Refuse a signature made when its key was not valid (closes #209)

verifySignature lets a key that has expired since verify a signature,
because a manifest outlives its key, but it checked the key only as of
now. It accepted a signature dated after its key expired, after the
key's self-signature or the signing subkey's binding signature expired,
or before the key was made. It now verifies a second time with the
library's clock set to the signature's creation time and refuses the
signature if the key or subkey was not valid then. docs/FORMAT.md
states the rule.

Judgement call: the tests make the refused signatures with the
library's packet API, because openpgp.DetachSign will not sign with a
key that is not valid at its clock's time.

Model: opus-5-5

docs/FORMAT.md

@@ -174,9 +174,16 @@ also refuses a manifest whose `signingPubKey` holds a DSA key or subkey, or any
 secret key or subkey, since checking the self-signatures of a DSA key or the
 numbers of a secret key can take hours when those numbers are very large.
 
-A signing key that has expired does not make the signature bad, because a
-manifest outlives its key. A signature past its own expiry time is not good,
-whether or not the key has expired too.
+A signature is good only if the key that made it was valid at the signature's
+creation time. The primary key is judged by the newest self-signature on its
+primary user ID, and a subkey by its newest binding signature. By the
+signature's creation time the primary key and that self-signature must have been
+made and neither may have expired, and when a subkey made the signature the same
+holds of the subkey and its binding signature. A signature made before that
+self-signature or binding signature is not good, even if an older one made the
+key valid at that time. A key that has expired since does not make the signature
+bad, because a manifest outlives its key. A signature past its own expiry time
+is not good, whether or not the key has expired too.
 
 ## Deterministic Serialization
 

mfer/openpgp.go

@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@ var (
 		"signature must hold exactly one signature")
 	errNotOneArmoredBlock = errors.New(
 		"must be exactly one armored block and nothing else")
-	errMalformedArmor = errors.New("armor is malformed")
+	errMalformedArmor        = errors.New("armor is malformed")
+	errKeyNotValidWhenSigned = errors.New(
+		"signature was made when its key was not valid")
 )
 
 // SigningOptions holds the key a manifest is signed with.
@@ -245,8 +247,9 @@ func fingerprint(key *openpgp.Entity) string {
 
 // verifySignature checks that signature is one good, unexpired OpenPGP
 // signature over data, made by the one primary key in pubKey or one of its
-// subkeys, and returns that primary key's fingerprint. signature and pubKey
-// may each be armored or binary.
+// subkeys while that key was valid, and returns that primary key's
+// fingerprint. The key may have expired since. signature and pubKey may
+// each be armored or binary.
 func verifySignature(data, signature, pubKey []byte) (string, error) {
 	key, err := readOneKey(pubKey, "embedded public key block", true)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -281,6 +284,25 @@ func verifySignature(data, signature, pubKey []byte) (string, error) {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("verify signature: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// The library checks whether the key is valid at the time its config
+	// gives, which above is now. Verifying again as of the signature's
+	// creation time refuses a signature made before the key or subkey that
+	// made it was made, after it expired, or after its self-signature or
+	// binding signature expired. The library judges the primary key by the
+	// newest self-signature on its primary user ID and a subkey by its
+	// newest binding signature, so this also refuses a signature made
+	// before either of those, even if an older one was valid then.
+	signedAt := &packet.Config{
+		Time: func() time.Time { return sig.CreationTime },
+	}
+
+	_, _, err = openpgp.VerifyDetachedSignature(openpgp.EntityList{key},
+		bytes.NewReader(data), bytes.NewReader(sigData), signedAt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("verify signature: %w: %w",
+			errKeyNotValidWhenSigned, err)
+	}
+
 	return fingerprint(key), nil
 }
 

mfer/openpgp_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package mfer
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"crypto"
 	"crypto/dsa" //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019: tests need a DSA key to refuse
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
@@ -419,8 +420,9 @@ func TestVerifySignature(t *testing.T) {
 
 // TestVerifySignatureKeyExpiredSince verifies two signatures made in 2020
 // by a key that expired a day after it was made. A signature with no
-// expiry time is still good. One that expired an hour after it was made is
-// refused, although the key has expired too.
+// expiry time is still good, as is one made then by a signing subkey that
+// expired a day after it was made. One that expired an hour after it was
+// made is refused, although the key has expired too.
 func TestVerifySignatureKeyExpiredSince(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -448,10 +450,132 @@ func TestVerifySignatureKeyExpiredSince(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, fingerprint(key), signer)
 
