By not advertising SMTPUTF8 support at the start, senders may opt to transmit recipient internationalized domain names in IDNA form instead, which will be deliverable.
Incoming mail with internationalized domains was probably working prior to our move to Ubuntu 18.04 when postfix's SMTPUTF8 support became enabled by default.
The previous commit is retained because Mail-in-a-Box users might prefer to keep SMTPUTF8 on for outbound mail, if they are not using internationalized domains for email, in which case the previous commit fixes the 'relay access denied' error even if the emails aren't deliverable.
When an email is received by Postfix using SMTPUTF8 and the recipient domain is a Unicode internationalized domain, it was failing to be delivered (bouncing with 'relay access denied') because our users and aliases tables only store ASCII (IDNA) forms of internationalized domains. In this commit, domain maps are added to the auto_aliases table from the Unicode form of each mail domain to its IDNA form, if those forms are different. The Postfix domains query is updated to look at the auto_aliases table now as well, since it is the only table with Unicode forms of the mail domains.
However, mail delivery is still not working since the Dovecot LMTP server does not support SMTPUTF8, and mail still bounces but with an error that SMTPUTF8 is not supported.
They really should never have been conflated with the user-provided aliases.
Update the postfix alias map to query the automatically generated aliases with lowest priority.
And write MIAB dns zone config into /etc/nsd/nsd.conf.d/zones.conf. Delete lingering old zones.conf file.
Co-authored-by: Joshua Tauberer <jt@occams.info>
Since the session cache clears keys after a period of time, this fixes#1821.
Based on https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox/pull/2012, and so:
Co-Authored-By: NewbieOrange <NewbieOrange@users.noreply.github.com>
Also fixes#2029 by not revealing through the login failure error message whether a user exists or not.
Port 465 with "implicit" (i.e. always-on) TLS is a more secure approach than port 587 with explicit (i.e. optional and only on with STARTTLS). Although we reject credentials on port 587 without STARTTLS, by that point credentials have already been sent.
* SC2068: Double quote array expansions to avoid re-splitting elements.
* SC2186: tempfile is deprecated. Use mktemp instead.
* SC2124: Assigning an array to a string! Assign as array, or use * instead of @ to concatenate.
* SC2102: Ranges can only match single chars (mentioned due to duplicates).
* SC2005: Useless echo? Instead of 'echo $(cmd)', just use 'cmd'.
This change will force everyone to be logged out of Roundcube since the encryption key and cipher won't match anyone's already-set cookie, but this happens anyway after every Mail-in-a-Box update since we generate a new key each time already.
Fixes#1968.
* Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records.
* Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/.
* Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm.
* Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.)
* When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed.
* In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice.
* In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record.
* In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't.
* Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml).
See #1953
Configures opendmarc to send failure reports for domains that request them, including when p=none.
The emails are sent as the package default of package name and user@hostname: OpenDMARC Filter <opendmarc@box.example.com>
Note I have been running this for several months with a configuration I did not include in the PR to have reports BCC'd to me (FailureReportsBcc postmaster@example.com). Very low load for my personal server of rarely more than a dozen emails sent out per day.
I am not familiar with editing scripts, so apologies in advance and please feel free to correct me.
KiekerJan
Ilnahro
jvolkenant
github@kiekerjan.isdronken.nl
Joshua Tauberer
drpixie
Thomas Urban
Jan van de Wijdeven
Paul