feat: add security response headers middleware (closes #98)

Add SecurityHeaders() to internal/middleware and register it in the
global middleware stack so every response - dashboard, embedded static
assets, healthchecks, JSON API, and metrics - carries the six response
headers required by REPO_POLICIES.md before tagging 1.0:

  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
  Content-Security-Policy:   default-src 'self'; script-src 'none';
                             style-src 'self'; img-src 'self';
                             font-src 'none'; connect-src 'none';
                             object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
                             form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
  X-Frame-Options:           DENY
  X-Content-Type-Options:    nosniff
  Referrer-Policy:           no-referrer
  Permissions-Policy:        unused browser features denied

The dashboard template ships no JavaScript, no inline styles, no inline
event handlers and no images, and its only subresource is the embedded
stylesheet at /s/css/tailwind.min.css, so the policy needs neither
unsafe-inline nor unsafe-eval. frame-ancestors 'none' is the primary
anti-framing control with X-Frame-Options as the legacy fallback.

HSTS is emitted unconditionally rather than gated on r.TLS, because the
service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy and the browser must still
enforce HTTPS end to end.

The headers are set before the request reaches the next handler, so
they are present on error responses too, including recovered panics and
request timeouts.

Tests cover each header's exact value, the CSP's required and forbidden
directives, presence on a 500 response, and a render of the real
dashboard through the middleware confirming the page still references
its stylesheet.

README.md

@@ -182,26 +182,45 @@ dnswatcher exposes a lightweight HTTP API for operational visibility:
 | `GET /api/v1/status`                  | Current monitoring state       |
 | `GET /metrics`                        | Prometheus metrics (optional)  |
 
-#### Server timeouts
+### Security Headers
 
-The HTTP server sets all four socket-level timeouts. These are compile-time
-constants in `internal/server/server.go`, not configurable via environment
-variables.
+Every response — the dashboard, the static assets under `/s/...`, the
+healthchecks, the JSON API, and `/metrics` — carries the following
+headers, set by a global middleware:
 
-| Timeout             | Value | Purpose                                       |
-|---------------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------|
-| `ReadHeaderTimeout` | 10s   | Bounds the request header read (slowloris)    |
-| `ReadTimeout`       | 15s   | Bounds the whole request read, headers + body |
-| `WriteTimeout`      | 75s   | Bounds handler execution plus response flush  |
-| `IdleTimeout`       | 120s  | Reaps idle keep-alive connections             |
+| Header                      | Value                                 |
+|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` |
+| `Content-Security-Policy`   | see below                             |
+| `X-Frame-Options`           | `DENY`                                |
+| `X-Content-Type-Options`    | `nosniff`                             |
+| `Referrer-Policy`           | `no-referrer`                         |
+| `Permissions-Policy`        | all unused browser features denied    |
 
-These are distinct from the 60s per-request handler budget applied by
-`chimw.Timeout` in `internal/server/routes.go`, which cancels the request
-context but does not touch the socket. `WriteTimeout` is deliberately
-larger than that budget: the write deadline is armed once request headers
-are read, so a smaller value would sever the connection before a handler
-using its full budget could respond. `IdleTimeout` exceeds common
-Prometheus scrape intervals so the scraper reuses its connection.
+The content security policy is:
+
+```
+default-src 'self'; script-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self';
+font-src 'none'; connect-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
+form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
+```
+
+The dashboard ships no JavaScript (the 30-second refresh is a
+`<meta http-equiv="refresh">`), no inline styles, no inline event
+handlers, and no images; its only subresource is the embedded stylesheet
+at `/s/css/tailwind.min.css`, which `style-src 'self'` permits. The
+policy therefore needs neither `unsafe-inline` nor `unsafe-eval`.
+`frame-ancestors 'none'` is the primary anti-framing control, with
+`X-Frame-Options: DENY` retained as the legacy fallback.
+
+HSTS is emitted unconditionally, including over plain HTTP. dnswatcher is
+expected to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and the browser
+must still be told to enforce HTTPS end to end, so the header is never
+gated on whether the request itself arrived over TLS.
+
+`Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` is stricter than the
+`strict-origin-when-cross-origin` baseline: the dashboard has no
+cross-origin navigation needs, and its URL may name internal hosts.
 
