Validate secret name in GetSecretVersion to prevent path traversal

Add isValidSecretName() check at the top of GetSecretVersion(), matching
the existing validation in AddSecret(). Without this, crafted secret names
containing path traversal sequences (e.g. '../../../etc/passwd') could be
used to read files outside the vault directory.

Add regression tests for both GetSecretVersion and GetSecret.

Closes #13
This commit is contained in:
clawbot 2026-02-15 14:03:28 -08:00
parent 6ff00c696a
commit 3fd30bb9e6
2 changed files with 72 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
package vault
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal verifies that GetSecretVersion
// validates the secret name and rejects path traversal attempts.
// This is a regression test for https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/13
func TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
testMnemonic := "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase, "test-passphrase")
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
stateDir := "/test/state"
vlt, err := CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Add a legitimate secret so the vault is set up
value := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("legitimate-secret"))
err = vlt.AddSecret("legit", value, false)
require.NoError(t, err)
// These names contain path traversal and should be rejected
maliciousNames := []string{
"../../../etc/passwd",
"..%2f..%2fetc/passwd",
".secret",
"../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target",
}
for _, name := range maliciousNames {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := vlt.GetSecretVersion(name, "")
assert.Error(t, err, "GetSecretVersion should reject malicious name: %s", name)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid secret name",
"error should indicate invalid name for: %s", name)
})
}
}
// TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal verifies GetSecret (which calls GetSecretVersion)
// also rejects path traversal names.
func TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
testMnemonic := "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase, "test-passphrase")
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
stateDir := "/test/state"
vlt, err := CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = vlt.GetSecret("../../../etc/passwd")
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid secret name")
}

View File

@ -319,6 +319,12 @@ func (v *Vault) GetSecretVersion(name string, version string) ([]byte, error) {
slog.String("version", version),
)
// Validate secret name to prevent path traversal
if !isValidSecretName(name) {
secret.Debug("Invalid secret name provided", "secret_name", name)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid secret name '%s': must match pattern [a-z0-9.\\-_/]+", name)
}
// Get vault directory
vaultDir, err := v.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {