All checks were successful
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The access log wrote one INFO line per request carrying r.URL.String(). Registered with Use, it runs ahead of the route limiter, so a client flooding the unauthenticated receiver with invented paths wrote attacker-chosen text of attacker-chosen length into the operator's log, one line per request. 3xx and 4xx responses now log the chi route pattern in place of the concrete URL, and the fixed literal "(unmatched)" when routing matched nothing at all. One line per request is retained, so real traffic stays observable and rate accounting still works, but the line's content is now bounded by the service's own route table. The pattern is only populated after routing, so it is read in the deferred part of the handler rather than before next.ServeHTTP. The route pattern alone does not close the hole, because it leaves two other ways for a request to choose the size of the line it writes. The query string is one: /.well-known/healthcheck and /s/* answer 200 to anyone with no rate limiter in front of them, and /pages/login behind only the login limiter, so appending 8 KB after the '?' bought the same amplification as an invented 404 path. The branches that keep the concrete URL now log the path only, with the query replaced by the fixed marker "?(redacted)". Nothing debuggable is lost: `page`, on the authenticated pagination links, is the only query parameter this service reads. The headers are the other: useragent and referer are logged on every line, including the correctly redacted ones, so an 8 KB User-Agent plus an 8 KB Referer produced a 24 KB line whose url field read "(unmatched)". Each field a client supplies is now truncated rather than dropped -- a truncated User-Agent is still worth reading -- to 512 bytes for url, useragent and referer, 128 for request_id (chi passes an inbound X-Request-Id header straight through), and 32 for method, which Go accepts as any token up to the header size limit. Truncation also drops invalid UTF-8, which an encoder would otherwise expand six-fold past the budget. Each budget is spent in encoded bytes rather than in the bytes the client sent, because the line an operator stores is the encoded one. Every rune is charged what the wider of the two handlers internal/logger can select will emit for it: two bytes for a quotation mark, a backslash or a tab; six for a non-printable rune below U+10000; and ten for one at or above it, which the text handler's strconv.Quote spells \UXXXXXXXX where the JSON handler passes the four UTF-8 bytes through untouched. Go's header parser accepts every one of them in a header value -- U+1000C is four bytes all >= 0x80, which httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue accepts and net/textproto does not strip -- so counted raw a 512-byte budget bought a 1,024-byte field, and charging the astral case six rather than ten bought an 861-byte one on a tty. Plain ASCII still encodes one byte for one, so a real browser's User-Agent fits whole, while a value built out of escapes keeps a proportionally shorter prefix. A complete line is now at most 2,560 bytes under either handler: 3*(512+11) for url, useragent and referer, 128+11 for request_id, 32+11 for method and a fixed portion of 336 for JSON come to 2,087, and 2,037 for the text handler's 286-byte fixed portion, both stated with headroom. The tests assert it against 8 KB in the path, in the query and in each of the three headers, including values built from the characters the handlers escape and from an unassigned astral code point, and against a 5xx whose concrete url is at its own budget on the same line. Every case runs through both handler shapes, since the two do not escape alike and the number is quoted unqualified. The README states it so an operator can size log storage against it.
659 lines
18 KiB
Go
659 lines
18 KiB
Go
package middleware_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi"
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chimw "github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
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)
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// floodRequests is the number of distinct invented paths each flood
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// test drives through the access log.
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const floodRequests = 64
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// attackerMarker is embedded in every invented path. No access log
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// line for a redirected or rejected request may contain it.
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const attackerMarker = "QQATTACKERTEXTQQ"
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// maxLineBytes bounds a single access log line whose client-supplied
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// fields are of ordinary size. Well above what the fixed fields need,
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// well below the length of the oversized input the amplification tests
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// send.
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const maxLineBytes = 1024
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// maxCappedLineBytes bounds a single access log line when every
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// client-supplied field arrives oversized and is truncated to its
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// budget. This is the number the README quotes as the per-line cost an
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// operator sizes log storage against, and it is a bound on the
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// ENCODED line, which is what the operator's disk holds.
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const maxCappedLineBytes = 2560
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// oversizedSegmentBytes is the length of the single attacker-chosen
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// path segment, query string or header used to show line size does not
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// track input size.
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const oversizedSegmentBytes = 8192
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// tailMarker is placed at the END of an oversized header value, so its
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// absence from the log proves the value was truncated rather than
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// merely being short.
