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Author SHA1 Message Date
1a23016df1 Merge pull request 'Validate secret name in GetSecretVersion to prevent path traversal (closes #13)' (#15) from clawbot/secret:fix/issue-13 into main
Reviewed-on: #15
2026-02-20 08:56:51 +01:00
ebe3c17618 Merge branch 'main' into fix/issue-13 2026-02-20 08:56:36 +01:00
clawbot
dc225bd0b1 fix: add blank line before return for nlreturn linter 2026-02-19 23:44:38 -08:00
clawbot
6acd57d0ec fix: suppress gosec G204 for validated GPG key ID inputs 2026-02-19 23:43:32 -08:00
user
8eb25b98fd fix: block .. path components in secret names and validate in GetSecretObject
- isValidSecretName() now rejects names with '..' path components (e.g. foo/../bar)
- GetSecretObject() now calls isValidSecretName() before building paths
- Added test cases for mid-path traversal patterns
2026-02-15 14:17:33 -08:00
clawbot
3fd30bb9e6 Validate secret name in GetSecretVersion to prevent path traversal
Add isValidSecretName() check at the top of GetSecretVersion(), matching
the existing validation in AddSecret(). Without this, crafted secret names
containing path traversal sequences (e.g. '../../../etc/passwd') could be
used to read files outside the vault directory.

Add regression tests for both GetSecretVersion and GetSecret.

Closes #13
2026-02-15 14:03:28 -08:00
2 changed files with 114 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
package vault
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal verifies that GetSecretVersion
// validates the secret name and rejects path traversal attempts.
// This is a regression test for https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/13
func TestGetSecretVersionRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
testMnemonic := "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase, "test-passphrase")
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
stateDir := "/test/state"
vlt, err := CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Add a legitimate secret so the vault is set up
value := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("legitimate-secret"))
err = vlt.AddSecret("legit", value, false)
require.NoError(t, err)
// These names contain path traversal and should be rejected
maliciousNames := []string{
"../../../etc/passwd",
"..%2f..%2fetc/passwd",
".secret",
"../sibling-vault/secrets.d/target",
"foo/../bar",
"a/../../etc/passwd",
}
for _, name := range maliciousNames {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := vlt.GetSecretVersion(name, "")
assert.Error(t, err, "GetSecretVersion should reject malicious name: %s", name)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid secret name",
"error should indicate invalid name for: %s", name)
})
}
}
// TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal verifies GetSecret (which calls GetSecretVersion)
// also rejects path traversal names.
func TestGetSecretRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
testMnemonic := "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase, "test-passphrase")
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
stateDir := "/test/state"
vlt, err := CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = vlt.GetSecret("../../../etc/passwd")
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid secret name")
}
// TestGetSecretObjectRejectsPathTraversal verifies GetSecretObject
// also validates names and rejects path traversal attempts.
func TestGetSecretObjectRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
testMnemonic := "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase, "test-passphrase")
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
stateDir := "/test/state"
vlt, err := CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
maliciousNames := []string{
"../../../etc/passwd",
"foo/../bar",
"a/../../etc/passwd",
}
for _, name := range maliciousNames {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := vlt.GetSecretObject(name)
assert.Error(t, err, "GetSecretObject should reject: %s", name)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid secret name")
})
}
}

View File

@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ func isValidSecretName(name string) bool {
return false return false
} }
// Check for path traversal via ".." components
for _, part := range strings.Split(name, "/") {
if part == ".." {
return false
}
}
// Check the basic pattern // Check the basic pattern
matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[a-z0-9\.\-\_\/]+$`, name) matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[a-z0-9\.\-\_\/]+$`, name)
@@ -319,6 +326,13 @@ func (v *Vault) GetSecretVersion(name string, version string) ([]byte, error) {
slog.String("version", version), slog.String("version", version),
) )
// Validate secret name to prevent path traversal
if !isValidSecretName(name) {
secret.Debug("Invalid secret name provided", "secret_name", name)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid secret name '%s': must match pattern [a-z0-9.\\-_/]+", name)
}
// Get vault directory // Get vault directory
vaultDir, err := v.GetDirectory() vaultDir, err := v.GetDirectory()
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -454,6 +468,10 @@ func (v *Vault) UnlockVault() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
// GetSecretObject retrieves a Secret object with metadata loaded from this vault // GetSecretObject retrieves a Secret object with metadata loaded from this vault
func (v *Vault) GetSecretObject(name string) (*secret.Secret, error) { func (v *Vault) GetSecretObject(name string) (*secret.Secret, error) {
if !isValidSecretName(name) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid secret name: %s", name)
}
// First check if the secret exists by checking for the metadata file // First check if the secret exists by checking for the metadata file
vaultDir, err := v.GetDirectory() vaultDir, err := v.GetDirectory()
if err != nil { if err != nil {