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sneak ed0e8c75e2 docs: say what a closed window does to a tx or sign approval (closes #505)
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e2e / e2e-firefox (push) Waiting to run
The approval port's disconnect handler leaves a transaction or signing
approval pending, and its comments said that was so the user could reopen
the toolbar popup. Those approvals open in their own window. When that
window closes, the windows.onRemoved listener rejects the approval, unless
an approved attempt is still running, in which case that attempt answers
the page. Both comments now say so. No code changed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 06:15:22 +00:00
13 changed files with 39 additions and 479 deletions
+12 -30
View File
@@ -239,12 +239,8 @@ provide:
`make check` stays non-mutating. Linting runs only in the container, because
an ESLint result that depends on whichever ESLint the host happens to have is
not a result, so docker is required to lint.
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes), on the host, with the `prettier`
that `script/bootstrap` installs in `node_modules/`; when that one is missing
it fails and says to run `script/bootstrap`, instead of using a `prettier`
from the `PATH`
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only), on the host, with the same
`prettier` and the same refusal
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes), on the host
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only), on the host
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`
- `script/check-censored` — assert the competitor name RULES.md bars appears
nowhere in the working tree or under `dist/` outside its documented
@@ -1110,16 +1106,14 @@ read:
The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
that side, or `Unknown (could not be decoded)` instead when a V4 swap action in
the transaction could not be read (see Transaction Decoding below). An
`UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side is WETH, on
mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; a WETH `Min. received`
figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise `Token Out` and `Min. received` keep the
output side's own token and figure, whether the swap was paid in ETH or in a
token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not
spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on the signature screen has its
own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the SignApproval section below
describes it.
that side. An `UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; a WETH
`Min. received` figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise `Token Out` and
`Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure, whether the swap
was paid in ETH or in a token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys USDC and then
unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
SignApproval section below describes it.
The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
@@ -2166,13 +2160,6 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
- Typed data whose domain `chainId` names a chain other than the active
network's → shown with the error line naming both chain ids and "Sign"
disabled; only "Reject" remains. EIP-712 asks for this, because the
signature is valid on the chain the domain names. Typed data with no
`chainId` is not refused. The background refuses such a signature too,
against the network active when the signature reaches it, and answers the
site with the same sentence
- A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` or `0X` and
an even number of hex digits, the form ethers' `getBytes` reads when
signing) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This message is plain
@@ -2665,8 +2652,7 @@ plaintext list of anyone's domain names.
When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
banner alerting the user. The domain checker matches exact hostnames and all
parent domains (subdomain matching), and checks a hostname written with a
trailing dot (`name.`) as `name`.
parent domains (subdomain matching).
#### Transaction Decoding
@@ -2692,11 +2678,7 @@ Currently supported:
or recipient, and amount.
- **Uniswap Universal Router**: `execute()` calls — shows swap direction (e.g.
"Swap USDT → ETH"), token addresses, amounts, execution steps, and deadline.
Decodes Permit2, V2/V3/V4 swaps, wrap/unwrap, and balance checks. A V4 swap
action is read only in the parameter shape deployed on mainnet and Sepolia,
not in the newer one on `v4-periphery` `main`, which adds a `minHopPriceX36`
field. An action in any other shape is not read, and its step is listed as
`V4 Swap (could not be decoded)`.
Decodes Permit2, V2/V3/V4 swaps, wrap/unwrap, and balance checks.
### Non-Goals Forever
-7
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@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ run_yarn() {
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# Without the repo's own prettier, yarn runs whatever prettier is on
# the PATH, which may be a version that formats files differently.
if [ ! -x node_modules/.bin/prettier ]; then
echo "fmt: this repo's prettier is not installed in node_modules/," \
"so run script/bootstrap first." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Formatting..."
run_yarn run fmt
}
-7
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@@ -26,13 +26,6 @@ run_yarn() {
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# Without the repo's own prettier, yarn runs whatever prettier is on
# the PATH, which may be a version that formats files differently.
if [ ! -x node_modules/.bin/prettier ]; then
echo "fmt-check: this repo's prettier is not installed in" \
"node_modules/, so run script/bootstrap first." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Checking formatting..."
run_yarn run fmt-check
}
+1 -17
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@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ const { debugFetch, log } = require("../shared/log");
const {
verifySignedTx,
verifySignature,
typedDataChainRefusal,
failureIsRetryable,
describeTxFailure,
sameAddress,
@@ -1768,8 +1767,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
(async () => {
try {
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
// Same as the transaction path: the address the approval named
// is the one that must have signed, and a switch since then is
// a refusal rather than a signature from another account.
