3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot
bfea5be063 fix: resolve lint issues for make check compliance 2026-02-19 23:42:28 -08:00
clawbot
214b5f83ba fix: restrict SCP-like URLs to git user only and reject path traversal
- Changed SCP regex to only accept 'git' as the username
- Added path traversal check: reject URLs containing '..'
- Added test cases for non-git users and path traversal
2026-02-19 23:39:25 -08:00
clawbot
b4b2a33089 fix: validate repo URL format on app creation (closes #88) 2026-02-19 23:39:25 -08:00
9 changed files with 307 additions and 40 deletions

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ type Config struct {
MaintenanceMode bool
MetricsUsername string
MetricsPassword string
SessionSecret string `json:"-"`
SessionSecret string //nolint:gosec // not a hardcoded credential, loaded from env/file
CORSOrigins string
params *Params
log *slog.Logger

View File

@@ -74,13 +74,18 @@ func deploymentToAPI(d *models.Deployment) apiDeploymentResponse {
// HandleAPILoginPOST returns a handler that authenticates via JSON credentials
// and sets a session cookie.
func (h *Handlers) HandleAPILoginPOST() http.HandlerFunc {
type loginRequest struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"` //nolint:gosec // request field, not a hardcoded credential
}
type loginResponse struct {
UserID int64 `json:"userId"`
Username string `json:"username"`
}
return func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
var req map[string]string
var req loginRequest
decodeErr := json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&req)
if decodeErr != nil {
@@ -91,10 +96,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAPILoginPOST() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
username := req["username"]
credential := req["password"]
if username == "" || credential == "" {
if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
h.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"error": "username and password are required"},
http.StatusBadRequest)
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAPILoginPOST() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
user, authErr := h.auth.Authenticate(request.Context(), username, credential)
user, authErr := h.auth.Authenticate(request.Context(), req.Username, req.Password)
if authErr != nil {
h.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"error": "invalid credentials"},
@@ -176,6 +178,27 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAPIGetApp() http.HandlerFunc {
}
// HandleAPICreateApp returns a handler that creates a new app.
// validateCreateAppRequest checks all fields of a create-app request and returns
// a user-facing error string or empty string if valid.
func validateCreateAppRequest(name, repoURL string) string {
if name == "" || repoURL == "" {
return "name and repo_url are required"
}
nameErr := validateAppName(name)
if nameErr != nil {
return "invalid app name: " + nameErr.Error()
}
repoURLErr := ValidateRepoURL(repoURL)
if repoURLErr != nil {
return "invalid repository URL: " + repoURLErr.Error()
}
return ""
}
// HandleAPICreateApp returns a handler that creates a new app via the API.
func (h *Handlers) HandleAPICreateApp() http.HandlerFunc {
type createRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
@@ -199,18 +222,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAPICreateApp() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
if req.Name == "" || req.RepoURL == "" {
if validationErr := validateCreateAppRequest(req.Name, req.RepoURL); validationErr != "" {
h.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"error": "name and repo_url are required"},
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
nameErr := validateAppName(req.Name)
if nameErr != nil {
h.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"error": "invalid app name: " + nameErr.Error()},
map[string]string{"error": validationErr},
http.StatusBadRequest)
return

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAppCreate() http.HandlerFunc { //nolint:funlen // valid
return
}
repoURLErr := ValidateRepoURL(repoURL)
if repoURLErr != nil {
data["Error"] = "Invalid repository URL: " + repoURLErr.Error()
h.renderTemplate(writer, tmpl, "app_new.html", data)
return
}
if branch == "" {
branch = "main"
}
@@ -225,6 +233,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAppUpdate() http.HandlerFunc { //nolint:funlen // valid
return
}
repoURLErr := ValidateRepoURL(request.FormValue("repo_url"))
if repoURLErr != nil {
data := h.addGlobals(map[string]any{
"App": application,
"Error": "Invalid repository URL: " + repoURLErr.Error(),
}, request)
_ = tmpl.ExecuteTemplate(writer, "app_edit.html", data)
return
}
application.Name = newName
application.RepoURL = request.FormValue("repo_url")
application.Branch = request.FormValue("branch")
@@ -499,7 +518,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAppLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
_, _ = writer.Write([]byte(logs)) // #nosec G705 -- Content-Type is text/plain, no XSS risk
//nolint:gosec // logs sanitized: ANSI escapes and control chars stripped
_, _ = writer.Write([]byte(SanitizeLogs(logs)))
}
}
@@ -534,11 +554,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDeploymentLogsAPI() http.HandlerFunc {
logs := ""
if deployment.Logs.Valid {
logs = deployment.Logs.String
logs = SanitizeLogs(deployment.Logs.String)
}
response := map[string]any{
"logs": logs,
"logs": SanitizeLogs(logs),
"status": deployment.Status,
}
@@ -581,8 +601,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDeploymentLogDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Check if file exists — logPath is constructed internally, not from user input
_, err := os.Stat(logPath) // #nosec G703 -- path from internal GetLogFilePath, not user input
// Check if file exists
_, err := os.Stat(logPath) //nolint:gosec // logPath is constructed by deploy service, not from user input
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
http.NotFound(writer, request)
@@ -661,7 +681,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleContainerLogsAPI() http.HandlerFunc {
}
response := map[string]any{
"logs": logs,
"logs": SanitizeLogs(logs),
"status": status,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
package handlers
import (
"errors"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// Repo URL validation errors.
