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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sneak
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790f5df069 | ||
 clawbot
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@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
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- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
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- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
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or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
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hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
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- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
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- R7: AS number lookup
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@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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## Verdict
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
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number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
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closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
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The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
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directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
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libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
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detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
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reimplementing them.
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
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scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
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tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
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or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
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`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
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The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
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reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
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- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
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- DNSBLs
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- AbuseIPDB
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- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
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Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
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blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
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Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
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- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
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limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
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it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
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database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
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Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
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sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
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- Fails:
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- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
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- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature.
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- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
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- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
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container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
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all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
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- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
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one app. AGPL-3.0.
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- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
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the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
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- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
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@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
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it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
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answers 429.
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- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
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acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
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for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
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- Fails:
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- R10, because it needs:
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- the security engine container with persistent state
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- log acquisition from traefik
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- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
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- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
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- R4's alerts on bytes.
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- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
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with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
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by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
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reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
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windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
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configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
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one sidecar's environment.
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reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
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the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
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in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
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three middlewares per router.
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## Candidate by candidate
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@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
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central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
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- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
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- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
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labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
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- Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
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- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
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container.
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- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
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catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
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@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
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semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
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- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
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challenge, authentication gate.
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challenge, authentication in front of the app.
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- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
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messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
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(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
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@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
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- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
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runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
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successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
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successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
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- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
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`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
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`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
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@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
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- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
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Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
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paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
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paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
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ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
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- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
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- Misses: R1 to R8.
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@@ -152,8 +164,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
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- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
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proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
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scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
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code forge.
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scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
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public code forge.
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- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
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difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
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IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
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@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
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(allowlist). Nothing else.
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- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
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plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
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shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
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plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
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one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
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- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
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- Traefik built-in middlewares
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- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
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in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
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or AS number awareness.
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lookups or AS number lookups.
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- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
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- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
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and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
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@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- open-appsec (Check Point)
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- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
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a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
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rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
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required sense.
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rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
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existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
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- iocaine
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- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
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scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
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curiosity for scraper traffic.
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scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
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passing interest for scraper traffic.
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- Pangolin
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- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
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Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
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@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
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- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
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- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
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- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
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anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
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- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
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not both by history.
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- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
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on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
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- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
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fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
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- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
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- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
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deny), Anubis (hosted service).
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- R8 biased thresholds: none.
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- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
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first).
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
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or ModSecurity).
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- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
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None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
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@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
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It protects against:
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- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
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requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
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room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
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one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
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a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
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it keeps at it.
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requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
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leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
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keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
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for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
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when it keeps at it.
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- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
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default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
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during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
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@@ -210,6 +210,10 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
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- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
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setting takes it.
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- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
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app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
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`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
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a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
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- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
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variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
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on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
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@@ -217,7 +221,7 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
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| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
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| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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@@ -226,8 +230,8 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
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| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
|
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@@ -236,24 +240,24 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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||||
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
@@ -261,6 +265,7 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
@@ -311,27 +316,27 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
|
||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
@@ -527,8 +532,9 @@ of the request reaches the app.
|
||||
|
||||
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
|
||||
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
|
||||
and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
|
||||
bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
|
||||
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
|
||||
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
|
||||
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
|
||||
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
|
||||
@@ -562,7 +568,9 @@ the `tags` field of its log line:
|
||||
or `vpn=mullvad`;
|
||||
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
|
||||
the client;
|
||||
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request.
|
||||
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request;
|
||||
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>`, from a routewatch instance, while
|
||||
`SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set.
|
||||
|
||||
`SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses requests by tag, and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers a
|
||||
client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
|
||||
key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
|
||||
- It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
|
||||
restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
|
||||
the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
|
||||
bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
|
||||
and permanently when they keep at it.
|
||||
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
|
||||
@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
|
||||
around its address, a /64 by default, since one abuser usually controls a
|
||||
whole /64. A client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group.
|
||||
3. The tag lists (`tag_lists`; see "Request tags"). Each list that holds the
|
||||
client adds its tag. A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` gets no tag.
|
||||
client adds its tag. Next, `routewatch_tags` adds the client's `asn=` and
|
||||
`prefix=` tags while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. A client in
|
||||
`SWW_ALLOW_NETS` gets no tag.
|
||||
4. The static lists. A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 5 to 15, the byte
|
||||
limits and the error burst. A client in `SWW_DENY_NETS` is refused
|
||||
(`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through.
