/List/Delete) are rclone's
// own, exercised against a real provider (drive, s3-via-rclone, ...), which
// needs a configured remote with credentials and network access and so is
// out of reach of a unit test. The shared Storer conformance suite therefore
// runs against the in-process file and s3 backends; the rclone backend
// inherits that contract once a remote is configured.
//
// These tests use rclone's ":local:" on-the-fly backend, which addresses the
// local filesystem directly without any configured remote, so construction
// runs entirely in-process.
// TestNewRcloneStorerConstruction checks that a valid remote constructs a
// backend and that Info() reports the shaped "remote:path" location.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // NewRcloneStorer installs the process-global rclone config
func TestNewRcloneStorerConstruction(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
s, err := storage.NewRcloneStorer(context.Background(), ":local", dir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewRcloneStorer: %v", err)
}
// Info().Location is the "remote:path" string the adapter builds from
// its two arguments, so asserting it confirms the argument shaping.
want := ":local:" + dir
if got := s.Info().Location; got != want {
t.Errorf("Info().Location = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
// TestNewRcloneStorerUnknownRemote checks that a remote that is not in the
// rclone config fails construction with the ErrRemoteNotFound sentinel,
// rather than silently returning a backend pointed nowhere.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // NewRcloneStorer installs the process-global rclone config
func TestNewRcloneStorerUnknownRemote(t *testing.T) {
_, err := storage.NewRcloneStorer(
context.Background(), "vaultik-no-such-remote", "path")
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrRemoteNotFound) {
t.Errorf("NewRcloneStorer error = %v, want ErrRemoteNotFound", err)
}
}
+16 -1
View File
@@ -38,14 +38,29 @@ func (s *S3Storer) PutWithProgress(
}
// Get retrieves data from the specified key.
// Returns ErrNotFound if the object does not exist.
func (s *S3Storer) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return s.client.GetObject(ctx, key)
rc, err := s.client.GetObject(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
if s3.IsNotFound(err) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get %q: %w", key, ErrNotFound)
}
return nil, err
}
return rc, nil
}
// Stat returns metadata about an object without retrieving its contents.
// Returns ErrNotFound if the object does not exist.
func (s *S3Storer) Stat(ctx context.Context, key string) (*ObjectInfo, error) {
info, err := s.client.StatObject(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
if s3.IsNotFound(err) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stat %q: %w", key, ErrNotFound)
}
return nil, err
}
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
package storage_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/johannesboyne/gofakes3"
"github.com/johannesboyne/gofakes3/backend/s3mem"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/s3"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// s3TestBucket is the bucket created for each in-process S3 server.
const s3TestBucket = "test-bucket"
// newS3Storer builds an s3:// backend backed by a fresh in-process
// S3 server. It reuses the same in-memory S3 harness (gofakes3 + s3mem
// over httptest) that internal/s3 and the not-found regression test use,
// so no new mock or dependency is introduced. Each call gets its own
// server, bucket, and client, so the conformance suite's per-section
// instances stay isolated.
//
//nolint:ireturn // conformance runs against the Storer interface by design
func newS3Storer(t *testing.T) storage.Storer {
t.Helper()
backend := s3mem.New()
err := backend.CreateBucket(s3TestBucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create bucket: %v", err)
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(gofakes3.New(backend).Server())
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
client, err := s3.NewClient(context.Background(), s3.Config{
Endpoint: srv.URL,
Bucket: s3TestBucket,
AccessKeyID: "test",
SecretAccessKey: "test",
Region: "us-east-1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new client: %v", err)
}
return storage.NewS3Storer(client)
}
// TestS3Storer runs the shared Storer contract against the s3:// backend,
// so it is held to the same round-trip, list, delete, and not-found
// behaviour as the file:// backend.
func TestS3Storer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runStorerConformance(t, newS3Storer)
}
// TestS3StorerMissingKeyMapsToErrNotFound pins the specific contract that a
// missing object surfaces as storage.ErrNotFound rather than the raw AWS SDK
// error. Without the mapping, errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) is false on
// s3 and callers would branch differently per backend.
func TestS3StorerMissingKeyMapsToErrNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
storer := newS3Storer(t)
ctx := context.Background()
_, err := storer.Get(ctx, "does-not-exist")
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Get on missing key: got %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
_, err = storer.Stat(ctx, "does-not-exist")
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Stat on missing key: got %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
}
+70 -15
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
)
@@ -23,6 +24,10 @@ var (
ErrUnsupportedScheme = errors.New(
"unsupported URL scheme: must start with s3://, file://, or rclone://")
ErrUnsupportedStorage = errors.New("unsupported storage scheme")
ErrURLCredentials = errors.New(
"storage URL must not carry credentials; " +
"set s3.access_key_id and s3.secret_access_key in the config instead")
ErrURLUnknownParam = errors.New("unknown query parameter in storage URL")
)
// URL represents a parsed storage URL.
@@ -59,11 +64,28 @@ func ParseStorageURL(rawURL string) (*URL, error) {
}, nil
}
// Handle s3:// URLs
if strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "s3://") {
return parseS3URL(rawURL)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "rclone://") {
return parseRcloneURL(rawURL)
}
return nil, ErrUnsupportedScheme
}
// parseS3URL parses an s3://bucket/prefix URL. It rejects credentials in
// the userinfo and any query parameter other than endpoint, region and
// ssl, so a credential-bearing URL is never stored or echoed.
func parseS3URL(rawURL string) (*URL, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
return nil, wrapParseError(err)
}
if u.User != nil {
return nil, ErrURLCredentials
}
bucket := u.Host
@@ -71,30 +93,34 @@ func ParseStorageURL(rawURL string) (*URL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingBucket
}
prefix := strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/")
query := u.Query()
useSSL := true
if query.Get("ssl") == "false" {
useSSL = false
err = rejectUnknownParams(query, "endpoint", "region", "ssl")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &URL{
Scheme: schemeS3,
Bucket: bucket,
Prefix: prefix,
Prefix: strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/"),
Endpoint: query.Get("endpoint"),
Region: query.Get("region"),
UseSSL: useSSL,
UseSSL: query.Get("ssl") != "false",
}, nil
}
// Handle rclone:// URLs
if strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "rclone://") {
// parseRcloneURL parses an rclone://remote/path URL. rclone:// takes no
// query parameters, so credentials in the userinfo and any parameter at
// all are rejected rather than silently ignored.
func parseRcloneURL(rawURL string) (*URL, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
return nil, wrapParseError(err)
}
if u.User != nil {
return nil, ErrURLCredentials
}
remote := u.Host
@@ -102,16 +128,45 @@ func ParseStorageURL(rawURL string) (*URL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingRemote
}
path := strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/")
err = rejectUnknownParams(u.Query())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &URL{
Scheme: schemeRclone,
Prefix: path,
Prefix: strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/"),
RcloneRemote: remote,
}, nil
}
return nil, ErrUnsupportedScheme
// rejectUnknownParams returns an error naming the first query parameter
// not in allowed. The parameter's name is included (so a misspelt
// endpoint= is caught), but never its value, which could be a secret,
// and never the whole URL.
func rejectUnknownParams(query url.Values, allowed ...string) error {
for name := range query {
if !slices.Contains(allowed, name) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q; put credentials in s3.access_key_id and "+
"s3.secret_access_key, not the URL",
ErrURLUnknownParam, name)
}
}
return nil
}
// wrapParseError wraps only the inner cause of a url.Parse failure. The
// *url.Error that url.Parse returns embeds the raw URL in its message, so
// wrapping it directly would echo a credential-bearing URL into logs.
func wrapParseError(err error) error {
var uerr *url.Error
if errors.As(err, &uerr) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", uerr.Err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
}
// String returns a human-readable representation of the storage URL.
+208
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
package storage_test
import (
"errors"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
)
// TestParseStorageURLValid checks that each supported scheme parses into
// the expected fields, since those fields decide which backend is built.
func TestParseStorageURLValid(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const bucket = "mybucket"
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
want *storage.URL
}{
{
name: "file absolute path",
raw: "file:///var/backups/vaultik",
want: &storage.URL{Scheme: "file", Prefix: "/var/backups/vaultik"},
},
{
name: "s3 bucket and prefix, ssl defaults on",
raw: "s3://mybucket/backups/host",
want: &storage.URL{
Scheme: "s3", Bucket: bucket,
Prefix: "backups/host", UseSSL: true,
},
},
{
name: "s3 bucket only",
raw: "s3://mybucket",
want: &storage.URL{Scheme: "s3", Bucket: bucket, UseSSL: true},
},
{
name: "s3 with endpoint, region, ssl off",
raw: "s3://mybucket?endpoint=minio.example.com&region=us-west-2&ssl=false",
want: &storage.URL{
Scheme: "s3", Bucket: bucket,
Endpoint: "minio.example.com", Region: "us-west-2", UseSSL: false,
},
},
{
name: "rclone remote and path",
raw: "rclone://gdrive/backups/host",
want: &storage.URL{
Scheme: "rclone", RcloneRemote: "gdrive", Prefix: "backups/host",
},
},
{
name: "rclone remote only",
raw: "rclone://gdrive",
want: &storage.URL{Scheme: "rclone", RcloneRemote: "gdrive"},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := storage.ParseStorageURL(tc.raw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseStorageURL(%q) returned error: %v", tc.raw, err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("ParseStorageURL(%q) = %+v, want %+v", tc.raw, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestParseStorageURLErrors checks that empty, missing, and unknown-scheme
// inputs fail with the documented sentinel errors instead of parsing to a
// wrong destination.
func TestParseStorageURLErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
wantErr error
}{
{"empty url", "", storage.ErrEmptyStorageURL},
{"file empty path", "file://", storage.ErrEmptyFilePath},
{"s3 missing bucket", "s3://", storage.ErrMissingBucket},
{"s3 missing bucket with path", "s3:///justprefix", storage.ErrMissingBucket},
{"rclone missing remote", "rclone://", storage.ErrMissingRemote},
{"unknown scheme", "gs://bucket/x", storage.ErrUnsupportedScheme},
{"no scheme", "/local/path", storage.ErrUnsupportedScheme},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := storage.ParseStorageURL(tc.raw)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("ParseStorageURL(%q) error = %v, want %v",
tc.raw, err, tc.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
// TestParseStorageURLRejectsCredentials checks that a URL carrying
// credentials in its userinfo or in an unknown query parameter is
// rejected, and that the error never echoes the secret-bearing URL back
// into logs or output.
func TestParseStorageURLRejectsCredentials(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Split so the literals never form a "user:pass@" URL pattern that
// tooling would flag as a real hardcoded credential.
const (
key = "AKIAKEY"
secret = "topsecret"
)
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
wantErr error
secrets []string // must not appear in the error message
}{
{
name: "s3 userinfo",
raw: "s3://" + key + ":" + secret + "@mybucket/prefix",
wantErr: storage.ErrURLCredentials,
secrets: []string{key, secret, "mybucket"},
},
{
name: "s3 unknown query param",
raw: "s3://mybucket?access_key=" + key + "&secret=" + secret,
wantErr: storage.ErrURLUnknownParam,
secrets: []string{key, secret},
},
{
name: "s3 misspelt endpoint",
raw: "s3://mybucket?endpiont=minio.example.com",
wantErr: storage.ErrURLUnknownParam,
secrets: nil,
},
{
name: "rclone userinfo",
raw: "rclone://user:" + secret + "@gdrive/backups",
wantErr: storage.ErrURLCredentials,
secrets: []string{secret},
},
{
name: "rclone query param",
raw: "rclone://gdrive/backups?token=" + secret,
wantErr: storage.ErrURLUnknownParam,
secrets: []string{secret},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := storage.ParseStorageURL(tc.raw)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("ParseStorageURL(%q) error = %v, want %v",
tc.raw, err, tc.wantErr)
}
// The rejection must name the proper config keys so the
// operator knows where credentials belong.
for _, key := range []string{"s3.access_key_id", "s3.secret_access_key"} {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), key) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name %q", err.Error(), key)
}
}
for _, secret := range tc.secrets {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) {
t.Errorf("error message leaked %q: %v", secret, err.Error())
}
}
})
}
}
// TestParseStorageURLParseFailureHidesURL checks that when url.Parse
// itself fails, the wrapped error carries only the inner cause, not the
// *url.Error whose text embeds the raw (possibly credential-bearing) URL.
func TestParseStorageURLParseFailureHidesURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const raw = "s3://mybucket/%zz"
_, err := storage.ParseStorageURL(raw)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseStorageURL(%q) returned no error", raw)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "mybucket") {
t.Errorf("error message echoed the raw URL: %v", err.Error())
}
}
+15 -3
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ import (
// not match the expected double-SHA-256 hash.
var errBlobHashMismatch = errors.New("blob hash mismatch")
// errBlobNotFullyRead is returned when the verifying reader is closed
// before its plaintext reached EOF. The hash can only be checked once
// the whole stream has been read, so an early or short-read close must
// fail rather than silently skip verification.
var errBlobNotFullyRead = errors.New(
"blob closed before fully read; hash not verified")
// hashVerifyReader wraps a blobgen.Reader and verifies the double-SHA-256 hash
// of decrypted plaintext when Close is called. It reuses the hash that
// blobgen.Reader already computes internally via its TeeReader, avoiding
@@ -38,12 +45,18 @@ func (h *hashVerifyReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
return n, err
}
// Close verifies the hash (if the stream was fully read) and closes underlying readers.
// Close closes the underlying readers and verifies the blob hash. The
// hash check cannot be skipped: closing before the plaintext reached
// EOF (a short read or an early close) is an error, so a caller can
// never obtain unverified blob bytes.
func (h *hashVerifyReader) Close() error {
readerErr := h.reader.Close()
fetcherErr := h.fetcher.Close()
if h.done {
if !h.done {
return errBlobNotFullyRead
}
firstHash := h.reader.Sum256()
secondHasher := sha256.New()
secondHasher.Write(firstHash)
@@ -53,7 +66,6 @@ func (h *hashVerifyReader) Close() error {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: expected %s, got %s",
errBlobHashMismatch, h.blobHash[:16], actualHashHex[:16])
}
}
if readerErr != nil {
return readerErr
+48
View File
@@ -133,3 +133,51 @@ func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobVerifiesHash(t *testing.T) {
}
})
}
// TestFetchAndDecryptBlobCloseBeforeEOFFails verifies the hash check
// cannot be skipped: a caller that reads only part of the blob and then
// closes gets an error rather than silently unverified bytes.
func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobCloseBeforeEOFFails(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generating identity: %v", err)
}
plaintext := []byte("hello world test data for blob hash verification")
encryptedData, correctHash := buildHashTestBlob(t, identity, plaintext)
mockStorage := NewMockStorer()
blobPath := "blobs/" + correctHash[:2] + "/" +
correctHash[2:4] + "/" + correctHash
mockStorage.mu.Lock()
mockStorage.data[blobPath] = encryptedData
mockStorage.mu.Unlock()
tv := vaultik.NewForTesting(mockStorage)
rc, err := tv.FetchAndDecryptBlob(
context.Background(), correctHash, int64(len(encryptedData)), identity)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error opening stream: %v", err)
}
// Read one byte, far short of the plaintext length, then close.
buf := make([]byte, 1)
_, err = rc.Read(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reading first byte: %v", err)
}
err = rc.Close()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error closing before EOF, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "hash not verified") {
t.Fatalf("expected not-verified error, got: %v", err)
}
}
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package vaultik_test
import (
"context"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
// TestDeepVerifyAcceptsHealthyAndRejectsCorruptBlob backs up a real
// snapshot with the on-disk storage backend, runs deep verification on
// it, then flips a byte inside one stored blob and runs deep
// verification again. A healthy snapshot must pass; a corrupted blob
// must fail. The healthy case is the regression guard: deep
// verification used to hash the encrypted blob bytes and compare them
// to the blob's ID (the double SHA256 of the plaintext), so it reported
// every healthy blob as corrupt.
func TestDeepVerifyAcceptsHealthyAndRejectsCorruptBlob(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "source")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
maxBlobSize := int64(512 * 1024)
// One file large enough to span several chunks within a single blob.
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o755))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
filepath.Join(dataDir, "data.bin"),
bytesPattern("deep-", int(chunkSize*3)), 0o644))
ctx := context.Background()
// runFileStorageBackup writes a real snapshot to storeDir and closes
// the source index, so verification runs from remote bytes only.
cfg, storer, snapshotID := runFileStorageBackup(
ctx, t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath, chunkSize, maxBlobSize)
newVerifier := func() *vaultik.Vaultik {
v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
Config: cfg,
Storage: storer,
Fs: fs,
Stdout: io.Discard,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
}
v.SetContext(ctx)
return v
}
require.NoError(t,
newVerifier().RunDeepVerify(snapshotID, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}),
"deep verify should pass on a healthy snapshot")
// Flip a byte inside one blob without changing its length, so the
// blob-existence and size checks still pass and verification reaches
// the blob-content stage.
corruptOneBlob(t, fs, filepath.Join(storeDir, "blobs"))
require.Error(t,
newVerifier().RunDeepVerify(snapshotID, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}),
"deep verify should fail on a corrupted blob")
}
// corruptOneBlob flips a middle byte of the first blob file found under
// blobsDir, leaving the file length unchanged.
func corruptOneBlob(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, blobsDir string) {
t.Helper()
var blobPath string
err := afero.Walk(fs, blobsDir,
func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if blobPath == "" && !info.IsDir() {
blobPath = path
}
return nil
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, blobPath, "expected at least one blob on disk")
data, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, blobPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, data)
data[len(data)/2] ^= 0xff
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, blobPath, data, 0o644))
}
+647
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
package vaultik_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage/faultstore"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
// These tests cover the failure modes a backup tool must survive:
// interrupted uploads, an interrupted metadata export, corrupt and
// truncated reads, a full restore disk, and a backend that reports
// success while storing nothing. Faults are injected through the
// storage.Storer seam (internal/storage/faultstore), never by patching
// production code. Each test asserts on the observable end state — what
// is in the index, what is at the destination, what the user is told —
// not merely that an error was returned. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/72.
//
// Object-level write atomicity (no partial blob object left behind) is
// covered by the file:// backend's atomic-write work
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/130) and is not re-tested
// here; these tests target the layers above the backend.
//
// The tests run serially, not with t.Parallel: each calls
// log.Initialize, which replaces the package-global logger, and a
// backup or restore running concurrently reads that same logger. Under
// -race the two collide. Running one at a time is the same choice
// prune_count_test.go already makes for the same reason.
const (
faultChunkSize = int64(64 * 1024)
faultMaxBlobSize = int64(256 * 1024)
)
// faultTestConfig returns the config shared by the fault-injection
// tests: a real recipient/secret keypair so blobs are genuinely
// encrypted, and a blob size limit the restore sweeper can divide.
func faultTestConfig() *config.Config {
return &config.Config{
AgeRecipients: []string{testAgePublicKey},
AgeSecretKey: testAgeSecretKey,
CompressionLevel: 3,
Hostname: testHostname,
BlobSizeLimit: config.Size(faultMaxBlobSize),
}
}
// writeFaultSourceTree writes a spread of file sizes that forces several
// chunks across more than one blob, so a fault landing on a single blob
// still leaves other data intact. Returns the expected content by path.
func writeFaultSourceTree(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, dataDir string,
) map[string][]byte {
t.Helper()
files := map[string][]byte{
filepath.Join(dataDir, "small.txt"): []byte("hello vaultik"),
filepath.Join(dataDir, "a.bin"): bytesPattern("a-", int(faultChunkSize*3)),
filepath.Join(dataDir, "sub", "b.bin"): bytesPattern("b-", int(faultChunkSize*3)),
filepath.Join(dataDir, "sub", "c.bin"): bytesPattern("c-", int(faultChunkSize*2)),
}
for path, content := range files {
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, path, content, 0o644))
}
return files
}
// newFaultScanner builds a scanner writing through the given storer.
func newFaultScanner(
fs afero.Fs, storer storage.Storer,
cfg *config.Config, repos *database.Repositories,
) *snapshot.Scanner {
return snapshot.NewScanner(snapshot.ScannerConfig{
FS: fs,
Storage: storer,
ChunkSize: faultChunkSize,
MaxBlobSize: faultMaxBlobSize,
CompressionLevel: cfg.CompressionLevel,
AgeRecipients: cfg.AgeRecipients,
Repositories: repos,
})
}
// newFaultSnapshotManager builds a snapshot manager writing through the
// given storer.
func newFaultSnapshotManager(
fs afero.Fs, storer storage.Storer,
cfg *config.Config, repos *database.Repositories,
) *snapshot.SnapshotManager {
sm := snapshot.NewSnapshotManager(snapshot.SnapshotManagerParams{
Repos: repos,
Storage: storer,
Config: cfg,
})
sm.SetFilesystem(fs)
return sm
}
// fullFaultBackup runs a complete backup (create, scan, complete,
// export) through storer and returns the snapshot ID.
func fullFaultBackup(
ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, storer storage.Storer,
cfg *config.Config, repos *database.Repositories,
dataDir, dbPath, name string,
) string {
t.Helper()
sm := newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, storer, cfg, repos)
scanner := newFaultScanner(fs, storer, cfg, repos)
id, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(ctx, cfg.Hostname, name, "v", "g")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, id)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sm.CompleteSnapshot(ctx, id))
require.NoError(t, sm.ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, id))
return id
}
// newReaderVaultik builds a Vaultik that reads (restore/verify) through
// storer, with the given repositories (nil is fine for restore/verify,
// which read metadata from storage).
func newReaderVaultik(
ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, storer storage.Storer,
repos *database.Repositories, fs afero.Fs,
) *vaultik.Vaultik {
v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
Config: cfg,
Storage: storer,
Repositories: repos,
Fs: fs,
Stdout: io.Discard,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
}
v.SetContext(ctx)
return v
}
// Scenario 3: a stored blob's bytes are flipped before restore reads
// them. Restore must fail loudly, and no file must be left on the
// restore target holding corrupt content.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestRestoreRejectsCorruptBlob(t *testing.T) {
assertRestoreRejectsDamagedBlob(t, faultstore.GetCorrupt, "corrupt")
}
// Scenario 4: a stored blob is truncated before restore reads it. Same
// contract as the corrupt case.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestRestoreRejectsTruncatedBlob(t *testing.T) {
assertRestoreRejectsDamagedBlob(t, faultstore.GetTruncate, "truncated")
}
// assertRestoreRejectsDamagedBlob backs up the source tree, then restores
// through a store that damages every blob read with the given fault, and
// asserts restore fails naming a blob and leaves no file on the target
// holding wrong bytes. Metadata reads are returned intact so the failure
// is isolated to the blob.
func assertRestoreRejectsDamagedBlob(
t *testing.T, fault faultstore.GetFault, name string,
) {
t.Helper()
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
testFiles := writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
id := fullFaultBackup(ctx, t, fs, inner, cfg, repos, dataDir, dbPath, name)
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
faultStore := faultstore.New(inner)
faultStore.OnGet = func(key string) faultstore.GetFault {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "blobs/") {
return fault
}
return faultstore.GetNormal
}
v := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, faultStore, nil, fs)
err = v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{SnapshotID: id, TargetDir: restoreDir})
require.Error(t, err, "restore must fail on a damaged blob")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "blob",
"error should name the blob that failed")
assertNoCorruptFiles(t, fs, restoreDir, testFiles)
}
// Scenario 6: the backend accepts blob uploads and reports success but
// stores nothing. verify --deep must catch it.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestDeepVerifyCatchesLyingBackend(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Blob uploads are swallowed; metadata uploads land, so verify can
// download the manifest and database and then discover the blobs are
// absent.
lying := faultstore.New(inner)
lying.OnPut = func(key string) faultstore.PutAction {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "blobs/") {
return faultstore.PutSwallow
}
return faultstore.PutNormal
}
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
id := fullFaultBackup(ctx, t, fs, lying, cfg, repos, dataDir, dbPath, "lying")
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
// No blob objects were actually written.
blobKeys, err := inner.List(ctx, "blobs/")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, blobKeys, "lying backend should have stored no blobs")
// Read back through the honest underlying store.
v := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, inner, nil, fs)
err = v.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(id, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true})
require.Error(t, err, "deep verify must catch a backend that stored nothing")
}
// Scenario 1a: a blob upload fails partway through. The interrupted run
// must not record the blob as uploaded, must not reference it from the
// snapshot, and must leave no blob object at the destination.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestInterruptedBlobUploadRecordsNoUploadedBlob(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
// Every blob upload fails partway through. The scan must surface it.
fault := faultstore.New(inner)
fault.OnPut = func(key string) faultstore.PutAction {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "blobs/") {
return faultstore.PutFail
}
return faultstore.PutNormal
}
sm := newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, fault, cfg, repos)
scanner := newFaultScanner(fs, fault, cfg, repos)
id, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(ctx, cfg.Hostname, "interrupted", "v", "g")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, id)
require.Error(t, err, "scan must fail when a blob upload fails")
// No blob may claim to be uploaded.
blobs, err := repos.Blobs.GetAll(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
for _, b := range blobs {
assert.Nilf(t, b.UploadedTS,
"blob %s marked uploaded after a failed upload", b.Hash)
}
// The snapshot may reference no blobs, and the destination holds none.
hashes, err := repos.Snapshots.GetBlobHashes(ctx, id)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, hashes, "interrupted snapshot must reference no blobs")
blobKeys, err := inner.List(ctx, "blobs/")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, blobKeys, "no blob object may survive at the destination")
}
// Scenario 1b: after an interrupted upload, a retry on the same local
// index must produce a restorable snapshot. The interrupted run leaves
// the blob's chunk rows in the index; the fix for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/148 discards those un-uploaded
// blob rows at the start of the next scan and deduplicates only against
// chunks in a blob that was actually uploaded, so the retry re-chunks and
// re-uploads the affected data instead of silently referencing data that
// never reached storage.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestBackupRetryAfterInterruptedUploadIsRestorable(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
testFiles := writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
// Attempt 1: every blob upload fails.
fault := faultstore.New(inner)
fault.OnPut = func(key string) faultstore.PutAction {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "blobs/") {
return faultstore.PutFail
}
return faultstore.PutNormal
}
sm := newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, fault, cfg, repos)
scanner := newFaultScanner(fs, fault, cfg, repos)
id1, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(ctx, cfg.Hostname, "interrupted", "v", "g")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, id1)
require.Error(t, err)
// Retry on the same local index with a working backend.
id2 := fullFaultBackup(ctx, t, fs, inner, cfg, repos, dataDir, dbPath, "retry")
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
v := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, inner, nil, fs)
require.NoError(t, v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: id2,
TargetDir: restoreDir,
Verify: true,
}), "retry after an interrupted upload must produce a restorable snapshot")
assertRestoredTree(t, fs, restoreDir, testFiles)
}
// Scenario 2: the process dies during the metadata export, after the
// database is uploaded but before the manifest. The destination is left
// with blobs and a database but no manifest. verify and snapshot list
// must report the damage honestly rather than crashing or passing.
// Automatic detection and repair of this partial state on the next run
// is tracked in https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177 and is not
// asserted here.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestBackupSurvivesMetadataExportInterruption(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
// Back up and complete with a working backend.
sm := newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, inner, cfg, repos)
scanner := newFaultScanner(fs, inner, cfg, repos)
id, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(ctx, cfg.Hostname, "export", "v", "g")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, id)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sm.CompleteSnapshot(ctx, id))
// Export through a backend that fails only the manifest upload. The
// database uploads first and lands; the manifest does not.
fault := faultstore.New(inner)
fault.OnPut = func(key string) faultstore.PutAction {
if strings.HasSuffix(key, "manifest.json.zst") {
return faultstore.PutFail
}
return faultstore.PutNormal
}
smFault := newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, fault, cfg, repos)
err = smFault.ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, id)
require.Error(t, err, "export must fail when the manifest upload fails")
// The destination is in the partial state the scenario describes.
key := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(id)
_, err = inner.Stat(ctx, "metadata/"+key+"/db.zst.age")
require.NoError(t, err, "database should have been uploaded before the manifest")
_, err = inner.Stat(ctx, "metadata/"+key+"/manifest.json.zst")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, storage.ErrNotFound, "manifest upload should not have landed")
// verify must fail loudly for this snapshot, in both modes.
reader := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, inner, repos, fs)
deepOpts := &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}
require.Error(t, reader.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(id, deepOpts),
"deep verify must report the missing manifest")
shallowOpts := &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: false}
require.Error(t, reader.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(id, shallowOpts),
"shallow verify must report the missing manifest")
// snapshot list must not crash on the partial snapshot.
require.NoError(t, reader.ListSnapshots(false),
"snapshot list must tolerate a partially-exported snapshot")
}
// Scenario 5: the restore target runs out of space mid-file. Restore
// must fail with an out-of-space error, and must not leave a truncated
// file at the target path presenting as a complete restore. Restore
// today writes each file straight to its final path and does not remove
// it when a write fails, so the truncated file survives; deleting it is
// tracked by https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/163. Skipped until
// that lands, so the destination assertion below is recorded rather than
// dropped.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestRestoreReportsDiskFull(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("blocked on https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/163: " +
"a disk-full write leaves a truncated file at the target path " +
"instead of removing it")
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
osFS := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := faultTestConfig()
testFiles := writeFaultSourceTree(t, osFS, dataDir)
inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
id := fullFaultBackup(ctx, t, osFS, inner, cfg, repos, dataDir, dbPath, "diskfull")
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
// Restore onto a filesystem that allows only a few bytes of file
// content: enough to create files, far too little to hold them.
budget := int64(8)
quota := &quotaFS{Fs: osFS, remaining: &budget}
v := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, inner, nil, quota)
err = v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{SnapshotID: id, TargetDir: restoreDir})
require.Error(t, err, "restore must fail when the target disk is full")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), errNoSpace.Error(),
"restore error should surface the out-of-space cause")
// The failure must not leave a truncated file behind presenting as a
// complete restore: any file at the target must hold the original
// bytes, or be absent.
assertNoCorruptFiles(t, osFS, restoreDir, testFiles)
}
// assertRestoredTree byte-compares every restored file against the
// original.
func assertRestoredTree(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, restoreDir string, testFiles map[string][]byte,
) {
t.Helper()
for origPath, expected := range testFiles {
restoredPath := filepath.Join(restoreDir, origPath)
got, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, restoredPath)
require.NoErrorf(t, err, "restored file missing: %s", origPath)
require.Equalf(t, expected, got, "restored content mismatch for %s", origPath)
}
}
// errNoSpace is the out-of-space error quotaFS returns once its byte
// budget is exhausted, mirroring a real ENOSPC.
var errNoSpace = errors.New("no space left on device")
// quotaFS is an afero.Fs whose files may write only a fixed total number
// of content bytes before failing, simulating a full restore target. It
// wraps the interface so every method except Create delegates to the
// real filesystem; only file writes are capped.
type quotaFS struct {
afero.Fs
remaining *int64
}
//nolint:ireturn // afero.Fs.Create's signature requires returning afero.File.
func (q *quotaFS) Create(name string) (afero.File, error) {
f, err := q.Fs.Create(name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &quotaFile{File: f, remaining: q.remaining}, nil
}
// quotaFile fails writes once the shared byte budget is exhausted.
type quotaFile struct {
afero.File
remaining *int64
}
func (q *quotaFile) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if *q.remaining <= 0 {
return 0, errNoSpace
}
allowed := min(int64(len(p)), *q.remaining)
n, err := q.File.Write(p[:allowed])
*q.remaining -= int64(n)
if err != nil {
return n, err
}
if int64(n) < int64(len(p)) {
return n, errNoSpace
}
return n, nil
}
// assertNoCorruptFiles fails if any file that made it to the restore
// target holds content that differs from the original: a failed restore
// may leave a file absent, but must never leave wrong bytes presenting
// as the real file.
func assertNoCorruptFiles(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, restoreDir string, testFiles map[string][]byte,
) {
t.Helper()
for origPath, expected := range testFiles {
restoredPath := filepath.Join(restoreDir, origPath)
got, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, restoredPath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
continue
}
require.NoError(t, err)
}
assert.Equalf(t, expected, got,
"restored file %s holds corrupt content", origPath)
}
}
+7 -1
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ var (
"invalid snapshot ID format: expected hostname_snapshotname_timestamp")
errInvalidDuration = errors.New("invalid duration")
errUnknownTimeUnit = errors.New("unknown time unit")
errNegativeDuration = errors.New("negative durations are not supported")
)
// Time-unit lengths used by parseDuration.
@@ -138,8 +139,13 @@ func parseSnapshotName(snapshotID string) string {
// parseDuration parses a duration string with support for human-friendly units:
// d/day/days, w/week/weeks, mo/month/months, y/year/years, plus standard Go
// duration units (h, m, s).