@@ -1788,20 +1786,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
signature,
approval.approvedFrom,
);
// The sign screen refuses typed data whose domain names
// another chain. A signature for it that arrives anyway is
// refused here, against the network active now.
const sp = approval.signParams;
if (
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData"
) {
const refusal = typedDataChainRefusal(
JSON.parse(sp.typedData).domain,
networkById(s.networkId),
);
if (refusal) throw new ApprovalMismatchError(refusal);
}
settleApproval(msg.id, { signature }, { holdsClaim: true });
sendResponse({ signature });
} catch (e) {
+4 -8
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const {
formatFee,
tokenLabel,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const {
networkById,
networkByChainId,
@@ -46,10 +46,7 @@ const {
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
const {
describeSigningFailure,
typedDataChainRefusal,
} = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
const { notify, runtimeApi, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
@@ -446,8 +443,7 @@ function signedPrimaryType(types) {
// Why a signature request cannot be signed, as a sentence for the error line,
// or null when it can. Only typed data is refused: the `primaryType` the page
// states has to be the type ethers will sign, or this screen would name one
// message while another is signed. Its domain may name no chain but the active
// network's.
// message while another is signed.
function typedDataRefusal(sp) {
if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") return null;
let data;
@@ -470,7 +466,7 @@ function typedDataRefusal(sp) {
", so it cannot be signed."
);
}
return typedDataChainRefusal(data.domain, currentNetwork());
return null;
}
// The largest amount a Permit2 allowance can hold, a uint160. Permit2 treats
-29
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@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ const {
accessListify,
formatEther,
getAddress,
getBigInt,
getBytes,
toQuantity,
verifyMessage,
@@ -636,33 +635,6 @@ function verifySignature(signParams, signature, expectedFrom) {
return recovered;
}
// Why typed data cannot be signed while `network` is the active network, as a
// sentence, or null when it can. EIP-712 has a wallet refuse typed data whose
// domain names another chain, because the signature is valid on that chain.
// ethers signs no chain id when the domain's is null or absent, and reads any
// other with getBigInt(), so 1, "1" and "0x1" are the same chain here too.
function typedDataChainRefusal(domain, network) {
const chainId = domain?.chainId;
if (chainId === undefined || chainId === null) return null;
let named;
try {
named = getBigInt(chainId);
} catch {
return "This typed data cannot be read, so it cannot be signed.";
}
const active = getBigInt(network.chainId);
if (named === active) return null;
return (
"This typed data is for chain id " +
named +
", but the active network is " +
network.name +
" (chain id " +
active +
"), so it cannot be signed."
);
}
// The stage a transaction approval failed at. Which stage it is decides
// whether the approval survives the failure.
const TX_STAGE_SIGN = "sign";
@@ -824,7 +796,6 @@ function describeSigningFailure(response, fallbackMessage) {
module.exports = {
verifySignedTx,
verifySignature,
typedDataChainRefusal,
assertNoForbiddenFields,
assertNothingUnchecked,
assertCanonicalBytes,
+1 -4
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@@ -110,14 +110,11 @@ function hashListed(hash) {
* Generate hostname variants for subdomain matching.
* "sub.evil.com" yields ["sub.evil.com", "evil.com"].
*
* A trailing dot is dropped: "evil.com." is the fully qualified spelling of
* "evil.com", and the browser loads the same site from either.
*
* @param {string} hostname
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
const variants = [h];
const parts = h.split(".");
// Parent domains: a.b.c.d -> b.c.d, c.d
+16 -58
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@@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ function formatAmount(raw, decimals) {
// on a scale — not as a token name, and not as a quantity.
const UNNAMED_CURRENCY = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
// The same refusal when a V4 swap action could not be read (see
// decodeExactly()). That action names both of its currencies, so saying the
// calldata did not name one would be false.
