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Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak e31a90bffc chore: keep the internal view id out of the release banner (closes #375)
e2e / e2e-chrome (push) Failing after 1s
e2e / e2e-firefox (push) Failing after 0s
check / check (push) Successful in 56s
The debug/testnet banner appended the active view's internal id, so the
user saw text like "[TESTNET] (approve-tx)" — developer vocabulary, and on
the approval screen it sat directly above the carefully worded line stating
what is being authorized. The view id is now gated on the compile-time
DEBUG constant instead of isDebug(), so it survives only in a debug build.
A testnet or the runtime debug toggle still raises the banner, but without
the view id, which is what a release build shows.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 19:47:35 +00:00
9 changed files with 55 additions and 317 deletions
+1 -3
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@@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ release/SHA256SUMS
```
Nothing is published by this. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone. The full procedure that turns a
green `main` into a tagged, packaged release — the order of steps, who performs
each, and how to check it worked — is in [docs/RELEASE.md](docs/RELEASE.md).
outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone.
The archives are deterministic — entries sorted, timestamps fixed, compression
level fixed — so two builds of one commit produce byte-identical files and the
-32
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@@ -90,16 +90,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
approve, reject and disconnect paths against a transaction approval
broadcasting behind them: each is declined and the dApp still receives its
broadcast result.
- 2026-09-21: `docs/RELEASE.md`, linked from `README.md`, states the release
procedure as a numbered list a newcomer can follow: confirm `main` is green in
CI, confirm the one version in the three files matches the intended tag,
`make package` from a clean checkout, verify `SHA256SUMS`, tag `vX.Y.Z`, then
distribute per browser. Each step names who performs it (owner-only steps
marked) and the check that it worked. The distribution step is written as
pending the owner's choice on
[#386](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386), with the Firefox and
Chrome options named but none settled. Docs only
([#387](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/387)).
- 2026-09-21: Adding a second wallet no longer accepts a different password with
nothing saying it is a separate one
@@ -132,28 +122,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
constant rather than `isDebug()`, so it survives only in a debug build; a
testnet or the runtime debug toggle still raises the banner but without the
view id.
- 2026-09-21: The Confirm Delete button on the delete-wallet screen no longer
stays dead after a successful delete
([#335](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/335)). The password route
disabled the button before the decrypt and never re-enabled it, so a second
delete in the same popup session needed a reopen; the lost-password route
re-enabled its own button in its leave hook, so the two screens behaved
differently. Both now reset through the shared `finishDelete()`, the one path
both routes take, so they behave the same and the button is live for the next
delete.
- 2026-09-21: The EIP-6963 provider UUID is generated fresh on each page load
and never persisted ([#398](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398)).
It was created once and stored, then announced verbatim to every page on every
load and across restarts, so any site — connected or not — could read it as a
stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install, contradicting the
"no tracking" promise. inpage.js now announces a per-load
`crypto.randomUUID()` and the `eip6963Uuid` storage key and the
`AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID` content-script message are gone. That key was a
standalone storage entry, never part of the versioned `autistmask` profile, so
the state schema is untouched and no existing profile is affected.
- 2026-08-30: An address no longer wraps, or is shortened to fit, in any of the
common views ([#380](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/380)). The
wallet list was the reported case: the address shared one row with the
-87
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@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# Releasing AutistMask
This is the procedure that turns a green `main` into a tagged, packaged release.
It gathers into one place what is otherwise spread across the `Makefile` and
three `README.md` sections, so the person cutting a release does not have to
reconstruct the order from them.
There is one version, declared in three files (`package.json`,
`manifest/chrome.json`, `manifest/firefox.json`), and `make package` builds and
packages but publishes nothing. `make build` and `make package` can be run by
anyone; tagging, signing, packing a CRX and any upload need credentials only the
owner ([@sneak](https://sneak.berlin)) holds and are marked **owner-only**
below. Releases are tagged from `main` (see the Workflow section of `TODO.md`),
so the "release commit" throughout is the `main` commit the milestone PR merged.
