225 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
225 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"net/http"
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"time"
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sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
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)
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// maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in
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// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
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// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
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//
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// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
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// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
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// orderings are deliberate.
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//
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// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
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// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
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// under net/http's 10 MB default instead of this one.
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//
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// Ahead of RequireAuth because an oversize body should be refused
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// before the request buys a cookie decrypt, a session load and the
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// database read behind it. Rejecting first is the cheaper failure,
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// and it is the ordering that keeps an unauthenticated flood from
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// choosing how much session work the process does.
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//
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// What that ordering costs: the 413 branch is reachable
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// unauthenticated, at a URL of the client's choosing and of the
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// client's chosen length. So is the CSRF rejection, which sits in
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// front of RequireAuth for the same reason. Both log that path, so
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// both cap it — see the log calls in Middleware.MaxBodySize and
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// Middleware.CSRF, which spend the same per-field budget as the
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// access log.
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const maxFormBodySize int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB
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// requestTimeout is the maximum time allowed for a single HTTP
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// request.
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const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
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// SetupRoutes configures all HTTP routes and middleware on the
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// server's router.
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func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
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s.router = chi.NewRouter()
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s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
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s.setupRoutes()
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}
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func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
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s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
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s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
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s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
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// Metrics middleware (only if credentials are configured)
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if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
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s.router.Use(s.mw.Metrics())
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}
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s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
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s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
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// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
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// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
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// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
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// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
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// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
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// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
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// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
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// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
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// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
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// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
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s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
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// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
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// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
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// registered immediately above.
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if s.sentryEnabled {
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sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
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Repanic: true,
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})
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s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
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}
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}
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func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
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s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
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s.router.Mount(
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"/s",
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http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
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)
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s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
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// API routes will be added here.
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})
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s.router.Get(
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"/.well-known/healthcheck",
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s.h.HandleHealthCheck(),
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)
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// set up authenticated /metrics route:
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if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
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s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
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r.Get(
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"/metrics",
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http.HandlerFunc(
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promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
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),
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)
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})
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}
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s.setupPageRoutes()
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s.setupUserRoutes()
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s.setupSourceRoutes()
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s.setupWebhookRoutes()
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}
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func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
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s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
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// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
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// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
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r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
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r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
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r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
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// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
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// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
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// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
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// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
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// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
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// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
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r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
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r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
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r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
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s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
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// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
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// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
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r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
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r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
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r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
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r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
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r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
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r.With(s.mw.PasswordChangeRateLimit()).Post(
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"/password", s.h.HandlePasswordChange(),
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)
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
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s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
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// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
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// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
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r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
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r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
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r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
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r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
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r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
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r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())
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r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
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})
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s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
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// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
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// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
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r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
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r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
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r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
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r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
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r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
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r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
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r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
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r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
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r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
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// The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so
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// this is the only route that serves a whole one. It
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// belongs to this group for its RequireAuth and
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// NoCache; see HandleEventBodyDownload for the headers
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// that keep the bytes it returns inert.
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r.Get(
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"/logs/{eventID}/body",
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s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
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)
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r.Post(
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"/entrypoints",
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s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate(),
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)
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r.Post(
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"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete",
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s.h.HandleEntrypointDelete(),
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)
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r.Post(
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"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle",
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s.h.HandleEntrypointToggle(),
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)
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r.Post("/targets", s.h.HandleTargetCreate())
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r.Post(
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"/targets/{targetID}/delete",
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s.h.HandleTargetDelete(),
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)
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r.Post(
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"/targets/{targetID}/toggle",
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s.h.HandleTargetToggle(),
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)
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
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s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
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"/webhook/{uuid}",
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s.h.HandleWebhook(),
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)
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}
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