Compare commits
28
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
c85c1fdddb | ||
|
|
809d2664d7 | ||
|
|
01e6b5d47e | ||
|
|
5099448f79 | ||
|
|
eb48796f27 | ||
|
|
9f42460f70 | ||
|
|
9cb8f362bc | ||
|
|
48edab5dad | ||
|
|
dadd5768d5 | ||
|
|
e6a081134a | ||
|
|
4cb91a4870 | ||
|
|
b9972af6a0 | ||
|
|
c0d9d5787e | ||
|
|
8c9f20d346 | ||
|
|
caa3079847 | ||
|
|
a2fcc00ded | ||
|
|
3c6b0d519f | ||
|
|
f33d0a4fce | ||
|
|
0a2b2d809f | ||
|
|
23788920f7 | ||
|
|
8efd6339a6 | ||
|
|
a93243a294 | ||
|
|
89a60cf9fc | ||
|
|
a05a82b1af | ||
|
|
53d9bf6af6 | ||
|
|
3550956cbb | ||
|
|
2bea6516a8 | ||
|
|
f52b1f9ab5 |
No files matched your search
+14
@@ -161,6 +161,20 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
|
||||
# ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
|
||||
FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
|
||||
|
||||
# The image's own labels, in place of the ones it would inherit from
|
||||
# Ubuntu's. script/docker and script/cibuild pass the build arguments;
|
||||
# a build that passes none labels the image unknown rather than leave
|
||||
# Ubuntu's values.
|
||||
ARG VERSION=unknown
|
||||
ARG CREATED=unknown
|
||||
ARG REVISION=unknown
|
||||
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf" \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.description="A web application firewall for self-hosted web apps: sww rproxy in front of an app, and sww waf, which decides." \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.created="${CREATED}" \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}" \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf"
|
||||
|
||||
# runit's install creates its _runit-log user with minsysusers, which
|
||||
# reads this file in place of runit's /usr/lib/sysusers.d/runit.conf.
|
||||
# runit's line leaves out the shell, and minsysusers prints a Perl
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,20 @@
|
||||
|
||||
`smallwebwaf` is an MIT-licensed web application firewall, written in Go by
|
||||
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), for self-hosted web apps. It refuses the
|
||||
requests of scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach an app.
|
||||
requests of misbehaving scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach
|
||||
an app.
|
||||
|
||||
With the default settings, a client is banned when it does any of these:
|
||||
|
||||
- makes more than 120 requests in a minute, 1500 in an hour or 6000 in a day;
|
||||
- moves more than `50G` of request and response bodies in an hour, or `100G` in
|
||||
a day;
|
||||
- asks for a secret or backup file, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`;
|
||||
- sends a user agent that names a security scanner, such as `sqlmap` or `nikto`;
|
||||
- has more than 30 requests in a minute refused as probes or attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
A scraper that does none of these is left alone. A scraper that waits 15 seconds
|
||||
between requests stays under the rate limits.
|
||||
|
||||
## What it does
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,10 +23,10 @@ A web application firewall reads each request on its way to a web app and
|
||||
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is one program, `sww`,
|
||||
shipped in one image, with two commands that do this together:
|
||||
|
||||
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik routes to
|
||||
it. It asks `waf` about each request, passes the allowed ones to the app, and
|
||||
passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing between requests and writes
|
||||
nothing to disk.
|
||||
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. It sits behind a
|
||||
TLS-terminating proxy, such as traefik, nginx or Caddy. It asks `waf` about
|
||||
each request, passes the allowed ones to the app, and passes the app's answers
|
||||
back. It writes nothing to disk.
|
||||
- `sww waf` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the counters and
|
||||
each client's history. One `waf` serves many sites: a client banned through
|
||||
one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on all of them count
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +35,26 @@ shipped in one image, with two commands that do this together:
|
||||
The site keeps answering while `waf` is down, slow or restarting: without an
|
||||
answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
|
||||
|
||||
It protects against:
|
||||
`rproxy` also protects the app on its own, whether or not `waf` answers. With
|
||||
the default settings, `rproxy`:
|
||||
|
||||
- answers `400` to a malformed request, such as a broken header line or a
|
||||
missing `Host`;
|
||||
- answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, such as `TRACE`;
|
||||
- answers `431` to a request line and headers over 32 KiB together;
|
||||
- gives the visitor 60 seconds to send the request line and headers, and then 60
|
||||
seconds more for the whole request to reach the app;
|
||||
- answers `413` to a request body over 100 MiB;
|
||||
- gives the app's answer 30 minutes to reach the visitor, counted from the end
|
||||
of the request;
|
||||
- answers `502` in place of an app's answer whose body is over 1 GiB, or cuts it
|
||||
off if it has started;
|
||||
- closes a kept-open connection after 120 seconds idle.
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` does not limit the number of headers. `waf` limits the number of
|
||||
headers and cookies, and the length of the request line and of each header line.
|
||||
|
||||
Together, `rproxy` and `waf` protect against:
|
||||
|
||||
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
|
||||
requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
|
||||
@@ -44,9 +76,7 @@ It protects against:
|
||||
limit, so that they are banned sooner;
|
||||
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
|
||||
AbuseIPDB score;
|
||||
- ban clients named by your own CrowdSec engine.
|
||||
- Slow and oversized requests. Every request and every answer has a time limit
|
||||
and a size limit.
|
||||
- ban the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist before they send a request.
|
||||
|
||||
For the operator, it:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,8 +88,7 @@ For the operator, it:
|
||||
|
||||
Not built, and not planned:
|
||||
|
||||
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with traefik, the reverse proxy in
|
||||
front of `rproxy`.
|
||||
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with the TLS-terminating proxy.
|
||||
- Browser challenges such as captchas.
|
||||
- A web console, or a configuration file.
|
||||
- Defence against floods large enough to fill the host's network link.
|
||||
@@ -91,20 +120,61 @@ accepts connections, whether or not `waf` answers; in `waf`'s container, once
|
||||
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
|
||||
|
||||
- the app;
|
||||
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to:
|
||||
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which the TLS-terminating proxy forwards to:
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names `waf` and `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` names the
|
||||
app;
|
||||
- `waf`, with `SWW_COMMAND=waf` and a volume at `/var/lib/sww` for its state
|
||||
files.
|
||||
|
||||
Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
|
||||
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080`). Publish no port
|
||||
of the app or of `waf`. Anything on that network can reach the app around
|
||||
`rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions, so the network holds only what you trust.
|
||||
Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
|
||||
Publish no port of the app or of `waf`. Anything on that network can reach the
|
||||
app around `rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions, so the network holds only what
|
||||
you trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `waf`. The "Smallest setup" example
|
||||
below shows this shape.
|
||||
|
||||
### The TLS-terminating proxy
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` serves plain HTTP. It runs behind any TLS-terminating proxy, such as
|
||||
traefik, nginx or Caddy. The TLS-terminating proxy must:
|
||||
|
||||
- forward each request to port 8080 of `rproxy` over plain HTTP;
|
||||
- keep the visitor's `Host` header;
|
||||
- add the visitor's address to `X-Forwarded-For`;
|
||||
- set `X-Forwarded-Proto` to the scheme the visitor used;
|
||||
- close an unused connection to `rproxy` in under 120 seconds;
|
||||
- connect to `rproxy` from an address in `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`, by
|
||||
default `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12` or `192.168.0.0/16`.
|
||||
|
||||
From any other address, `rproxy` ignores the forwarded headers and takes the
|
||||
TLS-terminating proxy for the visitor. Every visitor then shares one address,
|
||||
and one ban.
|
||||
|
||||
traefik and Caddy keep the `Host` header and set both forwarded headers by
|
||||
default. traefik's Docker label
|
||||
`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080` names the port.
|
||||
Caddy keeps an unused connection for 120 seconds by default, so its site
|
||||
shortens that to 90 seconds:
|
||||
|
||||
```caddyfile
|
||||
reverse_proxy rproxy:8080 {
|
||||
transport http {
|
||||
keepalive 90s
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
By default nginx sends the host in `proxy_pass` as `Host` and sets neither
|
||||
forwarded header, so its site sets all three:
|
||||
|
||||
```nginx
|
||||
location / {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://rproxy:8080;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `rproxy` in the app's container
|
||||
|
||||
An app's image can instead be built on the `smallwebwaf` image, so that `rproxy`
|
||||
@@ -155,13 +225,13 @@ entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
|
||||
the app's image with `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such
|
||||
an app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
|
||||
|
||||
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
|
||||
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
|
||||
`rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own, `rproxy` is
|
||||
on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy setting
|
||||
covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the private
|
||||
ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as `app.run`
|
||||
does.
|
||||
The app's TCP peer is `rproxy`. The app sees the headers the TLS-terminating
|
||||
proxy sent, with that proxy's address added to `X-Forwarded-For`. So the app
|
||||
must trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own,
|
||||
`rproxy` is on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy
|
||||
setting covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the
|
||||
private ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as
|
||||
`app.run` does.
|
||||
|
||||
### Checking that it works
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +239,7 @@ does.
|
||||
`healthy` for each container of `smallwebwaf`.
|
||||
- A log line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every
|
||||
setting in effect, with secrets masked.
|
||||
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer.
|
||||
- A request to the site through the TLS-terminating proxy gets the app's answer.
|
||||
`https://<site>/_sww/healthz` answers `ok`. `waf`'s log lines about the
|
||||
request have `"action":"forward"`.
|
||||
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `waf` with
|
||||
@@ -215,131 +285,136 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent
|
||||
over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response
|
||||
bytes.
|
||||
- An anomaly is more requests or bytes than an `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_` threshold
|
||||
allows. Crossing a threshold sends one `anomaly` alert to the alert
|
||||
destinations, and does nothing else: no client is banned, rate limited or
|
||||
blocked.
|
||||
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
|
||||
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
|
||||
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
|
||||
|
||||
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|
||||
| ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/waf`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `800` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|
||||
| --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` gives no answer in time, and while the circuit breaker for asks to `waf` is open: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `host1/waf`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps for broken limits and attacks; bans an admin made and bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `800` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, in milliseconds. The request to GeoJS goes on, and a later answer is kept. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `true`, or `false` while the lookup source is `off` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `8K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account. Set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background, and the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist are banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` | `90` | The least AbuseIPDB score, from 25 to 100, at which a client on its blacklist is banned. Do not set it below 50 to 75: lower scores list ordinary visitors. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` | `60` | How often AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched again, in minutes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` | `30` | How long a client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist is banned, in days. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||
|
||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
@@ -349,8 +424,8 @@ full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
Each example is a complete `compose.yaml`. `smallwebwaf` is the tag
|
||||
`make docker` gives the image; on another host, use the name you pushed it
|
||||
under, by digest. Docker Compose puts the services on a private network of its
|
||||
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Each example publishes
|
||||
`rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it out.
|
||||
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Each example but "On the
|
||||
open internet" publishes `rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it out.
|
||||
|
||||
### Smallest setup
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -382,6 +457,142 @@ volumes:
|
||||
waf-state:
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### On the open internet
|
||||
|
||||
One gitea at `git.example.com`, with traefik in front of `rproxy`. traefik gets
|
||||
the certificate from Let's Encrypt and is the only service with published ports.
|
||||
`waf` sets what most sites set. More `waf` settings follow, commented out, each
|
||||
with what it does and when to set it.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
services:
|
||||
traefik:
|
||||
# traefik v3.7.19, 2026-11-13
|
||||
image: traefik@sha256:a6c0194dda77bcb804824580f36fa7edc56e315b1acfe933366c8b52844a78a4
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
command:
|
||||
- --providers.docker=true
|
||||
- --providers.docker.exposedByDefault=false
|
||||
- --entryPoints.web.address=:80
|
||||
- --entryPoints.websecure.address=:443
|
||||
# Redirect plain HTTP to HTTPS.
|
||||
- --entryPoints.web.http.redirections.entryPoint.to=websecure
|
||||
- --entryPoints.web.http.redirections.entryPoint.scheme=https
|
||||
# A Let's Encrypt certificate for each site, by the TLS-ALPN
|
||||
# challenge on port 443.
|
||||
- --entryPoints.websecure.http.tls.certResolver=le
|
||||
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.email=hostmaster@example.com
|
||||
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.storage=/letsencrypt/acme.json
|
||||
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.tlsChallenge=true
|
||||
# Give a request 10 minutes to arrive, rather than 1, for the
|
||||
# large git pushes the rproxy lines below accept.
|
||||
# - --entryPoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=600s
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "80:80"
|
||||
- "443:443"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
|
||||
- acme:/letsencrypt
|
||||
|
||||
app:
|
||||
# Your app: here a gitea, which listens on port 3000.
|
||||
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
|
||||
rproxy:
|
||||
image: smallwebwaf
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://waf:8080
|
||||
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:3000
|
||||
# Accept git pushes up to 1 GiB, rather than 100 MiB, sent in
|
||||
# up to 10 minutes, rather than 1, with traefik's readTimeout
|
||||
# line above.
|
||||
# SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 1G
|
||||
# SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "600000"
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
- traefik.enable=true
|
||||
- traefik.http.routers.git.rule=Host(`git.example.com`)
|
||||
- traefik.http.routers.git.entryPoints=websecure
|
||||
- traefik.http.services.git.loadBalancer.server.port=8080
|
||||
|
||||
waf:
|
||||
image: smallwebwaf
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SWW_COMMAND: waf
|
||||
# The name in every log line, alert and metric. The default,
|
||||
# the container's host name, is a random id under Compose.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: host1/waf
|
||||
# The app each hostname serves. Only that app's fixes to the
|
||||
# Core Rule Set apply there.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_APPS: git.example.com:gitea
|
||||
# Monitoring skips every check.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
|
||||
# The office and the CI runner, which would exceed the rate
|
||||
# limits, are never rate limited.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
|
||||
# WordPress paths, which only scanners ask a gitea for. One
|
||||
# request for one bans the client.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
|
||||
# Spamhaus's list of netblocks hijacked or leased by
|
||||
# criminals. Their clients are refused.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS: https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt
|
||||
# The token for the ban endpoints, to lift a ban without
|
||||
# editing bans.json.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||
# Alerts, such as one for each ban, to an ntfy topic.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example.com/smallwebwaf
|
||||
|
||||
# Refuse nothing and ban no one, for the first days. Each log
|
||||
# line says what enforce mode would have done.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_MODE: observe
|
||||
# The access token for an ntfy topic that is not public.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
|
||||
# The token for /_sww/metrics, for Prometheus. Unset, the
|
||||
# metrics are off.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/metrics
|
||||
# 600 requests an hour rather than 1500, to ban slower
|
||||
# scrapers. A fast human reader can reach it too.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
|
||||
# A quarter of every limit for clients in two hosting
|
||||
# networks, where scrapers run rather than people.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT: asn=14061:25,asn=16276:25
|
||||
# For a site only for people in a few countries. Clients
|
||||
# elsewhere are refused, and so are any the lookup cannot place.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES: de,at,ch
|
||||
# Close a refused request's connection rather than answer
|
||||
# 403. traefik then answers 502, so a scraper cannot tell a
|
||||
# ban from a broken site.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE: close
|
||||
# A copy of every log line to a syslog server.
|
||||
# SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL: syslog+tls://logs.example.com:6514
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- waf-state:/var/lib/sww
|
||||
- /srv/sww/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro
|
||||
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
acme:
|
||||
waf-state:
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Change these before the first start:
|
||||
|
||||
- `git.example.com`, in the router rule and in `SWW_WAF_APPS`;
|
||||
- the email address for Let's Encrypt;
|
||||
- the ntfy topic's URL;
|
||||
- the app's image and port;
|
||||
- the netblocks, which are documentation addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
Make the admin token file first, as for any token file:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
mkdir -p /srv/sww/tokens
|
||||
openssl rand -hex 32 > /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||
chown 65532:65532 /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||
chmod 0400 /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom per-address limits
|
||||
|
||||
For a site with no API:
|
||||
@@ -463,7 +674,7 @@ services:
|
||||
image: smallwebwaf
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SWW_COMMAND: waf
|
||||
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/waf
|
||||
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: host1/waf
|
||||
# Refuse nothing yet; log what enforce mode would have done.
|
||||
SWW_WAF_MODE: observe
|
||||
# Look addresses up in a local IPinfo Lite database, never GeoJS.
|
||||
@@ -532,6 +743,11 @@ request reaches the app.
|
||||
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
|
||||
prefix.
|
||||
|
||||
Steps 12 to 14 only read the request. While the lookup waits for GeoJS, they run
|
||||
at the same time as steps 6 to 11. The first of the two sides to refuse the
|
||||
request ends the checks, and `waf` answers at once. Steps 12 to 14 have 500 ms
|
||||
together.
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` takes the rest, with `waf` counting at the end:
|
||||
|
||||
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
|
||||
@@ -543,17 +759,21 @@ request reaches the app.
|
||||
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
|
||||
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
|
||||
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`
|
||||
instead. A request over the header limits of step 3 is answered `431`, and bans
|
||||
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
|
||||
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
|
||||
instead. A request over the header limits of step 3 is answered `414` for a
|
||||
request line over 8 KiB and `431` otherwise. It bans nobody either. Nor does a
|
||||
request that steps 12 to 14 have not finished within 500 ms, which is answered
|
||||
`503`. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, and the
|
||||
status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
|
||||
|
||||
### Clients and bans
|
||||
|
||||
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
|
||||
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
|
||||
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
|
||||
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
|
||||
The table of clients and the bans for limits and attacks each have a bound
|
||||
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`). The bans for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
blacklist are bounded by the clients it listed over the last
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days. So memory is bounded too.
|
||||
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
|
||||
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
|
||||
lifts it.
|
||||
@@ -570,8 +790,7 @@ Each request gets tags from what `waf` knows of its client, written in the
|
||||
- `asn=<number>` and `country=<code>`, from the lookup;
|
||||
- one tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client, such as
|
||||
`torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`;
|
||||
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
|
||||
the client;
|
||||
- `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists the client;
|
||||
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request;
|
||||
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>`, from a routewatch instance, while
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set.
|
||||
@@ -677,14 +896,16 @@ stops the running process (see [`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
- `cmd/sww`: the binary, which only calls `internal/sww`.
|
||||
- `internal/sww`: the process, as the command it is given, and the health check.
|
||||
It is the only package that imports `go.uber.org/fx`, which builds the parts
|
||||
of `waf` and `rproxy`.
|
||||
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
|
||||
- `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app.
|
||||
- `internal/waf`: `waf`'s server, which runs the checks and answers its own
|
||||
endpoints.
|
||||
- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`,
|
||||
`internal/coreruleset`, `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`,
|
||||
`internal/routewatch`, `internal/anomaly` and `internal/alerts`: one check or
|
||||
source each.
|
||||
`internal/coreruleset`, `internal/geojs`, `internal/lookup`,
|
||||
`internal/reputation`, `internal/routewatch`, `internal/anomaly` and
|
||||
`internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
|
||||
- `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
|
||||
`internal/metrics`: the state and cache files, the log lines, the syslog
|
||||
sender and the metrics.
|
||||
@@ -751,10 +972,9 @@ on the host.
|
||||
- `script/docker`: builds the image, whose build runs the tests and the linter
|
||||
first. `make docker`.
|
||||
- `script/publish`: runs `script/docker`, whose build happens on the Docker host
|
||||
named by `DOCKER_HOST` (`ssh://root@fsn1app1` unless set). It then pushes the
|
||||
image to `PUBLISH_IMAGE` (`git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf` unless set). It
|
||||
refuses a working tree with uncommitted changes. `make publish`. It pushes
|
||||
four tags:
|
||||
named by `DOCKER_HOST`, then pushes the image to `PUBLISH_IMAGE`, such as
|
||||
`registry.example.com/smallwebwaf`. Both variables are required. It refuses a
|
||||
working tree with uncommitted changes. `make publish`. It pushes four tags:
|
||||
- the UTC date as `YYYY-MM-DD`;
|
||||
- the short commit hash;
|
||||
- the branch name;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
`smallwebwaf` is a web application firewall for self-hosted apps. It is one
|
||||
binary, `sww`, and two of its commands do the work:
|
||||
|
||||
- `sww rproxy` is a reverse proxy between traefik and one app.
|
||||
- `sww rproxy` is a reverse proxy between a TLS-terminating proxy and one app.
|
||||
- `sww waf` decides what happens to each request, for many sites.
|
||||
|
||||
This document says what it must do and why, each requirement once. Everything in
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ never as a time.
|
||||
|
||||
## Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- TLS, certificates and routing by host name. Those are traefik's job.
|
||||
- TLS, certificates and routing by host name. Those are the job of the
|
||||
TLS-terminating proxy, such as traefik, nginx or Caddy.
|
||||
- More than one app behind one `rproxy`. Each app has its own.
|
||||
- Browser challenges such as captchas or proof of work. If wanted, chain Anubis
|
||||
between `rproxy` and the app.
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +69,9 @@ never as a time.
|
||||
that command's settings, and runs `internal/rproxy` until `SIGTERM` or
|
||||
`SIGINT` (see "`rproxy`"). `sww healthcheck` is the image's health check.
|
||||
With no command, or one it does not know, the binary prints the commands
|
||||
and exits with status 2.
|
||||
and exits with status 2. `internal/sww` is the only package that imports
|
||||
`go.uber.org/fx`. fx builds the parts of `waf` and `rproxy`, and starts
|
||||
and stops their background work.
|
||||
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
|
||||
- `internal/waf`: `waf`'s server. It runs the checks in `check`, and holds
|
||||
`waf`'s question, answer and report. It answers `waf`'s own endpoints in
|
||||
@@ -86,10 +89,13 @@ never as a time.
|
||||
change, and tells which rules a request matches.
|
||||
- `internal/coreruleset`: the Core Rule Set, with the five changes and the
|
||||
apps' fixes listed under "Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
|
||||
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up through GeoJS or in the lookup
|
||||
database.
|
||||
- `internal/geojs`: looks clients up through GeoJS and keeps the answers. It
|
||||
imports no other package of this repository: `waf` gives it what it needs
|
||||
to count and report failures.
|
||||
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up in the lookup database.
|
||||
- `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
|
||||
AbuseIPDB in the background, and keeps their answers.
|
||||
AbuseIPDB in the background, and keeps their answers. It also fetches
|
||||
AbuseIPDB's blacklist, which `internal/waf` bans.
|
||||
- `internal/routewatch`: asks a routewatch instance about clients in the
|
||||
background, and keeps its answers.
|
||||
- `internal/anomaly`: the anomaly counters and their alerts.
|
||||
@@ -151,32 +157,32 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
|
||||
around its address, a /64 by default, since one abuser usually controls a
|
||||
whole /64. A client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group.
|
||||
3. The header limits (`header_limits`; see "Answering in time"). They come first
|
||||
after `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS`, since they only count header fields and cookies.
|
||||
Next, the tag lists (`tag_lists`; see "Request tags"). Each list that holds
|
||||
the client adds its tag. Next, `routewatch_tags` adds the client's `asn=` and
|
||||
`prefix=` tags while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. A client in
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the header limits and gets no tag.
|
||||
after `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS`, since they only measure lines and count header
|
||||
fields and cookies. Next, the tag lists (`tag_lists`; see "Request tags").
|
||||
Each list that holds the client adds its tag. Next, `routewatch_tags` adds
|
||||
the client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set.
|
||||
A client in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the header limits and gets no tag.
|
||||
4. The static lists. A client in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 5 to 15, the
|
||||
byte limits and the refusal limit. A client in `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` is refused
|
||||
(`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through.
|
||||
5. Bans. A client under a ban is refused (`active_ban`; see "Bans").
|
||||
6. The lookup, unless `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off` (see "Lookup of AS number
|
||||
and country"). The request goes on at once. It waits for the first GeoJS
|
||||
answer, up to `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, only when one of
|
||||
these needs it:
|
||||
and country"). The request waits for the first GeoJS answer, up to
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, when one of these needs it:
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`, which is `true` by default;
|
||||
- the country list;
|
||||
- a biased threshold;
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or
|
||||
`country=` tag;
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`.
|
||||
`country=` tag.
|
||||
|
||||
A request that ends before the answer comes is logged without it.
|
||||
Otherwise the request goes on at once. A request that ends before the answer
|
||||
comes is logged without it. While the request waits, steps 12 to 14 run at
|
||||
the same time as steps 6 to 11 (see "Answering in time").
|
||||
|
||||
7. The country list (`countries`; see "Country list").
|
||||
8. The reputation sources (see "Reputation"), in this order:
|
||||
- A client on a fetched blocklist gets `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION`
|
||||
(`blocklists`).
|
||||
- A client on the CrowdSec decision list is banned (`crowdsec`).
|
||||
- A client listed by a DNS blocklist gets `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`
|
||||
(`dnsbl`).
|
||||
- A client scored at least `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` by AbuseIPDB gets
|
||||
@@ -198,10 +204,10 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
|
||||
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
|
||||
prefix.
|
||||
17. `rproxy` passes the request to `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, streaming (see
|
||||
"Passing a request to the app"). With `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`,
|
||||
`X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country` are added for the app's own logs; a
|
||||
header whose value is unknown is left out. Whatever that setting says, any
|
||||
such header the client sent is removed.
|
||||
"Passing a request to the app"). While `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` is
|
||||
`true`, as by default, `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country` are added for
|
||||
the app's own logs; a header whose value is unknown is left out. Whatever
|
||||
that setting says, any such header the client sent is removed.
|
||||
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
|
||||
report"). `waf` then counts:
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
|
||||
@@ -235,13 +241,15 @@ apply.
|
||||
load.
|
||||
- Memory is bounded. When the table of clients holds
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, the least recently seen client is dropped
|
||||
first, with its history. The bans are bounded by `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (see
|
||||
"Bans"). The GeoJS answers, the reputation verdicts and scores, the DNS
|
||||
queries under way and the anomaly counters have fixed bounds, listed under
|
||||
"Fixed limits" in `docs/settings.md`. Past its bound, the GeoJS answer or
|
||||
anomaly counter used longest ago goes first, and the verdict or score fetched
|
||||
longest ago. Past the bound on DNS queries under way, a zone is asked at the
|
||||
client's next request.
|
||||
first, with its history. The bans for broken limits and clear signs of attack
|
||||
are bounded by `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (see "Bans"). Those for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
blacklist are bounded by the clients it listed over the last
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days (see "Reputation"). The GeoJS answers, the
|
||||
reputation verdicts and scores, the DNS queries under way and the anomaly
|
||||
counters have fixed bounds, listed under "Fixed limits" in `docs/settings.md`.
|
||||
Past its bound, the GeoJS answer or anomaly counter used longest ago goes
|
||||
first, and the verdict or score fetched longest ago. Past the bound on DNS
|
||||
queries under way, a zone is asked at the client's next request.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bans
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -253,9 +261,9 @@ does not reach neighbours who did nothing. Requests refused under a ban are not
|
||||
counted against limits. They are counted in the client's history and in the
|
||||
ban's notes.
|
||||
|
||||
A request over the header limits is refused with `431` before the bans are
|
||||
checked (see "Answering in time"). It makes no ban, makes no ban permanent and
|
||||
is not counted in a ban's notes.
|
||||
A request over the header limits is refused with `414` or `431` before the bans
|
||||
are checked (see "Answering in time"). It makes no ban, makes no ban permanent
|
||||
and is not counted in a ban's notes.
|
||||
|
||||
An offence is a request `waf` holds against the client. It is one of:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -296,19 +304,14 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
|
||||
Once it ends, only new requests can break a limit again. The client's
|
||||
history keeps its totals.
|
||||
|
||||
A client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist is banned before it sends a request, with the
|
||||
cause `abuseipdb` (see "Reputation").
|
||||
|
||||
A Core Rule Set match refuses only the request it matched, with `403` and
|
||||
without a ban, because the Core Rule Set has false positives. A `block` rule
|
||||
does the same. Those refusals count toward the refusal limit, so a client that
|
||||
keeps setting them off is banned for a broken limit.
|
||||
|
||||
A client on the CrowdSec decision list is banned until the decision ends, with
|
||||
the cause `crowdsec`. Only a client that sends a request is banned, so a long
|
||||
list does not fill `bans.json`. Such a ban is never made permanent. It does not
|
||||
make the netblock's next ban for a broken limit longer. A ban lifted while the
|
||||
decision is in force is made again at the client's next request. To lift it for
|
||||
good, delete the decision in CrowdSec, then lift the ban once the list has been
|
||||
fetched again.
|
||||
|
||||
These refuse each request they cover, record nothing in `bans.json`, and count
|
||||
no offence:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -330,18 +333,19 @@ does not count toward a longer ban; it refuses nothing. Deleting its entry from
|
||||
|
||||
A permanent ban does not run out. It ends when an admin lifts it, or when `waf`
|
||||
drops it from a full table, as below. When `waf` holds `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` bans
|
||||
of its own, it drops the earliest ban of one netblock: the netblock that has
|
||||
gone longest without a request. A past, active or permanent ban is dropped
|
||||
alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused and banned again by
|
||||
its next probe. A ban whose cause is `admin` is never dropped and does not count
|
||||
toward `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never fill the table.
|
||||
for broken limits and clear signs of attack, it drops the earliest such ban of
|
||||
one netblock: the netblock that has gone longest without a request. A past,
|
||||
active or permanent ban is dropped alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that
|
||||
way is refused and banned again by its next probe. Bans whose cause is `admin`
|
||||
or `abuseipdb` do not count toward `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` and are never dropped to
|
||||
make room, so they can never push out the others.
|
||||
|
||||
A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
|
||||
`temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
|
||||
A request refused for a clear sign of attack or a CrowdSec decision takes the
|
||||
action for the ban it made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as
|
||||
`permanently_banned`. A request over a rate limit is logged as
|
||||
`client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban it makes.
|
||||
A request refused for a clear sign of attack takes the action for the ban it
|
||||
made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as `permanently_banned`. A
|
||||
request over a rate limit is logged as `client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban
|
||||
it makes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Settings
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -515,19 +519,25 @@ service that keeps its visitors' addresses on its own host.
|
||||
dropped from that table. The answer reaches the client's history and ban notes
|
||||
when it comes.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` is how long a visitor's request
|
||||
waits for its client's first answer, when a setting needs it (see step 6). It
|
||||
also bounds each request to GeoJS. A client whose answer has not come in time
|
||||
counts as unknown until it comes, and its later requests do not wait. Its
|
||||
address is asked about again in the background.
|
||||
waits for its client's first answer, when a setting needs it (see step 6). A
|
||||
client whose answer has not come in time counts as unknown until it comes, and
|
||||
its later requests do not wait.
|
||||
- A request to GeoJS may take up to 10 seconds, however long visitors wait. It
|
||||
goes on after the visitor's request ends, and its answer is kept. Say GeoJS
|
||||
answers after 5 seconds. The visitor's request is decided after 800
|
||||
milliseconds, without a country. A request from the same client 6 seconds
|
||||
later gets the answer.
|
||||
- Requests from one client that come together share one request to GeoJS.
|
||||
- A client the lookup cannot place has an unknown country and AS number, which
|
||||
the country list and the biased thresholds treat as described there. Nothing
|
||||
else treats it differently.
|
||||
- GeoJS publishes no rate limit, but its terms forbid "an excessive amount of
|
||||
API requests", judged by GeoJS alone, and let it block a caller. While GeoJS
|
||||
is slow, down or refusing `waf`, new clients count as unknown. GeoJS is then
|
||||
left alone for a second, and twice as long after each further failure, up to
|
||||
five minutes. Each failure raises a `source_failure` alert (see "Alerting"). A
|
||||
service that cannot accept this uses the file.
|
||||
API requests", judged by GeoJS alone, and let it block a caller. A request to
|
||||
GeoJS fails when it takes over 10 seconds or GeoJS answers with an error.
|
||||
While GeoJS is slow, down or refusing `waf`, new clients count as unknown.
|
||||
After a failure GeoJS is left alone for a second, and twice as long after each
|
||||
further failure, up to five minutes. Each failure raises a `source_failure`
|
||||
alert (see "Alerting"). A service that cannot accept this uses the file.
|
||||
- The file is the free IPinfo Lite database (`ipinfo_lite.mmdb`), whose `asn`,
|
||||
`as_name` and `country_code` fields are read. The operator downloads it with a
|
||||
free IPinfo account and mounts it read-only; `waf` never fetches it and holds
|
||||
@@ -575,9 +585,9 @@ Each tag and where it comes from:
|
||||
- One tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client (`tag_lists`),
|
||||
the tag being the list's name, such as `torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`. These lists
|
||||
are fetched and kept like a blocklist. `waf` ships none of its own.
|
||||
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
|
||||
the client, whatever the source's action. A zone with a key is named with the
|
||||
key masked, as the `reputation` field gives it.
|
||||
- `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists the client,
|
||||
whatever the source's action. A zone with a key is named with the key masked,
|
||||
as the `reputation` field gives it.
|
||||
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request.
|
||||
For the Core Rule Set a match is a score at or over
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD`.
|
||||
@@ -712,11 +722,12 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
|
||||
rules is loaded yet.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` switches body inspection on, up
|
||||
to that size. It takes at most `64K`, since `waf` gets no more of a body than
|
||||
that (see "The answer"). Form data and multipart bodies are read up to the
|
||||
size. JSON and XML bodies are read only when no larger than the size, since
|
||||
those cannot be read in part. Any other body is not read: the Core Rule Set
|
||||
would read it as form data, where binary content such as a git push trips
|
||||
to that size. It takes at most `8K`, so that `waf` answers in time (see
|
||||
"Answering in time"). Form data and multipart bodies are read up to the size.
|
||||
JSON and XML bodies are read only when no larger than the size, since those
|
||||
cannot be read in part. A JSON body over 1 KiB is not read either, whatever
|
||||
the size (see "Answering in time"). Any other body is not read: the Core Rule
|
||||
Set would read it as form data, where binary content such as a git push trips
|
||||
rules written for text. A body the Core Rule Set cannot parse adds 5 to the
|
||||
score, and so does a multipart body cut by the limit in the middle of a part's
|
||||
header. Body inspection suits apps whose forms carry no code.
|
||||
@@ -1952,20 +1963,19 @@ leave out a cookie only when its name matches exactly, case included.
|
||||
### Ban lengths, response and scope
|
||||
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` is `403` by default, which makes a ban easy to recognise
|
||||
when debugging; `429` and `close` are the alternatives. Behind traefik, `close`
|
||||
does not leave the client unanswered: traefik answers `502`, as it does whenever
|
||||
its backend drops a connection. `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` widens an IPv4 ban
|
||||
to the surrounding netblock. The four ban lengths are under "Bans".
|
||||
when debugging; `429` and `close` are the alternatives. `close` does not leave
|
||||
the client unanswered: the TLS-terminating proxy answers `502`, as it does
|
||||
whenever its backend drops a connection. `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` widens an
|
||||
IPv4 ban to the surrounding netblock. The four ban lengths are under "Bans".
|
||||
|
||||
### Reputation
|
||||
|
||||
No source is on by default. A source acts on a list kept elsewhere; the defaults
|
||||
judge a client only by what it does here. AbuseIPDB and CrowdSec also need an
|
||||
account or an engine of the operator's own. The list best suited to be on by
|
||||
default, Spamhaus DROP, has terms, below, that forbid frequent fetching, and
|
||||
Spamhaus may block an address that breaks them. Each `waf` fetches its own copy,
|
||||
so several of them on one host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close
|
||||
together.
|
||||
judge a client only by what it does here. AbuseIPDB also needs an account of the
|
||||
operator's own. The list best suited to be on by default, Spamhaus DROP, has
|
||||
terms, below, that forbid frequent fetching, and Spamhaus may block an address
|
||||
that breaks them. Each `waf` fetches its own copy, so several of them on one
|
||||
host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
|
||||
|
||||
- Blocklists (`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`) are text files of addresses and
|
||||
netblocks, one to a line, as the Spamhaus DROP list is written. Anything after
|
||||
@@ -1998,18 +2008,6 @@ together.
|
||||
percentage of every request and byte limit, and suits a list of addresses
|
||||
shared with ordinary visitors, such as Tor exits. `log` only notes the hit in
|
||||
the log line and raises an alert.
|
||||
- A CrowdSec engine on the host (`SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL`) has its decision
|
||||
list fetched every minute, with `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` in the `X-Api-Key`
|
||||
header. The list is kept like a fetched blocklist, and a client on it is
|
||||
banned (see "Bans"). Only decisions of the type `ban` on an address or a
|
||||
netblock are used; any other, such as a captcha or a country, is left out. A
|
||||
decision lasts for the `duration` it had left when the engine answered. This
|
||||
is how a fleet-wide blocklist can arrive without `waf` depending on CrowdSec.
|
||||
A fetch fails when:
|
||||
- the engine answers other than `200`, a redirect included;
|
||||
- the fetch does not finish within a minute;
|
||||
- the answer is longer than 16 MiB;
|
||||
- the answer is not a list of decisions.
|
||||
- Each DNS blocklist (`SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES`) is asked about a client's own
|
||||
address in the background, the first time the client is seen. No request waits
|
||||
for the answer. The name asked about is the one RFC 5782 gives: the numbers of
|
||||
@@ -2047,6 +2045,26 @@ together.
|
||||
- AbuseIPDB answers other than `200`;
|
||||
- the answer gives no score;
|
||||
- no answer comes within `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
||||
- While `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set, AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched at the
|
||||
start and every `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` minutes
|
||||
(default `60`). It lists the clients AbuseIPDB scores at
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` (default `90`) or more. The blacklist itself is
|
||||
not kept.
|
||||
- Each client on it is banned for `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days (default
|
||||
`30`), with the cause `abuseipdb`. The ban covers the client's netblock,
|
||||
as any ban does.
|
||||
- A netblock that already has an active ban is left as it is. So is one
|
||||
whose `abuseipdb` ban an admin lifted, until that ban would have ended.
|
||||
- An `abuseipdb` ban that has ended is forgotten at the next of these:
|
||||
- a fetch of the blacklist in `enforce` mode;
|
||||
- a read of `bans.json`, at the start or after an admin's edit.
|
||||
- In `observe` mode the blacklist makes no ban.
|
||||
- The threshold takes 25 to 100. It should not be set below 50 to 75, since
|
||||
lower scores list ordinary visitors. AbuseIPDB serves free accounts the
|
||||
blacklist at the threshold 100, whatever is asked for.
|
||||
- AbuseIPDB limits the fetches of the blacklist a day: 5 for a free account.
|
||||
A fetch over the limit fails, and is logged and alerted. The default
|
||||
refresh fetches it 24 times a day.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits, is
|
||||
`limit:25` by default. Such verdicts are less certain than a blocklist, so a
|
||||
listed client gets a quarter of every request and byte limit rather than a
|
||||
@@ -2061,9 +2079,10 @@ together.
|
||||
- Alerts go to a webhook as JSON, and to Slack and ntfy as formatted messages.
|
||||
`docs/alerts.md` lists the events, the JSON object and the messages.
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` chooses which of the seven event types are sent; the
|
||||
hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. The bans an admin makes raise no
|
||||
alert. In `observe` mode, a request that would have made a ban still raises
|
||||
the ban's alert, with `mode` set to `observe` in its `detail`.
|
||||
hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. The bans an admin makes, and the
|
||||
bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist, raise no alert. In `observe` mode, a request
|
||||
that would have made a ban still raises the ban's alert, with `mode` set to
|
||||
`observe` in its `detail`.
|
||||
- A repeat is an alert with the same event, and the same netblock, source, file
|
||||
or anomaly scope, as one sent less than `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` before. An
|
||||
anomaly scope is one of the things counted under "Anomaly thresholds". A
|
||||
@@ -2211,7 +2230,7 @@ lists the files, what each holds, and their sizes.
|
||||
these stop the process with a message naming the file and position:
|
||||
- a file that does not parse, or has an unknown `version`;
|
||||
- an entry without a field it needs;
|
||||
- a ban whose cause is not one of the four;
|
||||
- a ban whose cause is not `limit`, `attack`, `admin` or `abuseipdb`;
|
||||
- a ban whose `expires` is not after its `start`.
|
||||
|
||||
Starting with empty state would silently forgive every repeat offender.
|
||||
@@ -2391,19 +2410,22 @@ runs no check, writes no request log line and counts nothing in the metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
### The answer
|
||||
|
||||
`waf` runs steps 3 to 16 of "What happens to a request", in that order. Every
|
||||
answer but the last below carries `X-Sww-Disposition`.
|
||||
`waf` runs steps 3 to 16 of "What happens to a request", in that order, apart
|
||||
from the steps that run at the same time (see "Answering in time"). Every answer
|
||||
but the last below carries `X-Sww-Disposition`.
|
||||
|
||||
- `X-Sww-Disposition: allow`, status `200`, no body. `rproxy` passes the request
|
||||
to the app. With `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` the answer also carries
|
||||
`X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`, which `rproxy` adds to the request it
|
||||
passes on. A header whose value is unknown is left out.
|
||||
to the app. While `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` is `true`, the answer also
|
||||
carries `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`, which `rproxy` adds to the
|
||||
request it passes on. A header whose value is unknown is left out.
|
||||
- `X-Sww-Disposition: deny`, with the status, headers and body the visitor is to
|
||||
get. `rproxy` gives them to the visitor, less this header. The status is one
|
||||
of:
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, for a refusal;
|
||||
- `403`, for a `block` rule or the Core Rule Set;
|
||||
- `431`, for a request over the header limits;
|
||||
- `414` or `431`, for a request over the header limits;
|
||||
- `503`, for a request that steps 12 to 14 have not finished within 500
|
||||
milliseconds;
|
||||
- `404`, for a path under `/_sww/` that passes the checks, so that the app
|
||||
never sees that prefix.
|
||||
- `X-Sww-Disposition: close`, status `200`, no body. This takes the place of a
|
||||
@@ -2418,33 +2440,37 @@ In `observe` mode a request that `enforce` mode would refuse is answered
|
||||
answered `404`.
|
||||
|
||||
The Core Rule Set inspects the body a question carries only while
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. It inspects at most 64 KiB
|
||||
less one byte. So it does not inspect a JSON or XML body of 64 KiB or more,
|
||||
which may have been cut short.
