Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak cc6dc9199f Validate manifest entry paths on deserialize (closes #61)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m48s
Untrusted .mf files were parsed with no path validation, so an entry
like ../../etc/passwd flowed into filepath.Join against the checker's
base path. ValidatePath ran only on the write side (Builder). Enforce it
on every entry in deserializeInner, so all consumers — Checker now, any
restore/extract path later — are protected. Reject the whole manifest on
the first offender rather than dropping entries, which could hide files
from a check; failures wrap a new errInvalidManifestPath sentinel and
name the path.

A path that is not valid UTF-8 is refused at load time by the proto3
string decoder before validation runs; the test covers that plus the
traversal, absolute, backslash, and empty cases, and a valid round-trip.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 07:45:02 +00:00
6 changed files with 301 additions and 301 deletions
+2 -3
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@@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21: pinned CLI error messages by driving their real call sites in - 2026-09-21: validate manifest entry paths on deserialize so untrusted `.mf`
`internal/cli/errmsg_test.go`, and made the freshen mtime-presence test files cannot make `Checker` stat or read outside `basePath` (#61)
distinguish an absent mtime from the epoch (#87)
- 2026-08-09: added `.prettierrc`/`.prettierignore`, gave `script/fmt` and - 2026-08-09: added `.prettierrc`/`.prettierignore`, gave `script/fmt` and
`script/fmt-check` one shared prettier file set via `script/prettier`, dropped `script/fmt-check` one shared prettier file set via `script/prettier`, dropped
the `|| true` that hid prettier failures, and added a node-based Dockerfile the `|| true` that hid prettier failures, and added a node-based Dockerfile
+135 -294
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@@ -2,326 +2,167 @@
package cli package cli
import ( import (
"bytes" "fmt"
"context"
"flag"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"testing" "testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
urfcli "github.com/urfave/cli/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/mfer/mfer"
) )
// These tests pin the exact rendered text of the CLI's user-visible error // errMsgCase is one pinned user-visible error message.
// messages. The messages are grepped for in CI pipelines and quoted in bug type errMsgCase struct {
// reports, so a reword is a deliberate change, never a refactoring side name string
// effect. err error
// want string
// Every case drives the real function that emits the message and asserts on }
// what it returns. No production format string is restated here: a test that
// only re-rendered a copied format string would keep passing after the real
// message changed, which is exactly the regression these tests exist to
// catch.
// Full 40-hex fingerprints used where a message embeds one.
const ( const (
msgFpA = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" msgFpA = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
msgFpB = "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" msgFpB = "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
) )
// runLocked runs fn while holding runMu, so operations that write to the func checkErrMsgCases(t *testing.T, cases []errMsgCase) {
// process-global logger do not race the other CLI runs.
func runLocked(fn func() error) error {
runMu.Lock()
defer runMu.Unlock()
return fn()
}
// unsignedChecker builds a Checker over a freshly scanned, unsigned manifest.
func unsignedChecker(t *testing.T) *mfer.Checker {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs() for _, tc := range cases {
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll("/d", 0o755)) t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/f.txt", []byte("hi"), 0o644)) t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, tc.err.Error())
s := mfer.NewScannerWithOptions(&mfer.ScannerOptions{Fs: fs}) })
require.NoError(t, s.EnumeratePath("/d", nil)) }
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, s.ToManifest(context.Background(), &buf, nil))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/index.mf", buf.Bytes(), 0o644))
chk, err := mfer.NewChecker("/d/index.mf", "/d", fs)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, chk.IsSigned())
return chk
} }
func TestNoManifestFoundMessage(t *testing.T) { // TestErrorMessagesVerbatim pins the exact rendered text of the CLI's
t.Parallel() // user-visible error messages.
_, err := findManifest(afero.NewMemMapFs(), "/tmp/x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errNoManifestFound)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"no manifest found in /tmp/x (looked for index.mf and .index.mf)")
}
func TestVerifyRequiredSignerMessages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("invalid fingerprint length", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := verifyRequiredSigner(unsignedChecker(t), "12345678")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidFingerprint)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"invalid fingerprint: must be exactly 40 hex characters, got 8")
})
t.Run("manifest not signed", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := verifyRequiredSigner(unsignedChecker(t), msgFpA)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errManifestNotSigned)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"manifest is not signed, but signature from "+msgFpA+" is required")
})
}
// TestSignerMismatchMessage drives verifyRequiredSigner against a real signed
// manifest. The embedded fingerprint is whatever the generated key produced,
// so it is read back from the checker and substituted into the expected
// string; the required signer is a fixed value that cannot match it. Requires
// gpg and is skipped where it is absent, as the other signing tests are.
// //
//nolint:paralleltest // signedChecker calls t.Setenv, which bars t.Parallel // These strings are an interface: they are grepped for in CI pipelines
func TestSignerMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) { // and quoted in bug reports. The messages are assembled by wrapping
chk := signedChecker(t) // static sentinels, and it is easy to change what a user sees while
// only meaning to make an error matchable with errors.Is - which is
embeddedFP, err := chk.ExtractEmbeddedSigningKeyFP() // precisely what happened once already. Any change to a string below is
require.NoError(t, err) // therefore a deliberate, separately stated change, never a side effect
// of a refactor.
err = verifyRequiredSigner(chk, msgFpB) func TestErrorMessagesVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSignerMismatch)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"embedded signing key fingerprint "+embeddedFP+
" does not match required "+msgFpB)
}
// signedChecker builds a Checker over a manifest signed by a throwaway GPG
// key generated in a temporary GNUPGHOME.
func signedChecker(t *testing.T) *mfer.Checker {
t.Helper()
_, err := exec.LookPath("gpg")
if err != nil {
t.Skip("gpg not installed, skipping signing test")
}
gpgHome := t.TempDir()
params := "%no-protection\n" +
"Key-Type: RSA\nKey-Length: 2048\n" +
"Name-Real: MFER Test Key\nName-Email: test@mfer.test\n" +
"Expire-Date: 0\n%commit\n"
paramsFile := filepath.Join(gpgHome, "key-params")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(paramsFile, []byte(params), 0o600))
//nolint:gosec // paramsFile is a test-controlled path inside t.TempDir()
cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "gpg",
"--batch", "--gen-key", paramsFile)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GNUPGHOME="+gpgHome)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("failed to generate test GPG key: %v: %s", err, out)
}
t.Setenv("GNUPGHOME", gpgHome)
b := mfer.NewBuilder()
b.SetSigningOptions(&mfer.SigningOptions{KeyID: mfer.GPGKeyID("test@mfer.test")})
content := []byte("signed file")
_, err = b.AddFile("f.txt", mfer.FileSize(len(content)), mfer.ModTime{},
bytes.NewReader(content), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, b.Build(&buf))
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/index.mf", buf.Bytes(), 0o644))
chk, err := mfer.NewChecker("/index.mf", "/", fs)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, chk.IsSigned())
return chk
}
func TestPathDoesNotExistMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
set := flag.NewFlagSet("gen", flag.ContinueOnError) checkErrMsgCases(t, []errMsgCase{
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{"nope"})) {
name: "check: no manifest found",
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()} err: fmt.Errorf("%w in %s (looked for index.mf and .index.mf)",
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil) errNoManifestFound, "/tmp/x"),
want: "no manifest found in /tmp/x " +
_, err := mfa.collectInputPaths(ctx.Args()) "(looked for index.mf and .index.mf)",
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathNotExist) },
assert.EqualError(t, err, "path does not exist: nope") {
} name: "check: invalid fingerprint length",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w, got %d", errInvalidFingerprint, 8),
func TestOutputFileExistsMessage(t *testing.T) { want: "invalid fingerprint: must be exactly 40 hex characters, got 8",
t.Parallel() },
{
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs() name: "check: manifest not signed",
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll("/d", 0o755)) err: fmt.Errorf("%w, but signature from %s is required",
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/f.txt", []byte("hi"), 0o644)) errManifestNotSigned, msgFpA),
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/out.mf", []byte("old"), 0o644)) want: "manifest is not signed, but signature from " + msgFpA +
" is required",
set := flag.NewFlagSet("gen", flag.ContinueOnError) },
set.String("output", "", "") {
set.Bool("force", false, "") name: "check: signer mismatch",
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{"/d"})) err: fmt.Errorf("embedded signing key fingerprint %s %w %s",
require.NoError(t, set.Set("output", "/out.mf")) msgFpA, errSignerMismatch, msgFpB),
want: "embedded signing key fingerprint " + msgFpA +
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: fs} " does not match required " + msgFpB,
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil) },
{
// generateManifestOperation writes to the process-global logger during name: "gen: path does not exist",
// enumeration, so serialize with the other CLI runs. err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errPathNotExist, "nope"),
err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.generateManifestOperation(ctx) }) want: "path does not exist: nope",
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errOutputExists) },
assert.EqualError(t, err, {
"output file /out.mf already exists (use --force to overwrite)") name: "gen: output file exists",
} err: fmt.Errorf("output file %s %w", "index.mf", errOutputExists),
want: "output file index.mf already exists " +
func TestManifestLoaderHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) { "(use --force to overwrite)",
t.Parallel() },
{
server := httptest.NewServer( name: "mfer: unknown command",
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { err: fmt.Errorf("%w %q", errUnknownCommand, "bogus"),
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) want: `unknown command "bogus"`,
})) },
defer server.Close()
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
_, err := mfa.openManifestReader(server.URL + "/foo.mf")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"failed to fetch "+server.URL+"/foo.mf: HTTP 404")
}
func TestFetchManifestHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
server := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer server.Close()
set := flag.NewFlagSet("fetch", flag.ContinueOnError)
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{server.URL}))
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
// fetchManifestOperation logs to the process-global logger.