## Procedure
1. **Confirm `main` is green in CI.** The `check` workflow
(`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`) runs `script/cibuild`, i.e. `docker build .`,
and the `Dockerfile` runs `make check` as a build step, so a green `check`
run is a green `make check`. Find the run for the exact release commit on the
tracker's Actions view. _Check:_ that commit's `check` run succeeded; running
`make check` on a clean checkout of the commit reproduces it and exits 0.
2. **Confirm the version matches the intended tag.** `package.json`,
`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json` must all declare the same
`X.Y.Z`. `make build` fails when they disagree, but nothing checks that they
equal the tag you mean to create — that is this manual step. _Check:_ all
three files read the same `X.Y.Z`, and it is the version you intend to tag
`vX.Y.Z`.
3. **Build and package from a clean checkout of that commit.** From a fresh
clone, or a working tree with no local modifications (`git status` clean),
checked out at the release commit: run `make setup`, then `make package`.
`make package` runs `make build` first, so the archives can only be made from
a `dist/` verified against that build's own receipt as a release (not debug)
build. It writes three files into `release/`:
`autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip`, `autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi`, and
`SHA256SUMS`. _Check:_ those three files exist and `<version>` in the archive
names is the version confirmed in step 2. The Firefox `.xpi` is **unsigned**
(see step 6 and "Installing on Firefox" in `README.md`).
4. **Verify `SHA256SUMS`.** The archives are deterministic — sorted entries,
fixed timestamps, fixed compression — so a second `make package` from another
clean checkout of the same commit produces byte-identical files. Verify the
recorded digests against the files with `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS`, run from
`release/`. To confirm reproducibility, run `make package` again on a
separate clean checkout and compare the digests. _Check:_ `sha256sum -c`
reports `OK` for every file, and an independent build's digests match.
5. **Tag the release commit.** _(owner-only)_ Create an annotated tag `vX.Y.Z`
on the release commit and push it: `git tag -a vX.Y.Z` (with a message), then
`git push origin vX.Y.Z`. _Check:_ `git tag` lists `vX.Y.Z`, and
`git rev-parse vX.Y.Z^{commit}` resolves to the release commit.
6. **Distribute per browser.** _(owner-only; pending the owner's choice on
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386)_ How 1.0.0 is distributed on
each browser is not yet decided; it is the open question on that issue, and
the concrete steps cannot be written until the owner records a choice there.
These steps need credentials only the owner holds. The options under
consideration are:
- **Firefox** — the packaged `.xpi` is unsigned, and release Firefox and ESR
refuse an unsigned add-on:
- (a) AMO self-distribution signing (unlisted): submit the `.xpi` to AMO
with the owner's credentials; AMO returns a signed `.xpi` installable
on every Firefox, with nothing listed publicly.
- (b) AMO listed: as (a), plus a public AMO listing and review.
- (c) Ship the unsigned `.xpi` and state that Firefox support means
Developer Edition, Nightly, or an Unbranded build with
`xpinstall.signatures.required` set to `false`.
- **Chrome** — the repo packs no CRX and publishes nothing; the extension id
is fixed by the `key` in `manifest/chrome.json`:
- (a) Chrome Web Store (unlisted): upload the `.zip` with the owner's
developer account; the store delivers installs and updates.
- (b) Self-hosted CRX signed with the private key the owner holds
(`chrome --pack-extension=dist/chrome --pack-extension-key=<path to the .pem>`),
installable only via enterprise policy on Windows and macOS, so
realistically Linux-only.
- (c) "Load unpacked" from `dist/chrome/` only, as today.
Once the owner decides, the chosen steps — including which credentials they
need and who holds them — are written into this section and `README.md`'s
installation sections are updated to match, which is part of the definition
of done of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386. _Check:_ for a
store or AMO route, the artifact installs from the store or AMO on a clean
browser profile; for the CRX or unpacked route, the documented load succeeds
and Chrome reports the extension id `gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`.