// duration units. Following Go, m is minutes and mo is months. A bare number,
// an unknown unit, and a negative value are all rejected.
func parseDuration(s string) (time.Duration, error) {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(s), "-") {
return 0, errNegativeDuration
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(s)
if err == nil {
return d, nil
+25 -6
View File
@@ -51,13 +51,32 @@ func TestParseDuration(t *testing.T) {
want time.Duration
err bool
}{
{"30d", 30 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"4w", 4 * 7 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"6mo", 6 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"1y", 365 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"2w3d", 2*7*24*time.Hour + 3*24*time.Hour, false},
{"1h", time.Hour, false},
// Go units, including the m-is-minutes / mo-is-months distinction
// that this parser exists to keep straight.
{"10ns", 10 * time.Nanosecond, false},
{"10us", 10 * time.Microsecond, false},
{"500ms", 500 * time.Millisecond, false},
{"30s", 30 * time.Second, false},
{"6m", 6 * time.Minute, false},
{"1h", time.Hour, false},
// Extended calendar units.
{"30d", 30 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"3days", 3 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"4w", 4 * 7 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"2weeks", 2 * 7 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"6mo", 180 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"1month", 30 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"1y", 365 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
{"2years", 2 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour, false},
// Combined units.
{"2w3d", 2*7*24*time.Hour + 3*24*time.Hour, false},
{"1y6mo", 365*24*time.Hour + 180*24*time.Hour, false},
// Rejected inputs.
{"6", 0, true}, // bare number, no unit
{"5x", 0, true}, // unknown unit
{"-5d", 0, true}, // negative, extended unit
{"-5h", 0, true}, // negative, Go unit
{"", 0, true}, // empty
{"garbage", 0, true},
}
+8 -7
View File
@@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) PruneBlobs(opts *PruneOptions) error {
// collectReferencedBlobs downloads all manifests and returns the set of
// referenced blob hashes.
//
// Every manifest must be read successfully. A manifest that cannot be
// downloaded or decoded means its snapshot's blobs are unknown, so
// treating them as unreferenced would let prune delete data a snapshot
// still needs. Rather than risk that silent loss, any failure returns an
// error naming the remote key and prune deletes nothing.
func (v *Vaultik) collectReferencedBlobs() (map[string]bool, error) {
log.Info("Listing remote snapshots")
// IDs returned by listUniqueSnapshotIDs are remote keys (hashed
@@ -179,27 +185,22 @@ func (v *Vaultik) collectReferencedBlobs() (map[string]bool, error) {
log.Info("Found manifests in remote storage", "count", len(remoteKeys))
allBlobsReferenced := make(map[string]bool)
manifestCount := 0
for _, remoteKey := range remoteKeys {
log.Debug("Processing manifest", "remote_key", remoteKey)
manifest, err := v.downloadManifestByKey(remoteKey)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to download manifest", "remote_key", remoteKey, "error", err)
continue
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading manifest %s: %w", remoteKey, err)
}
for _, blob := range manifest.Blobs {
allBlobsReferenced[blob.Hash] = true
}
manifestCount++
}
log.Info("Processed manifests",
"count", manifestCount, "unique_blobs_referenced", len(allBlobsReferenced))
"count", len(remoteKeys), "unique_blobs_referenced", len(allBlobsReferenced))
return allBlobsReferenced, nil
}
+79
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported count helpers
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
)
// TestTableCountForReportSurfacesReadFailure is the regression guard for
// the discarded-error bug: getTableCount for a table its query cannot
// resolve must not silently become 0. A count that could not be read is
// reported as unknown, which a reader can tell apart from an empty table.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
func TestTableCountForReportSurfacesReadFailure(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
ctx := context.Background()
db, err := database.New(ctx, ":memory:")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
v := &Vaultik{DB: db}
v.SetContext(ctx)
// A table present in the schema reads as a real count.
blobs := v.tableCountForReport("blobs")
require.NotNil(t, blobs, "an existing table must read as a real count")
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), *blobs)
// A syntactically valid name the sanitizer accepts but whose table
// the query cannot resolve is the exact shape #96 describes: a
// would-be loud failure that used to be discarded into a 0.
_, err = v.getTableCount("snapshots_missing")
require.Error(t, err, "a query against a nonexistent table must fail")
missing := v.tableCountForReport("snapshots_missing")
assert.Nil(t, missing, "a failed read is unknown, not a count")
// The rendered count for a failed read must say unknown, never 0.
assert.Equal(t, countUnknown, countText(missing))
assert.NotEqual(t, "0", countText(missing))
}
// TestCountTextDistinguishesEmptyFromUnknown pins the distinction the
// output has to preserve: 0 means the table was empty, "unknown" means
// the count could not be read.
func TestCountTextDistinguishesEmptyFromUnknown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
zero := int64(0)
seven := int64(7)
assert.Equal(t, "0", countText(&zero))
assert.Equal(t, "7", countText(&seven))
assert.Equal(t, countUnknown, countText(nil))
}
// TestCountDiffUnknownWhenEitherSideUnknown checks that a delta computed
// from an unreadable count is itself unknown rather than a plausible
// number.
func TestCountDiffUnknownWhenEitherSideUnknown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := int64(10)
after := int64(3)
require.NotNil(t, countDiff(&before, &after))
assert.Equal(t, int64(7), *countDiff(&before, &after))
assert.Nil(t, countDiff(nil, &after), "unknown before yields unknown delta")
assert.Nil(t, countDiff(&before, nil), "unknown after yields unknown delta")
assert.Nil(t, countDiff(nil, nil))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
package vaultik_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
// TestPruneBlobs_UnreadableManifestDeletesNothing is the regression guard
// for issue #157: prune identifies referenced blobs by reading every
// snapshot's manifest, and a manifest it cannot decode used to be logged
// and skipped. Blobs referenced only by that snapshot then looked
// unreferenced and were deleted, with a zero exit — silent backup loss,
// made worse by `snapshot create --prune` running unattended with force.
//
// The single blob here is referenced only by the snapshot whose manifest
// is corrupt, so the old behaviour would delete it and succeed. Prune
// must instead delete nothing and return an error.
func TestPruneBlobs_UnreadableManifestDeletesNothing(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
env := newListEnv(t)
ctx := context.Background()
blobKey := "blobs/" + testBlobHashA[:2] + "/" + testBlobHashA[2:4] +
"/" + testBlobHashA
require.NoError(t, env.store.Put(ctx, blobKey,
bytes.NewReader([]byte("blob-bytes"))))
// A manifest at the path prune reads, but with contents it cannot
// decode.
require.NoError(t, env.store.Put(ctx,
"metadata/corruptkey/manifest.json.zst",
bytes.NewReader([]byte("not a valid manifest"))))
err := env.v.PruneBlobs(&vaultik.PruneOptions{Force: true})
require.Error(t, err, "prune must fail when a manifest cannot be read")
assert.True(t, env.store.hasKey(blobKey),
"no blob may be deleted when a manifest is unreadable")
}
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
package vaultik_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
// setupConsistencyTest builds a Vaultik whose local database and mock
// remote both hold the given snapshots. Remote metadata is stored under
// the production layout, metadata/<RemoteSnapshotKey(id)>/manifest.json.zst.
// It returns the instance and the mock so a test can inspect the remote.
func setupConsistencyTest(
t *testing.T, snapshotIDs []string,
) (*vaultik.Vaultik, *MockStorer) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
db, err := database.New(ctx, ":memory:")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
mockStorage := NewMockStorer()
for _, id := range snapshotIDs {
parts := strings.Split(id, "_")
startedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, parts[len(parts)-1])
require.NoError(t, err, "parsing timestamp from snapshot ID %q", id)
completedAt := startedAt.Add(5 * time.Minute)
snap := &database.Snapshot{
ID: types.SnapshotID(id),
Hostname: testHostname,
VaultikVersion: testLabel,
StartedAt: startedAt,
CompletedAt: &completedAt,
}
err = repos.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
return repos.Snapshots.Create(ctx, tx, snap)
})
require.NoError(t, err, "creating snapshot %s", id)
metadataKey := "metadata/" + snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(id) +
"/manifest.json.zst"
err = mockStorage.Put(ctx, metadataKey, strings.NewReader("stub"))
require.NoError(t, err)
}
v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
Storage: mockStorage,
Repositories: repos,
DB: db,
Stdout: &bytes.Buffer{},
Stderr: &bytes.Buffer{},
Stdin: &bytes.Buffer{},
}
v.SetContext(ctx)
return v, mockStorage
}
func remoteHasSnapshot(t *testing.T, m *MockStorer, id string) bool {
t.Helper()
prefix := "metadata/" + snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(id) + "/"
keys, err := m.List(context.Background(), prefix)
require.NoError(t, err)
return len(keys) > 0
}
// TestPurgeKeepsRemotelyBackedLocalRows guards against issue #160
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/160): purge reconciles local
// rows against the remote first, and that step compared human snapshot IDs
// against the hashed remote directory names, which never match — so it
// deleted every local record and the purge itself then removed nothing.
//
// With every snapshot still present remotely and nothing old enough to
// purge, all local rows must survive the reconcile untouched.
func TestPurgeKeepsRemotelyBackedLocalRows(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
ids := []string{snapHomeT0, snapHomeT1, snapSystemT0}
v, _ := setupConsistencyTest(t, ids)
err := v.PurgeSnapshotsWithOptions(&vaultik.SnapshotPurgeOptions{
// 100 years: nothing is old enough to delete, so the reconcile
// is the only thing that touches the rows.
OlderThan: "36500d",
Force: true,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
remaining := listRemainingSnapshots(t, v)
assert.Len(t, remaining, len(ids),
"remotely-backed local rows must survive the reconcile")
assert.Contains(t, remaining, snapHomeT0)
assert.Contains(t, remaining, snapHomeT1)
assert.Contains(t, remaining, snapSystemT0)
}
// TestPurgeRemovesLocalAndRemoteTogether proves the two halves stay
// consistent: a purged snapshot is gone both locally and remotely, while a
// retained one keeps both. Before the fix, the reconcile dropped every
// local row yet the remote metadata was left in place.
func TestPurgeRemovesLocalAndRemoteTogether(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
ids := []string{snapHomeT0, snapHomeT1, snapSystemT0}
v, mock := setupConsistencyTest(t, ids)
err := v.PurgeSnapshotsWithOptions(&vaultik.SnapshotPurgeOptions{
KeepLatest: true,
Force: true,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
// Keep latest per name: newest home and the lone system are kept.
remaining := listRemainingSnapshots(t, v)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{snapHomeT1, snapSystemT0}, remaining)
// Local and remote agree: the older home snapshot is gone from both,
// the retained ones are present in both.
assert.False(t, remoteHasSnapshot(t, mock, snapHomeT0),
"purged snapshot must also be removed remotely")
assert.True(t, remoteHasSnapshot(t, mock, snapHomeT1),
"retained snapshot must remain remotely")
assert.True(t, remoteHasSnapshot(t, mock, snapSystemT0),
"retained snapshot must remain remotely")
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
@@ -60,8 +61,11 @@ func setupPurgeTest(t *testing.T, snapshotIDs []string) *vaultik.Vaultik {
})
require.NoError(t, err, "creating snapshot %s", id)
// Create remote metadata stub so syncWithRemote keeps it
metadataKey := "metadata/" + id + "/manifest.json.zst"
// Create the remote metadata stub under the production layout so
// syncWithRemote keeps the local row. Production stores metadata
// under the hashed remote key, not the human snapshot ID.
metadataKey := "metadata/" + snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(id) +
"/manifest.json.zst"
err = mockStorage.Put(ctx, metadataKey, strings.NewReader("stub"))
require.NoError(t, err)
}
+249 -57
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"math"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
@@ -18,7 +19,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
)
@@ -35,13 +35,30 @@ var (
errChunkNotInAnyBlob = errors.New("chunk not found in any blob")
errBlobIDNotInHashIndex = errors.New("blob id missing from hash index")
errShortChunkRead = errors.New("short read")
errRestorePathEscapesTarget = errors.New(
"refusing to restore path outside the target directory")
errTrailingRestoreData = errors.New(
"restored file has trailing data after its last chunk")
errRestoreIncomplete = errors.New(
"restore loop ended with files still pending")
)
// snapshotDBFilename is the name the decrypted snapshot database is
// written under inside its private temp directory.
const snapshotDBFilename = "snapshot.db"
// restoreDirMode is the permission mode for directories created while
// restoring (parent directories and the target root; restored
// directories themselves get their stored mode).
const restoreDirMode = 0o755
// restoreFileMode is the restrictive mode a regular file is created with
// during restore. Content is written while the file holds this mode; the
// stored mode is applied only after the file is fully written and closed,
// so a file whose stored mode is restrictive is never briefly readable by
// other local users while its content is being written.
const restoreFileMode = 0o600
// sweepIntervalDivisor sets the sweeper threshold to one N-th of the
// configured blob size limit.
const sweepIntervalDivisor = 100
@@ -91,7 +108,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) Restore(opts *RestoreOptions) error {
// Step 1: Download and decrypt the snapshot metadata database
log.Info("Downloading snapshot metadata...")
tempDB, err := v.downloadSnapshotDB(opts.SnapshotID, identity)
tempDB, tempDir, err := v.downloadSnapshotDB(opts.SnapshotID, identity)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("downloading snapshot database: %w", err)
}
@@ -101,10 +118,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) Restore(opts *RestoreOptions) error {
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to close temp database", "error", err)
}
// Clean up temp file
err = v.Fs.Remove(tempDB.Path())
// Remove the whole private directory, so the decrypted database
// and any SQLite side files it produced are gone on every path.
err = v.Fs.RemoveAll(tempDir)
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to remove temp database", "error", err)
log.Debug("Failed to remove temp database directory", "error", err)
}
}()
@@ -357,6 +375,13 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runRestoreLoop(
totalBytesExpected, startTime, &lastStatusTime)
}
// The loop above stops as soon as nothing is ready and nothing more
// can be downloaded. If files still remain, they were abandoned
// rather than restored; fail loudly instead of reporting success.
if plan.hasPending() {
return errRestoreIncomplete
}
return nil
}
@@ -371,12 +396,18 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runRestoreLoop(
func (s *restoreSession) downloadNextBlobSet(plan *restorePlan) (bool, error) {
s.sweeper.sweep()
next := plan.pickNextDownload()
if next.IsZero() {
next, ok := plan.pickNextDownload()
if !ok {
return false, nil
}
for _, hash := range plan.blobsNeeded(next) {
// Stop between blobs on cancel so an interrupt ends the download
// phase promptly rather than fetching the rest of the set.
if s.ctx.Err() != nil {
return false, s.ctx.Err()
}
blob, ok := s.blobByHash[hash]
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errBlobMissingFromIndex, hash[:16])
@@ -577,18 +608,24 @@ func (v *Vaultik) handleRestoreVerification(
}
// downloadSnapshotDB downloads and decrypts the snapshot metadata
// database. The snapshotID is the human ID; we hash it to the remote
// key for the storage path.
// database. The identifier is resolved to the snapshot's remote key: a
// human ID is hashed, and a remote key (or its abbreviation, as printed
// for a remote-only snapshot) is used as-is, so a host with no local
// index can restore the snapshots it can only see on the store.
func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
snapshotID string, identity age.Identity,
) (*database.DB, error) {
) (*database.DB, string, error) {
remoteKey, err := v.resolveSnapshotRemoteKey(snapshotID)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// Download encrypted database from storage
dbKey := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age",
snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID))
dbKey := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age", remoteKey)
reader, err := v.Storage.Get(v.ctx, dbKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("downloading %s: %w", dbKey, err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("downloading %s: %w", dbKey, err)
}
defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
@@ -596,7 +633,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
// Read all data
encryptedData, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading encrypted data: %w", err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("reading encrypted data: %w", err)
}
log.Debug("Downloaded encrypted database",
@@ -605,7 +642,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
// Decrypt and decompress using blobgen.Reader
blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(encryptedData), identity)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating decryption reader: %w", err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("creating decryption reader: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = blobReader.Close() }()
@@ -613,44 +650,52 @@ func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
// Read the binary SQLite database
dbData, err := io.ReadAll(blobReader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypting and decompressing: %w", err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("decrypting and decompressing: %w", err)
}
log.Debug("Decrypted database", "size", ubytes(int64(len(dbData))))
// Create a temporary database file and write the binary SQLite data directly
tempFile, err := afero.TempFile(v.Fs, "", "vaultik-restore-*.db")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating temp file: %w", err)
return v.materializeSnapshotDB(dbData)
}
tempPath := tempFile.Name()
// Write the binary SQLite database directly
_, err = tempFile.Write(dbData)
// materializeSnapshotDB writes the decrypted snapshot database bytes into
// a fresh private (0700) temp directory and opens the file read-only. On
// any failure it removes the directory before returning, so no decrypted
// metadata is left on disk when the open is interrupted or the payload is
// damaged. On success the returned directory is the caller's to remove.
func (v *Vaultik) materializeSnapshotDB(
dbData []byte,
) (*database.DB, string, error) {
tempDir, err := afero.TempDir(v.Fs, "", "vaultik-restore-")
if err != nil {
_ = tempFile.Close()
_ = v.Fs.Remove(tempPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing database file: %w", err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("creating temp directory: %w", err)
}
err = tempFile.Close()
if err != nil {
_ = v.Fs.Remove(tempPath)
success := false
return nil, fmt.Errorf("closing temp file: %w", err)
defer func() {
if !success {
_ = v.Fs.RemoveAll(tempDir)
}
}()
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, snapshotDBFilename)
err = afero.WriteFile(v.Fs, dbPath, dbData, restoreFileMode)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("writing database file: %w", err)
}
log.Debug("Created restore database", "path", tempPath)
log.Debug("Created restore database", "path", dbPath)
// Open the database
db, err := database.New(v.ctx, tempPath)
db, err := database.OpenReadOnly(v.ctx, dbPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening restore database: %w", err)
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("opening restore database: %w", err)
}
return db, nil
success = true
return db, tempDir, nil
}
// getFilesToRestore returns the list of files to restore based on path filters
@@ -755,13 +800,85 @@ type restoreSession struct {
runningAsRoot bool
}
// containedRestorePath resolves rel — a path read from the snapshot
// database — to its location under targetDir and confirms the write will
// stay inside the target.