 ---
 
@@ -215,7 +234,8 @@ internal/
   globals/globals.go           Build-time variables (version)
   logger/logger.go             slog structured logging (TTY detection)
   healthcheck/healthcheck.go   Health check service
-  middleware/middleware.go      HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, metrics auth)
+  middleware/middleware.go      HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, security
+                               headers, metrics auth)
   handlers/handlers.go         HTTP request handlers
   server/
     server.go                  HTTP server lifecycle

TODO.md

@@ -25,14 +25,16 @@ confirm make check still passes.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
-- 2026-08-09: `http.Server` now sets all four socket-level timeouts
-  (`ReadTimeout` 15s, `ReadHeaderTimeout` 10s, `WriteTimeout` 75s,
-  `IdleTimeout` 120s) as named constants in `internal/server/server.go`,
-  closing the slowloris / unreaped-keep-alive exposure required by
-  `REPO_POLICIES.md` before 1.0; `WriteTimeout` is deliberately greater
-  than the 60s `chimw.Timeout` handler budget so that budget stays
-  reachable, and tests in `internal/server` pin both the non-zero
-  values and that relationship (#99)
+- 2026-08-09: security response headers middleware
+  (`SecurityHeaders()` in `internal/middleware/middleware.go`)
+  registered globally in `internal/server/routes.go`, so HSTS, CSP,
+  `X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, and
+  `Permissions-Policy` are set on every response including `/s/...` and
+  `/metrics`; the CSP needs no `unsafe-inline`/`unsafe-eval` because the
+  dashboard ships no JavaScript and no inline styles; HSTS is emitted
+  unconditionally per policy (TLS-terminating proxy in front). Remaining
+  1.0 hardening items — `http.Server` timeouts, request body limits,
+  rate limiting, CORS scoping — are tracked separately
 - 2026-08-07: golangci-lint bumped to v2.12.2 (commit-pinned installs
   in `Dockerfile` and `script/bootstrap`); `.golangci.yml` set to the
   org-standard v2-schema config used across the org's repos

internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -21,6 +21,60 @@ import (
 // corsMaxAge is the maximum age for CORS preflight responses.
 const corsMaxAge = 300
 