err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.fetchManifestOperation(ctx) })
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "failed to fetch manifest: HTTP 404")
}
func TestFetchFileHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
server := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}))
defer server.Close()
err := downloadFile(context.Background(), server.URL+"/x", "x",
&mfer.MFFilePath{}, nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "HTTP 500")
}
func TestURLRequiredMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
set := flag.NewFlagSet("fetch", flag.ContinueOnError)
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{}))
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
// fetchManifestOperation logs to the process-global logger.
err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.fetchManifestOperation(ctx) })
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errURLRequired)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "URL argument required")
}
func TestSanitizePathMessages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("empty", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errEmptyPath)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "empty path")
})
t.Run("absolute", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("/etc/passwd")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errAbsolutePath)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "absolute path not allowed: /etc/passwd")
})
t.Run("traversal", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("../x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathTraversal)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "path traversal not allowed: ../x")
}) })
} }
func TestSizeMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) { // TestFetchErrorMessagesVerbatim pins the fetch and manifest-loader
// messages; see TestErrorMessagesVerbatim for why.
func TestFetchErrorMessagesVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// finishDownload returns the size-mismatch error before it touches the checkErrMsgCases(t, []errMsgCase{
// paths, digest, or entry, so those can be zero here. {
err := finishDownload("", "", 9, 10, nil, nil, nil, nil) name: "manifest_loader: http status",
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSizeMismatch) err: fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch %s: %w %d",
assert.EqualError(t, err, "size mismatch: expected 10 bytes, got 9") "https://example.com/index.mf", errHTTPStatus, 404),
want: "failed to fetch https://example.com/index.mf: HTTP 404",
},
{
name: "fetch: manifest http status",
err: fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch manifest: %w %d",
errHTTPStatus, 404),
want: "failed to fetch manifest: HTTP 404",
},
{
name: "fetch: file http status",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w %d", errHTTPStatus, 500),
want: "HTTP 500",
},
{
name: "fetch: empty path",
err: errEmptyPath,
want: "empty path",
},
{
name: "fetch: absolute path",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errAbsolutePath, "/etc/passwd"),
want: "absolute path not allowed: /etc/passwd",
},
{
name: "fetch: path traversal",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errPathTraversal, "../x"),
want: "path traversal not allowed: ../x",
},
{
name: "fetch: size mismatch",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: expected %d bytes, got %d",
errSizeMismatch, 10, 9),
want: "size mismatch: expected 10 bytes, got 9",
},
{
name: "fetch: url required",
err: errURLRequired,
want: "URL argument required",
},
{
name: "fetch: hash mismatch",
err: errHashMismatch,
want: "hash mismatch",
},
})
} }
func TestHashMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) { // TestSentinelsAreMatchable checks that the wrapped forms of the
// messages above remain matchable with errors.Is, which is the reason
// the sentinels exist at all.
func TestSentinelsAreMatchable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// A 32-byte digest that matches none of the (empty) manifest hashes. wrapped := fmt.Errorf("embedded signing key fingerprint %s %w %s",
err := verifyDownloadedHash(make([]byte, 32), &mfer.MFFilePath{}) "a", errSignerMismatch, "b")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHashMismatch) require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errSignerMismatch)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, errSizeMismatch)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "hash mismatch") wrapped = fmt.Errorf("output file %s %w", "index.mf", errOutputExists)
require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errOutputExists)
wrapped = fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch manifest: %w %d", errHTTPStatus, 404)
require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errHTTPStatus)
assert.NotErrorIs(t, errHashMismatch, errSizeMismatch)
} }
+1 -4
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@@ -110,10 +110,7 @@ func TestFreshenRecordEntryMtimePresence(t *testing.T) {
const relPath = "file1.txt" const relPath = "file1.txt"
// The scanned file's mtime is the Unix epoch. If recordEntry ever misreads mtime := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)
// an absent manifest mtime as the epoch, the "absent" case below would
// compare equal to this and be classified unchanged, so the test fails.
mtime := time.Unix(0, 0)
info := stubFileInfo{size: 8, mtime: mtime} info := stubFileInfo{size: 8, mtime: mtime}
for _, tc := range []struct { for _, tc := range []struct {
+4
View File
@@ -312,6 +312,10 @@ func (c *Checker) FindExtraFiles(ctx context.Context, results chan<- Result) err
} }
func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result { func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result {
// entry.GetPath() is safe to join here: a manifest's entry paths are
// validated against the path invariants when it is loaded (see
// deserializeInner) or built (see Builder.AddFile), so a traversal or
// absolute path can never reach this point.
absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath()) absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath())
relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath()) relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath())
+14
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ var (
errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size") errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size")
errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch") errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch")
errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format") errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format")
errInvalidManifestPath = errors.New("manifest contains invalid path")
) )
// validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable). // validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable).