//
// age decryption proves a snapshot is readable, not that it is honest, so
// every stored path is treated as hostile. rel is rejected unless
// filepath.IsLocal accepts it once the leading separator is stripped:
// stored paths are absolute and the join to targetDir drops that
// separator, so "/etc/passwd" is judged as the relative "etc/passwd" it
// becomes on disk. This bars "..", absolute, and empty paths.
//
// A stored symlink whose target points outside the tree is still honest
// (and restored verbatim), but a later entry must not be written through
// it. Each existing ancestor directory below the target is therefore
// Lstat'ed and a symlink among them is refused. The leaf itself is not
// traversed: honest snapshots restore symlinks at leaf positions, and the
// unique-path constraint keeps a leaf from being both a symlink and a
// regular file. The target directory itself may be a symlink; only
// components below it are checked.
func containedRestorePath(fs afero.Fs, targetDir, rel string) (string, error) {
local := strings.TrimPrefix(rel, string(filepath.Separator))
if !filepath.IsLocal(local) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errRestorePathEscapesTarget, rel)
}
local = filepath.Clean(local)
targetPath := filepath.Join(targetDir, local)
relDir := filepath.Dir(local)
if relDir == "." {
return targetPath, nil
}
current := targetDir
for component := range strings.SplitSeq(relDir, string(filepath.Separator)) {
current = filepath.Join(current, component)
info, err := lstatIfPossible(fs, current)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
continue
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("checking restore path %s: %w", current, err)
}
if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s descends through symlink %s",
errRestorePathEscapesTarget, rel, current)
}
}
return targetPath, nil
}
// lstatIfPossible performs a symlink-aware stat when the filesystem
// supports it. afero.OsFs does; MemMapFs, which has no symlinks, reports
// that Lstat was not used and its result never carries ModeSymlink.
func lstatIfPossible(fs afero.Fs, name string) (os.FileInfo, error) {
if lstater, ok := fs.(afero.Lstater); ok {
info, _, err := lstater.LstatIfPossible(name)
return info, err
}
return fs.Stat(name)
}
// restoreFile dispatches to the right per-kind restorer.
func (s *restoreSession) restoreFile(file *database.File) error {
targetPath := filepath.Join(s.opts.TargetDir, file.Path.String())
targetPath, err := containedRestorePath(
s.v.Fs, s.opts.TargetDir, file.Path.String())
if err != nil {
return err
}
parentDir := filepath.Dir(targetPath)
err := s.v.Fs.MkdirAll(parentDir, restoreDirMode)
err = s.v.Fs.MkdirAll(parentDir, restoreDirMode)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating parent directory: %w", err)
}
@@ -809,6 +926,13 @@ func (s *restoreSession) restoreDirectory(
return fmt.Errorf("creating directory: %w", err)
}
// MkdirAll applies the process umask, so chmod to the exact stored
// mode. A failure here is non-fatal.
err = s.v.Fs.Chmod(targetPath, os.FileMode(file.Mode))
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to set permissions", "path", targetPath, "error", err)
}
s.applyFileMetadata(file, targetPath)
s.result.FilesRestored++
@@ -816,25 +940,22 @@ func (s *restoreSession) restoreDirectory(
return nil
}
// applyFileMetadata applies stored permissions, ownership (when running
// as root on a real filesystem), and mtime to a restored path. Failures
// are logged at debug level and do not abort the restore.
// applyFileMetadata applies ownership (when running as root on a real
// filesystem) and mtime to a restored path. Permission mode is applied
// separately by each caller, with different failure handling, so it is
// not touched here. Failures are logged at debug level and do not abort
// the restore.
func (s *restoreSession) applyFileMetadata(file *database.File, targetPath string) {
err := s.v.Fs.Chmod(targetPath, os.FileMode(file.Mode))
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to set permissions", "path", targetPath, "error", err)
}
if s.runningAsRoot {
if _, ok := s.v.Fs.(*afero.OsFs); ok {
err = os.Chown(targetPath, int(file.UID), int(file.GID))
err := os.Chown(targetPath, int(file.UID), int(file.GID))
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to set ownership", "path", targetPath, "error", err)
}
}
}
err = s.v.Fs.Chtimes(targetPath, file.MTime, file.MTime)
err := s.v.Fs.Chtimes(targetPath, file.MTime, file.MTime)
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to set mtime", "path", targetPath, "error", err)
}
@@ -868,17 +989,30 @@ func (s *restoreSession) restoreRegularFile(
t0 = time.Now()
outFile, err := s.v.Fs.Create(targetPath)
// Remove any existing entry, then create the file with a restrictive
// mode via O_EXCL. The stored mode is applied only after the content
// is written and the file closed, so a file whose stored mode is
// restrictive is never briefly readable by other local users while
// its content is written. Removing first (rather than failing on a
// leftover file) matches the documented behaviour that re-running
// restore overwrites partial output.
_ = s.v.Fs.Remove(targetPath)
outFile, err := s.v.Fs.OpenFile(
targetPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, restoreFileMode)
createDur := time.Since(t0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating output file: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = outFile.Close() }()
bytesWritten, timings, err := s.writeFileChunks(outFile, fileChunks)
if err != nil {
// Do not leave a partial file behind.
_ = outFile.Close()
s.removePartialRestore(targetPath)
return err
}
@@ -896,9 +1030,12 @@ func (s *restoreSession) restoreRegularFile(
err = outFile.Close()
if err != nil {
s.removePartialRestore(targetPath)
return fmt.Errorf("closing output file: %w", err)
}
s.applyRestoredFileMode(file, targetPath)
s.applyFileMetadata(file, targetPath)
s.result.FilesRestored++
@@ -909,6 +1046,31 @@ func (s *restoreSession) restoreRegularFile(
return nil
}
// applyRestoredFileMode applies the stored permission bits to a
// just-written regular file (created with restoreFileMode). A failure is
// a user-visible warning, not a fatal error: the file's content is
// intact and it remains at the restrictive create-time mode, so the
// restore is not aborted or discarded over it.
func (s *restoreSession) applyRestoredFileMode(
file *database.File, targetPath string,
) {
err := s.v.Fs.Chmod(targetPath, os.FileMode(file.Mode))
if err != nil {
s.v.UI.Warningf("Failed to set mode %s on %s: %v",
os.FileMode(file.Mode).Perm(), s.v.UI.Path(targetPath), err)
}
}
// removePartialRestore deletes a restore output file whose write did not
// complete, so a failed restore never leaves a partial file behind.
func (s *restoreSession) removePartialRestore(targetPath string) {
err := s.v.Fs.Remove(targetPath)
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Failed to remove partial restore file",
"path", targetPath, "error", err)
}
}
// writeFileChunks streams each of the file's chunks from the blob disk
// cache into outFile, crediting restored bytes to the sweeper as it
// goes. Returns the bytes written plus per-phase timing accumulators.
@@ -921,6 +1083,12 @@ func (s *restoreSession) writeFileChunks(
)
for _, fc := range fileChunks {
// Stop between chunks on cancel so an interrupt does not keep
// writing a large file after the operation has been told to stop.
if s.ctx.Err() != nil {
return bytesWritten, timings, s.ctx.Err()
}
chunkHashStr := fc.ChunkHash.String()
blobChunk, ok := s.chunkToBlobMap[chunkHashStr]
@@ -990,11 +1158,19 @@ func (s *restoreSession) downloadBlobToCache(
streamDur := time.Since(t0)
closeErr := rc.Close()
// closeErr carries the blob's hash-verification result (a mismatch,
// or the stream not being fully read). On any failure, drop the
// cache entry so a blob that failed verification is never read back
// as if it were valid.
if copyErr != nil {
s.blobCache.Delete(blobHash)
return copyErr
}
if closeErr != nil {
s.blobCache.Delete(blobHash)
return closeErr
}
@@ -1057,17 +1233,22 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyRestoredFiles(
return ctx.Err()
}
targetPath := filepath.Join(targetDir, file.Path.String())
targetPath, err := containedRestorePath(v.Fs, targetDir, file.Path.String())
if err == nil {
var bytesVerified int64
bytesVerified, err = v.verifyFile(ctx, repos, file, targetPath)
if err == nil {
result.FilesVerified++
result.BytesVerified += bytesVerified
}
}
bytesVerified, err := v.verifyFile(ctx, repos, file, targetPath)
if err != nil {
log.Error("File verification failed", "path", file.Path, "error", err)
result.FilesFailed++
result.FailedFiles = append(result.FailedFiles, file.Path.String())
} else {
result.FilesVerified++
result.BytesVerified += bytesVerified
}
bytesProcessed += file.Size
@@ -1157,6 +1338,17 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyFile(
bytesVerified += int64(n)
}
// The stored chunks account for the whole file, so the reader must
// be at EOF now. Trailing bytes past the last chunk are corruption
// the per-chunk loop cannot see.
extra := make([]byte, 1)
n, err := f.Read(extra)
if n != 0 || !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return bytesVerified, fmt.Errorf("%w: file longer than its %d chunk(s)",
errTrailingRestoreData, len(fileChunks))
}
log.Debug("File verified",
"path", file.Path, "bytes", bytesVerified, "chunks", len(fileChunks))
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
package vaultik_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
)
// TestRestoreOnAnotherMachine proves the disaster-recovery path: a host
// that has only the vaultik binary, the age secret key, and the storage
// credentials — no local index, a different hostname, and no
// age_recipients configured — can list, restore, and verify a snapshot
// straight from the destination store.
//
// The backup half writes a snapshot with one index and hostname. The
// restore half throws that index away entirely: a fresh, empty index and
// a config that shares nothing with the original but the storage location
// and the secret key. If restore or verify needed the original local
// index — or the human snapshot ID that only that index holds — this test
// could not run, because the recovery host can know neither.
func TestRestoreOnAnotherMachine(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "source")
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
maxBlobSize := int64(512 * 1024)
sourceFiles := writeRecoverySourceTree(t, fs, dataDir, chunkSize)
ctx := context.Background()
// Backup host: one index, hostname test-host, age_recipients set.
// runFileStorageBackup closes the index before returning, so nothing
// below can lean on it.
_, storer, originalID := runFileStorageBackup(
ctx, t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath, chunkSize, maxBlobSize)
// Recovery host: a fresh empty index, a different hostname, and no
// age_recipients — only the secret key and the same storage location.
recovery, stdout := newRecoveryHost(ctx, t, fs, storer)
// The recovery index really is empty. This is the assertion that makes
// the test a guard against restore quietly depending on the original
// index: if it did, an empty index would make restore fail.
localSnaps, err := recovery.Repositories.Snapshots.ListRecent(ctx, 100)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, localSnaps, "recovery host must start with no local index")
// List: the snapshot shows up as remote-only, identified by its remote
// key, with no recoverable human ID.
require.NoError(t, recovery.ListSnapshots(true))
rows := decodeListJSON(t, stdout.String())
require.Len(t, rows, 1)
remote := rows[0]
assert.False(t, remote.LocallyTracked, "snapshot must be remote-only here")
assert.Empty(t, remote.ID, "the human ID is unknown to the recovery host")
require.Len(t, remote.RemoteKey, 64)
assert.Equal(t, snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(originalID), remote.RemoteKey,
"the listed key is the hashed snapshot ID")
// Restore driven by the abbreviated identifier the table prints (the
// first 12 hex of the remote key), then deep-verify from the store
// keyed by the full remote key. Both are what a recovery host can know.
require.NoError(t, recovery.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: remote.RemoteKey[:12],
TargetDir: restoreDir,
Verify: true,
}))
require.NoError(t, recovery.RunDeepVerify(
remote.RemoteKey, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}))
assertRestoredTreeMatches(t, fs, restoreDir, sourceFiles)
}
// writeRecoverySourceTree writes a small source tree spanning several
// chunks (so restore reassembles real multi-chunk files) and returns the
// content keyed by absolute path.
func writeRecoverySourceTree(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, dataDir string, chunkSize int64,
) map[string][]byte {
t.Helper()
sourceFiles := map[string][]byte{
filepath.Join(dataDir, "notes.txt"): []byte("recover me"),
filepath.Join(dataDir, "sub", "big.bin"): bytesPattern("big-", int(chunkSize*3)),
filepath.Join(dataDir, "sub", "small.bin"): bytesPattern("small-", 128),
}
for path, content := range sourceFiles {
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, path, content, 0o644))
}
return sourceFiles
}
// newRecoveryHost builds the Vaultik a replacement machine would run: an
// empty in-memory index, a hostname different from the backup host, no
// age_recipients, and only the secret key plus the shared storer. It
// returns the instance and the buffer its stdout is wired to.
func newRecoveryHost(
ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, storer storage.Storer,
) (*vaultik.Vaultik, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
recoveryDB, err := database.New(ctx, ":memory:")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = recoveryDB.Close() })
stdout := &bytes.Buffer{}
recovery := &vaultik.Vaultik{
Config: &config.Config{
AgeSecretKey: testAgeSecretKey,
Hostname: "recovery-host",
},
Storage: storer,
Fs: fs,
Repositories: database.NewRepositories(recoveryDB),
DB: recoveryDB,
Stdout: stdout,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
}
recovery.SetContext(ctx)
return recovery, stdout
}
// assertRestoredTreeMatches byte-compares every restored file against its
// source content.
func assertRestoredTreeMatches(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, restoreDir string, sourceFiles map[string][]byte,
) {
t.Helper()
for origPath, expected := range sourceFiles {
restored := filepath.Join(restoreDir, origPath)
got, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, restored)
require.NoErrorf(t, err, "restored file missing: %s", restored)
require.Truef(t, bytes.Equal(got, expected),
"byte mismatch for %s", origPath)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // drives unexported restore internals
import (
"context"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
)
// These tests exercise the path-containment guard that keeps restore from
// writing outside its target directory. age decryption proves only that a
// snapshot is readable, not that its recorded paths are honest, so restore
// treats every stored path as hostile: a compromised backed-up host could
// forge a snapshot that decrypts cleanly, and restore usually runs as root.
//
// They drive restoreAllFiles directly (rather than the full Restore, which
// downloads and decrypts the metadata database from storage) so a snapshot
// database with adversarial rows can be handed to the restore loop without
// the surrounding blob/storage machinery. Directory and symlink entries
// carry no chunks, so no blobs are needed.
// containmentDirMode marks a File row as a directory for the restore loop.
const containmentDirMode = uint32(os.ModeDir | 0o755)
// newContainmentVaultik builds the minimal Vaultik needed to run
// restoreAllFiles against fs.
func newContainmentVaultik(ctx context.Context, fs afero.Fs) *Vaultik {
v := &Vaultik{
Config: &config.Config{
BlobSizeLimit: config.Size(10 * 1024 * 1024),
},
Fs: fs,
Stdout: io.Discard,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
}
v.SetContext(ctx)
return v
}
// makeFiles inserts the given rows into a fresh in-memory snapshot database
// and returns them (with IDs assigned) plus the repositories.
func makeFiles(
ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, rows []*database.File,
) ([]*database.File, *database.Repositories) {
t.Helper()
db, err := database.New(ctx, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.sqlite"))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
for _, f := range rows {
require.NoError(t, repos.Files.Create(ctx, nil, f))
}
return rows, repos
}
func TestRestoreRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
// rows are inserted in order; the escape entry is restored after
// any entry it depends on (the symlink case needs its link first).
rows func(outsideDir string) []*database.File
// escaped is the path, outside the target, that must not appear.
escaped func(tempDir, outsideDir string) string
}{
{
name: "relative dotdot",
rows: func(_ string) []*database.File {
return []*database.File{{
Path: "../escaped-relative",
Mode: containmentDirMode,
}}
},
escaped: func(tempDir, _ string) string {
return filepath.Join(tempDir, "escaped-relative")
},
},
{
name: "absolute with dotdot",
rows: func(_ string) []*database.File {
return []*database.File{{
Path: "/a/../../escaped-absolute",
Mode: containmentDirMode,
}}
},
escaped: func(tempDir, _ string) string {
return filepath.Join(tempDir, "escaped-absolute")
},
},
{
name: "child through symlink",
rows: func(outsideDir string) []*database.File {
return []*database.File{
// Restored first: an in-target symlink pointing out.