|
||||
@@ -154,8 +156,8 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
|
||||
up to `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, only when one of these needs it:
|
||||
- the country list;
|
||||
- a biased threshold;
|
||||
- `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or `country=`
|
||||
tag;
|
||||
- `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag, or an
|
||||
`asn=` tag while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
|
||||
- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`.
|
||||
|
||||
A request that ends before the answer comes is logged without it.
|
||||
@@ -192,11 +194,12 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
|
||||
sent is removed.
|
||||
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
|
||||
report"). `discriminator` then counts:
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
|
||||
are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
|
||||
WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
|
||||
total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
|
||||
is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
|
||||
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For
|
||||
a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
|
||||
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
|
||||
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
|
||||
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
|
||||
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
|
||||
clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
|
||||
- A broken limit, one of:
|
||||
- a request over a rate limit;
|
||||
- a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
|
||||
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
|
||||
past a byte limit;
|
||||
- more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
|
||||
|
||||
The bans for a broken limit:
|
||||
@@ -448,10 +452,15 @@ the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
### Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
|
||||
speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
|
||||
allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
|
||||
it ends (see step 18).
|
||||
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
|
||||
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
|
||||
What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
|
||||
sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
|
||||
added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
|
||||
request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
|
||||
the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
|
||||
client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
|
||||
and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
|
||||
|
||||
### Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -547,6 +556,19 @@ Each tag and where it comes from:
|
||||
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request.
|
||||
For the Core Rule Set a match is a score at or over
|
||||
`SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`.
|
||||
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from a routewatch instance
|
||||
(`routewatch_tags`), while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
|
||||
- The tag `prefix=` holds the netblock the client's address is announced in,
|
||||
such as `prefix=192.0.2.0/24`.
|
||||
- An `asn=` tag has the same spelling as the lookup's. A request carries it
|
||||
once, and carries both when the two sources disagree.
|
||||
- These tags come before `deny_nets`, so a line that check refused has them.
|
||||
- `discriminator` asks routewatch in the background and never waits for it.
|
||||
An answer is kept for 1 hour, in memory only.
|
||||
- After a query fails, routewatch is not asked for 1 minute.
|
||||
- A request without these tags gives the reason in the log field
|
||||
`routewatch_tags_missing` (see
|
||||
[`docs/request-log.md`](docs/request-log.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips the checks and gets no tag. Every tag is in
|
||||
lower case, except a country code, which is in capitals. `SWW_TAG_DENY` and
|
||||
@@ -953,7 +975,8 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
|
||||
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
|
||||
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
|
||||
|
||||
- Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
|
||||
minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- a client;
|
||||
- the surrounding netblock;
|
||||
- an AS number;
|
||||
@@ -1263,9 +1286,9 @@ short.
|
||||
### Answering in time
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
|
||||
`discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
|
||||
and whatever its outside sources do.
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question
|
||||
waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds,
|
||||
well within that time.
|
||||
|
||||
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
|
||||
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
|
||||
@@ -1361,9 +1384,9 @@ answer.
|
||||
For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
|
||||
"The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
|
||||
|
||||
- counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
|
||||
the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client that passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits
|
||||
at the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
|
||||
and the metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
|
||||
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
|
||||
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
|
||||
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
|
||||
|
||||
## Traffic
|
||||
|
||||
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-6
@@ -145,20 +145,22 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
|
||||
holds:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
|
||||
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
|
||||
|
||||
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
|
||||
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
|
||||
request's.
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
|
||||
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
|
||||
three byte totals leave them out.
|
||||
|
||||
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
|
||||
- `error_burst`.
|
||||
|
||||
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
|
||||
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
|
||||
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
|
||||
`report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
|
||||
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
|
||||
refused.
|
||||
@@ -171,6 +173,12 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
- `abuseipdb`.
|
||||
- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
|
||||
where it comes from is under "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
|
||||
- `routewatch_tags_missing`: why the request got no tags from routewatch,
|
||||
present only while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
|
||||
- `no_answer_yet`: routewatch has not answered about this client yet;
|
||||
- `request_failed`: a query to routewatch failed within the last minute, and
|
||||
the process log says why;
|
||||
- `no_route`: routewatch knows no live route for the address.
|
||||
- `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
|
||||
- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
|
||||
refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
|
||||
|
||||
+31
-8
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Request rate limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
|
||||
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
|
||||
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
|
||||
@@ -120,11 +122,22 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
|
||||
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
|
||||
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
|
||||
cut off; the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
|
||||
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
|
||||
counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
|
||||
`response`, `request` or `both`.
