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sneak ee24afafd1 docs: name every approval-screen amount string, fix stale zero claim (closes #369)
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The README's amount-display section carried a claim that contradicted the
tree: it said a genuine zero renders `0.0000`, but a swap's `Min. received`
worked example now shows `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero minimum.
The claim is corrected — it holds for the ERC-20 amount, while the swap's
`Amount` and `Min. received` state their two misleading zeros (a V4 open
delta and a zero minimum) in words before the floor is reached.

A new list names every string an amount slot can show and what each means:
a formatted quantity, `Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)`,
`None (no minimum guaranteed)`, base units with decimals unknown, and
`Unknown (not named in the calldata)`. It also records that a zero
`minBalance` on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads the no-minimum
wording where it once read `0.0000`. Each claim was checked against the
tree. Docs only; no code or tests change.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 22:49:20 +00:00
4 changed files with 64 additions and 93 deletions
+40 -3
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@@ -882,9 +882,14 @@ On those screens, when the truncated string would contain no digit from 1 to 9
and the value does, the amount is extended to its first significant digit
instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000`
the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero. A
genuine zero still renders `0.0000`, and truncation stays truncation: `0.99999`
shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up.
the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero.
Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. A
genuine zero reaching this rule renders `0.0000`, and the ERC-20
`approve`/`transfer` amount does exactly that. The swap's `Amount` and
`Min. received` lines never hand it one: the two zeros that would mislead there
— a V4 open-delta amount and a zero minimum — are stated in words before the
floor is reached, so on those lines a zero is never shown as `0.0000` (see the
list of amount-slot strings below).
The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
@@ -936,6 +941,38 @@ and compare against. Reading the stored field directly instead answers `null`
for a bundled or tracked token the explorer merely omitted, which is not a
refusal the wallet has any reason to make.
**Every string an amount slot can show:** taken together, the exceptions above
mean an amount line on the dApp approval screen (and the wait/success/error
screens that carry a figure forward) shows one of a fixed set of strings, not
always a number:
- A formatted quantity, e.g. `17.1900 USDT`: the token's scale is known and the
figure is at or above the floor, or below it and extended to its first
significant digit. This is `truncateAmountNeverZero()`
(`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`).
- `Unlimited`: an unbounded allowance or permit, which needs no scale to
describe — a `uint256`-max ERC-20 `approve` (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) or
a Permit2 amount at the `uint160` max on a swap's `Amount`
(`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
- `All available (V4 open delta)`: a V4 exact-in swap whose `amountIn` is zero.
V4 reads that zero as "use the whole open delta", not as a literal zero, so
the calldata states no quantity at all. Swap `Amount` line only
(`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: a zero minimum — the swap guarantees nothing
back. It is a literal zero slippage floor on a V2/V3/V4 swap, and it also
reaches a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step: a zero `minBalance`, which once rendered
`0.0000` beside the token symbol, now reads this. Swap `Min. received` line
(`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
- `<amount> base units (decimals unknown)`: the token's scale could not be
resolved, so the base-unit integer is shown with that caveat rather than
formatted (see Unknown token scale above). Reaches both the ERC-20 amount line
and the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` (`unknownDecimalsAmount()` in
`src/shared/approvalAmount.js`).
- `Unknown (not named in the calldata)`: not an amount but the currency itself —
the `Token In` or `Token Out` line when nothing in the calldata established
which token, shown beside the amount and, like the strings above, a sentence
rather than a value (`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
#### Partial USD totals
Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
+12 -11
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@@ -132,17 +132,18 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
constant rather than `isDebug()`, so it survives only in a debug build; a
testnet or the runtime debug toggle still raises the banner but without the
view id.
- 2026-09-21: The Confirm Delete button on the delete-wallet screen no longer
stays dead after a successful delete
([#335](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/335)). The password route
disabled the button before the decrypt and never re-enabled it, so a second
delete in the same popup session needed a reopen; the lost-password route
re-enabled its own button in its leave hook, so the two screens behaved
differently. Both now reset through the shared `finishDelete()`, the one path
both routes take, so they behave the same and the button is live for the next
delete.
- 2026-09-21: `README.md` now documents the approval screen's amount-slot
vocabulary and no longer contradicts itself
([#369](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/369)). The stale claim
that a genuine zero still renders `0.0000` is corrected: it holds for the
ERC-20 amount, but the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` state their two
misleading zeros in words upstream. The amount-display section now names every
string a slot can show — a formatted quantity, `Unlimited`,
`All available (V4 open delta)`, `None (no minimum guaranteed)`, base units
with decimals unknown, and `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` — and records
that a zero `minBalance` on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads
`None (no minimum guaranteed)` where it once read `0.0000`. Docs only; each
claim checked against the tree.
- 2026-08-30: An address no longer wraps, or is shortened to fit, in any of the
common views ([#380](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/380)). The
wallet list was the reported case: the address shared one row with the
+7 -14
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@@ -51,12 +51,16 @@ function clear() {
// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off.
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
function clearLostPassword() {
lostPasswordIndex = null;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
function show(walletIdx) {
@@ -94,17 +98,6 @@ function showLostPassword() {
// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
// them.
async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
// Each route's confirm button was disabled by its own click handler
// before the delete ran. Re-enable both here, on the one path they
// share, so the two routes reset the same way and a second delete in
// the same popup session finds a live button instead of a dead one.
const passwordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
passwordBtn.disabled = false;
passwordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
const lostPasswordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
lostPasswordBtn.disabled = false;
lostPasswordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
@@ -194,8 +187,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
// finishDelete() re-enables the button; navigating away then runs
// the leave hook that wipes the typed name.
// finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
// button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
});
+5 -65
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@@ -172,15 +172,6 @@ async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
}
// Delete a wallet through the password route: open its confirm screen,
// enter the password, and confirm. The vault is mocked, so the password
// text itself is irrelevant — decryptWithPassword decides pass or fail.
async function deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
@@ -465,21 +456,15 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
);
});
// Both routes now re-enable through finishDelete(), not their leave
// hooks, so the button comes back live once a delete completes.
test("the confirm button is re-enabled after a delete", async () => {
const { deleteWallet } = load();
// Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
helpers.showView("settings");
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
expect(
node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").classList.contains(
"text-muted",
),
).toBe(false);
});
// A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
@@ -490,48 +475,3 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
});
});
// The password route is the pre-existing bug this file's fix addresses:
// its Confirm Delete button was disabled before the decrypt and never
// re-enabled on success, so a second delete in the same popup session
// found a dead button. Now both routes re-enable through finishDelete().
//
// Against head these tests fail: with the re-enable absent, the button
// stays disabled after the first delete, so the disabled assertions read
// true where they expect false.
describe("the password route's confirm button", () => {
test("is re-enabled after a successful delete", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, vault } = load();
vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
expect(
node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").classList.contains("text-muted"),
).toBe(false);
});
// The reported symptom: delete one wallet, then open Delete Wallet for
// a second one without reopening the popup. The button must be live on
// that second visit, and the second delete must actually persist.
test("a second delete works in the same popup session", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
// Wallet 2 is gone; the list is now [Wallet 1, Wallet 3]. Opening
// the confirm screen for the wallet now at index 1 (Wallet 3) must
// find its button live, not the dead one the first delete left.
deleteWallet.show(1);
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
expect((await persistedWallets(storage)).map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
]);
});
});