+26
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@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const {
hasBrowserNamespace,
runtimeApi,
sendMessage,
storageGet,
storageSet,
} = require("../shared/browserApi");
// In Chrome (MV3), inpage.js runs as a MAIN-world content script declared
@@ -19,6 +21,30 @@ if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
(document.head || document.documentElement).appendChild(script);
}
// Send the persisted EIP-6963 provider UUID to the inpage script.
// Generated once at install time and stored in extension storage.
(async function sendProviderUuid() {
let uuid = null;
try {
const items = await storageGet("eip6963Uuid");
uuid = items?.eip6963Uuid;
if (!uuid) {
uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
await storageSet({ eip6963Uuid: uuid });
}
} catch {
// Storage was unavailable or refused the write. The announcement
// still has to go out — a provider that never announces is invisible
// to every EIP-6963 dApp — so it goes under a fresh uuid that this
// page load will not outlive.
if (!uuid) uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
}
window.postMessage(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid },
location.origin,
);
})();
// Relay requests from the page to the background script
window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
if (event.source !== window) return;
+11 -8
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@@ -204,14 +204,7 @@
"</svg>",
);
// EIP-6963 wants a fresh UUIDv4 per page load — it identifies one
// announcement, so a provider can be told apart from another instance of
// itself in the same page. It is generated here and never stored:
// announcing one persisted value to every site, on every load and across
// restarts, turned it into a stable cross-site, cross-session tracking
// identifier any page could read
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398).
const providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
let providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID(); // fallback until real UUID arrives
function buildProviderInfo() {
return {
@@ -233,6 +226,16 @@
);
}
// Listen for the persisted UUID from the content script
function onProviderUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID") return;
window.removeEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
providerUuid = event.data.uuid;
announceProvider();
}
window.addEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
window.addEventListener("eip6963:requestProvider", announceProvider);
announceProvider();
+7 -14
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@@ -51,12 +51,16 @@ function clear() {
// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off.
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
function clearLostPassword() {
lostPasswordIndex = null;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
function show(walletIdx) {
@@ -94,17 +98,6 @@ function showLostPassword() {
// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
// them.
async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
// Each route's confirm button was disabled by its own click handler
// before the delete ran. Re-enable both here, on the one path they
// share, so the two routes reset the same way and a second delete in
// the same popup session finds a live button instead of a dead one.
const passwordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
passwordBtn.disabled = false;
passwordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
const lostPasswordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
lostPasswordBtn.disabled = false;
lostPasswordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
@@ -194,8 +187,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
// finishDelete() re-enables the button; navigating away then runs
// the leave hook that wipes the typed name.
// finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
// button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
});
+5 -65
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@@ -172,15 +172,6 @@ async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
}
// Delete a wallet through the password route: open its confirm screen,
// enter the password, and confirm. The vault is mocked, so the password
// text itself is irrelevant — decryptWithPassword decides pass or fail.
async function deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
@@ -465,21 +456,15 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
);
});
// Both routes now re-enable through finishDelete(), not their leave
// hooks, so the button comes back live once a delete completes.
test("the confirm button is re-enabled after a delete", async () => {
const { deleteWallet } = load();
// Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
helpers.showView("settings");
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
expect(
node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").classList.contains(
"text-muted",
),
).toBe(false);
});
// A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
@@ -490,48 +475,3 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
});
});
// The password route is the pre-existing bug this file's fix addresses:
// its Confirm Delete button was disabled before the decrypt and never
// re-enabled on success, so a second delete in the same popup session
// found a dead button. Now both routes re-enable through finishDelete().