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const tailMarker = "QQTRUNCATEDTAILQQ"
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// These mirror the middleware's own budgets, which are unexported.
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// They are duplicated rather than exported so that widening a budget
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// in the middleware has to be restated here deliberately.
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const (
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maxFieldBytes = 512
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maxRequestIDBytes = 128
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maxMethodBytes = 32
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truncationSuffix = "[truncated]"
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unmatchedRouteLiteral = "(unmatched)"
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)
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// capturingMiddleware returns a Middleware whose logger writes JSON
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// lines into the returned buffer, so the access log can be asserted
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// on directly.
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func capturingMiddleware(t *testing.T) (*middleware.Middleware, *bytes.Buffer) {
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t.Helper()
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buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
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log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
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buf,
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&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo},
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))
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cfg := &config.Config{Environment: config.EnvironmentDev}
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return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil), buf
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}
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// capturingTextMiddleware is capturingMiddleware for the other handler
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// internal/logger can select: slog's text handler, which
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// internal/logger/logger.go installs when stderr is a tty. It escapes
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// differently from the JSON one, so the line bound has to be asserted
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// against both.
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func capturingTextMiddleware(
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t *testing.T,
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) (*middleware.Middleware, *bytes.Buffer) {
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t.Helper()
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buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
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log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
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buf,
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&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo},
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))
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cfg := &config.Config{Environment: config.EnvironmentDev}
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return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil), buf
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}
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// accessLogRouter mirrors the production route shapes that an
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// unauthenticated client can reach: the public receiver, the
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// authenticated profile route (which redirects to login rather than
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// rejecting outright), the health check (which answers 200 to anyone,
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// behind no rate limiter at all), and a plain static route.
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func accessLogRouter(m *middleware.Middleware) *chi.Mux {
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router := chi.NewRouter()
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// Production registers RequestID ahead of Logging, and chi's
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// RequestID passes an inbound X-Request-Id header straight
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// through, so the request_id field is client-supplied too.
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router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
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router.Use(m.Logging())
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router.Get(
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"/.well-known/healthcheck",
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func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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},
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)
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router.HandleFunc(
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"/webhook/{uuid}",
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func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Stands in for the real handler: an unknown entrypoint
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// UUID 404s, a known one succeeds.
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if chi.URLParam(r, "uuid") != "known" {
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http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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},
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)
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router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Redirect(
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w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
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)
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})
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})
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boom := func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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http.Error(w, "boom", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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router.Get("/boom", boom)
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// The 5xx branch keeps the concrete path, so it needs a route that
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// answers 500 to a path of the client's choosing: that is where the
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// url field and the header fields are both at their budget on the
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// same line.
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router.Get("/boom/*", boom)
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return router
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}
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// accessLogEntries decodes the captured buffer into one map per
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// logged line, holding every line to maxLineBytes.
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func accessLogEntries(
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t *testing.T,
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buf *bytes.Buffer,
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) []map[string]any {
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t.Helper()
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return accessLogEntriesWithin(t, buf, maxLineBytes)
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}
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// accessLogEntriesWithin decodes the captured buffer into one map per
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// logged line, holding every line to bound bytes.
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func accessLogEntriesWithin(
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t *testing.T,
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buf *bytes.Buffer,
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bound int,
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) []map[string]any {
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t.Helper()
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var entries []map[string]any
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for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
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strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n",
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) {
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if line == "" {
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continue
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}
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require.LessOrEqual(
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t, len(line), bound,
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"access log line exceeded its bound",
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)
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var entry map[string]any
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &entry))
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entries = append(entries, entry)
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}
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return entries
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}
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// get drives one GET through the router.
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func get(t *testing.T, router *chi.Mux, target string) int {
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t.Helper()
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return getWithHeaders(t, router, target, nil)
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}
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// getWithHeaders drives one GET through the router with the supplied
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// request headers set.
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func getWithHeaders(
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t *testing.T,
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router *chi.Mux,
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target string,
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headers map[string]string,
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) int {
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t.Helper()
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req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
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context.Background(), http.MethodGet, target, nil,
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)
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for name, value := range headers {
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req.Header.Set(name, value)
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}
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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return w.Code
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}
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// assertFloodIsBounded drives floodRequests distinct invented paths
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// built by pathFor and asserts every logged line names wantURL, that
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// none carries the invented text, and that the line count is exactly
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// one per request.
