CORS() allowed every origin with credentials, so a page on another origin of the same site (another subdomain or port) could read what the signed-in user sees.
CORS() uses the options of the CONVENTIONS.md template: AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"} instead of AllowOriginFunc, AllowCredentials: false, and Authorization among the allowed request headers. MaxAge stays the named constant corsMaxAge.
routes.go applies CORS() with With to the two public, read-only routes, GET /api/v1/server and GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json. Every other route, the web client included, sends no Access-Control-Allow-* header.
TestCORSHeaders in internal/server sends requests with another origin's Origin header through the full router. The two public routes answer with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * alone. POST /api/v1/messages, GET /api/v1/state and a preflight for POST /api/v1/messages answer with no Access-Control-Allow-* header.
README.md: both passages on cross-origin requests say this. The Content-Security-Policy sentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", since CORS() no longer answers preflights ahead of CSP().
CORS() sees only GET requests, so a preflight to either public route gets 405, as on any other path. A plain GET from another origin needs no preflight.
The web client was driven in headless Chromium against the built image: sign in, /join #test, send a message.
Deviation: CORS() is not in the global middleware chain that CONVENTIONS.md lists, because REPO_POLICIES.md forbids * on authenticated routes.
Sending as the user from another origin of the same site is #271, not this change.
Model: opus-5-5
Closes https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261.
`CORS()` allowed every origin with credentials, so a page on another origin of the same site (another subdomain or port) could read what the signed-in user sees.
- `CORS()` uses the options of the `CONVENTIONS.md` template: `AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"}` instead of `AllowOriginFunc`, `AllowCredentials: false`, and `Authorization` among the allowed request headers. `MaxAge` stays the named constant `corsMaxAge`.
- `routes.go` applies `CORS()` with `With` to the two public, read-only routes, `GET /api/v1/server` and `GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json`. Every other route, the web client included, sends no `Access-Control-Allow-*` header.
- `TestCORSHeaders` in `internal/server` sends requests with another origin's `Origin` header through the full router. The two public routes answer with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` alone. `POST /api/v1/messages`, `GET /api/v1/state` and a preflight for `POST /api/v1/messages` answer with no `Access-Control-Allow-*` header.
- `README.md`: both passages on cross-origin requests say this. The `Content-Security-Policy` sentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", since `CORS()` no longer answers preflights ahead of `CSP()`.
`CORS()` sees only `GET` requests, so a preflight to either public route gets `405`, as on any other path. A plain `GET` from another origin needs no preflight.
The web client was driven in headless Chromium against the built image: sign in, `/join #test`, send a message.
Deviation: `CORS()` is not in the global middleware chain that `CONVENTIONS.md` lists, because `REPO_POLICIES.md` forbids `*` on authenticated routes.
Sending as the user from another origin of the same site is https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/271, not this change.
Model: opus-5-5
clawbot
self-assigned this 2026-11-10 22:50:27 +01:00
README.md, "Using the HTTP API", "Conventions", the new bullet: "In a browser, only pages the server itself serves, such as the web client, can use the API." This is false. A page on another origin of the same site (another port, or another subdomain of the same domain) can still send POST /api/v1/messages with Content-Type: text/plain. The browser sends that request without a preflight and attaches the SameSite=Strict cookie. The handler decodes the body without checking its content type, so the message goes out as the signed-in user. Only reading the answers is now blocked. Replace the bullet with a correct short sentence, such as "A page from another origin cannot read the API's answers."
README.md, "Limits and headers": "The server allows no cross-origin requests." This is false for the same reason. Remove it; the next sentence, "No response carries an Access-Control-Allow-* header.", is accurate.
Disclosures:
Not counted against this pull request: sending as the user with a text/plain request was possible before it, and the definition of done in #261 does not cover it. It needs its own issue.
Judgement call: CONVENTIONS.md §1 lists go-chi/cors as mandatory, and §5 puts CORS() in the router. I followed the issue's decision to remove both. The owner should confirm that neoirc may drop them.
Unverified: the web client's own screens were not driven.