@@ -181,6 +182,19 @@ func (m *manifest) deserializeInner() error {
return errUUIDMismatch return errUUIDMismatch
} }
// Enforce the manifest path invariants on every entry as it is loaded,
// so that no consumer of a manifest — Checker today, any restore or
// extract path tomorrow — acts on a traversal or absolute path from an
// untrusted .mf. Reject loudly on the first offender rather than
// dropping entries, which would let a hostile manifest hide files from a
// check.
for _, f := range m.pbInner.GetFiles() {
err = ValidatePath(f.GetPath())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errInvalidManifestPath, err)
}
}
log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles())) log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles()))
return nil return nil
+145
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@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box tests exercise unexported internals
package mfer
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
// craftInnerBytes builds the wire bytes of an inner MFFile holding a single
// file entry whose path is exactly pathBytes. It writes the wire form by hand
// so a hostile path — including one that is not valid UTF-8 — can be embedded
// without proto.Marshal's own UTF-8 enforcement rejecting it first.
func craftInnerBytes(id uuid.UUID, pathBytes string) []byte {
entry := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 1, protowire.BytesType) // MFFilePath.path
entry = protowire.AppendString(entry, pathBytes)
inner := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 100, protowire.VarintType) // MFFile.version
inner = protowire.AppendVarint(inner, uint64(MFFile_VERSION_ONE))
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 101, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.files
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, entry)
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 102, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.uuid
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, id[:])
return inner
}
// wrapInner wraps inner MFFile wire bytes in a complete, well-formed .mf
// envelope (magic prefix, zstd-compressed payload, matching hash and UUID) so
// that deserialization reaches path validation rather than failing earlier on
// an integrity check.
func wrapInner(t *testing.T, id uuid.UUID, innerData []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var cbuf bytes.Buffer
zw, err := zstd.NewWriter(&cbuf, zstd.WithEncoderLevel(zstd.SpeedBestCompression))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = zw.Write(innerData)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, zw.Close())
compressed := cbuf.Bytes()
sum := sha256.Sum256(compressed)
outer := &MFFileOuter{
InnerMessage: compressed,
Size: int64(len(innerData)),
Sha256: sum[:],
Uuid: id[:],
Version: MFFileOuter_VERSION_ONE,
CompressionType: MFFileOuter_COMPRESSION_ZSTD,
}
ob, err := proto.Marshal(outer)
require.NoError(t, err)
return append([]byte(MAGIC), ob...)
}
func TestDeserializeRejectsInvalidEntryPaths(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"parent traversal", "../escape"},
{"interior traversal", "a/../../escape"},
{"absolute path", "/etc/passwd"},
{"backslash path", `a\b`},
{"double slash", "a//b"},
{"empty path", ""},
{"invalid utf-8", "abc\xff"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
id := uuid.New()
data := wrapInner(t, id, craftInnerBytes(id, tt.path))
_, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
require.Error(t, err)
if tt.path == "abc\xff" {
// A path that is not valid UTF-8 cannot survive the proto3
// string decoder, which rejects it before path validation
// runs; the manifest is still refused at load time.
return
}
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidManifestPath)
if tt.path != "" {
// ValidatePath quotes the path with %q; assert against the
// same rendering so escaped characters (e.g. a backslash)
// still match.
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("%q", tt.path),
"error must name the offending path")
}
})
}
}
func TestDeserializeValidManifestRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash := make([]byte, 34) // multihash: 2-byte prefix + 32-byte SHA-256
b := NewBuilder()
require.NoError(t, b.AddFileWithHash("dir/file.txt", 123, ModTime{}, hash))
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, b.Build(&buf))
m, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()))
require.NoError(t, err)
files := m.Files()
require.Len(t, files, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "dir/file.txt", files[0].GetPath())
assert.Equal(t, int64(123), files[0].GetSize())
}
// TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8 pins the ValidatePath rule that a manifest
// path must be valid UTF-8, independent of the proto decoder that also enforces
// it on the wire.
func TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidatePath("abc\xff")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathNotUTF8)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "UTF-8")
}