const UNDECODED_CURRENCY = "Unknown (could not be decoded)";
// Explicit presence, never truthiness. Every gate in this file that guards a
// decoded value goes through here: an address is never falsy once set, but an
// amount of 0n is, and a gate that cannot tell a genuine zero from an absent
@@ -300,24 +295,6 @@ function v4ExactInAmount(raw) {
return raw === 0n ? OPEN_DELTA : raw;
}
// The V4 swap actions are read only in the parameter structs V4Router has
// deployed on mainnet and Sepolia. v4-periphery `main` has since added a
// `minHopPriceX36` field to all four (`src/interfaces/IV4Router.sol`), and
// reading a shape nobody has deployed would be guessing. ethers alone would
// read the newer structs anyway: it takes whatever word sits where a
// deployed field would be, ignores bytes left over, and holds back an error
// in a field until that field is used. The newer multi-hop exact-in struct
// then yields the offset of its hop-price array as `amountIn`. So a decode
// counts only when encoding the result again gives back the same bytes;
// otherwise this throws, and decodeV4Swap() marks the step as not decoded.
function decodeExactly(types, data) {
const decoded = coder.decode(types, data);
if (coder.encode(types, decoded) !== data) {
throw new Error("Not in the deployed V4 parameter shape.");
}
return decoded;
}
// Decode V4_SWAP (command 0x10) input bytes.
// The input is ABI-encoded as (bytes actions, bytes[] params).
// We extract token addresses from SETTLE (input) and TAKE (output) sub-actions,
@@ -332,10 +309,6 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
let takeToken = null;
let amountIn = null;
let amountOutMin = null;
// Set when a swap action's parameters are not in the deployed shape
// (see decodeExactly()), so nothing was read from that action. SETTLE
// and TAKE may still name both currencies.
let swapUndecoded = false;
for (let i = 0; i < actions.length; i++) {
const actionId = actions[i];
@@ -364,7 +337,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
// tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[] path,
// uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin)
try {
const s = decodeExactly(
const s = coder.decode(
[
"tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
],
@@ -382,13 +355,13 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
amountOutMin = s[0][3];
}
} catch {
swapUndecoded = true;
// Fall through — SETTLE/TAKE will provide tokens
}
} else {
// ExactInputSingleParams: (tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address) poolKey,
// bool zeroForOne, uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin, bytes hookData)
try {
const s = decodeExactly(
const s = coder.decode(
[
"tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
],
@@ -411,7 +384,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
amountOutMin = s[0][3];
}
} catch {
swapUndecoded = true;
// Fall through
}
}
} else if (
@@ -420,7 +393,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
) {
if (actionId === V4_SWAP_EXACT_OUT) {
try {
const s = decodeExactly(
const s = coder.decode(
[
"tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
],
@@ -432,11 +405,11 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
settleToken = path[path.length - 1][0];
}
} catch {
swapUndecoded = true;
// Fall through
}
} else {
try {
const s = decodeExactly(
const s = coder.decode(
[
"tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
],
@@ -453,7 +426,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
? poolKey[1]
: poolKey[0];
} catch {
swapUndecoded = true;
// Fall through
}
}
}
@@ -467,7 +440,6 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
tokenOut: takeToken,
amountIn,
amountOutMin,
swapUndecoded,
};
} catch {
return null;
@@ -493,7 +465,6 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
let minOutput = null;
let hasUnwrapWeth = false;
let hasV2ExactOut = false;
let swapUndecoded = false;
const commandNames = [];
// THE INVARIANT: an amount and the token it is counted in always come
@@ -597,12 +568,6 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
if (cmdId === 0x10) {
const v4 = decodeV4Swap(inputs[i]);
if (v4) {
// Without this, a swap action that went unread would
// look like one that had nothing to show.
if (v4.swapUndecoded) {
swapUndecoded = true;
commandNames[i] += " (could not be decoded)";
}
setInputOnce(v4.tokenIn, v4.amountIn);
// Always update output: last swap step wins. A step
// that carries the Min. received figure but decoded no
@@ -626,13 +591,12 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
}
}
// Resolve token info. A null token on either side means no step that
// was read named a currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than
// calling it ETH. UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the
// output ETH when the output side is WETH, or when no step set the
// output side. Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap
// that buys USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives
// USDC.
// Resolve token info. A null token on either side means the calldata
// named no currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it
// ETH. UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the output ETH
// when the output side is WETH, or when no step set the output side.
// Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that buys
// USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
const outputIsWeth =
present(outputToken) &&
WETH_ADDRESSES.includes(outputToken.toLowerCase());
@@ -676,10 +640,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
// rather than going missing or naming a token by default. Same
// wording as the Token Out refusal below: the two sides of this
// screen must not describe the same condition in two ways.
details.push({
label: "Token In",
value: swapUndecoded ? UNDECODED_CURRENCY : UNNAMED_CURRENCY,
});
details.push({ label: "Token In", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
}
if (present(inputAmount)) {
@@ -742,10 +703,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
// rather than going missing or naming a token by default, and a
// Min. received figure below it is never attached to a token the
// calldata did not state.
details.push({
label: "Token Out",
value: swapUndecoded ? UNDECODED_CURRENCY : UNNAMED_CURRENCY,
});
details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
}
if (present(minOutput)) {
+1 -56
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@@ -397,13 +397,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
rpcResult = r;
},
);
return {
id: () =>
new URL(created[created.length - 1].url).searchParams.get(
"approval",
),
result: () => rpcResult,
};
return { result: () => rpcResult };
}
// A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
@@ -1490,55 +1484,6 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
});
});
// Typed data whose domain names another chain is refused on the sign
// screen; a signature for it that reaches the background anyway is not
// handed to the page (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/519).
// TYPED_DATA names mainnet.
async function answerTypedData(bg, pending) {
const { domain, types, message } = JSON.parse(TYPED_DATA);
delete types.EIP712Domain;
const signature = await signer.signTypedData(domain, types, message);
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: pending.id(),
approved: true,
signature,
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
return { answer, signature };
}
test("typed data for the active chain is handed back signed", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTypedData();
await settle();
const { answer, signature } = await answerTypedData(bg, pending);
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ signature });
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: signature });
});
test("typed data for another chain is refused, not handed back", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
bg.setNetwork(SEPOLIA);
const pending = bg.requestTypedData();
await settle();
const { answer } = await answerTypedData(bg, pending);
const refusal =
"This typed data is for chain id 1, but the active network is Sepolia Testnet (chain id 11155111), so it cannot be signed.";
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
error: refusal,
retryable: false,
});
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: { message: refusal } });
});
test("a sign request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSign(other.address);
-13
View File
@@ -89,12 +89,6 @@ describe("vendored blocklist", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[0].toUpperCase())).toBe(true);
});
test("a hostname ending in a dot is the same host", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
expect(isPhishingDomain("wallet." + LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
expect(isPhishingDomain(CLEAN[0] + ".")).toBe(false);
});
test("returns false for an empty or missing hostname", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain("")).toBe(false);
expect(isPhishingDomain(null)).toBe(false);
@@ -139,13 +133,6 @@ describe("hostnameVariants", () => {
test("lowercases hostnames", () => {
expect(hostnameVariants("Evil.COM")).toEqual(["evil.com"]);
});
test("drops the trailing dot of a fully qualified hostname", () => {
expect(hostnameVariants("sub.evil.com.")).toEqual([
"sub.evil.com",
"evil.com",
]);
});
});
describe("domain hashing", () => {
-64
View File
@@ -240,7 +240,6 @@ function request(data) {
beforeEach(() => {
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [];
state.networkId = "mainnet";
});
describe("a token permission is warned about, naming spender and amount", () => {
@@ -533,66 +532,3 @@ describe("the sign screen refuses a mismatched primary type", () => {
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
});
// EIP-712: a wallet refuses typed data whose domain names a chain other than
// the active one, because the signature is valid on the chain it names
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/519). The wallet is on Sepolia
// and the site asks for a mainnet USDC Permit.
describe("the sign screen refuses typed data for another chain", () => {
const REFUSAL =
"This typed data is for chain id 1, but the active network is Sepolia Testnet (chain id 11155111), so it cannot be signed.";
function withChainId(chainId) {
return { ...PERMIT, domain: { ...PERMIT.domain, chainId } };
}
beforeEach(() => {
decryptWithPassword.mockClear();
state.networkId = "sepolia";
});
test("another chain shows the error, with Sign disabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(PERMIT);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
test("Sign clicked anyway decrypts and signs nothing", async () => {
const sent = await openSignScreen(PERMIT);
node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-approve-sign");
expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
"AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
});
// ethers signs 1, "1" and "0x1" as the same chain id.
test("the chain id is refused in each form ethers signs", () => {
for (const chainId of [1, "1", "0x1"]) {
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(withChainId(chainId)))).toBe(
REFUSAL,
);
}
});
test("a chain id that is not a number is refused", () => {
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(withChainId("mainnet")))).toBe(
"This typed data cannot be read, so it cannot be signed.",
);
});
test("the active chain leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(withChainId("0xaa36a7"));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
});
test("no chain id leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(withChainId(undefined));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
});
});
+3 -181
View File
@@ -163,110 +163,6 @@ function encodeV4ExactInSingle(currency0, currency1, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
);
}
// Each V4 swap action's parameters in two shapes: the struct V4Router has
// deployed on mainnet and Sepolia, and the one v4-periphery `main` has since
// moved to, which adds a `minHopPriceX36` field. Each swaps WETH for USDC.