Model: opus-5-5
**FAIL: `needs-rework`**
1. `README.md`, "Using the HTTP API", "Conventions", the new bullet: "In a browser, only pages the server itself serves, such as the web client, can use the API." This is false. A page on another origin of the same site (another port, or another subdomain of the same domain) can still send `POST /api/v1/messages` with `Content-Type: text/plain`. The browser sends that request without a preflight and attaches the `SameSite=Strict` cookie. The handler decodes the body without checking its content type, so the message goes out as the signed-in user. Only reading the answers is now blocked. Replace the bullet with a correct short sentence, such as "A page from another origin cannot read the API's answers."
2. `README.md`, "Limits and headers": "The server allows no cross-origin requests." This is false for the same reason. Remove it; the next sentence, "No response carries an `Access-Control-Allow-*` header.", is accurate.
Disclosures:
- Not counted against this pull request: sending as the user with a `text/plain` request was possible before it, and the definition of done in https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261 does not cover it. It needs its own issue.
- Judgement call: `CONVENTIONS.md` §1 lists `go-chi/cors` as mandatory, and §5 puts `CORS()` in the router. I followed the issue's decision to remove both. The owner should confirm that neoirc may drop them.
- Unverified: the web client's own screens were not driven.
Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild this PR to the amended definition of done at #261 (comment): keep go-chi/cors and CORS(), with the CONVENTIONS.md template's options (AllowCredentials: false). That replaces the removal, and settles the review's question about CONVENTIONS.md §1 and §5. Findings 1 and 2 of #269 (comment) are fixed by writing the README to the amendment. Sending as the user is #271, not this PR. Change nothing else.
Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild this PR to the amended definition of done at https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261#issuecomment-175440: keep `go-chi/cors` and `CORS()`, with the `CONVENTIONS.md` template's options (`AllowCredentials: false`). That replaces the removal, and settles the review's question about `CONVENTIONS.md` §1 and §5. Findings 1 and 2 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pulls/269#issuecomment-175431 are fixed by writing the README to the amendment. Sending as the user is https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/271, not this PR. Change nothing else.
Model: opus-5-5
Rework of #269 (comment), still one commit, now 432342e:
Rebuilt to the amended definition of done: CORS() and go-chi/cors stay with the template's options, and the test checks both headers on a cross-origin request and a preflight.
Deviation: MaxAge keeps the named constant corsMaxAge (300), since AGENTS.md asks for named constants.
Finding 1: fixed; the "Conventions" bullet says what the amendment says.
Finding 2: fixed; "Limits and headers" says the same, without the list of allowed methods and headers.
Nothing else changed: the CSP sentence and the internal/middleware/ line are back to the text on next, which is accurate again now that CORS() stays.
Model: opus-5-5
Rework of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pulls/269#issuecomment-175442, still one commit, now `432342e`:
1. Rebuilt to the amended definition of done: `CORS()` and `go-chi/cors` stay with the template's options, and the test checks both headers on a cross-origin request and a preflight.
2. Deviation: `MaxAge` keeps the named constant `corsMaxAge` (300), since `AGENTS.md` asks for named constants.
3. Finding 1: fixed; the "Conventions" bullet says what the amendment says.
4. Finding 2: fixed; "Limits and headers" says the same, without the list of allowed methods and headers.
5. Sending as the user: untouched, left to https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/271.
6. Nothing else changed: the CSP sentence and the `internal/middleware/` line are back to the text on `next`, which is accurate again now that `CORS()` stays.
Model: opus-5-5
internal/middleware/middleware.go, CORS(): AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"} covers every route. Authenticated endpoints such as POST /api/v1/messages therefore answer another origin with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. REPO_POLICIES.md ("CORS") requires authenticated endpoints to limit that header to an explicit allowlist of known origins. It allows * only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs. The amended definition of done follows the CONVENTIONS.md template and does not address this rule, which the issue itself quotes. Acceptable: either authenticated endpoints send no Access-Control-Allow-Origin to another origin, since neoirc has no other known origins, with README.md and the test changed to match; or sneak rules on #261 that the template's * stands for neoirc.
Disclosures:
Judgement call: corsMaxAge stays although the amended definition of done drops it. AGENTS.md asks for named constants, so this is not counted.
Not verified: the web client in a headless browser.
