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Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies (closes #141 )

Four defects found by the integration review, each of which would have
made the README or the release notes untrue at the moment of tagging.

RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL was absent from the README env table while two
other passages referred to it as documented. Enumerated every variable
read by internal/config from the source (12 in total) rather than by
eye; that was the only one missing.

TODO.md omitted five of the units landed in this milestone (#64, #79,
#90, #113, #118), two of them credential-exposure fixes, which are
precisely the entries a reader of the release notes wants to find. The
list is now derived from git log origin/main..origin/next.

The README sold Replay in the present tense as a core capability while
no redelivery code exists anywhere in the tree, and the roadmap entry
for it had been dropped without it being implemented. The README now
says planned, and the roadmap entry is back.

The production JS asset shipped a console.log on load. The rest of the
file and every other shipped asset were checked; that was the only one
(alpine.min.js is vendored and untouched).

No behavioural change: the only non-documentation edit is the deleted
console.log.

2026-08-12 10:42:41 +00:00

9.0 KiB

Raw Blame History

Workflow

One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:

ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
branch from next (never from main)
do the work; open a PR based on next (never on main)
pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into next
push; nothing stays local-only

next is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and mergeable to main without notice. One next -> main PR accumulates the milestone; releases are cut from main separately.

Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on next. Every branch editing TODO.md conflicts with every other (#112).

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. main (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target, event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling (#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).

next (9bfd033) holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed, and it is verified green by cache-defeated container runs rather than by the CI badge, which can pass without executing anything (#119). Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.

Next Step

Tag 1.0.0 from main once the milestone PR merges, then repair the CI gate (#119) before the next cycle's work lands — a gate that can report success without running is the one thing every other guarantee here rests on.

Completed Steps

2026-08-12 Bound the X-Forwarded-For scan's allocation to the hop cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with strings.LastIndexByte instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver. Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the previous implementation (#133)
2026-08-12 Cap the X-Forwarded-For hop walk at 64 entries, so an attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address (#124)
2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a TRUSTED_PROXIES CIDR list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case X-Forwarded-For is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop. Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs: Go embeds the request URL in *url.Error, so every transport failure persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event database via DeliveryResult.Error, a field a future REST API would have served. maskURLError drops path, query and userinfo while preserving the wrapped cause, so errors.Is/As and Timeout() still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently (#118)
2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget; over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After. It was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form: MaxBodySize is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a TargetView of labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
2026-08-11 Allow retention_days of 0 to mean retain forever, via a sentinel written in BeforeSave so the GORM column default cannot win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts above 106751 overflowed time.Duration and wrapped the cutoff into the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything (#79)
2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry (SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT, default 24h) refreshed on authenticated requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent backstop that activity never extends (#66)
2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an orphaned retrying delivery whose target type no longer supports retries, recording a DeliveryResult with the reason instead of leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention reaper's sweep loop at context.Background() rather than the fx OnStart hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a single sweep under its default one-hour interval
2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its last database target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes its handle while deliberately leaving archive-{webhookID}.db on disk, and a new ArchiveSweeper prunes idle archives on the existing RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL without ever creating an archive file
2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable environment values: envInt removed in favour of envPositiveInt plus a PORT range check, envBool now parses with strconv.ParseBool, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on retention_days, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in Dockerfile, release-archive sha256 pins in script/bootstrap), adopt the canonical .golangci.yml (v2 linters.settings layout so lll/funlen/cyclop/dupl thresholds actually apply), and fix all newly surfaced lint findings
2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49); absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on login, request body size limits (#41)
2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker, parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded into README (#6)

Future Steps

Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
Delivery status and retry management UI
Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver endpoints)
Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists; Bearer token middleware does not)
REST API v1
- CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
- event viewing and filtering endpoints
- event redelivery endpoint
- OpenAPI specification
Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
A remember-me option at login
Password change and reset flow
Later, nice to have
- email delivery target type
- SNS and S3 delivery targets
- data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
- JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
- webhook event search and filtering
- multi-user with role-based access control