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func assertFloodIsBounded(
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t *testing.T,
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pathFor func(i int) string,
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wantStatus int,
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wantURL string,
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) {
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t.Helper()
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m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
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router := accessLogRouter(m)
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for i := range floodRequests {
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assert.Equal(t, wantStatus, get(t, router, pathFor(i)))
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}
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assert.NotContains(
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t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
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"access log carried attacker-chosen path text",
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)
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entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
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require.Len(t, entries, floodRequests)
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for _, entry := range entries {
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assert.Equal(t, wantURL, entry["url"])
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assert.InDelta(
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t, float64(wantStatus), entry["status"], 0,
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)
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}
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}
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func TestAccessLog_InventedReceiverPathsLogRoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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assertFloodIsBounded(
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t,
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func(i int) string {
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return "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
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strings.Repeat("x", i) + "?q=" + attackerMarker
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},
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http.StatusNotFound,
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"/webhook/{uuid}",
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)
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}
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func TestAccessLog_InventedProfilePathsLogRoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// The login redirect is a 3xx, not a 4xx, but it is just as free
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// for an unauthenticated client to drive with invented input.
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// The doubled slash is what chi's RoutePattern yields for a
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// mounted subrouter's index route.
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assertFloodIsBounded(
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t,
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func(i int) string {
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return "/user/" + attackerMarker +
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strings.Repeat("x", i) + "/"
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},
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http.StatusSeeOther,
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"/user/{username}//",
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)
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}
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func TestAccessLog_UnroutablePathsLogFixedLiteral(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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assertFloodIsBounded(
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t,
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func(i int) string {
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return "/" + attackerMarker + strings.Repeat("x", i)
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},
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http.StatusNotFound,
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"(unmatched)",
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)
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}
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// oversizedValue builds an 8 KB header value out of repetitions of ch,
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// with the tail marker at its end.
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//
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// The leading 'x' is load-bearing for tab: net/textproto strips leading
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// and trailing whitespace from a header value, so a value that were
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// nothing but tabs would arrive empty over a real connection and the
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// case would prove nothing.
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func oversizedValue(ch string) string {
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return "x" + strings.Repeat(ch, oversizedSegmentBytes) + tailMarker
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}
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// oversizedHeaders fills every client-supplied header the access log
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// reads with the same value.
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func oversizedHeaders(value string) map[string]string {
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return map[string]string{
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"User-Agent": value,
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"Referer": value,
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"X-Request-Id": value,
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}
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}
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// sizeCase is one way of pointing 8 KB of client-chosen text at the
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// access log.
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type sizeCase struct {
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target string
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headers map[string]string
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wantStatus int
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wantURL string
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bound int
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}
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// lineSizeCases enumerates every part of a request that reaches the
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// access log, at 8 KB apiece.
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func lineSizeCases() map[string]sizeCase {
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cases := map[string]sizeCase{
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"oversized path segment": {
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target: "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
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strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes),
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wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
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wantURL: "/webhook/{uuid}",
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bound: maxLineBytes,
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},
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// /.well-known/healthcheck answers 200 to anyone and has no
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// rate limiter in front of it, so an oversized query appended
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// to it would otherwise buy the same amplification as an
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// invented 404 path, unauthenticated and unthrottled.
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"oversized query on an unauthenticated 200": {
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target: "/.well-known/healthcheck?q=" + attackerMarker +
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strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes),
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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wantURL: "/.well-known/healthcheck?(redacted)",
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bound: maxLineBytes,
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},
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// These reach the line on every request, including one whose
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// url field is correctly redacted.
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"oversized headers": {
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target: "/" + attackerMarker,
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headers: oversizedHeaders(oversizedValue("h")),
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wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
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wantURL: unmatchedRouteLiteral,
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bound: maxCappedLineBytes,
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},
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}
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// The url field on a 5xx keeps the concrete path, so it reaches its
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// own budget on the same line as the three header fields. That is
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// the widest line the service can be made to write.
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longPath := "/boom/" + strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes)
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wantLongURL := longPath[:maxFieldBytes] + truncationSuffix
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// escapeChars are the runes Go's header parser accepts in a header
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// value and the log handler then escapes, coming out wider than
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// they went in. A budget counted in raw bytes lets any of them buy
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// a field several times its nominal size, so every one of them
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// gets a case.