//
// Against head these tests fail: with the re-enable absent, the button
// stays disabled after the first delete, so the disabled assertions read
// true where they expect false.
describe("the password route's confirm button", () => {
test("is re-enabled after a successful delete", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, vault } = load();
vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
expect(
node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").classList.contains("text-muted"),
).toBe(false);
});
// The reported symptom: delete one wallet, then open Delete Wallet for
// a second one without reopening the popup. The button must be live on
// that second visit, and the second delete must actually persist.
test("a second delete works in the same popup session", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
// Wallet 2 is gone; the list is now [Wallet 1, Wallet 3]. Opening
// the confirm screen for the wallet now at index 1 (Wallet 3) must
// find its button live, not the dead one the first delete left.
deleteWallet.show(1);
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
expect((await persistedWallets(storage)).map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
]);
});
});
+5 -5
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@@ -372,10 +372,10 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
// EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries a
// UUIDv4 inpage.js generates fresh for this page load (nothing persists
// it — see issue #398) and has to name this extension and hand back the
// very object on window.ethereum.
// EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries the
// uuid src/content/index.js reads out of extension storage — call site 1
// in the issue — and it has to name this extension and hand back the very
// object on window.ethereum.
const announced = await d.executeAsync(
`const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
const onAnnounce = (e) => {
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
);
assert(
typeof announced.uuid === "string" && announced.uuid.length === 36,
"the announcement carries no provider uuid: " +
"the announcement carries no stored provider uuid: " +
JSON.stringify(announced.uuid),
);
-103
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@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
// The EIP-6963 provider UUID inpage.js announces (src/content/inpage.js).
//
// The bug this pins down (issue #398): the UUID used to be generated once,
// persisted in extension storage, and announced verbatim to every page on
// every load and across browser restarts, so any site — connected or not —
// could read a stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install.
// EIP-6963 wants a fresh UUIDv4 per announcement instead. The fix generates
// it per page load and stores nothing.
//
// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module;
// see tests/inpageErrors.test.js for why it is evaluated against a stub window
// rather than imported. Here the stub captures the CustomEvent that carries
// the announcement, so the UUID this file reads is the one a real dApp's
// eip6963:announceProvider listener would see.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
"utf8",
);
const loadInto = new Function(
"window",
"self",
"crypto",
"Event",
"CustomEvent",
SOURCE,
);
class StubEvent {
constructor(type) {
this.type = type;
}
}
class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
constructor(type, init) {
super(type);
this.detail = init && init.detail;
}
}
// Evaluate inpage.js once against a fresh stub window and return every UUID it
// announced. A `requestProvider` event is dispatched too, so a re-announcement
// within one load is observed as well as the announcement at load.
function announcedUuids() {
const listeners = {};
const uuids = [];
const win = {
addEventListener(type, fn) {
(listeners[type] || (listeners[type] = [])).push(fn);
},
removeEventListener(type, fn) {
const fns = listeners[type];
if (!fns) return;
const i = fns.indexOf(fn);
if (i !== -1) fns.splice(i, 1);
},
postMessage() {},
dispatchEvent(event) {
if (event.type === "eip6963:announceProvider") {
uuids.push(event.detail.info.uuid);
}
for (const fn of (listeners[event.type] || []).slice()) fn(event);
return true;
},
};
win.window = win;
loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
win.dispatchEvent(new StubEvent("eip6963:requestProvider"));
return uuids;
}
const UUID_V4 =
/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
describe("the EIP-6963 provider UUID is fresh per page load", () => {
test("a load announces a UUIDv4, unprompted, with nothing delivered", () => {
const uuids = announcedUuids();
expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(uuids[0]).toMatch(UUID_V4);
});
test("every announcement within one load carries the same UUID", () => {
const uuids = announcedUuids();
expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
expect(new Set(uuids).size).toBe(1);
});
test("two page loads announce different UUIDs", () => {
const first = announcedUuids()[0];
const second = announcedUuids()[0];
expect(first).toMatch(UUID_V4);
expect(second).toMatch(UUID_V4);
expect(second).not.toBe(first);
});
});