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Configure prettier and make fmt-check cover markdown (closes #69)
script/fmt ran prettier with default settings over root-level *.md and
*.json, swallowing every failure with `|| true`, while script/fmt-check
checked gofmt only. The formatter and the gate therefore disagreed
silently: `make fmt` rewrote markdown that `make check` never looked at,
including REPO_POLICIES.md, which is a verbatim copy of an authoritative
upstream document that local tooling must not touch.

Configuration:

- .prettierrc pins the two policy deviations from prettier defaults,
  four-space indents and proseWrap: always. Nothing else.
- .prettierignore excludes REPO_POLICIES.md so no local run can drift it
  from upstream again, plus .golangci.yml (user-owned, and listed even
  though the current file set does not reach it) and node_modules,
  vendor, bin.

One canonical file set:

- New script/prettier takes --write or --check and applies the same
  patterns in both modes, so script/fmt and script/fmt-check cannot
  drift apart by construction. The patterns are repo-wide (**/*.md,
  **/*.json) rather than root-only, so markdown in subdirectories such
  as a future docs/ is covered.
- No `|| true` anywhere, and no --no-error-on-unmatched-pattern: both
  patterns always match tracked files, so an empty match means the glob
  broke and prettier should say so instead of passing vacuously. A
  missing prettier is a hard error naming script/bootstrap, not a
  silent skip.

Pinned prettier:

- package.json/yarn.lock pin prettier 3.9.6; the lockfile carries the
  integrity hash, and --frozen-lockfile enforces it. script/prettier
  prefers node_modules/.bin/prettier and warns on stderr when it has to
  fall back to a PATH prettier of unknown version.
- script/bootstrap now installs node, yarn, and the locked JS deps. Its
  NODE_VERSION and YARN_VERSION pins already existed.

Docker gate:

- The golangci-lint image has no node, so the lint stage runs the new
  script/fmt-check-go (the Go half of fmt-check, extracted) instead of
  the whole thing.
- The markdown half gets its own stage on a digest-pinned node image
  shipping exactly the node and yarn versions bootstrap pins. The
  builder stage takes a COPY --from dependency on it, so BuildKit cannot
  skip it and a markdown violation fails `docker build .` rather than
  being skipped somewhere nobody looks.

Markdown files other than REPO_POLICIES.md are reformatted here for the
first time under the policy settings.
2026-08-10 14:08:33 +00:00

145 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown

# .mf File Format Specification
Version 1.0
## Overview
An `.mf` file is a binary manifest that describes a directory tree of files,
including their paths, sizes, and cryptographic checksums. It supports optional
GPG signatures for integrity verification and optional timestamps for metadata
preservation.
## File Structure
An `.mf` file consists of two parts, concatenated:
1. **Magic bytes** (8 bytes): the ASCII string `ZNAVSRFG`
2. **Outer message**: a Protocol Buffers serialized `MFFileOuter` message
There is no length prefix or version byte between the magic and the protobuf
message. The protobuf message extends to the end of the file.
See [`mfer/mf.proto`](mfer/mf.proto) for exact field numbers and types.
## Outer Message (`MFFileOuter`)
The outer message contains:
| Field | Number | Type | Description |
| ----------------- | ------ | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `version` | 101 | enum | Must be `VERSION_ONE` (1) |
| `compressionType` | 102 | enum | Compression of `innerMessage`; must be `COMPRESSION_ZSTD` (1) |
| `size` | 103 | int64 | Uncompressed size of `innerMessage` (corruption detection) |
| `sha256` | 104 | bytes | SHA-256 hash of the **compressed** `innerMessage` (corruption detection) |
| `uuid` | 105 | bytes | Random v4 UUID; must match the inner message UUID |
| `innerMessage` | 199 | bytes | Zstd-compressed serialized `MFFile` message |
| `signature` | 201 | bytes (optional) | GPG signature (ASCII-armored or binary) |
| `signer` | 202 | bytes (optional) | Full GPG key ID of the signer |
| `signingPubKey` | 203 | bytes (optional) | Full GPG signing public key |
### SHA-256 Hash
The `sha256` field (104) covers the **compressed** `innerMessage` bytes. This
allows verifying data integrity before decompression.
## Compression
The `innerMessage` field is compressed with
[Zstandard (zstd)](https://facebook.github.io/zstd/). Implementations must
enforce a decompression size limit to prevent decompression bombs. The reference
implementation limits decompressed size to 256 MB.
## Inner Message (`MFFile`)
After decompressing `innerMessage`, the result is a serialized `MFFile`
(referred to as the manifest):
| Field | Number | Type | Description |
| ----------- | ------ | --------------------- | ------------------------------------- |
| `version` | 100 | enum | Must be `VERSION_ONE` (1) |
| `files` | 101 | repeated `MFFilePath` | List of files in the manifest |
| `uuid` | 102 | bytes | Random v4 UUID; must match outer UUID |
| `createdAt` | 201 | Timestamp (optional) | When the manifest was created |
## File Entries (`MFFilePath`)
Each file entry contains:
| Field | Number | Type | Description |
| ---------- | ------ | ------------------------- | ----------------------------------- |
| `path` | 1 | string | Relative file path (see Path Rules) |
| `size` | 2 | int64 | File size in bytes |
| `hashes` | 3 | repeated `MFFileChecksum` | At least one hash required |
| `mimeType` | 301 | string (optional) | MIME type |
| `mtime` | 302 | Timestamp (optional) | Modification time |
| `ctime` | 303 | Timestamp (optional) | Change time (inode metadata change) |
Field 304 (`atime`) has been removed from the specification. Access time is
volatile and non-deterministic; it is not useful for integrity verification.
## Path Rules
All `path` values must satisfy these invariants:
- **UTF-8**: paths must be valid UTF-8
- **Forward slashes**: use `/` as the path separator (never `\`)
- **Relative only**: no leading `/`
- **No parent traversal**: no `..` path segments
- **No empty segments**: no `//` sequences
- **No trailing slash**: paths refer to files, not directories
Implementations must validate these invariants when reading and writing
manifests. Paths that violate these rules must be rejected.
## Hash Format (`MFFileChecksum`)
Each checksum is a single `bytes multiHash` field containing a
[multihash](https://multiformats.io/multihash/)-encoded value. Multihash is
self-describing: the encoded bytes include a varint algorithm identifier
followed by a varint digest length followed by the digest itself.
The 1.0 implementation writes SHA-256 multihashes (`0x12` algorithm code).
Implementations must be able to verify SHA-256 multihashes at minimum.
## Signature Scheme
Signing is optional. When present, the signature covers a canonical string
constructed as:
```
ZNAVSRFG-<UUID>-<SHA256>
```
Where:
- `ZNAVSRFG` is the magic bytes string (literal ASCII)
- `<UUID>` is the hex-encoded UUID from the outer message
- `<SHA256>` is the hex-encoded SHA-256 hash from the outer message (covering
compressed data)
Components are separated by hyphens. The signature is produced by GPG over this
canonical string and stored in the `signature` field of the outer message.
## Deterministic Serialization
By default, manifests are generated deterministically:
- File entries are sorted by `path` in **lexicographic byte order**
- `createdAt` is omitted unless explicitly requested
- `atime` is never included (field removed from schema)
This ensures that two independent runs over the same directory tree produce
byte-identical `.mf` files (assuming file contents and metadata have not
changed).
## MIME Type
The recommended MIME type for `.mf` files is `application/octet-stream`. The
`.mf` file extension is the canonical identifier.
## Reference
- Proto definition: [`mfer/mf.proto`](mfer/mf.proto)
- Reference implementation:
[git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer)