Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot aede434f6a Name request log actions so they say what they mean (closes #229)
check / check (push) Successful in 6m30s
The request log's `action` values now say what they mean, as sneak named them: `request_header_too_large`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and `client_denied`, with no aliases. `banned` splits into `temporarily_banned` and `permanently_banned`, by whether the ban runs out. When a permanent ban also covers a client, that ban is the one reported.

Trips a reader: a request over a rate limit stays `client_is_rate_limited` even when the ban it makes is permanent.
Disclosure: the offence key `rule_blocked` is renamed in `clients.json` too, so an existing file holding it stops the start and must be removed. Its `version` stays 1.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-09 06:48:26 +01:00
clawbot 6850cb0e9f Add asn= and prefix= tags from a routewatch instance (closes #204)
check / check (push) Successful in 5m0s
With `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, a new heuristic, `routewatch_tags`, adds `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` to a request from what a routewatch instance answers about the client. New package `internal/routewatch` asks in the background, never on a request's path, and keeps answers 1 hour in memory. The request log gains `routewatch_tags_missing`, saying why a request has none. `prefix=` works in `SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`.

Trips a reader: a client's first request has no routewatch tags, so `prefix=` refuses from its next request after the answer comes.
Judgement call: with `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off` and `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, an `asn=` tag no longer stops the start.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-09 05:47:34 +01:00
clawbot d7c62f2854 Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m48s
sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten.

Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out.

Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00
clawbot c66277b111 Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175)
check / check (push) Failing after 5m8s
Each request gets tags, logged as `tags`: `asn=`, `country=`, one per `SWW_TAG_LISTS` list holding the client, `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>`, `abuseipdb` and `exploitsignature`. `SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses by tag and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers limits by tag. They replace `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`, with no aliases. A tag in those settings that nothing configured can give stops the start.

Judgement call: `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` stays, its entries counting like `asn=` tags.
Judgement call: `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` also lowers byte limits, as the settings it replaces did.
Trips a reader: `sww_country_list_refusals_total` now counts only `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refusals.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00
clawbot 2349b2a081 discriminator: each decision heuristic is its own module (closes #195)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m53s
Each discriminator check is now a type in its own file behind one small interface, listed in `heuristics.go`. Adding a heuristic is one file and one line. Behaviour does not change.

Refusal and ban log lines gain `heuristic` and `heuristic_figures`. A ban after the answer, by `refusal_limit` or `byte_limits`, logs `after_answer_heuristic` and its figures, so one line can name both.

Deviation: four lists, not the planned three, so `refusal_limit` still bans at the decision.
Rule suppressed: `//nolint:lll` on one struct tag.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-09 01:14:24 +01:00
clawbot beb503b233 Rename the program to sww and its deciding daemon to discriminator (closes #218) (#221)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m34s
2026-11-07 06:51:06 +01:00
clawbot 344ce13c96 rproxy and servewaf replace the one-process smallwebwaf (closes #172, closes #165)
check / check (push) Failing after 14m44s
`smallwebwaf` with no command now prints the commands and exits with status 2.
The image runs rproxy, or servewaf with SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf. The
passing-on code, its settings and its log fields and metric go. internal/proxy
keeps the checks, answers, reports and own endpoints; its tests run through the
real rproxy. The documents describe the pair.

Judgement call: clients.json keeps token_refused, since state files refuse unknown fields.
Deviation: script/gitea-requests sets SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS, to label requests.
Partially verified: make example-app and make gitea-requests never built the image, as Ubuntu's snapshot service answered 5xx.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-05 13:15:05 +01:00
clawbot 17c5dd2438 rproxy, the proxy in front of each app, asks servewaf and fails open (closes #171)
check / check (push) Successful in 7m25s
`smallwebwaf rproxy` reads the first 64 KiB of each body, asks servewaf over
HTTP/1.1, and passes what servewaf allows to the app within its limits. Any
other answer goes to the visitor as servewaf gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
decides only when servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A method SPEC.md does not list gets 405.

Duplication: internal/rproxy copies passing-on code from internal/proxy until
#172 removes the originals.
Rule suppressed: gosec G704 and G705; gosec at
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy_test.go:431; tagliatelle at
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go:203; paralleltest on one test.
Judgement call: an answer over 1 MiB, or with a status below 200, gets 502.
Judgement call: every target not starting with one / gets 400.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-05 06:32:08 +01:00
clawbot 4a4874ae2f servewaf always answers rproxy well within its time limit (closes #182)
check / check (push) Successful in 8m31s
A question waits on GeoJS at most 800ms, the new default of
SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT. In enforce mode it does not wait at all when it is
over the header limits, on a fetched blocklist with deny, on the CrowdSec
decision list, or over a whole rate limit. Not waiting never lowers a
client's limit. Just before the Core Rule Set, servewaf refuses more than
50 cookies or 100 header fields with 431.

Shared default changed: SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT also applies to smallwebwaf
with no command.
Judgement call: SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT stays 2s, since no request waits
on the DNS blocklists or AbuseIPDB.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-05 05:48:50 +01:00
clawbot 2eeea136e8 servewaf answers rproxy's question about each request and takes its report (closes #170)
check / check (push) Failing after 14m16s
`smallwebwaf servewaf` runs today's checks on the visitor's request each
question carries, answers rproxy, and passes nothing to an app. rproxy reports
every request servewaf answered. A report counts an allowed request's bytes and
writes servewaf's second log line. The table holds a copy of what a report
needs, never the request, so a report cannot reach a request being handled.

Judgement call: a question's body is read before any check; over 64 KiB gets 400.
Judgement call: a report's bytes and durations have ceilings, so they cannot overflow.
Judgement call: a `close` disposition for SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-05 00:32:08 +01:00
clawbot f408f42b28 SPEC, README and docs rewritten from scratch (closes #154, closes #155, closes #156)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
SPEC.md is the only place that says how smallwebwaf behaves and why; docs/ holds lists linking to it; the README is short and links to both. Passed independent review in round 8.

Model: fable-5-1 (writing); opus-5-5 (review, merge)
2026-10-26 03:06:28 +01:00