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set, and at most 8 KiB of it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Answering in time
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` stops waiting for `waf` after `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, by
|
||||
default 2 seconds, and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` then
|
||||
decides. The longest a question waits on an outside source is
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 800 milliseconds, well
|
||||
within that time.
|
||||
decides. Two things in a decision take time:
|
||||
|
||||
- the wait for GeoJS, at most `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by
|
||||
default 800 milliseconds;
|
||||
- the trap paths, the rule files and the Core Rule Set, which have 500
|
||||
milliseconds.
|
||||
|
||||
They run at the same time, so `waf` answers within the longer of the two, well
|
||||
within `rproxy`'s wait.
|
||||
|
||||
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
|
||||
when step 6 says so, and for at most
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 800 milliseconds. A
|
||||
client without an answer by then counts as unknown. No question waits on these,
|
||||
which run in the background:
|
||||
client without an answer by then counts as unknown. The setting bounds only the
|
||||
question's wait: the request to GeoJS goes on, and its answer is kept for later
|
||||
questions. No question waits on these, which run in the background:
|
||||
|
||||
- the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB;
|
||||
- fetching the blocklists, the tag lists, the CrowdSec decision list and the
|
||||
file `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` names.
|
||||
- fetching the blocklists, the tag lists and the file
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` names.
|
||||
|
||||
In `enforce` mode, a question does not wait for GeoJS when it is a request:
|
||||
|
||||
- from a client on a fetched blocklist, while `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` is
|
||||
`deny`;
|
||||
- from a client on the CrowdSec decision list;
|
||||
- that would take its client over a rate limit at 100% of it, since a percentage
|
||||
can only lower a limit.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2460,38 +2486,92 @@ never wait. These can still wait for GeoJS:
|
||||
- a country list, which needs the answer;
|
||||
- a rate limit a percentage has lowered, which needs the answer;
|
||||
- a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB, while `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` is
|
||||
`deny`;
|
||||
- a trap path;
|
||||
- a rule file;
|
||||
- the Core Rule Set.
|
||||
`deny`.
|
||||
|
||||
The header limits are fixed, with no setting. `waf` refuses a request over
|
||||
either one:
|
||||
The trap paths, the rule files and the Core Rule Set, steps 12 to 14, run during
|
||||
that wait. Once a request has passed the bans, the lookup starts. While it waits
|
||||
for GeoJS, steps 12 to 14 run at the same time as steps 6 to 11. A lookup that
|
||||
needs no wait has its answer at once, and steps 7 to 11 then run before steps 12
|
||||
to 14 start.
|
||||
|
||||
- The first of the two sides to refuse the request ends the checks. `waf`
|
||||
answers at once, and does not wait for the other side. The lookup goes on, and
|
||||
its answer is kept.
|
||||
- What the other side finds leaves no trace. It counts nothing, bans nothing,
|
||||
raises no alert, counts no metric and adds nothing to the log line.
|
||||
- When both sides would refuse, the one that finishes first is answered and
|
||||
logged.
|
||||
- When neither refuses, step 15 runs.
|
||||
|
||||
Steps 12 to 14 only read the request. They have 500 milliseconds together, from
|
||||
their start. The limit is fixed, with no setting. A request they have not
|
||||
finished by then is refused:
|
||||
|
||||
- the answer is `deny`, with `503`;
|
||||
- the log line's action is `checks_timed_out`, and its `heuristic` names the
|
||||
step that had not finished;
|
||||
- the refusal makes no ban, is no offence and does not count toward the refusal
|
||||
limit;
|
||||
- it holds in every `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE`;
|
||||
- in `observe` mode the request is answered `allow` with `would_action`, like
|
||||
every refusal.
|
||||
|
||||
The limit is measured on the clock. While `waf`'s host is so busy that an
|
||||
ordinary request takes 500 milliseconds, that request is refused too.
|
||||
|
||||
The header limits are fixed, with no setting. A line's length is in bytes and
|
||||
does not count its line ending. `waf` refuses a request whose request line is
|
||||
longer than 8 KiB with `414`. An example is `GET /search?q=` followed by 30,000
|
||||
characters.
|
||||
|
||||
It refuses a request with `431` for any of:
|
||||
|
||||
- a header line longer than 8 KiB. Each value of a header sent twice is a line
|
||||
of its own. `Host` counts as a line.
|
||||
- more than 50 cookies. Each part of its `Cookie` headers between semicolons
|
||||
counts as one, unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs.
|
||||
- more than 100 header fields. A header sent twice counts twice. `Host` and
|
||||
`Transfer-Encoding` do not count. `X-Request-ID` and `X-Forwarded-Proto` do.
|
||||
|
||||
Real clients never reach these limits. The answer is `deny` with `431`, and the
|
||||
log line's action is `request_header_too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is
|
||||
no offence.
|
||||
Real clients rarely reach these limits. nginx refuses lines over 8 KiB by
|
||||
default, and Apache's default limit is about the same. The answer is `deny`. The
|
||||
log line's action is `request_line_too_long` for `414` and
|
||||
`request_header_too_large` for `431`. The refusal makes no ban and is no
|
||||
offence.
|
||||
|
||||
The header limits are the first check after `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS`. A request over
|
||||
them is refused before any later check runs. So it causes no lookup, no query to
|
||||
an outside source and no rule match, and the rate limits do not count it. A
|
||||
client under a ban or in `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` also gets `431` for such a request.
|
||||
client under a ban or in `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` also gets `414` or `431` for such a
|
||||
request.
|
||||
|
||||
The limits apply on every path and in every `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE`. A
|
||||
client in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips them, as it skips the Core Rule Set. In
|
||||
`observe` mode such a request is answered `allow` with `would_action`, and no
|
||||
other check runs on it.
|
||||
|
||||
The Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so thousands of small
|
||||
cookies would keep it busy for over a second. Within the limits, one long cookie
|
||||
or query string can still keep it busy for a fraction of a second. So enough
|
||||
such requests at once can overload `waf` past
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
||||
The Core Rule Set is the one check a visitor can keep busy for long. It runs
|
||||
each of its rules on each part of a request, so thousands of small cookies would
|
||||
keep it busy for over a second. These fixed limits bound what it reads:
|
||||
|
||||
- the header limits above;
|
||||
- `rproxy`'s limit of 32 KiB on the request line and headers together (see
|
||||
"`rproxy`'s limits");
|
||||
- 8 KiB of a body, the most `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` takes,
|
||||
or 1 KiB of a JSON body.
|
||||
|
||||
Coraza names each value in a JSON body by the whole path to it, such as
|
||||
`json.users.0.name`. So the names and values the Core Rule Set reads in a JSON
|
||||
body can add up to more than the body. From 1 KiB of JSON, Coraza makes at most
|
||||
8 KiB of them, no more than the largest body of another kind.
|
||||
|
||||
A request can reach all of these at once. At paranoia level 4, with no rule
|
||||
switched off, the Core Rule Set takes under a second on one core of a current
|
||||
server to inspect it. `waf` refuses it if the inspection takes over 500
|
||||
milliseconds. Coraza cannot stop an inspection part-way, so the inspection runs
|
||||
to its end with nobody waiting for it. These limits keep one request from
|
||||
holding a processor for more than about a second. Enough such requests at once
|
||||
can still overload `waf` past `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
||||
|
||||
### The report
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2595,11 +2675,11 @@ request and ban notes name the site by its host.
|
||||
## `rproxy`
|
||||
|
||||
`sww rproxy` is the reverse proxy in front of one app. It asks `waf` about each
|
||||
request, and passes on what `waf` allows. It keeps nothing between requests and
|
||||
writes nothing to disk. When `waf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at
|
||||
all, or does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`,
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides. Its default, `allow`,
|
||||
keeps the site answering.
|
||||
request, and passes on what `waf` allows. It writes nothing to disk. The only
|
||||
thing it keeps between requests is its circuit breaker for asks to `waf`.
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides what is done with a
|
||||
request when `waf` gives no answer in time, and while the circuit breaker is
|
||||
open. Its default, `allow`, keeps the site answering.
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` reads only its `SWW_RPROXY_` settings, which `docs/settings.md` lists.
|
||||
One of them is required: `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND`, `waf`'s URL. It has no
|
||||
@@ -2617,7 +2697,8 @@ only. The image runs it by default (see "Deployment").
|
||||
4. It refuses a request with a method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put
|
||||
to `waf` as the visitor sent it (see "Requests `rproxy` refuses itself").
|
||||
5. It reads up to the first 64 KiB of the body into memory.
|
||||
6. It sends `waf` the question (see "The question"). It speaks HTTP/1.1 to
|
||||
6. It sends `waf` the question (see "The question"), unless the circuit breaker
|
||||
keeps it from asking (see "The circuit breaker"). It speaks HTTP/1.1 to
|
||||
`waf`, whatever `waf` offers. Go's HTTP/2 client would refuse to send a
|
||||
visitor's `Upgrade` header, and most `Connection` headers. The question never
|
||||
carries the visitor's `Trailer`.
|
||||
@@ -2691,23 +2772,24 @@ log line has status `0`.
|
||||
### Without an answer from `waf`
|
||||
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides what is done with the
|
||||
request only when `waf`:
|
||||
request when `waf`:
|
||||
|
||||
- cannot be connected to;
|
||||
- does not answer at all;
|
||||
- does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, which covers
|
||||
connecting, sending the question and reading the whole answer.
|
||||
|
||||
An answer whose body breaks off counts as no answer at all.
|
||||
An answer whose body breaks off counts as no answer at all. The setting also
|
||||
decides, without asking `waf`, while the circuit breaker is open.
|
||||
|
||||
`allow`, the default, passes the request to the app. `deny` answers `503`.
|
||||
Either way `rproxy` writes a process warning, its log line has
|
||||
`waf_backend_no_answer`, and it sends no report.
|
||||
|
||||
A visitor can make `waf` slow. A request that keeps `waf` busy past
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, like any request while `waf` is overloaded,
|
||||
gets `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION`. With `deny`, such a request
|
||||
gets `503` instead of reaching the app.
|
||||
`waf` taking longer than `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` to decide a request
|
||||
is a bug in `waf`. Such a request gets
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION`, like any request while `waf` is
|
||||
overloaded. With `deny`, it gets `503` instead of reaching the app.
|
||||
|
||||
A path under `/_sww/` that `allow` would pass on is answered `404` instead, so
|
||||
that the app never sees that prefix.
|
||||
@@ -2722,6 +2804,28 @@ A visitor that goes away while `waf` is being asked is no failure of `waf`.
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` does not apply. Its log line has
|
||||
status `0` and no `disposition`.
|
||||
|
||||
### The circuit breaker
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` stops asking `waf` for a while when `waf` keeps failing to answer. An
|
||||
ask fails when `waf` gives no answer in time (see "Without an answer from
|
||||
`waf`"), or an answer `rproxy` cannot pass on. Any other answer in time
|
||||
succeeds, whatever it decides. A visitor that goes away while `waf` is being
|
||||
asked counts as neither.
|
||||
|
||||
The breaker works like this:
|
||||
|
||||
- It opens when 5 asks fail within 5 seconds. Fewer failures never open it.
|
||||
- While it is open, a request gets
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` at once, without asking `waf`.
|
||||
It gets the same process warning and `waf_backend_no_answer` as a request
|
||||
whose ask failed.
|
||||
- While it is open, one request a second still asks `waf`.
|
||||
- Each ask that succeeds clears the failures counted so far, and closes the
|
||||
breaker if it is open.
|
||||
|
||||
The breaker lives in memory, and a restart of `rproxy` closes it. It has no
|
||||
settings.
|
||||
|
||||
### Passing a request to the app
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` sends the app at `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` the visitor's request: the
|
||||
@@ -2784,9 +2888,9 @@ its whole body. The visitor gets that answer at once, and the connection closes
|
||||
after it.
|
||||
|
||||
The largest request line and headers is 32 KiB. A kept-open connection is closed
|
||||
after 120 seconds idle. Neither has a setting. traefik, by default, closes an
|
||||
unused connection after 90 seconds. So traefik closes first, and never sends a
|
||||
request on a connection `rproxy` is closing.
|
||||
after 120 seconds idle. Neither has a setting. The TLS-terminating proxy should
|
||||
close an unused connection sooner, so that it never sends a request on a
|
||||
connection `rproxy` is closing. traefik closes one after 90 seconds by default.
|
||||
|
||||
What the visitor gets when a limit is passed:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2837,14 +2941,16 @@ chooses: `waf` runs `waf`, and with it unset the image runs `rproxy`.
|
||||
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
|
||||
|
||||
- the app;
|
||||
- `rproxy`, which traefik routes to, with `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` naming the
|
||||
app and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` naming `waf`;
|
||||
- `rproxy`, which the TLS-terminating proxy forwards to, with
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` naming the app and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` naming
|
||||
`waf`;
|
||||
- `waf`, with `SWW_COMMAND=waf` and a volume for its state files.
|
||||
|
||||
Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `waf` (see "Sites"). Anything on that
|
||||
network can reach an app around `rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions or send it
|
||||
reports. So the network holds only what you trust.
|
||||
reports. So the network holds only what you trust. `README.md` lists what the
|
||||
TLS-terminating proxy must do.
|
||||
|
||||
### `rproxy` in the app's container
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2916,10 +3022,10 @@ process that stops at start is started again every second, not in a tight loop.
|
||||
container's output, which `docker logs` shows.
|
||||
- When a service exits, runit runs its `run` script again, and the container
|
||||
does not stop. Beside an app, the other process keeps running.
|
||||
- While `rproxy` is down, traefik answers `502`. While the app is down, `rproxy`
|
||||
answers `502`, which is not a client offence. While `waf` is down,
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides (see "Without an answer
|
||||
from `waf`").
|
||||
- While `rproxy` is down, the TLS-terminating proxy answers `502`. While the app
|
||||
is down, `rproxy` answers `502`, which is not a client offence. While `waf` is
|
||||
down, `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides (see "Without an
|
||||
answer from `waf`").
|
||||
- Only faults found at start stop `waf`:
|
||||
- invalid configuration;
|
||||
- a lookup database that is missing or unreadable;
|
||||
@@ -2952,23 +3058,26 @@ checks:
|
||||
- With `SWW_COMMAND` unset, empty or `rproxy`, it passes while `rproxy` answers
|
||||
that request on `127.0.0.1`, at the port in `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR`, and the
|
||||
app accepts connections at `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`. It does not ask `waf`,
|
||||
so that the site stays in traefik's routes while `waf` is down.
|
||||
so that the site stays in the TLS-terminating proxy's routes while `waf` is
|
||||
down.
|
||||
- With any other value, it fails with a message naming `SWW_COMMAND` and its
|
||||
value.
|
||||
|
||||
traefik sends a container no requests until it shows as healthy. So the check
|
||||
runs every second from the container's start until it first passes, for up to a
|
||||
minute, and every 30 seconds after that. An app with a health check of its own
|
||||
can replace the image's `HEALTHCHECK` with one that checks both.
|
||||
A TLS-terminating proxy that reads Docker's health status, as traefik does,
|
||||
sends a container no requests until it shows as healthy. So the check runs every
|
||||
second from the container's start until it first passes, for up to a minute, and
|
||||
every 30 seconds after that. An app with a health check of its own can replace
|
||||
the image's `HEALTHCHECK` with one that checks both.
|
||||
|
||||
### Ports
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` listens on no port but the one in `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR`, 8080 by
|
||||
default, which traefik routes to. It passes requests to the app at
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, `http://127.0.0.1:8081` by default. Another port may
|
||||
be set: the health check follows the setting, and traefik's port label
|
||||
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port`) must name it. An app
|
||||
beside `rproxy` must leave that port free.
|
||||
default, which the TLS-terminating proxy forwards to. It passes requests to the
|
||||
app at `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, `http://127.0.0.1:8081` by default. Another
|
||||
port may be set: the health check follows the setting, and the TLS-terminating
|
||||
proxy must name it, as traefik's port label
|
||||
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port`) does. An app beside
|
||||
`rproxy` must leave that port free.
|
||||
|
||||
`waf` listens on no port but the one in `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR`, 8080 by default.
|
||||
The questions, the reports and its own endpoints all come there.
|
||||
@@ -2990,8 +3099,8 @@ host directory, keeps them across deploys. A host directory mounted there needs
|
||||
no change of owner, and files an earlier owner left in it can be read and
|
||||
replaced. The volume holds a few tens of MiB at most with the defaults, and
|
||||
needs no backup beyond the host's own. The image declares no volume, since every
|
||||
app image built on it would inherit it. `rproxy` keeps nothing, and needs no
|
||||
volume.
|
||||
app image built on it would inherit it. `rproxy` writes nothing to disk, and
|
||||
needs no volume.
|
||||
|
||||
`waf` keeps its cache files in `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR`, `/var/cache/sww` by default,
|
||||
which the `run` script makes. The cache directory needs no volume and can be
|
||||
@@ -3009,9 +3118,9 @@ in `docs/settings.md` shows the commands.
|
||||
### Forwarded headers
|
||||
|
||||
The app's TCP peer is `rproxy`, and the `X-Forwarded-For` the app receives ends
|
||||
with traefik's address, which `rproxy` adds after the visitor's. So the app must
|
||||
trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers, besides the private address
|
||||
ranges traefik is on.
|
||||
with the TLS-terminating proxy's address, which `rproxy` adds after the
|
||||
visitor's. So the app must trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers,
|
||||
besides the private address ranges the TLS-terminating proxy is on.
|
||||
|
||||
- In a container of its own, `rproxy`'s address is on the private network. The
|
||||
usual default for a trusted-proxy setting, the private ranges, covers it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
|
||||
ARG SWW_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
|
||||
FROM ${SWW_IMAGE}
|
||||
|
||||
# Its own title and description, in place of the smallwebwaf image's.
|
||||
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf-example-app" \
|
||||
org.opencontainers.image.description="An example app built on the smallwebwaf image."
|
||||
|
||||
# Packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image.
|
||||
RUN nix-env -iA nixpkgs.busybox
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-7
@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@ back or dropped.
|
||||
|
||||
## Events
|
||||
|
||||
- `ban`: a ban `waf` made.
|
||||
- `ban`: a ban `waf` made for a broken limit or a clear sign of attack.
|
||||
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
|
||||
a request.
|
||||
- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
|
||||
threshold. The request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`:
|
||||
`detect` or `observe`.
|
||||
- `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
|
||||
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
|
||||
decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
|
||||
One alert per source.
|
||||
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist or a DNS blocklist,
|
||||
or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit. One alert per source.
|
||||
- `source_failure`: one of:
|
||||
- GeoJS failing;
|
||||
- a list that cannot be fetched;
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ on one line:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"instance": "fsn1/waf",
|
||||
"instance": "host1/waf",
|
||||
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123461Z",
|
||||
"event": "ban",
|
||||
"host": "app.example",
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ on one line:
|
||||
"limit": 0,
|
||||
"attack": 0,
|
||||
"admin": 0,
|
||||
"crowdsec": 0
|
||||
"abuseipdb": 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ on one line:
|
||||
## Slack and ntfy
|
||||
|
||||
Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
|
||||
and the event, such as `fsn1/waf: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one line
|
||||
and the event, such as `host1/waf: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one line
|
||||
for each of these that the alert has:
|
||||
|
||||
- the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
|
||||
|
||||
+19
-9
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ These questions write no line:
|
||||
A `report` line:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{"type":"request","waf_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/waf","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"core_rule_set_score":0,"duration_total_ms":3.217,"duration_checks_ms":0.041,"duration_core_rule_set_ms":0.029,"duration_upstream_total_ms":3.104}
|
||||
{"type":"request","waf_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"host1/waf","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"core_rule_set_score":0,"duration_total_ms":3.217,"duration_checks_ms":0.041,"duration_core_rule_set_ms":0.029,"duration_upstream_total_ms":3.104}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Every line
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
### Request detail
|
||||
|
||||
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
|
||||
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
|
||||
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally the TLS-terminating
|
||||
proxy.
|
||||
- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
|
||||
- `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
|
||||
/32 or an IPv6 group.
|
||||
@@ -97,12 +98,15 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
- `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source
|
||||
with the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`;
|
||||
- `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
|
||||
rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
|
||||
rule or a trap path that made such a ban;
|
||||
- `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
|
||||
ban this request made or made permanent;
|
||||
- `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
|
||||
`blocked_by_core_rule_set`: refused by that check;
|
||||
- `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
|
||||
- `request_line_too_long`: a request line over the header limits;
|
||||
- `request_header_too_large`: headers over the header limits;
|
||||
- `checks_timed_out`: refused with `503` because the trap paths, the rule
|
||||
files and the Core Rule Set had not finished within 500 ms;
|
||||
- `own_endpoint`: answered at one of `waf`'s own endpoints, or `404` for a
|
||||
path under `/_sww/`.
|
||||
- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
|
||||
@@ -118,19 +122,25 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
- `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
|
||||
- `tag_deny`: `tag`, the tag of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` the request carries;
|
||||
- `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
|
||||
- `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
|
||||
decision ends;
|
||||
- `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
|
||||
masked;
|
||||
- `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
|
||||
- `rate_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`;
|
||||
- `trap_paths`: `path`, the trap path asked for;
|
||||
- `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
|
||||
- `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
|
||||
- `header_limits`: for a request line, `request_line_bytes` and
|
||||
`request_line_bytes_limit`; for headers, `longest_header_line_bytes`,
|
||||
`header_line_bytes_limit`, `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and
|
||||
`cookies_limit`;
|
||||
- `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`,
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD`;
|
||||
- `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the refusal limit;
|
||||
- `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
For a request refused as `checks_timed_out`, `heuristic` is the one of
|
||||
`trap_paths`, `rule_files` and `core_rule_set` that had not finished, and
|
||||
its figure is `time_limit_ms`, 500.
|
||||
|
||||
- `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after `waf`
|
||||
answered the request, in `observe` mode too: `refusal_limit` or `byte_limits`.
|
||||
- `after_answer_heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic
|
||||
@@ -171,7 +181,6 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
and the rules that matched, for a request it inspected.
|
||||
- `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
|
||||
- blocklist URLs;
|
||||
- the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
|
||||
- DNS blocklist zones;
|
||||
- `abuseipdb`.
|
||||
- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +245,8 @@ meanings where they differ:
|
||||
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
|
||||
is `waf`'s answer, or the value of
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION`. It is left out when:
|
||||
- `waf` was not asked, as for the health check;
|
||||
- `waf` was not asked and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` did
|
||||
not apply, as for the health check;
|
||||
- the visitor went away while `waf` was being asked;
|
||||
- `waf`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
|
||||
- `rproxy` could not pass on `waf`'s answer, and answered `502`.
|
||||
|
||||
+40
-35
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance`
|
||||
name in each line `waf` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
|
||||
`fsn1/waf`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL`
|
||||
`host1/waf`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL`
|
||||
is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space while
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
|
||||
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
client's group, from 32 to 128.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a
|
||||
whole number above zero.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `waf` keeps, a
|
||||
whole number above zero.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): the most bans `waf` keeps for broken
|
||||
limits and attacks, a whole number above zero.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tokens
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off`
|
||||
stops the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` set to `true`;
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag,
|
||||
or an `asn=` tag while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
|
||||
- the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
|
||||
@@ -159,11 +159,14 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in
|
||||
its `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `800`): how long a
|
||||
request waits for its client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request
|
||||
to GeoJS may take. A time in milliseconds; never `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
|
||||
request waits for its client's first answer from GeoJS. A time in
|
||||
milliseconds; never `off`. It does not cut off the request to GeoJS, whose
|
||||
answer is kept when it comes later.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `true`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
|
||||
app the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
|
||||
`X-Client-Country`.
|
||||
`X-Client-Country`. The default is `false` while `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is
|
||||
`off`. With GeoJS, a new client's first request waits for its answer, up to
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Country list
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -180,8 +183,8 @@ in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
|
||||
`name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. A name is the
|
||||
tag, and may hold `=`, such as `vpn=mullvad`. Each list is an `http` or
|
||||
`https` URL fetched like a blocklist. A name or URL listed twice is refused.
|
||||
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`,
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`, or the CrowdSec decision list.
|
||||
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` or is
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` (default empty): tags whose requests are refused, such as
|
||||
`torexit,country=CN`. A tag listed twice, an `asn=` tag without a number, or a
|
||||
`country=` tag without a country, is refused.
|
||||
@@ -214,9 +217,6 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` nor `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` is
|
||||
`off`.
|
||||
|
||||
`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
|
||||
the request first.
|
||||
|
||||
## Biased thresholds
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT`
|
||||
@@ -252,10 +252,9 @@ the request first.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core
|
||||
Rule Set does not inspect.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` (default `off`): `off`, or how
|
||||
much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A
|
||||
question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at
|
||||
most 64 KiB less one byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
|
||||
much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `8K`. A
|
||||
larger size would let one request keep it busy past `rproxy`'s timeout (see
|
||||
"Answering in time" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule
|
||||
Set exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core
|
||||
Rule Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that
|
||||
@@ -333,20 +332,19 @@ the request first.
|
||||
score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a
|
||||
day, a whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec
|
||||
engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL
|
||||
without a user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it.
|
||||
Set without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
|
||||
`smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
|
||||
URL, it is refused.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`,
|
||||
`limit:<percent>` or `log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict
|
||||
or AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long a query to a
|
||||
zone or a check with AbuseIPDB may take. A time in milliseconds.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` (default `90`): the least abuse confidence score
|
||||
of the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, a whole number from 25 to 100. It
|
||||
should not be set below 50 to 75, since lower scores list ordinary visitors.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` (default `60`): how often
|
||||
the blacklist is fetched again, in minutes. A whole number above zero.
|
||||
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` (default `30`): how long the ban of a client on
|
||||
the blacklist lasts, in days. A whole number above zero.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alerting
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -373,6 +371,11 @@ the request first.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anomaly thresholds
|
||||
|
||||
An anomaly is more requests or bytes than one of these thresholds allows.
|
||||
Crossing a threshold sends one `anomaly` alert to the destinations under
|
||||
"Alerting", and does nothing else: no client is banned, rate limited or blocked.
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` holds back repeats of that alert.
|
||||
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
|
||||
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED`
|
||||
names. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
|
||||
@@ -432,8 +435,9 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
|
||||
- at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
|
||||
- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
|
||||
- `waf` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports;
|
||||
- `waf` refuses a request with more than 50 cookies or more than 100 header
|
||||
fields (see "Answering in time" under "`waf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
|
||||
- `waf` refuses a request with a request line or header line over 8 KiB, more
|
||||
than 50 cookies or more than 100 header fields (see "Answering in time" under
|
||||
"`waf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
|
||||
- `rproxy` takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB, and closes a
|
||||
kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds;
|
||||
- `rproxy` reads at most 1 MiB of the body of `waf`'s answer, and answers `502`
|
||||
@@ -443,7 +447,9 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
|
||||
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` is the longest a question waits on
|
||||
an outside source. Keep it well under `rproxy`'s
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits for
|
||||
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. The trap paths, the rule
|
||||
files and the Core Rule Set run during that wait and have 500 ms, so `waf`
|
||||
answers within the longer of the two times. No question waits for
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are
|
||||
asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`waf`" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
|
||||
@@ -461,10 +467,9 @@ start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
|
||||
for `waf`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time in milliseconds;
|
||||
never `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done
|
||||
with a request when `waf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
|
||||
does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it
|
||||
to the app, and `deny` answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `waf`
|
||||
gives, such as an error.
|
||||
with a request when `waf` gives no answer in time, and while the circuit
|
||||
breaker for asks to `waf` is open. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny`
|
||||
answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `waf` gives, such as an error.
|
||||
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A
|
||||
size or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A
|
||||
@@ -486,9 +491,9 @@ start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
|
||||
`10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`): the netblocks whose
|
||||
`X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts nothing. A client
|
||||
outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where other containers
|
||||
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach traefik, they
|
||||
can name another address in the header. Narrowing the setting to traefik's own
|
||||
network closes that gap.
|
||||
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach the
|
||||
TLS-terminating proxy, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing
|
||||
the setting to the TLS-terminating proxy's own network closes that gap.
|
||||
|
||||
## The image's command
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+19
-5
@@ -21,11 +21,22 @@ top-level `version` of 1.
|
||||
|
||||
## `bans.json`
|
||||
|
||||
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of
|
||||
those `waf` made. Per entry:
|
||||
Active and past bans:
|
||||
|
||||
- every ban an admin made;
|
||||
- up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of those `waf` made for a broken limit or an attack;
|
||||
- the bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist.
|
||||
|
||||
A ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist that has ended is forgotten at the next of
|
||||
these:
|
||||
|
||||
- a fetch of the blacklist in `enforce` mode;
|
||||
- a read of `bans.json`, at the start or after an admin's edit.
|
||||
|
||||
Per entry:
|
||||
|
||||
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
|
||||
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
|
||||
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `abuseipdb`;
|
||||
- `reason`: a short reason;
|
||||
- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
|
||||
- `notes`: the notes below.
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +71,8 @@ ban. The notes:
|
||||
- for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
|
||||
- `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
|
||||
AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
|
||||
- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes:
|
||||
- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes, and
|
||||
empty for a ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist:
|
||||
- `time`, `method` and `host`;
|
||||
- `path`, with its query string;
|
||||
- `status` and `user_agent`;
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +163,9 @@ A cache file. routewatch's answers from the last hour, one per line:
|
||||
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
|
||||
the default `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
|
||||
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
|
||||
more.
|
||||
more. A ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist takes about 1 KiB. A free account's
|
||||
blacklist lists 10,000 clients, so it adds at least 10 MiB, and 1 GiB of
|
||||
writes a day.
|
||||
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
|
||||
full.
|
||||
- `routewatch.json`: about 120 bytes per answer, at most about 12 MiB.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ require (
|
||||
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
|
||||
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
|
||||
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
@@ -43,11 +45,13 @@ require (
|
||||
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
|
||||
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 // indirect
|
||||
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 // indirect
|
||||
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 // indirect
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 // indirect
|
||||
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.60.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/text v0.42.0 // indirect
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
|
||||
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 // indirect
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,8 +97,16 @@ github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 h1:qjsOFOWWQl+N3RsoF5/ssm1pHmJJwhjlSbZ51I6wMl4=
|
||||
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
|
||||
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 h1:eR8k/3jP/OOqB8LRCtdJ4U+vlgd/gk5y3KMXoodrsrw=
|
||||
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3/go.mod h1:sZ3as9xqm1SSK5feFWIR2CuGeGRhsM7TR1MbpBctzPk=
|
||||
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 h1:BACLhebsYdpQ7IROQ1AGPjrXcP5dF80U3gKoFzbaq/4=
|
||||
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0/go.mod h1:Us0rSJiThwCv2GteUN0Q7OKvU7n5J4dxZ9JKUXozFdE=
|
||||
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0 h1:wE8mruvpg2kiiL1Vqd0CC+tr0/24XIB10Iwp2lLWzkg=
|
||||
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0/go.mod h1:AmDeGyS+ZARGKM4tlH4FY2Jr63VjbEDJHtqXTGP5hbo=
|
||||
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
|
||||
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
|
||||
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 h1:S0h4aNzvfcFsC3dRF1jLoaov7oRaKqRGC/pUEJ2yvPQ=
|
||||
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0/go.mod h1:20+QtiLqy0Nd6FdQB9TLXag12DsQkrbs3htMFfDN80Y=
|
||||
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 h1:sI7k6L95XOKS281NhVKOFCUNIvv9e0w4BF8N3u+tCRo=
|
||||
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0/go.mod h1:dtElttAiwGvoJ/vj4IwHBS/gXsEu/pZ50mUIRWuG0so=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4/go.mod h1:gMZqIpDtDqOfM0uNfy0SkpRhvUryYH0Z6wdMYcacYXQ=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,9 +48,8 @@ const (
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
|
||||
// detect mode.
|
||||
EventCoreRuleSetMatch = "core_rule_set_match"
|
||||
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
|
||||
// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
|
||||
// is a hit.
|
||||
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL
|
||||
// zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit.
|
||||
EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
|
||||
// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing sww, a fetch
|
||||
// of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const (
|
||||
ntfyURL = "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts"
|
||||
ntfyToken = "tk_0123456789abcdefghijklmnopq"
|
||||
// instance is the instance name every alert gives.
|
||||
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
instance = "host1/blog"
|
||||
// started is when each test starts, as an alert gives it, and
|
||||
// anHourOn an hour later.
|
||||
started = "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"
|
||||
@@ -1160,8 +1160,8 @@ func TestEachDestinationIsSentOnlyTheAlertsWaitingForIt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
|
||||
wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationSlack],
|
||||
`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
|
||||
`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nthird"}`)
|
||||
`{"text":"*host1/blog: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
|
||||
`{"text":"*host1/blog: file_error*\nthird"}`)
|
||||
wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationNtfy], "fourth")
|
||||
|
||||
// alerts.json then lists Slack and ntfy alone, with no alert waiting.
|
||||
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
Reason: "requests per hour over the limit of 10000",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]any{"mode": "observe"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: ban", "default no_entry",
|
||||
"host1/blog: ban", "default no_entry",
|
||||
"requests per hour over the limit of 10000\nclient: 203.0.113.9\n" +
|
||||
"netblock: 203.0.113.0/24\ncountry: DE\nmode: observe",
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
), Country: "FR",
|
||||
Reason: "matched the rule env-file",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
|
||||
"host1/blog: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
|
||||
"matched the rule env-file\nclient: 198.51.100.7\n" +
|
||||
"netblock: 198.51.100.7/32\ncountry: FR",
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
Reason: "refused by the Core Rule Set",
|
||||
Host: "app.example",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: core_rule_set_match", "default shield",
|
||||
"host1/blog: core_rule_set_match", "default shield",
|
||||
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
|
||||
"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventAnomaly, Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"),
|
||||
Reason: "requests per minute over the threshold of 5000",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
|
||||
"host1/blog: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
|
||||
"requests per minute over the threshold of 5000\nnetblock: 192.0.2.0/24",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1518,7 +1518,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/32"),
|
||||
Reason: "listed by a DNS blocklist",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: reputation_hit", "low label",
|
||||
"host1/blog: reputation_hit", "low label",
|
||||
"listed by a DNS blocklist\nclient: 192.0.2.2\nnetblock: 192.0.2.2/32",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure, Reason: "asking GeoJS failed",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]any{"source": "geojs"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: source_failure", "high warning",
|
||||
"host1/blog: source_failure", "high warning",
|
||||
"asking GeoJS failed\nsource: geojs",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1537,7 +1537,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
|
||||
"file": "/etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules", "error": "line 2: no action",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog: file_error", "high warning",
|
||||
"host1/blog: file_error", "high warning",
|
||||
"a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were\n" +
|
||||
"file: /etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules\nerror: line 2: no action",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
|
||||
package bans_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBlacklistedNetblockIsBannedUntilTheGivenEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
now := midnight()
|
||||
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||
|
||||
made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||
now, expires, map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 95},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if made != 1 || ledger.Made(bans.CauseAbuseIPDB) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("made %d bans, %d counted, want 1 and 1",
|
||||
made, ledger.Made(bans.CauseAbuseIPDB))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ban, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), now)
|
||||
if !banned || madePermanent || !ban.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
|
||||
ban.Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB ||
|
||||
ban.Reason != "on AbuseIPDB's blacklist with a score of 95" ||
|
||||
len(ban.Notes.Reputation) != 1 ||
|
||||
ban.Notes.Reputation[0].Source != "abuseipdb" ||
|
||||
*ban.Notes.Reputation[0].Score != 95 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"ban %+v, banned %t, made permanent %t, want the blacklist's "+
|
||||
"ban until %s",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
banned,
|
||||
madePermanent,
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
|
||||
t.Error("the ban refuses a request at its end")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBlacklistLeavesANetblockWithAnActiveBanAsItIs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
now := midnight()
|
||||
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 100}
|
||||
|
||||
limitBan, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, now.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans over a ban for a limit, want none", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Once that ban has ended the netblock is banned, and the blacklist
|
||||
// fetched again makes no second ban while the first lasts.
|
||||
later := limitBan.Expires
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans after the ban for a limit, want 1", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
later = later.Add(time.Hour)
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans while the blacklist's lasts, want none", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 2})
|
||||
|
||||
if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[1].Notes.EarlierBans; got != (bans.EarlierBans{
|
||||
Limit: 1,
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("earlier bans %+v, want 1 for a limit", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLiftedBlacklistBanHoldsUntilItsEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
now := midnight()
|
||||
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 100}
|
||||
|
||||
ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, expires, scores)
|
||||
ledger.Lift(netblock.Addr(), now)
|
||||
|
||||
// The admin lifted it: the blacklist fetched again until its end bans
|
||||
// nothing.
|
||||
later := expires.Add(-time.Hour)
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans before the lifted ban's end, want none", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// From its end on, the blacklist bans the netblock again, and the
|
||||
// lifted ban, ended, is forgotten.
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(expires, expires.Add(30*day), scores); made != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans at the lifted ban's end, want 1", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 1})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEndedBlacklistBansAreForgottenAtTheNextFetch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
listed := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
|
||||
now := midnight()
|
||||
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||
|
||||
ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, expires, map[netip.Prefix]int64{listed: 100})
|
||||
ledger.BanForLimit(limited, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
|
||||
// listed is off the blacklist when it is fetched after the ban's end.
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(expires, expires.Add(30*day), nil); made != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans for an empty blacklist, want none", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{listed: 0, limited: 1})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBlacklistBansDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
params := defaultParams()
|
||||
params.MaxBans = 1
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(params)
|
||||
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
|
||||
attacker := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
|
||||
now := midnight()
|
||||
|
||||
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{}
|
||||
for i := range 3 {
|
||||
scores[netip.PrefixFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 51, 100, byte(i)}), 32)] = 100
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ledger.BanForLimit(limited, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
|
||||
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, now.Add(30*day), scores); made != 3 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("made %d bans for 3 netblocks, want 3", made)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{limited: 1})
|
||||
|
||||
// The ban for an attack takes the place of the one for a limit, and no
|
||||
// blacklist ban goes.
|
||||
ledger.BanForAttack(attacker, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
|
||||
want := map[netip.Prefix]int{limited: 0, attacker: 1}
|
||||
for netblock := range scores {
|
||||
want[netblock] = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantBans(t, ledger, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+181
-127
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
|
||||
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
|
||||
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the refusal
|
||||
// limit, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
|
||||
// decision list, and
|
||||
// limit or show a clear sign of attack, or are on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, and
|
||||
// those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
|
||||
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and
|
||||
// read from it by the state package.
|
||||
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and read
|
||||
// from it by the state package.
|
||||
package bans
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
@@ -28,9 +27,9 @@ const (
|
||||
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
|
||||
// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
|
||||
CauseAdmin = "admin"
|
||||
// CauseCrowdSec is a ban sww made for a client the CrowdSec
|
||||
// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
|
||||
CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
|
||||
// CauseAbuseIPDB is a ban sww made for a client on AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
// blacklist. It is forgotten once it has ended.
|
||||
CauseAbuseIPDB = "abuseipdb"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
|
||||
@@ -45,8 +44,8 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
|
||||
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
|
||||
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
|
||||
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for
|
||||
// CrowdSec's decision, a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
|
||||
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
|
||||
// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
|
||||
// repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
|
||||
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
|
||||
// A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than
|
||||
@@ -55,10 +54,11 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
|
||||
// lasts.
|
||||
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
|
||||
// MaxBans is the most bans held whose cause is not CauseAdmin, at
|
||||
// least one. Past it, the earliest such ban of the netblock that has
|
||||
// gone longest without a request is dropped. Bans whose cause is
|
||||
// CauseAdmin are held besides, and never dropped.
|
||||
// MaxBans is the most bans held whose cause is CauseLimit or
|
||||
// CauseAttack, at least one. Past it, the earliest such ban of the
|
||||
// netblock that has gone longest without a request is dropped. Bans
|
||||
// whose cause is CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB are held besides, and
|
||||
// never dropped this way.
|
||||
MaxBans int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ type Ban struct {
|
||||
Start time.Time
|
||||
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
|
||||
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB.
|
||||
Cause string
|
||||
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken,
|
||||
// the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
|
||||
// admin's, what the admin wrote.
|
||||
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken, the
|
||||
// rule that matched or AbuseIPDB's score; for an admin's, what the
|
||||
// admin wrote.
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
|
||||
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
|
||||
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ type Notes struct {
|
||||
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
|
||||
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
|
||||
// it, that was the clear sign of attack, or that came from a client the
|
||||
// CrowdSec decision list lists.
|
||||
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack. A ban for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
// blacklist has none, and leaves it zero.
|
||||
Request Request `json:"request"`
|
||||
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
|
||||
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
|
||||
@@ -148,9 +148,8 @@ type Notes struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// ReputationHit is a reputation source that listed a client, as a
|
||||
// reputation_hit alert's detail gives it: Source is the URL of the
|
||||
// blocklist or of the CrowdSec decision list, the DNSBL zone with its key
|
||||
// masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score, for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the
|
||||
// client.
|
||||
// blocklist, the DNSBL zone with its key masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score,
|
||||
// for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the client.
|
||||
type ReputationHit struct {
|
||||
Source string `json:"source"`
|
||||
Score *int64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
|
||||
@@ -158,10 +157,10 @@ type ReputationHit struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
|
||||
type EarlierBans struct {
|
||||
Limit int `json:"limit"`
|
||||
Attack int `json:"attack"`
|
||||
Admin int `json:"admin"`
|
||||
CrowdSec int `json:"crowdsec"`
|
||||
Limit int `json:"limit"`
|
||||
Attack int `json:"attack"`
|
||||
Admin int `json:"admin"`
|
||||
AbuseIPDB int `json:"abuseipdb"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
|
||||
@@ -189,8 +188,8 @@ type Ledger struct {
|
||||
// netblocks holds each banned netblock's bans, oldest first. Check and
|
||||
// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
|
||||
netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
|
||||
// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
|
||||
// at most params.MaxBans.
|
||||
// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is CauseLimit or
|
||||
// CauseAttack, at most params.MaxBans.
|
||||
held int
|
||||
// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
|
||||
// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
|
||||
@@ -207,8 +206,9 @@ type Ledger struct {
|
||||
// New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
|
||||
func New(params Params) *Ledger {
|
||||
// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
|
||||
// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
|
||||
// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
|
||||
// CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB to make room, however many there are, so
|
||||
// the LRU has no limit of its own: it keeps the netblocks in the order
|
||||
// they were last seen.
|
||||
netblocks, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban](
|
||||
math.MaxInt,
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
@@ -303,8 +303,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
|
||||
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
|
||||
// returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban
|
||||
// made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended
|
||||
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for CrowdSec's
|
||||
// decision, or a lifted one, lasts
|
||||
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts
|
||||
// repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
|
||||
// than LimitBanPermanentAbove is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
|
||||
// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
|
||||
@@ -318,7 +317,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
time.Time{},
|
||||
CauseLimit,
|
||||
limitReason(notes),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
@@ -334,7 +332,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit(
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
time.Time{},
|
||||
CauseLimit,
|
||||
limitReason(notes),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
@@ -353,7 +350,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
time.Time{},
|
||||
CauseAttack,
|
||||
attackReason(notes),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
@@ -369,7 +365,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
time.Time{},
|
||||
CauseAttack,
|
||||
attackReason(notes),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
@@ -377,51 +372,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BanForCrowdSec bans netblock at now until expires, when CrowdSec's
|
||||
// decision on the client ends, with notes, and returns the ban, and
|
||||
// whether it made it, as BanForLimit does. Its reason is "CrowdSec's
|
||||
// decision for <scenario>", the scenario that made the decision.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) BanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock netip.Prefix,
|
||||
now, expires time.Time,
|
||||
scenario string,
|
||||
notes Notes,
|
||||
) (Ban, bool) {
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
CauseCrowdSec,
|
||||
crowdSecReason(scenario),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WouldBanForCrowdSec returns what BanForCrowdSec would, without making
|
||||
// the ban: what observe mode would have done.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock netip.Prefix,
|
||||
now, expires time.Time,
|
||||
scenario string,
|
||||
notes Notes,
|
||||
) (Ban, bool) {
|
||||
return l.ban(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
CauseCrowdSec,
|
||||
crowdSecReason(scenario),
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit,
|
||||
// CauseAttack or CauseCrowdSec, made at now would be permanent, as
|
||||
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack or BanForCrowdSec would make it. It works out
|
||||
// nothing else of the ban. A ban for CrowdSec's decision is never
|
||||
// permanent: it ends with the decision.
|
||||
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit
|
||||
// or CauseAttack, made at now would be permanent, as BanForLimit or
|
||||
// BanForAttack would make it. It works out nothing else of the ban.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
|
||||
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
|
||||
) bool {
|
||||
@@ -433,14 +386,11 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
|
||||
held = *bans
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch cause {
|
||||
case CauseAttack:
|
||||
if cause == CauseAttack {
|
||||
return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
|
||||
case CauseLimit:
|
||||
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
|
||||
default: // CauseCrowdSec
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes.
|
||||
@@ -459,12 +409,6 @@ func attackReason(notes Notes) string {
|
||||
return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecReason is the reason of a ban for CrowdSec's decision, which
|
||||
// scenario made.
|
||||
func crowdSecReason(scenario string) string {
|
||||
return "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until
|
||||
// expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose
|
||||
// cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the
|
||||
@@ -494,6 +438,88 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAdmin(
|
||||
return ban
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BanForAbuseIPDB bans each netblock in scores at now until expires, and
|
||||
// returns how many bans it made. scores are the netblocks of the clients
|
||||
// on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, each with the highest score of its clients.
|
||||
// A netblock is left as it is while a ban on it is active, or while a ban
|
||||
// for the blacklist that an admin lifted has not reached its end: the
|
||||
// admin's lift holds that long. Each ban whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||
// and that has ended is forgotten first, so that the bans held for the
|
||||
// blacklist are those of the clients listed within one ban's length.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||
now, expires time.Time, scores map[netip.Prefix]int64,
|
||||
) int {
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
changed := l.forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now)
|
||||
made := 0
|
||||
|
||||
for netblock, score := range scores {
|
||||
netblock = netblock.Masked()
|
||||
|
||||
var notes Notes
|
||||
|
||||
if held, found := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock); found {
|
||||
if activeBan(*held, now) != nil ||
|
||||
liftedAbuseIPDBBan(*held, now) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
notes.EarlierBans = earlierBans(*held)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The source is named as the request log names AbuseIPDB.
|
||||
notes.Reputation = []ReputationHit{
|
||||
{Source: CauseAbuseIPDB, Score: &score},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l.add(Ban{
|
||||
Netblock: netblock,
|
||||
Start: now,
|
||||
Expires: expires,
|
||||
Cause: CauseAbuseIPDB,
|
||||
Reason: fmt.Sprintf(
|
||||
"on AbuseIPDB's blacklist with a score of %d", score,
|
||||
),
|
||||
Notes: notes,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
made++
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l.made[CauseAbuseIPDB] += made
|
||||
|
||||
if changed || made > 0 {
|
||||
l.markChanged()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return made
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans forgets the bans whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||
// and that have ended at now, as BanForAbuseIPDB does first. The state
|
||||
// package calls it each time it reads bans.json, so that these bans are
|
||||
// also forgotten while no fetch of the blacklist reaches the ledger.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now time.Time) {
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if l.forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now) {
|
||||
l.markChanged()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// liftedAbuseIPDBBan reports whether bans, a netblock's, hold a ban whose
|
||||
// cause is CauseAbuseIPDB that an admin lifted, and whose end is not
|
||||
// reached at now.
|
||||
func liftedAbuseIPDBBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
return slices.ContainsFunc(bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||
return ban.Cause == CauseAbuseIPDB && !ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
|
||||
(ban.Permanent() || now.Before(ban.Expires))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Lift lifts, at now, every ban active then on a netblock client is in,
|
||||
// as an admin does, and returns those bans. A lifted ban is kept, refuses
|
||||
// nothing, and does not make the netblock's next ban longer.
|
||||
@@ -580,9 +606,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) AddLookup(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Made returns how many bans for cause have been made since the start:
|
||||
// for CauseLimit and CauseAttack, by the ledger; for CauseAdmin, by an
|
||||
// admin, with BanForAdmin or in an edit of bans.json, as LoadEdit counts
|
||||
// them. The bans read from bans.json at the start are not among them.
|
||||
// for CauseLimit, CauseAttack and CauseAbuseIPDB, by the ledger; for
|
||||
// CauseAdmin, by an admin, with BanForAdmin or in an edit of bans.json, as
|
||||
// LoadEdit counts them. The bans read from bans.json at the start are not among them.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) Made(cause string) int {
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -639,8 +665,8 @@ func (l *Ledger) Snapshot() []Ban {
|
||||
// seen. A ban without a cause is an admin's, and gets CauseAdmin. Each
|
||||
// netblock is masked to its length, so that 203.0.113.9/24 is
|
||||
// 203.0.113.0/24, and each text in the notes is cut to 256 bytes. Past
|
||||
// MaxBans the earliest bans whose cause is not CauseAdmin are dropped, as
|
||||
// when they are made.
|
||||
// MaxBans the earliest bans that count toward it are dropped, as when they
|
||||
// are made.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -704,15 +730,42 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
|
||||
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack and BanForCrowdSec describe, and returns the
|
||||
// ban, and whether it made it. expires is when a ban for CauseCrowdSec
|
||||
// ends, and zero for the others, whose end the ledger works out. Unless
|
||||
// keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it is the ban that
|
||||
// would have been made.
|
||||
// forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans forgets each ban whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||
// and whose end is reached at now, lifted or not, and each netblock left
|
||||
// without a ban. It reports whether it forgot one.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
forgot := false
|
||||
|
||||
for _, netblock := range l.netblocks.Keys() {
|
||||
bans, _ := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock)
|
||||
|
||||
kept := slices.DeleteFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||
return ban.Cause == CauseAbuseIPDB && !ban.Permanent() &&
|
||||
!now.Before(ban.Expires)
|
||||
})
|
||||
if len(kept) == len(*bans) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
forgot = true
|
||||
|
||||
if len(kept) == 0 {
|
||||
l.netblocks.Remove(netblock)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
*bans = kept
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return forgot
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, CauseLimit or CauseAttack, with
|
||||
// reason and notes, as BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns
|
||||
// the ban, and whether it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not
|
||||
// made, only returned: it is the ban that would have been made.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) ban(
|
||||
netblock netip.Prefix,
|
||||
now, expires time.Time,
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
cause, reason string,
|
||||
notes Notes,
|
||||
keep bool,
|
||||
@@ -743,13 +796,10 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
|
||||
Notes: notes,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch cause {
|
||||
case CauseAttack:
|
||||
if cause == CauseAttack {
|
||||
ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
|
||||
case CauseLimit:
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
|
||||
default: // CauseCrowdSec
|
||||
ban.Expires = expires
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !keep {
|
||||
@@ -784,16 +834,16 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
|
||||
fromHere.Attack++
|
||||
case CauseAdmin:
|
||||
fromHere.Admin++
|
||||
case CauseCrowdSec:
|
||||
fromHere.CrowdSec++
|
||||
case CauseAbuseIPDB:
|
||||
fromHere.AbuseIPDB++
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
|
||||
count := EarlierBans{
|
||||
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
|
||||
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
|
||||
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
|
||||
CrowdSec: notes.CrowdSec + fromHere.CrowdSec,
|
||||
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
|
||||
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
|
||||
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
|
||||
AbuseIPDB: notes.AbuseIPDB + fromHere.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
|
||||
@@ -808,7 +858,7 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
|
||||
|
||||
// total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
|
||||
func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
|
||||
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.CrowdSec
|
||||
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
|
||||
@@ -879,9 +929,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) covering(client netip.Addr) []*[]Ban {
|
||||
|
||||
// add adds ban to its netblock's bans, after the last, and makes its
|
||||
// netblock the most recently seen. With MaxBans held, it drops one first,
|
||||
// unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
|
||||
// unless ban does not count toward MaxBans.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
|
||||
counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
|
||||
counted := countsTowardMaxBans(ban)
|
||||
if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
|
||||
l.dropOne()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -913,9 +963,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
|
||||
// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
|
||||
// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
|
||||
// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
|
||||
// sign of attack or for CrowdSec's decision, or a lifted one, can make the
|
||||
// new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
|
||||
// another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
|
||||
// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an
|
||||
// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so
|
||||
// that one is looked for among them all.
|
||||
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
|
||||
length := l.params.LimitBanDuration
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -962,7 +1012,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
|
||||
return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the
|
||||
// countsTowardMaxBans reports whether ban counts toward MaxBans: its cause
|
||||
// is CauseLimit or CauseAttack.
|
||||
func countsTowardMaxBans(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||
return ban.Cause == CauseLimit || ban.Cause == CauseAttack
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// dropOne drops the earliest ban that counts toward MaxBans of the
|
||||
// netblock that has gone longest without a request, of those that hold
|
||||
// such a ban, and the netblock with it if that was its only ban. It is
|
||||
// called with at least one such ban held. It looks at each netblock once
|
||||
@@ -971,11 +1027,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) dropOne() {
|
||||
for range l.netblocks.Len() {
|
||||
netblock, bans, _ := l.netblocks.GetOldest()
|
||||
|
||||
i := slices.IndexFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||
return ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
|
||||
})
|
||||
i := slices.IndexFunc(*bans, countsTowardMaxBans)
|
||||
if i < 0 {
|
||||
// Its bans are all an admin's, and never dropped. Get makes
|
||||
// None of its bans is dropped to make room. Get makes
|
||||
// it the most recently seen, so that the next netblock is
|
||||
// looked at; when it was seen matters only for dropping a
|
||||
// ban, and a ban added to it makes it the most recently seen
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package bans_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// scenario is the scenario of the tests' CrowdSec decisions.
|
||||
const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
|
||||
|
||||
// The ban that would be made is not made.
|
||||
would, wouldBan := ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
midnight(),
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
scenario,
|
||||
bans.Notes{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if !wouldBan || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"would ban %t, and the ledger holds %+v, want true and nothing",
|
||||
wouldBan,
|
||||
ledger.Bans(netblock),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const reason = "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
|
||||
|
||||
ban, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
midnight(),
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
scenario,
|
||||
bans.Notes{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if !made || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, would) ||
|
||||
ban.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
|
||||
!ban.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
|
||||
ban.Reason != reason ||
|
||||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"made %t the ban %+v, want the one that would be made, %+v, for "+
|
||||
"crowdsec until %s",
|
||||
made,
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
would,
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A second decision on the netblock while the ban lasts makes no other.
|
||||
again, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
expires.Add(time.Hour), scenario, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
if made || !again.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
|
||||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"made %t the ban %+v while the first lasts, want none",
|
||||
made,
|
||||
again,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
|
||||
ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
midnight(),
|
||||
expires,
|
||||
scenario,
|
||||
bans.Notes{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// A request as the ban ends is refused, and leaves it as it is.
|
||||
last := expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
|
||||
held, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), last)
|
||||
if !banned || madePermanent || !held.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
|
||||
ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, last, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"as the ban ends, banned %t with %+v, made permanent %t, want "+
|
||||
"refused under the ban as it was",
|
||||
banned,
|
||||
held,
|
||||
madePermanent,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
|
||||
t.Error("the ban refuses a request once the decision has ended")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
|
||||
// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
|
||||
// ban for CrowdSec's decision ends bans for an hour, as a first broken
|
||||
// limit does.
|
||||
crowdSec, _ := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
midnight(),
|
||||
midnight().Add(3*day),
|
||||
scenario,
|
||||
bans.Notes{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, crowdSec.Expires, bans.Notes{})
|
||||
|
||||
if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour ||
|
||||
limit.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{CrowdSec: 1}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour after one for crowdsec",
|
||||
limit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+74
-86
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ type WAF struct {
|
||||
// client's first answer from GeoJS while a setting needs it
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS), which cannot be off.
|
||||
// AddLookupHeaders is true when the app is passed the client's AS number
|
||||
// and country in headers (SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS).
|
||||
// and country in headers (SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS), by default unless
|
||||
// LookupSource is off.
|
||||
LookupSource string
|
||||
LookupDBPath string
|
||||
ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout time.Duration
|
||||
@@ -157,13 +158,14 @@ type WAF struct {
|
||||
DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent int64
|
||||
IPReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
|
||||
DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout time.Duration
|
||||
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is where the decision list of the CrowdSec
|
||||
// engine whose local API SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names is fetched from:
|
||||
// that URL with v1/decisions added to its path, "" while it is unset and
|
||||
// none is. CrowdSecKey is the key the engine is asked with
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
|
||||
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
|
||||
CrowdSecKey string
|
||||
// While AbuseIPDBKey is set, AbuseIPDB's blacklist of the clients it
|
||||
// scores AbuseIPDBThreshold or more (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD), from
|
||||
// 25 to 100, is fetched at the start and every AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS). Each client on it
|
||||
// is banned for AbuseIPDBBanDuration (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS).
|
||||
AbuseIPDBThreshold int64
|
||||
AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh time.Duration
|
||||
AbuseIPDBBanDuration time.Duration
|
||||
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
|
||||
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
|
||||
@@ -336,6 +338,9 @@ const (
|
||||
// netblock a provider is usually given: a shorter one would make one
|
||||
// client of the customers of several providers.
|
||||
minIPv6GroupPrefix = 32
|
||||
// minAbuseIPDBThreshold is the lowest score AbuseIPDB's blacklist can
|
||||
// be cut at.
|
||||
minAbuseIPDBThreshold = 25
|
||||
// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
|
||||
minTokenLength = 32
|
||||
// maxParanoiaLevel is the Core Rule Set's highest paranoia level.
|
||||
@@ -371,8 +376,8 @@ var (
|
||||
"it names the file to look clients up in",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
|
||||
errOver64K = errors.New(
|
||||
"is more than 64K, the most waf gets of a body")
|
||||
errOver8K = errors.New(
|
||||
"is more than 8K, the most the Core Rule Set can read in time")
|
||||
errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d")
|
||||
errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New(
|
||||
@@ -452,6 +457,13 @@ var (
|
||||
errNotPercent = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotAbuseIPDBThreshold = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a whole number from 25 to 100, the scores AbuseIPDB's " +
|
||||
"blacklist can be cut at",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotWholeUnits = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a whole number above zero, such as 30, that fits a duration",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errListedTwice = errors.New("is listed twice")
|
||||
errNotListURL = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
||||
@@ -473,21 +485,12 @@ var (
|
||||
"is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
|
||||
"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
||||
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
|
||||
errNotRouteWatchURL = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
||||
"such as https://routewatch.example")
|
||||
errNeedsLAPIKey = errors.New("the engine answers no request without it")
|
||||
errLAPIKeyUnused = errors.New(
|
||||
"it is sent only to the engine at that URL",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errAnotherList = errors.New(
|
||||
errFetchedOtherwise = errors.New(
|
||||
"is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errFetchedOtherwise = errors.New("is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, is " +
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL or is the CrowdSec decision list too")
|
||||
errNotTagList = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a name, = and an http or https URL, such as " +
|
||||
"torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt")
|
||||
@@ -502,8 +505,6 @@ var (
|
||||
errExploitTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"cannot lower limits: the rate limits count a request before its " +
|
||||
"rules are matched")
|
||||
errCrowdSecTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"cannot be used: a CrowdSec decision refuses the request first")
|
||||
errNoRequestGetsTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"is a tag no request can get: it is not a name in SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, an " +
|
||||
"asn= or country= tag, a dnsbl= tag of a zone in SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES, " +
|
||||
@@ -567,7 +568,6 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS",
|
||||
"800",
|
||||
),
|
||||
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
|
||||
ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
|
||||
TagLists: env.tagLists("SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"),
|
||||
@@ -605,10 +605,20 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS",
|
||||
"2000",
|
||||
),
|
||||
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: env.crowdSecDecisionsURL(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL",
|
||||
AbuseIPDBThreshold: env.abuseIPDBThreshold(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD",
|
||||
"90",
|
||||
),
|
||||
AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: env.wholeUnits(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS",
|
||||
"60",
|
||||
time.Minute,
|
||||
),
|
||||
AbuseIPDBBanDuration: env.wholeUnits(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS",
|
||||
"30",
|
||||
day,
|
||||
),
|
||||
CrowdSecKey: env.secret("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"),
|
||||
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
|
||||
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION",
|
||||
@@ -746,6 +756,9 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
|
||||
|
||||
cfg.LogRemoteAppName = env.appName("SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME",
|
||||
cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil)
|
||||
// The app gets the headers by default, unless no client is looked up.
|
||||
cfg.AddLookupHeaders = env.boolean("SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS",
|
||||
strconv.FormatBool(cfg.LookupSource != off))
|
||||
cfg.BlocklistAction, cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent = env.action(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION", "deny")
|
||||
cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction, cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent = env.action(
|
||||
@@ -755,7 +768,6 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
|
||||
env.checkLookupDBPath(cfg)
|
||||
env.checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg)
|
||||
env.checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg)
|
||||
env.checkCrowdSec(cfg)
|
||||
env.checkTagLists(cfg)
|
||||
env.checkTags(cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -977,6 +989,35 @@ func (e *environment) percent(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
|
||||
return percent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// abuseIPDBThreshold reads the setting that is the least score of the
|
||||
// clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist: a whole number from 25 to 100, the
|
||||
// range AbuseIPDB takes.
|
||||
func (e *environment) abuseIPDBThreshold(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
|
||||
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
|
||||
|
||||
threshold, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
|
||||
if err != nil || threshold < minAbuseIPDBThreshold || threshold > 100 {
|
||||
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotAbuseIPDBThreshold))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return threshold
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wholeUnits reads a setting that is a whole number above zero of unit,
|
||||
// such as minutes or days, and returns it as a duration.
|
||||
func (e *environment) wholeUnits(
|
||||
name, defaultValue string, unit time.Duration,
|
||||
) time.Duration {
|
||||
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
|
||||
|
||||
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
|
||||
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(unit) {
|
||||
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotWholeUnits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return time.Duration(n) * unit
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// listURL reads a setting that is the URL a list is fetched from, "" while
|
||||
// it is unset or empty.
|
||||
func (e *environment) listURL(name string) string {
|
||||
@@ -1061,26 +1102,6 @@ func (e *environment) resolver(name string) netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
return resolver
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecDecisionsURL reads the setting that is the URL of the CrowdSec
|
||||
// engine's local API, such as http://172.17.0.1:8080, and returns the URL
|
||||
// its decision list is fetched from, that URL with v1/decisions added to
|
||||
// its path, "" while it is unset or empty.
|
||||
func (e *environment) crowdSecDecisionsURL(name string) string {
|
||||
value := e.value(name, "")
|
||||
if value == "" {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lapi, err := url.Parse(value)
|
||||
if err != nil || !isHTTPURL(lapi) {
|
||||
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLAPIURL))
|
||||
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return lapi.JoinPath("v1", "decisions").String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// routeWatchURL reads the setting that is the URL of a routewatch instance,
|
||||
// "" while it is unset or empty.
|
||||
func (e *environment) routeWatchURL(name string) string {
|
||||
@@ -1190,39 +1211,12 @@ func (e *environment) checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkCrowdSec refuses SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL without
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY, the key without the URL, and a decision list
|
||||
// that is fetched as another list too.
|
||||
func (e *environment) checkCrowdSec(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
decisionsURL := cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case decisionsURL != "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey == "":
|
||||
e.check("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"is set while SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY is unset; %w",
|
||||
errNeedsLAPIKey,
|
||||
))
|
||||
case decisionsURL == "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey != "":
|
||||
e.check("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY", fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"is set while SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset; %w",
|
||||
errLAPIKeyUnused,
|
||||
))
|
||||
case decisionsURL != "" && (slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, decisionsURL) ||
|
||||
decisionsURL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL):
|
||||
e.check(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf("gives the decision list %q, which %w",
|
||||
decisionsURL, errAnotherList),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkTagLists refuses a list of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS whose URL is fetched as
|
||||
// another list too: the file at a URL is read as one kind of list.
|
||||
func (e *environment) checkTagLists(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
for _, list := range cfg.TagLists {
|
||||
if slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, list.URL) ||
|
||||
list.URL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL || list.URL == cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
|
||||
list.URL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL {
|
||||
e.check(
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf("%q %w", list.URL, errFetchedOtherwise),
|
||||
@@ -1232,8 +1226,7 @@ func (e *environment) checkTagLists(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkTags refuses a tag of SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY or SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT that would
|
||||
// never apply: crowdsec, whose request is refused before tags are acted on, and
|
||||
// any tag these settings cannot give a request.
|
||||
// never apply: any tag these settings cannot give a request.
|
||||
func (e *environment) checkTags(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
for _, tag := range cfg.TagDeny {
|
||||
e.check("SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY", checkTag(cfg, tag))
|
||||
@@ -1246,10 +1239,6 @@ func (e *environment) checkTags(cfg *WAF) {
|
||||
|
||||
// checkTag returns an error when tag would never apply, as checkTags says.
|
||||
func checkTag(cfg *WAF, tag string) error {
|
||||
if tag == CrowdSecTag {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%q %w", tag, errCrowdSecTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !requestCanGetTag(cfg, tag) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(tag), errNoRequestGetsTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1673,16 +1662,16 @@ func durationOrDays(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
|
||||
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 64K, since waf
|
||||
// gets no more of a body than that.
|
||||
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 8K, so that one
|
||||
// request cannot keep the Core Rule Set busy past rproxy's timeout.
|
||||
func parseCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize(value string) (int64, error) {
|
||||
limit, err := parseSize(value)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if limit > 64*kibibyte {
|
||||
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver64K)
|
||||
if limit > 8*kibibyte {
|
||||
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver8K)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return limit, nil
|
||||
@@ -2010,7 +1999,6 @@ const (
|
||||
DNSBLTagPrefix = "dnsbl="
|
||||
PrefixTagPrefix = "prefix="
|
||||
AbuseIPDBTag = "abuseipdb"
|
||||
CrowdSecTag = "crowdsec"
|
||||
// ExploitSignatureTag is the tag of a request a rule file or the Core
|
||||
// Rule Set matched.
|
||||
ExploitSignatureTag = "exploitsignature"
|
||||
|
||||
+106
-169
@@ -61,12 +61,13 @@ const (
|
||||
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
|
||||
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
|
||||
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
|
||||
abuseIPDBThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD"
|
||||
abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS"
|
||||
abuseIPDBBanDays = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS"
|
||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION"
|
||||
ipReputationCacheTTL = "SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
|
||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS"
|
||||
routeWatchURL = "SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
|
||||
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
|
||||
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
|
||||
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
|
||||
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
|
||||
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
|
||||
@@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ const (
|
||||
// instance is an SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
|
||||
// remoteURL an SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
instance = "host1/blog"
|
||||
remoteURL = "syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
wantLookupSettings(t, cfg, config.WAF{
|
||||
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
AddLookupHeaders: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.WAF{
|
||||
BytesLimitPerMinute: 0, BytesLimitPerHour: 50 << 30,
|
||||
@@ -617,7 +619,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
coreRuleSetScoreThreshold: "10",
|
||||
coreRuleSetDisabledRules: "942100, 920350",
|
||||
coreRuleSetExemptPaths: "/api/, /static/",
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "32K",
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "4K",
|
||||
exclusionsFile: "/etc/sww/crs-exclusions.conf",
|
||||
},
|
||||
config.WAF{
|
||||
@@ -626,7 +628,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold: 10,
|
||||
CoreRuleSetDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
|
||||
CoreRuleSetExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
|
||||
CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: 32 << 10,
|
||||
CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: 4 << 10,
|
||||
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: "/etc/sww/crs-exclusions.conf",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -763,15 +765,15 @@ func TestInvalidAppsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSizeOf64K(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSizeOf8K(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
environment{coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "64K"},
|
||||
environment{coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "8K"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize != 64<<10 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("64K read as %d", cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize)
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize != 8<<10 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("8K read as %d", cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -820,11 +822,13 @@ func TestInvalidCoreRuleSetSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize, "128KB",
|
||||
`"128KB" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize, "65K", `"65K" is more than 64K, the most waf ` +
|
||||
`gets of a body`},
|
||||
{
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize, "65537",
|
||||
`"65537" is more than 64K, the most waf gets of a body`,
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize, "9K",
|
||||
`"9K" is more than 8K, the most the Core Rule Set can read in time`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize, "8193",
|
||||
`"8193" is more than 8K, the most the Core Rule Set can read in time`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -846,11 +850,11 @@ func TestInstanceNameAndLoggedHeadersAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
instanceName: "fsn1app1/blog",
|
||||
instanceName: "host1/blog",
|
||||
logRequestHeaders: " Accept , X-Custom",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.InstanceName != "fsn1app1/blog" ||
|
||||
if cfg.InstanceName != "host1/blog" ||
|
||||
!slices.Equal(
|
||||
cfg.LogRequestHeaders,
|
||||
[]string{"accept", "x-custom"},
|
||||
@@ -1023,14 +1027,14 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotAnAppNameStopsTheStartOnlyWhileSending(
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const spaced = "fsn1 app1"
|
||||
const spaced = "host1 blog"
|
||||
|
||||
sending := environment{logRemoteURL: remoteURL, instanceName: spaced}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(sending.viper())
|
||||
|
||||
want := logRemoteAppName + `: is unset, and ` + instanceName +
|
||||
` "fsn1 app1", its default, is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters ` +
|
||||
` "host1 blog", its default, is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters ` +
|
||||
`without a space, such as blog`
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
|
||||
@@ -1332,13 +1336,13 @@ func TestInstanceNameWithAControlCharacterStopsTheStartOnlyWithNtfySet(
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const name = "fsn1app1\r"
|
||||
const name = "host1\r"
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(environment{
|
||||
instanceName: name, alertNtfyURL: "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts",
|
||||
}.viper())
|
||||
|
||||
want := instanceName + `: "fsn1app1\r" holds a control character, such as the ` +
|
||||
want := instanceName + `: "host1\r" holds a control character, such as the ` +
|
||||
`carriage return of a Windows line end, and is sent to ntfy in a header ` +
|
||||
`while ` + alertNtfyURL + ` is set`
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
@@ -1397,13 +1401,13 @@ func TestLookupSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "500", addLookupHeaders: enabled,
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "500", addLookupHeaders: disabled,
|
||||
})
|
||||
wantLookupSettings(t, cfg, config.WAF{
|
||||
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
AddLookupHeaders: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// With no client looked up, the headers are off unless set.
|
||||
cfg = wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{lookupSource: off})
|
||||
wantLookupSettings(t, cfg, config.WAF{
|
||||
LookupSource: off, ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
@@ -1424,6 +1428,10 @@ func TestLookupDBPathGoesWithTheFileSourceAlone(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg.LookupSource, cfg.LookupDBPath, path)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !cfg.AddLookupHeaders {
|
||||
t.Error("headers off by default with lookups from file, want on")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
want string
|
||||
@@ -1813,9 +1821,6 @@ func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
"abuseipdb with a key",
|
||||
environment{abuseIPDBKey: "k", tagLimitPercent: "abuseipdb:50"}, "",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"crowdsec, though a list has its name", environment{
|
||||
tagLists: "crowdsec=https://example.com/c.txt", tagDeny: "crowdsec",
|
||||
}, `"crowdsec" cannot be used`},
|
||||
{exploitTag, environment{tagDeny: exploitTag}, ""},
|
||||
{
|
||||
exploitTag + " with rule files off",
|
||||
@@ -1887,26 +1892,20 @@ func TestErrorOfATagSettingLeavesOutAZoneKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestTagListURLFetchedAsAnotherListStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const lapi = "http://172.17.0.1:8080"
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name, listURL string
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"a blocklist", dropURL, environment{blocklistURLs: dropURL}},
|
||||
{"the file of AS:percent lines", asnURL, environment{asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL}},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the CrowdSec decision list", lapi + "/v1/decisions",
|
||||
environment{"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": lapi, "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": "key"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
tc.env[tagLists] = "dup=" + tc.listURL
|
||||
|
||||
want := tagLists + `: "` + tc.listURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, is ` +
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL or is the CrowdSec decision list too"
|
||||
want := tagLists + `: "` + tc.listURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS ` +
|
||||
"or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too"
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
@@ -2403,6 +2402,75 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAbuseIPDBBlacklistSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{})
|
||||
if cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold != 90 ||
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh != time.Hour ||
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration != 30*24*time.Hour {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"by default, the threshold %d, the refresh %s and the ban %s, "+
|
||||
"want 90, 1h and 720h",
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cfg = wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
abuseIPDBThreshold: "25", abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: "1440",
|
||||
abuseIPDBBanDays: "1",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold != 25 ||
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh != 24*time.Hour ||
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration != 24*time.Hour {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"set, the threshold %d, the refresh %s and the ban %s, "+
|
||||
"want 25, 24h and 24h",
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBBlacklistSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
notThreshold = " is not a whole number from 25 to 100, the scores " +
|
||||
"AbuseIPDB's blacklist can be cut at"
|
||||
notWhole = " is not a whole number above zero, such as 30, that fits " +
|
||||
"a duration"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
|
||||
{abuseIPDBThreshold, "24", `"24"` + notThreshold},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBThreshold, "101", `"101"` + notThreshold},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBThreshold, off, `"off"` + notThreshold},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh, "0", `"0"` + notWhole},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh, "1h", `"1h"` + notWhole},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBBanDays, "-1", `"-1"` + notWhole},
|
||||
{abuseIPDBBanDays, "200000", `"200000"` + notWhole},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(
|
||||
environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
@@ -2456,138 +2524,6 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBKeyIsLoggedMasked(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecSettingsGiveTheDecisionListAndTheKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{})
|
||||
if cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" || cfg.CrowdSecKey != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"by default, the decision list %q and the key %q, want neither",
|
||||
cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL,
|
||||
cfg.CrowdSecKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for lapi, want := range map[string]string{
|
||||
"http://172.17.0.1:8080": "http://172.17.0.1:8080/v1/decisions",
|
||||
"http://172.17.0.1:8080/": "http://172.17.0.1:8080/v1/decisions",
|
||||
"https://crowdsec.example/lapi/": "https://crowdsec.example/lapi/v1/decisions",
|
||||
"https://crowdsec.example:8443/x": "https://crowdsec.example:8443/x/v1/decisions",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
environment{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != want || cfg.CrowdSecKey != token {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"%s=%s gave the decision list %q and the key %q, want %s and %s",
|
||||
crowdSecURL,
|
||||
lapi,
|
||||
cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL,
|
||||
cfg.CrowdSecKey,
|
||||
want,
|
||||
token,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
lapi = "http://172.17.0.1:8080"
|
||||
notLAPIURL = " is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
||||
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080"
|
||||
anotherList = `gives the decision list "` + lapi + `/v1/decisions", which is in ` +
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
want string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a URL that is not http",
|
||||
environment{crowdSecURL: "ftp://172.17.0.1", crowdSecKey: token},
|
||||
crowdSecURL + `: "ftp://172.17.0.1"` + notLAPIURL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a URL with a user",
|
||||
environment{crowdSecURL: "http://bouncer@172.17.0.1:8080", crowdSecKey: token},
|
||||
crowdSecURL + `: "http://bouncer@172.17.0.1:8080"` + notLAPIURL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the URL without the key",
|
||||
environment{crowdSecURL: lapi},
|
||||
crowdSecURL + ": is set while " + crowdSecKey + " is unset; the engine " +
|
||||
"answers no request without it",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the key without the URL",
|
||||
environment{crowdSecKey: token},
|
||||
crowdSecKey + ": is set while " + crowdSecURL + " is unset; it is sent only " +
|
||||
"to the engine at that URL",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the decision list as a blocklist too",
|
||||
environment{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token,
|
||||
blocklistURLs: "https://lists.example/drop.txt," + lapi + "/v1/decisions",
|
||||
},
|
||||
crowdSecURL + ": " + anotherList,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the decision list as the file of AS:percent lines too",
|
||||
environment{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi + "/", crowdSecKey: token,
|
||||
asnLimitPercentURL: lapi + "/v1/decisions",
|
||||
},
|
||||
crowdSecURL + ": " + anotherList,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// The key itself is never shown.
