And write MIAB dns zone config into /etc/nsd/nsd.conf.d/zones.conf. Delete lingering old zones.conf file.
Co-authored-by: Joshua Tauberer <jt@occams.info>
* Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records.
* Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/.
* Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm.
* Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.)
* When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed.
* In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice.
* In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record.
* In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't.
* Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml).
See #1953
Prior to nsd 4.0.1-1ubuntu0.1, we had to create the nsd user before installing the nsd package.
This was our issue #25 (see 4e6037c0e1, c7e1e29d) and I reported it upstream at https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/nsd/+bug/1311886. The new package was published by Ubuntu on 2015-01-15 so this work-around is no longer needed.
Rather than pass `-r /dev/random` to ldns-keygen (it was `-r /dev/urandom`),
don't pass `-r` at all since /dev/random is the default.
Merges branch 'master' of github.com:pysiak/mailinabox
/dev/random should be used for crypto-grade RNG.
To make sure use of /dev/random doesn't stall due to lack of entropy, install haveged which fills the entropy pool with sources such as network traffic, key strokes, etc.
On branch master
Your branch is up-to-date with 'origin/master'.
Changes to be committed:
modified: setup/dns.sh
modified: setup/system.sh
modified: setup/webmail.sh
Viktor Szépe
Teal Dulcet
Daniel Mabbett
drpixie
Joshua Tauberer
Achilleas Pipinellis
Pieter
solt
Michael Kropat