|
||||
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
|
||||
which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
|
||||
passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
|
||||
ends.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
|
||||
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
|
||||
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -173,11 +186,19 @@ Every request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client. See
|
||||
`exploitsignature`: a request gets that tag after the rate limits have counted
|
||||
it.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
|
||||
routewatch instance. `discriminator` asks it about each client, in the
|
||||
background, and adds the tags `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from its
|
||||
answer. While it is unset, nothing asks routewatch and no request gets a
|
||||
`prefix=` tag.
|
||||
|
||||
`SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` accept tags in either case. A tag
|
||||
that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
|
||||
|
||||
- a name in `SWW_TAG_LISTS`;
|
||||
- an `asn=` or `country=` tag;
|
||||
- a `prefix=` tag with a netblock, while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. It matches
|
||||
only that exact announced netblock, such as `prefix=192.0.2.0/24`;
|
||||
- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
|
||||
masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
|
||||
- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
|
||||
@@ -233,8 +254,9 @@ the request first.
|
||||
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
|
||||
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
|
||||
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
|
||||
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
|
||||
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
|
||||
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Ban lengths, response and scope
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -311,9 +333,10 @@ the request first.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anomaly thresholds
|
||||
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
|
||||
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
|
||||
default. The four thresholds per client are:
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
|
||||
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
|
||||
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
|
||||
thresholds per client are:
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ since it was first seen:
|
||||
- the first and last time seen;
|
||||
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
|
||||
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
|
||||
- bytes in each direction;
|
||||
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
|
||||
- responses by status class;
|
||||
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
|
||||
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"math"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +107,9 @@ type Config struct {
|
||||
TagLists []TagList
|
||||
TagDeny []string
|
||||
TagLimitPercent map[string]int64
|
||||
// RouteWatchURL is where the routewatch instance is that adds the asn=
|
||||
// and prefix= tags, "" for none (SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL).
|
||||
RouteWatchURL string
|
||||
// The biased thresholds. ASNBytesPercent and CountryBytesPercent give
|
||||
// those they list a percentage of the byte limits in place of the one
|
||||
// TagLimitPercent gives their asn= or country= tag
|
||||
@@ -475,6 +479,8 @@ var (
|
||||
"is not a tag, : and a percentage, such as vpn:50 or asn=14061:25")
|
||||
errNotTagPercent = errors.New("is not a percentage from 1 to 99")
|
||||
errNotASNTag = errors.New("is not asn= and a number, such as asn=14061")
|
||||
errNotPrefixTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not prefix= and a netblock, such as prefix=192.0.2.0/24")
|
||||
errExploitTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"cannot lower limits: the rate limits count a request before its " +
|
||||
"rules are matched")
|
||||
@@ -483,8 +489,9 @@ var (
|
||||
errNoRequestGetsTag = errors.New(
|
||||
"is a tag no request can get: it is not a name in SWW_TAG_LISTS, an " +
|
||||
"asn= or country= tag, a dnsbl= tag of a zone in SWW_DNSBL_ZONES, " +
|
||||
"abuseipdb with SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY set, or exploitsignature with " +
|
||||
"rule files or the Core Rule Set on")
|
||||
"a prefix= tag with SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL set, abuseipdb with " +
|
||||
"SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY set, or exploitsignature with rule files or the " +
|
||||
"Core Rule Set on")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
|
||||
@@ -524,6 +531,7 @@ func FromEnvironment(
|
||||
TagLists: env.tagLists("SWW_TAG_LISTS"),
|
||||
TagDeny: env.tags("SWW_TAG_DENY"),
|
||||
TagLimitPercent: env.tagPercents("SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
|
||||
RouteWatchURL: env.listURL("SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"),
|
||||
ASNBytesPercent: env.percents("SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT", ParseASN),
|
||||
CountryBytesPercent: env.percents("SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT", parseCountry),
|
||||
UnknownLimitPercent: env.percent("SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT", "100"),
|
||||
@@ -1064,14 +1072,21 @@ func (e *environment) checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg *Config) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// routewatch gives asn= tags too.
