TransactionDetail read the block, network details and calldata from the
active network's Blockscout and decoded the calldata for the active network,
so after a network switch a transaction sent on the other network showed none
of them. It now reads them from the Blockscout Settings has for the network
the transaction was sent on, and decodes the calldata for that network.
endpointsByChainId() in the shared view helpers gives a network's RPC and
Blockscout URLs, picked as reviewedNetworkProvider() picked its node;
reviewedNetworkProvider() now uses it. Restore refuses a stored transaction
whose chain id names no network, as it does for WaitTx.
Model: opus-5-5
SuccessTx and ErrorTx built their recipient, block, hash and decoded-action
address links for the active network. After a network switch, WaitTx now finds
a transaction on the network it was sent on and moves on to these screens, whose
links then opened an explorer where the transaction does not exist. Both
screens now keep the transaction's chain id with their view data and build
every link for that network, as WaitTx does. A stored SuccessTx or ErrorTx
whose chain id names no network is refused on restore, as a stored transaction
already is.
Model: opus-5-5
WaitTx asked the active network's node for the receipt, so after a network
switch a transaction sent on the other network was never found and was
reported as timed out. It now asks the node of the network its chain id
names, through reviewedNetworkProvider(), moved from ConfirmTx into the
shared view helpers so both screens use one function. WaitTx and
TransactionDetail build their explorer links for that network too. A stored
wait or transaction whose chain id names no network is refused on restore,
as a stored ConfirmTx transaction already is.
Model: opus-5-5
ConfirmTx and the wait, success and error screens printed Send's amount field
as it stood (`.5 ETH`, or every digit Max filled in); TxApproval shows
`0.5000 ETH`. ConfirmTx now writes the amount as TxApproval does: parsed at the
scale it is encoded with, written back as plain decimal text and cut by
truncateAmountNeverZero(), and hands the status screens a copy carrying that
text. A token whose scale is unknown, which cannot be sent, has the field's
text cut the same way. The transaction is still signed for the exact amount,
which also prices the USD value. A saved confirmation screen whose amount is
not text is no longer redrawn.
Model: opus-5-5
A network switch puts the outgoing network's tracked tokens away in a new
persisted field, networkTrackedTokens, and brings back the incoming network's
list, or an empty one, as endpoints are kept; the background's switch uses the
same function. The two add-token screens offer their common-token picks on
Ethereum Mainnet only. After a switch in Settings, Back renders the screen it
lands on again, and the stack is cut at the first screen that cannot be
rendered from saved state, or at AddressToken for any token but the native
one; the cut stack is saved with the switch. ConfirmTx drawn again keeps the
network it was reviewed on. A contract lookup that answers after a switch adds
nothing.
Model: opus-5-5
ConfirmTx set the transaction's chain id to the active network's every
time it drew the screen, so a popup reopened onto a saved confirmation
after a network switch in Settings described the reviewed transfer as
the new network's and sent it there.
show() now sets the chain id only on a transaction Send hands over, and
the screen describes the transaction entirely on that network: native
currency, USD values, explorer links, and the node and explorer its
checks ask. explorerUrl(), renderAddressHtml(), getPrice(), formatFee()
and checkEtherscanLabel() take an optional chain id for this. A saved
transaction whose chain id names no network is not restored.
Model: opus-5-5
A stored allowedSites whose value was not a list rendered a working popup and then made every subsequent save fail silently, so the user operated a wallet that persisted nothing -- worse than a blank popup, which is at least visibly broken. fraudContracts and selectedToken had the same shape: a container floored by truthiness or not at all, while its entries were dereferenced. Entries are now floored as well as containers, following the idiom #311 established, and a failed save raises a persistent banner instead of vanishing into a swallowed rejection.
The per-field justifications that used to live in a hand-written header are replaced by a contract test that drives each field's hostile and falsy values through a real popup boot, so a claim about a field answers to the code rather than to prose. Its guarantee is stated narrowly and deliberately: no structural dereference on the code paths a wholly-corrupted profile takes, which is not every path a stored record takes. The paths it does not drive are named where the claim is made, and are tracked in #379.
Stored state had no version and no structural validation, so a corrupt blob produced a completely blank popup with no message and no recovery control, and made every dApp RPC call from every page answer a generic -32603. There was no reset or wipe control anywhere in the UI.
saveState() now stamps a schema version and loadState() validates the shape. A version it does not understand, or a wallets array it cannot parse, lands on a recovery screen that names the problem, offers the stored record verbatim for export, and offers a destructive reset behind a typed confirmation. Unversioned but valid state -- which every existing install has -- migrates in place and keeps working; it is never shown a wipe prompt. A dApp call against unusable state answers -32007, which EIP-1474 leaves unassigned, rather than -32603. networkById() refuses an unknown id loudly instead of returning mainnet, and networkId is validated so a corrupt value cannot be used as an object key.
Fields the gate does not refuse are floored by type, container and entries both: a malformed trackedTokens or tokenBalances entry is dropped rather than dereferenced. Verified by an independent sweep of 1152 corrupt blobs producing no blank popup, with the same harness showing 9 blanks against the previous revision.
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