{Path: "linkdir", LinkTarget: types.FilePath(outsideDir)},
// Restored second: a child written through that link.
{Path: "linkdir/child", Mode: containmentDirMode},
}
},
escaped: func(_, outsideDir string) string {
return filepath.Join(outsideDir, "child")
},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
targetDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "target")
outsideDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "outside")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(outsideDir, 0o755))
rows, repos := makeFiles(ctx, t, tc.rows(outsideDir))
v := newContainmentVaultik(ctx, fs)
_, err := v.restoreAllFiles(rows, repos,
&RestoreOptions{TargetDir: targetDir}, nil, nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errRestorePathEscapesTarget)
escaped := tc.escaped(tempDir, outsideDir)
_, statErr := os.Lstat(escaped)
require.Truef(t, os.IsNotExist(statErr),
"restore wrote outside the target at %s", escaped)
})
}
}
// TestRestoreAllowsSymlinkPointingOutsideTree confirms the guard does not
// over-block: an honest snapshot may contain a symlink whose target lies
// outside the restored tree, and it must still be restored verbatim.
func TestRestoreAllowsSymlinkPointingOutsideTree(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
targetDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "target")
linkTarget := filepath.Join(tempDir, "outside", "data")
rows, repos := makeFiles(ctx, t, []*database.File{
{Path: "goodlink", LinkTarget: types.FilePath(linkTarget), MTime: time.Unix(0, 0)},
})
v := newContainmentVaultik(ctx, fs)
_, err := v.restoreAllFiles(rows, repos,
&RestoreOptions{TargetDir: targetDir}, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := os.Readlink(filepath.Join(targetDir, "goodlink"))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, linkTarget, got)
}
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // sets ctx/cancel and inspects scratch files
import (
"context"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
)
// blockingBlobStorer wraps a Storer and blocks the first blob download
// until its context is cancelled, so a test can catch a restore while it
// is mid-download. Metadata reads pass straight through, so the restore
// reaches the blob-download phase — having already written its decrypted
// scratch files — before it blocks.
type blockingBlobStorer struct {
storage.Storer
once sync.Once
entered chan struct{}
}
func newBlockingBlobStorer(inner storage.Storer) *blockingBlobStorer {
return &blockingBlobStorer{Storer: inner, entered: make(chan struct{})}
}
func (b *blockingBlobStorer) Get(
ctx context.Context, key string,
) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "blobs/") {
b.once.Do(func() { close(b.entered) })
<-ctx.Done()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
return b.Storer.Get(ctx, key)
}
// TestRestoreCleansTempDirOnInterrupt drives a restore through the stop
// path (v.StartOperation, which is what the fx OnStop hook uses) instead
// of calling Restore directly, catches it mid-download, and asserts that
// stopping waits for the operation to unwind and removes its decrypted
// scratch files — the blob cache and the temporary snapshot database —
// from the temp directory. Without the wait a SIGINT exits the process
// before those defers run, leaving decrypted data on disk (issue #159).
//
// Not parallel: it points TMPDIR at a private directory (via t.Setenv)
// so it can assert on exactly the scratch files this restore created.
func TestRestoreCleansTempDirOnInterrupt(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
root := t.TempDir()
dataDir := filepath.Join(root, "source")
storeDir := filepath.Join(root, "remote")
restoreDir := filepath.Join(root, "restored")
dbPath := filepath.Join(root, "index.sqlite")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o755))
buildLocalityFixture(t, fs, dataDir)
cfg, storer, snapshotID := setupLocalityBackup(
context.Background(), t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath)
// Point the "" temp paths (the blob cache directory and the
// snapshot-database directory) at a private directory so the test can
// assert on exactly the scratch this restore creates.
scratch := filepath.Join(root, "scratch")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(scratch, 0o755))
t.Setenv("TMPDIR", scratch)
gate := newBlockingBlobStorer(storer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
v := &Vaultik{
Config: cfg,
Storage: gate,
Fs: fs,
Stdout: io.Discard,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}
var (
opReturned atomic.Bool
restoreErr error
)
stop := v.StartOperation(func() {
defer opReturned.Store(true)
restoreErr = v.Restore(&RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: snapshotID,
TargetDir: restoreDir,
})
})
// Wait until the restore is blocked mid-download; its decrypted
// scratch files exist by now.
select {
case <-gate.entered:
case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("restore never reached the blob-download phase")
}
require.NotEmpty(t, scratchEntries(t, scratch),
"expected decrypted scratch files to exist mid-restore")
// Stop the operation the way the fx OnStop hook does.
stopCtx, stopCancel := context.WithTimeout(
context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer stopCancel()
require.True(t, stop(stopCtx),
"stop timed out; the operation goroutine did not return")
// stop returns only once the operation goroutine has returned, so its
// cleanup defers have run by the time we read these.
require.True(t, opReturned.Load(),
"stop returned before the operation goroutine finished")
require.ErrorIs(t, restoreErr, context.Canceled)
require.Empty(t, scratchEntries(t, scratch),
"decrypted scratch files remained after the interrupt")
}
// scratchEntries returns the vaultik blob-cache and snapshot-database
// scratch entries currently present in dir.
func scratchEntries(t *testing.T, dir string) []string {
t.Helper()
var matches []string
for _, pattern := range []string{
"vaultik-blobcache-*", "vaultik-restore-*",
} {
found, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dir, pattern))
require.NoError(t, err)
matches = append(matches, found...)
}
return matches
}
+306
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // drives restore through unexported session
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
)
// errSpyWrite is the injected write failure used to exercise the
// partial-file cleanup path.
var errSpyWrite = errors.New("injected write failure")
// modeSpyFs wraps a real filesystem so restore tests can observe and
// perturb the single output file whose path contains watch. It records
// the on-disk permission bits seen at the moment content is first
// written (the window during which another local user could read it),
// and can inject a write failure or append trailing bytes on close.
type modeSpyFs struct {
afero.Fs
watch string
mu sync.Mutex
writeModes []os.FileMode
failWrite bool
trailing int
}
//nolint:ireturn // afero.Fs.OpenFile is defined to return the interface
func (m *modeSpyFs) OpenFile(
name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode,
) (afero.File, error) {
f, err := m.Fs.OpenFile(name, flag, perm)
if err != nil || !strings.Contains(name, m.watch) {
return f, err
}
return &modeSpyFile{File: f, fs: m, path: name}, nil
}
type modeSpyFile struct {
afero.File
fs *modeSpyFs
path string
written bool
}
func (f *modeSpyFile) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if !f.written {
f.written = true
info, err := f.fs.Stat(f.path)
if err == nil {
f.fs.mu.Lock()
f.fs.writeModes = append(f.fs.writeModes, info.Mode().Perm())
f.fs.mu.Unlock()
}
}
if f.fs.failWrite {
return 0, errSpyWrite
}
return f.File.Write(p)
}
func (f *modeSpyFile) Close() error {
if f.fs.trailing > 0 {
_, _ = f.File.Write(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'x'}, f.fs.trailing))
}
return f.File.Close()
}
// backupOneFile writes a single source file with the given mode and
// backs it up into a fresh file storer, returning everything a restore
// needs. The index database is closed before returning so the restore
// half runs from the exported metadata and remote bytes only.
func backupOneFile(
ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, tempDir, name string,
content []byte, mode os.FileMode,
) (*config.Config, *storage.FileStorer, string, string) {
t.Helper()
dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o755))
srcPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, name)
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, srcPath, content, mode))
require.NoError(t, fs.Chmod(srcPath, mode))
storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
storer, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
cfg := &config.Config{
AgeRecipients: []string{
"age1ezrjmfpwsc95svdg0y54mums3zevgzu0x0ecq2f7tp8a05gl0sjq9q9wjg",
},
AgeSecretKey: "AGE-SECRET-KEY-19CR5YSFW59HM4TLD6GXVEDMZFTVVF7PPHKU" +
"T68TXSFPK7APHXA2QS2NJA5",
CompressionLevel: 3,
Hostname: "test-host",
BlobSizeLimit: config.Size(5 * 1024 * 1024),
}
db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
sm := snapshot.NewSnapshotManager(snapshot.SnapshotManagerParams{
Repos: repos,
Storage: storer,
Config: cfg,
})
sm.SetFilesystem(fs)
scanner := snapshot.NewScanner(snapshot.ScannerConfig{
FS: fs,
Storage: storer,
ChunkSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024,
MaxBlobSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024,
CompressionLevel: cfg.CompressionLevel,
AgeRecipients: cfg.AgeRecipients,
Repositories: repos,
})
snapshotID, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(
ctx, cfg.Hostname, "perms", "test-version", "test-git")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, snapshotID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sm.CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID))
require.NoError(t, sm.ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, snapshotID))
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
return cfg, storer, snapshotID, srcPath
}
// restoredPathFor returns where backupOneFile's source lands under a
// restore target: restore recreates each file at its original absolute
// path beneath TargetDir.
func restoredPathFor(restoreDir, srcPath string) string {
return filepath.Join(restoreDir, srcPath)
}
// withUmask022 forces the process umask to 022 for the duration of a
// test, so the difference between a 0600 create and a default create is
// observable. Restored serially (no t.Parallel) so it does not race
// other tests.
func withUmask022(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
old := syscall.Umask(0o022)
t.Cleanup(func() { syscall.Umask(old) })
}
// TestRestoreCreatesFileNeverWiderThanStoredMode checks that a file with
// a restrictive stored mode (0600) is never observable with a wider mode
// while its content is being written, and ends at its stored mode.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // sets the process umask; must run serially
func TestRestoreCreatesFileNeverWiderThanStoredMode(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
withUmask022(t)
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
ctx := context.Background()
content := randomBytes(t, 4096)
cfg, storer, snapshotID, srcPath := backupOneFile(
ctx, t, fs, tempDir, "secret.bin", content, 0o600)
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
spy := &modeSpyFs{Fs: fs, watch: "secret.bin"}
v := newRestoreVaultik(ctx, cfg, storer, spy)
require.NoError(t, v.Restore(&RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: snapshotID,
TargetDir: restoreDir,
}))
spy.mu.Lock()
observed := append([]os.FileMode(nil), spy.writeModes...)
spy.mu.Unlock()
require.NotEmpty(t, observed,
"spy never saw the output file being written")
for _, m := range observed {
assert.Equalf(t, os.FileMode(0o600), m,
"file was observable at mode %o during write; must be 0600", m)
}
// The stored mode is applied after the content is written.
info, err := fs.Stat(restoredPathFor(restoreDir, srcPath))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o600), info.Mode().Perm())
got, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, restoredPathFor(restoreDir, srcPath))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(got, content))
}
// TestRestoreRemovesPartialFileOnWriteFailure checks that a file whose
// content write fails is not left behind.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // sets the process umask; must run serially
func TestRestoreRemovesPartialFileOnWriteFailure(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
withUmask022(t)
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
ctx := context.Background()
cfg, storer, snapshotID, srcPath := backupOneFile(
ctx, t, fs, tempDir, "doomed.bin", randomBytes(t, 4096), 0o600)
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
spy := &modeSpyFs{Fs: fs, watch: "doomed.bin", failWrite: true}
v := newRestoreVaultik(ctx, cfg, storer, spy)
err := v.Restore(&RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: snapshotID,
TargetDir: restoreDir,
})
require.Error(t, err, "restore should fail when the write fails")
exists, err := afero.Exists(fs, restoredPathFor(restoreDir, srcPath))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, exists, "partial file must be removed after a failed write")
}
// TestVerifyRejectsTrailingBytes checks that --verify fails a restored
// file that has bytes past its last chunk.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // sets the process umask; must run serially
func TestVerifyRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
withUmask022(t)
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
ctx := context.Background()
cfg, storer, snapshotID, _ := backupOneFile(
ctx, t, fs, tempDir, "padded.bin", randomBytes(t, 4096), 0o600)
restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
// Append one byte to the file as it is written, so its content still
// matches the stored chunks but it is one byte too long.
spy := &modeSpyFs{Fs: fs, watch: "padded.bin", trailing: 1}
v := newRestoreVaultik(ctx, cfg, storer, spy)
err := v.Restore(&RestoreOptions{
SnapshotID: snapshotID,
TargetDir: restoreDir,
Verify: true,
})
require.Error(t, err, "verify should fail on a file with trailing bytes")
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, errFilesFailedVerify)
}
// newRestoreVaultik builds a Vaultik wired for a restore-only test.
func newRestoreVaultik(
ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, storer storage.Storer, fs afero.Fs,
) *Vaultik {
v := &Vaultik{
Config: cfg,
Storage: storer,
Fs: fs,
Stdout: io.Discard,
Stderr: io.Discard,
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
}
v.SetContext(ctx)
return v
}
+8 -4
View File
@@ -171,10 +171,13 @@ func (p *restorePlan) finishFile(fileID types.FileID) {
// downloaded next, after which it — together with any other pending
// files whose blob sets become empty — moves to the ready queue.
//
// The zero FileID return means nothing is pending.
func (p *restorePlan) pickNextDownload() types.FileID {
// The second return value is false when no file needs a download, so a
// genuine file carrying the nil UUID is picked rather than mistaken for
// "nothing left".
func (p *restorePlan) pickNextDownload() (types.FileID, bool) {
var best types.FileID
found := false
bestCount := math.MaxInt
var bestID string
@@ -188,14 +191,15 @@ func (p *restorePlan) pickNextDownload() types.FileID {
}
idStr := id.String()
if n < bestCount || (n == bestCount && (best.IsZero() || idStr < bestID)) {
if !found || n < bestCount || (n == bestCount && idStr < bestID) {
best = id
found = true
bestCount = n
bestID = idStr
}
}
return best
return best, found
}
// blobsNeeded returns the uncached blob hashes for fileID in any order.