|
||||
onlyLookupGives := func(tag string) bool {
|
||||
return isLookupTag(tag) &&
|
||||
(cfg.RouteWatchURL == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(tag, ASNTagPrefix))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, setting := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
set bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", len(cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0},
|
||||
{"SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", cfg.AddLookupHeaders},
|
||||
{"SWW_TAG_DENY", slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagDeny, isLookupTag)},
|
||||
{"SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", tagLimitNeedsLookups(cfg)},
|
||||
{"SWW_TAG_DENY", slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagDeny, onlyLookupGives)},
|
||||
{"SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", slices.ContainsFunc(
|
||||
slices.Collect(maps.Keys(cfg.TagLimitPercent)), onlyLookupGives)},
|
||||
{"SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT", len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0},
|
||||
{"SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT", len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0},
|
||||
{"SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT", cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < 100},
|
||||
@@ -1171,6 +1186,10 @@ func requestCanGetTag(cfg *Config, tag string) bool {
|
||||
return cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(tag, PrefixTagPrefix) {
|
||||
return cfg.RouteWatchURL != ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
zone, isZoneTag := strings.CutPrefix(tag, DNSBLTagPrefix)
|
||||
|
||||
return isZoneTag && slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.DNSBLZones, func(each string) bool {
|
||||
@@ -1923,6 +1942,7 @@ const (
|
||||
ASNTagPrefix = "asn="
|
||||
CountryTagPrefix = "country="
|
||||
DNSBLTagPrefix = "dnsbl="
|
||||
PrefixTagPrefix = "prefix="
|
||||
AbuseIPDBTag = "abuseipdb"
|
||||
CrowdSecTag = "crowdsec"
|
||||
// ExploitSignatureTag is the tag of a request a rule file or the Core
|
||||
@@ -1999,9 +2019,10 @@ func parseTags(value string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
|
||||
// parseTag reads a tag in either case, with spaces around it, and returns it
|
||||
// as a request carries it: in lower case, but for a country code, which is in
|
||||
// capitals, and an asn= tag's number without leading zeros. An asn= or
|
||||
// country= tag must name a number or a country, so that a mistyped one stops
|
||||
// the start instead of never matching.
|
||||
// capitals, an asn= tag's number without leading zeros, and a prefix= tag's
|
||||
// netblock as routewatch writes it. An asn=, country= or prefix= tag must name
|
||||
// a number, a country or a netblock, so that a mistyped one stops the start
|
||||
// instead of never matching.
|
||||
func parseTag(value string) (string, error) {
|
||||
tag := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2023,6 +2044,15 @@ func parseTag(value string) (string, error) {
|
||||
return CountryTagPrefix + country, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if text, isPrefix := strings.CutPrefix(tag, PrefixTagPrefix); isPrefix {
|
||||
netblock, err := netip.ParsePrefix(text)
|
||||
if err != nil || netblock != netblock.Masked() {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotPrefixTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return PrefixTagPrefix + netblock.String(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return tag, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const (
|
||||
reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
|
||||
reputationCacheTTL = "SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
|
||||
reputationTimeout = "SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
|
||||
routeWatchURL = "SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
|
||||
crowdSecURL = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
|
||||
crowdSecKey = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
|
||||
banResponse = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
|
||||
@@ -1403,6 +1404,54 @@ func TestTagSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouteWatchURLAndPrefixTags(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const rw = "https://routewatch.example"
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{}); cfg.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("default %s is %q, want unset", routeWatchURL, cfg.RouteWatchURL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=2001:DB8::/32",
|
||||
tagLimitPercent: "prefix=192.0.2.0/24:50",
|
||||
})
|
||||
wantDeny := []string{"prefix=2001:db8::/32"}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.RouteWatchURL != rw || !slices.Equal(cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny) ||
|
||||
cfg.TagLimitPercent["prefix=192.0.2.0/24"] != 50 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("gave %q, %v, %v", cfg.RouteWatchURL, cfg.TagDeny, cfg.TagLimitPercent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// routewatch gives asn= tags too, so an asn= tag needs no lookups while it is set.
|
||||
fromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "asn=64496",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for _, stopped := range []struct {
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
name string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{environment{routeWatchURL: "ftp://routewatch.example"}, routeWatchURL},
|
||||
{environment{routeWatchURL: "routewatch.example"}, routeWatchURL},
|
||||
{environment{tagDeny: "prefix=192.0.2.0/24"}, tagDeny},
|
||||
{environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=nowhere"}, tagDeny},
|
||||
{environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=192.0.2.5/24"}, tagDeny},
|
||||
{
|
||||
environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagLimitPercent: "prefix=192.0.2.0/33:50"},
|
||||
tagLimitPercent,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{environment{lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "country=DE"}, tagDeny},
|
||||
{environment{lookupSource: off, tagDeny: "asn=64496"}, tagDeny},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(stopped.env.lookupEnv)
|
||||
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), stopped.name+": ") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%v gave the error %v, want one naming %s", stopped.env, err, stopped.name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2503,6 +2552,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
reputationAction: "limit:25",
|
||||
reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||
reputationTimeout: "2s",
|
||||
routeWatchURL: "",
|
||||
crowdSecURL: "",
|
||||
crowdSecKey: "",
|
||||
banResponse: "403",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
|
||||
Lists: h.lists,
|
||||
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
|
||||
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
|
||||
RouteWatch: h.routeWatch,
|
||||
Metrics: h.metrics,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ const (
|
||||
func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
|
||||
return []heuristic{
|
||||
tagLists{},
|
||||
routeWatchTags{},
|
||||
denyNets{},
|
||||
activeBan{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
// Server is the server discriminator runs, with the parts whose state the state
|
||||
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
|
||||
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
|
||||
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics. RouteWatch, nil while
|
||||
// SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset, keeps its answers in memory only.