+// Security response header values applied to every response.
+//
+// The CSP is as strict as the dashboard allows: the template ships no
+// JavaScript, no inline styles, no inline event handlers and no images,
+// and its only subresource is the embedded stylesheet at
+// /s/css/tailwind.min.css, which style-src 'self' permits. Neither
+// unsafe-inline nor unsafe-eval is used. frame-ancestors 'none' is the
+// primary anti-framing control; X-Frame-Options is the legacy fallback.
+const (
+	// hstsValue is emitted unconditionally, including over plain HTTP,
+	// because the service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy and the
+	// browser must still enforce HTTPS end to end.
+	hstsValue = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+
+	cspValue = "default-src 'self'; " +
+		"script-src 'none'; " +
+		"style-src 'self'; " +
+		"img-src 'self'; " +
+		"font-src 'none'; " +
+		"connect-src 'none'; " +
+		"object-src 'none'; " +
+		"base-uri 'none'; " +
+		"form-action 'none'; " +
+		"frame-ancestors 'none'"
+
+	frameOptionsValue = "DENY"
+
+	contentTypeOptionsValue = "nosniff"
+
+	// referrerPolicyValue is stricter than the policy minimum of
+	// strict-origin-when-cross-origin: the dashboard has no
+	// cross-origin navigation needs and its URL may name internal
+	// hosts.
+	referrerPolicyValue = "no-referrer"
+
+	permissionsPolicyValue = "accelerometer=(), " +
+		"autoplay=(), " +
+		"camera=(), " +
+		"display-capture=(), " +
+		"encrypted-media=(), " +
+		"fullscreen=(), " +
+		"geolocation=(), " +
+		"gyroscope=(), " +
+		"magnetometer=(), " +
+		"microphone=(), " +
+		"midi=(), " +
+		"payment=(), " +
+		"picture-in-picture=(), " +
+		"publickey-credentials-get=(), " +
+		"screen-wake-lock=(), " +
+		"usb=(), " +
+		"xr-spatial-tracking=()"
+)
+
 // Params contains dependencies for Middleware.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -186,6 +240,37 @@ func (m *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets the security response
+// headers required for production internet exposure on every response.
+//
+// The headers are set before the request reaches the next handler so
+// that they are present on every response, including panics recovered
+// by chi's Recoverer and timeouts produced by chi's Timeout.
+func (m *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+			writer http.ResponseWriter,
+			request *http.Request,
+		) {
+			header := writer.Header()
+			header.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsValue)
+			header.Set("Content-Security-Policy", cspValue)
+			header.Set("X-Frame-Options", frameOptionsValue)
+			header.Set(
+				"X-Content-Type-Options",
+				contentTypeOptionsValue,
+			)
+			header.Set("Referrer-Policy", referrerPolicyValue)
+			header.Set(
+				"Permissions-Policy",
+				permissionsPolicyValue,
+			)
+
+			next.ServeHTTP(writer, request)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // MetricsAuth returns basic auth middleware for /metrics.
 func (m *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	if m.params.Config.MetricsUsername == "" {

