Files
webhooker/internal/server/routes.go
sneak f3cb56345f
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Resubmit a stored event as a new undelivered event (closes #250)
Capturing real webhook traffic and firing it repeatedly at a backend
under development is a primary function of this service, and
per-delivery replay cannot do it: it only ever resolves the delivery's
own original target, so a target created for a dev backend has no
prior delivery and nothing can be replayed to it.

The event log now offers a per-event Resubmit action. It stores a NEW
event copying the stored one's method, headers, body and content type
verbatim, and fans it out to the webhook's currently ACTIVE targets,
resolved fresh by the query the receiver uses -- so a target created
long after the original event arrived receives it. The original
event's deliveries have no bearing on where the copy goes, inactive
targets are skipped as the receiver skips them, and the action is
repeatable: replay's in-flight refusal is deliberately not ported,
because firing one captured event over and over is the point.

The receiver and the resubmit path share one construction and one
fan-out site. An eventSource value carries where the fields came from,
live request or stored event, and createAndFanOut writes the event and
its pending deliveries in one transaction and hands the tasks to the
same Notifier, so a resubmitted delivery is retried, SSRF-guarded and
circuit-broken exactly as a first one is. buildDeliveryTasks returns
an error instead of writing a response, which is what lets both
callers share it.

The stored event is read once, before the write transaction, with a
cast to blob, so a body over delivery.MaxInlineBodySize is copied byte
for byte and the engine loads it from the new event row.

A nullable resubmitted_from_id records provenance -- empty for an
event that arrived on the receiver -- and the event log reports the
relationship in both directions, without which the log is unreadable
after a few resubmits of one event. The route sits in the owned-source
group, so auth, CSRF and the body cap apply, with its own rate limit
bucket and an events_resubmitted_total counter.

Inbound signature verification is not re-run: there is no inbound
signature to check on a copy an authenticated, CSRF-protected operator
action submits.

Per-delivery replay is unchanged; it serves recovery, which resubmit
does not replace. The README claimed in four places that replay was
unimplemented, one of them telling the operator that a delivery
stranded by a target type change was lost; all four are corrected and
resubmit is documented beside replay.
2026-08-23 22:38:10 +00:00

276 lines
9.0 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"net/http"
"time"
sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
)
// maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in
// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
//
// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
// orderings are deliberate.
//
// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
// under net/http's 10 MB default instead of this one.
//
// Ahead of RequireAuth because an oversize body should be refused
// before the request buys a cookie decrypt, a session load and the
// database read behind it. Rejecting first is the cheaper failure,
// and it is the ordering that keeps an unauthenticated flood from
// choosing how much session work the process does.
//
// What that ordering costs: the 413 branch is reachable
// unauthenticated, at a URL of the client's choosing and of the
// client's chosen length. So is the CSRF rejection, which sits in
// front of RequireAuth for the same reason. Both log that path, so
// both cap it — see the log calls in Middleware.MaxBodySize and
// Middleware.CSRF, which spend the same per-field budget as the
// access log.
const maxFormBodySize int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB
// requestTimeout is the maximum time allowed for a single HTTP
// request.
const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// SetupRoutes configures all HTTP routes and middleware on the
// server's router.
func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
s.setupRoutes()
}
func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
// Metrics recording middleware, registered only when the
// endpoint that exposes what it records is served. The
// condition is the same MetricsAuthEnabled the /metrics mount
// in setupRoutes reads.
if s.params.Config.MetricsAuthEnabled() {
s.router.Use(s.mw.Metrics())
}
s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
// registered immediately above.
if s.sentryEnabled {
sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
Repanic: true,
})
s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
}
}
func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
s.router.Mount(
"/s",
http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
)
s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
// API routes will be added here.
})
s.router.Get(
"/.well-known/healthcheck",
s.h.HandleHealthCheck(),
)
// Authenticated /metrics route. The condition is
// Config.MetricsAuthEnabled and never the username alone: a
// username with an empty password would otherwise mount the
// endpoint behind a credential map that accepts an empty
// password. Config rejects that combination at startup, and
// this reads the same value the startup log reports, so the
// two cannot disagree about whether the route exists.
if s.params.Config.MetricsAuthEnabled() {
s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
r.Get(
"/metrics",
http.HandlerFunc(
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
),
)
})
}
s.setupPageRoutes()
s.setupUserRoutes()
s.setupSourceRoutes()
s.setupWebhookRoutes()
}
func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
})
}
func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
r.With(s.mw.PasswordChangeRateLimit()).Post(
"/password", s.h.HandlePasswordChange(),
)
})
}
func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())
r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
})
s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
// The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so
// this is the only route that serves a whole one. It
// belongs to this group for its RequireAuth and
// NoCache; see HandleEventBodyDownload for the headers
// that keep the bytes it returns inert.
r.Get(
"/logs/{eventID}/body",
s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
)
// Replay is the one page action that queues outbound work:
// it creates a delivery from a stored event and hands it to
// the delivery engine. The rate limit is what bounds a
// held-down button or a scripted loop; the handler
// separately refuses a replay while an earlier one for the
// same event and target is still in flight. POST only, so
// the action cannot be taken by a link, a prefetch or an
// image tag.
r.With(s.mw.ReplayRateLimit()).Post(
"/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay",
s.h.HandleDeliveryReplay(),
)
// Resubmit is the other page action that queues outbound
// work: it copies a stored event into a new one and fans
// that out to every currently active target. It is
// deliberately repeatable, so the rate limit is the only
// bound on a held-down button; it gets its own bucket so
// that spending it does not also disable replay. POST
// only, so the action cannot be taken by a link, a
// prefetch or an image tag.
r.With(s.mw.ResubmitRateLimit()).Post(
"/events/{eventID}/resubmit",
s.h.HandleEventResubmit(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints",
s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete",
s.h.HandleEntrypointDelete(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle",
s.h.HandleEntrypointToggle(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/secret",
s.h.HandleEntrypointSecret(),
)
r.Post("/targets", s.h.HandleTargetCreate())
// The edit form is the one page that renders a target's
// destination URL and header values in full; see
// delivery.TargetConfigForm. It belongs to this group for
// its RequireAuth and NoCache, which are what keep that
// exception from reaching an unauthenticated request or a
// shared cache.
r.Get(
"/targets/{targetID}/edit",
s.h.HandleTargetEdit(),
)
r.Post(
"/targets/{targetID}/edit",
s.h.HandleTargetEditSubmit(),
)
r.Post(
"/targets/{targetID}/delete",
s.h.HandleTargetDelete(),
)
r.Post(
"/targets/{targetID}/toggle",
s.h.HandleTargetToggle(),
)
})
}
func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
"/webhook/{uuid}",
s.h.HandleWebhook(),
)
}