|
||||
type Server struct {
|
||||
*http.Server
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
Lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
|
||||
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
RouteWatch *routewatch.Client
|
||||
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,6 +155,12 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
|
||||
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
|
||||
alerts: params.Alerts,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if params.Config.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
||||
h.routeWatch = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
|
||||
URL: params.Config.RouteWatchURL, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
|
||||
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
|
||||
Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
|
||||
@@ -255,6 +264,7 @@ type handler struct {
|
||||
lists *reputation.Lists
|
||||
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
|
||||
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
|
||||
routeWatch *routewatch.Client
|
||||
rules *rules.Files
|
||||
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
|
||||
alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
package discriminator
|
||||
|
||||
// The heuristic routewatch_tags. It reads SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// routeWatchTags adds to the request the tags asn=<number> and prefix=<netblock>
|
||||
// from what routewatch answered about the client. It refuses nothing, and the
|
||||
// request does not wait for routewatch. A request that gets no tags from it has
|
||||
// the reason in the log line's routewatch_tags_missing. While SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL
|
||||
// is unset it does nothing. Answers are kept by client and asked for by the
|
||||
// request's address, and a route without an origin AS gives only the prefix= tag.
|
||||
type routeWatchTags struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (routeWatchTags) name() string { return "routewatch_tags" }
|
||||
|
||||
func (routeWatchTags) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
|
||||
if rq.h.routeWatch == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
route, missing := rq.h.routeWatch.Route(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.client)
|
||||
if missing != "" {
|
||||
rq.line.RouteWatchTagsMissing = string(missing)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rq.addTag(config.PrefixTagPrefix + route.Netblock.String())
|
||||
|
||||
if route.ASN != 0 {
|
||||
rq.addTag(config.ASNTagPrefix + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(route.ASN), 10))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
|
||||
package discriminator_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// routeWatchURL is SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL, and tagsMissing the log line's field
|
||||
// that says why a request got no tags from routewatch.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
routeWatchURL = "SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
|
||||
tagsMissing = "routewatch_tags_missing"
|
||||
fromV6 = "2001:db8:1::5"
|
||||
prefixV6 = "2001:db8::/32"
|
||||
prefixDE = "203.0.113.0/24"
|
||||
prefixKP = "198.51.100.0/24"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// standInRoute is what the stand-in for routewatch answers about an address.
|
||||
type standInRoute struct {
|
||||
Netblock string `json:"netblock"`
|
||||
ASN int `json:"asn"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// startRouteWatch starts a stand-in for routewatch's IP info API that knows the
|
||||
// routes given by address, and returns its URL.
|
||||
func startRouteWatch(t *testing.T, routes map[string]standInRoute) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
address := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/ip/")
|
||||
|
||||
result := map[string]any{"ip": address}
|
||||
if route, known := routes[address]; known {
|
||||
result["netblock"], result["asn"] = route.Netblock, route.ASN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
|
||||
"status": "ok",
|
||||
"data": map[string]any{"results": []any{result}},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
return server.URL
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// waitForRouteWatch waits until routewatch's answer about from, in the client
|
||||
// group of the given length, is kept, so that the next request gets its tags.
|
||||
func waitForRouteWatch(
|
||||
t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, from string, bits int,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(from)
|
||||
client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits).Masked()
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
_, missing := server.RouteWatch.Route(context.Background(), client, addr)
|
||||
if missing == "" {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("routewatch's answer about %s not kept: %q", from, missing)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func wantTagsMissing(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
|
||||
if got != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("log line has %s %q, want %q", tagsMissing, got, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnTheLogLineWithTheLookupsTags(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}})
|
||||
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{routeWatchURL: url})
|
||||
|
||||
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "country=DE", "prefix="+prefixDE)
|
||||
wantTagsMissing(t, line, "")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnALineDenyNetsRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511}})
|
||||
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, denyNets: fromKP,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
|
||||
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+fromKP+`/32"}`)
|
||||
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "prefix="+prefixKP)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnsetRouteWatchChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: off})
|
||||
|
||||
if server.RouteWatch != nil {
|
||||
t.Error("RouteWatch is set while SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
if _, present := line.fields[tagsMissing]; present {
|
||||
t.Errorf("log line has %s", tagsMissing)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
|
||||
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v", line.fields["tags"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnreachableRouteWatchLetsTheRequestThroughAndSaysWhy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
// A stand-in that is closed at once, so that the port refuses connections.