+	withSubkey := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{Time: config.Time})
+	require.NoError(t, withSubkey.AddSigningSubkey(&packet.Config{
+		Algorithm: packet.PubKeyAlgoEdDSA, Time: config.Time,
+		KeyLifetimeSecs: config.KeyLifetimeSecs,
+	}))
+
+	var subkeySig bytes.Buffer
+
+	require.NoError(t, openpgp.ArmoredDetachSign(&subkeySig, withSubkey,
+		bytes.NewReader(data), config))
+
+	subkeyPubKey, err := armoredPublicKey(withSubkey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = verifySignature(data, subkeySig.Bytes(), subkeyPubKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
 	_, err = verifySignature(data, expiringSig.Bytes(), pubKey)
 	require.ErrorIs(t, err, pgperrors.ErrSignatureExpired)
 }
 
+// signDated returns a detached signature over data by signer, dated when.
+// openpgp.DetachSign signs only with a key that is valid at the time its
+// config gives, so this makes the signature packet without that check.
+func signDated(t *testing.T, signer *packet.PrivateKey, data []byte,
+	when time.Time,
+) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sig := &packet.Signature{
+		SigType:      packet.SigTypeBinary,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   signer.PubKeyAlgo,
+		Hash:         crypto.SHA256,
+		CreationTime: when,
+		IssuerKeyId:  &signer.KeyId,
+	}
+
+	h, err := sig.PrepareSign(nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = h.Write(data)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, sig.Sign(h, signer, nil))
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+
+	require.NoError(t, sig.Serialize(&buf))
+
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// TestVerifySignatureRefusesKeyNotValidWhenSigned verifies signatures
+// dated when the key or subkey that made them was not valid: after the key
+// expired; after the key's self-signature, or the signing subkey's binding
+// signature, expired, the key or subkey having expired since as well; and
+// before the key was made, also by a key made in 2100. Each must be
+// refused.
+func TestVerifySignatureRefusesKeyNotValidWhenSigned(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	made := time.Date(2020, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	twoDaysLater := made.Add(48 * time.Hour)
+	day := uint32((24 * time.Hour).Seconds())
+	clock := func(when time.Time) func() time.Time {
+		return func() time.Time { return when }
+	}
+
+	expiredAfterADay := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{
+		Time: clock(made), KeyLifetimeSecs: day,
+	})
+	selfSignatureExpiredAfterADay := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{
+		Time: clock(made), KeyLifetimeSecs: 30 * day, SigLifetimeSecs: day,
+	})
+
+	withSubkey := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{Time: clock(made)})
+	require.NoError(t, withSubkey.AddSigningSubkey(&packet.Config{
+		Algorithm: packet.PubKeyAlgoEdDSA, Time: clock(made),
+		KeyLifetimeSecs: 30 * day, SigLifetimeSecs: day,
+	}))
+	subkey := withSubkey.Subkeys[len(withSubkey.Subkeys)-1].PrivateKey
+
+	madeADayLater := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{
+		Time: clock(made.Add(24 * time.Hour)),
+	})
+	madeIn2100 := newTestKey(t, &packet.Config{
+		Time: clock(time.Date(2100, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)),
+	})
+
+	for name, test := range map[string]struct {
+		key    *openpgp.Entity
+		signer *packet.PrivateKey
+		when   time.Time
+	}{
+		"after the key expired": {
+			expiredAfterADay, expiredAfterADay.PrivateKey, twoDaysLater,
+		},
+		"after the self-signature expired": {
+			selfSignatureExpiredAfterADay,
+			selfSignatureExpiredAfterADay.PrivateKey, twoDaysLater,
+		},
+		"after the binding signature expired": {
+			withSubkey, subkey, twoDaysLater,
+		},
+		"before the key was made": {
+			madeADayLater, madeADayLater.PrivateKey, made,
+		},
+		"before a key made in 2100": {
+			madeIn2100, madeIn2100.PrivateKey, made,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			data := []byte("signed in 2020")
+
+			pubKey, err := armoredPublicKey(test.key)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			_, err = verifySignature(data,
+				signDated(t, test.signer, data, test.when), pubKey)
+			require.ErrorIs(t, err, errKeyNotValidWhenSigned)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestManifestSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()