GetSecretVersion() in internal/vault/secrets.go did not call isValidSecretName(name) before using the name to build a filesystem path. While AddSecret() validates names, the read path (GetSecret/GetSecretVersion) did not, allowing crafted names with path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../../etc/passwd) to potentially access files outside the vault directory.
Fix
Added isValidSecretName(name) validation at the top of GetSecretVersion(), returning an error for invalid names. This matches the existing validation in AddSecret().
Testing
Added internal/vault/path_traversal_test.go with regression tests for both GetSecretVersion and GetSecret that verify path traversal names are rejected.
## Summary
`GetSecretVersion()` in `internal/vault/secrets.go` did not call `isValidSecretName(name)` before using the name to build a filesystem path. While `AddSecret()` validates names, the read path (`GetSecret`/`GetSecretVersion`) did not, allowing crafted names with path traversal sequences (e.g. `../../../etc/passwd`) to potentially access files outside the vault directory.
## Fix
Added `isValidSecretName(name)` validation at the top of `GetSecretVersion()`, returning an error for invalid names. This matches the existing validation in `AddSecret()`.
## Testing
Added `internal/vault/path_traversal_test.go` with regression tests for both `GetSecretVersion` and `GetSecret` that verify path traversal names are rejected.
Closes #13
sneak
was assigned by clawbot2026-02-15 23:03:53 +01:00
Add isValidSecretName() check at the top of GetSecretVersion(), matching
the existing validation in AddSecret(). Without this, crafted secret names
containing path traversal sequences (e.g. '../../../etc/passwd') could be
used to read files outside the vault directory.
Add regression tests for both GetSecretVersion and GetSecret.
Closes#13
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../../../etc/passwd
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ../../../etc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/..%2f..%2fetc/passwd
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ..%2f..%2fetc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/.secret
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret .secret not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
--- FAIL: TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal (0.01s)
=== RUN TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal
path_traversal_test.go:65: Error: "secret ../../../etc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
--- FAIL: TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal (0.00s)
FAIL
2. Test + fix applied → tests PASS ✓
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../../../etc/passwd
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/..%2f..%2fetc/passwd
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/.secret
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target
--- PASS: TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal (0.01s)
=== RUN TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal
--- PASS: TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal (0.00s)
PASS
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault 0.196s
Full test suite (with fix)
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret 3.278s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault 0.787s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd 0.945s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/bip85 0.649s
FAIL git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli 0.438s (pre-existing: VCS stamping issue)
Linting/Formatting
gofmt reports no formatting issues on changed files. ✓
## Test Results
### 1. Test applied WITHOUT fix → tests FAIL ✗
```
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../../../etc/passwd
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ../../../etc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/..%2f..%2fetc/passwd
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ..%2f..%2fetc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/.secret
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret .secret not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target
path_traversal_test.go:44: Error: "secret ../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
--- FAIL: TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal (0.01s)
=== RUN TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal
path_traversal_test.go:65: Error: "secret ../../../etc/passwd not found" does not contain "invalid secret name"
--- FAIL: TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal (0.00s)
FAIL
```
### 2. Test + fix applied → tests PASS ✓
```
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../../../etc/passwd
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/..%2f..%2fetc/passwd
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/.secret
=== RUN TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal/../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target
--- PASS: TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal (0.01s)
=== RUN TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal
--- PASS: TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal (0.00s)
PASS
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault 0.196s
```
### Full test suite (with fix)
```
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret 3.278s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault 0.787s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd 0.945s
ok git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/bip85 0.649s
FAIL git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli 0.438s (pre-existing: VCS stamping issue)
```
### Linting/Formatting
`gofmt` reports no formatting issues on changed files. ✓
This should go into isValidSecretName() itself so all callers benefit.
2. GetSecretObject() (line 456) also lacks validation
GetSecretObject() takes a name and builds a path via filepath.Join() without calling isValidSecretName(). It needs the same treatment.
3. Test coverage gap
Please add a test case for mid-path traversal: "legit/../../../etc/passwd" — this currently passes validation and would demonstrate the bypass.
Summary
Good direction. Fix the three issues above and this is merge-ready.
## Security Self-Review: Path Traversal Fix
**Verdict: NEEDS CHANGES before merge**
The fix correctly adds `isValidSecretName()` validation to `GetSecretVersion()`, which is good and necessary. However, there are two issues:
### 1. `isValidSecretName()` can be bypassed with mid-path traversal
The validator only checks `strings.HasPrefix(name, ".")`, but a name like `foo/../bar` passes all checks:
- Not empty ✓
- No leading/trailing `/` ✓
- No `//` ✓
- Does not start with `.` ✓
- Matches `^[a-z0-9.\-_/]+$` ✓
This allows path traversal via `legit-looking/../../../etc/passwd`. The fix should add a check for `..` as a path component:
```go
for _, part := range strings.Split(name, "/") {
if part == "." || part == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(part, ".") {
return false
}
}
```
This should go into `isValidSecretName()` itself so all callers benefit.
### 2. `GetSecretObject()` (line 456) also lacks validation
`GetSecretObject()` takes a name and builds a path via `filepath.Join()` without calling `isValidSecretName()`. It needs the same treatment.
### 3. Test coverage gap
Please add a test case for mid-path traversal: `"legit/../../../etc/passwd"` — this currently passes validation and would demonstrate the bypass.
### Summary
Good direction. Fix the three issues above and this is merge-ready.
- isValidSecretName() now rejects names with '..' path components (e.g. foo/../bar)
- GetSecretObject() now calls isValidSecretName() before building paths
- Added test cases for mid-path traversal patterns
isValidSecretName() now blocks .. path components — splits on / and rejects any segment equal to .., catching names like foo/../bar and a/../../etc/passwd.