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // inspects unexported restore plan internals
import (
"context"
"math"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
)
// TestPickNextDownloadReturnsNilUUIDFile proves a genuine pending file
// carrying the nil UUID is picked for download rather than mistaken for
// "nothing left" — the bug that could abandon every remaining file.
func TestPickNextDownloadReturnsNilUUIDFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var nilID types.FileID // zero value is the nil UUID
plan := &restorePlan{
fileBlobs: map[types.FileID]map[string]struct{}{
nilID: {"blobhash": {}},
},
}
id, ok := plan.pickNextDownload()
require.True(t, ok,
"pickNextDownload treated a pending nil-UUID file as nothing to do")
require.True(t, id.IsZero(), "expected the nil-UUID file to be picked")
}
// TestPickNextDownloadEmptyPlan confirms the second return value is false
// only when no file needs a download.
func TestPickNextDownloadEmptyPlan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
plan := &restorePlan{
fileBlobs: map[types.FileID]map[string]struct{}{},
}
_, ok := plan.pickNextDownload()
require.False(t, ok, "pickNextDownload reported work on an empty plan")
}
// TestRunRestoreLoopFailsOnAbandonedFiles proves the loop returns an
// error rather than silent success when files remain pending after it
// can make no further progress.
func TestRunRestoreLoopFailsOnAbandonedFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
db, err := database.NewTestDB()
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
cache, err := newBlobDiskCache(math.MaxInt64)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cache.Close() })
v := &Vaultik{ctx: ctx}
session := &restoreSession{
v: v,
ctx: ctx,
repos: repos,
sweeper: newRestoreSweeper(ctx, repos, cache, 1),
result: &RestoreResult{},
}
// A file that is still pending but whose uncached-blob set is empty
// and which was never queued as ready: the loop can neither restore
// nor download it. This is the abandonment the guard must catch.
var stuck types.FileID
plan := &restorePlan{
fileBlobs: map[types.FileID]map[string]struct{}{stuck: {}},
blobFiles: map[string]map[types.FileID]struct{}{},
cached: map[string]struct{}{},
}
err = v.runRestoreLoop(session, plan, map[types.FileID]*database.File{}, 0)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errRestoreIncomplete)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // inspects unexported snapshot-db materialization
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
)
// genuineSnapshotDBBytes returns the on-disk bytes of a real snapshot
// database (the full schema applied).
func genuineSnapshotDBBytes(t *testing.T) []byte {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snapshot.db")
db, err := database.New(context.Background(), path)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // G304: test-controlled temp path
require.NoError(t, err)
return data
}
// TestMaterializeSnapshotDBPrivateDir proves the decrypted database lands
// in a private (0700) directory and opens read-only.
func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBPrivateDir(t *testing.T) {
dbData := genuineSnapshotDBBytes(t)
t.Setenv("TMPDIR", t.TempDir())
v := &Vaultik{ctx: context.Background(), Fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
db, dir, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB(dbData)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = db.Close()
_ = os.RemoveAll(dir)
})
info, err := os.Stat(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o700), info.Mode().Perm(),
"snapshot database directory must not be world-readable")
_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(context.Background(),
"CREATE TABLE probe_readonly (x)")
require.Error(t, err, "materialized snapshot database must be read-only")
}
// TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRemovesDirOnOpenFailure proves a failed open
// leaves no temp directory behind.
func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRemovesDirOnOpenFailure(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("TMPDIR", base)
v := &Vaultik{ctx: context.Background(), Fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
_, _, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB([]byte("this is not a sqlite database"))
require.Error(t, err)
entries, rerr := os.ReadDir(base)
require.NoError(t, rerr)
require.Empty(t, entries, "temp directory left behind after open failure")
}
+99 -50
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -669,9 +670,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) VerifySnapshotWithOptions(
v.printVerifyHeader(snapshotID, opts)
// Download and parse manifest. The caller supplies a human
// snapshot ID; we hash it to address remote storage.
manifest, err := v.downloadManifestByKey(snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID))
// Resolve the identifier to the snapshot's remote key and download the
// manifest. A human ID is hashed; a remote key (or its abbreviation,
// as printed for a remote-only snapshot) is used as-is, so a host with
// no local index can verify a snapshot it can only see on the store.
manifest, err := v.resolveAndDownloadManifest(snapshotID)
if err != nil {
if opts.JSON {
result.Status = verifyStatusFailed
@@ -932,29 +935,23 @@ func (v *Vaultik) downloadManifestByKey(remoteKey string) (*snapshot.Manifest, e
func (v *Vaultik) syncWithRemote() error {
log.Info("Syncing with remote snapshots")
// Get all remote snapshot IDs
remoteSnapshots := make(map[string]bool)
objectCh := v.Storage.ListStream(v.ctx, "metadata/")
for object := range objectCh {
if object.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listing remote snapshots: %w", object.Err)
// Remote metadata lives under metadata/<remote-key>/, where the
// directory name is snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(id), not the human
// snapshot ID. Compare each local row's hashed key against that set
// so a row still backed by remote metadata is kept. Comparing human
// IDs against the hashed directory names matches nothing and deletes
// every local snapshot record (issue #160).
remoteKeys, err := v.listAllRemoteSnapshotKeys()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listing remote snapshots: %w", err)
}
// Extract snapshot ID from paths like metadata/hostname-20240115-143052Z/
parts := strings.Split(object.Key, "/")
if len(parts) >= minSnapshotIDParts &&
parts[0] == metadataDirName && parts[1] != "" {
// Skip macOS resource fork files (._*) and other hidden files
if strings.HasPrefix(parts[1], ".") {
continue
remoteKeySet := make(map[string]bool, len(remoteKeys))
for _, k := range remoteKeys {
remoteKeySet[k] = true
}
remoteSnapshots[parts[1]] = true
}
}
log.Debug("Found remote snapshots", "count", len(remoteSnapshots))
log.Debug("Found remote snapshots", "count", len(remoteKeySet))
// Get all local snapshots (use a high limit to get all)
localSnapshots, err := v.Repositories.Snapshots.ListRecent(v.ctx, listRecentLimit)
@@ -962,12 +959,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) syncWithRemote() error {
return fmt.Errorf("listing local snapshots: %w", err)
}
// Remove local snapshots that don't exist remotely
// Remove local snapshots whose metadata is absent from the remote.
removedCount := 0
for _, snap := range localSnapshots {
snapshotIDStr := snap.ID.String()
if !remoteSnapshots[snapshotIDStr] {
if !remoteKeySet[snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotIDStr)] {
log.Info("Removing local snapshot not found in remote",
"snapshot_id", snap.ID)
@@ -1540,12 +1537,17 @@ func (v *Vaultik) outputRemoveJSON(result *RemoveResult) error {
return encoder.Encode(result)
}
// PruneResult contains statistics about the prune operation
// PruneResult contains statistics about the prune operation.
// SnapshotsDeleted counts snapshots actually deleted. FilesDeleted,
// ChunksDeleted, and BlobsDeleted are derived from before/after row
// counts of the local index; each is nil when a count could not be read,
// so an unreadable count is reported as unknown rather than silently
// as 0.
type PruneResult struct {
SnapshotsDeleted int64
FilesDeleted int64
ChunksDeleted int64
BlobsDeleted int64
FilesDeleted *int64
ChunksDeleted *int64
BlobsDeleted *int64
}
// PruneDatabase removes incomplete snapshots and orphaned files, chunks,
@@ -1560,7 +1562,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) PruneDatabase() (*PruneResult, error) {
result := &PruneResult{}
// Snapshot counts before deletion of incompletes.
snapshotCountBefore, _ := v.getTableCount("snapshots")
snapshotCountBefore := v.tableCountForReport("snapshots")
// First, delete any incomplete snapshots
incompleteSnapshots, err := v.Repositories.Snapshots.GetIncompleteSnapshots(v.ctx)
@@ -1575,9 +1577,9 @@ func (v *Vaultik) PruneDatabase() (*PruneResult, error) {
}
// Get counts before cleanup for reporting
fileCountBefore, _ := v.getTableCount("files")
chunkCountBefore, _ := v.getTableCount("chunks")
blobCountBefore, _ := v.getTableCount("blobs")
fileCountBefore := v.tableCountForReport("files")
chunkCountBefore := v.tableCountForReport("chunks")
blobCountBefore := v.tableCountForReport("blobs")
// Run the cleanup
err = v.SnapshotManager.CleanupOrphanedData(v.ctx)
@@ -1586,36 +1588,83 @@ func (v *Vaultik) PruneDatabase() (*PruneResult, error) {
}
// Get counts after cleanup
fileCountAfter, _ := v.getTableCount("files")
chunkCountAfter, _ := v.getTableCount("chunks")
blobCountAfter, _ := v.getTableCount("blobs")
fileCountAfter := v.tableCountForReport("files")
chunkCountAfter := v.tableCountForReport("chunks")
blobCountAfter := v.tableCountForReport("blobs")
result.FilesDeleted = fileCountBefore - fileCountAfter
result.ChunksDeleted = chunkCountBefore - chunkCountAfter
result.BlobsDeleted = blobCountBefore - blobCountAfter
result.FilesDeleted = countDiff(fileCountBefore, fileCountAfter)
result.ChunksDeleted = countDiff(chunkCountBefore, chunkCountAfter)
result.BlobsDeleted = countDiff(blobCountBefore, blobCountAfter)
log.Info("Local database prune complete",
"incomplete_snapshots", result.SnapshotsDeleted,
"orphaned_files", result.FilesDeleted,
"orphaned_chunks", result.ChunksDeleted,
"orphaned_blobs", result.BlobsDeleted,
"orphaned_files", countText(result.FilesDeleted),
"orphaned_chunks", countText(result.ChunksDeleted),
"orphaned_blobs", countText(result.BlobsDeleted),
)
snapshotCountAfter := snapshotCountBefore - result.SnapshotsDeleted
// Snapshots remaining after removing the incomplete ones; unknown if
// the pre-prune snapshot count could not be read.
snapshotsRemain := countDiff(snapshotCountBefore, &result.SnapshotsDeleted)
v.UI.Completef("Pruned local index database.")
v.UI.Detailf("Incomplete snapshots: %d removed (%d remain).",
result.SnapshotsDeleted, snapshotCountAfter)
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned files: %d removed (%d remain).",
result.FilesDeleted, fileCountAfter)
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned chunks: %d removed (%d remain).",
result.ChunksDeleted, chunkCountAfter)
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned blobs: %d removed (%d remain).",
result.BlobsDeleted, blobCountAfter)
v.UI.Detailf("Incomplete snapshots: %s removed (%s remain).",
countText(&result.SnapshotsDeleted), countText(snapshotsRemain))
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned files: %s removed (%s remain).",
countText(result.FilesDeleted), countText(fileCountAfter))
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned chunks: %s removed (%s remain).",
countText(result.ChunksDeleted), countText(chunkCountAfter))
v.UI.Detailf("Orphaned blobs: %s removed (%s remain).",
countText(result.BlobsDeleted), countText(blobCountAfter))
return result, nil
}
// countUnknown is what a count reads as when its query could not be run,
// distinct from "0", which means the table really was empty.
const countUnknown = "unknown"
// tableCountForReport returns the row count of a table for the prune
// summary, or nil if the count could not be read. A read failure is
// logged at warn — visible even under --json, which routes warnings to
// stderr — and then rendered as unknown rather than silently becoming 0,
// so a broken query is a visible failure instead of a plausible wrong
// number.
func (v *Vaultik) tableCountForReport(tableName string) *int64 {
count, err := v.getTableCount(tableName)
if err != nil {
log.Warn("could not read table row count for prune summary",
"table", tableName, "error", err)
return nil
}
return &count
}
// countDiff returns before-after, or nil if either count is unknown so
// that an unreadable count does not collapse into a plausible delta.
func countDiff(before, after *int64) *int64 {
if before == nil || after == nil {
return nil
}
diff := *before - *after
return &diff
}
// countText renders a count that may be unknown: nil (the read failed)
// becomes "unknown", never "0", so a reader can tell an empty table from
// one that could not be queried.
func countText(count *int64) string {
if count == nil {
return countUnknown
}
return strconv.FormatInt(*count, 10)
}
// validTableNameRe matches table names containing only lowercase
// alphanumeric characters and underscores.
var validTableNameRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9_]+$`)
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
package vaultik
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
)
// remoteKeyHexLen is the length of a full remote snapshot key: a SHA256
// digest rendered as lowercase hex.
const remoteKeyHexLen = 64
// Sentinel errors for resolving a snapshot identifier against the store.
var (
errSnapshotKeyNotFound = errors.New(
"no snapshot on the destination store matches this identifier")
errSnapshotKeyAmbiguous = errors.New(
"identifier matches more than one snapshot on the destination store")
)
// resolveSnapshotRemoteKey turns a snapshot identifier supplied on the
// command line into the remote key that names the snapshot's metadata
// directory on the destination store. Every remote path a restore or
// verify reads is built from that key.
//
// Two forms are accepted, matching the two things a host can know:
//
// - A human snapshot ID (hostname_name_timestamp), which a host holding
// the local index has. It is hashed to its remote key; the store is
// not consulted.
// - A remote key, or the leading part of one, which is all a host with
// no local index can know — it is exactly what `snapshot list` prints
// for a remote-only snapshot (see formatRemoteOnlyID). It is resolved
// against the destination store's metadata listing; an identifier that
// matches no snapshot, or more than one, is an error.
//
// The two are told apart by shape: a remote key is lowercase hex, and a
// human snapshot ID never is (it carries a hostname, underscores, and an
// RFC3339 timestamp).
func (v *Vaultik) resolveSnapshotRemoteKey(identifier string) (string, error) {
if !isRemoteKeyOrPrefix(identifier) {
return snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(identifier), nil
}
keys, err := v.listAllRemoteSnapshotKeys()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"listing destination store to resolve %q: %w", identifier, err)
}
var matches []string
for _, key := range keys {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, identifier) {
matches = append(matches, key)
}
}
switch len(matches) {
case 1:
return matches[0], nil
case 0:
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errSnapshotKeyNotFound, identifier)
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (%d matches)",
errSnapshotKeyAmbiguous, identifier, len(matches))
}
}
// resolveAndDownloadManifest resolves a snapshot identifier to its remote
// key (see resolveSnapshotRemoteKey) and downloads that snapshot's
// manifest.
func (v *Vaultik) resolveAndDownloadManifest(
identifier string,
) (*snapshot.Manifest, error) {
remoteKey, err := v.resolveSnapshotRemoteKey(identifier)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return v.downloadManifestByKey(remoteKey)
}
// isRemoteKeyOrPrefix reports whether s is a full remote key or the
// leading part of one: 1 to 64 lowercase hex characters. A human snapshot
// ID is never all hex, so this shape test is enough to tell the two apart.
func isRemoteKeyOrPrefix(s string) bool {
if s == "" || len(s) > remoteKeyHexLen {
return false
}
for _, r := range s {
if (r < '0' || r > '9') && (r < 'a' || r > 'f') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+34
View File
@@ -136,6 +136,40 @@ func (v *Vaultik) Cancel() {
v.cancel()
}
// StartOperation runs fn in its own goroutine and returns a stop
// function. fn is the command being run (a restore, verify, prune, and
// so on); it observes cancellation through the Vaultik context and
// removes its decrypted scratch files (the blob cache and the temporary
// snapshot database) from the temp directory as it unwinds.
//
// Calling stop cancels the Vaultik context and then blocks until fn has
// returned — so that unwinding, and the cleanup it does, completes
// before the caller proceeds — or until the passed context is done,
// whichever comes first. It reports whether fn returned before that
// deadline. A signal-driven shutdown must call stop before the process
// exits; otherwise the process can exit mid-operation and leave
// decrypted data behind.
func (v *Vaultik) StartOperation(fn func()) func(context.Context) bool {
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
fn()
}()
return func(ctx context.Context) bool {
v.Cancel()
select {
case <-done:
return true
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
}
}
}
// CanDecrypt returns true if this Vaultik instance has decryption capabilities
func (v *Vaultik) CanDecrypt() bool {
return v.Config.AgeSecretKey != ""
+90 -56
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ import (
"hash"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
// Blank import registers the pure-Go sqlite driver for database/sql.
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
)
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ var (
errTrailingBlobData = errors.New(
"blob has unexpected trailing bytes not covered by chunk list")
errManifestExtraBlob = errors.New("manifest contains blob not in database")
errManifestMissingBlob = errors.New(
"manifest omits blob present in database")
errBlobSizeMismatch = errors.New("blob size mismatch")
)
@@ -138,8 +140,15 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(
snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions, result *VerifyResult,
) (*snapshot.Manifest, *tempDB, []snapshot.BlobInfo, error) {
// All remote paths use the hashed key derived from the human ID.
remoteKey := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID)
// Resolve the identifier to the snapshot's remote key. A human ID is
// hashed; a remote key (or its abbreviation, as printed for a
// remote-only snapshot) is used as-is, so a host with no local index
// can verify a snapshot it can only see on the store.
remoteKey, err := v.resolveSnapshotRemoteKey(snapshotID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
fmt.Sprintf("resolving snapshot identifier: %v", err), err)
}
// Download manifest. downloadManifestByKey is the single reader for
// remote manifests; see its doc comment.
@@ -186,7 +195,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(
fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt database: %w", err))
}
dbBlobs, err := v.getBlobsFromDatabase(snapshotID, tdb.DB)
dbBlobs, err := v.getBlobsFromDatabase(tdb.db.Conn())
if err != nil {
_ = tdb.Close()
@@ -247,7 +256,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runVerificationSteps(
len(dbBlobs), ubytes(totalSize))
}
err = v.performDeepVerificationFromDB(dbBlobs, tdb.DB, opts)
err = v.performDeepVerificationFromDB(dbBlobs, tdb.db.Conn(), opts)
if err != nil {
return v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts, err.Error(), err)
}
@@ -255,16 +264,18 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runVerificationSteps(
return nil
}
// tempDB wraps sql.DB with cleanup
// tempDB is the downloaded snapshot database opened read-only for deep
// verify, held in a private temp directory removed in full on Close.
type tempDB struct {
*sql.DB
tempPath string
db *database.DB
tempDir string
}
func (t *tempDB) Close() error {
err := t.DB.Close()
_ = os.Remove(t.tempPath)
err := t.db.Close()
// Remove the whole private directory so the decrypted database and
// any SQLite side files are gone on every path.
_ = os.RemoveAll(t.tempDir)
return err
}
@@ -291,41 +302,56 @@ func (v *Vaultik) decryptAndLoadDatabase(reader io.ReadCloser) (*tempDB, error)
}
defer decompressor.Close()
// Create temporary file for the database
tempFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "vaultik-verify-*.db")
// Materialize the decrypted database inside a private (0700) temp
// directory so it is never world-readable, and remove the whole
// directory on any failure below.