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a key with a control character",
|
||||
environment{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token + "\r"},
|
||||
crowdSecKey + ": holds a control character, such as the carriage return " +
|
||||
"of a Windows line end",
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecKeyIsLoggedMasked(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: "http://172.17.0.1:8080", crowdSecKey: token,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
var out bytes.Buffer
|
||||
|
||||
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).
|
||||
Info("starting", "settings", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
logged := out.String()
|
||||
if strings.Contains(logged, token) ||
|
||||
!strings.Contains(logged, `"`+crowdSecKey+`":"********"`) ||
|
||||
!strings.Contains(
|
||||
logged,
|
||||
`"`+crowdSecURL+`":"http://172.17.0.1:8080"`,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("the key is not logged masked beside the URL: %s", logged)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSizesAndOff(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2714,10 +2650,10 @@ func TestInvalidLookupTagOrLogValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
{tagDeny, "a,,b"}, {tagDeny, "country=nk"}, {tagDeny, "asn=abc"},
|
||||
{tagDeny, "asn="},
|
||||
{tagDeny, "torexit,TOREXIT"}, {tagDeny, "torexti"},
|
||||
{tagDeny, zenTag}, {tagDeny, "abuseipdb"}, {tagDeny, "crowdsec"},
|
||||
{tagDeny, zenTag}, {tagDeny, "abuseipdb"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "torexti:50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "dnsbl=zen.example:50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "crowdsec:50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn :50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn"}, {tagLimitPercent, ":50"},
|
||||
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:"},
|
||||
@@ -3070,7 +3006,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
|
||||
lookupDBPath: "",
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "800",
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: disabled,
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: enabled,
|
||||
allowedCountries: "",
|
||||
tagLists: "",
|
||||
tagDeny: "",
|
||||
@@ -3087,12 +3023,13 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
abuseIPDBKey: "",
|
||||
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
|
||||
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
|
||||
abuseIPDBThreshold: "90",
|
||||
abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: "60",
|
||||
abuseIPDBBanDays: "30",
|
||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: "limit:25",
|
||||
ipReputationCacheTTL: defaultIPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout: "2000",
|
||||
routeWatchURL: "",
|
||||
crowdSecURL: "",
|
||||
crowdSecKey: "",
|
||||
banResponse: "403",
|
||||
limitBanDuration: "1h",
|
||||
limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -481,12 +481,21 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
|
||||
return Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: score(tx)}, read, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mostJSONRead is the largest JSON body the Core Rule Set reads, even while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is larger. Coraza names each
|
||||
// value in a JSON body by the whole path to it, so what it gives the Core
|
||||
// Rule Set to read can outgrow the body: up to 8 times its size, and up to
|
||||
// 4 KiB for a small body. 1 KiB of JSON thus gives at most 8 KiB, no more
|
||||
// than the largest body of another kind.
|
||||
const mostJSONRead = 1 << 10
|
||||
|
||||
// readBody reads body, the body of the request in tx, which has run on
|
||||
// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is
|
||||
// set and the body is of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and
|
||||
// multipart, of which it reads the first c.bodyInspectionSize bytes, and
|
||||
// JSON and XML, which it reads only when they are no longer than that,
|
||||
// since they cannot be read in part.
|
||||
// since they cannot be read in part. The Core Rule Set reads no JSON body
|
||||
// longer than mostJSONRead either.
|
||||
// readBody reads one byte past c.bodyInspectionSize, to tell which they
|
||||
// are, gives the Core Rule Set what it reads, and returns what it read and
|
||||
// the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
|
||||
@@ -499,6 +508,8 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) readBody(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
inPart := false
|
||||
// largest is the largest JSON or XML body the Core Rule Set reads.
|
||||
largest := c.bodyInspectionSize
|
||||
// How the body is read is a variable of the transaction, which only
|
||||
// Coraza's interface for plugins reads.
|
||||
state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
|
||||
@@ -506,14 +517,16 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) readBody(
|
||||
switch state.Variables().RequestBodyProcessor().Get() {
|
||||
case "URLENCODED", "MULTIPART":
|
||||
inPart = true
|
||||
case "JSON", "XML":
|
||||
case "JSON":
|
||||
largest = min(largest, mostJSONRead)
|
||||
case "XML":
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
read, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, c.bodyInspectionSize+1))
|
||||
|
||||
if inPart || (err == nil && int64(len(read)) <= c.bodyInspectionSize) {
|
||||
if inPart || (err == nil && int64(len(read)) <= largest) {
|
||||
// Coraza holds what it reads of the body in memory, up to the
|
||||
// limit, so this cannot fail.
|
||||
_, _, _ = tx.WriteRequestBody(read)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -390,22 +390,15 @@ func TestMoreParametersThanCorazaKeepsIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
matched(900300),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// So it is with the fields of a form data or JSON body.
|
||||
// So it is with the fields of a form data body. A JSON body the Core
|
||||
// Rule Set reads, of at most mostJSONRead bytes, cannot hold that many.
|
||||
crs = readingBodies(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
|
||||
{formData, strings.Repeat("a=1&", 999) + attack},
|
||||
{jsonBody, `{"a":[` + strings.Repeat("1,", 998) + `1],"id":"` + injection + `"}`},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
body := strings.Repeat("a=1&", 999) + attack
|
||||
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), body, matched(942100), body)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
|
||||
{formData, strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + attack},
|
||||
{jsonBody, `{"a":[` + strings.Repeat("1,", 999) + `1],"id":"` + injection + `"}`},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(900300), tc.body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
body = strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + attack
|
||||
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), body, matched(900300), body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRedirectURIMayNameALocalAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -1512,13 +1505,15 @@ const (
|
||||
wpTags = "/wp-json/wp/v2/tags"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// readingBodiesUpTo64K returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default,
|
||||
// readingBodiesUpTo8K returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default,
|
||||
// but reading bodies up to the largest SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE.
|
||||
func readingBodiesUpTo64K(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
|
||||
func readingBodiesUpTo8K(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
return shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyInspectionSize: 64<<10 - 1,
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1,
|
||||
DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
|
||||
BodyInspectionSize: mostBodyRead,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1582,7 +1577,7 @@ func TestWordPressAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodiesUpTo8K(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, attack := range []string{
|
||||
sqlInjection,
|
||||
@@ -1693,7 +1688,7 @@ func wordpressRESTAddresses(route string) []string {
|
||||
func TestWordPressExclusionsFollowEveryRESTAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo8K(t)
|
||||
content := `{"content":"` + wordpressBlock + `"}`
|
||||
|
||||
for _, route := range []string{
|
||||
@@ -1919,7 +1914,7 @@ func TestWordPressCommandAfterASeparatorIsRefusedOnSearchesAndNames(
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, get(target+command), matched(932235))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bodies := readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
bodies := readingBodiesUpTo8K(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, p := range wordpressBodyFields(command) {
|
||||
r := request{http.MethodPost, p.target, []string{p.contentType}}
|
||||
@@ -2143,7 +2138,7 @@ func TestWordPressBodyFieldsAreCheckedInTheQuery(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestWordPressBodyNamesAndAddressesAreExcludedOnlyThere(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo8K(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, v := range wordpressWords() {
|
||||
for _, field := range []string{"title", "excerpt", "name"} {
|
||||
@@ -2262,7 +2257,7 @@ func TestWordPressExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
length = "Content-Length: 2"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
crs := readingBodiesUpTo8K(t)
|
||||
saving := request{
|
||||
http.MethodPost,
|
||||
wpPost,
|
||||
@@ -2473,19 +2468,35 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := readingBodies(t)
|
||||
// The limit is the body inspection size, but at most mostJSONRead for
|
||||
// JSON. smallSize is a body inspection size under mostJSONRead.
|
||||
const smallSize = 512
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, head, tail string }{
|
||||
{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `","pad":"`, `"}`},
|
||||
{xmlBody, "<r><q>" + injection + "</q><pad>", "</pad></r>"},
|
||||
bodies, smallBodies := readingBodies(t), shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
|
||||
BodyInspectionSize: smallSize,
|
||||
})
|
||||
jsonHead, jsonTail := `{"q":"`+injection+`","pad":"`, `"}`
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
|
||||
header, head, tail string
|
||||
limit int
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{bodies, jsonBody, jsonHead, jsonTail, mostJSONRead},
|
||||
{smallBodies, jsonBody, jsonHead, jsonTail, smallSize},
|
||||
{
|
||||
bodies, xmlBody, "<r><q>" + injection + "</q><pad>", "</pad></r>",
|
||||
bodyInspectionSize,
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
fits := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyInspectionSize)
|
||||
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
|
||||
fits := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, tc.limit)
|
||||
wantBody(t, tc.crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
|
||||
|
||||
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyInspectionSize+1)
|
||||
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, tc.limit+1)
|
||||
wantBody(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
crs,
|
||||
tc.crs,
|
||||
post(tc.header),
|
||||
larger,
|
||||
coreruleset.Result{},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
|
||||
package coreruleset_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The bounds on what a visitor can send, as SPEC.md gives them.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// lineLimit is the longest request line or header line.
|
||||
lineLimit = 8 << 10
|
||||
// headerLimit is the most bytes rproxy reads of a request line and
|
||||
// headers together.
|
||||
headerLimit = 32 << 10
|
||||
// mostCookies and mostHeaderFields are waf's limits on cookies and header
|
||||
// fields.
|
||||
mostCookies = 50
|
||||
mostHeaderFields = 100
|
||||
// mostBodyRead is the largest SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE.
|
||||
mostBodyRead = 8 << 10
|
||||
// mostJSONRead is the largest JSON body the Core Rule Set reads.
|
||||
mostJSONRead = 1 << 10
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// waf refuses a request the Core Rule Set has not inspected within 500
|
||||
// milliseconds, but Coraza cannot stop an inspection part-way, so it runs to
|
||||
// its end with nobody waiting for it. The test checks that an inspection ends
|
||||
// within about 1 second, so that a visitor cannot keep a processor busy for
|
||||
// longer with one request.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A busy host slows all work, so the test does not compare an inspection with
|
||||
// 1 second. It compares it with referenceTime, timed on the same thread just
|
||||
// before and after. inspectionTimeLimitMultiple is how many times
|
||||
// referenceTime an inspection may take.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On the host that runs our checks, referenceTime took at least 78
|
||||
// milliseconds, so 13 times it is about 1 second. With that host fully busy,
|
||||
// no try of the slowest request took more than 9.5 times referenceTime.
|
||||
const inspectionTimeLimitMultiple = 13
|
||||
|
||||
// referencePattern is what referenceTime matches. Like the Core Rule Set's
|
||||
// rules, it is a regular expression with alternatives and repeats.
|
||||
var referencePattern = regexp.MustCompile(
|
||||
`(?i)(union|select|insert|delete)\s+\w+\s+(from|into)\s+\w+[0-9]+;`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// referenceTime returns the processor time the calling thread takes to do a
|
||||
// fixed amount of work unrelated to the Core Rule Set, so that a change to the
|
||||
// rules does not change it. referencePattern matches nowhere in the text, so
|
||||
// each match reads all of it.
|
||||
func referenceTime(t *testing.T) time.Duration {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
referenceText := text(4 << 10)
|
||||
began := threadCPUTime(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for range 200 {
|
||||
if referencePattern.MatchString(referenceText) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("the reference pattern matched")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return threadCPUTime(t) - began
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// text returns n bytes of letters, digits and spaces, which the Core Rule Set
|
||||
// takes longer over than one letter repeated.
|
||||
func text(n int) string {
|
||||
const words = "select 0x2f from tbl_1 where name like abc_9 "
|
||||
|
||||
return strings.Repeat(words, n/len(words)+1)[:n]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// visitorRequest is a request a visitor can send, at the most of one or more
|
||||
// of the bounds above.
|
||||
type visitorRequest struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
target string
|
||||
// header holds the headers besides Host.
|
||||
header http.Header
|
||||
// contentType is the body's type, "" for no body.
|
||||
contentType string
|
||||
body string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// longestTarget returns a target whose request line, "POST <target>
|
||||
// HTTP/1.1", is lineLimit bytes long.
|
||||
func longestTarget() string {
|
||||
const around = len("POST /?q= HTTP/1.1")
|
||||
|
||||
return "/?q=" + strings.ReplaceAll(text(lineLimit-around), " ", "+")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cookieLine returns a Cookie value whose line, "Cookie: <value>", is
|
||||
// lineLimit bytes long, made of count cookies.
|
||||
func cookieLine(count int) string {
|
||||
const linePrefix = len("Cookie: ")
|
||||
|
||||
cookies := make([]string, count)
|
||||
for i := range cookies {
|
||||
cookies[i] = "c" + strconv.Itoa(i) + "="
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Each cookie is followed by "; ", but for the last.
|
||||
room := lineLimit - linePrefix - len(strings.Join(cookies, "; "))
|
||||
for i := range cookies {
|
||||
share := room / count
|
||||
if i == 0 {
|
||||
share += room % count
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cookies[i] += strings.ReplaceAll(text(share), " ", "_")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return strings.Join(cookies, "; ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// headerValue returns a value whose line, "<name>: <value>", is n bytes long.
|
||||
func headerValue(name string, n int) string {
|
||||
return text(n - len(name) - len(": "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// formFields returns a form body of mostBodyRead bytes holding count fields.
|
||||
func formFields(count int) string {
|
||||
fields := make([]string, count)
|
||||
for i := range fields {
|
||||
fields[i] = "f" + strconv.Itoa(i) + "="
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
room := mostBodyRead - len(strings.Join(fields, "&"))
|
||||
for i := range fields {
|
||||
share := room / count
|
||||
if i == 0 {
|
||||
share += room % count
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fields[i] += strings.ReplaceAll(text(share), " ", "+")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return strings.Join(fields, "&")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// multipartBody returns a multipart body of mostBodyRead bytes, with the
|
||||
// boundary "b", holding fields of about size bytes each.
|
||||
func multipartBody(size int) string {
|
||||
var body strings.Builder
|
||||
|
||||
const end = "--b--\r\n"
|
||||
|
||||
for i := 0; ; i++ {
|
||||
head := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"f" +
|
||||
strconv.Itoa(i) + "\"\r\n\r\n"
|
||||
|
||||
room := mostBodyRead - body.Len() - len(
|
||||
end,
|
||||
) - len(
|
||||
head,
|
||||
) - len(
|
||||
"\r\n",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if room <= 0 {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body.WriteString(head + text(min(size, room)) + "\r\n")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body.WriteString(end)
|
||||
|
||||
return body.String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jsonArrayOfMostElements returns a JSON array of at most mostJSONRead bytes
|
||||
// holding as many elements as fit, each the number 1.
|
||||
func jsonArrayOfMostElements() string {
|
||||
return "[1" + strings.Repeat(
|
||||
",1",
|
||||
(mostJSONRead-len("[1]"))/len(",1"),
|
||||
) + "]"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jsonOfMostElementsUnderAKey returns a JSON body of mostJSONRead bytes
|
||||
// holding as many elements as fit, each the number 1, in an array under a
|
||||
// key of 6 bytes. Coraza names each element "json.<key>.<index>", so a
|
||||
// longer key makes longer names. 6 bytes is the longest key that keeps the
|
||||
// names and values of this body within the 8 KiB Coraza allows.
|
||||
func jsonOfMostElementsUnderAKey() string {
|
||||
head := `{"` + text(6) + `":[1`
|
||||
|
||||
return head + strings.Repeat(
|
||||
",1",
|
||||
(mostJSONRead-len(head+"]}"))/len(",1"),
|
||||
) + "]}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The kinds of body the Core Rule Set reads, and the header that names a
|
||||
// request's cookies.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
formType = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
|
||||
jsonType = "application/json"
|
||||
multipartType = "multipart/form-data; boundary=b"
|
||||
cookieHeader = "Cookie"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fullLine is the length of each of the request line and the three or four
|
||||
// header lines that together fill rproxy's limit, with room for the line
|
||||
// endings and the other headers.
|
||||
const fullLine = lineLimit - 64
|
||||
|
||||
// worstCaseRequests are, for each kind of thing a visitor sends, the requests
|
||||
// that keep the Core Rule Set busiest, within the bounds above. The last
|
||||
// holds the most of everything at once: Cookie lines keep it busier than
|
||||
// other header lines, and the JSON body of the most elements under a key
|
||||
// keeps it busier than the other bodies.
|
||||
func worstCaseRequests() []visitorRequest {
|
||||
fullCookieLine := cookieLine(1)[:fullLine-len("Cookie: ")]
|
||||
|
||||
return append(
|
||||
append(worstCaseHeaders(), worstCaseBodies()...),
|
||||
visitorRequest{
|
||||
name: "the longest request line, three Cookie lines and body",
|
||||
target: longestTarget()[:fullLine-len("POST HTTP/1.1")],
|
||||
header: http.Header{cookieHeader: {
|
||||
fullCookieLine, fullCookieLine, fullCookieLine,
|
||||
}},
|
||||
contentType: jsonType, body: jsonOfMostElementsUnderAKey(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// worstCaseHeaders are the requests of worstCaseRequests with no body.
|
||||
func worstCaseHeaders() []visitorRequest {
|
||||
headerFields := http.Header{}
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range mostHeaderFields - 1 {
|
||||
name := "X-Field-" + strconv.Itoa(i)
|
||||
headerFields.Set(
|
||||
name,
|
||||
headerValue(name, headerLimit/mostHeaderFields),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return []visitorRequest{
|
||||
{name: "the longest request line", target: longestTarget()},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the longest request line, as query parameters",
|
||||
target: "/?" + strings.Repeat(
|
||||
"a=1&",
|
||||
(lineLimit-len("POST /? HTTP/1.1"))/len("a=1&"),
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the longest Cookie line, as one cookie",
|
||||
target: "/",
|
||||
header: http.Header{cookieHeader: {cookieLine(1)}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the longest Cookie line, as the most cookies",
|
||||
target: "/",
|
||||
header: http.Header{cookieHeader: {cookieLine(mostCookies)}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{name: "the most header fields", target: "/", header: headerFields},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the longest header lines",
|
||||
target: "/",
|
||||
header: http.Header{
|
||||
"User-Agent": {headerValue("User-Agent", fullLine)},
|
||||
"Referer": {headerValue("Referer", fullLine)},
|
||||
"Accept": {headerValue("Accept", fullLine)},
|
||||
"X-Long": {headerValue("X-Long", fullLine)},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// worstCaseBodies are the requests of worstCaseRequests whose body holds
|
||||
// the most the Core Rule Set reads.
|
||||
func worstCaseBodies() []visitorRequest {
|
||||
const nested = (mostJSONRead - len(`{"a":1}`)) / len(`{"a":}`)
|
||||
|
||||
return []visitorRequest{
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a form body of one field", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: formType, body: formFields(1),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a form body of the most fields Coraza keeps", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: formType, body: formFields(1000),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a JSON body of one string", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: jsonType,
|
||||
body: `{"a":"` + text(
|
||||
mostJSONRead-len(`{"a":""}`),
|
||||
) + `"}`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a JSON body of the most elements", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: jsonType, body: jsonArrayOfMostElements(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a JSON body of the most elements under a key", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: jsonType, body: jsonOfMostElementsUnderAKey(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a JSON body nested deep", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: jsonType,
|
||||
body: strings.Repeat(`{"a":`, nested) + "1" +
|
||||
strings.Repeat("}", nested),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "an XML body of many elements", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: "application/xml",
|
||||
body: "<a>" + strings.Repeat(
|
||||
"<b>x</b>",
|
||||
(mostBodyRead-len("<a></a>"))/len("<b>x</b>"),
|
||||
) + "</a>",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a multipart body of one field", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: multipartType, body: multipartBody(mostBodyRead),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a multipart body of many fields", target: "/",
|
||||
contentType: multipartType, body: multipartBody(1),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// threadCPUTime returns the processor time the calling thread has used.
|
||||
func threadCPUTime(t *testing.T) time.Duration {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
var now unix.Timespec
|
||||
|
||||
err := unix.ClockGettime(unix.CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, &now)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("read the thread's processor time: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return time.Duration(now.Nano())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// inspectionTime returns the processor time crs takes to inspect tc, and the
|
||||
// mean of referenceTime just before and after. It fails t unless crs reads all
|
||||
// of tc's body and Coraza parses it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All of it runs on this goroutine, kept on one thread, so the thread's
|
||||
// processor time measures it. Time other work holds the processor does not
|
||||
// count.
|
||||
func inspectionTime(
|
||||
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, tc visitorRequest,
|
||||
) (time.Duration, time.Duration) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
||||
t.Context(), http.MethodPost, tc.target, nil,
|
||||
)
|
||||
maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.contentType != "" {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runtime.LockOSThread()
|
||||
|
||||
defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
|
||||
|
||||
before := referenceTime(t)
|
||||
|
||||
began := threadCPUTime(t)
|
||||
result, read, _ := crs.Inspect(
|
||||
req, netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"), strings.NewReader(tc.body),
|
||||
)
|
||||
took := threadCPUTime(t) - began
|
||||
|
||||
reference := (before + referenceTime(t)) / 2
|
||||
|
||||
if string(read) != tc.body {
|
||||
t.Errorf("read %d bytes of %d", len(read), len(tc.body))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Rule 900440 matches a body Coraza could not parse.
|
||||
if slices.Contains(result.RuleIDs, 900440) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Coraza could not parse the body")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return took, reference
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestTheCoreRuleSetInspectsEachWorstCaseRequestInTime runs one at a time, so
|
||||
// that the tests running in parallel do not slow it. Other work on the host
|
||||
// can still slow one try more than the reference work around it, so a request
|
||||
// fails only when three tries in a row take too long.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as above
|
||||
func TestTheCoreRuleSetInspectsEachWorstCaseRequestInTime(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
const tries = 3
|
||||
|
||||
// The settings that make the Core Rule Set slowest: the highest paranoia
|
||||
// level, no rule switched off, and the most of a body read.
|
||||
crs := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 4, BodyInspectionSize: mostBodyRead,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range worstCaseRequests() {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var took, reference time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
for range tries {
|
||||
took, reference = inspectionTime(t, crs, tc)
|
||||
if took <= inspectionTimeLimitMultiple*reference {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"took %s on the last of %d tries, over %d times the %s "+
|
||||
"of the reference work",
|
||||
took, tries, inspectionTimeLimitMultiple, reference,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
package lookup
|
||||
package geojs
|
||||
|
||||
import "net/http"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
// Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country, through
|
||||
// the GeoJS web service or in the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
|
||||
// most 100,000 clients and for 7 days each, and are written to
|
||||
// lookups.json and read from it by the state package.
|
||||
package lookup
|
||||
// Package geojs looks up clients' AS numbers and countries through the GeoJS
|
||||
// web service. Its answers are kept in memory, for at most 100,000 clients and
|
||||
// for 7 days each. A caller waits for an answer as long as it says. A request to
|
||||
// GeoJS goes on after its callers stop waiting, and its answer is kept. The
|
||||
// package imports no other package of this repository.
|
||||
package geojs
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
@@ -21,8 +20,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// URL is GeoJS's endpoint for an address's place and network. Asked about
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +40,9 @@ const (
|
||||
maxWaiting = 10000
|
||||
// maxPerRequest is how many addresses one request to GeoJS asks about.
|
||||
maxPerRequest = 200
|
||||
// requestTimeout is how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is
|
||||
// abandoned, which is a failure. It is apart from how long callers wait.
|
||||
requestTimeout = 10 * time.Second
|
||||
// unknownASN is the AS number GeoJS gives when it knows none.
|
||||
unknownASN = 64512
|
||||
// After a failure GeoJS is not asked again for a second, and for
|
||||
@@ -64,39 +64,32 @@ var (
|
||||
type Params struct {
|
||||
// URL is where GeoJS is asked, normally URL.
|
||||
URL string
|
||||
// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
|
||||
// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS).
|
||||
Timeout time.Duration
|
||||
// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
|
||||
// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
|
||||
Wait bool
|
||||
// Answered, unless nil, is given each answer GeoJS gives, once it is
|
||||
// kept.
|
||||
Answered func(Answer)
|
||||
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
||||
Now func() time.Time
|
||||
// ProcessLog receives GeoJS's failures.
|
||||
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
||||
// Metrics count the requests to GeoJS, those that failed, and the
|
||||
// clients that go without an answer.
|
||||
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
// Alerts receive a source_failure alert each time GeoJS fails.
|
||||
Alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
// Asked is called for each request to GeoJS.
|
||||
Asked func()
|
||||
// Failed is called for each failure of GeoJS, with what went wrong and
|
||||
// how long GeoJS is left alone after it. The error never names the
|
||||
// addresses asked about.
|
||||
Failed func(err error, askingAgainIn time.Duration)
|
||||
// WentWithoutAnswer is called each time a caller that waits for an
|
||||
// answer goes on without one.
|
||||
WentWithoutAnswer func()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GeoJS looks up clients' AS numbers and countries through GeoJS. At most
|
||||
// one request to GeoJS is under way at a time, and it asks about every
|
||||
// client waiting, up to maxPerRequest. It is safe for concurrent use.
|
||||
type GeoJS struct {
|
||||
url string
|
||||
timeout time.Duration
|
||||
wait bool
|
||||
answered func(Answer)
|
||||
now func() time.Time
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger
|
||||
metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
url string
|
||||
answered func(Answer)
|
||||
now func() time.Time
|
||||
asked func()
|
||||
failed func(err error, askingAgainIn time.Duration)
|
||||
wentWithoutAnswer func()
|
||||
// httpClient follows no redirect, so that visitors' addresses go to
|
||||
// GeoJS alone: a redirect is a failure.
|
||||
httpClient *http.Client
|
||||
@@ -114,12 +107,10 @@ type GeoJS struct {
|
||||
retryAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Answer is what GeoJS or the lookup database said about a client: its AS
|
||||
// number, such as AS64496, and the AS's name, both "" when the source knows
|
||||
// no AS number for it; its country, "" when the source cannot place it;
|
||||
// when the source said so; and, for GeoJS's answers, which lookups.json
|
||||
// holds, when the answer was last used. The zero Answer is that of a
|
||||
// client with no answer.
|
||||
// Answer is what GeoJS said about a client: its AS number, such as AS64496,
|
||||
// and the AS's name, both "" when GeoJS knows no AS number for it; its
|
||||
// country, "" when GeoJS cannot place it; when GeoJS said so; and when the
|
||||
// answer was last used. The zero Answer is that of a client with no answer.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
|
||||
type Answer struct {
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +128,7 @@ type wait struct {
|
||||
// replaced each time GeoJS fails before then.
|
||||
asked chan struct{}
|
||||
// late is true once the client has gone without an answer, for a
|
||||
// whole timeout or because GeoJS failed: its requests no longer wait.
|
||||
// whole wait or because GeoJS failed: its callers no longer wait.
|
||||
late bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -149,14 +140,12 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &GeoJS{
|
||||
url: params.URL,
|
||||
timeout: params.Timeout,
|
||||
wait: params.Wait,
|
||||
answered: params.Answered,
|
||||
now: params.Now,
|
||||
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
metrics: params.Metrics,
|
||||
alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
url: params.URL,
|
||||
answered: params.Answered,
|
||||
now: params.Now,
|
||||
asked: params.Asked,
|
||||
failed: params.Failed,
|
||||
wentWithoutAnswer: params.WentWithoutAnswer,
|
||||
httpClient: &http.Client{
|
||||
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
|
||||
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
|
||||
@@ -170,21 +159,22 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
|
||||
// LookUp returns the answer GeoJS gave about client, with its country as
|
||||
// a two-letter code in capitals, or the zero Answer when there is none
|
||||
// yet. An answer is kept for 7 days. Without one, the client is asked
|
||||
// about in the background, and, while Wait is set, the request waits up
|
||||
// to Timeout for the answer, unless the client has gone without one
|
||||
// before. ctx is the context of the client's request, and ends the wait
|
||||
// when it ends.
|
||||
// about in the background, and LookUp waits up to wait for the answer,
|
||||
// unless the client has gone without one before. The wait ends early when
|
||||
// ctx ends. Neither ends the request to GeoJS.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// GeoJS is asked about the client's first address, which is the client's
|
||||
// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
|
||||
// netblock.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
|
||||
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, g.wait)
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, wait time.Duration,
|
||||
) Answer {
|
||||
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, true)
|
||||
if asked == nil {
|
||||
return answer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
timer := time.NewTimer(g.timeout)
|
||||
timer := time.NewTimer(wait)
|
||||
defer timer.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
@@ -198,7 +188,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
|
||||
|
||||
answer, found := g.kept(client)
|
||||
if !found {
|
||||
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
|
||||
g.wentWithoutAnswer()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
w, waiting := g.waiting[client]
|
||||
@@ -209,8 +199,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
|
||||
return answer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a request that does not need the answer,
|
||||
// whatever Wait says: it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
|
||||
// LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a caller that does not need the answer:
|
||||
// it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) LookUpWithoutWaiting(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
client netip.Prefix,
|
||||
@@ -228,8 +218,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
|
||||
return g.kept(client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Snapshot returns every answer kept, sorted by client, as lookups.json
|
||||
// lists them.
|
||||
// Snapshot returns every answer kept, sorted by client.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) Snapshot() []Answer {
|
||||
g.mu.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -247,9 +236,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Snapshot() []Answer {
|
||||
return answers
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Load keeps answers read from lookups.json, in place of the answers it
|
||||
// keeps, in the order they were last used, so that the one used longest
|
||||
// ago is dropped first. Answers GeoJS gave keepFor ago or more are
|
||||
// Load keeps answers, such as those of an earlier Snapshot, in place of the
|
||||
// answers it keeps, in the order they were last used, so that the one used
|
||||
// longest ago is dropped first. Answers GeoJS gave keepFor ago or more are
|
||||
// dropped.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
|
||||
answers = slices.Clone(answers)
|
||||
@@ -295,11 +284,11 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
|
||||
g.ask(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
if !mustWait {
|
||||
return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the request goes on
|
||||
return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the caller goes on
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if w == nil {
|
||||
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
|
||||
g.wentWithoutAnswer()
|
||||
|
||||
return Answer{}, nil // too many clients wait already
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -310,7 +299,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if w.late {
|
||||
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
|
||||
g.wentWithoutAnswer()
|
||||
|
||||
return Answer{}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -335,8 +324,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
|
||||
|
||||
// ask starts asking GeoJS about the waiting clients, unless a request to
|
||||
// it is under way or it is left alone after a failure. The requests to
|
||||
// GeoJS are for every client waiting, so they go on when the client's
|
||||
// request whose ctx is given ends.
|
||||
// GeoJS are for every client waiting, so they go on when the caller whose
|
||||
// ctx is given stops waiting.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) ask(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
if g.asking || g.now().Before(g.retryAt) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -441,8 +430,6 @@ func (g *GeoJS) keep(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
g.metrics.GeoJSFailures.Inc()
|
||||
|
||||
g.retryDelay = min(
|
||||
max(retryDelayFactor*g.retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
|
||||
maxRetryDelay,
|
||||
@@ -457,16 +444,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) keep(
|
||||
w.late = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
g.processLog.Warn("asking GeoJS failed",
|
||||
"error", err.Error(), "asking_again_in", g.retryDelay.String())
|
||||
g.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
|
||||
Reason: "asking GeoJS failed",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]any{
|
||||
"source": "geojs", "error": err.Error(),
|
||||
"asking_again_in": g.retryDelay.String(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
g.failed(err, g.retryDelay)
|
||||
|
||||
return kept, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -479,7 +457,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) keep(
|
||||
// request asks GeoJS about clients in one request, and returns the answer
|
||||
// for each address GeoJS's answer names: its AS number and the AS's name,
|
||||
// both "" for the AS number 64512, which GeoJS gives when it knows none,
|
||||
// and its country, in capitals.
|
||||
// and its country, in capitals. The request is abandoned after
|
||||
// requestTimeout.
|
||||
func (g *GeoJS) request(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, clients []netip.Prefix,
|
||||
) (map[netip.Addr]Answer, error) {
|
||||
@@ -489,7 +468,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) request(
|
||||
addrs = append(addrs, client.Addr().String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, g.timeout)
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, requestTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
|
||||
@@ -504,7 +483,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) request(
|
||||
|
||||
req.URL.RawQuery = "ip=" + strings.Join(addrs, ",")
|
||||
|
||||
g.metrics.GeoJSRequests.Inc()
|
||||
g.asked()
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := g.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
package lookup_test
|
||||
package geojs_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing/synctest"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSnapshotHoldsEachAnswerAndWhenItWasLastUsed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func TestSnapshotHoldsEachAnswerAndWhenItWasLastUsed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
clock.advance(time.Hour)
|
||||
wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
|
||||
|
||||
want := []lookup.Answer{
|
||||
want := []geojs.Answer{
|
||||
{Client: notPlaced, Answered: asked, Used: asked},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Client: placed, ASN: asn, ASName: asName, Country: germany,
|
||||
@@ -41,24 +41,24 @@ func TestSnapshotHoldsEachAnswerAndWhenItWasLastUsed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestLoadedAnswersAreKeptFor7DaysFromWhenGeoJSGaveThem(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
geojs, clock, g := start()
|
||||
service, clock, g := start()
|
||||
now := clock.Now()
|
||||
kept := lookup.Answer{
|
||||
kept := geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"),
|
||||
Country: "FR",
|
||||
Answered: now.Add(-week + time.Second),
|
||||
Used: now.Add(-time.Hour),
|
||||
}
|
||||
stale := lookup.Answer{
|
||||
stale := geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32"),
|
||||
Country: "FR",
|
||||
Answered: now.Add(-week),
|
||||
Used: now.Add(-time.Hour),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
g.Load([]lookup.Answer{kept, stale})
|
||||
g.Load([]geojs.Answer{kept, stale})
|
||||
|
||||
if got := g.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, []lookup.Answer{kept}) {
|
||||
if got := g.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, []geojs.Answer{kept}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"kept %+v, want only the answer GeoJS gave less than 7 days ago",
|
||||
got,
|
||||
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestLoadedAnswersAreKeptFor7DaysFromWhenGeoJSGaveThem(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantCountry(t, g, kept.Client, "FR")
|
||||
wantRequests(t, geojs, 0)
|
||||
wantRequests(t, service, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLoadDropsTheAnswerUsedLongestAgoFirst(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ func TestLoadDropsTheAnswerUsedLongestAgoFirst(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// lookups.json lists the answers by client. Here each was last used a
|
||||
// second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the
|
||||
// one used longest ago, and the one dropped.
|
||||
answers := make([]lookup.Answer, maxAnswers+1)
|
||||
answers := make([]geojs.Answer, maxAnswers+1)
|
||||
addr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.0")
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range answers {
|
||||
answers[i] = lookup.Answer{
|
||||
answers[i] = geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()),
|
||||
Country: germany,
|
||||
Answered: now,
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
// Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country in the lookup
|
||||
// database, the IPinfo Lite file SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. Its answers
|
||||
// take the form of GeoJS's, so that waf handles both alike.
|
||||
package lookup
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +17,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// quietTime is how long the lookup database must go without a change
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ func OpenFile(params FileParams) (*File, error) {
|
||||
// each "" when the database does not give it, as for an address missing
|
||||
// from it. The database is asked about the client's first address, as
|
||||
// GeoJS is.
|
||||
func (f *File) LookUp(client netip.Prefix) Answer {
|
||||
func (f *File) LookUp(client netip.Prefix) geojs.Answer {
|
||||
f.mu.Lock()
|
||||
reader := f.reader
|
||||
f.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +95,7 @@ func (f *File) LookUp(client netip.Prefix) Answer {
|
||||
found = record{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Answer{
|
||||
return geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: client,
|
||||
ASN: found.ASN,
|
||||
ASName: found.ASName,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter/mmdbtype"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ func TestFilePlacesClientsAndCountsAnAddressMissingFromItAsUnknown(
|
||||
prefix := netip.MustParsePrefix(client)
|
||||
|
||||
got := f.LookUp(prefix)
|
||||
if got != (Answer{
|
||||
if got != (geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: prefix, ASN: want.ASN, ASName: want.ASName, Country: want.Country,
|
||||
Answered: now,
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-14
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
|
||||
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
for _, cause := range []string{
|
||||
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
|
||||
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseAbuseIPDB,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
m.registry.MustRegister(
|
||||
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
||||
@@ -274,8 +274,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
|
||||
// AddLookupFile adds the metrics of the lookup database, read as the
|
||||
// metrics are asked for: when the file in use was read, which lastRead
|
||||
// returns, and the replacements of it that could not be read, which
|
||||
// readFailures returns. The lookup package's File, which has both, cannot
|
||||
// be named here: that package counts GeoJS's requests in these metrics.
|
||||
// readFailures returns.
|
||||
func (m *Metrics) AddLookupFile(
|
||||
lastRead func() time.Time,
|
||||
readFailures func() int,
|
||||
@@ -302,20 +301,20 @@ const sourceLabel = "source"
|
||||
|
||||
// AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the
|
||||
// DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone, its key masked as
|
||||
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, the
|
||||
// CrowdSec decision list, a zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists,
|
||||
// which ReputationHit counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the
|
||||
// metrics are asked for, for a list, the fetches that failed and when the
|
||||
// copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
|
||||
// failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
|
||||
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, a
|
||||
// zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists, which ReputationHit counts,
|
||||
// and, read from lists and dnsbl as the metrics are asked for, for a list,
|
||||
// the fetches that failed and when the copy in use was fetched, and for a
|
||||
// zone, the queries made and those that failed. It is called once, before
|
||||
// ReputationHit.
|
||||
func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(
|
||||
lists *reputation.Lists,
|
||||
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
m.reputationHits = counterVec(
|
||||
"sww_reputation_hits_total",
|
||||
"Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
|
||||
"zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
|
||||
"Requests whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, "+
|
||||
"by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
|
||||
[]string{sourceLabel},
|
||||
)
|
||||
m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits)
|
||||
@@ -378,9 +377,8 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist
|
||||
// or the CrowdSec decision list, by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked,
|
||||
// or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
|
||||
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist,
|
||||
// by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked, or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
|
||||
func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) {
|
||||
m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import (
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// started is the time a record made as a test starts gives.
|
||||
started = "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
|
||||
appName = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
appName = "host1/blog"
|
||||
// local0 is the number of the default facility, and local0Info the
|
||||
// priority of its records.
|
||||
local0 = 16
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +24,9 @@ const (
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked: the check endpoint of
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's API.
|
||||
AbuseIPDBURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check"
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL is where AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched from:
|
||||
// the blacklist endpoint of AbuseIPDB's API.
|
||||
AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBSource is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics
|
||||
// name AbuseIPDB.
|
||||
AbuseIPDBSource = "abuseipdb"
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +36,8 @@ const (
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
errNoScore = errors.New("the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore")
|
||||
errNoBlacklist = errors.New("the answer gives no data")
|
||||
errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address")
|
||||
errBudgetUsedUp = errors.New(
|
||||
"checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC")
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +59,13 @@ type ChecksSpent struct {
|
||||
Spent int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BlacklistEntry is a client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist: its address and its
|
||||
// abuse confidence score.
|
||||
type BlacklistEntry struct {
|
||||
Addr netip.Addr
|
||||
Score int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
|
||||
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
|
||||
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
|
||||
@@ -69,10 +82,19 @@ type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
|
||||
// take (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS).
|
||||
CacheTTL time.Duration
|
||||
Timeout time.Duration
|
||||
// BlacklistURL is where the blacklist is fetched from, normally
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL, with the clients scored Threshold or more
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD), every BlacklistRefresh
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS). Blacklisted
|
||||
// receives the clients on each blacklist fetched.
|
||||
BlacklistURL string
|
||||
Threshold int64
|
||||
BlacklistRefresh time.Duration
|
||||
Blacklisted func([]BlacklistEntry)
|
||||
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
||||
Now func() time.Time
|
||||
// ProcessLog receives each check that fails, and why, and the day's
|
||||
// budget used up.
|
||||
// ProcessLog receives each check or fetch of the blacklist that fails,
|
||||
// and why, and the day's budget used up.
|
||||
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
||||
// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each.
|
||||
Alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
@@ -256,6 +278,40 @@ func (a *AbuseIPDB) LoadChecksSpent(checks ChecksSpent) {
|
||||
a.day, a.spent = checks.Day, checks.Spent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RunBlacklist fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist at once, and again every
|
||||
// BlacklistRefresh, until ctx is done, and gives the clients on each copy
|
||||
// fetched to Blacklisted. While Key is unset it does nothing. A fetch that
|
||||
// fails is logged and raised as a source_failure alert, unless it was cut
|
||||
// off as ctx ended.
|
||||
func (a *AbuseIPDB) RunBlacklist(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
if a.params.Key == "" {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
listed, err := a.fetchBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case ctx.Err() != nil:
|
||||
return
|
||||
case err != nil:
|
||||
a.alert("fetching AbuseIPDB's blacklist failed", err)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
a.params.Blacklisted(listed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
timer := time.NewTimer(a.params.BlacklistRefresh)
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
timer.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
case <-timer.C:
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check checks client with AbuseIPDB by addr, one of its addresses, keeps
|
||||
// the score as client's, and notes the check as no longer under way. A
|
||||
// check that fails gives no score: it is counted, logged and raised as a
|
||||
@@ -344,6 +400,94 @@ func (a *AbuseIPDB) ask(
|
||||
return *answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fetchBlacklist fetches the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist scored
|
||||
// Threshold or more, sending the key in the header Key. An answer other
|
||||
// than 200, one longer than maxListBytes or without the list, an entry
|
||||
// whose address does not read, and none within fetchTimeout, fail.
|
||||
func (a *AbuseIPDB) fetchBlacklist(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
) ([]BlacklistEntry, error) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
query := url.Values{
|
||||
"confidenceMinimum": {strconv.FormatInt(a.params.Threshold, 10)},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet,
|
||||
a.params.BlacklistURL+"?"+query.Encode(), http.NoBody)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Key", a.params.Key)
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := a.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetch the blacklist: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
_ = res.Body.Close()
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxListBytes+1))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the blacklist: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(body) > maxListBytes {
|
||||
return nil, errTooLong
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return parseBlacklist(body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseBlacklist reads body, AbuseIPDB's answer with its blacklist.
|
||||
func parseBlacklist(body []byte) ([]BlacklistEntry, error) {
|
||||
var answer struct {
|
||||
Data *[]struct {
|
||||
IPAddress string `json:"ipAddress"`
|
||||
AbuseConfidenceScore int64 `json:"abuseConfidenceScore"`
|
||||
} `json:"data"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := json.Unmarshal(body, &answer)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the blacklist: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if answer.Data == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errNoBlacklist
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
listed := make([]BlacklistEntry, 0, len(*answer.Data))
|
||||
|
||||
for i, entry := range *answer.Data {
|
||||
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry.IPAddress)
|
||||
if err != nil || addr.Zone() != "" {
|
||||
// The error leaves out what the entry holds, as it does a
|
||||
// client's address.
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"entry %d's ipAddress %w",
|
||||
i+1,
|
||||
errNotAddress,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
listed = append(listed, BlacklistEntry{
|
||||
Addr: addr.Unmap(), Score: entry.AbuseConfidenceScore,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return listed, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// alert raises a source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB with reason and err,
|
||||
// and logs them.
|
||||
func (a *AbuseIPDB) alert(reason string, err error) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
||||
package reputation_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"testing/synctest"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The tests of the blacklist run in synctest bubbles, as those of the
|
||||
// checks do, with AbuseIPDB a stand-in reached without the network.
|
||||
|
||||
// blacklistURL is where the tests fetch the blacklist from.
|
||||
const blacklistURL = "https://abuseipdb.example/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBlacklistIsFetchedAtOnceAndEveryRefresh(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: `{"meta":{},"data":[` +
|
||||
`{"ipAddress":"203.0.113.9","abuseConfidenceScore":100},` +
|
||||
`{"ipAddress":"::ffff:198.51.100.7","abuseConfidenceScore":95},` +
|
||||
`{"ipAddress":"2001:db8::9","abuseConfidenceScore":90}]}`}
|
||||
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, key, newQueue())
|
||||
|
||||
want := []reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"), Score: 100},
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("198.51.100.7"), Score: 95},
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8::9"), Score: 90},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
got.want(t, want)
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
got.want(t, want)
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
got.want(t, want, want)
|
||||
|
||||
// Each fetch asks for the clients scored 90 or more, with the key
|
||||
// in the header Key alone.
|
||||
abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, req := range abuseIPDB.asked {
|
||||
if req.URL.String() != blacklistURL+"?confidenceMinimum=90" ||
|
||||
req.Header.Get("Key") != key {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"asked %s with the key %q, want %s?confidenceMinimum=90 "+
|
||||
"with %q",
|
||||
req.URL,
|
||||
req.Header.Get("Key"),
|
||||
blacklistURL,
|
||||
key,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFailedBlacklistFetchIsAlertedAndTriedAgainAtTheNextRefresh(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, body, error string }{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a refusal", "",
|
||||
"the server answered 429 Too Many Requests",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"an answer without the list", `{"errors":[]}`,
|
||||
"the answer gives no data",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"an entry that is not an address",
|
||||
`{"data":[{"ipAddress":"203.0.113.9"},{"ipAddress":"example"}]}`,
|
||||
"entry 2's ipAddress is not an address",
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: tc.body}
|
||||
if tc.body == "" {
|
||||
abuseIPDB.status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
queue := newQueue()
|
||||
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, key, queue)
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
|
||||
got.want(t)
|
||||
|
||||
alerted := waiting(queue)
|
||||
if len(alerted) != 1 ||
|
||||
alerted[0].Event != alerts.EventSourceFailure ||
|
||||
alerted[0].Reason != "fetching AbuseIPDB's blacklist failed" ||
|
||||
alerted[0].Detail["source"] != reputation.AbuseIPDBSource ||
|
||||
alerted[0].Detail["error"] != tc.error {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"alerts %+v, want the failure %q",
|
||||
alerted,
|
||||
tc.error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
abuseIPDB.answer(`{"data":[]}`)
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Hour)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
got.want(t, []reputation.BlacklistEntry{})
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBlacklistIsNotFetchedWithoutAKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: `{"data":[]}`}
|
||||
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, "", newQueue())
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Hour)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
got.want(t)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(abuseIPDB.asked) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("fetched the blacklist %d times, want none",
|
||||
len(abuseIPDB.asked))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// blacklistStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that answers each fetch of
|
||||
// the blacklist with status, 200 when it is zero, and body, and keeps the
|
||||
// requests.
|
||||
type blacklistStandIn struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
status int
|
||||
body string
|
||||
asked []*http.Request
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network.
|
||||
func (s *blacklistStandIn) RoundTrip(
|
||||
req *http.Request,
|
||||
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.asked = append(s.asked, req)
|
||||
status, body := s.status, s.body
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if status == 0 {
|
||||
status = http.StatusOK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &http.Response{
|
||||
StatusCode: status,
|
||||
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
|
||||
Header: http.Header{},
|
||||
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
||||
Request: req,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// answer has the stand-in answer each fetch with 200 and body.
|
||||
func (s *blacklistStandIn) answer(body string) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
s.status, s.body = 0, body
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// blacklisted holds the clients on each blacklist given to Blacklisted.
|
||||
type blacklisted struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
fetched [][]reputation.BlacklistEntry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// want checks the clients on each blacklist given so far.
|
||||
func (b *blacklisted) want(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
want ...[]reputation.BlacklistEntry,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if !slices.EqualFunc(b.fetched, want, slices.Equal) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("blacklists %v, want %v", b.fetched, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runBlacklist runs RunBlacklist, until the test ends, with the key
|
||||
// accountKey, the threshold 90 and a refresh of an hour, fetching from
|
||||
// abuseIPDB and raising alerts into queue, and returns what it gives
|
||||
// Blacklisted.
|
||||
func runBlacklist(
|
||||
t *testing.T, abuseIPDB *blacklistStandIn, accountKey string,
|
||||
queue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) *blacklisted {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
got := &blacklisted{}
|
||||
p := abuseIPDBParams()
|
||||
p.Key = accountKey
|
||||
p.BlacklistURL = blacklistURL
|
||||
p.Threshold = 90
|
||||
p.BlacklistRefresh = time.Hour
|
||||
p.Alerts = queue
|
||||
p.Blacklisted = func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||
got.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer got.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
got.fetched = append(got.fetched, listed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
|
||||
checker.SetTransport(abuseIPDB)
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
checker.RunBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
<-done
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
return got
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,622 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package reputation_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"testing/synctest"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The tests run in a synctest bubble, as those of the blocklists do, and
|
||||
// fetch the decision list from engine, a stand-in for a CrowdSec engine
|
||||
// that answers without the network.