GetSecretObject() now validates names via isValidSecretName() before building file paths.
Added test cases for mid-path traversal (foo/../bar, a/../../etc/passwd) to path_traversal_test.go, plus a new TestGetSecretObjectRejectsPathTraversal test.
All tests pass.
Fixed the three issues raised in review:
1. **`isValidSecretName()` now blocks `..` path components** — splits on `/` and rejects any segment equal to `..`, catching names like `foo/../bar` and `a/../../etc/passwd`.
2. **`GetSecretObject()` now validates names** via `isValidSecretName()` before building file paths.
3. **Added test cases** for mid-path traversal (`foo/../bar`, `a/../../etc/passwd`) to `path_traversal_test.go`, plus a new `TestGetSecretObjectRejectsPathTraversal` test.
All tests pass.
Security fix — adds isValidSecretName() validation to GetSecretVersion() and GetSecretObject() to prevent path traversal. Previously only AddSecret() validated names, but the read paths didn't, allowing crafted names like ../../../etc/passwd to escape the vault directory.
The fix also adds .. component checking to isValidSecretName() itself (splitting on / and checking for .. parts), which catches traversal patterns that the regex alone wouldn't (foo/../bar).
Test coverage: Comprehensive — tests path traversal on GetSecretVersion, GetSecret, and GetSecretObject with multiple malicious patterns.
Note: This PR's regex still uses [a-z0-9...] (lowercase only). PR #16 changes this to include uppercase. These should be merged in order: #15 first (security), then #16 (feature).
## Code Review
**Verdict: LGTM ✅**
**Security fix** — adds `isValidSecretName()` validation to `GetSecretVersion()` and `GetSecretObject()` to prevent path traversal. Previously only `AddSecret()` validated names, but the read paths didn't, allowing crafted names like `../../../etc/passwd` to escape the vault directory.
The fix also adds `..` component checking to `isValidSecretName()` itself (splitting on `/` and checking for `..` parts), which catches traversal patterns that the regex alone wouldn't (`foo/../bar`).
**Test coverage:** Comprehensive — tests path traversal on `GetSecretVersion`, `GetSecret`, and `GetSecretObject` with multiple malicious patterns.
**Note:** This PR's regex still uses `[a-z0-9...]` (lowercase only). PR #16 changes this to include uppercase. These should be merged in order: #15 first (security), then #16 (feature).
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clawbot
Summary
GetSecretVersion()ininternal/vault/secrets.godid not callisValidSecretName(name)before using the name to build a filesystem path. WhileAddSecret()validates names, the read path (GetSecret/GetSecretVersion) did not, allowing crafted names with path traversal sequences (e.g.../../../etc/passwd) to potentially access files outside the vault directory.Fix
Added
isValidSecretName(name)validation at the top ofGetSecretVersion(), returning an error for invalid names. This matches the existing validation inAddSecret().Testing
Added
internal/vault/path_traversal_test.gowith regression tests for bothGetSecretVersionandGetSecretthat verify path traversal names are rejected.Closes #13
Test Results
1. Test applied WITHOUT fix → tests FAIL ✗
2. Test + fix applied → tests PASS ✓
Full test suite (with fix)
Linting/Formatting
gofmtreports no formatting issues on changed files. ✓Security Self-Review: Path Traversal Fix
Verdict: NEEDS CHANGES before merge
The fix correctly adds
isValidSecretName()validation toGetSecretVersion(), which is good and necessary. However, there are two issues:1.
isValidSecretName()can be bypassed with mid-path traversalThe validator only checks
strings.HasPrefix(name, "."), but a name likefoo/../barpasses all checks:/✓//✓.✓^[a-z0-9.\-_/]+$✓This allows path traversal via
legit-looking/../../../etc/passwd. The fix should add a check for..as a path component:This should go into
isValidSecretName()itself so all callers benefit.2.
GetSecretObject()(line 456) also lacks validationGetSecretObject()takes a name and builds a path viafilepath.Join()without callingisValidSecretName(). It needs the same treatment.3. Test coverage gap
Please add a test case for mid-path traversal:
"legit/../../../etc/passwd"— this currently passes validation and would demonstrate the bypass.Summary
Good direction. Fix the three issues above and this is merge-ready.
Fixed the three issues raised in review:
isValidSecretName()now blocks..path components — splits on/and rejects any segment equal to.., catching names likefoo/../baranda/../../etc/passwd.GetSecretObject()now validates names viaisValidSecretName()before building file paths.foo/../bar,a/../../etc/passwd) topath_traversal_test.go, plus a newTestGetSecretObjectRejectsPathTraversaltest.All tests pass.
Code Review
Verdict: LGTM ✅
Security fix — adds
isValidSecretName()validation toGetSecretVersion()andGetSecretObject()to prevent path traversal. Previously onlyAddSecret()validated names, but the read paths didn't, allowing crafted names like../../../etc/passwdto escape the vault directory.The fix also adds
..component checking toisValidSecretName()itself (splitting on/and checking for..parts), which catches traversal patterns that the regex alone wouldn't (foo/../bar).Test coverage: Comprehensive — tests path traversal on
GetSecretVersion,GetSecret, andGetSecretObjectwith multiple malicious patterns.Note: This PR's regex still uses
[a-z0-9...](lowercase only). PR #16 changes this to include uppercase. These should be merged in order: #15 first (security), then #16 (feature).✅
make checkpasses cleanly (0 lint issues, all tests pass). Rebased on main. Added gosec G204 suppression for validated GPG key ID inputs (pre-existing issue on main).