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "vaultik-verify-")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp directory: %w", err)
}
success := false
defer func() {
if !success {
_ = os.RemoveAll(tempDir)
}
}()
dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, snapshotDBFilename)
//nolint:gosec // G304: dbPath is our MkdirTemp dir plus a constant filename
tempFile, err := os.OpenFile(
dbPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, restoreFileMode)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
}
tempPath := tempFile.Name()
// Stream decompress directly to file
log.Info("Decompressing database...")
written, err := io.Copy(tempFile, decompressor)
if err != nil {
_ = tempFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tempPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decompress database: %w", err)
}
_ = tempFile.Close()
err = tempFile.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to close temp database file: %w", err)
}
log.Info("Database decompressed", "size", ubytes(written))
// Open the database
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", tempPath)
db, err := database.OpenReadOnly(v.ctx, dbPath)
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tempPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open database: %w", err)
}
return &tempDB{
DB: db,
tempPath: tempPath,
}, nil
success = true
return &tempDB{db: db, tempDir: tempDir}, nil
}
// verifyBlob downloads and verifies a single blob
@@ -344,12 +370,8 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get decryptor: %w", err)
}
// Hash the encrypted blob data as it streams through to decryption
blobHasher := sha256.New()
teeReader := io.TeeReader(reader, blobHasher)
// Decrypt blob (reading through teeReader to hash encrypted data)
decryptedReader, err := decryptor.DecryptStream(teeReader)
// Decrypt blob
decryptedReader, err := decryptor.DecryptStream(reader)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt: %w", err)
}
@@ -361,12 +383,19 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB) error {
}
defer decompressor.Close()
chunkCount, err := v.verifyBlobChunks(db, blobInfo.Hash, decompressor)
// A blob's hash — its remote name — is the double SHA256 of its
// decompressed plaintext (see blobgen.Writer.Sum256), not of the
// encrypted bytes. Hash the plaintext as chunk verification streams
// it, then compare on completion.
plaintextHasher := sha256.New()
hashedStream := io.TeeReader(decompressor, plaintextHasher)
chunkCount, err := v.verifyBlobChunks(db, blobInfo.Hash, hashedStream)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = v.verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(decompressor, blobHasher, blobInfo.Hash)
err = v.verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(hashedStream, plaintextHasher, blobInfo.Hash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -470,14 +499,13 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobChunks(
}
// verifyBlobFinalIntegrity checks that no trailing data exists in the
// decompressed stream and that the encrypted blob hash matches the
// expected value.
// decompressed stream and that the blob hash matches the expected value.
func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(
decompressor io.Reader, blobHasher hash.Hash, expectedHash string,
plaintext io.Reader, plaintextHasher hash.Hash, expectedHash string,
) error {
// Verify no remaining data in blob - if the chunk list is accurate,
// the blob should be fully consumed.
remaining, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, decompressor)
remaining, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, plaintext)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check for remaining blob data: %w", err)
}
@@ -486,8 +514,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %d bytes", errTrailingBlobData, remaining)
}
// Verify blob hash matches the encrypted data we downloaded
calculatedBlobHash := hex.EncodeToString(blobHasher.Sum(nil))
// The blob hash is the double SHA256 of its plaintext content.
firstHash := plaintextHasher.Sum(nil)
secondHash := sha256.Sum256(firstHash)
calculatedBlobHash := hex.EncodeToString(secondHash[:])
if calculatedBlobHash != expectedHash {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: calculated %s, expected %s",
errBlobHashMismatch, calculatedBlobHash, expectedHash)
@@ -496,19 +527,21 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(
return nil
}
// getBlobsFromDatabase gets all blobs for the snapshot from the database
func (v *Vaultik) getBlobsFromDatabase(
snapshotID string, db *sql.DB,
) ([]snapshot.BlobInfo, error) {
// getBlobsFromDatabase gets all blobs for the snapshot from the database.
//
// The exported per-snapshot database holds exactly one snapshot's data
// (see cleanSnapshotDB), so every row in snapshot_blobs belongs to it.
// We select them directly rather than filtering by the human snapshot ID,
// which a host restoring from the store alone does not have.
func (v *Vaultik) getBlobsFromDatabase(db *sql.DB) ([]snapshot.BlobInfo, error) {
query := `
SELECT b.blob_hash, b.compressed_size
FROM snapshot_blobs sb
JOIN blobs b ON sb.blob_hash = b.blob_hash
WHERE sb.snapshot_id = ?
ORDER BY b.blob_hash
`
rows, err := db.QueryContext(v.ctx, query, snapshotID)
rows, err := db.QueryContext(v.ctx, query)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query snapshot blobs: %w", err)
}
@@ -561,16 +594,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyManifestAgainstDatabase(
manifestBlobMap[blob.Hash] = blob.CompressedSize
}
// Check counts match
if len(dbBlobMap) != len(manifestBlobMap) {
log.Warn("Manifest blob count mismatch",
"database_blobs", len(dbBlobMap),
"manifest_blobs", len(manifestBlobMap),
)
// This is a warning, not an error - database is authoritative
}
// Check each manifest blob exists in database with correct size
// The manifest is the only blob list prune consults, so it must match
// the database exactly. A blob in the manifest but not the database
// points at a corrupt manifest; a blob in the database but omitted
// from the manifest would be pruned away while this snapshot still
// needs it. Either divergence fails verification.
for hash, manifestSize := range manifestBlobMap {
dbSize, exists := dbBlobMap[hash]
if !exists {
@@ -584,6 +612,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyManifestAgainstDatabase(
}
}
for hash := range dbBlobMap {
if _, exists := manifestBlobMap[hash]; !exists {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errManifestMissingBlob, hash)
}
}
log.Info("✓ Manifest verified against database",
"manifest_blobs", len(manifestBlobMap),
"database_blobs", len(dbBlobMap),
+61
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // calls unexported verifyManifestAgainstDatabase
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
)
// Blob hashes shared by the manifest-verification tests below.
const (
manifestTestBlobA = "blob-a"
manifestTestBlobB = "blob-b"
)
// TestVerifyManifestAgainstDatabase_MissingBlobFails is the regression
// guard for issue #157: deep verify must fail when the manifest omits a
// blob the database records. The divergence used to be logged as a
// warning while verification still returned ok, so an incomplete
// manifest — the exact defect that lets prune later delete a needed blob
// — passed unnoticed.
func TestVerifyManifestAgainstDatabase_MissingBlobFails(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
v := &Vaultik{}
dbBlobs := []snapshot.BlobInfo{
{Hash: manifestTestBlobA, CompressedSize: 10},
{Hash: manifestTestBlobB, CompressedSize: 20},
}
manifest := &snapshot.Manifest{
Blobs: []snapshot.BlobInfo{
{Hash: manifestTestBlobA, CompressedSize: 10},
},
}
err := v.verifyManifestAgainstDatabase(manifest, dbBlobs)
require.Error(t, err, "verify must fail when the manifest omits a database blob")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), manifestTestBlobB)
}
// TestVerifyManifestAgainstDatabase_MatchingSetsPass keeps the other half
// honest: identical blob sets still verify, so the check above cannot be
// satisfied by failing everything.
func TestVerifyManifestAgainstDatabase_MatchingSetsPass(t *testing.T) {
log.Initialize(log.Config{})
t.Parallel()
v := &Vaultik{}
blobs := []snapshot.BlobInfo{
{Hash: manifestTestBlobA, CompressedSize: 10},
{Hash: manifestTestBlobB, CompressedSize: 20},
}
manifest := &snapshot.Manifest{Blobs: blobs}
require.NoError(t, v.verifyManifestAgainstDatabase(manifest, blobs))
}
+18 -18
View File
@@ -48,11 +48,12 @@ missing() {
! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
}
# Docker is a hard requirement, not a nice-to-have: script/lint runs the
# digest-pinned golangci-lint image from the Dockerfile's lint stage, and
# script/check and script/precommit both run script/lint. A bootstrap
# that prints "bootstrap complete" on a machine where `make check` cannot
# run is a false success, so this fails instead.
# Docker is a hard requirement, not a nice-to-have: script/lint lints by
# building Dockerfile.lint, whose digest-pinned golangci-lint image is
# the only place the linter runs, and script/check and script/precommit
# both run script/lint. A bootstrap that prints "bootstrap complete" on a
# machine where `make check` cannot run is a false success, so this fails
# instead.
#
# Installing docker from here was considered and rejected: it needs root,
# a running daemon, and on macOS a GUI cask, so an attempt would itself
@@ -79,13 +80,15 @@ bootstrap: FAILED - $reason.
Docker is required to develop this repo. Without it these do not work:
script/lint runs the digest-pinned golangci-lint image declared
by the Dockerfile's lint stage, which is the single
source of truth for the linter version
script/lint builds Dockerfile.lint, which runs the linter as a
build step in a digest-pinned golangci-lint image.
That FROM line is the single source of truth for the
linter version
script/check runs script/lint
script/precommit runs script/check, so commits are blocked by the
pre-commit hook installed by script/setup
script/cibuild builds the Dockerfile, which is what CI runs
script/cibuild builds Dockerfile.lint and Dockerfile, which is what
CI runs
Install docker (and start the daemon, checking DOCKER_HOST and your
group membership), then re-run script/bootstrap. golangci-lint on PATH
@@ -104,15 +107,12 @@ main() {
# Go toolchain
if missing go; then pkg_install go golang go go; fi
# golangci-lint is deliberately NOT installed: script/lint runs the
# digest-pinned golangci-lint image from the Dockerfile's lint stage,
# so whatever a package manager happens to ship would only be a
# shadow of the pinned version that could drift from CI. script/lint
# will not use a PATH binary on a host at any version, so installing
# one here would buy nothing.
# sqlite3 CLI: the test suite shells out to it (VACUUM).
if missing sqlite3; then pkg_install sqlite sqlite3 sqlite sqlite; fi
# golangci-lint is deliberately NOT installed: script/lint lints by
# building Dockerfile.lint, whose digest-pinned image is the only
# place the linter runs, so whatever a package manager happens to
# ship would only be a shadow of the pinned version that could drift
# from CI. Nothing on the host is ever used as a linter, at any
# version, so installing one here would buy nothing.
# goreleaser, at the version pinned by script/install-goreleaser and
# verified against a hardcoded sha256. Package managers are not used
+48 -12
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,31 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/cibuild: run the CI build. The Dockerfile does not run
# script/check; it runs `make fmt-check` and `make lint` in its lint
# stage and `make test` in its builder stage. A successful build
# implies those three passed, provided they actually ran -- which is
# what the CHECK_EPOCH below is for.
# Generic: needs no adaptation. The Gitea workflow runs this on push.
# script/cibuild: run the CI build. This is the full gate, and it is two
# builds, in this order:
#
# Dockerfile.lint the linter, as a build step (a clean build IS a
# clean lint)
# Dockerfile `make fmt-check` and `make test` in the builder
# stage, then the product image
#
# Either one failing fails this script. Note what follows from the
# split: script/docker builds only the product image and so no longer
# lints -- this script and script/check (which runs script/lint) are the
# things that decide whether the tree is clean.
#
# Generic apart from the two Dockerfiles: the Gitea workflow runs this
# on push.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# The Dockerfile's check layers are keyed on CHECK_EPOCH, so a
# fresh value here is what forces them to re-run: without it an
# Both Dockerfiles key their check layers on CHECK_EPOCH, so a fresh
# value is what forces those layers to re-run: without it an
# unchanged tree replays them from cache, the checks never execute,
# and the build still exits 0. The ARG sits immediately above the
# check RUNs, so dependency and module layers still cache. The
# Dockerfile also refuses to build at all when CHECK_EPOCH is empty,
# and the build still exits 0. Each ARG sits immediately above the
# check RUNs, so dependency and module layers still cache. Both
# Dockerfiles also refuse to build at all when CHECK_EPOCH is empty,
# so a missing value fails loudly here rather than passing quietly.
#
# The value must be unique per invocation, not per second. `date +%s`
@@ -35,8 +44,35 @@ main() {
# script exists to prevent -- so the guard would disarm itself and
# still exit 0. As a bare assignment, `set -e` catches a failing
# `date` and no build starts.
#
# A separate value per build, because they are separate builds: one
# `date` shared between them would still be fresh, but reusing it
# invites the two to be collapsed into a single value that is
# computed somewhere else and passed in.
epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"
docker build --build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch" .
# cacheonly for the lint build: its verdict is the exit status and
# the image is never run, so exporting it is pure cost. See
# script/lint.
docker build --output=type=cacheonly \
--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch" -f Dockerfile.lint .
# Version, commit and build date are computed here on the host, the
# same way script/docker does, and passed into the product build so
# the CI-built image reports its real source. The build context
# excludes .git (see .dockerignore), so the build cannot derive them
# itself; without these it would stamp the Dockerfile's dev/unknown
# fallbacks. VERSION comes from script/version, the source of truth
# shared with the Makefile.
version="$("$ROOT/script/version")"
commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
commit_date="$(git show -s --format=%cs HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"
docker build --build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch" \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
--build-arg COMMIT="$commit" \
--build-arg COMMIT_DATE="$commit_date" \
.
}
main "$@"
+24
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@
# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
# Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname.
# Generic: needs no adaptation.
#
# This builds the PRODUCT image only, and the product Dockerfile has no
# lint stage: linting lives in Dockerfile.lint and is run by
# script/lint. So a green here means `make fmt-check` and `make test`
# passed and the image built -- it says nothing about lint. The gates
# are script/check (which runs script/lint) and script/cibuild (which
# builds both files).
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -17,7 +24,24 @@ main() {
# whether the tree is clean. The Dockerfile now refuses to build
# without a non-empty value, so this is required, not optional.
epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"
# Version, commit and build date are computed here on the host,
# where .git exists, and passed into the build. The build context
# excludes .git (see .dockerignore), so the container cannot derive
# them itself -- it used to try and always got "unknown", giving
# every image a "commit: unknown" it could not be traced from.
# VERSION comes from script/version, the source of truth shared with
# the Makefile, so a Docker build reports the same string (tag,
# dev-<sha>, or a -dirty variant) that a local build of the same
# tree would.
version="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/version")"
commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
commit_date="$(git show -s --format=%cs HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
docker build --build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch" \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
--build-arg COMMIT="$commit" \
--build-arg COMMIT_DATE="$commit_date" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
}
+161
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/install-go: install the Go toolchain pinned by go.mod into the
# repo-local tool directory, verified against a committed sha256. Our
# own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Idempotent: exits at once
# when the pinned toolchain is already installed.
#
# Only .gitea/workflows/release.yml calls this. goreleaser is not a
# compiler: it shells out to `go` for the `before:` hook and for every
# one of the four cross-compiles, so the release runner needs a Go
# toolchain on PATH. check.yml never does -- it builds inside the
# digest-pinned Dockerfile images -- so this is the release path's only
# host Go, and per REPO_POLICIES.md it must be pinned by hash.
# actions/setup-go exposes no checksum input, so Go is installed the way
# script/install-goreleaser installs goreleaser: download the exact
# archive from go.dev and refuse it unless its sha256 matches the value
# committed below.
#
# The version is go.mod's `go` directive, the single source of truth for
# the toolchain. GO_VERSION below MUST equal it, and this script fails
# when they disagree -- so bumping Go is one reviewed change touching
# go.mod, the checksum here, and the Dockerfile golang digest together.
#
# Linux only, because that is what the release runner is. A darwin dev
# building a snapshot uses their own Go; supporting an OS means adding
# its checksums.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Go 1.26.1, 2026-09-21. Checksums are the sha256 values go.dev publishes
# for each archive at https://go.dev/dl/ (also in its ?mode=json
# manifest).
GO_VERSION="1.26.1"
SHA256_LINUX_AMD64="031f088e5d955bab8657ede27ad4e3bc5b7c1ba281f05f245bcc304f327c987a"
SHA256_LINUX_ARM64="a290581cfe4fe28ddd737dde3095f3dbeb7f2e4065cab4eae44dfc53b760c2f7"
GOROOT_DIR="$ROOT/.tool/go"
GOCMD="$GOROOT_DIR/bin/go"
# The `go` directive in go.mod, e.g. "1.26.1" from `go 1.26.1`.
gomod_go_version() {
sed -n 's/^go \([0-9][0-9.]*\).*/\1/p' "$ROOT/go.mod" | head -n 1
}
# Print the version of the go at $1 as "1.26.1", or nothing if it is not
# usable. `go version` prints "go version go1.26.1 linux/amd64".
go_version() {
[ -x "$1" ] || return 0
"$1" version 2>/dev/null |
sed -n 's/^go version go\([0-9][0-9.]*\) .*/\1/p' |
head -n 1
}
verify_sha256() {
file="$1"
want="$2"
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
got="$(sha256sum "$file" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
got="$(shasum -a 256 "$file" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
else
echo "install-go: no sha256sum or shasum available" >&2
return 1
fi
if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
echo "install-go: checksum mismatch for $file" >&2
echo " expected: $want" >&2
echo " actual: $got" >&2
return 1
fi
}
# On a Gitea/GitHub Actions runner, put the toolchain on PATH for the
# steps that follow by appending to the file named by $GITHUB_PATH. A
# no-op off CI, where the caller manages its own PATH.
export_ci_path() {
[ -n "${GITHUB_PATH:-}" ] || return 0
echo "$GOROOT_DIR/bin" >>"$GITHUB_PATH"
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
want="$(gomod_go_version)"
if [ "$want" != "$GO_VERSION" ]; then
echo "install-go: go.mod says go $want but this script pins" \
"$GO_VERSION." >&2
echo " Update GO_VERSION and the checksums in this script to" \
"match go.mod." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Already installed from a previous run? Then just fix PATH and stop.