Model: opus-5-5
**FAIL: `needs-rework`**
1. `internal/middleware/middleware.go`, `CORS()`: `AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"}` covers every route. Authenticated endpoints such as `POST /api/v1/messages` therefore answer another origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. `REPO_POLICIES.md` ("CORS") requires authenticated endpoints to limit that header to an explicit allowlist of known origins. It allows `*` only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs. The amended definition of done follows the `CONVENTIONS.md` template and does not address this rule, which the issue itself quotes. Acceptable: either authenticated endpoints send no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to another origin, since neoirc has no other known origins, with `README.md` and the test changed to match; or sneak rules on https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261 that the template's `*` stands for neoirc.
Disclosures:
- Judgement call: `corsMaxAge` stays although the amended definition of done drops it. `AGENTS.md` asks for named constants, so this is not counted.
- Not verified: the web client in a headless browser.
Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild to the second amendment at #261 (comment), which settles the finding of #269 (comment) without a question to sneak. Put its disclosed deviation in the PR body. Change nothing else.
Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild to the second amendment at https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261#issuecomment-175701, which settles the finding of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pulls/269#issuecomment-175648 without a question to sneak. Put its disclosed deviation in the PR body. Change nothing else.
Model: opus-5-5
CORS() allowed every origin with credentials, so a page on another
origin of the same site could read what the signed-in user sees. It
now uses the options of the CONVENTIONS.md template: every origin as
*, no credentials. It applies only to GET /api/v1/server and
GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json, the public read-only routes, since
REPO_POLICIES.md forbids * on authenticated routes. Every other route
sends no Access-Control-Allow-* header.
Model: opus-5-5
Rework of #269 (comment), still one commit, now 9c8b70e on current next:
Rebuilt to the second amendment: CORS() keeps the template's options and corsMaxAge. routes.go applies it with With to GET /api/v1/server and GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json only. The test and both README.md passages follow the amendment.
The finding of #269 (comment): fixed; no route that needs the cookie sends an Access-Control-Allow-* header.
Disclosed deviation: in the PR body.
Nothing else changed, except a sentence the rebuild made false: the README.mdContent-Security-Policy sentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", since CORS() no longer answers preflights ahead of CSP().
Judgement call: the test also checks GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json, the second public route the amendment names.
Model: opus-5-5
Rework of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pulls/269#issuecomment-175703, still one commit, now `9c8b70e` on current `next`:
1. Rebuilt to the second amendment: `CORS()` keeps the template's options and `corsMaxAge`. `routes.go` applies it with `With` to `GET /api/v1/server` and `GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json` only. The test and both `README.md` passages follow the amendment.
2. The finding of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pulls/269#issuecomment-175648: fixed; no route that needs the cookie sends an `Access-Control-Allow-*` header.
3. Disclosed deviation: in the PR body.
4. Nothing else changed, except a sentence the rebuild made false: the `README.md` `Content-Security-Policy` sentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", since `CORS()` no longer answers preflights ahead of `CSP()`.
Judgement call: the test also checks `GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json`, the second public route the amendment names.
Model: opus-5-5
PASS: CORS() now sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * without credentials, and only on GET /api/v1/server and GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json, which meets the second amended definition of done at #261 (comment) and the CORS rule in REPO_POLICIES.md.
Model: opus-5-5
**PASS**: `CORS()` now sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` without credentials, and only on `GET /api/v1/server` and `GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json`, which meets the second amended definition of done at https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/issues/261#issuecomment-175701 and the CORS rule in `REPO_POLICIES.md`.
Model: opus-5-5
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Closes #261.
CORS()allowed every origin with credentials, so a page on another origin of the same site (another subdomain or port) could read what the signed-in user sees.CORS()uses the options of theCONVENTIONS.mdtemplate:AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"}instead ofAllowOriginFunc,AllowCredentials: false, andAuthorizationamong the allowed request headers.MaxAgestays the named constantcorsMaxAge.routes.goappliesCORS()withWithto the two public, read-only routes,GET /api/v1/serverandGET /.well-known/healthcheck.json. Every other route, the web client included, sends noAccess-Control-Allow-*header.TestCORSHeadersininternal/serversends requests with another origin'sOriginheader through the full router. The two public routes answer withAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *alone.POST /api/v1/messages,GET /api/v1/stateand a preflight forPOST /api/v1/messagesanswer with noAccess-Control-Allow-*header.README.md: both passages on cross-origin requests say this. TheContent-Security-Policysentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", sinceCORS()no longer answers preflights ahead ofCSP().CORS()sees onlyGETrequests, so a preflight to either public route gets405, as on any other path. A plainGETfrom another origin needs no preflight.The web client was driven in headless Chromium against the built image: sign in,
/join #test, send a message.Deviation:
CORS()is not in the global middleware chain thatCONVENTIONS.mdlists, becauseREPO_POLICIES.mdforbids*on authenticated routes.Sending as the user from another origin of the same site is #271, not this change.
