Seems that in Ubuntu 22.04 the behavior in su changed, making - ( alias for -l, --login ) mutually exclusive with --preserve-environment which is required for passing enviroment variables for cgi to work for dynazoom in munin.dropping - fixes the issue
* certbot's PPA is no longer needed because a recent version is now included in the Ubuntu respository.
* Un-pin b2sdk (reverts 69d8fdef99 and d829d74048).
* Revert boto+s3 workaround for duplicity (partial revert of 99474b348f).
* Revert old "fix boto 2 conflict on Google Compute Engine instances" (cf33be4596) which is probably no longer needed.
They really should never have been conflated with the user-provided aliases.
Update the postfix alias map to query the automatically generated aliases with lowest priority.
The /admin/munin routes used the same Authorization: header logic as the other API routes, but they are browsed directly in the browser because they are handled as static pages or as a proxy to a CGI script.
This required users to enter their email username/password for HTTP basic authentication in the standard browser auth prompt, which wasn't ideal (and may leak the password in browser storage). It also stopped working when MFA was enabled for user accounts.
A token is now set in a cookie when visiting /admin/munin which is then checked in the routes that proxy the Munin pages. The cookie's lifetime is kept limited to limit the opportunity for any unknown CSRF attacks via the Munin CGI script.
Since the session cache clears keys after a period of time, this fixes#1821.
Based on https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox/pull/2012, and so:
Co-Authored-By: NewbieOrange <NewbieOrange@users.noreply.github.com>
Also fixes#2029 by not revealing through the login failure error message whether a user exists or not.
* Rename the 'master' API key to be called the 'system' API key
* Generate the key using the Python secrets module which is meant for this
* Remove some debugging helper code which will be obsoleted by the upcoming changes for session keys
thanks @downtownallday
* this invalidates all user_keys after TOTP status is changed for user
* after changing TOTP state, a login is required
* due to the forced login, we can't and don't need to store the code used for setup in `mru_code`
* Due to the way that the /login UI works, this persists at least one failed login each time a user logs into the admin panel. This in turn triggers fail2ban at some point.
* this allows implementation of other mfa schemes in the future (webauthn)
* also makes key management easier and enforces one totp credentials per user on db-level
* Only spawn a thread pool when strictly needed
For --check-primary-hostname, the pool is not used.
When exiting, the other processes are left alive and will hang.
* Acquire pools with the 'with' statement
The cryptography package has created all sorts of installation trouble over the last few years, probably because of mismatches between OS-installed packages and pip-installed packages. Using a virtualenv for all Python packages used by the management daemon should make sure everything is consistent.
See #1298, see #1264.
Seems like if REQUEST_METHOD is set to GET, then we can drop two redundant ways the query string is given. munin-cgi-graph itself reads the environment variables only, but its calls to Perl's CGI::param will look at the command line if REQUEST_METHOD is not used, otherwise it uses environment variables like CGI used to work.
Since this is all behind admin auth anyway, there isn't a public vulnerability. #914 was opened without comment which lead me to notice the redundancy and worry about a vulnerability, before I realized this is admin-only anyway.
Teal Dulcet
Tomas P
Steve Hay
Joshua Tauberer
Victor
Felix Spöttel
David Duque
Michael Kroes
mike