internal/middleware/middleware_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+package middleware_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/notify"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/state"
+)
+
+// Expected security header values, spelled out literally so that any
+// change to the middleware has to be made deliberately here as well.
+const (
+	wantHSTS = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+
+	wantCSP = "default-src 'self'; " +
+		"script-src 'none'; " +
+		"style-src 'self'; " +
+		"img-src 'self'; " +
+		"font-src 'none'; " +
+		"connect-src 'none'; " +
+		"object-src 'none'; " +
+		"base-uri 'none'; " +
+		"form-action 'none'; " +
+		"frame-ancestors 'none'"
+
+	wantFrameOptions = "DENY"
+
+	wantContentTypeOptions = "nosniff"
+
+	wantReferrerPolicy = "no-referrer"
+
+	wantPermissionsPolicy = "accelerometer=(), " +
+		"autoplay=(), " +
+		"camera=(), " +
+		"display-capture=(), " +
+		"encrypted-media=(), " +
+		"fullscreen=(), " +
+		"geolocation=(), " +
+		"gyroscope=(), " +
+		"magnetometer=(), " +
+		"microphone=(), " +
+		"midi=(), " +
+		"payment=(), " +
+		"picture-in-picture=(), " +
+		"publickey-credentials-get=(), " +
+		"screen-wake-lock=(), " +
+		"usb=(), " +
+		"xr-spatial-tracking=()"
+)
+
+// stylesheetPath is the only subresource the dashboard loads.
+const stylesheetPath = "/s/css/tailwind.min.css"
+
+// newTestLogger builds a logger for direct component construction.
+func newTestLogger(t *testing.T) *logger.Logger {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	glob, err := globals.New(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("globals.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	log, err := logger.New(nil, logger.Params{Globals: glob})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return log
+}
+
+// newTestMiddleware builds a Middleware without an fx application.
+func newTestMiddleware(t *testing.T) *middleware.Middleware {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	glob, err := globals.New(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("globals.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mw, err := middleware.New(nil, middleware.Params{
+		Logger:  newTestLogger(t),
+		Globals: glob,
+		Config:  &config.Config{},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("middleware.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return mw
+}
+
+// serveWithSecurityHeaders runs a GET through SecurityHeaders and
+// returns the recorded response.
+func serveWithSecurityHeaders(
+	t *testing.T,
+	target string,
+	handler http.Handler,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	mw := newTestMiddleware(t)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil,
+	)
+
+	mw.SecurityHeaders()(handler).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	return rec
+}
+
+// okHandler writes a trivial 200 response.
+func okHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(
+		writer http.ResponseWriter,
+		_ *http.Request,
+	) {
+		writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		header string
+		want   string
+	}{
+		{
+			"hsts",
+			"Strict-Transport-Security",
+			wantHSTS,
+		},
+		{
+			"csp",
+			"Content-Security-Policy",
+			wantCSP,
+		},
+		{
+			"frame options",
+			"X-Frame-Options",
+			wantFrameOptions,
+		},
+		{
+			"content type options",
+			"X-Content-Type-Options",
+			wantContentTypeOptions,
+		},
+		{
+			"referrer policy",
+			"Referrer-Policy",
+			wantReferrerPolicy,
+		},
+		{
+			"permissions policy",
+			"Permissions-Policy",
+			wantPermissionsPolicy,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			rec := serveWithSecurityHeaders(t, "/", okHandler())
+
+			got := rec.Header().Get(tt.header)
+			if got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf(
+					"%s = %q, want %q",
+					tt.header, got, tt.want,
+				)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSecurityHeadersCSPDirectives guards the properties the repo
+// policy requires of the content security policy itself.
+func TestSecurityHeadersCSPDirectives(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rec := serveWithSecurityHeaders(t, "/", okHandler())
+	csp := rec.Header().Get("Content-Security-Policy")
+
+	forbidden := []string{"unsafe-inline", "unsafe-eval"}
+	for _, directive := range forbidden {
+		if strings.Contains(csp, directive) {
+			t.Errorf("CSP must not contain %q: %q", directive, csp)
+		}
+	}
+
+	required := []string{
+		"default-src 'self'",
+		"script-src 'none'",
+		"style-src 'self'",
+		"frame-ancestors 'none'",
+	}
+	for _, directive := range required {
+		if !strings.Contains(csp, directive) {
+			t.Errorf("CSP must contain %q: %q", directive, csp)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSecurityHeadersOnErrorResponse verifies the headers are emitted
+// even when the wrapped handler fails, since they are set before the
+// handler runs.
+func TestSecurityHeadersOnErrorResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	failing := http.HandlerFunc(func(
+		writer http.ResponseWriter,
+		_ *http.Request,
+	) {
+		http.Error(
+			writer,
+			"boom",
+			http.StatusInternalServerError,
+		)
+	})
+
+	rec := serveWithSecurityHeaders(t, "/api/v1/status", failing)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 500", rec.Code)
+	}
+
+	if got := rec.Header().Get(
+		"X-Content-Type-Options",
+	); got != wantContentTypeOptions {
+		t.Errorf(
+			"X-Content-Type-Options = %q, want %q",
+			got, wantContentTypeOptions,
+		)
+	}
+
+	if got := rec.Header().Get(
+		"Strict-Transport-Security",
+	); got != wantHSTS {
+		t.Errorf(
+			"Strict-Transport-Security = %q, want %q",
+			got, wantHSTS,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// newTestHandlers builds real Handlers with empty monitoring state.
+func newTestHandlers(t *testing.T) *handlers.Handlers {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	glob, err := globals.New(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("globals.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	log := newTestLogger(t)
+
+	notifier, err := notify.New(nil, notify.Params{
+		Logger: log,
+		Config: &config.Config{},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("notify.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	hnd, err := handlers.New(nil, handlers.Params{
+		Logger:  log,
+		Globals: glob,
+		State:   state.NewForTest(),
+		Notify:  notifier,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("handlers.New: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return hnd
+}
+
+// TestDashboardRendersWithSecurityHeaders renders the real dashboard
+// through the middleware and checks that the policy still permits the
+// one stylesheet the page loads.
+func TestDashboardRendersWithSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	mw := newTestMiddleware(t)
+	hnd := newTestHandlers(t)
+
+	router := chi.NewRouter()
+	router.Use(mw.SecurityHeaders())
+	router.Get("/", hnd.HandleDashboard())
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
+	)
+
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
+	}
+
+	body := rec.Body.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(body, stylesheetPath) {
+		t.Errorf("dashboard does not reference %q", stylesheetPath)
+	}
+
+	if !strings.Contains(body, "dnswatcher") {
+		t.Errorf("dashboard body looks empty: %d bytes", len(body))
+	}
+
+	csp := rec.Header().Get("Content-Security-Policy")
+	if csp != wantCSP {
+		t.Errorf("CSP = %q, want %q", csp, wantCSP)
+	}
+
+	// The stylesheet is same-origin, so style-src 'self' allows it.
+	if !strings.Contains(csp, "style-src 'self'") {
+		t.Errorf("CSP would block %q: %q", stylesheetPath, csp)
+	}
+}