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// decisionsURL is the decision list of the tests' engine, and engineKey
|
||||
// the key it answers.
|
||||
decisionsURL = "http://crowdsec.example:8080/v1/decisions"
|
||||
engineKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
|
||||
// sshBF and probing are scenarios of the engine's decisions.
|
||||
sshBF = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
|
||||
probing = "crowdsecurity/http-probing"
|
||||
// ban is the type of a decision to ban, and rangeScope the scope of a
|
||||
// decision on a netblock, as CrowdSec names them.
|
||||
ban = "ban"
|
||||
rangeScope = "Range"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecDecisionBansItsNetblockUntilItEndsEvenWithTheEngineDown(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
manual := "manual 'ban' from 'localhost'"
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, manual, began.Add(6 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
// A shorter decision on the same address, which is not the one
|
||||
// used.
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
{
|
||||
rangeScope,
|
||||
"198.51.100.0/24",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
probing,
|
||||
began.Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"Ip", "2001:db8::1", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
// Left out: a decision to show a captcha, and one on a country.
|
||||
{"Ip", "192.0.2.50", "captcha", probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
|
||||
{"Country", "KP", ban, manual, began.Add(time.Hour)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
|
||||
|
||||
for addr, want := range map[string]reputation.Decision{
|
||||
suspect: {Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual},
|
||||
"198.51.100.0": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
|
||||
"198.51.100.255": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
|
||||
"2001:db8::1": {Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF},
|
||||
"203.0.113.10": {},
|
||||
"198.51.101.0": {},
|
||||
"2001:db8::2": {},
|
||||
"192.0.2.50": {},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
wantDecision(t, lists, addr, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// With the engine down, the copy kept still holds the decision on
|
||||
// 198.51.100.0/24, which no longer bans once it has ended.
|
||||
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.failing = true })
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
"198.51.100.7",
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
suspect,
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: manual,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListFetchedAgainEveryMinute(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
|
||||
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
added := reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.set(func(e *engine) {
|
||||
e.decisions = append(e.decisions,
|
||||
decision{"Ip", "203.0.113.10", ban, probing, added.Expires})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
|
||||
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", reputation.Decision{})
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
|
||||
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", added)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecDecisionOnAClientIsTheOneThatEndsLast(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
// Two decisions on one address, the shorter listed first.
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, probing, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
// 198.51.100.130 is held by a decision on its address that ends
|
||||
// after the one on its netblock, and 192.0.2.20 by one that ends
|
||||
// before.
|
||||
{
|
||||
rangeScope,
|
||||
"198.51.100.128/25",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
sshBF,
|
||||
began.Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"Ip", "198.51.100.130", ban, probing, began.Add(3 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
{
|
||||
rangeScope,
|
||||
"192.0.2.0/24",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
probing,
|
||||
began.Add(5 * time.Hour),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"Ip", "192.0.2.20", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
|
||||
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
suspect,
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
"198.51.100.130",
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(3 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
"192.0.2.20",
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(5 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecAnswerOfNoDecisionIsAGoodCopyThatListsNoClient(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
|
||||
|
||||
// With its decision deleted, the engine answers null.
|
||||
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.decisions = nil })
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
|
||||
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
|
||||
|
||||
want := []reputation.List{{
|
||||
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: time.Now(), Fetched: time.Now(), Lines: []string{"null"},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want %+v", got, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 0", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect, reputation.Decision{})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecFailureKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAlertsOncePerCooldownAndHidesTheKey(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range crowdSecFailures() {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var log bytes.Buffer
|
||||
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
queue := newQueue()
|
||||
p := crowdSecParams()
|
||||
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
|
||||
p.Alerts = queue
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, p)
|
||||
kept := lists.Snapshot()
|
||||
|
||||
e.set(tc.fail)
|
||||
|
||||
// Each failure is tried again a minute after it.
|
||||
for range 2 {
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 3)
|
||||
wantDecision(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lists,
|
||||
suspect,
|
||||
reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: sshBF,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
want := kept[0]
|
||||
want.Tried = time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
got := lists.Snapshot()
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v",
|
||||
got,
|
||||
want,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if n := lists.Failures(decisionsURL); n != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
|
||||
// second.
|
||||
failed := time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)
|
||||
alert := fetchFailure(failed, decisionsURL, tc.error)
|
||||
wantAlert(t, queue, alert)
|
||||
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(
|
||||
log.String(),
|
||||
`"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
|
||||
`"url":"`+decisionsURL+`","error":"`+tc.error,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantKeyNotShown(t, e, log.String(), lists, queue)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecFailure is a way for the engine to fail: fail has it answer the
|
||||
// fetches after the first so that they fail with error.
|
||||
type crowdSecFailure struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
fail func(e *engine)
|
||||
error string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecFailures returns the ways the engine can fail.
|
||||
func crowdSecFailures() []crowdSecFailure {
|
||||
const notDecision = " does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, " +
|
||||
"such as 4h0m0s"
|
||||
|
||||
return []crowdSecFailure{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"an answer other than 200",
|
||||
func(e *engine) { e.failing = true },
|
||||
"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a key the engine refuses",
|
||||
func(e *engine) { e.key = "another-key-0123456789abcdef" },
|
||||
"the server answered 403 Forbidden",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a redirect",
|
||||
func(e *engine) { e.redirect = "http://elsewhere.example/v1/decisions" },
|
||||
"the server answered 302 Found",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"an answer that does not read",
|
||||
func(e *engine) { e.answer = "<html>" },
|
||||
"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a decision to ban whose value does not read",
|
||||
func(e *engine) {
|
||||
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scenario": "` + sshBF + `", ` +
|
||||
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.300"}]`
|
||||
},
|
||||
"decision 1" + notDecision,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a decision to ban whose duration does not read",
|
||||
func(e *engine) {
|
||||
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Country", "type": "ban", ` +
|
||||
`"value": "KP"}, {"duration": "four hours", "scope": "Range", ` +
|
||||
`"type": "ban", "value": "198.51.100.0/24"}]`
|
||||
},
|
||||
"decision 2" + notDecision,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantKeyNotShown checks that no fetch carried the engine's key to a URL
|
||||
// other than its decision list, such as the one a redirect names, and that
|
||||
// the key is in none of what the fetches leave behind: log, the process
|
||||
// log, the alerts waiting in queue, and the copies of lists, which
|
||||
// lists.json keeps.
|
||||
func wantKeyNotShown(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
e *engine,
|
||||
log string,
|
||||
lists *reputation.Lists,
|
||||
queue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
keySentTo := e.keySentTo
|
||||
e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if len(keySentTo) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("the key was sent to %v", keySentTo)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
shown, err := json.Marshal([]any{lists.Snapshot(), waiting(queue)})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.Contains(log+string(shown), engineKey) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("the key is shown in\n%s\n%s", log, shown)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptAcrossARestartEndsWhenItsDecisionsDo(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
|
||||
{
|
||||
rangeScope,
|
||||
"198.51.100.0/24",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
probing,
|
||||
began.Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
|
||||
kept := lists.Snapshot()
|
||||
|
||||
// Restarted half an hour later with what lists.json keeps, and
|
||||
// the engine down, the decision still bans, until the end it had at
|
||||
// the fetch, half an hour on.
|
||||
time.Sleep(30 * time.Minute)
|
||||
|
||||
down := &engine{key: engineKey, failing: true}
|
||||
again := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
|
||||
again.SetTransport(down)
|
||||
|
||||
err := again.Load(kept)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
run(t, again)
|
||||
|
||||
want := reputation.Decision{
|
||||
Expires: began.Add(time.Hour),
|
||||
Scenario: probing,
|
||||
}
|
||||
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(30*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLoadTakesACrowdSecListNeverFetchedAndRefusesACopyThatDoesNotRead(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
||||
lists := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
|
||||
|
||||
// Tried, and never fetched: there is no copy to read.
|
||||
err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now}})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("load the list never fetched: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
|
||||
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{
|
||||
`[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", ` +
|
||||
`"value": "198.51.100.0/33"}]`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}})
|
||||
|
||||
const want = "the copy of " + decisionsURL + ": decision 1 does not give an " +
|
||||
"address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s"
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// engine is a stand-in for the local API of a CrowdSec engine. It answers
|
||||
// a fetch of the decision list that carries its key in X-Api-Key with its
|
||||
// decisions still in force, each with the time it has left as it answers,
|
||||
// by the bubble's clock, as an engine does, or with answer while that is
|
||||
// not "". It answers 403 to a fetch without its key, as an engine does,
|
||||
// with a redirect to redirect while that is not "", and 503 while failing.
|
||||
// It counts the fetches, and notes in keySentTo the URL of each fetch of
|
||||
// another URL that carries a key, as one following a redirect would.
|
||||
type engine struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
key string
|
||||
decisions []decision
|
||||
answer string
|
||||
redirect string
|
||||
failing bool
|
||||
fetches int
|
||||
keySentTo []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// decision is a decision of the engine, which ends at expires.
|
||||
type decision struct {
|
||||
scope, value, kind, scenario string
|
||||
expires time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RoundTrip has the engine answer req, in place of the network.
|
||||
func (e *engine) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
e.fetches++
|
||||
|
||||
if req.URL.String() != decisionsURL &&
|
||||
req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != "" {
|
||||
e.keySentTo = append(e.keySentTo, req.URL.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
status, header, body := http.StatusOK, http.Header{}, e.answer
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case req.URL.String() != decisionsURL || req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != e.key:
|
||||
status, body = http.StatusForbidden, `{"message":"access forbidden"}`
|
||||
case e.redirect != "":
|
||||
status, header = http.StatusFound, http.Header{
|
||||
"Location": {e.redirect},
|
||||
}
|
||||
case e.failing:
|
||||
status, body = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ""
|
||||
case body == "":
|
||||
body = e.inForce(time.Now())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &http.Response{
|
||||
StatusCode: status,
|
||||
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
|
||||
Header: header,
|
||||
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
||||
Request: req,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// inForce returns the decisions in force at now, as the engine answers
|
||||
// them: a JSON list, null for none.
|
||||
func (e *engine) inForce(now time.Time) string {
|
||||
var answer []map[string]string
|
||||
|
||||
for _, d := range e.decisions {
|
||||
if now.Before(d.expires) {
|
||||
answer = append(answer, map[string]string{
|
||||
"duration": d.expires.Sub(now).
|
||||
String(),
|
||||
"origin": "crowdsec",
|
||||
"scenario": d.scenario, "scope": d.scope, "type": d.kind, "value": d.value,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body, err := json.Marshal(answer)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err) // a list of maps of strings always encodes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return string(body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// set changes the engine with change.
|
||||
func (e *engine) set(change func(e *engine)) {
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
change(e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecParams returns the Params of the decision list of the tests'
|
||||
// engine, fetched with its key, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a
|
||||
// queue that sends none.
|
||||
func crowdSecParams() reputation.Params {
|
||||
p := params()
|
||||
p.CrowdSecDecisionsURL = decisionsURL
|
||||
p.CrowdSecKey = engineKey
|
||||
|
||||
return p
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantEngineFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks
|
||||
// how many the engine has had.
|
||||
func wantEngineFetches(t *testing.T, e *engine, want int) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Wait()
|
||||
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
got := e.fetches
|
||||
e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if got != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantDecision checks the decision lists says is in force on addr now,
|
||||
// the zero Decision for none.
|
||||
func wantDecision(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
lists *reputation.Lists,
|
||||
addr string,
|
||||
want reputation.Decision,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
got, listed := lists.CrowdSecDecision(
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddr(addr),
|
||||
time.Now(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if listed != !want.Expires.IsZero() ||
|
||||
listed &&
|
||||
(!got.Expires.Equal(want.Expires) || got.Scenario != want.Scenario) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"%s has the decision %+v in force %t, want %+v",
|
||||
addr,
|
||||
got,
|
||||
listed,
|
||||
want,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -31,10 +31,12 @@ import (
|
||||
// this package: Go's resolver counts the queries under way in one
|
||||
// sync.WaitGroup for the whole process, and the process fails when
|
||||
// queries from two bubbles, or from a bubble and from outside one, are
|
||||
// under way at once. TestMain has the resolver make its configuration,
|
||||
// which it makes on its first query, outside every bubble, since the
|
||||
// configuration holds a channel, which the bubble it was made in would
|
||||
// keep to itself.
|
||||
// under way at once. The one test outside a bubble is parallel, so it
|
||||
// starts only once every test that is not parallel has ended; no other
|
||||
// parallel test of this package queries a resolver. TestMain has the
|
||||
// resolver make its configuration, which it makes on its first query,
|
||||
// outside every bubble, since the configuration holds a channel, which
|
||||
// the bubble it was made in would keep to itself.
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// zone and otherZone are the DNSBL zones the tests name.
|
||||
@@ -525,8 +527,9 @@ func TestAtMost100000VerdictsKeptTheOneFetchedLongestAgoDroppedFirst(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
|
||||
func TestQueriesGoToTheResolverSWWDNSBLResolverNames(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
|
||||
listedName: {addrs: []string{listing}},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
|
||||
// network.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
|
||||
l.httpClient.Transport = transport
|
||||
l.crowdSecClient.Transport = transport
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetTransport has a's checks go through transport instead of the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
|
||||
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
|
||||
// blocklists of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and
|
||||
// the decision list of the CrowdSec engine SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It
|
||||
// keeps the last good copy of
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the address lists of
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS. It keeps the last good copy of
|
||||
// each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
|
||||
// and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
|
||||
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
|
||||
// today. The state package writes all of these to files and reads them
|
||||
// from there, so that a restart keeps them too.
|
||||
// from there, so that a restart keeps them too. Last, it fetches
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's blacklist, which it does not keep.
|
||||
package reputation
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
@@ -35,10 +34,6 @@ const (
|
||||
maxListBytes = 16 << 20
|
||||
// fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list.
|
||||
fetchTimeout = time.Minute
|
||||
// crowdSecRefresh is how long after the CrowdSec decision list was last
|
||||
// fetched or tried it is fetched again: the engine is the operator's
|
||||
// own, and makes and ends decisions all the time.
|
||||
crowdSecRefresh = time.Minute
|
||||
// mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every
|
||||
// IPv4-mapped address.
|
||||
mappedBits = 96
|
||||
@@ -52,9 +47,6 @@ var (
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotASNPercent = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50")
|
||||
errNotDecision = errors.New(
|
||||
"does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// List is a list as lists.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from,
|
||||
@@ -77,14 +69,8 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
ASNLimitPercentURL string
|
||||
// TagLists are the address lists that add a tag (SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS).
|
||||
TagLists []config.TagList
|
||||
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
|
||||
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
|
||||
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
|
||||
CrowdSecKey string
|
||||
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
|
||||
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
|
||||
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
|
||||
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH).
|
||||
Refresh time.Duration
|
||||
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
||||
Now func() time.Time
|
||||
@@ -99,10 +85,6 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
type Lists struct {
|
||||
params Params
|
||||
httpClient *http.Client
|
||||
// crowdSecClient fetches the CrowdSec decision list. It follows no
|
||||
// redirect, so that the key goes to the engine alone: a redirect is a
|
||||
// failure.
|
||||
crowdSecClient *http.Client
|
||||
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
// lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names.
|
||||
@@ -119,22 +101,12 @@ type list struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist or a tag list, the
|
||||
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent
|
||||
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
|
||||
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths among
|
||||
// them.
|
||||
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, and for the file of
|
||||
// AS:percent lines, the percentage it gives each AS number.
|
||||
type entries struct {
|
||||
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
|
||||
lengths []int
|
||||
percents map[string]int64
|
||||
decisions map[netip.Prefix]Decision
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decision is a decision of the CrowdSec engine to ban a netblock: when
|
||||
// it ends, and the scenario that made it, such as crowdsecurity/ssh-bf.
|
||||
type Decision struct {
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
Scenario string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet.
|
||||
@@ -142,12 +114,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
|
||||
l := &Lists{
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
httpClient: &http.Client{},
|
||||
crowdSecClient: &http.Client{
|
||||
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
|
||||
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
lists: map[string]*list{},
|
||||
lists: map[string]*list{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
|
||||
@@ -159,7 +126,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
|
||||
|
||||
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then the
|
||||
// tag lists', then the CrowdSec decision list's.
|
||||
// tag lists'.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
|
||||
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
|
||||
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
|
||||
@@ -170,10 +137,6 @@ func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
|
||||
urls = append(urls, list.URL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
|
||||
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return urls
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,40 +188,6 @@ func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
|
||||
return percent, listed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CrowdSecDecision returns the decision of the copy of the CrowdSec
|
||||
// decision list on a netblock that holds addr and that ends last, and
|
||||
// whether it is still in force at now. A decision that has ended no
|
||||
// longer bans, even before the next fetch drops it.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) CrowdSecDecision(
|
||||
addr netip.Addr,
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
) (Decision, bool) {
|
||||
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL == "" {
|
||||
return Decision{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
kept := l.lists[l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL].entries
|
||||
|
||||
var last Decision
|
||||
|
||||
for _, length := range kept.lengths {
|
||||
netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue // an IPv6 netblock's length, past an IPv4 address's 32 bits
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
decision := kept.decisions[netblock]
|
||||
if decision.Expires.After(last.Expires) {
|
||||
last = decision
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return last, now.Before(last.Expires)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was
|
||||
// fetched, or zero while there is none.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time {
|
||||
@@ -331,7 +260,7 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
|
||||
continue // dropped, or a list tried but never fetched, without a copy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines, kept.Fetched)
|
||||
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -377,8 +306,7 @@ func (l *Lists) fetchDue(ctx context.Context) time.Time {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it
|
||||
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two, or crowdSecRefresh
|
||||
// after for the CrowdSec decision list.
|
||||
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
|
||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -390,10 +318,6 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
|
||||
last = held.kept.Tried
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
|
||||
return last.Add(crowdSecRefresh)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return last.Add(l.params.Refresh)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -408,7 +332,7 @@ func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
|
||||
|
||||
var found entries
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines, now)
|
||||
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil
|
||||
@@ -468,11 +392,8 @@ func raiseFailure(queue *alerts.Queue, reason, source string, err error) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. The CrowdSec
|
||||
// decision list is fetched with CrowdSecKey in the header X-Api-Key, where
|
||||
// the engine looks for it, by crowdSecClient, which follows no redirect.
|
||||
// An answer other than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a
|
||||
// failure.
|
||||
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. An answer other
|
||||
// than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a failure.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
@@ -487,14 +408,7 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client := l.httpClient
|
||||
|
||||
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", l.params.CrowdSecKey)
|
||||
client = l.crowdSecClient
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := client.Do(req)
|
||||
res, err := l.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name
|
||||
// already: only what went wrong is kept.
|
||||
@@ -526,22 +440,16 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
return lines, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
|
||||
// of a blocklist or a tag list, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the
|
||||
// CrowdSec decision list. In all but the decision list, anything after a ; or
|
||||
// a # on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
|
||||
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL: those of a blocklist or a
|
||||
// tag list, or of the file of AS:percent lines. Anything after a ; or a #
|
||||
// on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
|
||||
// does not read is an error naming it by its number.
|
||||
func (l *Lists) parse(
|
||||
listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
|
||||
) (entries, error) {
|
||||
switch listURL {
|
||||
case l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL:
|
||||
func (l *Lists) parse(listURL string, lines []string) (entries, error) {
|
||||
if listURL == l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL {
|
||||
return parsePercents(lines)
|
||||
case l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL:
|
||||
return parseDecisions(lines, fetched)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return parseNetblocks(lines)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return parseNetblocks(lines)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseNetblocks reads the lines of a blocklist or a tag list, each an address
|
||||
@@ -628,64 +536,6 @@ func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
|
||||
return found, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseDecisions reads the lines of the CrowdSec decision list fetched at
|
||||
// fetched: the engine's answer, a JSON list of its decisions in force,
|
||||
// null while it has none. A decision of the type ban whose scope is Ip or
|
||||
// Range, as CrowdSec names them, bans its value, an address or a netblock
|
||||
// as parseNetblock reads it, until its duration, the time it had left as
|
||||
// the engine answered, has passed since fetched. Any other decision, such
|
||||
// as one to show a captcha or one on a country, is left out. A decision
|
||||
// to ban whose value or duration does not read is an error naming it by
|
||||
// its number.
|
||||
func parseDecisions(lines []string, fetched time.Time) (entries, error) {
|
||||
var answer []struct {
|
||||
Duration string `json:"duration"`
|
||||
Scenario string `json:"scenario"`
|
||||
Scope string `json:"scope"`
|
||||
Type string `json:"type"`
|
||||
Value string `json:"value"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), &answer)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
found := entries{decisions: map[netip.Prefix]Decision{}}
|
||||
|
||||
for i, decision := range answer {
|
||||
if decision.Type != "ban" ||
|
||||
(decision.Scope != "Ip" && decision.Scope != "Range") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
netblock, ok := parseNetblock(decision.Value)
|
||||
|
||||
duration, err := time.ParseDuration(decision.Duration)
|
||||
if !ok || err != nil {
|
||||
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"decision %d %w",
|
||||
i+1,
|
||||
errNotDecision,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expires := fetched.Add(duration)
|
||||
if expires.After(found.decisions[netblock].Expires) {
|
||||
found.decisions[netblock] = Decision{
|
||||
Expires: expires,
|
||||
Scenario: decision.Scenario,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
|
||||
found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return found, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and
|
||||
// without the spaces around what is left.
|
||||
func withoutComment(line string) string {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,12 @@ const (
|
||||
// the app.
|
||||
ActionForward = "forward"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
|
||||
// ActionRequestLineTooLong is a request whose request line is too long for
|
||||
// the header limits.
|
||||
ActionRequestLineTooLong = "request_line_too_long"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge is a request whose headers are over the
|
||||
// header limits.
|
||||
ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge = "request_header_too_large"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionClientIsRateLimited is a request refused because it took its
|
||||
@@ -29,9 +34,8 @@ const (
|
||||
ActionClientIsRateLimited = "client_is_rate_limited"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionTemporarilyBanned is a request refused because a ban that runs
|
||||
// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a
|
||||
// trap path or the CrowdSec decision list lists its client, and so made
|
||||
// such a ban.
|
||||
// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule or asked for a
|
||||
// trap path, and so made such a ban.
|
||||
ActionTemporarilyBanned = "temporarily_banned"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionPermanentlyBanned is a request refused because a ban that never
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +61,12 @@ const (
|
||||
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
|
||||
// is not in SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
|
||||
ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionChecksTimedOut is a request refused because the trap paths, the
|
||||
// rule files and the Core Rule Set had not finished with it within 500
|
||||
// milliseconds.
|
||||
ActionChecksTimedOut = "checks_timed_out"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActionOwnEndpoint is a request waf answered at one of its own
|
||||
// endpoints, or a question about a path under /_sww/.
|
||||
ActionOwnEndpoint = "own_endpoint"
|
||||
@@ -144,8 +154,9 @@ type Line struct {
|
||||
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionClientDenied,
|
||||
// ActionTemporarilyBanned, ActionPermanentlyBanned, ActionCountryDenied,
|
||||
// ActionClientIsRateLimited, ActionBlockedByBlockRule,
|
||||
// ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, or, in waf,
|
||||
// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits.
|
||||
// ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, or, in waf, ActionRequestLineTooLong or
|
||||
// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits, or
|
||||
// ActionChecksTimedOut.
|
||||
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Heuristic is the name of the heuristic that refused the request, in
|
||||
// observe mode too, and HeuristicFigures are the figures it acted on, by
|
||||
@@ -184,8 +195,7 @@ type Line struct {
|
||||
// LimitHitMinuteRefusals for the refusal limit.
|
||||
LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then
|
||||
// that of the CrowdSec decision list when it does, then the DNSBL zones
|
||||
// whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
|
||||
// the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
|
||||
// score is a hit.
|
||||
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Tags are the request's tags, sorted.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
var out bytes.Buffer
|
||||
|
||||
requestlog.NewProcessLogger(&out, "fsn1app1/blog", slog.LevelInfo).
|
||||
requestlog.NewProcessLogger(&out, "host1/blog", slog.LevelInfo).
|
||||
Info("starting",
|
||||
"version", "v1")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if fields["type"] != "process" ||
|
||||
fields["instance"] != "fsn1app1/blog" ||
|
||||
fields["instance"] != "host1/blog" ||
|
||||
fields["msg"] != "starting" ||
|
||||
fields["level"] != "INFO" ||
|
||||
fields["version"] != "v1" {
|
||||
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func TestProcessLoggerWritesTheMessagesAtItsLevelOrMoreSevere(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(
|
||||
&out,
|
||||
"fsn1app1/blog",
|
||||
"host1/blog",
|
||||
level,
|
||||
)
|
||||
for _, at := range levels {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package rproxy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bufio"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +23,9 @@ type requestBody struct {
|
||||
// body is the visitor's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
|
||||
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
|
||||
body io.ReadCloser
|
||||
rq *request
|
||||
// refuse refuses the request with a status, as the request's own refuse
|
||||
// does.
|
||||
refuse func(status int)
|
||||
// held is the part read before the request goes to the app, which Read gives
|
||||
// first.
|
||||
held []byte
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +71,7 @@ func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
|
||||
b.received.Store(true)
|
||||
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
|
||||
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
b.refuse(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return n, err
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +89,13 @@ type responseBody struct {
|
||||
// body is the app's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
|
||||
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
|
||||
body io.ReadCloser
|
||||
rq *request
|
||||
// refuse refuses the request with a status, as the request's own refuse
|
||||
// does.
|
||||
refuse func(status int)
|
||||
// responseReceived is called once the app's whole answer has arrived.
|
||||
responseReceived func()
|
||||
// ctx is the visitor's request's context.
|
||||
ctx context.Context //nolint:containedctx // the body ends with the request
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Read reads from the app's body.
|
||||
@@ -100,15 +109,15 @@ func (b *responseBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
|
||||
b.rq.responseReceived()
|
||||
b.responseReceived()
|
||||
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
|
||||
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
|
||||
b.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
|
||||
|
||||
return n, errResponseTooLarge
|
||||
case b.rq.in.Context().Err() == nil:
|
||||
case b.ctx.Err() == nil:
|
||||
// The answer broke off, not because the visitor went away. If a time
|
||||
// limit cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
|
||||
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
|
||||
b.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return n, err
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
package rproxy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// What opens the circuit breaker, and how often a request asks waf while it is
|
||||
// open.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
breakerFailures = 5
|
||||
breakerWindow = 5 * time.Second
|
||||
breakerAskInterval = time.Second
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// errBreakerOpen is why a request did not ask waf.
|
||||
var errBreakerOpen = errors.New(
|
||||
"waf is not asked while the circuit breaker is open",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// breaker is the circuit breaker for asks to waf. It opens when
|
||||
// breakerFailures asks fail within breakerWindow. An ask fails when it gets no
|
||||
// answer in time, or an answer rproxy cannot pass on. While it is open, at
|
||||
// most one request each breakerAskInterval asks waf. Any usable answer closes
|
||||
// it, whatever it decides, and forgets the failures before it.
|
||||
type breaker struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
// failures holds the times of the latest failed asks, oldest first, at most
|
||||
// breakerFailures of them.
|
||||
failures []time.Time
|
||||
open bool
|
||||
// lastAsk is when a request last asked waf while the breaker was open.
|
||||
lastAsk time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mayAsk reports whether a request may ask waf at now. While the breaker is
|
||||
// open, it says yes once each breakerAskInterval.
|
||||
func (b *breaker) mayAsk(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.open {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if now.Sub(b.lastAsk) < breakerAskInterval {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
b.lastAsk = now
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// noteAnswer notes that an ask got an answer rproxy can use. It closes the
|
||||
// breaker and forgets the failures before it.
|
||||
func (b *breaker) noteAnswer() {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
b.open = false
|
||||
b.failures = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// noteFailure notes that an ask that ended at now got no answer in time, and
|
||||
// opens the breaker if breakerFailures asks have failed within breakerWindow.
|
||||
func (b *breaker) noteFailure(now time.Time) {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
b.failures = append(b.failures, now)
|
||||
if len(b.failures) > breakerFailures {
|
||||
b.failures = b.failures[1:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.open && len(b.failures) == breakerFailures &&
|
||||
now.Sub(b.failures[0]) <= breakerWindow {
|
||||
b.open = true
|
||||
b.lastAsk = now
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||
package rproxy_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The breaker tests give the breaker each time themselves, counted from
|
||||
// time.Now(), and never wait.
|
||||
|
||||
// fail notes count failed asks on b, one each step from at.
|
||||
func fail(b *rproxy.Breaker, at time.Time, count int, step time.Duration) {
|
||||
for i := range count {
|
||||
b.NoteFailure(at.Add(time.Duration(i) * step))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// openBreaker returns a breaker opened at now by five failed asks, one a
|
||||
// second.
|
||||
func openBreaker(now time.Time) *rproxy.Breaker {
|
||||
b := &rproxy.Breaker{}
|
||||
fail(b, now.Add(-4*time.Second), 5, time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFourFailedAsksWithinFiveSecondsLeaveTheBreakerClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
b := &rproxy.Breaker{}
|
||||
fail(b, now, 4, time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now.Add(3 * time.Second)) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFiveFailedAsksWithinFiveSecondsOpenTheBreaker(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
b := openBreaker(now)
|
||||
|
||||
if b.MayAsk(now) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may ask, want it not to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFiveFailedAsksOverMoreThanFiveSecondsLeaveTheBreakerClosed(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
b := &rproxy.Breaker{}
|
||||
fail(b, now, 5, 1300*time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now.Add(6 * time.Second)) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAnAnswerBetweenFailedAsksKeepsTheBreakerClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
b := &rproxy.Breaker{}
|
||||
fail(b, now, 4, 100*time.Millisecond)
|
||||
b.NoteAnswer()
|
||||
fail(b, now.Add(500*time.Millisecond), 4, 100*time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now.Add(900 * time.Millisecond)) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAnOpenBreakerLetsOneRequestAskEachSecond(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
b := openBreaker(now)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
after time.Duration
|
||||
want bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{999 * time.Millisecond, false},
|
||||
{time.Second, true},
|
||||
{time.Second, false},
|
||||
{1500 * time.Millisecond, false},
|
||||
{2 * time.Second, true},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
got := b.MayAsk(now.Add(tc.after))
|
||||
if got != tc.want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("may ask %v after it opened: %v, want %v",
|
||||
tc.after, got, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAFailedAskKeepsTheBreakerOpen(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
opened := time.Now()
|
||||
b := openBreaker(opened)
|
||||
now := opened.Add(time.Second)
|
||||
b.MayAsk(now)
|
||||
b.NoteFailure(now)
|
||||
|
||||
if b.MayAsk(now.Add(999 * time.Millisecond)) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may ask, want it not to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now.Add(time.Second)) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask a second later, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOneAnswerClosesTheBreaker(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
opened := time.Now()
|
||||
b := openBreaker(opened)
|
||||
now := opened.Add(time.Second)
|
||||
b.MayAsk(now)
|
||||
b.NoteAnswer()
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The failures before the answer no longer count, so one more does not open
|
||||
// the breaker again.
|
||||
b.NoteFailure(now)
|
||||
|
||||
if !b.MayAsk(now) {
|
||||
t.Error("a request may not ask after one failure, want it to")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
package rproxy
|
||||
|
||||
import "time"
|
||||
|
||||
// Breaker is the circuit breaker, for tests that give it the time.
|
||||
type Breaker struct {
|
||||
b breaker
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MayAsk reports whether a request may ask waf at now.
|
||||
func (b *Breaker) MayAsk(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
return b.b.mayAsk(now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NoteAnswer notes that an ask got an answer rproxy can use.
|
||||
func (b *Breaker) NoteAnswer() {
|
||||
b.b.noteAnswer()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NoteFailure notes that an ask that ended at now got no answer in time.
|
||||
func (b *Breaker) NoteFailure(now time.Time) {
|
||||
b.b.noteFailure(now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -71,6 +71,59 @@ func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// getOfSize is a GET whose request line and headers, the blank line that ends
|
||||
// them included, are size bytes long.
|
||||
func getOfSize(size int) string {
|
||||
const start, end = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\nX-Pad: ", "\r\n\r\n"
|
||||
|
||||
return start + strings.Repeat("x", size-len(start)-len(end)) + end
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestARequestLineAndHeadersOf32KiBReachTheApp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
standIn := startWAF(t, allow)
|
||||
app := startApp(t, greet)
|
||||
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
conn := dial(t, addr)
|
||||
send(t, conn, getOfSize(32<<10))
|
||||
|
||||
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestARequestLineAndHeadersOver32KiBAreRefusedAndTheConnectionClosed(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
standIn := startWAF(t, allow)
|
||||
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
|
||||
t.Error("the app was asked")
|
||||
})
|
||||
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
conn := dial(t, addr)
|
||||
send(t, conn, getOfSize(32<<10+1))
|
||||
|
||||
// io.ReadAll returns without an error only once rproxy has closed the
|
||||
// connection.
|
||||
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
|
||||
if err != nil || !strings.HasPrefix(string(text), "HTTP/1.1 431 ") {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"read %q (%v), want 431 and the connection closed",
|
||||
text,
|
||||
err,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Error("waf was asked")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(
|
||||
|
||||
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
|
||||
rq.body = &requestBody{
|
||||
body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.MaxRequestSize),
|
||||
rq: rq,
|
||||
body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.MaxRequestSize),
|
||||
refuse: rq.refuse,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -294,7 +294,12 @@ func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
|
||||
// the request, and SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS starts.
|
||||
rq.startResponseTimer(requestEnd)
|
||||
|
||||
res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
|
||||
res.Body = &responseBody{
|
||||
body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes),
|
||||
refuse: rq.refuse,
|
||||
responseReceived: rq.responseReceived,
|
||||
ctx: rq.in.Context(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
rq.out.afterStatus = rq.setResponseDeadline
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
|
||||
// waf goes to the visitor as waf gave it.
|
||||
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION decides only when waf cannot
|
||||
// be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within
|
||||
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
|
||||
// method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put to waf as the visitor
|
||||
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and writes nothing to disk. "rproxy" in
|
||||
// SPEC.md says what it does.
|
||||
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, or while the circuit breaker for asks to
|
||||
// waf is open. rproxy itself refuses a request with a method it does not pass
|
||||
// on, or one it cannot put to waf as the visitor sent it. It keeps nothing
|
||||
// between requests but the circuit breaker, and writes nothing to disk.
|
||||
// "rproxy" in SPEC.md says what it does.
|
||||
package rproxy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
@@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ type handler struct {
|
||||
wafTransport http.RoundTripper
|
||||
// reportURL is where the reports go.
|
||||
reportURL string
|
||||
// breaker is the circuit breaker for asks to waf.
|
||||
breaker breaker
|
||||
// reports waits for the reports being sent. reportsMu guards starting one
|
||||
// against reportsStopped, which is set once nothing is to wait for another.
|
||||
reports sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
@@ -196,7 +199,7 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answer, err := rq.ask(r.Context())
|
||||
answer, err := rq.askUnlessBreakerOpen(r.Context())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
rq.handleNoUsableAnswer(r.Context(), err)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +324,8 @@ func greet(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
|
||||
// startRProxy starts rproxy with waf at backend and the app at appURL, and
|
||||
// the settings in env on top of the defaults. It returns where rproxy listens
|
||||
// and what it writes.
|
||||
// and what it writes. SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless env
|
||||
// sets it, so that a busy host cannot make rproxy drop a question or a report.
|
||||
func startRProxy(
|
||||
t *testing.T, backend, appURL string, env map[string]string,
|
||||
) (string, *output) {
|
||||
@@ -356,6 +358,7 @@ func startServerLogging(
|
||||
|
||||
settings := map[string]string{
|
||||
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": backend, "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
|
||||
}
|
||||
maps.Copy(settings, env)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1395,6 +1398,163 @@ func TestSendsNoReportWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFiveFailedAsksKeepTheNextRequestFromAskingWAF(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for name, failure := range map[string]http.HandlerFunc{
|
||||
"no answer at all": func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
|
||||
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
|
||||
},
|
||||
"a slow answer": func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
<-r.Context().Done()
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
var answering atomic.Bool
|
||||
|
||||
standIn := startWAF(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if answering.Load() {
|
||||
allow(w, r)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
failure(w, r)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
nextID := make(chan string, 1)
|
||||
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if answering.Load() {
|
||||
nextID <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
greet(w, r)
|
||||
})
|
||||
addr, out := startRProxy(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
standIn.URL,
|
||||
app.URL,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout: "200",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// An ask can time out before it reaches the stand-in, so these
|
||||
// may leave fewer than five questions, or leave some late.
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// rproxy writes this line before it answers a request it kept
|
||||
// from asking waf, so no wait is needed.
|
||||
if out.has("the circuit breaker is open") {
|
||||
t.Error("the circuit breaker opened before five asks failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answering.Store(true)
|
||||
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
|
||||
out.waitFor(t, "the circuit breaker is open")
|
||||
|
||||
// Had the next request asked waf, its question would have reached
|
||||
// the stand-in before the request reached the app.
|
||||
var id string
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case id = <-nextID:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
t.Fatal("the app did not get the next request")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for len(standIn.questions) > 0 {
|
||||
asked := <-standIn.questions
|
||||
if asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader) == id {
|
||||
t.Error("waf was asked, want it not to be")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVisitorsThatGoAwayWhileWAFIsAskedLeaveTheBreakerClosed(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
var answering atomic.Bool
|
||||
|
||||
standIn := startWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if answering.Load() {
|
||||
allow(w, r)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
<-r.Context().Done()
|
||||
})
|
||||
app := startApp(t, greet)
|
||||
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Five of these would open the breaker if they counted as failures.