|
||||
dead := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
|
||||
url := dead.URL
|
||||
|
||||
dead.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
wantTagsMissing(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
|
||||
"no_answer_yet")
|
||||
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
|
||||
missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
|
||||
if missing == "request_failed" {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("still %q, want request_failed", missing)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAddressWithoutARouteHasNoTagsAndTheLineSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: startRouteWatch(t, nil),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
|
||||
missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
|
||||
if missing == "no_route" {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("still %q, want no_route", missing)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTagDenyRefusesOnARouteWatchPrefix(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{
|
||||
fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}, fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511},
|
||||
})
|
||||
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, tagDeny: "prefix=" + prefixKP,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
|
||||
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
|
||||
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "prefix=`+prefixKP+`"}`)
|
||||
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTagLimitPercentWorksWithAnIPv6Prefix(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromV6: {prefixV6, 64496}})
|
||||
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
|
||||
tagLimitPercent: "prefix=" + prefixV6 + ":50",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromV6, 64)
|
||||
|
||||
// Half of two is one: the second request breaks the limit.
|
||||
line := s.get(fromV6, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "prefix="+prefixV6)
|
||||
s.get(fromV6, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -182,6 +182,10 @@ type Line struct {
|
||||
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Tags are the request's tags, sorted.
|
||||
Tags []string `json:"tags,omitempty"`
|
||||
// RouteWatchTagsMissing, while SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL is set, says why the
|
||||
// request got no tags from routewatch: no_answer_yet, request_failed or
|
||||
// no_route.
|
||||
RouteWatchTagsMissing string `json:"routewatch_tags_missing,omitempty"`
|
||||
// Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit.
|
||||
Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"`
|
||||
// BanExpires is when the ban the request made, or was refused under,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
|
||||
// Package routewatch asks a routewatch instance about client addresses, in the
|
||||
// background, and keeps its answers in memory. A routewatch instance knows, for
|
||||
// an address, the netblock it is announced in and the AS that originates it.
|
||||
package routewatch
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// answerKept is how long an answer is used after it came.
|
||||
answerKept = time.Hour
|
||||
// failureKept is how long routewatch is not asked again after a query
|
||||
// fails, so that a dead routewatch is not asked on every request.
|
||||
failureKept = time.Minute
|
||||
// queryTimeout is how long one query may take.
|
||||
queryTimeout = 2 * time.Second
|
||||
// maxAnswers is how many answers are kept. Past it, the one that came
|
||||
// longest ago is dropped.
|
||||
maxAnswers = 100000
|
||||
// maxQueries is how many queries may be under way at once. Past it, a
|
||||
// client is not asked about until its next request, so that a swarm of
|
||||
// new addresses cannot fill the memory.
|
||||
maxQueries = 100
|
||||
// maxAnswerBytes is the most of an answer that is read.
|
||||
maxAnswerBytes = 64 << 10
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Missing is why Route gives no route. The request log's field
|
||||
// routewatch_tags_missing gives these values.
|
||||
type Missing string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// NoAnswerYet is a client routewatch has not answered about yet.
|
||||
NoAnswerYet Missing = "no_answer_yet"
|
||||
// RequestFailed is no answer because a recent query failed.
|
||||
RequestFailed Missing = "request_failed"
|
||||
// NoRoute is routewatch knowing no live route for the address.
|
||||
NoRoute Missing = "no_route"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
errStatus = errors.New("routewatch answered")
|
||||
errNoResult = errors.New("the answer holds no result")
|
||||
errNotNetblock = errors.New("the answer's netblock is not a netblock")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Route is what routewatch knows of an address: the netblock it is announced
|
||||
// in, and the AS that originates it.
|
||||
type Route struct {
|
||||
Netblock netip.Prefix
|
||||
ASN uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Params are what New needs.
|
||||
type Params struct {
|
||||
// URL is where routewatch is (SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL).
|
||||
URL string
|
||||
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
||||
Now func() time.Time
|
||||
// ProcessLog receives the query that fails, and why.
|
||||
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Client asks a routewatch instance about clients, in the background, and keeps
|
||||
// its answers. It is safe for concurrent use.