const POOL_KEY = "tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address)";
const PATH_KEY = "tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)";
const WETH_USDC_POOL = [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR];
const ONE_WETH = 1000000000000000000n;
const V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES = [
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE",
id: 0x06,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, "0x"]],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, 0n, "0x"]],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_IN",
id: 0x07,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
WETH_ADDR,
[[USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
ONE_WETH,
990000n,
],
],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint256[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
WETH_ADDR,
[[USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
[],
ONE_WETH,
990000n,
],
],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE",
id: 0x08,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_WETH, "0x"]],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_WETH, 0n, "0x"]],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_OUT",
id: 0x09,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
USDC_ADDR,
[[WETH_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
990000n,
ONE_WETH,
],
],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint256[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
USDC_ADDR,
[[WETH_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
[],
990000n,
ONE_WETH,
],
],
),
},
];
// Helper: execute() with one V4_SWAP step holding the swap action, then
// SETTLE of WETH and TAKE of USDC.
function v4SwapCalldata(actionId, swapParams) {
return buildExecute(
"0x10",
[
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([actionId, V4_SETTLE_ID, V4_TAKE_ID]), [
swapParams,
encodeV4Settle(WETH_ADDR),
encodeV4Take(USDC_ADDR),
]),
],
9999999999n,
);
}
function detail(result, label) {
return result.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
}
@@ -307,83 +203,11 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Min. received").value,
).toBe("0.0002 ETH");
// Real mainnet calldata is in the deployed shape, so its V4 step is
// not said to be undecoded.
const steps = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Steps");
expect(steps.value).toBe("Permit2 Permit → V4 Swap");
expect(steps.value).toContain("Permit2 Permit");
expect(steps.value).toContain("V4 Swap");
});
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the deployed shape is read",
({ id, deployed }) => {
const result = uniswap.decode(
v4SwapCalldata(id, deployed),
ROUTER_ADDR,
);
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe("V4 Swap");
},
);
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/358 — before it, all four
// newer structs decoded as the deployed ones without an error, and the
// newer SWAP_EXACT_IN showed the offset of its hop-price array as Amount
// ("0.0000000000000004 WETH") and its amountIn as Min. received.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the newer periphery shape is shown as not decoded",
({ id, newer }) => {
const result = uniswap.decode(
v4SwapCalldata(id, newer),
ROUTER_ADDR,
);
expect(detail(result, "Amount")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe(
"V4 Swap (could not be decoded)",
);
// SETTLE and TAKE keep their own shape and still name both sides.
expect(detail(result, "Token In").address).toBe(WETH_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
},
);
// The decoder does not read SETTLE_ALL or TAKE_ALL, so here only the
// unread swap action names the currencies. The token lines must not say
// the calldata did not name them.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the newer shape, then SETTLE_ALL and TAKE_ALL, says both tokens could not be decoded",
({ id, newer }) => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x10",
[
// 0x0c is SETTLE_ALL (currency, maxAmount), 0x0f is
// TAKE_ALL (currency, minAmount).
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([id, 0x0c, 0x0f]), [
newer,
coder.encode(
["address", "uint256"],
[WETH_ADDR, ONE_WETH],
),
coder.encode(
["address", "uint256"],
[USDC_ADDR, 990000n],
),
]),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe(
"V4 Swap (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
},
);
test("decodes V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN with known tokens", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x08", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN
@@ -724,11 +548,9 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
// The V4 swap action's parameters are empty, so that step is said to
// be undecoded.
const steps = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Steps");
expect(steps.value).toBe(
"Permit2 Permit \u2192 V4 Swap (could not be decoded) \u2192 Unwrap WETH",
"Permit2 Permit \u2192 V4 Swap \u2192 Unwrap WETH",
);
});
+1 -5
View File
@@ -97,11 +97,7 @@ describe("an execute() whose input currency never decoded", () => {
]);
test("says the input token is unknown instead of naming ETH", () => {
// The swap action that would name it could not be read, so the line
// says that rather than REFUSAL's "not named in the calldata".
expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
});
test("keeps a Token In line, so the screen never omits what is paid", () => {