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
conn := dial(t, addr)
|
||||
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
|
||||
id := standIn.question(t).header.Get(requestIDHeader)
|
||||
|
||||
_ = conn.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
// rproxy writes the request's log line once it is done with the ask.
|
||||
out.waitFor(t, id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answering.Store(true)
|
||||
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
|
||||
standIn.question(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAnswersThatCannotBePassedOnOpenTheBreaker(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
var answering atomic.Bool
|
||||
|
||||
tooLarge := overOneMiB(dispositionDeny)
|
||||
standIn := startWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if answering.Load() {
|
||||
allow(w, r)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tooLarge(w, r)
|
||||
})
|
||||
app := startApp(t, greet)
|
||||
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
|
||||
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
standIn.question(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answering.Store(true)
|
||||
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
|
||||
out.waitFor(t, "the circuit breaker is open")
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-standIn.questions:
|
||||
t.Error("waf was asked, want it not to be")
|
||||
case <-time.After(10 * pollInterval):
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAPathUnderOwnPrefixNeverReachesTheApp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+28
-1
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +68,8 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
|
||||
rq.answer(http.StatusBadGateway)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// waf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
|
||||
// within SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps waf
|
||||
// within SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS; or the circuit breaker
|
||||
// kept the request from asking. A request that keeps waf
|
||||
// busy past SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while
|
||||
// waf is overloaded, gets SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION
|
||||
// here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503 whenever waf is
|
||||
@@ -86,6 +88,31 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// askUnlessBreakerOpen asks waf, unless the circuit breaker is open and it is
|
||||
// not yet time for a request to ask. It then tells the breaker whether waf
|
||||
// answered in time. An answer rproxy cannot pass on counts as a failure. A
|
||||
// visitor that goes away tells the breaker nothing. ctx is the request's own
|
||||
// context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) askUnlessBreakerOpen(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
) (*wafAnswer, error) {
|
||||
b := &rq.h.breaker
|
||||
if !b.mayAsk(time.Now()) {
|
||||
return nil, errBreakerOpen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answer, err := rq.ask(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case err == nil:
|
||||
b.noteAnswer()
|
||||
case ctx.Err() == nil:
|
||||
b.noteFailure(time.Now())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return answer, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ask sends waf the question, and returns its answer, which must have come
|
||||
// whole within SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as
|
||||
// when the visitor goes away.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ var (
|
||||
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
|
||||
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
|
||||
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
|
||||
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec")
|
||||
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb")
|
||||
errExpires = errors.New("is not after its start")
|
||||
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
|
||||
errScope = errors.New(
|
||||
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
// sww runs.
|
||||
Ledger *bans.Ledger
|
||||
Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
||||
GeoJS *lookup.GeoJS
|
||||
GeoJS *geojs.GeoJS
|
||||
Lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
|
||||
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ type clientsFile struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// lookupsFile is lookups.json, with each answer on a line of its own.
|
||||
type lookupsFile struct {
|
||||
Version int `json:"version"`
|
||||
Lookups []lookup.Answer `json:"lookups"`
|
||||
Version int `json:"version"`
|
||||
Lookups []geojs.Answer `json:"lookups"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// abuseIPDBChecksSpentFile is abuseipdb-checks-spent.json, indented for an
|
||||
@@ -638,6 +638,8 @@ func (f *Files) takeInState(
|
||||
f.params.Ledger.Load(held)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.params.Ledger.ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(f.params.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
entries = len(held)
|
||||
case clientsJSON:
|
||||
var file clientsFile
|
||||
@@ -967,7 +969,7 @@ func (e BanEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
|
||||
// each expires is read again as written. An expires not after the start
|
||||
// is refused too, since the netblock's next ban for a broken limit, three
|
||||
// times as long as this one, would then refuse nothing; and so is a cause
|
||||
// other than limit, attack, admin or crowdsec, most likely misspelt.
|
||||
// other than limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb, most likely misspelt.
|
||||
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
|
||||
var written struct {
|
||||
Bans []struct {
|
||||
@@ -992,7 +994,7 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's expires %w", i+1, errExpires)
|
||||
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
|
||||
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin &&
|
||||
entry.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec:
|
||||
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"entry %d's cause %q %w",
|
||||
i+1,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
|
||||
"limit": 3,
|
||||
"attack": 1,
|
||||
"admin": 1,
|
||||
"crowdsec": 2
|
||||
"abuseipdb": 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ const filledAlertsJSON = `{
|
||||
"waiting": {
|
||||
"webhook": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"instance": "fsn1app1/blog",
|
||||
"instance": "host1/blog",
|
||||
"time": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z",
|
||||
"event": "ban",
|
||||
"client": "203.0.113.9",
|
||||
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ const filledAlertsJSON = `{
|
||||
"suppressed_repeats": 0
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"instance": "fsn1app1/blog",
|
||||
"instance": "host1/blog",
|
||||
"time": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z",
|
||||
"event": "file_error",
|
||||
"client": "",
|
||||
@@ -1188,10 +1188,10 @@ func TestBanWithAnotherCauseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": null, "cause": "admin"}, `+
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "crowdsec"}, `+
|
||||
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}, `+
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.12/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
|
||||
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec`)
|
||||
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBanThatDoesNotEndAfterItsStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -1701,7 +1701,7 @@ func TestEditOfEachFileTakenIn(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t,
|
||||
lookupsJSON,
|
||||
params.GeoJS.Snapshot(),
|
||||
[]lookup.Answer{
|
||||
[]geojs.Answer{
|
||||
{Client: client, Country: "FR", Answered: midnight()},
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -2091,6 +2091,39 @@ func TestLiftedBanReadAtTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wantLiftedBanKept(t, load(t, params), dir, params.Ledger)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEndedAbuseIPDBBanForgottenWhenBansJSONIsReadAtTheStart(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
ended := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||
lasting := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
|
||||
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.11/32")
|
||||
|
||||
// At midnight, the start's time, the first ban has ended and the second
|
||||
// lasts. The third has ended too, but is for a limit.
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
edit(t, dir, bansJSON, `{"version": 1, "bans": [`+
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32", "start": "2026-09-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "cause": "abuseipdb"}, `+
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-09-07T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": "2026-10-07T00:00:00Z", "cause": "abuseipdb"}, `+
|
||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-05T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||
`"expires": "2026-10-05T01:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}]}`)
|
||||
|
||||
params := newParams(dir)
|
||||
load(t, params)
|
||||
|
||||
for netblock, want := range map[netip.Prefix]int{
|
||||
ended: 0, lasting: 1, limited: 1,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
if got := len(params.Ledger.Bans(netblock)); got != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %d bans on %s, want %d",
|
||||
got, netblock, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBanLiftedByAnEditWhileRunning(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2399,7 +2432,7 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
|
||||
Events: alerts.Events(),
|
||||
Cooldown: 15 * time.Minute,
|
||||
MaxPerHour: 2,
|
||||
Instance: "fsn1app1/blog",
|
||||
Instance: "host1/blog",
|
||||
Now: midnight,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2416,9 +2449,7 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
|
||||
MaxBans: 5000,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
Limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, 20000),
|
||||
GeoJS: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
|
||||
Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Metrics: m,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
GeoJS: geojs.New(geojs.Params{Now: midnight}),
|
||||
Lists: reputation.New(reputation.Params{
|
||||
BlocklistURLs: []string{
|
||||
blocklistURL,
|
||||
@@ -2466,9 +2497,8 @@ func office() netip.Prefix {
|
||||
return netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit, one
|
||||
// for a clear sign of attack and one for CrowdSec's decision, clients
|
||||
// with counts and histories,
|
||||
// fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit and one
|
||||
// for a clear sign of attack, clients with counts and histories,
|
||||
// GeoJS answers, the blocklists' last tries and the copy of one, two
|
||||
// verdicts of a DNSBL zone, the AbuseIPDB checks spent today with two
|
||||
// scores, and two answers of routewatch, as filledListsJSON,
|
||||
@@ -2485,13 +2515,6 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
params.Ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"), now,
|
||||
bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"})
|
||||
params.Ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.9/32"),
|
||||
now,
|
||||
now.Add(4*time.Hour),
|
||||
"crowdsecurity/ssh-bf",
|
||||
bans.Notes{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range []string{"2001:db8::/64", "203.0.113.9/32", "192.0.2.1/32"} {
|
||||
params.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(c), now, whole)
|
||||
@@ -2503,7 +2526,7 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
params.Limiter.AddLookup(client, now.Add(-time.Hour), asn, asName, "DE")
|
||||
|
||||
params.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
|
||||
params.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{
|
||||
{
|
||||
Client: client, ASN: asn, ASName: asName, Country: "DE",
|
||||
Answered: now.Add(-time.Hour), Used: now,
|
||||
@@ -2634,10 +2657,9 @@ func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
|
||||
Requests: 1500,
|
||||
Refused: 3,
|
||||
EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{
|
||||
Limit: 3,
|
||||
Attack: 1,
|
||||
Admin: 1,
|
||||
CrowdSec: 2,
|
||||
Limit: 3,
|
||||
Attack: 1,
|
||||
Admin: 1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
|
||||
package sww
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"go.uber.org/fx"
|
||||
"go.uber.org/fx/fxevent"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
|
||||
// once sww is told to stop, before their connections are closed.
|
||||
// runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
|
||||
const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// requestLog is where a daemon's server writes the request log: stdout, and
|
||||
// the remote log sender while there is one. fx tells parts apart by type, so
|
||||
// it has a type of its own.
|
||||
type requestLog struct {
|
||||
io.Writer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// servingFailed gets why serving failed, for run, which then stops the
|
||||
// daemon. fx tells parts apart by type, so it has a type of its own.
|
||||
type servingFailed chan error
|
||||
|
||||
// utcNow is the time the state files, the alerts and the rate limits go by.
|
||||
func utcNow() time.Time {
|
||||
return time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// startError is why a daemon cannot start: the message its process log gives,
|
||||
// and the error it logs with it.
|
||||
type startError struct {
|
||||
message string
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e startError) Error() string {
|
||||
return e.message + ": " + e.err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e startError) Unwrap() error {
|
||||
return e.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cannotStart logs why a daemon cannot start, with the message of the
|
||||
// startError in err, and returns its exit status.
|
||||
func cannotStart(processLog *slog.Logger, err error) int {
|
||||
message, cause := "cannot start", err
|
||||
|
||||
failed, ok := errors.AsType[startError](err)
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
message, cause = failed.message, failed.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Error(message, "error", cause.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// listen listens on address, which the setting names.
|
||||
func listen(address, setting string) (net.Listener, error) {
|
||||
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(
|
||||
context.Background(), "tcp", address)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, startError{"cannot listen on " + setting, err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return listener, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// background returns the hook that runs loop on a goroutine of its own from
|
||||
// the start, and at the stop ends it and waits for it to return.
|
||||
func background(loop func(context.Context)) fx.Hook {
|
||||
running, stop := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
ended := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
return fx.StartStopHook(
|
||||
func() {
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
loop(running)
|
||||
close(ended)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
},
|
||||
func() {
|
||||
stop()
|
||||
<-ended
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serve serves requests on listener from the start. At the stop it gives the
|
||||
// requests in progress shutdownTimeout to finish, then closes their
|
||||
// connections. When serving fails, it logs why and sends the error to
|
||||
// failed.
|
||||
func serve(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, server *http.Server, listener net.Listener,
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger, failed servingFailed,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
served := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
|
||||
OnStart: func(context.Context) error {
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
err := server.Serve(listener)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
|
||||
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
failed <- err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
served <- err
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopping")
|
||||
|
||||
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, shutdownTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Warn("requests still in progress were cut off",
|
||||
"error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
_ = server.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = <-served
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// run starts app, which serves until ctx is done or serving fails, as
|
||||
// failed tells. Then it stops app and takes the daemon's last step. It
|
||||
// returns the process's exit status, 1 when serving failed, a part could
|
||||
// not stop in order or the last step failed; each logs why.
|
||||
func run(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, app *fx.App, failed servingFailed,
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger, lastStep func() error,
|
||||
) int {
|
||||
// The hooks only start goroutines, and end them at the stop, so neither
|
||||
// is cut short by a deadline or by ctx.
|
||||
err := app.Start(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
status := 0
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
case <-failed:
|
||||
status = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = app.Stop(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
status = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = lastStep()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
status = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status == 0 {
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopped")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return status
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fxEventLogger returns what fx.WithLogger takes to write fx's own events to
|
||||
// processLog at debug, which the daemons' log levels normally hold back. Its
|
||||
// errors are at debug too: the daemon logs each one itself.
|
||||
func fxEventLogger(processLog *slog.Logger) func() fxevent.Logger {
|
||||
return func() fxevent.Logger {
|
||||
logger := &fxevent.SlogLogger{Logger: processLog}
|
||||
logger.UseLogLevel(slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
logger.UseErrorLevel(slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
|
||||
return logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+42
-63
@@ -2,12 +2,13 @@ package sww
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
|
||||
"go.uber.org/fx"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
|
||||
@@ -30,26 +31,31 @@ func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(params.Viper)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Error("invalid setting", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, startError{"invalid setting", err})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: params.Stdout,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
var (
|
||||
server *rproxy.Server
|
||||
listener net.Listener
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
|
||||
failed := make(servingFailed, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
app := fx.New(
|
||||
fx.Supply(cfg, processLog, requestLog{params.Stdout}, failed),
|
||||
fx.Provide(
|
||||
newRProxyServer,
|
||||
func(server *rproxy.Server) *http.Server { return server.Server },
|
||||
newRProxyListener,
|
||||
),
|
||||
fx.Invoke(serve),
|
||||
fx.Populate(&server, &listener),
|
||||
fx.WithLogger(fxEventLogger(processLog)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
err = app.Err()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Error(
|
||||
"cannot listen on SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR",
|
||||
"error",
|
||||
err.Error(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("starting",
|
||||
@@ -57,52 +63,25 @@ func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
|
||||
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"settings", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
return serveRProxy(ctx, server, listener, processLog)
|
||||
return run(ctx, app, failed, processLog, func() error {
|
||||
server.WaitForReports()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serveRProxy serves requests on listener until ctx is done, and then stops as
|
||||
// RunRProxy says.
|
||||
func serveRProxy(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, server *rproxy.Server, listener net.Listener,
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) int {
|
||||
served := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
served <- server.Serve(listener)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-served:
|
||||
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopping")
|
||||
|
||||
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx),
|
||||
shutdownTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Warn("requests still in progress were cut off",
|
||||
"error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
_ = server.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = <-served
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
|
||||
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server.WaitForReports()
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopped")
|
||||
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
// newRProxyServer returns the server rproxy runs.
|
||||
func newRProxyServer(
|
||||
cfg *config.RProxy, out requestLog, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) *rproxy.Server {
|
||||
return rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: out,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRProxyListener listens on SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR.
|
||||
func newRProxyListener(cfg *config.RProxy) (net.Listener, error) {
|
||||
return listen(cfg.ListenAddr, "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ func runRProxy(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
|
||||
|
||||
// startRProxy runs rproxy with waf at backend and the app at appURL, and
|
||||
// returns its URL and what it writes. It believes X-Forwarded-For from the
|
||||
// tests. It stops as the test ends, and that it stopped in order is checked.
|
||||
// tests. It waits a minute for waf's answer, so that a slow answer on a busy
|
||||
// host is not taken for no answer. It stops as the test ends, and that it
|
||||
// stopped in order is checked.
|
||||
func startRProxy(t *testing.T, backend, appURL string) (string, *output) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ func startRProxy(t *testing.T, backend, appURL string) (string, *output) {
|
||||
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
|
||||
"SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES": localhost + "/32",
|
||||
wafBackend: backend,
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
|
||||
}, out)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -260,7 +263,17 @@ func TestTheSiteAnswersWhileWAFIsStoppedAndStartedAgain(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
stop()
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
// The visitor's asks have opened rproxy's circuit breaker, which lets one
|
||||
// request a second ask until one is answered.
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
|
||||
for statusFrom(t, site+"/", placed) != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("request from %s: never answered %d", placed,
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
close(visitorStop)
|
||||
<-visitorDone
|
||||
@@ -539,7 +552,9 @@ func TestAStatusWAFDoesNotTakeIsReportedAs599(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// startRProxyProcess runs `sww rproxy` in a process of its own, with the
|
||||
// settings in env, each as NAME=value. It returns where rproxy listens and a
|
||||
// function that sends rproxy SIGTERM and fails the test unless it exits with
|
||||
// status 0 within waitLimit.
|
||||
// status 0 within waitLimit. It waits a minute for waf's answers unless env
|
||||
// sets SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, so that a busy host cannot make it
|
||||
// drop a question.
|
||||
func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -555,7 +570,8 @@ func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, func()) {
|
||||
|
||||
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
||||
commandForMain+"=rproxy",
|
||||
"SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0")
|
||||
"SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0",
|
||||
wafBackendTimeout+"=60000")
|
||||
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, env...)
|
||||
|
||||
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-393
@@ -4,17 +4,14 @@
|
||||
// stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the state and cache files.
|
||||
// `sww rproxy` reads rproxy's settings alone, and runs the reverse proxy in
|
||||
// front of one app that asks waf about each request. `sww healthcheck` is the
|
||||
// container's health check.
|
||||
// container's health check. fx builds the parts of each daemon, starts their
|
||||
// background work and stops it.
|
||||
package sww
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"os/signal"
|
||||
"syscall"
|
||||
@@ -22,28 +19,9 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/spf13/viper"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
|
||||
// once sww is told to stop, before their connections are closed.
|
||||
// runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
|
||||
const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as waf stops, the log lines still
|
||||
// waiting are sent to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given up. stdout has
|
||||
// carried them.
|
||||
const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// usageStatus is the exit status with no command, or one sww does not
|
||||
// know.
|
||||
const usageStatus = 2
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +44,9 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
Viper *viper.Viper
|
||||
// Stdout receives the request log and the process's own messages.
|
||||
Stdout io.Writer
|
||||
// BesideLookupTimeLimit is the waf.Params.BesideLookupTimeLimit RunWAF
|
||||
// gives waf. Main leaves it zero, waf's own limit; tests lengthen it.
|
||||
BesideLookupTimeLimit time.Duration
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Main runs the command os.Args names, and returns the process's exit status.
|
||||
@@ -106,372 +87,3 @@ func printUsage(w io.Writer) int {
|
||||
|
||||
return usageStatus
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RunWAF is `sww waf`: it reads the settings, the rule files,
|
||||
// the lookup database and the state and cache files, then serves requests until
|
||||
// ctx is done. It returns the process's exit status, 1 when waf cannot start.
|
||||
func RunWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
|
||||
// Until the settings are read, the one message is an invalid setting's
|
||||
// error, which every SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL lets through.
|
||||
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
|
||||
config.InstanceName(params.Viper), slog.LevelError)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(params.Viper)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, "invalid setting", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// While SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL is set, every line on stdout from here on
|
||||
// is sent there too.
|
||||
stdout := params.Stdout
|
||||
|
||||
var remote *remotelog.Sender
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
|
||||
remote = newRemoteLogSender(cfg)
|
||||
stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(
|
||||
stdout,
|
||||
cfg.InstanceName,
|
||||
cfg.LogLevel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if remote != nil {
|
||||
stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog)
|
||||
defer stopSending()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return runWAFWithSettings(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
params.Version,
|
||||
cfg,
|
||||
stdout,
|
||||
remote,
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runWAFWithSettings is the rest of RunWAF once the settings are read and
|
||||
// the process log goes where they say. remote is nil unless
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL is set.
|
||||
func runWAFWithSettings(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
version string,
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF,
|
||||
stdout io.Writer,
|
||||
remote *remotelog.Sender,
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) int {
|
||||
// The state files and the alerts give times in UTC.
|
||||
now := func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() }
|
||||
|
||||
alertQueue := newAlertQueue(cfg, now, processLog)
|
||||
|
||||
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
|
||||
Dir: cfg.RuleFilesDir,
|
||||
Enabled: cfg.RuleFilesEnabled,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, "cannot use the rule files", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
crs, err := waf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, "cannot use the Core Rule Set", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server, err := newServer(
|
||||
cfg,
|
||||
stdout,
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
ruleFiles,
|
||||
alertQueue,
|
||||
crs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, "cannot use the lookup database", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if remote != nil {
|
||||
server.Metrics.AddRemoteLog(remote)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
files, err := loadStateFiles(cfg, server, alertQueue, now, processLog)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
"cannot use the state and cache files",
|
||||
err,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
"cannot listen on SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR",
|
||||
err,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("starting",
|
||||
"version", version,
|
||||
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"settings", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
return serve(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
server,
|
||||
listener,
|
||||
files,
|
||||
ruleFiles,
|
||||
alertQueue,
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cannotStart logs why waf cannot start, and returns its exit status.
|
||||
func cannotStart(processLog *slog.Logger, message string, err error) int {
|
||||
processLog.Error(message, "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newServer returns the server waf runs, with the metrics of the alerts,
|
||||
// after reading the lookup database while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup
|
||||
// database that cannot be read is an error.
|
||||
func newServer(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet,
|
||||
) (*waf.Server, error) {
|
||||
var lookupFile *lookup.File
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.LookupSource == "file" {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
|
||||
lookupFile, err = lookup.OpenFile(lookup.FileParams{
|
||||
Path: cfg.LookupDBPath,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server := waf.New(waf.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: stdout,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
GeoJSURL: lookup.URL,
|
||||
AbuseIPDBURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
|
||||
LookupFile: lookupFile,
|
||||
CoreRuleSet: crs,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
Rules: ruleFiles,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
server.Metrics.AddAlerts(alertQueue)
|
||||
|
||||
if lookupFile != nil {
|
||||
server.Metrics.AddLookupFile(
|
||||
lookupFile.LastRead,
|
||||
lookupFile.ReadFailures,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return server, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// loadStateFiles reads the state and cache files into the parts of server and
|
||||
// into alertQueue, as state.Load does.
|
||||
func loadStateFiles(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, server *waf.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) (*state.Files, error) {
|
||||
return state.Load(state.Params{
|
||||
Dir: cfg.StateDir,
|
||||
CacheDir: cfg.CacheDir,
|
||||
BansWriteDelay: cfg.BansWriteDelay,
|
||||
WriteInterval: cfg.StateWriteInterval,
|
||||
Ledger: server.Ledger,
|
||||
Limiter: server.Limiter,
|
||||
GeoJS: server.GeoJS,
|
||||
Lists: server.Lists,
|
||||
DNSBL: server.DNSBL,
|
||||
AbuseIPDB: server.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||
RouteWatch: server.RouteWatch,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
Anomalies: server.Anomalies,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Metrics: server.Metrics,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newAlertQueue returns the queue of the alerts to the webhook, Slack and
|
||||
// ntfy, with the settings for them.
|
||||
func newAlertQueue(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) *alerts.Queue {
|
||||
return alerts.New(alerts.Params{
|
||||
WebhookURL: cfg.AlertWebhookURL,
|
||||
WebhookHeaders: cfg.AlertWebhookHeaders,
|
||||
SlackURL: cfg.AlertSlackWebhookURL,
|
||||
NtfyURL: cfg.AlertNtfyURL,
|
||||
NtfyToken: cfg.AlertNtfyToken,
|
||||
Events: cfg.AlertEvents,
|
||||
Cooldown: cfg.AlertCooldown,
|
||||
MaxPerHour: cfg.AlertMaxPerHour,
|
||||
Instance: cfg.InstanceName,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRemoteLogSender returns a sender of the log lines to
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, with the settings for it.
|
||||
func newRemoteLogSender(cfg *config.WAF) *remotelog.Sender {
|
||||
return remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
|
||||
URL: cfg.LogRemoteURL,
|
||||
RootCAs: cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
|
||||
BufferLines: cfg.LogRemoteBufferLines,
|
||||
Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
|
||||
AppName: cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// startSending runs remote until the function it returns is called, which
|
||||
// then waits at most remoteLogStopTimeout for the lines still waiting to
|
||||
// be sent. Sending goes on after ctx is done, so that the lines written
|
||||
// while sww stops are sent too.
|
||||
func startSending(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, remote *remotelog.Sender, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) func() {
|
||||
sending, stop := context.WithCancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
|
||||
sent := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
remote.Run(sending, processLog)
|
||||
close(sent)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return func() {
|
||||
stop()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-sent:
|
||||
case <-time.After(remoteLogStopTimeout):
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serve serves requests on listener, writes the state and cache files as they
|
||||
// are due, takes in an admin's edits of them, reads the rule files again as
|
||||
// they change, and the lookup database when it is replaced, fetches the
|
||||
// lists the settings name by URL as they are due, and sends the alerts,
|
||||
// until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress
|
||||
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes every state and cache file,
|
||||
// alerts.json with the alerts still waiting.
|
||||
func serve(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, server *waf.Server, listener net.Listener,
|
||||
files *state.Files, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) int {
|
||||
served := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
served <- server.Serve(listener)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
writing, stopWriting := context.WithCancel(ctx)
|
||||
defer stopWriting()
|
||||
|
||||
written := inBackground(func() { files.Run(writing) })
|
||||
watched := inBackground(func() { files.Watch(writing) })
|
||||
rulesWatched := inBackground(func() { ruleFiles.Watch(writing) })
|
||||
lookupFileWatched := inBackground(func() {
|
||||
if server.LookupFile != nil {
|
||||
server.LookupFile.Watch(writing)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
listsFetched := inBackground(func() { server.Lists.Run(writing) })
|
||||
alertsSent := inBackground(func() { alertQueue.Run(writing) })
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-served:
|
||||
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopping")
|
||||
|
||||
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx),
|
||||
shutdownTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Warn("requests still in progress were cut off",
|
||||
"error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
_ = server.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = <-served
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
|
||||
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Run and Watch have ended, so nothing else reads or writes the
|
||||
// files, and no alert is being sent, so that alerts.json keeps every
|
||||
// alert not yet sent. Every request has ended too, but for one cut off
|
||||
// because Shutdown timed out, which adds to its client's history only as
|
||||
// it ends. That can be after this write, and then that request is missing
|
||||
// from clients.json.
|
||||
<-written
|
||||
<-watched
|
||||
<-rulesWatched
|
||||
<-lookupFileWatched
|
||||
<-listsFetched
|
||||
<-alertsSent
|
||||
|
||||
err = files.WriteAll()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Error(
|
||||
"writing the state and cache files failed",
|
||||
"error",
|
||||
err.Error(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("stopped")
|
||||
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// inBackground runs task on a goroutine of its own, and returns a channel
|
||||
// that is closed once task has returned.
|
||||
func inBackground(task func()) <-chan struct{} {
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
task()
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return done
|
||||
}
|
||||
+17
-100
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ const (
|
||||
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
|
||||
// instance is the SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME the tests set where they look at
|
||||
// it.
|
||||
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
instance = "host1/blog"
|
||||
// greeting is what the tests' app answers.
|
||||
greeting = "hello from the app"
|
||||
// placed is the client the tests' lookup databases place.
|
||||
@@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
|
||||
Version: testVersion,
|
||||
Viper: v,
|
||||
Stdout: out,
|
||||
// The race detector and a busy host can slow the Core Rule Set's
|
||||
// inspections past waf's own limit.
|
||||
BesideLookupTimeLimit: time.Hour,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -386,8 +389,8 @@ func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// the comments.
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
|
||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") &&
|
||||
!strings.Contains(line, `instance="fsn1app1/blog"`) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("series %q, without instance=\"fsn1app1/blog\"", line)
|
||||
!strings.Contains(line, `instance="host1/blog"`) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("series %q, without instance=\"host1/blog\"", line)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -734,12 +737,12 @@ func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t,
|
||||
url+"_sww/metrics",
|
||||
token,
|
||||
`sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 1`,
|
||||
`sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total{instance="host1/blog"} 1`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lastRead = seriesValue(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
metrics,
|
||||
`sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds{instance="fsn1app1/blog"}`,
|
||||
`sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds{instance="host1/blog"}`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
wantStatus(t, url, placed, http.StatusOK)
|
||||
@@ -801,7 +804,7 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInListsJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// too.
|
||||
rateLimitExemptNets: placed + "," + localhost,
|
||||
}
|
||||
failures := `sww_reputation_failures_total{instance="fsn1app1/blog",` +
|
||||
failures := `sww_reputation_failures_total{instance="host1/blog",` +
|
||||
`source="` + torURL + `"} `
|
||||
|
||||
// tor.txt cannot be fetched at first, which is counted.
|
||||
@@ -847,92 +850,6 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInListsJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptInListsJSONAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
|
||||
|
||||
// A stand-in for the engine's local API, which bans 203.0.113.0/24 for
|
||||
// four hours, and answers only a request with its key, while it is up.
|
||||
down := new(atomic.Bool)
|
||||
engine := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case r.URL.Path != "/v1/decisions" || r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != bouncerKey:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
case down.Load():
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
_, _ = io.WriteString(
|
||||
w,
|
||||
`[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "origin": "crowdsec", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", `+
|
||||
`"type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.0/24"}]`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(engine.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
dir, cache := t.TempDir(), t.TempDir()
|
||||
env := map[string]string{
|
||||
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
|
||||
stateDir: dir,
|
||||
cacheDir: cache,
|
||||
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": engine.URL,
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": bouncerKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Once the list is fetched, the client's request bans it.
|
||||
first := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
|
||||
for statusFrom(t, url, placed) != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
ban := onlyBan(t, dir)
|
||||
if ban["netblock"] != placed+"/32" || ban["cause"] != "crowdsec" ||
|
||||
ban["reason"] != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/http-probing" {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"bans.json holds %v, want the ban for crowdsec on %s",
|
||||
ban,
|
||||
placed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Restarted with the engine down, the copy kept in lists.json bans
|
||||
// another client in the netblock from its first request.
|
||||
down.Store(true)
|
||||
|
||||
second := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
|
||||
wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.10", http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// The key is in neither run's output, nor in a state or cache file.
|
||||
files := []string{
|
||||
filepath.Join(dir, "bans.json"), filepath.Join(dir, "clients.json"),
|
||||
filepath.Join(cache, "lists.json"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
shown := make([]string, 0, len(files)+2)
|
||||
shown = append(shown, first.text(), second.text())
|
||||
|
||||
for _, path := range files {
|
||||
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the test's
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
shown = append(shown, string(data))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if all := strings.Join(shown, "\n"); strings.Contains(all, bouncerKey) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"the key is shown in the output or the state and cache files:\n%s",
|
||||
all,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantDeniedByList checks that the request log line is of a request the
|
||||
// blocklist at listURL refused.
|
||||
func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
|
||||
@@ -1070,8 +987,8 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// last.
|
||||
metrics := metricsText(t, url+"_sww/metrics", token)
|
||||
for _, series := range []string{
|
||||
`sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 0`,
|
||||
`sww_remote_log_lines_waiting{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 1`,
|
||||
`sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total{instance="host1/blog"} 0`,
|
||||
`sww_remote_log_lines_waiting{instance="host1/blog"} 1`,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+"\n") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("no %q in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
|
||||
@@ -1079,7 +996,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const dropped = "\nsww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total" +
|
||||
`{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} `
|
||||
`{instance="host1/blog"} `
|
||||
if strings.Contains(metrics, dropped+"0\n") ||
|
||||
!strings.Contains(metrics, dropped) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("no line dropped in the metrics:\n%s", metrics)
|
||||
@@ -1175,7 +1092,7 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedAndAnAlertNotSentIsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
|
||||
webhook.waitFor(t, "permanent_ban", true)
|
||||
|
||||
const ofWebhook = `{destination="webhook",instance="fsn1app1/blog"}`
|
||||
const ofWebhook = `{destination="webhook",instance="host1/blog"}`
|
||||
|
||||
metrics := metricsWith(t, url+"_sww/metrics", token,
|
||||
"\nsww_alerts_sent_total"+ofWebhook+" 1\n")
|
||||
@@ -1262,13 +1179,13 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedToSlackAndNtfy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(slackPost.body), &message)
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil ||
|
||||
!strings.HasPrefix(message.Text, "*fsn1app1/blog: ban*\n") ||
|
||||
!strings.HasPrefix(message.Text, "*host1/blog: ban*\n") ||
|
||||
!strings.Contains(message.Text, "\nclient: "+client+"\n") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Slack was sent %s", slackPost.body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ntfyPost := ntfy.firstPost(t)
|
||||
if ntfyPost.header.Get("Title") != "fsn1app1/blog: ban" ||
|
||||
if ntfyPost.header.Get("Title") != "host1/blog: ban" ||
|
||||
ntfyPost.header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer "+ntfyToken ||
|
||||
!strings.Contains(ntfyPost.body, "\nclient: "+client+"\n") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ntfy was sent %s, with the headers %v", ntfyPost.body,
|
||||
@@ -1280,9 +1197,9 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedToSlackAndNtfy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// test process cannot fail the test.
|
||||
sent := []string{
|
||||
"\nsww_alerts_sent_total{destination=\"slack\"," +
|
||||
"instance=\"fsn1app1/blog\"} 1\n",
|
||||
"instance=\"host1/blog\"} 1\n",
|
||||
"\nsww_alerts_sent_total{destination=\"ntfy\"," +
|
||||
"instance=\"fsn1app1/blog\"} 1\n",
|
||||
"instance=\"host1/blog\"} 1\n",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
metrics := metricsWith(t, url+"_sww/metrics", token, sent...)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
|
||||
package sww
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"go.uber.org/fx"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as waf stops, the log lines still
|
||||
// waiting are sent to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given up. stdout has
|
||||
// carried them.
|
||||
const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// RunWAF is `sww waf`: it reads the settings, the rule files,
|
||||
// the lookup database and the state and cache files, then serves requests until
|
||||
// ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress shutdownTimeout to
|
||||
// finish, ends its background work and writes every state and cache file,
|
||||
// alerts.json with the alerts still waiting. It returns the process's exit
|
||||
// status, 1 when waf cannot start or stop in order.
|
||||
func RunWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
|
||||
// Until the settings are read, the one message is an invalid setting's
|
||||
// error, which every SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL lets through.
|
||||
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
|
||||
config.InstanceName(params.Viper), slog.LevelError)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(params.Viper)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, startError{"invalid setting", err})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// While SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL is set, every line on stdout from here on
|
||||
// is sent there too. The sender runs before any part is built, so that it
|
||||
// sends why waf cannot start.
|
||||
stdout := params.Stdout
|
||||
|
||||
var remote *remotelog.Sender
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
|
||||
remote = newRemoteLogSender(cfg)
|
||||
stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(
|
||||
stdout,
|
||||
cfg.InstanceName,
|
||||
cfg.LogLevel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if remote != nil {
|
||||
stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog)
|
||||
defer stopSending()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
files *state.Files
|
||||
listener net.Listener
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
failed := make(servingFailed, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
app := fx.New(
|
||||
fx.Supply(
|
||||
params,
|
||||
cfg,
|
||||
processLog,
|
||||
requestLog{stdout},
|
||||
remote,
|
||||
failed,
|
||||
),
|
||||
fx.Provide(
|
||||
newAlertQueue, newRuleFiles, newCoreRuleSet, newLookupFile,
|
||||
newLimiter, newLedger, newAnomalyCounters,
|
||||
newLists, newDNSBL, newAbuseIPDB, newRouteWatch,
|
||||
newMetrics, newGeoJS, newWAFServer,
|
||||
func(server *waf.Server) *http.Server { return server.Server },
|
||||
newWAFListener, newStateFiles,
|
||||
),
|
||||
// fx stops hooks in the reverse of the order they were added in. The
|
||||
// state files are read before serving is set up, so that serving
|
||||
// stops before their loops do.
|
||||
fx.Populate(&files),
|
||||
fx.Invoke(serve),
|
||||
fx.Populate(&listener),
|
||||
fx.WithLogger(fxEventLogger(processLog)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
err = app.Err()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return cannotStart(processLog, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info("starting",
|
||||
"version", params.Version,
|
||||
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
|
||||
"settings", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
// The last write follows the stop of every hook, and so the end of every
|
||||
// loop that changes the state or raises an alert. A hook of the state
|
||||
// files would stop before the loops of the parts built ahead of them.
|
||||
return run(ctx, app, failed, processLog, func() error {
|
||||
err := files.WriteAll()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
processLog.Error("writing the state and cache files failed",
|
||||
"error", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return err
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newAlertQueue returns the queue of the alerts to the webhook, Slack and
|
||||
// ntfy, with the settings for them. Until waf stops, it sends them.
|
||||
func newAlertQueue(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) *alerts.Queue {
|
||||
alertQueue := alerts.New(alerts.Params{
|
||||
WebhookURL: cfg.AlertWebhookURL,
|
||||
WebhookHeaders: cfg.AlertWebhookHeaders,
|
||||
SlackURL: cfg.AlertSlackWebhookURL,
|
||||
NtfyURL: cfg.AlertNtfyURL,
|
||||
NtfyToken: cfg.AlertNtfyToken,
|
||||
Events: cfg.AlertEvents,
|
||||
Cooldown: cfg.AlertCooldown,
|
||||
MaxPerHour: cfg.AlertMaxPerHour,
|
||||
Instance: cfg.InstanceName,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(alertQueue.Run))
|
||||
|
||||
return alertQueue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRuleFiles reads the rule files, and reads them again as they change
|
||||
// until waf stops.
|
||||
func newRuleFiles(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) (*rules.Files, error) {
|
||||
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
|
||||
Dir: cfg.RuleFilesDir,
|
||||
Enabled: cfg.RuleFilesEnabled,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, startError{"cannot use the rule files", err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(ruleFiles.Watch))
|
||||
|
||||
return ruleFiles, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set, as waf.NewCoreRuleSet does.
|
||||
func newCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
crs, err := waf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, startError{"cannot use the Core Rule Set", err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return crs, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newLookupFile reads the lookup database while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is
|
||||
// file, and reads it again when it is replaced until waf stops. It returns
|
||||
// nil while the source is anything else.
|
||||
func newLookupFile(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) (*lookup.File, error) {
|
||||
if cfg.LookupSource != "file" {
|
||||
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // no lookup database, and no error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lookupFile, err := lookup.OpenFile(lookup.FileParams{
|
||||
Path: cfg.LookupDBPath,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, startError{"cannot use the lookup database", err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(lookupFile.Watch))
|
||||
|
||||
return lookupFile, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newLimiter returns the table of clients, with the rate and byte limits.
|
||||
func newLimiter(cfg *config.WAF) *ratelimit.Limiter {
|
||||
return ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
|
||||
PerMinute: cfg.RateLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
PerHour: cfg.RateLimitPerHour,
|
||||
PerDay: cfg.RateLimitPerDay,
|
||||
BytesPerMinute: cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
BytesPerHour: cfg.BytesLimitPerHour,
|
||||
BytesPerDay: cfg.BytesLimitPerDay,
|
||||
}, cfg.MaxTrackedClients)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newLedger returns the ledger of the bans, with the settings for them.
|
||||
func newLedger(cfg *config.WAF) *bans.Ledger {
|
||||
return bans.New(bans.Params{
|
||||
LimitBanDuration: cfg.LimitBanDuration,
|
||||
LimitBanRepeatWindow: cfg.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
|
||||
LimitBanPermanentAbove: cfg.LimitBanPermanentAbove,
|
||||
AttackBanDuration: cfg.AttackBanDuration,
|
||||
MaxBans: cfg.MaxBans,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newAnomalyCounters returns the counters of the anomaly thresholds.
|
||||
func newAnomalyCounters(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) *anomaly.Counters {
|
||||
return anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
|
||||
Client: cfg.AnomalyClient,
|
||||
Net: cfg.AnomalyNet,
|
||||
ASN: cfg.AnomalyASN,
|
||||
Total: cfg.AnomalyTotal,
|
||||
WatchedNet: cfg.AnomalyWatchedNet,
|
||||
NetV4Prefix: cfg.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
|
||||
NetV6Prefix: cfg.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
|
||||
NamedNetblocks: cfg.AnomalyWatchedNets,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newLists returns the lists the settings name by URL, none fetched yet.
|
||||
// Until waf stops, it fetches them as they are due.
|
||||
func newLists(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) *reputation.Lists {
|
||||
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
|
||||
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs,
|
||||
Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
|
||||
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
|
||||
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(lists.Run))
|
||||
|
||||
return lists
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newDNSBL returns what asks the DNSBL zones, none asked yet.
|
||||
func newDNSBL(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) *reputation.DNSBL {
|
||||
return reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
|
||||
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones,
|
||||
Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver,
|
||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newAbuseIPDB returns what checks clients with AbuseIPDB while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, none checked yet. Until waf stops, it
|
||||
// fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist as it is due, and bans the clients on it in
|
||||
// ledger, as waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist says.
|
||||
func newAbuseIPDB(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue, ledger *bans.Ledger,
|
||||
) *reputation.AbuseIPDB {
|
||||
abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
||||
URL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
|
||||
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
||||
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
||||
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||
BlacklistURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL,
|
||||
Threshold: cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||
BlacklistRefresh: cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||
Blacklisted: func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||
waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||
cfg, ledger, processLog, utcNow(), listed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(abuseIPDB.RunBlacklist))
|
||||
|
||||
return abuseIPDB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRouteWatch returns what asks routewatch about clients, or nil while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset.
|
||||
func newRouteWatch(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) *routewatch.Client {
|
||||
if cfg.RouteWatchURL == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
|
||||
URL: cfg.RouteWatchURL,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newMetrics returns the metrics, with those read from the other parts as
|
||||
// the metrics are asked for: AbuseIPDB's while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set,
|
||||
// the lookup database's while there is one, and the remote log sender's
|
||||
// while there is one.
|
||||
func newMetrics(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter,
|
||||
ruleFiles *rules.Files, lists *reputation.Lists,
|
||||
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL, abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue, lookupFile *lookup.File,
|
||||
remote *remotelog.Sender,
|
||||
) *metrics.Metrics {
|
||||
m := metrics.New(cfg.MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs, cfg.InstanceName)
|
||||
m.AddBansAndClients(ledger, limiter, utcNow)
|
||||
m.AddRules(ruleFiles)
|
||||
m.AddReputation(lists, dnsbl)
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
|
||||
m.AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m.AddAlerts(alertQueue)
|
||||
|
||||
if lookupFile != nil {
|
||||
m.AddLookupFile(lookupFile.LastRead, lookupFile.ReadFailures)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if remote != nil {
|
||||
m.AddRemoteLog(remote)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newGeoJS returns what looks clients up at GeoJS, none looked up yet. Each
|
||||
// answer goes to the limiter and the ledger, as waf.AddLookup says, and each
|
||||
// failure is handled as waf.GeoJSFailed says.
|
||||
func newGeoJS(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, m *metrics.Metrics, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter,
|
||||
ledger *bans.Ledger, alertQueue *alerts.Queue, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) *geojs.GeoJS {
|
||||
return geojs.New(geojs.Params{
|
||||
URL: geojs.URL,
|
||||
Answered: func(answer geojs.Answer) {
|
||||
waf.AddLookup(cfg, limiter, ledger, answer)
|
||||
},
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
Asked: m.GeoJSRequests.Inc,
|
||||
Failed: func(err error, askingAgainIn time.Duration) {
|
||||
waf.GeoJSFailed(processLog, alertQueue, m, err, askingAgainIn)
|
||||
},
|
||||
WentWithoutAnswer: m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newWAFServer returns the server waf runs, with its parts and the time
|
||||
// limit params gives.
|
||||
func newWAFServer(
|
||||
params Params, cfg *config.WAF, out requestLog, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
m *metrics.Metrics, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, ledger *bans.Ledger,
|
||||
anomalies *anomaly.Counters, lists *reputation.Lists,
|
||||
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL, abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||
routeWatch *routewatch.Client, geoJS *geojs.GeoJS,
|
||||
lookupFile *lookup.File, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet,
|
||||
ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||
) *waf.Server {
|
||||
return waf.New(waf.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: out,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Metrics: m,
|
||||
Limiter: limiter,
|
||||
Ledger: ledger,
|
||||
Anomalies: anomalies,
|
||||
Lists: lists,
|
||||
DNSBL: dnsbl,
|
||||
AbuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
|
||||
RouteWatch: routeWatch,
|
||||
GeoJS: geoJS,
|
||||
LookupFile: lookupFile,
|
||||
CoreRuleSet: crs,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
Rules: ruleFiles,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
|
||||
BesideLookupTimeLimit: params.BesideLookupTimeLimit,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newWAFListener listens on SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR.
