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With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered 429 indefinitely with no second administrative path. The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt, so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold. Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is unsafe without the other two: - Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After. A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then succeeding does not leave the operator throttled. - Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames. - Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is answered 503 and no hash runs for it. An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames. The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its bucket. Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client. Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there left the suite green. README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
232 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
232 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
package database_test
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
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)
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func TestGenerateRandomPassword(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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length int
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}{
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{"Short password", 8},
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{"Medium password", 16},
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{"Long password", 32},
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{"Very short password", 3},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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password, err := database.GenerateRandomPassword(
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tt.length,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf(
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"GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v",
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err,
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)
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}
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if len(password) != tt.length {
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t.Errorf(
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"Password length = %v, want %v",
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len(password), tt.length,
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)
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}
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checkPasswordComplexity(
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t, password, tt.length,
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)
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})
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}
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}
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func checkPasswordComplexity(
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t *testing.T,
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password string,
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length int,
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) {
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t.Helper()
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// For passwords >= 4 chars, check complexity
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if length < 4 {
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return
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}
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flags := classifyChars(password)
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if !flags[0] || !flags[1] || !flags[2] || !flags[3] {
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t.Errorf(
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"Password lacks required complexity: "+
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"upper=%v, lower=%v, digit=%v, special=%v",
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flags[0], flags[1], flags[2], flags[3],
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)
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}
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}
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func classifyChars(s string) [4]bool {
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var flags [4]bool // upper, lower, digit, special
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for _, char := range s {
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switch {
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case char >= 'A' && char <= 'Z':
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flags[0] = true
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case char >= 'a' && char <= 'z':
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flags[1] = true
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case char >= '0' && char <= '9':
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flags[2] = true
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case strings.ContainsRune(
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"!@#$%^&*()_+-=[]{}|;:,.<>?",
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char,
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):
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flags[3] = true
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}
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}
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return flags
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}
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func TestGenerateRandomPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Generate multiple passwords and ensure they're different
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passwords := make(map[string]bool)
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const numPasswords = 100
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for range numPasswords {
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password, err := database.GenerateRandomPassword(16)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf(
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"GenerateRandomPassword() error = %v",
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err,
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)
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}
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if passwords[password] {
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t.Errorf(
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"Duplicate password generated: %s",
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password,
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)
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}
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passwords[password] = true
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}
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}
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func TestHashPassword(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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password := "testPassword123!"
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hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
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}
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// Check that hash has correct format
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if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, "$argon2id$") {
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t.Errorf(
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"Hash doesn't have correct prefix: %s",
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hash,
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)
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}
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// Verify password
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valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, hash)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
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}
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if !valid {
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t.Error(
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"VerifyPassword() returned false " +
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"for correct password",
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)
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}
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// Verify wrong password fails
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valid, err = database.VerifyPassword(
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"wrongPassword", hash,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
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}
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if valid {
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t.Error(
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"VerifyPassword() returned true " +
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"for wrong password",
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)
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}
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}
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func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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password := "testPassword123!"
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// Same password should produce different hashes
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hash1, err := database.HashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
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}
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hash2, err := database.HashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
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}
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if hash1 == hash2 {
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t.Error(
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"Same password produced identical hashes " +
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"(salt not working)",
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)
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}
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}
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// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
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// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
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// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
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// microseconds where a real one takes tens of milliseconds. That only
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// works if the dummy hash is a real, decodable Argon2id hash: a
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// malformed one would make VerifyPassword fail on the decode and
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// return before hashing anything.
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func TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Runs the OnceValue that builds the dummy hash, so a panic in
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// it surfaces here rather than on a live login.
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database.VerifyDummyPassword("whatever was submitted")
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dummy := database.DummyPasswordHashForTest()
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// A hash the verifier cannot decode would make VerifyPassword
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// return on the decode error, before hashing anything — the
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// timing oracle this path exists to close.
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valid, err := database.VerifyPassword("whatever", dummy)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf(
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"the dummy hash must decode like a real one: %v", err,
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)
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}
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if valid {
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t.Error("nothing may authenticate against the dummy hash")
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(dummy, "$argon2id$") {
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t.Errorf(
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"the dummy hash must use the same algorithm as real "+
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"hashes, got %q", dummy,
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)
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}
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}
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