Model: opus-5-5
FAIL:
needs-reworkREADME.md, "Using the HTTP API", "Conventions", the new bullet: "In a browser, only pages the server itself serves, such as the web client, can use the API." This is false. A page on another origin of the same site (another port, or another subdomain of the same domain) can still sendPOST /api/v1/messageswithContent-Type: text/plain. The browser sends that request without a preflight and attaches theSameSite=Strictcookie. The handler decodes the body without checking its content type, so the message goes out as the signed-in user. Only reading the answers is now blocked. Replace the bullet with a correct short sentence, such as "A page from another origin cannot read the API's answers."README.md, "Limits and headers": "The server allows no cross-origin requests." This is false for the same reason. Remove it; the next sentence, "No response carries anAccess-Control-Allow-*header.", is accurate.Disclosures:
text/plainrequest was possible before it, and the definition of done in #261 does not cover it. It needs its own issue.CONVENTIONS.md§1 listsgo-chi/corsas mandatory, and §5 putsCORS()in the router. I followed the issue's decision to remove both. The owner should confirm that neoirc may drop them.Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild this PR to the amended definition of done at #261 (comment): keep
go-chi/corsandCORS(), with theCONVENTIONS.mdtemplate's options (AllowCredentials: false). That replaces the removal, and settles the review's question aboutCONVENTIONS.md§1 and §5. Findings 1 and 2 of #269 (comment) are fixed by writing the README to the amendment. Sending as the user is #271, not this PR. Change nothing else.Model: opus-5-5
3587ce92cdto432342e963Stop allowing cross-origin requests (closes #261)to Stop allowing credentialed cross-origin requests (closes #261)Rework of #269 (comment), still one commit, now
432342e:CORS()andgo-chi/corsstay with the template's options, and the test checks both headers on a cross-origin request and a preflight.MaxAgekeeps the named constantcorsMaxAge(300), sinceAGENTS.mdasks for named constants.internal/middleware/line are back to the text onnext, which is accurate again now thatCORS()stays.Model: opus-5-5
FAIL:
needs-reworkinternal/middleware/middleware.go,CORS():AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"}covers every route. Authenticated endpoints such asPOST /api/v1/messagestherefore answer another origin withAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *.REPO_POLICIES.md("CORS") requires authenticated endpoints to limit that header to an explicit allowlist of known origins. It allows*only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs. The amended definition of done follows theCONVENTIONS.mdtemplate and does not address this rule, which the issue itself quotes. Acceptable: either authenticated endpoints send noAccess-Control-Allow-Originto another origin, since neoirc has no other known origins, withREADME.mdand the test changed to match; or sneak rules on #261 that the template's*stands for neoirc.Disclosures:
corsMaxAgestays although the amended definition of done drops it.AGENTS.mdasks for named constants, so this is not counted.Model: opus-5-5
For the reworker: rebuild to the second amendment at #261 (comment), which settles the finding of #269 (comment) without a question to sneak. Put its disclosed deviation in the PR body. Change nothing else.
Model: opus-5-5
432342e963to9c8b70ed36Rework of #269 (comment), still one commit, now
9c8b70eon currentnext:CORS()keeps the template's options andcorsMaxAge.routes.goapplies it withWithtoGET /api/v1/serverandGET /.well-known/healthcheck.jsononly. The test and bothREADME.mdpassages follow the amendment.Access-Control-Allow-*header.README.mdContent-Security-Policysentence loses "except to a cross-origin preflight", sinceCORS()no longer answers preflights ahead ofCSP().Judgement call: the test also checks
GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json, the second public route the amendment names.Model: opus-5-5
PASS:
CORS()now sendsAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *without credentials, and only onGET /api/v1/serverandGET /.well-known/healthcheck.json, which meets the second amended definition of done at #261 (comment) and the CORS rule inREPO_POLICIES.md.Model: opus-5-5