|
||||
func newWAFListener(cfg *config.WAF) (net.Listener, error) {
|
||||
return listen(cfg.ListenAddr, "SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newStateFiles reads the state and cache files into the parts and the
|
||||
// alert queue, as state.Load does. Until waf stops, it writes them as they
|
||||
// are due and takes in an admin's edits of them.
|
||||
func newStateFiles(
|
||||
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
m *metrics.Metrics, ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter,
|
||||
geoJS *geojs.GeoJS, lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL,
|
||||
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB, routeWatch *routewatch.Client,
|
||||
alertQueue *alerts.Queue, anomalies *anomaly.Counters,
|
||||
) (*state.Files, error) {
|
||||
files, err := state.Load(state.Params{
|
||||
Dir: cfg.StateDir,
|
||||
CacheDir: cfg.CacheDir,
|
||||
BansWriteDelay: cfg.BansWriteDelay,
|
||||
WriteInterval: cfg.StateWriteInterval,
|
||||
Ledger: ledger,
|
||||
Limiter: limiter,
|
||||
GeoJS: geoJS,
|
||||
Lists: lists,
|
||||
DNSBL: dnsbl,
|
||||
AbuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
|
||||
RouteWatch: routeWatch,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
Anomalies: anomalies,
|
||||
Now: utcNow,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Metrics: m,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, startError{"cannot use the state and cache files", err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lc.Append(background(files.Run))
|
||||
lc.Append(background(files.Watch))
|
||||
|
||||
return files, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRemoteLogSender returns a sender of the log lines to
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, with the settings for it.
|
||||
func newRemoteLogSender(cfg *config.WAF) *remotelog.Sender {
|
||||
return remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
|
||||
URL: cfg.LogRemoteURL,
|
||||
RootCAs: cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
|
||||
BufferLines: cfg.LogRemoteBufferLines,
|
||||
Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
|
||||
AppName: cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// startSending runs remote until the function it returns is called, which
|
||||
// then waits at most remoteLogStopTimeout for the lines still waiting to
|
||||
// be sent. Sending goes on after ctx is done, so that the lines written
|
||||
// while sww stops are sent too.
|
||||
func startSending(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, remote *remotelog.Sender, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) func() {
|
||||
sending, stop := context.WithCancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
|
||||
sent := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
remote.Run(sending, processLog)
|
||||
close(sent)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return func() {
|
||||
stop()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-sent:
|
||||
case <-time.After(remoteLogStopTimeout):
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ func TestMainRunsWAF(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), binary)
|
||||
cmd.Stdout = out
|
||||
|
||||
// The Core Rule Set is off. Main keeps waf's own limit for its checks,
|
||||
// and on a busy host the Core Rule Set's inspection can pass it.
|
||||
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
||||
"TZ="+zone,
|
||||
commandForMain+"="+wafCommand,
|
||||
@@ -97,7 +99,8 @@ func TestMainRunsWAF(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
stateDir+"="+dir,
|
||||
cacheDir+"="+dir,
|
||||
ruleFilesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
|
||||
lookupSource+"=off")
|
||||
lookupSource+"=off",
|
||||
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE=off")
|
||||
|
||||
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (abuseIPDB) check(
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
|
||||
client := clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client)
|
||||
held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
|
||||
offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
// The bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist. They read SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS and
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_MODE; the blacklist is fetched by the reputation package.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist bans in ledger the netblock of each client on
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's blacklist, listed, for SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS from now, as
|
||||
// the ledger's BanForAbuseIPDB describes. It logs to processLog how many
|
||||
// clients were listed and how many bans were made. Clients in one netblock
|
||||
// make one ban, with the highest of their scores. In observe mode it makes
|
||||
// no ban.
|
||||
func BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, ledger *bans.Ledger, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||
now time.Time, listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
scores := make(map[netip.Prefix]int64, len(listed))
|
||||
|
||||
for _, client := range listed {
|
||||
netblock := banNetblock(cfg, client.Addr)
|
||||
scores[netblock] = max(scores[netblock], client.Score)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
made := 0
|
||||
|
||||
if !cfg.Observe {
|
||||
made = ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||
now, now.Add(cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration), scores,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processLog.Info(
|
||||
"fetched AbuseIPDB's blacklist",
|
||||
"clients", len(listed),
|
||||
"bans_made", made,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
||||
package waf_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// abuseIPDBBanDays is the setting of how long a ban for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
// blacklist lasts, in days.
|
||||
const abuseIPDBBanDays = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestClientOnTheFetchedAbuseIPDBBlacklistIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||
stopped := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
server.AbuseIPDB.RunBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||
close(stopped)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
<-stopped
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
waitUntil(func() bool {
|
||||
active, _ := server.Ledger.Count(clk.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
return active == 1
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
|
||||
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestClientsOnTheAbuseIPDBBlacklistAreBannedForTheBanDays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
abuseIPDBBanDays: "2", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Two clients in one netblock make one ban, with the higher score.
|
||||
server.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist([]reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(client), Score: 95},
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(otherClient), Score: 100},
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8:5::1"), Score: 90},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet))
|
||||
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB ||
|
||||
*held[0].Notes.Reputation[0].Score != 100 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bans on %s %+v, want one for the blacklist, with 100",
|
||||
clientsNet, held)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Every client of a banned netblock is refused, the IPv6 address's /64
|
||||
// included.
|
||||
for _, from := range []string{"203.0.113.200", "2001:db8:5::ffff:1"} {
|
||||
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s.get("2001:db8:5:1::1", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
|
||||
clk.advance(2 * 24 * time.Hour)
|
||||
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAbuseIPDBBlacklistMakesNoBanInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server := startWithClock(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
"",
|
||||
map[string]string{mode: "observe"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
server.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist([]reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(client), Score: 100},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if active, _ := server.Ledger.Count(clk.Now()); active != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d bans active, want none", active)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ func (rq *request) addBan() {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
netblock, err = rq.h.banNetblock(toAdd.Netblock)
|
||||
netblock, err = rq.h.parseBanNetblock(toAdd.Netblock)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
@@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ func (rq *request) readBanToAdd() (banToAdd, error) {
|
||||
return toAdd, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// banNetblock reads value, a netblock such as 203.0.113.0/24, or a
|
||||
// parseBanNetblock reads value, a netblock such as 203.0.113.0/24, or a
|
||||
// client's address, which stands for the netblock a ban on that client
|
||||
// covers. An IPv4-mapped netblock, such as ::ffff:203.0.113.0/120, is
|
||||
// refused, since a client's address is looked up as IPv4 and a ban on it
|
||||
// would refuse nothing, and so is a value with a zone.
|
||||
func (h *handler) banNetblock(value string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
|
||||
func (h *handler) parseBanNetblock(value string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
|
||||
netblock, err := netip.ParsePrefix(value)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
if netblock.Addr().Is4In6() {
|
||||
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ func (h *handler) banNetblock(value string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
|
||||
return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("netblock %q %w", value, errZone)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return h.netblock(addr), nil
|
||||
return banNetblock(h.config, addr), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// expiry returns when a ban made at now for duration ends: duration
|
||||
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func (rq *request) showClient() {
|
||||
Bans: state.BanEntries(rq.h.ledger.Covering(addr)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(rq.h.clientGroup(addr))
|
||||
client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(clientGroup(rq.h.config, addr))
|
||||
if seen {
|
||||
answer.Client = &client
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ const (
|
||||
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
|
||||
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
|
||||
// alertInstance is the instance every alert of these tests gives.
|
||||
alertInstance = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
alertInstance = "host1/blog"
|
||||
// alertWebhook is where the tests send alerts.
|
||||
alertWebhook = "https://alerts.example/sww"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -270,7 +272,7 @@ func startAppWithAlerts(
|
||||
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
|
||||
settings := map[string]string{
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/sww",
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: alertWebhook,
|
||||
instanceName: alertInstance,
|
||||
}
|
||||
maps.Copy(settings, env)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
anomalyASN + requestsPerMinute: aLot,
|
||||
})
|
||||
server.Store(started)
|
||||
|
||||
+146
-37
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/testutil"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ const (
|
||||
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
|
||||
cookieLimit = 50
|
||||
headerFieldLimit = 100
|
||||
lineLimit = 8192
|
||||
// cookieHeader is the header the cookie limit counts.
|
||||
cookieHeader = "Cookie"
|
||||
// tooLarge is how waf refuses a request over the header limits.
|
||||
@@ -48,9 +49,6 @@ const (
|
||||
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "silent://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
|
||||
// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
|
||||
wholeLimit = 100
|
||||
// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
|
||||
clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
|
||||
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
|
||||
@@ -107,11 +105,139 @@ func TestHeaderLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountsAndLimits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
|
||||
do(t, req)
|
||||
|
||||
// The longest header line is X-Request-ID's, with its 26-character id.
|
||||
wantHeuristic(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
s.out.requestLine(t),
|
||||
"header_limits",
|
||||
`{"fields": 101, "fields_limit": 100, "cookies": 0, "cookies_limit": 50}`,
|
||||
`{"longest_header_line_bytes": 40, "header_line_bytes_limit": 8192,
|
||||
"fields": 101, "fields_limit": 100, "cookies": 0, "cookies_limit": 50}`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// longQuery returns a path whose request line, sent by Go's client as
|
||||
// "GET <path> HTTP/1.1", is lineBytes long.
|
||||
func longQuery(lineBytes int) string {
|
||||
const around = len("GET /?q= HTTP/1.1")
|
||||
|
||||
return "/?q=" + strings.Repeat("a", lineBytes-around)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestARequestLineOverTheLimitIsRefusedWith414BeforeAnyOtherCheck(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
lineBytes int
|
||||
// cookies is how many cookies the request carries.
|
||||
cookies int
|
||||
status int
|
||||
action string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"at the limit", lineLimit, 0, http.StatusOK,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionForward,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"over the limit", lineLimit + 1, 0, http.StatusRequestURITooLong,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionRequestLineTooLong,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"over the limit and the cookie limit", lineLimit + 1,
|
||||
cookieLimit + 1, http.StatusRequestURITooLong,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionRequestLineTooLong,
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block})
|
||||
req := s.question(siteA, client, longQuery(tc.lineBytes))
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.cookies > 0 {
|
||||
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(tc.cookies))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got := do(t, req)
|
||||
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.status == http.StatusOK {
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, tc.status, waf.DispositionAllow)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, tc.status, waf.DispositionDeny)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
|
||||
|
||||
refused := tc.status != http.StatusOK
|
||||
if refused != (line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"Core Rule Set time %v for a request refused: %t",
|
||||
line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS,
|
||||
refused,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAHeaderLineOverTheLimitIsRefusedWith431(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
make func(*http.Request)
|
||||
// refused is true for a request over the limit, and false for one at it.
|
||||
refused bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"a header line at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Long", strings.Repeat("a", lineLimit-len("X-Long: ")))
|
||||
}, false},
|
||||
{"a header line over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Long", strings.Repeat("a", lineLimit+1-len("X-Long: ")))
|
||||
}, true},
|
||||
{"one cookie over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, "a="+strings.Repeat("a", lineLimit))
|
||||
}, true},
|
||||
{"a Host line over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Host = strings.Repeat("a", lineLimit+1-len("Host: "))
|
||||
}, true},
|
||||
{"a header sent twice, each line within the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Header.Add("X-Long", strings.Repeat("a", 8000))
|
||||
req.Header.Add("X-Long", strings.Repeat("a", 8000))
|
||||
}, false},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s := startWAF(t, "", nil)
|
||||
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
|
||||
tc.make(req)
|
||||
|
||||
got := do(t, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.refused {
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequestLineRefusalNamesItsHeuristicLengthAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s := startWAF(t, "", nil)
|
||||
do(t, s.question(siteA, client, longQuery(lineLimit+1)))
|
||||
|
||||
wantHeuristic(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
s.out.requestLine(t),
|
||||
"header_limits",
|
||||
`{"request_line_bytes": 8193, "request_line_bytes_limit": 8192}`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -296,10 +422,6 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeBeforeEveryCheckThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
"/", leaveAsItIs,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"a blocklist", map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL}, "/", listClient},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"the CrowdSec decision list",
|
||||
map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey}, "/", decideOnClient,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"a DNS blocklist", map[string]string{
|
||||
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: actionDeny,
|
||||
@@ -469,7 +591,7 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(
|
||||
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
|
||||
unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
|
||||
})
|
||||
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
|
||||
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
|
||||
Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
|
||||
}})
|
||||
@@ -592,12 +714,6 @@ func listClient(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, now time.Time) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
|
||||
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, now time.Time) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
|
||||
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *waf.Server, time.Time) {}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -641,12 +757,6 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
|
||||
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
|
||||
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
|
||||
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
|
||||
action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
|
||||
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
|
||||
@@ -660,6 +770,8 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says,
|
||||
// so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
server, out := newWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
|
||||
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -728,6 +840,8 @@ func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
server, out := newWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
|
||||
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -763,19 +877,13 @@ func TestWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
|
||||
held, _, _ := startHeldGeoJS(t)
|
||||
resolver, releaseResolver := startHeldResolver(t)
|
||||
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFWith(t, func(
|
||||
params waf.Params,
|
||||
) *waf.Server {
|
||||
params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
|
||||
|
||||
return waf.New(params)
|
||||
}, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
|
||||
tagDeny: "country=KP", coreRuleSetMode: block,
|
||||
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver,
|
||||
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
|
||||
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
|
||||
crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFWith(t, waf.New,
|
||||
silentGeoJSURL, silentAbuseIPDBURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
|
||||
tagDeny: "country=KP", coreRuleSetMode: block,
|
||||
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver,
|
||||
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
|
||||
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// The lists are fetched outside the synctest bubble below: a wait on the
|
||||
// network inside it would keep its clock from moving on.
|
||||
@@ -841,10 +949,11 @@ func TestWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d checks with AbuseIPDB, want 1", checked)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The query is answered, and the check with AbuseIPDB abandoned,
|
||||
// before the bubble ends.
|
||||
// The query is answered, and the check with AbuseIPDB and the request
|
||||
// to GeoJS abandoned, before the bubble ends.
|
||||
releaseResolver()
|
||||
time.Sleep(defaultDNSBLAbuseIPDBWait)
|
||||
waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-59
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(
|
||||
rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit
|
||||
rq.h.metrics.LimitHit(hit)
|
||||
|
||||
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
|
||||
netblock := banNetblock(rq.h.config, rq.client)
|
||||
if rq.h.config.Observe &&
|
||||
!rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseLimit) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
|
||||
rq.h.limiter.Reset(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
|
||||
rq.h.limiter.Reset(clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client))
|
||||
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
|
||||
|
||||
if made {
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(
|
||||
// no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
|
||||
// alert would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
|
||||
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
|
||||
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
|
||||
netblock := banNetblock(rq.h.config, rq.client)
|
||||
if rq.h.config.Observe &&
|
||||
!rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
|
||||
return banAction(
|
||||
@@ -206,57 +206,6 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
|
||||
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
|
||||
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
|
||||
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
|
||||
// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
|
||||
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
decision reputation.Decision,
|
||||
) string {
|
||||
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
|
||||
if rq.h.config.Observe &&
|
||||
!rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
|
||||
return banAction(
|
||||
rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
notes := bans.Notes{
|
||||
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
|
||||
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
|
||||
Country: rq.line.Country,
|
||||
Reputation: rq.reputation,
|
||||
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
|
||||
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if rq.h.config.Observe {
|
||||
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(
|
||||
netblock,
|
||||
now,
|
||||
decision.Expires,
|
||||
decision.Scenario,
|
||||
notes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if wouldBan {
|
||||
rq.alertBan(ban)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
|
||||
decision.Scenario, notes)
|
||||
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
|
||||
|
||||
if made {
|
||||
rq.alertBan(ban)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
|
||||
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
|
||||
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per
|
||||
@@ -325,16 +274,16 @@ func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
|
||||
return rq.h.limiter.Requests(netblock) + 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// netblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
|
||||
// banNetblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
|
||||
// widened to SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
|
||||
// counts it in.
|
||||
func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
|
||||
func banNetblock(cfg *config.WAF, client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
|
||||
addr := client.Unmap()
|
||||
if addr.Is4() {
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked()
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, cfg.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return h.clientGroup(addr)
|
||||
return clientGroup(cfg, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// banExpires is when ban ends, as the log line gives it: a time, or
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
// The heuristics of besideLookup, and how they run beside the lookup.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// besideLookupTimeLimit is how long the heuristics of besideLookup have for a
|
||||
// request, from when they start. They only read the request, and no request
|
||||
// should take them that long. A request they have not finished by then is
|
||||
// refused with 503, as ActionChecksTimedOut.
|
||||
const besideLookupTimeLimit = 500 * time.Millisecond
|
||||
|
||||
// besideLookupFindings is what the heuristics of besideLookup found of a
|
||||
// request, before any of it is applied to the request.
|
||||
type besideLookupFindings struct {
|
||||
// trapPath is the request's path when it is in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS, and ""
|
||||
// otherwise.
|
||||
trapPath string
|
||||
// rules are the rules of the rule files the request matched.
|
||||
rules []rules.Rule
|
||||
// inspected is true when the Core Rule Set inspected the request.
|
||||
// inspection, read and inspectionTime are then what it found, what it read
|
||||
// of the body, and how long it took.
|
||||
inspected bool
|
||||
inspection coreruleset.Result
|
||||
read []byte
|
||||
inspectionTime time.Duration
|
||||
// refuses is true when one of the heuristics refuses the request, or would
|
||||
// in observe mode. Those after it did no work.
|
||||
refuses bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runBesideLookup runs the heuristics of besideLookup while the lookup waits
|
||||
// for GeoJS, and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one.
|
||||
// lookedUp is the channel the lookup's result comes on, or nil once afterLookup
|
||||
// has let the request through.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The first of the two to refuse the request ends the checks: waf answers at
|
||||
// once, and what the other found is dropped. besideLookup has
|
||||
// besideLookupTimeLimit; past it, the request is refused as
|
||||
// ActionChecksTimedOut. Once both have let the request through, the heuristics
|
||||
// of afterBesideLookup run. ctx is the request's own context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) runBesideLookup(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, lookedUp <-chan lookupResult,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
var running atomic.Pointer[string]
|
||||
|
||||
running.Store(new(trapPaths{}.name()))
|
||||
|
||||
found := make(chan *besideLookupFindings, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
go func() { found <- rq.findBesideLookup(&running) }()
|
||||
|
||||
timeUp := time.NewTimer(rq.h.besideLookupLimit)
|
||||
defer timeUp.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
var findings *besideLookupFindings
|
||||
|
||||
for findings == nil || lookedUp != nil {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case result := <-lookedUp:
|
||||
lookedUp = nil
|
||||
|
||||
v := rq.runAfterLookup(ctx, result)
|
||||
if v != nil {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
case findings = <-found:
|
||||
found = nil
|
||||
|
||||
timeUp.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
if findings.refuses {
|
||||
return rq.applyFindings(ctx, findings)
|
||||
}
|
||||
case <-timeUp.C:
|
||||
return rq.timedOut(*running.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
v := rq.applyFindings(ctx, findings)
|
||||
if v != nil {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rq.runHeuristics(ctx, afterBesideLookup(), rq.h.now())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// findBesideLookup does the work of the heuristics of besideLookup on the
|
||||
// request, in their order, until one refuses it, and returns what they found.
|
||||
// It changes nothing of the request or of what waf keeps, so that it can run
|
||||
// while the lookup and afterLookup do. running holds the name of the heuristic
|
||||
// at work, the first one's when findBesideLookup is called.
|
||||
func (rq *request) findBesideLookup(
|
||||
running *atomic.Pointer[string],
|
||||
) *besideLookupFindings {
|
||||
findings := &besideLookupFindings{}
|
||||
|
||||
findings.trapPath = rq.trapPath()
|
||||
if findings.trapPath != "" {
|
||||
findings.refuses = true
|
||||
|
||||
return findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
running.Store(new(ruleFiles{}.name()))
|
||||
|
||||
findings.rules = rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
|
||||
if refusedByRule(findings.rules) {
|
||||
findings.refuses = true
|
||||
|
||||
return findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
running.Store(new(coreRuleSet{}.name()))
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := rq.h.config
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff ||
|
||||
pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.CoreRuleSetExemptPaths) {
|
||||
return findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
start := time.Now()
|
||||
// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
|
||||
// cannot fail.
|
||||
findings.inspection, findings.read, _ = rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(
|
||||
rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body,
|
||||
)
|
||||
findings.inspectionTime = time.Since(start)
|
||||
findings.inspected = true
|
||||
findings.refuses = rq.refusedByCoreRuleSet(findings.inspection)
|
||||
|
||||
return findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// applyFindings applies findings, what findBesideLookup found, to the
|
||||
// request: it runs the heuristics of besideLookup, which read them, at the
|
||||
// time it is called, and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives
|
||||
// one.
|
||||
func (rq *request) applyFindings(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, findings *besideLookupFindings,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
rq.findings = findings
|
||||
|
||||
return rq.runHeuristics(ctx, besideLookup(), rq.h.now())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// timedOut refuses the request for the heuristics of besideLookup not having
|
||||
// finished with it within besideLookupTimeLimit. running is the name of the
|
||||
// one at work, which the log line's heuristic gives. The refusal makes no ban
|
||||
// and is no offence.
|
||||
func (rq *request) timedOut(running string) *verdict {
|
||||
v := &verdict{
|
||||
action: requestlog.ActionChecksTimedOut,
|
||||
figures: map[string]any{
|
||||
"time_limit_ms": rq.h.besideLookupLimit.Milliseconds(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
rq.line.Heuristic = running
|
||||
rq.line.HeuristicFigures = v.figures
|
||||
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
|
||||
package waf_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"testing/synctest"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/testutil"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// checksTimeLimit is how long the trap paths, the rule files and the Core Rule
|
||||
// Set have for a request, as SPEC.md gives it, and checksTimedOut the status of
|
||||
// a request they have not finished by then.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
checksTimeLimit = 500 * time.Millisecond
|
||||
checksTimedOut = http.StatusServiceUnavailable
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// heldCoreRuleSet is a stand-in for the Core Rule Set: each inspection takes
|
||||
// took, then finds result. asked counts the inspections.
|
||||
type heldCoreRuleSet struct {
|
||||
took time.Duration
|
||||
result coreruleset.Result
|
||||
asked atomic.Int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inspect inspects a request as the stand-in does, and reads all of body.
|
||||
func (c *heldCoreRuleSet) Inspect(
|
||||
_ *http.Request, _ netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
|
||||
) (coreruleset.Result, []byte, error) {
|
||||
c.asked.Add(1)
|
||||
time.Sleep(c.took)
|
||||
|
||||
read, err := io.ReadAll(body)
|
||||
|
||||
return c.result, read, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// coreRuleSetMatch returns what the stand-in finds of an attack: rule 942100,
|
||||
// with a score of 5, the default SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD.
|
||||
func coreRuleSetMatch() coreruleset.Result {
|
||||
return coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{942100}, Score: 5}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet makes a waf, to be asked in a synctest bubble,
|
||||
// with crs in place of the Core Rule Set, in block mode. GeoJS never answers,
|
||||
// a setting needs its answer, alerts go to a webhook, and everything else is
|
||||
// at its default but for env. No request to it may use the network.
|
||||
func newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(
|
||||
t *testing.T, crs *heldCoreRuleSet, env map[string]string,
|
||||
) (*waf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
settings := map[string]string{
|
||||
tagDeny: denyKP, coreRuleSetMode: block,
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: alertWebhook,
|
||||
}
|
||||
maps.Copy(settings, env)
|
||||
|
||||
server, out, queue := newWAFWith(t, func(params waf.Params) *waf.Server {
|
||||
params.CoreRuleSet = crs
|
||||
params.BesideLookupTimeLimit = waf.BesideLookupTimeLimit
|
||||
|
||||
return waf.New(params)
|
||||
}, silentGeoJSURL, abuseIPDBURL, time.Now, settings)
|
||||
|
||||
return server, out, queue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// lookupWait is SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS for wait.
|
||||
func lookupWait(wait time.Duration) string {
|
||||
return strconv.FormatInt(wait.Milliseconds(), 10)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantAnswer checks the status of an answer and how long it took.
|
||||
func wantAnswer(
|
||||
t *testing.T, status int, took time.Duration,
|
||||
wantStatus int, wantTook time.Duration, out *output,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
if status != wantStatus || took != wantTook {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"answered %d after %s, want %d after %s; output:\n%s",
|
||||
status, took, wantStatus, wantTook, out.text(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantNoCoreRuleSetTrace checks that what the Core Rule Set found of a request
|
||||
// left no trace: line has none of its fields, and server has counted no match
|
||||
// of it and raised no alert for one.
|
||||
func wantNoCoreRuleSetTrace(
|
||||
t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, queue *alerts.Queue, line logLine,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil || line.CoreRuleSetScore != nil ||
|
||||
line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"log line has Core Rule Set time %v, score %v and rule ids %v, want none",
|
||||
line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS,
|
||||
line.CoreRuleSetScore,
|
||||
line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
server.Metrics.ServeHTTP(
|
||||
recorder,
|
||||
httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
||||
t.Context(),
|
||||
http.MethodGet,
|
||||
waf.MetricsPath,
|
||||
http.NoBody,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.Contains(
|
||||
recorder.Body.String(),
|
||||
"sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{",
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("a Core Rule Set match is counted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, alert := range queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook] {
|
||||
if alert.Event == alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch {
|
||||
t.Errorf("alert raised: %+v", alert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTheLookupAndTheCoreRuleSetTakeTheLongerOfTheirTimesNotTheirSum(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
inspection := checksTimeLimit - time.Millisecond
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
// wait is how long the request waits for GeoJS.
|
||||
wait time.Duration
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"the lookup waits longer", defaultLookupWait},
|
||||
{"the inspection takes longer", inspection / 2},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{took: inspection}
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
crs,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: lookupWait(tc.wait),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
server,
|
||||
func(*http.Request) {},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, http.StatusOK,
|
||||
max(tc.wait, inspection), out)
|
||||
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// firstToRefuse is a case of
|
||||
// TestTheFirstOfTheLookupAndTheRequestChecksToRefuseIsAnswered: a request
|
||||
// under env, whose inspection by the Core Rule Set takes inspection, refused as
|
||||
// action after took.
|
||||
type firstToRefuse struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
env map[string]string
|
||||
inspection time.Duration
|
||||
took time.Duration
|
||||
action string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// firstToRefuseCases are the cases of
|
||||
// TestTheFirstOfTheLookupAndTheRequestChecksToRefuseIsAnswered.
|
||||
func firstToRefuseCases() []firstToRefuse {
|
||||
return []firstToRefuse{
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "a trap path, before GeoJS answers",
|
||||
env: map[string]string{trapPaths: "/", allowedCountries: "DE"},
|
||||
took: 0, action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the Core Rule Set, before GeoJS answers",
|
||||
env: map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
|
||||
inspection: 100 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
took: 100 * time.Millisecond, action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the country list, while the Core Rule Set inspects",
|
||||
env: map[string]string{
|
||||
allowedCountries: "DE", asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "100",
|
||||
},
|
||||
inspection: 400 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
took: 100 * time.Millisecond, action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "the rate limits, while the Core Rule Set inspects",
|
||||
env: map[string]string{
|
||||
rateLimitPerMinute: "2", unknownCountryLimitPercent: "50",
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "100",
|
||||
},
|
||||
inspection: 400 * time.Millisecond,
|
||||
took: 100 * time.Millisecond, action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTheFirstOfTheLookupAndTheRequestChecksToRefuseIsAnswered(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const forbidden = http.StatusForbidden
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range firstToRefuseCases() {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{
|
||||
took: tc.inspection,
|
||||
result: coreRuleSetMatch(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
server, out, queue := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(t, crs, tc.env)
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
// Under the rate limits of the last case, the client's next
|
||||
// request takes it over a limit only at the percentage of an
|
||||
// unknown country, so it waits for GeoJS.
|
||||
countClient(t, server, time.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
server,
|
||||
func(*http.Request) {},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, forbidden, tc.took, out)
|
||||
|
||||
line := out.requestLine(t)
|
||||
wantLine(t, line, forbidden, tc.action)
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.action != requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited &&
|
||||
line.Counts != (ratelimit.Counts{}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"the rate limits counted the request: %+v",
|
||||
line.Counts,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What the Core Rule Set finds once the request is answered is
|
||||
// dropped.
|
||||
time.Sleep(tc.inspection)
|
||||
wantNoCoreRuleSetTrace(t, server, queue, line)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookupStartsNoInspection(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{took: time.Second}
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(t, crs, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
banClient(t, server, time.Now())
|
||||
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, http.StatusForbidden, 0, out)
|
||||
|
||||
requests := testutil.ToFloat64(server.Metrics.GeoJSRequests)
|
||||
if asked := crs.asked.Load(); asked != 0 || requests != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"%d inspections and %v requests to GeoJS, want none",
|
||||
asked,
|
||||
requests,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAClientInTheAllowNetsIsAllowedAtOnceAndNothingElseStarts(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{took: time.Second, result: coreRuleSetMatch()}
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(t, crs,
|
||||
map[string]string{allowNets: client, allowedCountries: "DE"})
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, http.StatusOK, 0, out)
|
||||
|
||||
requests := testutil.ToFloat64(server.Metrics.GeoJSRequests)
|
||||
if asked := crs.asked.Load(); asked != 0 || requests != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"%d inspections and %v requests to GeoJS, want none",
|
||||
asked,
|
||||
requests,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestARequestTheCoreRuleSetHasNotFinishedWithIn500MillisecondsIsRefused(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{took: checksTimeLimit + time.Second}
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(t, crs,
|
||||
map[string]string{refusalsLimitPerMinute: "1"})
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
// Were it counted toward the refusal limit, the second refusal would
|
||||
// ban the client, and the third request would be refused for the ban.
|
||||
for i := range 3 {
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
|
||||
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "id-"+strconv.Itoa(i))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, checksTimedOut, checksTimeLimit, out)
|
||||
|
||||
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
|
||||
wantLine(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
line,
|
||||
checksTimedOut,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionChecksTimedOut,
|
||||
)
|
||||
wantHeuristic(t, line, "core_rule_set", `{"time_limit_ms": 500}`)
|
||||
|
||||
if line.Offence != "" || line.BanExpires != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"log line has offence %q and ban_expires %q, want neither",
|
||||
line.Offence,
|
||||
line.BanExpires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if bans := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(bans) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", bans)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences
|
||||
if offences != (ratelimit.Offences{}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(crs.took)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestTheCoreRuleSetHasNotFinishedWith(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := &heldCoreRuleSet{took: checksTimeLimit + time.Second}
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAFHoldingTheCoreRuleSet(t, crs,
|
||||
map[string]string{mode: observe})
|
||||
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
|
||||
|
||||
wantAnswer(t, status, took, http.StatusOK, checksTimeLimit, out)
|
||||
|
||||
line := out.requestLine(t)
|
||||
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
|
||||
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionChecksTimedOut {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"log line has would_action %q, want %q",
|
||||
line.WouldAction,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionChecksTimedOut,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(crs.took)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownCountryLimitPercent(
|
||||
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says, with
|
||||
// a GeoJS that never answers.
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAF(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
|
||||
map[string]string{unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0"})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -387,14 +389,18 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// In a synctest bubble, as
|
||||
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says,
|
||||
// with a GeoJS that never answers.
|
||||
// with a GeoJS that never answers. The headers, which need the
|
||||
// answer too, are off.
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
server, out, _ := newWAF(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: strconv.FormatInt(
|
||||
timeout.Milliseconds(), 10),
|
||||
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
|
||||
tc.setting: tc.value,
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
|
||||
tc.setting: tc.value,
|
||||
})
|
||||
began := time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func (byteLimits) check(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(
|
||||
rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
now,
|
||||
rq.countedBytes(),
|
||||
rq.bytesLimitPercent.percent,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer.
|
||||
@@ -45,10 +47,10 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
|
||||
// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
|
||||
// length SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
|
||||
// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
|
||||
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
|
||||
func clientGroup(cfg *config.WAF, addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
|
||||
addr = addr.Unmap()
|
||||
if addr.Is6() {
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, cfg.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
|
||||
|
||||
+24
-16
@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
|
||||
// exempts its path, as pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and
|
||||
// its score in the log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
|
||||
// coreRuleSet takes what the Core Rule Set found of the request, which
|
||||
// findBesideLookup inspected with it unless SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off
|
||||
// or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as pathExempt
|
||||
// decides. It notes the rules the request matched and its score in the log
|
||||
// line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag
|
||||
// exploitsignature, raises the core_rule_set_match alert, and in block mode
|
||||
// refuses the request with 403, which is an offence its client's history
|
||||
@@ -30,21 +31,17 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
|
||||
rq *request,
|
||||
_ time.Time,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
cfg := rq.h.config
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff ||
|
||||
pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.CoreRuleSetExemptPaths) {
|
||||
findings := rq.findings
|
||||
if !findings.inspected {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
start := time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
|
||||
// cannot fail.
|
||||
result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
|
||||
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
|
||||
cfg := rq.h.config
|
||||
result := findings.inspection
|
||||
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(findings.read))
|
||||
|
||||
rq.line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS = new(
|
||||
requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)),
|
||||
requestlog.Milliseconds(findings.inspectionTime),
|
||||
)
|
||||
rq.line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
|
||||
rq.line.CoreRuleSetScore = &result.Score
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +58,7 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
|
||||
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
|
||||
rq.alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result)
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeDetect {
|
||||
if !rq.refusedByCoreRuleSet(result) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +73,17 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// refusedByCoreRuleSet reports whether coreRuleSet refuses a request the Core
|
||||
// Rule Set found result of: whether the score is at or over
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD in block mode.
|
||||
func (rq *request) refusedByCoreRuleSet(result coreruleset.Result) bool {
|
||||
cfg := rq.h.config
|
||||
threshold := cfg.CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold
|
||||
|
||||
return cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeBlock &&
|
||||
threshold != 0 && result.Score >= threshold
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// alertCoreRuleSetMatch raises the core_rule_set_match alert for the request,
|
||||
// which the Core Rule Set scored at result, at or over
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD. Its detail gives the rule ids, the
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +108,7 @@ func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
|
||||
Host: rq.site,
|
||||
Client: rq.client,
|
||||
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
Netblock: clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
|
||||
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
|
||||
Country: rq.line.Country,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,8 +108,11 @@ func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
|
||||
// The headers are off, so that only the country list makes the request
|
||||
// wait for its answer.
|
||||
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000", allowedCountries: "de",
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000", addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
allowedCountries: "de",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(
|
||||
@@ -239,7 +242,10 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
env map[string]string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"no setting needs the lookup", nil},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"no setting needs the lookup",
|
||||
map[string]string{addLookupHeaders: falseValue},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"a tag setting needs it", map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP}},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
|
||||
// through the reputation lists.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
|
||||
// the client is in force at now. It then adds the tag crowdsec, notes the
|
||||
// list, as noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends. Its
|
||||
// figures are the decision's scenario and when it ends.
|
||||
type crowdSec struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
|
||||
|
||||
func (crowdSec) check(
|
||||
_ context.Context,
|
||||
rq *request,
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
decision, listed := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
|
||||
if !listed {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
|
||||
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
|
||||
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
|
||||
|
||||
return &verdict{
|
||||
action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
|
||||
figures: map[string]any{
|
||||
"scenario": decision.Scenario,
|
||||
"expires": requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// crowdSecDecisionInForce returns the decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
|
||||
// the client that is in force at now, and reports whether there is one, which
|
||||
// the heuristic crowdsec refuses the request for.
|
||||
func (rq *request) crowdSecDecisionInForce(
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
) (reputation.Decision, bool) {
|
||||
return rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package waf_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
|
||||
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
|
||||
// needs, as lists.json would at start.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
|
||||
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
|
||||
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
|
||||
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
|
||||
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, metricsToken: token,
|
||||
})
|
||||
// client had four hours left on its decision as the engine answered.
|
||||
fetched := clk.Now()
|
||||
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
|
||||
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
|
||||
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
|
||||
|
||||
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
|
||||
banned := requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
|
||||
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, banned)
|
||||
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
|
||||
|
||||
if line.BanExpires != expires {
|
||||
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s",
|
||||
line.BanExpires, expires)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{{Source: decisionsURL}}
|
||||
|
||||
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
|
||||
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
|
||||
!held[0].Start.Equal(fetched) ||
|
||||
!held[0].Expires.Equal(fetched.Add(4*time.Hour)) ||
|
||||
held[0].Reason != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/ssh-bf" ||
|
||||
!reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, listed) ||
|
||||
held[0].Notes.Request.Path != "/" || held[0].Notes.Requests != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf(
|
||||
"bans %+v, want one for crowdsec of four hours, with the list and "+
|
||||
"the request in its notes",
|
||||
held,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The listing raises a reputation_hit alert, and the ban its own.
|
||||
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
|
||||
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
|
||||
waiting[0].Reason != "listed by the CrowdSec decision list" ||
|
||||
!reflect.DeepEqual(
|
||||
waiting[1],
|
||||
banAlert(alerts.EventBan, fetched, client, held[0],
|
||||
expires),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban's",
|
||||
waiting,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Each request while the ban lasts is refused under it, as under any
|
||||
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
|
||||
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, banned)
|
||||
wantReputation(t, line)
|
||||
|
||||
if line.BanExpires != expires {
|
||||
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s",
|
||||
line.BanExpires, expires)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
clk.advance(time.Second)
|
||||
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
|
||||
// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
|
||||
// list fetched from a URL.
|
||||
metrics := s.scrape()
|
||||
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
|
||||
|
||||
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
|
||||
`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
|
||||
wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
|
||||
wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
|
||||
wantMetric(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
metrics,
|
||||
"sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
|
||||
float64(fetched.Unix()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server, _ := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
|
||||
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(
|
||||
client,
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
wantHeuristic(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
line,
|
||||
"crowdsec",
|
||||
`{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
|
||||
`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
// 198.51.100.0/24 and 2001:db8::9 had a minute left as the engine
|
||||
// answered.
|
||||
fetched := clk.Now()
|
||||
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "1m0s", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", `+
|
||||
`"value": "198.51.100.0/24"}, {"duration": "1m0s", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
|
||||
`"value": "2001:db8::9"}]`)
|
||||
|
||||
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
|
||||
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
|
||||
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
s.get(
|
||||
"198.51.100.7",
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
s.get(
|
||||
"2001:db8::9",
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
s.get(
|
||||
"2001:db8::5",
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
|
||||
// with it.
|
||||
clk.advance(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, from := range []string{"198.51.100.8", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"} {
|
||||
wantReputation(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if made := server.Ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec); made != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"%d bans made for crowdsec, want 2, on 198.51.100.7/32 and "+
|
||||
"2001:db8::/64",
|
||||
made,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")); len(
|
||||
held,
|
||||
) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bans of 2001:db8::/64 %+v, want one", held)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
|
||||
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, mode: observe,
|
||||
})
|
||||
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
|
||||
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
|
||||
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
|
||||
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
|
||||
|
||||
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
|
||||
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[1].Event != alerts.EventBan ||
|
||||
waiting[1].Detail["cause"] != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
|
||||
waiting[1].Detail["mode"] != observe {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban alert "+
|
||||
"marked observe",
|
||||
waiting,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// loadDecisions puts into server's lists the copy of the decision list at
|
||||
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
|
||||
// lists.json would at start.
|
||||
func loadDecisions(
|
||||
t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
|
||||
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{answer},
|
||||
}})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("load the decision list: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
import "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
|
||||
// BesideLookupTimeLimit is besideLookupTimeLimit.
|
||||
const BesideLookupTimeLimit = besideLookupTimeLimit
|
||||
|
||||
// BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist does on s what a fetch of AbuseIPDB's blacklist with
|
||||
// the clients on listed does.
|
||||
func (s *Server) BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||
h := s.Handler.(*handler) //nolint:forcetypeassert // New makes it one
|
||||
BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(h.config, h.ledger, h.processLog, h.now(), listed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -10,16 +10,22 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have.
|
||||
// Real clients never reach them.
|
||||
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have,
|
||||
// and the longest its request line and each header line may be, in bytes, not
|
||||
// counting the line ending. Real clients rarely reach them. maxLineBytes is
|
||||
// what nginx allows by default.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
maxCookies = 50
|
||||
maxHeaderFields = 100
|
||||
maxLineBytes = 8 << 10
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// headerLimits refuses a request with more than maxHeaderFields header fields
|
||||
// or more than maxCookies cookies, with 431. Its figures are the request's
|
||||
// header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
|
||||
// headerLimits refuses a request with a request line longer than maxLineBytes,
|
||||
// with 414. It refuses a request with a header line longer than maxLineBytes,
|
||||
// more than maxHeaderFields header fields or more than maxCookies cookies, with
|
||||
// 431. Its figures are the request line's length and its limit for 414. For
|
||||
// 431 they are the longest header line, the header fields and the cookies,
|
||||
// each with its limit.