if [ "$(go_version "$GOCMD")" = "$GO_VERSION" ]; then
echo "go $GO_VERSION already installed in .tool/go"
export_ci_path
return 0
fi
os="$(uname -s)"
arch="$(uname -m)"
case "$os" in
Linux) os="linux" ;;
*)
echo "install-go: unsupported OS $os (release runner is Linux)" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
case "$arch" in
x86_64 | amd64)
arch="amd64"
sum="$SHA256_LINUX_AMD64"
;;
arm64 | aarch64)
arch="arm64"
sum="$SHA256_LINUX_ARM64"
;;
*)
echo "install-go: no pinned checksum for architecture $arch" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
archive="go${GO_VERSION}.${os}-${arch}.tar.gz"
url="https://go.dev/dl/${archive}"
if ! command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "install-go: curl is required" >&2
exit 1
fi
dl="$(mktemp -d)"
mkdir -p "$ROOT/.tool"
stage="$(mktemp -d "$ROOT/.tool/.go-install.XXXXXX")"
# shellcheck disable=SC2064 # expand the paths now, not at trap time
trap "rm -rf '$dl' '$stage'" EXIT INT TERM
echo "installing go $GO_VERSION for ${os}-${arch}"
curl -fsSL --retry 3 -o "$dl/$archive" "$url"
verify_sha256 "$dl/$archive" "$sum"
# The archive unpacks to a top-level `go/` directory. Extract it into
# a staging directory on the same filesystem as the destination, then
# rename it into place so a concurrent run never observes a
# half-written toolchain.
tar -xzf "$dl/$archive" -C "$stage"
rm -rf "$GOROOT_DIR"
mv "$stage/go" "$GOROOT_DIR"
installed="$(go_version "$GOCMD")"
if [ "$installed" != "$GO_VERSION" ]; then
echo "install-go: installed toolchain reports '$installed'," \
"expected '$GO_VERSION'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "go $GO_VERSION installed to .tool/go"
export_ci_path
}
main "$@"
+64 -291
View File
@@ -1,110 +1,42 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/lint: run the linter.
#
# The linter always runs at the version pinned by the Dockerfile's lint
# stage, so a local run and a CI run of the same tree cannot disagree.
# That FROM line (image tag plus digest) is the single source of truth
# for the linter version in this repo: bump it there and nothing else
# needs editing.
# The linter runs inside the image built by Dockerfile.lint, and it runs
# there as a BUILD STEP: a successful build of that file IS a clean
# lint. Nothing lints on the host, at any version, ever. That FROM line
# is the single source of truth for the linter version in this repo, so
# a local run and a CI run of the same tree cannot disagree.
#
# Normally that means running the pinned image with docker. The one
# exception is running INSIDE that image: the Dockerfile's lint stage
# runs `make lint`, and there is no docker daemon in there. That stage
# sets VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER=1, and only when that variable is set
# is a golangci-lint on PATH used directly - and then only if its
# version is exactly the pin. Version equality alone is deliberately NOT
# enough: it also matches a developer's locally installed copy of the
# same version, which is a different build with a different Go
# toolchain, reached by a different code path, and it would bypass the
# digest pin this script exists to enforce. /.dockerenv was considered
# as the context signal and rejected: dockerd creates it for `docker
# run`, but it is not reliably present during a BuildKit `docker build`,
# which is exactly the case the exception exists for.
# One container per run means one lint cache and one golangci-lint lock
# per run, both private to that run and thrown away with it. That is
# what makes concurrent runs on a shared host safe, and it is why this
# script no longer carries per-worktree cache directories, a lock-retry
# loop, or an output audit: there is no shared state left for them to
# defend (issue https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113).
#
# The linter's output is checked before it is believed: every run is
# audited by script/lint-audit for findings that cannot belong to this
# tree, and a run refused by golangci-lint's cross-process lock is
# retried rather than reported as a verdict. See the lock-retry loop in
# main and the header of script/lint-audit.
# To watch the linter execute, set BUILDKIT_PROGRESS=plain, which docker
# honours directly:
#
# Extra arguments are passed through to `golangci-lint run`, before
# `./...` (see script/lint-fix).
# BUILDKIT_PROGRESS=plain script/lint
#
# The check layers -- `golangci-lint config verify` and then
# `golangci-lint run` -- must appear as executing rather than CACHED on
# every run; see the CHECK_EPOCH comment in Dockerfile.lint.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
DOCKERFILE="$ROOT/Dockerfile"
# golangci-lint takes a cross-process lock and refuses to start while
# another instance holds it. That refusal is not a lint result, and
# exiting non-zero on it is indistinguishable to a caller from real
# findings - so it is retried rather than reported. Bounded, because a
# lock that is never released must fail rather than hang.
LOCK_MESSAGE="parallel golangci-lint is running"
LOCK_ATTEMPTS=6
LOCK_SLEEP=15
# The image reference of the Dockerfile's lint stage, tag and digest
# included, e.g.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine@sha256:91b2...
lint_image() {
awk '$1 == "FROM" && $3 == "AS" && $4 == "lint" { print $2; exit }' \
"$DOCKERFILE"
}
# The bare version that image reference pins, e.g. 2.12.2
pinned_version() {
lint_image | sed -e 's/@.*//' -e 's/.*://' -e 's/^v//' -e 's/-.*//'
}
# The version of the golangci-lint on PATH, if any, e.g. 2.12.2
#
# `version --short` prints the bare version and is the interface meant
# for this (checked against 2.10.1 and 2.12.2). The banner scrape below
# it is a fallback for a release where --short is absent or silent; the
# banner's exact wording is not a stable interface, which is why it is
# no longer the primary parse.
installed_version() {
command -v golangci-lint >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0
short="$(golangci-lint version --short 2>/dev/null |
tr -d '[:space:]' | sed -e 's/^v//')"
case "$short" in
*[0-9].[0-9]*.[0-9]*)
echo "$short"
return 0
;;
esac
golangci-lint version 2>/dev/null | awk '
{
for (i = 1; i <= NF; i++) {
if ($i ~ /^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$/) {
print $i
exit
}
}
}'
}
# True inside the Dockerfile's lint stage, which sets this. Nothing else
# sets it: setting it by hand on a host is an explicit, visible decision
# to lint with an unpinned binary, not something reached by accident.
in_lint_container() {
[ "${VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER:-}" = "1" ]
}
DOCKERFILE="$ROOT/Dockerfile.lint"
require_docker() {
image="$1"
if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
lint: docker is required to run the pinned linter.
pinned image: $image
lint image declared by: $DOCKERFILE
Install docker. Linting with any other golangci-lint is not supported:
it is what lets a local run pass while CI fails. An installed
golangci-lint on PATH is not used, whatever its version; only the lint
stage of the Dockerfile itself runs the linter natively.
it is what lets a local run pass while CI fails. A golangci-lint on
PATH is never used, whatever its version.
EOF
exit 1
fi
@@ -113,7 +45,7 @@ EOF
lint: the docker daemon is not reachable, so the pinned linter cannot
run.
pinned image: $image
lint image declared by: $DOCKERFILE
Start the daemon (and check DOCKER_HOST / your group membership). This
script will not fall back to a different linter version or to an
@@ -123,213 +55,54 @@ EOF
fi
}
# Where the per-worktree caches live.
cache_home() {
echo "${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-${HOME:-/tmp}/.cache}/vaultik-lint"
}
usage() {
cat >&2 <<EOF
usage: $(basename "$0")
# A short, stable digest of this worktree's path.
path_digest() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf '%s' "$ROOT" | sha256sum | cut -c1-12
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf '%s' "$ROOT" | shasum -a 256 | cut -c1-12
else
printf '%s' "$ROOT" | cksum | tr -cd '0-9' | cut -c1-12
fi
}
# Caches for the containerized linter, private to THIS worktree.
#
# Keeping them out of the repo and persisting them between runs is what
# keeps the inner loop fast: a warm run costs about the same as a native
# one plus container startup. Keeping them keyed on the worktree path is
# what keeps them correct. One shared cache for the whole repo was the
# defect in issue #99: two worktrees of this repo have identical file
# contents, so their cache keys collide, and golangci-lint replays the
# stored results - including the file paths recorded when they were
# produced. That silently reports one worktree's findings, or one
# worktree's clean bill of health, for another.
cache_dir() {
slug="$(printf '%s' "$(basename "$ROOT")" | tr -c 'A-Za-z0-9._-' '-')"
echo "$(cache_home)/$slug-$(path_digest)"
}
# One cache per worktree means throwaway worktrees would otherwise leave
# caches behind forever. Each cache records the worktree it belongs to,
# and any cache whose worktree no longer exists is collected here, so
# growth is bounded by the number of worktrees that actually exist. The
# whole tree also sits under XDG_CACHE_HOME (~/.cache by default), so it
# is disposable by definition: `rm -rf "${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-~/.cache}/vaultik-lint"`
# costs nothing but the next run's cold cache.
prune_dead_caches() {
home="$(cache_home)"
if [ ! -d "$home" ]; then
return 0
fi
for dir in "$home"/*; do
if [ ! -f "$dir/worktree" ]; then
continue
fi
owner="$(cat "$dir/worktree")"
if [ -z "$owner" ]; then
continue
fi
if [ ! -d "$owner" ]; then
# The Go module cache inside is deliberately read-only, and
# rm(1) cannot unlink a file out of a directory it may not
# write, so the tree has to be made writable first. And
# failing to tidy up is a housekeeping problem, never a
# reason to fail a lint: without the fallback below, `set
# -e` turns a stale cache that will not delete into a lint
# error, which is a gate failing for a reason that has
# nothing to do with the code. (Observed, not theorised.)
chmod -R u+w "$dir" 2>/dev/null || true
if ! rm -rf "$dir" 2>/dev/null; then
# Restore the marker on a partial removal: an
# unmarked leftover would be skipped by every future
# run and never collected.
mkdir -p "$dir" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "$owner" >"$dir/worktree" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "lint: could not remove stale cache $dir" >&2
fi
fi
done
}
prepare_cache() {
cache="$1"
mkdir -p "$cache/go-build" "$cache/go-mod" "$cache/golangci-lint"
echo "$ROOT" >"$cache/worktree"
}
# Run the linter, wherever it is that this script is allowed to run it.
run_linter() {
if in_lint_container; then
golangci-lint run "$@" ./...
return $?
fi
docker run --rm \
--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
--env HOME=/tmp \
--env GOFLAGS=-buildvcs=false \
--env GOCACHE=/cache/go-build \
--env GOMODCACHE=/cache/go-mod \
--env GOLANGCI_LINT_CACHE=/cache/golangci-lint \
--volume "$ROOT:/src" \
--volume "$CACHE:/cache" \
--workdir /src \
"$IMAGE" \
golangci-lint run "$@" ./...
}
# Run the linter, streaming its combined output while also capturing it,
# and hand back its exit status. The output has to be inspected before
# it is believed, which is why this script no longer just execs the
# linter. `tee` would swallow the status, so it is smuggled out through
# a file: there is no pipefail in POSIX sh.
run_capture() {
capture="$1"
shift
rm -f "$capture.status"
{
rc=0
# `set -e` is in force inside this subshell too, so the status
# has to be caught here: an unguarded non-zero exit (which is
# what "the linter found something" looks like) would abort the
# subshell before the status was ever written.
run_linter "$@" 2>&1 || rc=$?
echo "$rc" >"$capture.status"
} | tee "$capture"
if [ ! -s "$capture.status" ]; then
echo "lint: the linter did not report an exit status" >&2
exit 1
fi
read -r captured_status <"$capture.status"
rm -f "$capture.status"
return "$captured_status"
}
# Reject output that cannot describe this tree. See script/lint-audit
# for what that means and why: in short, a finding citing a file that is
# not here means the result being reported was produced somewhere else,
# and a PASS built out of another checkout's analysis is silent (issue
# #99). The audit therefore runs on clean output as well.
audit_output() {
capture="$1"
if ! "$ROOT/script/lint-audit" "$capture"; then
if [ -n "$CACHE" ]; then
echo " this tree's lint cache: $CACHE" >&2
fi
exit 1
fi
script/lint takes no arguments. The linter runs as a build step, so
there is no command line to pass flags to; anything accepted here would
have to be silently dropped. To apply autofixes, use script/lint-fix,
which runs the same pinned image as a container for exactly this
reason.
EOF
exit 2
}
main() {
[ "$#" -eq 0 ] || usage
cd "$ROOT"
require_docker
IMAGE="$(lint_image)"
if [ -z "$IMAGE" ]; then
echo "lint: no lint stage found in $DOCKERFILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
# A fresh epoch per invocation is what forces the check layers to
# execute; the layers above the ARG in Dockerfile.lint still cache,
# so a run is not cold. The value must be unique per invocation, not
# per second: `date +%s` is second-granular, so two concurrent
# invocations in the same second would get identical epochs and the
# later one could be served from cache -- the false green in
# miniature. `%N` alone does not fix it either, because busybox
# silently drops %N, exits 0, and hands back second granularity with
# no warning. `$$` is what makes this correct regardless, since
# concurrent invocations have different pids.
#
# Assign it on its own line rather than inline in the argument.
# Under `set -eu` a command substitution that fails inside an
# argument does NOT abort the script: CHECK_EPOCH would become an
# empty string, an empty string is a constant, and a constant epoch
# is exactly the cached-lint false green this guards against. As a
# bare assignment, `set -e` catches a failing `date` and no build
# starts.
epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"
CACHE=""
if in_lint_container; then
# No docker daemon in here, so there is no fallback: a mismatch
# is a hard error rather than a quiet substitution.
installed="$(installed_version)"
pinned="$(pinned_version)"
if [ -z "$installed" ] || [ "$installed" != "$pinned" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
lint: VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER is set, so this is expected to be
running inside the Dockerfile's pinned lint image, but the golangci-lint
on PATH does not match the pin.
pinned: $pinned ($IMAGE)
installed: ${installed:-<none>}
EOF
exit 1
fi
else
require_docker "$IMAGE"
prune_dead_caches
CACHE="$(cache_dir)"
prepare_cache "$CACHE"
fi
capture="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/vaultik-lint.XXXXXX")"
trap 'rm -f "$capture" "$capture.status"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
attempt=1
while :; do
status=0
run_capture "$capture" "$@" || status=$?
if grep -Fq "$LOCK_MESSAGE" "$capture"; then
if [ "$attempt" -lt "$LOCK_ATTEMPTS" ]; then
echo "lint: another golangci-lint holds the lock;" \
"retrying in ${LOCK_SLEEP}s" \
"(attempt $attempt of $LOCK_ATTEMPTS)" >&2
sleep "$LOCK_SLEEP"
attempt=$((attempt + 1))
continue
fi
cat >&2 <<EOF
lint: gave up after $LOCK_ATTEMPTS attempts, each blocked by another
golangci-lint holding the cross-process lock. This is NOT a lint
verdict: the tree was never analysed. Re-run when the other run has
finished.
EOF
exit 1
fi
audit_output "$capture"
exit "$status"
done
# cacheonly: the lint verdict is the build's exit status, and the
# image it would otherwise produce is never run. Exporting it costs
# most of the wall time of a warm run and leaves a dangling image
# behind on every invocation, on a host that may be running many.
docker build \
--output=type=cacheonly \
--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch" \
-f "$DOCKERFILE" \
"$ROOT"
}
main "$@"

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