Files
upaas/internal/middleware/realip_test.go
clawbot ef109b9513
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fix: address review findings for observability PR
1. Security: Replace insecure extractRemoteIP() in audit service with
   middleware.RealIP() which validates trusted proxies before trusting
   X-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For headers. Export RealIP from middleware.
   Update audit tests to verify anti-spoofing behavior.

2. Audit coverage: Add audit instrumentation to all 9 handlers that
   had dead action constants: HandleEnvVarSave, HandleLabelAdd,
   HandleLabelEdit, HandleLabelDelete, HandleVolumeAdd, HandleVolumeEdit,
   HandleVolumeDelete, HandlePortAdd, HandlePortDelete.

3. README: Fix API path from /api/audit to /api/v1/audit.

4. README: Fix duplicate numbering in DI order section (items 10-11
   were listed twice, now correctly numbered 10-16).
2026-03-17 02:52:34 -07:00

158 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package middleware //nolint:testpackage // tests RealIP via internal package access
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
func TestRealIP(t *testing.T) { //nolint:funlen // table-driven test
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xRealIP string
xff string
want string
}{
// === Trusted proxy (RFC1918 / loopback) — headers ARE honoured ===
{
name: "trusted: X-Real-IP from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.5",
xff: "198.51.100.1, 10.0.0.1",
want: "203.0.113.5",
},
{
name: "trusted: XFF from 10.x when no X-Real-IP",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: "198.51.100.1, 10.0.0.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: XFF single IP from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: "203.0.113.10",
want: "203.0.113.10",
},
{
name: "trusted: falls back to RemoteAddr (192.168.x)",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.1:5678",
want: "192.168.1.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.1",
want: "192.168.1.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: X-Real-IP with whitespace from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: " 203.0.113.5 ",
want: "203.0.113.5",
},
{
name: "trusted: XFF with whitespace from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: " 198.51.100.1 , 10.0.0.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: empty X-Real-IP falls through to XFF from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: " ",
xff: "198.51.100.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: loopback honours X-Real-IP",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:9999",
xRealIP: "93.184.216.34",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
{
name: "trusted: 172.16.x honours XFF",
remoteAddr: "172.16.0.1:4321",
xff: "8.8.8.8",
want: "8.8.8.8",
},
// === Untrusted proxy (public IP) — headers IGNORED, use RemoteAddr ===
{
name: "untrusted: X-Real-IP ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:1234",
xRealIP: "10.0.0.1",
want: "203.0.113.50",
},
{
name: "untrusted: XFF ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.99:5678",
xff: "10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1",
want: "198.51.100.99",
},
{
name: "untrusted: both headers ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "8.8.8.8:443",
xRealIP: "1.2.3.4",
xff: "5.6.7.8",
want: "8.8.8.8",
},
{
name: "untrusted: no headers, public RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "93.184.216.34:8080",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
{
name: "untrusted: public RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "93.184.216.34",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
if tt.xRealIP != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", tt.xRealIP)
}
if tt.xff != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tt.xff)
}
got := RealIP(req)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("RealIP() = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
trusted := []string{"10.0.0.1", "10.255.255.255", "172.16.0.1", "172.31.255.255",
"192.168.0.1", "192.168.255.255", "127.0.0.1", "127.255.255.255", "::1"}
untrusted := []string{"8.8.8.8", "203.0.113.1", "172.32.0.1", "11.0.0.1", "2001:db8::1"}
for _, addr := range trusted {
ip := net.ParseIP(addr)
if !isTrustedProxy(ip) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to be trusted", addr)
}
}
for _, addr := range untrusted {
ip := net.ParseIP(addr)
if isTrustedProxy(ip) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to be untrusted", addr)
}
}
}