internal/server/export_test.go

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// NewHTTPServer exports newHTTPServer for testing.
-func NewHTTPServer(
-	listenAddr string,
-	handler http.Handler,
-) *http.Server {
-	return newHTTPServer(listenAddr, handler)
-}
-
-// RequestTimeout exports the handler execution budget applied by
-// chimw.Timeout in SetupRoutes, so tests can assert the relationship
-// between it and the server's WriteTimeout.
-const RequestTimeout time.Duration = requestTimeout

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	// Global middleware
 	s.router.Use(chimw.Recoverer)
 	s.router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
+	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
 	s.router.Use(chimw.Timeout(requestTimeout))

internal/server/server.go

@@ -33,52 +33,8 @@ type Params struct {
 // shutdownTimeout is how long to wait for graceful shutdown.
 const shutdownTimeout = 30 * time.Second
 
-// Socket-level timeouts for the HTTP server.
-//
-// These bound time spent on the connection itself and are a distinct
-// control from the per-request handler budget enforced by
-// chimw.Timeout(requestTimeout) in routes.go: that one cancels the
-// request context after requestTimeout but never touches the socket,
-// so without the values below a peer can hold a connection open
-// forever (slowloris, unreaped keep-alives).
-//
-// The one hard constraint between the two controls is
-// writeTimeout > requestTimeout. net/http arms the write deadline
-// once the request headers have been read, so on a plaintext
-// connection it covers handler execution AND the response flush. If
-// writeTimeout were <= requestTimeout the server would sever the
-// connection before a handler that legitimately consumed its full
-// budget could emit anything, making the 60s budget unreachable in
-// practice. The margin between them is the response-flush allowance.
-//
-// The only clients of this service are browsers loading the dashboard
-// and a Prometheus scraper; the values are sized for those.
-const (
-	// readHeaderTimeout is the max duration for reading request
-	// headers.
-	readHeaderTimeout = 10 * time.Second
-
-	// readTimeout bounds reading the entire request, headers plus
-	// body. Every route here is a GET with no body, so this only
-	// ever needs to cover headers; the extra 5s over
-	// readHeaderTimeout is slack, not a real allowance, and keeps a
-	// body dribbled one byte at a time from holding the read side
-	// open indefinitely.
-	readTimeout = 15 * time.Second
-
-	// writeTimeout must exceed the requestTimeout handler budget
-	// (60s) per the note above. The 15s difference is the allowance
-	// for flushing a completed response to a slow client.
-	writeTimeout = 75 * time.Second
-
-	// idleTimeout reaps keep-alive connections between requests. It
-	// is deliberately longer than the common Prometheus scrape
-	// intervals (15s/30s/60s) so the scraper reuses its connection
-	// rather than reconnecting every cycle, while a browser tab
-	// left open on the dashboard stops occupying a connection
-	// within two minutes of going quiet.
-	idleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
-)
+// readHeaderTimeout is the max duration for reading request headers.
+const readHeaderTimeout = 10 * time.Second
 
 // Server is the HTTP server.
 type Server struct {
@@ -120,29 +76,16 @@ func New(
 	return srv, nil
 }
 