|
||||
type Client struct {
|
||||
params Params
|
||||
httpClient *http.Client
|
||||
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
// answers are by client. Each is added as it comes and never moved up,
|
||||
// so that the one that came longest ago is the first dropped.
|
||||
answers *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, answer]
|
||||
// asking are the clients whose query is under way.
|
||||
asking map[netip.Prefix]bool
|
||||
// retryAt is when routewatch may be asked again after a query failed.
|
||||
retryAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// answer is one kept answer: the route, or why there is none, and when it came.
|
||||
type answer struct {
|
||||
route Route
|
||||
missing Missing
|
||||
came time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New returns a Client with no answer yet.
|
||||
func New(params Params) *Client {
|
||||
answers, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, answer](maxAnswers, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &Client{
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
httpClient: &http.Client{},
|
||||
answers: answers,
|
||||
asking: map[netip.Prefix]bool{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Route returns what routewatch answered about client, an IPv4 address or an
|
||||
// IPv6 group, or why it has no route. It never waits for a query. A client
|
||||
// without an answer is asked about in the background, by addr, the address its
|
||||
// request came from, unless its query is under way, a query failed less than
|
||||
// failureKept ago, or maxQueries are under way. ctx is the context of the
|
||||
// client's request, and a query goes on after the request ends.
|
||||
func (c *Client) Route(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr,
|
||||
) (Route, Missing) {
|
||||
c.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
now := c.params.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
kept, found := c.answers.Peek(client)
|
||||
if found && now.Sub(kept.came) < answerKept {
|
||||
return kept.route, kept.missing
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if now.Before(c.retryAt) {
|
||||
return Route{}, RequestFailed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !c.asking[client] && len(c.asking) < maxQueries {
|
||||
c.asking[client] = true
|
||||
|
||||
go c.ask(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), client, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Route{}, NoAnswerYet
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ask asks routewatch about addr, keeps the answer as client's, and notes the
|
||||
// query as no longer under way. A query that fails gives no answer, and
|
||||
// routewatch is not asked again for failureKept. Only the first failure of
|
||||
// those under way is logged.
|
||||
func (c *Client) ask(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) {
|
||||
route, missing, err := c.query(ctx, addr)
|
||||
now := c.params.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
c.mu.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
delete(c.asking, client)
|
||||
|
||||
firstFailure := err != nil && !now.Before(c.retryAt)
|
||||
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
c.answers.Add(client, answer{route: route, missing: missing, came: now})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
c.retryAt = now.Add(failureKept)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if firstFailure {
|
||||
c.params.ProcessLog.Warn("asking routewatch failed", "error", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// query asks routewatch's IP info API about addr. An answer other than 200, one
|
||||
// that cannot be read, and none within queryTimeout, fail. A result with no
|
||||
// netblock is an address without a live route.
|
||||
func (c *Client) query(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) (Route, Missing, error) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, queryTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
endpoint, err := url.JoinPath(c.params.URL, "api/v1/ip", addr.String())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("make the URL: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, endpoint, http.NoBody)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Do's error names the URL, which holds the client's address, which
|
||||
// is not to be logged: only what went wrong is kept.
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("ask routewatch: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
_ = res.Body.Close()
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return readAnswer(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxAnswerBytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readAnswer reads routewatch's answer about one address.
|
||||
func readAnswer(body io.Reader) (Route, Missing, error) {
|
||||
var decoded struct {
|
||||
Data struct {
|
||||
Results []struct {
|
||||
Netblock string `json:"netblock"`
|
||||
ASN uint32 `json:"asn"`
|
||||
} `json:"results"`
|
||||
} `json:"data"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := json.NewDecoder(body).Decode(&decoded)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(decoded.Data.Results) == 0 {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", errNoResult
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result := decoded.Data.Results[0]
|
||||
if result.Netblock == "" {
|
||||
return Route{}, NoRoute, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
netblock, err := netip.ParsePrefix(result.Netblock)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Route{}, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errNotNetblock, result.Netblock)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Route{Netblock: netblock.Masked(), ASN: result.ASN}, "", nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
|
||||
package routewatch_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
clientAddr = "192.0.2.1"
|
||||
routedAnswer = `{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[` +
|
||||
`{"ip":"192.0.2.1","netblock":"192.0.2.0/24","asn":64496}]}}`
|
||||
noRouteAnswer = `{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[{"ip":"192.0.2.1"}]}}`
|
||||
waitLimit = 5 * time.Second
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// clock is a time the tests move by hand.
