While SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, waf fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist at
the start and every SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS
(60), cut at SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD (90, from 25 to 100). Each
listed client's netblock gets a ban of SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS (30)
with the new cause abuseipdb. The blacklist itself is not kept.
These bans do not count toward SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS, so a 10,000-address
blacklist cannot push out the bans for limits and attacks. An ended
abuseipdb ban is forgotten at each fetch and each read of bans.json. A
netblock with an active ban is left alone, and so is one whose abuseipdb
ban an admin lifted, until that ban would have ended. Observe mode makes
no ban.
Model: opus-5-5
go.uber.org/fx builds the parts of waf and rproxy in internal/sww, one
provider per part. Each background loop is a lifecycle hook added where
its part is built. waf.Params takes every part built, and waf.New builds
none. GeoJS calls back into waf, so waf exports AddLookup and
GeoJSFailed, and clientGroup and banNetblock take the settings.
newServer, loadStateFiles, the inBackground list and serveRProxy are
gone. serve is the one hook that serves both daemons, and reports a
failure to run on a channel of its own; fx's signal handling is not
used. Once fx has stopped, run takes each daemon's last step: waf writes
the state files, and rproxy waits for its reports.
Model: opus-5-5
The rproxy package's tests and sww's startRProxyProcess give rproxy a
minute for waf's answers unless a test sets
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. At the 2-second default, a slow host
made rproxy drop questions and reports.
TestMainRunsWAF runs waf with the Core Rule Set off. Main keeps waf's
500 ms limit for its checks, and under the race detector the Core Rule
Set's inspection could pass it and get 503.
Model: opus-5-5
A new example puts one gitea behind traefik, rproxy and waf. waf sets
nine settings most sites use, then eight more commented out, each with
what it does and when to set it.
Model: opus-5-5
Each SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ threshold's description now says crossing it sends
one alert to the alert destinations and bans, rate limits and blocks no
client. The prefix and watched-netblock settings say their thresholds
only alert. README's configuration notes and docs/settings.md explain
"anomaly" once.
Model: opus-5-5
Under heavy host load the sww tests got 503 where they expected 200 or
403: waf refused requests whose trap paths, rule files and Core Rule Set
took longer than 500 ms, and rproxy gave up on waf after 2 s.
waf.Params and sww.Params gain BesideLookupTimeLimit; zero keeps the
500 ms limit, so the binary is unchanged. The sww tests' run gives waf
an hour, and startRProxy sets SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS to
60000, as the rproxy package's tests do. waf's own tests set the limit
through the new field instead of SetBesideLookupTimeLimit, which is gone.
Model: opus-5-5
The limit was already a constant with no setting. These tests pin it:
a request line and headers of exactly 32 KiB reach the app, and one
byte more is answered 431 with the connection closed and waf not asked.
Model: opus-5-5