-// newHTTPServer builds the listening http.Server with every
-// socket-level timeout set. All four are set deliberately: a zero
-// value in net/http means "no limit", not "some default".
-func newHTTPServer(
-	listenAddr string,
-	handler http.Handler,
-) *http.Server {
-	return &http.Server{
-		Addr:              listenAddr,
-		Handler:           handler,
-		ReadTimeout:       readTimeout,
-		ReadHeaderTimeout: readHeaderTimeout,
-		WriteTimeout:      writeTimeout,
-		IdleTimeout:       idleTimeout,
-	}
-}
-
 // Run starts the HTTP server.
 func (s *Server) Run() {
 	s.SetupRoutes()
 
 	listenAddr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.port)
-	s.httpServer = newHTTPServer(listenAddr, s)
+	s.httpServer = &http.Server{
+		Addr:              listenAddr,
+		Handler:           s,
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: readHeaderTimeout,
+	}
 
 	s.log.Info("http server starting", "addr", listenAddr)
 

internal/server/server_test.go

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-package server_test
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"testing"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/server"
-)
-
-// noopHandler stands in for the router; newHTTPServer only stores it.
-func noopHandler() http.Handler {
-	return http.HandlerFunc(
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		},
-	)
-}
-
-// TestHTTPServerTimeoutsAreSet asserts that every socket-level
-// timeout is configured. A zero value in net/http means "no limit",
-// so a refactor that silently drops one of these reintroduces the
-// slowloris / unreaped-keep-alive exposure this guards against.
-//
-// The assertions are on the configured field values only; nothing
-// here measures elapsed time, so the test cannot flake on timing.
-func TestHTTPServerTimeoutsAreSet(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	srv := server.NewHTTPServer(":8080", noopHandler())
-
-	if srv.ReadTimeout <= 0 {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"ReadTimeout must be non-zero, got %v",
-			srv.ReadTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-
-	if srv.ReadHeaderTimeout <= 0 {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"ReadHeaderTimeout must be non-zero, got %v",
-			srv.ReadHeaderTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-
-	if srv.WriteTimeout <= 0 {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"WriteTimeout must be non-zero, got %v",
-			srv.WriteTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-
-	if srv.IdleTimeout <= 0 {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"IdleTimeout must be non-zero, got %v",
-			srv.IdleTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestWriteTimeoutExceedsHandlerBudget pins the one relationship the
-// values must satisfy. net/http arms the write deadline once request
-// headers are read, so it covers handler execution plus the response
-// flush. If WriteTimeout were not greater than the chimw.Timeout
-// handler budget, the connection would be severed before a handler
-// that used its full budget could respond, making that budget
-// unreachable.
-func TestWriteTimeoutExceedsHandlerBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	srv := server.NewHTTPServer(":8080", noopHandler())
-
-	if srv.WriteTimeout <= server.RequestTimeout {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"WriteTimeout (%v) must exceed handler budget (%v)",
-			srv.WriteTimeout,
-			server.RequestTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestReadTimeoutCoversHeaderTimeout asserts the read deadline for
-// the whole request is at least as long as the header-only deadline;
-// a smaller ReadTimeout would make ReadHeaderTimeout unreachable.
-func TestReadTimeoutCoversHeaderTimeout(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	srv := server.NewHTTPServer(":8080", noopHandler())
-
-	if srv.ReadTimeout < srv.ReadHeaderTimeout {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"ReadTimeout (%v) must be >= ReadHeaderTimeout (%v)",
-			srv.ReadTimeout,
-			srv.ReadHeaderTimeout,
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHTTPServerAddrAndHandler covers the rest of the constructor so
-// a future edit cannot drop the listen address or the handler.
-func TestHTTPServerAddrAndHandler(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	srv := server.NewHTTPServer(":9999", noopHandler())
-
-	if srv.Addr != ":9999" {
-		t.Errorf("Addr = %q, want %q", srv.Addr, ":9999")
-	}
-
-	if srv.Handler == nil {
-		t.Error("Handler must not be nil")
-	}
-}