var (
errRepoURLEmpty = errors.New("repository URL must not be empty")
errRepoURLScheme = errors.New("file:// URLs are not allowed for security reasons")
errRepoURLInvalid = errors.New("repository URL must use https://, http://, ssh://, git://, or git@host:path format")
errRepoURLNoHost = errors.New("repository URL must include a host")
errRepoURLNoPath = errors.New("repository URL must include a path")
)
// scpLikeRepoRe matches SCP-like git URLs: git@host:path (e.g. git@github.com:user/repo.git).
// Only the "git" user is allowed, as that is the standard for SSH deploy keys.
var scpLikeRepoRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^git@[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+:.+$`)
// ValidateRepoURL checks that the given repository URL is valid and uses an allowed scheme.
func ValidateRepoURL(repoURL string) error {
if strings.TrimSpace(repoURL) == "" {
return errRepoURLEmpty
}
// Reject path traversal in any URL format
if strings.Contains(repoURL, "..") {
return errRepoURLInvalid
}
// Check for SCP-like git URLs first (git@host:path)
if scpLikeRepoRe.MatchString(repoURL) {
return nil
}
// Reject file:// explicitly
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(repoURL), "file://") {
return errRepoURLScheme
}
return validateParsedURL(repoURL)
}
// validateParsedURL validates a standard URL format repository URL.
func validateParsedURL(repoURL string) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(repoURL)
if err != nil {
return errRepoURLInvalid
}
switch strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme) {
case "https", "http", "ssh", "git":
// allowed
default:
return errRepoURLInvalid
}
if parsed.Host == "" {
return errRepoURLNoHost
}
if parsed.Path == "" || parsed.Path == "/" {
return errRepoURLNoPath
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas/internal/handlers"
)
func TestValidateRepoURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
url string
wantErr bool
}{
// Valid URLs
{name: "https URL", url: "https://github.com/user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "http URL", url: "http://github.com/user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "ssh URL", url: "ssh://git@github.com/user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "git URL", url: "git://github.com/user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "SCP-like URL", url: "git@github.com:user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "SCP-like with dots", url: "git@git.example.com:org/repo.git", wantErr: false},
{name: "https without .git", url: "https://github.com/user/repo", wantErr: false},
{name: "https with port", url: "https://git.example.com:8443/user/repo.git", wantErr: false},
// Invalid URLs
{name: "empty string", url: "", wantErr: true},
{name: "whitespace only", url: " ", wantErr: true},
{name: "file URL", url: "file:///etc/passwd", wantErr: true},
{name: "file URL uppercase", url: "FILE:///etc/passwd", wantErr: true},
{name: "bare path", url: "/some/local/path", wantErr: true},
{name: "relative path", url: "../repo", wantErr: true},
{name: "just a word", url: "notaurl", wantErr: true},
{name: "ftp URL", url: "ftp://example.com/repo.git", wantErr: true},
{name: "no host https", url: "https:///path", wantErr: true},
{name: "no path https", url: "https://github.com", wantErr: true},
{name: "no path https trailing slash", url: "https://github.com/", wantErr: true},
{name: "SCP-like non-git user", url: "root@github.com:user/repo.git", wantErr: true},
{name: "SCP-like arbitrary user", url: "admin@github.com:user/repo.git", wantErr: true},
{name: "path traversal SCP", url: "git@github.com:../../etc/passwd", wantErr: true},
{name: "path traversal https", url: "https://github.com/user/../../../etc/passwd", wantErr: true},
{name: "path traversal in middle", url: "https://github.com/user/repo/../secret", wantErr: true},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := handlers.ValidateRepoURL(tc.url)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Errorf("handlers.ValidateRepoURL(%q) = nil, want error", tc.url)
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Errorf("handlers.ValidateRepoURL(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.url, err)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package handlers
import (
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// ansiEscapePattern matches ANSI escape sequences (CSI, OSC, and single-character escapes).
var ansiEscapePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(\x1b\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z]|\x1b\][^\x07]*\x07|\x1b[^[\]])`)
// SanitizeLogs strips ANSI escape sequences and non-printable control characters
// from container log output. Newlines (\n), carriage returns (\r), and tabs (\t)
// are preserved. This ensures that attacker-controlled container output cannot
// inject terminal escape sequences or other dangerous control characters.
func SanitizeLogs(input string) string {
// Strip ANSI escape sequences
result := ansiEscapePattern.ReplaceAllString(input, "")
// Strip remaining non-printable characters (keep \n, \r, \t)
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(len(result))
for _, r := range result {
if r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == '\t' || r >= ' ' {
b.WriteRune(r)
}
}
return b.String()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas/internal/handlers"
)
func TestSanitizeLogs(t *testing.T) { //nolint:funlen // table-driven tests
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
expected string
}{
{
name: "plain text unchanged",
input: "hello world\n",
expected: "hello world\n",
},
{
name: "strips ANSI color codes",
input: "\x1b[31mERROR\x1b[0m: something failed\n",
expected: "ERROR: something failed\n",
},
{
name: "strips OSC sequences",
input: "\x1b]0;window title\x07normal text\n",
expected: "normal text\n",
},
{
name: "strips null bytes",
input: "hello\x00world\n",
expected: "helloworld\n",
},
{
name: "strips bell characters",
input: "alert\x07here\n",
expected: "alerthere\n",
},
{
name: "preserves tabs",
input: "field1\tfield2\tfield3\n",
expected: "field1\tfield2\tfield3\n",
},
{
name: "preserves carriage returns",
input: "line1\r\nline2\r\n",
expected: "line1\r\nline2\r\n",
},
{
name: "strips mixed escape sequences",
input: "\x1b[32m2024-01-01\x1b[0m \x1b[1mINFO\x1b[0m starting\x00\n",
expected: "2024-01-01 INFO starting\n",
},
{
name: "empty string",
input: "",
expected: "",
},
{
name: "only control characters",
input: "\x00\x01\x02\x03",
expected: "",
},
{
name: "cursor movement sequences stripped",
input: "\x1b[2J\x1b[H\x1b[3Atext\n",
expected: "text\n",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := handlers.SanitizeLogs(tt.input)
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("SanitizeLogs(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -248,15 +247,10 @@ func (svc *Service) sendNtfy(
) error {
svc.log.Debug("sending ntfy notification", "topic", topic, "title", title)
parsedURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(topic)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ntfy topic URL: %w", err)
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx,
http.MethodPost,
parsedURL.String(),
topic,
bytes.NewBufferString(message),
)
if err != nil {
@@ -266,7 +260,7 @@ func (svc *Service) sendNtfy(
request.Header.Set("Title", title)
request.Header.Set("Priority", svc.ntfyPriority(priority))
resp, err := svc.client.Do(request) // #nosec G704 -- URL from validated config, not user input
resp, err := svc.client.Do(request) //nolint:gosec // URL constructed from trusted config, not user input
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send ntfy request: %w", err)
}
@@ -346,15 +340,10 @@ func (svc *Service) sendSlack(
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal slack payload: %w", err)
}
parsedWebhookURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(webhookURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid slack webhook URL: %w", err)
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx,
http.MethodPost,
parsedWebhookURL.String(),
webhookURL,
bytes.NewBuffer(body),
)
if err != nil {
@@ -363,7 +352,7 @@ func (svc *Service) sendSlack(
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := svc.client.Do(request) // #nosec G704 -- URL from validated config, not user input
resp, err := svc.client.Do(request) //nolint:gosec // URL from trusted webhook config
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send slack request: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
// KeyPair contains an SSH key pair.
type KeyPair struct {
PrivateKey string `json:"-"`
PrivateKey string //nolint:gosec // field name describes SSH key material, not a hardcoded secret
PublicKey string
}