|
||||
type headerLimits struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" }
|
||||
@@ -29,20 +35,59 @@ func (headerLimits) check(
|
||||
rq *request,
|
||||
_ time.Time,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
requestLine := rq.requestLineBytes()
|
||||
if requestLine > maxLineBytes {
|
||||
return &verdict{
|
||||
action: requestlog.ActionRequestLineTooLong,
|
||||
figures: map[string]any{
|
||||
"request_line_bytes": requestLine,
|
||||
"request_line_bytes_limit": maxLineBytes,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
longest := rq.longestHeaderLineBytes()
|
||||
fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts()
|
||||
if fields <= maxHeaderFields && cookies <= maxCookies {
|
||||
|
||||
if longest <= maxLineBytes && fields <= maxHeaderFields &&
|
||||
cookies <= maxCookies {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &verdict{
|
||||
action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
|
||||
figures: map[string]any{
|
||||
"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
|
||||
"longest_header_line_bytes": longest,
|
||||
"header_line_bytes_limit": maxLineBytes,
|
||||
"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
|
||||
"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// requestLineBytes returns the length of the request's request line, such as
|
||||
// "GET /search?q=x HTTP/1.1", not counting its line ending. The target is the
|
||||
// one the visitor sent, which rproxy's question carries unchanged.
|
||||
func (rq *request) requestLineBytes() int {
|
||||
return len(rq.in.Method) + len(" ") + len(rq.in.RequestURI) +
|
||||
len(" ") + len(rq.in.Proto)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// longestHeaderLineBytes returns the length of the request's longest header
|
||||
// line, such as "Cookie: a=1", not counting its line ending. Each value of a
|
||||
// header sent twice is a line of its own, and Host is a line too.
|
||||
func (rq *request) longestHeaderLineBytes() int {
|
||||
longest := len("Host: ") + len(rq.in.Host)
|
||||
|
||||
for name, values := range rq.in.Header {
|
||||
for _, value := range values {
|
||||
longest = max(longest, len(name)+len(": ")+len(value))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return longest
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent
|
||||
// twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between
|
||||
// semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ const (
|
||||
|
||||
// beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
|
||||
// country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
|
||||
// header_limits comes first: it only counts, and a request it refuses causes no
|
||||
// other work.
|
||||
// header_limits comes first: it only measures and counts, and a request it
|
||||
// refuses causes no other work.
|
||||
func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
return []heuristic{
|
||||
headerLimits{},
|
||||
@@ -54,20 +54,34 @@ func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// afterLookup are the heuristics that run once the lookup has been made.
|
||||
// tag_deny runs twice: before the rate limits, on the tags known by then, and
|
||||
// last, on the tag rule_files and core_rule_set can add.
|
||||
func afterLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
return []heuristic{
|
||||
countries{},
|
||||
blocklists{},
|
||||
crowdSec{},
|
||||
dnsbl{},
|
||||
abuseIPDB{},
|
||||
tagDeny{},
|
||||
rateLimits{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// besideLookup are the heuristics that only read the request. Their work runs
|
||||
// beside the lookup and afterLookup, in findBesideLookup, which changes nothing
|
||||
// of the request. Their check then applies what that work found, and runs only
|
||||
// once waf takes it.
|
||||
func besideLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
return []heuristic{
|
||||
trapPaths{},
|
||||
ruleFiles{},
|
||||
coreRuleSet{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// afterBesideLookup are the heuristics that run once afterLookup and
|
||||
// besideLookup have both let the request through. tag_deny runs a second time,
|
||||
// on the tag rule_files and core_rule_set can add.
|
||||
func afterBesideLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
return []heuristic{
|
||||
tagDeny{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ func (rq *request) runAfterAnswer(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, afterAnswer())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runHeuristics runs list, beforeLookup or afterLookup, on the request at now,
|
||||
// runHeuristics runs list, one of those checkClient runs, on the request at now,
|
||||
// and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. The log line's
|
||||
// heuristic and heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave it, and give its
|
||||
// figures. ctx is the request's own context.
|
||||
|
||||
+106
-30
@@ -2,17 +2,22 @@ package waf
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
|
||||
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
|
||||
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is true. Go writes
|
||||
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
|
||||
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
@@ -20,33 +25,80 @@ const (
|
||||
countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
|
||||
// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line and as the
|
||||
// request's asn= and country= tags, unless
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
|
||||
// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
|
||||
// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
|
||||
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
|
||||
// unless refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. ctx is the request's own
|
||||
// context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
|
||||
// lookupResult is what the lookup gave for a request: whether its client was
|
||||
// looked up, the answer, and whether the request skipped the wait for GeoJS.
|
||||
type lookupResult struct {
|
||||
lookedUp, skippedWait bool
|
||||
answer geojs.Answer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// startLookUp starts looking up the client's AS number and country, in the
|
||||
// lookup database or through GeoJS, unless SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the
|
||||
// client is on a private, loopback or link-local address, which no lookup can
|
||||
// place. It returns the channel the result comes on. A result that needs no
|
||||
// wait is on it when startLookUp returns: the lookup database's, an answer
|
||||
// GeoJS gave earlier, or none. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer,
|
||||
// such as a country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits
|
||||
// for it up to SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS, unless
|
||||
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. The wait goes on to its end even once
|
||||
// the request has been answered, so that it ends as it would have for a
|
||||
// request that waited. startLookUp changes nothing of the request. ctx is the
|
||||
// request's own context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) startLookUp(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, now time.Time,
|
||||
) <-chan lookupResult {
|
||||
result := make(chan lookupResult, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
|
||||
result <- lookupResult{}
|
||||
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client := clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client)
|
||||
|
||||
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
|
||||
result <- lookupResult{
|
||||
lookedUp: true, answer: rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
answer := rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
|
||||
refused := rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now)
|
||||
|
||||
if !answer.Answered.IsZero() || refused || !rq.h.waitForGeoJS {
|
||||
result <- lookupResult{
|
||||
lookedUp: true,
|
||||
skippedWait: refused && answer.Answered.IsZero(),
|
||||
answer: answer,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
result <- lookupResult{
|
||||
lookedUp: true,
|
||||
answer: rq.h.geojs.LookUp(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), client,
|
||||
rq.h.config.ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// noteLookup notes result for the log line and as the request's asn= and
|
||||
// country= tags.
|
||||
func (rq *request) noteLookup(result lookupResult) {
|
||||
if !result.lookedUp {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
|
||||
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file":
|
||||
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client)
|
||||
case rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now):
|
||||
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
|
||||
rq.skippedLookupWait = rq.lookupAnswer.Answered.IsZero()
|
||||
default:
|
||||
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rq.lookedUp = true
|
||||
rq.lookupAnswer = result.answer
|
||||
rq.skippedLookupWait = result.skippedWait
|
||||
rq.line.ASN = rq.lookupAnswer.ASN
|
||||
rq.line.ASName = rq.lookupAnswer.ASName
|
||||
rq.line.Country = rq.lookupAnswer.Country
|
||||
@@ -80,16 +132,40 @@ func countryTag(country string) string {
|
||||
return config.CountryTagPrefix + country
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// addLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup
|
||||
// database or GeoJS, to the client's history, and to the notes of the bans
|
||||
// on its netblock that have no AS number, AS name or country yet.
|
||||
func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
|
||||
h.limiter.AddLookup(answer.Client, answer.Answered,
|
||||
// AddLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup database
|
||||
// or GeoJS, to the client's history in limiter, and to the notes of the bans
|
||||
// in ledger on its netblock that have no AS number, AS name or country yet.
|
||||
// cfg sets the netblock's size.
|
||||
func AddLookup(
|
||||
cfg *config.WAF, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, ledger *bans.Ledger,
|
||||
answer geojs.Answer,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
limiter.AddLookup(answer.Client, answer.Answered,
|
||||
answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
|
||||
h.ledger.AddLookup(h.netblock(answer.Client.Addr()),
|
||||
ledger.AddLookup(banNetblock(cfg, answer.Client.Addr()),
|
||||
answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GeoJSFailed logs a failure of GeoJS to processLog, raises a
|
||||
// source_failure alert for it on alertQueue and counts it in m.
|
||||
// askingAgainIn is how long GeoJS is left alone after it.
|
||||
func GeoJSFailed(
|
||||
processLog *slog.Logger, alertQueue *alerts.Queue, m *metrics.Metrics,
|
||||
err error, askingAgainIn time.Duration,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
processLog.Warn("asking GeoJS failed",
|
||||
"error", err.Error(), "asking_again_in", askingAgainIn.String())
|
||||
alertQueue.Raise(alerts.Alert{
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
|
||||
Reason: "asking GeoJS failed",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]any{
|
||||
"source": "geojs", "error": err.Error(),
|
||||
"asking_again_in": askingAgainIn.String(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
m.GeoJSFailures.Inc()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// setLookupHeaders sets the headers that give the client's AS number and
|
||||
// country, leaving out one that is unknown.
|
||||
func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(
|
||||
geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
|
||||
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// of lookups.json would keep it, while the first request still waits
|
||||
// for GeoJS. The second request goes on at once, and is counted.
|
||||
clk.advance(2500 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(
|
||||
fromDE + "/32",
|
||||
), ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE,
|
||||
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(
|
||||
clk.Now,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/sww",
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: alertWebhook,
|
||||
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(
|
||||
// The answer is kept before the requests, so GeoJS is not asked, and
|
||||
// gives no answer of its own.
|
||||
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{{
|
||||
Client: netblock, ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE, Country: "DE",
|
||||
Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
|
||||
}})
|
||||
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ func TestLookupSourceOffLooksNoClientUp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Even an answer kept from before is not used.
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(
|
||||
fromDE + "/32",
|
||||
), ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE,
|
||||
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ func TestClientsOwnLookupHeadersAreRemovedWhileTheSettingIsOff(
|
||||
geojsURL,
|
||||
time.Now,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
|
||||
@@ -449,6 +450,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays(
|
||||
// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
|
||||
// handed to waf's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
|
||||
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned()
|
||||
|
||||
// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
|
||||
// is never reached.
|
||||
const timeout = 3 * time.Second
|
||||
@@ -457,6 +460,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays(
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: strconv.FormatInt(
|
||||
timeout.Milliseconds(), 10),
|
||||
// Off, so that only the country list makes the request wait.
|
||||
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
|
||||
allowedCountries: "DE",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -492,6 +497,17 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
|
||||
m.Run()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// geojsRequestTimeout is how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is
|
||||
// abandoned.
|
||||
const geojsRequestTimeout = 10 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned sleeps until every request to the GeoJS at
|
||||
// silentGeoJSURL made so far has been abandoned. A synctest bubble that asks
|
||||
// it defers this: the bubble cannot end while a request waits on it.
|
||||
func waitForGeoJSRequestsToBeAbandoned() {
|
||||
time.Sleep(geojsRequestTimeout)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// silentGeoJS is the GeoJS at silentGeoJSURL.
|
||||
type silentGeoJS struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
package waf_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
@@ -10,8 +11,9 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
|
||||
// GeoJS.
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{
|
||||
keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"),
|
||||
keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -329,13 +331,13 @@ func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(
|
||||
|
||||
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
|
||||
// of its own. Each client is in an AS of its own.
|
||||
answer := func(addr, asn string) lookup.Answer {
|
||||
return lookup.Answer{
|
||||
answer := func(addr, asn string) geojs.Answer {
|
||||
return geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), ASN: asn,
|
||||
Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{
|
||||
answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -357,21 +359,23 @@ func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(
|
||||
`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64502",instance="app"}`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestGeoJSFailureIsCountedLoggedAndAlerted(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
|
||||
failingGeoJS := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
|
||||
t.Cleanup(failingGeoJS.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
|
||||
addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
|
||||
addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL,
|
||||
failingGeoJS.URL, time.Now,
|
||||
map[string]string{
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
metricsToken: token,
|
||||
tagDeny: denyKP,
|
||||
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
|
||||
metricsToken: token,
|
||||
tagDeny: denyKP,
|
||||
alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/waf",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// GeoJS fails, so the client has no country= tag, and SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY does
|
||||
@@ -401,14 +405,46 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
`sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total{instance="app"}`,
|
||||
1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The process log's line names the failure but not the address asked
|
||||
// about.
|
||||
logged := ""
|
||||
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(out.text()) {
|
||||
if strings.Contains(line, "asking GeoJS failed") {
|
||||
logged = line
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if logged == "" || strings.Contains(logged, fromDE) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"logged %q, want the failure without the address asked about",
|
||||
logged,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fmt prints a map sorted by its keys.
|
||||
const want = "map[asking_again_in:1s " +
|
||||
"error:GeoJS answered 503 Service Unavailable source:geojs]"
|
||||
|
||||
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
|
||||
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventSourceFailure ||
|
||||
waiting[0].Reason != "asking GeoJS failed" ||
|
||||
fmt.Sprint(waiting[0].Detail) != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"alerts waiting %+v, want one source_failure alert with %v",
|
||||
waiting,
|
||||
want,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
|
||||
// country, given now.
|
||||
func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
|
||||
func keptAnswer(addr, country string) geojs.Answer {
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
return lookup.Answer{
|
||||
return geojs.Answer{
|
||||
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
|
||||
Answered: now, Used: now,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+85
-133
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
|
||||
// Package waf is the server the waf command runs. It answers
|
||||
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and
|
||||
// writes a log line for each.
|
||||
// writes a log line for each. It also bans the clients on AbuseIPDB's
|
||||
// blacklist each time the reputation package fetches it.
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"cmp"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +20,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
@@ -54,18 +58,34 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
RequestLog io.Writer
|
||||
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
|
||||
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
||||
// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
|
||||
// while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
|
||||
GeoJSURL string
|
||||
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
|
||||
AbuseIPDBURL string
|
||||
// Metrics count what waf does. Whoever builds them adds the metrics
|
||||
// read from the other parts.
|
||||
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
// Limiter is the table of clients the rate limits count, with each
|
||||
// client's history.
|
||||
Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
||||
// Ledger holds the bans.
|
||||
Ledger *bans.Ledger
|
||||
// Anomalies are the counters of the anomaly thresholds.
|
||||
Anomalies *anomaly.Counters
|
||||
// Lists are the lists fetched from URLs, DNSBL the DNSBL zones'
|
||||
// verdicts, and AbuseIPDB AbuseIPDB's scores and the checks spent.
|
||||
Lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
|
||||
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
// RouteWatch asks routewatch about clients, and is nil while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset.
|
||||
RouteWatch *routewatch.Client
|
||||
// GeoJS looks clients' AS numbers and countries up while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs. It is given AddLookup as its Answered
|
||||
// and GeoJSFailed as its Failed.
|
||||
GeoJS *geojs.GeoJS
|
||||
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
|
||||
LookupFile *lookup.File
|
||||
// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
|
||||
// while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
|
||||
CoreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
|
||||
CoreRuleSet CoreRuleSetInspector
|
||||
// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
|
||||
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
|
||||
// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
|
||||
@@ -75,25 +95,35 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
Rules *rules.Files
|
||||
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban waf makes or makes
|
||||
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
|
||||
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
|
||||
// whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, for each
|
||||
// request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
|
||||
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
|
||||
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
|
||||
Alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
// BesideLookupTimeLimit is how long the heuristics of besideLookup have
|
||||
// for a request. Zero means besideLookupTimeLimit. Tests that run the
|
||||
// Core Rule Set lengthen it, since the race detector and a busy host can
|
||||
// slow an inspection past besideLookupTimeLimit.
|
||||
BesideLookupTimeLimit time.Duration
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Server is the server waf runs, with the parts whose state the state
|
||||
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
|
||||
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, routewatch's answers, and the metrics.
|
||||
// RouteWatch is nil while SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset.
|
||||
// CoreRuleSetInspector inspects a request with the Core Rule Set, as
|
||||
// coreruleset.CoreRuleSet's Inspect says. Tests give waf a stand-in for it.
|
||||
type CoreRuleSetInspector interface {
|
||||
Inspect(
|
||||
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
|
||||
) (coreruleset.Result, []byte, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Server is the server waf runs, with the parts of its Params. The tests
|
||||
// read them.
|
||||
type Server struct {
|
||||
*http.Server
|
||||
|
||||
Ledger *bans.Ledger
|
||||
Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
||||
GeoJS *lookup.GeoJS
|
||||
GeoJS *geojs.GeoJS
|
||||
Anomalies *anomaly.Counters
|
||||
LookupFile *lookup.File
|
||||
Lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
@@ -103,135 +133,54 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
|
||||
// settings in params make it.
|
||||
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, the parts
|
||||
// in params among it.
|
||||
func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
|
||||
m := metrics.New(
|
||||
params.Config.MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs,
|
||||
params.Config.InstanceName,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
|
||||
|
||||
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h := &handler{
|
||||
return &handler{
|
||||
config: params.Config,
|
||||
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
|
||||
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
now: params.Now,
|
||||
metrics: m,
|
||||
metrics: params.Metrics,
|
||||
awaitingReport: awaitingReport,
|
||||
limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
|
||||
PerMinute: params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
PerHour: params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
|
||||
PerDay: params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
|
||||
BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
BytesPerHour: params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
|
||||
BytesPerDay: params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
|
||||
}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
|
||||
ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
|
||||
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
|
||||
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
|
||||
LimitBanPermanentAbove: params.Config.LimitBanPermanentAbove,
|
||||
AttackBanDuration: params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
|
||||
MaxBans: params.Config.MaxBans,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
|
||||
Client: params.Config.AnomalyClient,
|
||||
Net: params.Config.AnomalyNet,
|
||||
ASN: params.Config.AnomalyASN,
|
||||
Total: params.Config.AnomalyTotal,
|
||||
WatchedNet: params.Config.AnomalyWatchedNet,
|
||||
NetV4Prefix: params.Config.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
|
||||
NetV6Prefix: params.Config.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
|
||||
NamedNetblocks: params.Config.AnomalyWatchedNets,
|
||||
Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
|
||||
lists: lists,
|
||||
dnsbl: dnsbl,
|
||||
abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
|
||||
rules: params.Rules,
|
||||
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
|
||||
alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if params.Config.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
||||
h.routeWatch = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
|
||||
URL: params.Config.RouteWatchURL, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
|
||||
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
|
||||
Timeout: params.Config.ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout,
|
||||
limiter: params.Limiter,
|
||||
ledger: params.Ledger,
|
||||
geojs: params.GeoJS,
|
||||
anomalies: params.Anomalies,
|
||||
lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
|
||||
lists: params.Lists,
|
||||
dnsbl: params.DNSBL,
|
||||
abuseIPDB: params.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||
routeWatch: params.RouteWatch,
|
||||
rules: params.Rules,
|
||||
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
|
||||
alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
// The country list, the headers, the tag settings that name an asn=
|
||||
// or country= tag and the biased thresholds act on the answer before
|
||||
// the request goes on.
|
||||
Wait: len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
|
||||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || params.Config.TagsNeedLookup() ||
|
||||
waitForGeoJS: len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
|
||||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders ||
|
||||
params.Config.TagsNeedLookup() ||
|
||||
biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
|
||||
Answered: h.addLookup,
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
Metrics: m,
|
||||
Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
})
|
||||
m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
|
||||
m.AddRules(params.Rules)
|
||||
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
|
||||
// verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
|
||||
// with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
|
||||
// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
|
||||
func newReputation(
|
||||
params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
|
||||
) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
|
||||
cfg := params.Config
|
||||
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
|
||||
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
|
||||
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
|
||||
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
|
||||
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
|
||||
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
})
|
||||
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
|
||||
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver,
|
||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
})
|
||||
abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
||||
URL: params.AbuseIPDBURL, Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
||||
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
m.AddReputation(lists, dnsbl)
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
|
||||
m.AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB)
|
||||
besideLookupLimit: cmp.Or(
|
||||
params.BesideLookupTimeLimit,
|
||||
besideLookupTimeLimit,
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
|
||||
// without the rules SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
|
||||
// up to SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE, with the exclusions in
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE and the fixes of the apps in SWW_WAF_APPS,
|
||||
// or nil while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off. It
|
||||
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
|
||||
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
|
||||
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
|
||||
// an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
|
||||
// Core Rule Set only to check it.
|
||||
// or nil while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off. An exclusions file that
|
||||
// coreruleset.New refuses is an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a
|
||||
// set file is loaded with the Core Rule Set only to check it.
|
||||
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff &&
|
||||
cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
|
||||
@@ -239,14 +188,11 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
coreRuleSet, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel,
|
||||
DisabledRules: cfg.CoreRuleSetDisabledRules,
|
||||
BodyInspectionSize: min(
|
||||
cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize,
|
||||
QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1,
|
||||
),
|
||||
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
|
||||
Apps: cfg.Apps,
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel,
|
||||
DisabledRules: cfg.CoreRuleSetDisabledRules,
|
||||
BodyInspectionSize: cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize,
|
||||
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
|
||||
Apps: cfg.Apps,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
@@ -272,7 +218,7 @@ type handler struct {
|
||||
metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
||||
ledger *bans.Ledger
|
||||
geojs *lookup.GeoJS
|
||||
geojs *geojs.GeoJS
|
||||
anomalies *anomaly.Counters
|
||||
lookupFile *lookup.File
|
||||
lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
@@ -280,8 +226,14 @@ type handler struct {
|
||||
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
routeWatch *routewatch.Client
|
||||
rules *rules.Files
|
||||
coreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
|
||||
coreRuleSet CoreRuleSetInspector
|
||||
alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
// waitForGeoJS is true when a setting needs each request's answer from
|
||||
// GeoJS before the request goes on.
|
||||
waitForGeoJS bool
|
||||
// besideLookupLimit is how long the heuristics of besideLookup have for a
|
||||
// request, as Params.BesideLookupTimeLimit says.
|
||||
besideLookupLimit time.Duration
|
||||
// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
|
||||
// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
|
||||
awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
|
||||
|
||||
+159
-16
@@ -16,10 +16,17 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
@@ -93,6 +100,10 @@ const off = "off"
|
||||
// on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
|
||||
const on = "true"
|
||||
|
||||
// falseValue is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false
|
||||
// off.
|
||||
const falseValue = "false"
|
||||
|
||||
// output collects what sww writes on stdout.
|
||||
type output struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
@@ -420,7 +431,8 @@ func startRProxy(
|
||||
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
|
||||
// database SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
|
||||
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY.
|
||||
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY, and its blacklist is
|
||||
// fetched from abuseIPDBBlacklistURL.
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the
|
||||
// Core Rule Set have their requests inspected by it.
|
||||
func newWAF(
|
||||
@@ -431,13 +443,15 @@ func newWAF(
|
||||
) (*waf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
return newWAFWith(t, waf.New, geojsURL, now, env)
|
||||
return newWAFWith(t, waf.New, geojsURL, abuseIPDBURL, now, env)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newWAFWith is newWAF for the server build makes.
|
||||
// newWAFWith is newWAF for the server build makes, with clients checked with
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB at abuseIPDBCheckURL.
|
||||
func newWAFWith(
|
||||
t *testing.T, build func(waf.Params) *waf.Server,
|
||||
geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
|
||||
geojsURL, abuseIPDBCheckURL string, now func() time.Time,
|
||||
env map[string]string,
|
||||
) (*waf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -495,22 +509,151 @@ func newWAFWith(
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Core Rule Set: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server := build(waf.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: out,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
GeoJSURL: geojsURL,
|
||||
AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
|
||||
LookupFile: lookupFile,
|
||||
CoreRuleSet: coreRuleSet,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
Rules: ruleFiles,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
params := waf.Params{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
RequestLog: out,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
LookupFile: lookupFile,
|
||||
CoreRuleSet: coreRuleSet,
|
||||
Now: now,
|
||||
Rules: ruleFiles,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
// The tests of the limit set it back, and hold the Core Rule Set
|
||||
// with a stand-in.
|
||||
BesideLookupTimeLimit: time.Hour,
|
||||
}
|
||||
addCounters(¶ms)
|
||||
addOutsideSources(¶ms, geojsURL, abuseIPDBCheckURL)
|
||||
|
||||
server := build(params)
|
||||
|
||||
return server, out, alertQueue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// addCounters adds to params the metrics, the table of clients, the ledger
|
||||
// and the anomaly counters, as sww builds them from params' settings. The
|
||||
// metrics read the ledger, the table of clients and the rules.
|
||||
func addCounters(params *waf.Params) {
|
||||
cfg := params.Config
|
||||
|
||||
params.Metrics = metrics.New(
|
||||
cfg.MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs,
|
||||
cfg.InstanceName,
|
||||
)
|
||||
params.Limiter = ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
|
||||
PerMinute: cfg.RateLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
PerHour: cfg.RateLimitPerHour,
|
||||
PerDay: cfg.RateLimitPerDay,
|
||||
BytesPerMinute: cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
BytesPerHour: cfg.BytesLimitPerHour,
|
||||
BytesPerDay: cfg.BytesLimitPerDay,
|
||||
}, cfg.MaxTrackedClients)
|
||||
params.Ledger = bans.New(bans.Params{
|
||||
LimitBanDuration: cfg.LimitBanDuration,
|
||||
LimitBanRepeatWindow: cfg.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
|
||||
LimitBanPermanentAbove: cfg.LimitBanPermanentAbove,
|
||||
AttackBanDuration: cfg.AttackBanDuration,
|
||||
MaxBans: cfg.MaxBans,
|
||||
})
|
||||
params.Anomalies = anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
|
||||
Client: cfg.AnomalyClient,
|
||||
Net: cfg.AnomalyNet,
|
||||
ASN: cfg.AnomalyASN,
|
||||
Total: cfg.AnomalyTotal,
|
||||
WatchedNet: cfg.AnomalyWatchedNet,
|
||||
NetV4Prefix: cfg.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
|
||||
NetV6Prefix: cfg.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
|
||||
NamedNetblocks: cfg.AnomalyWatchedNets,
|
||||
Alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
params.Metrics.AddBansAndClients(
|
||||
params.Ledger,
|
||||
params.Limiter,
|
||||
params.Now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
params.Metrics.AddRules(params.Rules)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// addOutsideSources adds to params the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL
|
||||
// zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores from abuseIPDBCheckURL and its
|
||||
// blacklist from abuseIPDBBlacklistURL, routewatch's answers while its
|
||||
// setting is set, and GeoJS at geojsURL, as sww builds
|
||||
// them from params' settings and the parts addCounters added. The metrics
|
||||
// read the lists, the zones' verdicts, and AbuseIPDB's while its key is set.
|
||||
func addOutsideSources(
|
||||
params *waf.Params, geojsURL, abuseIPDBCheckURL string,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
cfg := params.Config
|
||||
m, limiter, ledger := params.Metrics, params.Limiter, params.Ledger
|
||||
processLog, alertQueue := params.ProcessLog, params.Alerts
|
||||
|
||||
params.Lists = reputation.New(reputation.Params{
|
||||
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs,
|
||||
Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
|
||||
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
|
||||
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
params.DNSBL = reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
|
||||
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones,
|
||||
Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver,
|
||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
params.AbuseIPDB = reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
||||
URL: abuseIPDBCheckURL,
|
||||
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
||||
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
||||
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||
BlacklistURL: abuseIPDBBlacklistURL,
|
||||
Threshold: cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||
BlacklistRefresh: cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||
Blacklisted: func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||
waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||
cfg, ledger, processLog, params.Now(), listed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
||||
params.RouteWatch = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
|
||||
URL: cfg.RouteWatchURL,
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
params.GeoJS = geojs.New(geojs.Params{
|
||||
URL: geojsURL,
|
||||
Answered: func(answer geojs.Answer) {
|
||||
waf.AddLookup(cfg, limiter, ledger, answer)
|
||||
},
|
||||
Now: params.Now,
|
||||
Asked: m.GeoJSRequests.Inc,
|
||||
Failed: func(err error, askingAgainIn time.Duration) {
|
||||
waf.GeoJSFailed(processLog, alertQueue, m, err, askingAgainIn)
|
||||
},
|
||||
WentWithoutAnswer: m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
m.AddReputation(params.Lists, params.DNSBL)
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
|
||||
m.AddAbuseIPDB(params.AbuseIPDB)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newClient returns an HTTP client that sends requests as they are made,
|
||||
// with no compression of its own.
|
||||
func newClient(t *testing.T) *http.Client {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ func (rateLimits) check(
|
||||
rq.line.BytesLimitPercent, rq.line.BytesLimitPercentSetting =
|
||||
rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
|
||||
|
||||
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
|
||||
rq.rateLimitPercent.percent)
|
||||
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(
|
||||
clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
now,
|
||||
rq.rateLimitPercent.percent,
|
||||
)
|
||||
rq.line.Counts = counts
|
||||
|
||||
if !over {
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +62,7 @@ func (rateLimits) check(
|
||||
// limit. It counts nothing.
|
||||
func (rq *request) overAWholeRateLimit(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
return rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
|
||||
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now)
|
||||
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client), now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
|
||||
// GeoJS.
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
|
||||
server.GeoJS.Load([]geojs.Answer{
|
||||
keptAnswer(client, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,8 +36,11 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
|
||||
cfg.RefusalsLimitPerMinute)
|
||||
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(
|
||||
clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
now,
|
||||
cfg.RefusalsLimitPerMinute,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if !over {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
package waf
|
||||
|
||||
// What the reputation heuristics share: blocklists, crowdsec, dnsbl and
|
||||
// abuseipdb.
|
||||
// What the reputation heuristics share: blocklists, dnsbl and abuseipdb.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
|
||||
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
|
||||
Host: rq.site,
|
||||
Client: rq.client,
|
||||
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
Netblock: clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
|
||||
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
|
||||
Country: rq.line.Country,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -822,22 +822,39 @@ const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource
|
||||
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
|
||||
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
|
||||
|
||||
// abuseIPDBBlacklistURL is where newWAF has AbuseIPDB's blacklist fetched
|
||||
// from: at abuseIPDBStandIn too.
|
||||
const abuseIPDBBlacklistURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||
|
||||
// abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that gives every client the
|
||||
// score 100, at once and without the network.
|
||||
// score 100, at once and without the network. Its blacklist lists client
|
||||
// alone, with the score 100, to a fetch with accountKey that asks for the
|
||||
// clients scored 90 or more, the default threshold; it refuses any other
|
||||
// fetch of it with 400.
|
||||
type abuseIPDBStandIn struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// RoundTrip answers req with the score 100.
|
||||
// RoundTrip answers req with the score 100, or with the blacklist.
|
||||
func (abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(
|
||||
req *http.Request,
|
||||
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||
status, body := http.StatusOK, `{"data":{"abuseConfidenceScore":100}}`
|
||||
|
||||
if req.URL.Path == "/api/v2/blacklist" {
|
||||
body = `{"data":[{"ipAddress":"` + client +
|
||||
`","abuseConfidenceScore":100}]}`
|
||||
|
||||
if req.Header.Get("Key") != accountKey ||
|
||||
req.URL.RawQuery != "confidenceMinimum=90" {
|
||||
status, body = http.StatusBadRequest, `{"errors":[]}`
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &http.Response{
|
||||
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
|
||||
Status: "200 OK",
|
||||
StatusCode: status,
|
||||
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
|
||||
Header: http.Header{},
|
||||
Body: io.NopCloser(
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"data":{"abuseConfidenceScore":100}}`),
|
||||
),
|
||||
Request: req,
|
||||
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
||||
Request: req,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+54
-18
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/geojs"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ type decision struct {
|
||||
// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
|
||||
// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
|
||||
lookedUp bool
|
||||
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
|
||||
lookupAnswer geojs.Answer
|
||||
// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
|
||||
// found no answer kept. SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
|
||||
// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ type request struct {
|
||||
checked time.Time
|
||||
// refused is what the request was refused with, nil if it was not.
|
||||
refused *refusal
|
||||
// findings is what the heuristics of besideLookup found of the request,
|
||||
// once waf has taken it, and nil before.
|
||||
findings *besideLookupFindings
|
||||
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
|
||||
requestBytes int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ func (h *handler) startRequest(
|
||||
RequestID: requestID(r, isQuestion),
|
||||
PeerIP: peer.String(),
|
||||
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
|
||||
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
|
||||
ClientGroup: clientGroup(h.config, client).String(),
|
||||
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
|
||||
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(
|
||||
r,
|
||||
@@ -177,9 +180,9 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
|
||||
// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
|
||||
// the request through. The heuristics of checkClient decide: a request they
|
||||
// refuse is answered with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
|
||||
// Rule Set, or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused,
|
||||
// and the log line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the
|
||||
// request's own context.
|
||||
// Rule Set, 503 for heuristics that ran out of time, or 414 or 431 for the
|
||||
// header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log line names
|
||||
// what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
|
||||
v := rq.checkClient(ctx)
|
||||
if v == nil {
|
||||
@@ -196,6 +199,13 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
|
||||
case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
|
||||
action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
|
||||
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
|
||||
case action == requestlog.ActionChecksTimedOut:
|
||||
return &refusal{
|
||||
status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
|
||||
action: action,
|
||||
}
|
||||
case action == requestlog.ActionRequestLineTooLong:
|
||||
return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestURITooLong, action: action}
|
||||
case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
|
||||
return &refusal{
|
||||
status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge,
|
||||
@@ -206,11 +216,16 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkClient runs the heuristics of beforeLookup on the request, then looks
|
||||
// up the client's AS number and country, then runs those of afterLookup. It
|
||||
// returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
|
||||
// own context.
|
||||
// checkClient runs the heuristics on the request, and returns the first
|
||||
// verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them
|
||||
// all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's own context.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The heuristics of beforeLookup run first. Then the client's AS number and
|
||||
// country are looked up, and afterLookup runs once the lookup has its result.
|
||||
// While the lookup waits for GeoJS, besideLookup runs too, as runBesideLookup
|
||||
// says. A lookup that needs no wait is done, and afterLookup with it, before
|
||||
// besideLookup starts, so that besideLookup does no work for a request
|
||||
// afterLookup refuses.
|
||||
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
|
||||
if isInside(rq.client, rq.h.config.AllowNets) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
@@ -223,7 +238,28 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
|
||||
lookedUp := rq.startLookUp(ctx, now)
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case result := <-lookedUp:
|
||||
v := rq.runAfterLookup(ctx, result)
|
||||
if v != nil {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rq.runBesideLookup(ctx, nil)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return rq.runBesideLookup(ctx, lookedUp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runAfterLookup notes result, the lookup's, and runs the heuristics of
|
||||
// afterLookup. It returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. ctx is
|
||||
// the request's own context.
|
||||
func (rq *request) runAfterLookup(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, result lookupResult,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
rq.noteLookup(result)
|
||||
|
||||
// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
|
||||
// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
|
||||
@@ -329,7 +365,7 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(
|
||||
rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
rq.h.now(),
|
||||
request,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -337,7 +373,7 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
|
||||
|
||||
answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
|
||||
if found {
|
||||
rq.h.addLookup(answer)
|
||||
AddLookup(rq.h.config, rq.h.limiter, rq.h.ledger, answer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -358,7 +394,7 @@ func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
|
||||
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
|
||||
Host: rq.site,
|
||||
Client: rq.client,
|
||||
ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
ClientGroup: clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
ASN: answer.ASN,
|
||||
ASName: answer.ASName,
|
||||
Country: answer.Country,
|
||||
@@ -380,16 +416,16 @@ func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.WAF) bool {
|
||||
// answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
|
||||
// lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
|
||||
// by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
|
||||
func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
|
||||
func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (geojs.Answer, bool) {
|
||||
if !rq.lookedUp {
|
||||
return lookup.Answer{}, false
|
||||
return geojs.Answer{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
|
||||
return rq.lookupAnswer, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
|
||||
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// responseWriter is waf's answer to a request. It notes the status and
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ const (
|
||||
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
|
||||
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
|
||||
// instance is the SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
|
||||
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
|
||||
instance = "host1/blog"
|
||||
// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
|
||||
// limits count it as.
|
||||
ipv6Client = "2001:db8::7"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func (routeWatchTags) check(
|
||||
|
||||
route, missing := rq.h.routeWatch.Route(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
|
||||
clientGroup(rq.h.config, rq.client),
|
||||
rq.client,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if missing != "" {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
|
||||
// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
|
||||
// ruleFiles takes the rules of the rule files the request matched, which
|
||||
// findBesideLookup found, notes their ids in the log line, adds the tag
|
||||
// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
|
||||
// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
|
||||
// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func (ruleFiles) check(
|
||||
rq *request,
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
|
||||
matched := rq.findings.rules
|
||||
|
||||
for _, rule := range matched {
|
||||
rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
|
||||
@@ -70,3 +70,15 @@ func (ruleFiles) check(
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// refusedByRule reports whether ruleFiles refuses a request that matched
|
||||
// matched: whether the last of them is a block rule or a ban rule.
|
||||
func refusedByRule(matched []rules.Rule) bool {
|
||||
if len(matched) == 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
action := matched[len(matched)-1].Action
|
||||
|
||||
return action == rules.ActionBlock || action == rules.ActionBan
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
|
||||
// path rule sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is one
|
||||
// of them. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
|
||||
// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS, as trapPath
|
||||
// finds it. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
|
||||
// it bans the client's netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the
|
||||
// ban it would have made. The ban's notes give the path as sent, and so does
|
||||
// its figure.
|
||||
@@ -26,9 +25,8 @@ func (trapPaths) check(
|
||||
rq *request,
|
||||
now time.Time,
|
||||
) *verdict {
|
||||
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
|
||||
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
|
||||
!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
|
||||
path := rq.findings.trapPath
|
||||
if path == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,3 +37,16 @@ func (trapPaths) check(
|
||||
figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// trapPath returns the request's path as sent, when its path as a path rule
|
||||
// sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is in
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS, and "" otherwise.
|
||||
func (rq *request) trapPath() string {
|
||||
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
|
||||
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
|
||||
!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return path
|
||||
}
|
||||
+4
-7
@@ -146,18 +146,15 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
|
||||
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
|
||||
// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
|
||||
// its client: the heuristic crowdsec, blocklists or rate_limits will refuse it,
|
||||
// as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode, which refuses
|
||||
// its client: the heuristic blocklists or rate_limits will refuse it, as a
|
||||
// function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode, which refuses
|
||||
// nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when waf answers too late.
|
||||
func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
if rq.h.config.Observe {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
|
||||
|
||||
return decided ||
|
||||
rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
|
||||
return rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
|
||||
rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +320,7 @@ func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is true, the client's AS number and country.
|
||||
func (rq *request) allow() {
|
||||
rq.allowed = true
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ func TestAllowCarriesTheLookupHeadersWhileTheSettingIsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wantASN, wantCountry string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{on, "AS64496", "DE"},
|
||||
{"false", "", ""},
|
||||
{falseValue, "", ""},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
@@ -1690,7 +1690,12 @@ func TestALargeBodyAnnouncedAndLongHeadersAreNoReasonToRefuse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader("a body"))
|
||||
req.Header.Set(waf.ContentLengthHeader, "1073741824")
|
||||
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, otherClient)
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Long", strings.Repeat("x", 40<<10))
|
||||
|
||||
// 40,000 bytes of headers, over rproxy's 32 KiB, in lines within the
|
||||
// header limits.
|
||||
for i := range 5 {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Long-"+strconv.Itoa(i), strings.Repeat("x", 8000))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got := do(t, req)
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
|
||||
@@ -1782,7 +1787,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetReadsTheBodyAQuestionCarries(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "64K",
|
||||
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: "8K",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
ask := func(contentType, body string) answer {
|
||||
@@ -1797,10 +1802,10 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetReadsTheBodyAQuestionCarries(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
got := ask(formData, "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1")
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny)
|
||||
|
||||
// The first 64 KiB of a longer JSON body cannot be parsed, which is no
|
||||
// The first 8 KiB of a longer JSON body cannot be parsed, which is no
|
||||
// attack, so the Core Rule Set does not read it.
|
||||
cut := `{"text":"` + strings.Repeat("x", waf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes)
|
||||
got = ask("application/json", cut[:waf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes])
|
||||
cut := `{"text":"` + strings.Repeat("x", 8<<10)
|
||||
got = ask("application/json", cut)
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,8 +20,13 @@ main() {
|
||||
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
|
||||
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
|
||||
revision="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "$revision" ] || revision="unknown"
|
||||
created="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
|
||||
docker build --no-cache \
|
||||
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
|
||||
--build-arg REVISION="$revision" \
|
||||
--build-arg CREATED="$created" \
|
||||
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,8 +16,13 @@ main() {
|
||||
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
|
||||
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
|
||||
revision="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "$revision" ] || revision="unknown"
|
||||
created="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
|
||||
docker build --no-cache \
|
||||
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
|
||||
--build-arg REVISION="$revision" \
|
||||
--build-arg CREATED="$created" \
|
||||
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-6
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
|
||||
# script/publish: build the image on the Docker host and push it to the
|
||||
# registry under four tags: the UTC date (YYYY-MM-DD), the short commit
|
||||
# hash, the branch name and latest. The build is script/docker's, so the
|
||||
# tests and the linter run first. The host and the registry name are
|
||||
# environment variables with defaults, for running it against another.
|
||||
# tests and the linter run first. DOCKER_HOST names the Docker host and
|
||||
# PUBLISH_IMAGE the image in the registry. Both must be set; neither has
|
||||
# a default.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The working tree must be clean: the hash tag names a commit, and an
|
||||
# image built from uncommitted changes would carry a hash that does not
|
||||
@@ -13,11 +14,16 @@ set -eu
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
|
||||
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
|
||||
|
||||
: "${DOCKER_HOST:=ssh://root@fsn1app1}"
|
||||
: "${PUBLISH_IMAGE:=git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf}"
|
||||
export DOCKER_HOST
|
||||
|
||||
main() {
|
||||
if [ -z "${DOCKER_HOST:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "script/publish: DOCKER_HOST is not set; set it to the Docker host that builds the image, such as ssh://user@build.example.com" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -z "${PUBLISH_IMAGE:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "script/publish: PUBLISH_IMAGE is not set; set it to the image name in the registry, such as registry.example.com/smallwebwaf" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cd "$ROOT"
|
||||
|
||||
# Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user