|
||||
type clock struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
now time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *clock) Now() time.Time {
|
||||
c.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
return c.now
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *clock) advance(by time.Duration) {
|
||||
c.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
c.now = c.now.Add(by)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fixture is a Client asking a stand-in for routewatch. queries counts what the
|
||||
// stand-in was asked, paths holds the last path it was asked for, and log holds
|
||||
// the process log.
|
||||
type fixture struct {
|
||||
t *testing.T
|
||||
client *routewatch.Client
|
||||
clk *clock
|
||||
queries *atomic.Int32
|
||||
path *atomic.Value
|
||||
log *syncBuffer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// syncBuffer is a buffer the background queries can log to while a test reads it.
|
||||
type syncBuffer struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
return b.buf.Write(p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *syncBuffer) String() string {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
return b.buf.String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFixture(t *testing.T, standIn http.HandlerFunc) *fixture {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
f := &fixture{
|
||||
t: t,
|
||||
clk: &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 11, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)},
|
||||
queries: &atomic.Int32{},
|
||||
path: &atomic.Value{},
|
||||
log: &syncBuffer{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
f.queries.Add(1)
|
||||
f.path.Store(r.URL.Path)
|
||||
standIn(w, r)
|
||||
}))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
|
||||
|
||||
f.client = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
|
||||
URL: server.URL + "/", Now: f.clk.Now,
|
||||
ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(f.log, nil)),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
return f
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func answering(body string) http.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fixture) route() (routewatch.Route, routewatch.Missing) {
|
||||
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(clientAddr)
|
||||
client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
|
||||
|
||||
return f.client.Route(context.Background(), client, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// waitFor asks until the answer is why, or, while why is "", until there is a
|
||||
// route, and returns the route.
|
||||
func (f *fixture) waitFor(why routewatch.Missing) routewatch.Route {
|
||||
f.t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
route, missing := f.route()
|
||||
if missing == why {
|
||||
return route
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
f.t.Fatalf("still %q after %s, want %q", missing, waitLimit, why)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouteGivesRoutewatchsAnswerAndAsksByAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, answering(routedAnswer))
|
||||
|
||||
if _, missing := f.route(); missing != routewatch.NoAnswerYet {
|
||||
t.Errorf("before the answer: %q, want %q", missing, routewatch.NoAnswerYet)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
route := f.waitFor("")
|
||||
|
||||
want := routewatch.Route{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"), ASN: 64496}
|
||||
if route != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("route %+v, want %+v", route, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if got := f.path.Load(); got != "/api/v1/ip/"+clientAddr {
|
||||
t.Errorf("asked for path %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAddressWithoutARouteIsKeptAsNoRoute(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, answering(noRouteAnswer))
|
||||
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
f.waitFor(routewatch.NoRoute)
|
||||
|
||||
if got := f.queries.Load(); got != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d queries, want 1", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAnswerRoutewatchCannotBeTakenFromFails(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
tests := map[string]http.HandlerFunc{
|
||||
"500": func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
},
|
||||
"not JSON": answering("no"),
|
||||
"no results": answering(`{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[]}}`),
|
||||
"bad netblock": answering(
|
||||
`{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[{"netblock":"nowhere","asn":1}]}}`),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for name, standIn := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, standIn)
|
||||
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
|
||||
|
||||
// The failure is noted before it is logged.
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
|
||||
for !strings.Contains(f.log.String(), "asking routewatch failed") {
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("process log %q names no failure", f.log.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.Contains(f.log.String(), clientAddr) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("process log %q names the client", f.log.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFailureIsKeptForAMinuteSoRoutewatchIsNotAskedPerRequest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
|
||||
if got := f.queries.Load(); got != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d queries while the failure is kept, want 1", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.clk.advance(time.Minute)
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
|
||||
for f.queries.Load() != 2 {
|
||||
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%d queries after the failure expired, want 2", f.queries.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHangingRoutewatchNeverDelaysAndFailsTheQuery(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
<-r.Context().Done()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
start := time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
|
||||
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > time.Second {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Route took %s while routewatch hangs", elapsed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRepeatedRequestsMakeOneQueryAndTheAnswerExpires(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
release := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
f := newFixture(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
<-release
|
||||
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(routedAnswer))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for range 50 {
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
close(release)
|
||||
f.waitFor("")
|
||||
|
||||
for range 50 {
|
||||
f.route()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if got := f.queries.Load(); got != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d queries for repeated requests, want 1", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.clk.advance(time.Hour)
|
||||
f.waitFor(routewatch.NoAnswerYet)
|
||||
f.waitFor("")
|
||||
|
||||
if got := f.queries.Load(); got != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%d queries after the answer expired, want 2", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user