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//
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// The astral one is the case the JSON handler alone does not
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// reach: U+1000C is unassigned, so it is non-printable, and
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// strconv.Quote spells a non-printable rune at or above U+10000
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// as a ten-byte \UXXXXXXXX. The JSON handler passes it through as
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// its four UTF-8 bytes, so only the text-handler shape of this
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// test holds the ten-byte charge honest.
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escapeChars := map[string]string{
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"quote": `"`,
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"backslash": `\`,
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"tab": "\t",
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"astral": "\U0001000C",
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}
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for kind, char := range escapeChars {
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fill := oversizedValue(char)
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cases["oversized "+kind+" headers"] = sizeCase{
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target: "/" + attackerMarker,
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headers: oversizedHeaders(fill),
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wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
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wantURL: unmatchedRouteLiteral,
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bound: maxCappedLineBytes,
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}
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cases["oversized "+kind+" headers with a 5xx concrete url"] =
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sizeCase{
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target: longPath,
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headers: oversizedHeaders(fill),
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wantStatus: http.StatusInternalServerError,
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wantURL: wantLongURL,
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bound: maxCappedLineBytes,
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}
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}
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return cases
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}
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// TestAccessLog_LineSizeDoesNotTrackInputSize drives 8 KB of
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// client-chosen text at the access log through each part of the
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// request that reaches it, and holds the resulting line to a fixed
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// bound in every case.
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//
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// The bound is on the ENCODED line, so the cases built out of
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// characters the handler escapes are the ones that matter: a budget
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// spent in raw bytes passes every plain-ASCII case here and still
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// writes a line half again as long as the stated ceiling.
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func TestAccessLog_LineSizeDoesNotTrackInputSize(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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require.Equal(
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t, middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes, maxCappedLineBytes,
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"the README quotes this ceiling and the middleware derives "+
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"it; they have to agree",
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)
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for name, tc := range lineSizeCases() {
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t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
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router := accessLogRouter(m)
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assert.Equal(
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t,
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tc.wantStatus,
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getWithHeaders(t, router, tc.target, tc.headers),
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)
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// accessLogEntriesWithin enforces the bound, which is
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// orders of magnitude smaller than the input just sent.
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entries := accessLogEntriesWithin(t, buf, tc.bound)
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require.Len(t, entries, 1)
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assert.Equal(t, tc.wantURL, entries[0]["url"])
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// The markers sit at the far end of the client-chosen
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// text, so their absence is what proves the redaction and
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// the truncation actually ran.
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assert.NotContains(
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t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
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"access log carried attacker-chosen text",
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)
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assert.NotContains(
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t, buf.String(), tailMarker,
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"access log carried an untruncated client field",
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)
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})
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}
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}
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|
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// TestAccessLog_LineSizeDoesNotTrackInputSizeOnTheTextHandler runs the
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// same cases through slog's text handler, which internal/logger
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// selects on a tty.
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//
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// MaxAccessLogLineBytes is quoted to operators unqualified, so it has
|
|
// to hold for whichever handler is installed — and the two do not
|
|
// escape alike. The astral case is the one that separates them: the
|
|
// JSON handler emits U+1000C as its four UTF-8 bytes, while
|
|
// strconv.Quote spells it \U0001000C at ten. Charging six for it, as
|
|
// this code did, put a real 2,676-byte line on the wire here while
|
|
// every JSON case stayed comfortably inside the bound.
|
|
//
|
|
// Only the size bound is asserted; the url field's contents are the
|
|
// JSON shape's business above.
|
|
func TestAccessLog_LineSizeDoesNotTrackInputSizeOnTheTextHandler(
|
|
t *testing.T,
|
|
) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
for name, tc := range lineSizeCases() {
|
|
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingTextMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t,
|
|
tc.wantStatus,
|
|
getWithHeaders(t, router, tc.target, tc.headers),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
line := strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())
|
|
|
|
require.NotEmpty(t, line)
|
|
assert.NotContains(
|
|
t, line, "\n", "expected exactly one log line",
|
|
)
|
|
require.LessOrEqual(
|
|
t, len(line), tc.bound,
|
|
"access log line exceeded its bound",
|
|
)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, line, "url=")
|
|
assert.NotContains(
|
|
t, line, attackerMarker,
|
|
"access log carried attacker-chosen text",
|
|
)
|
|
assert.NotContains(
|
|
t, line, tailMarker,
|
|
"access log carried an untruncated client field",
|
|
)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestAccessLog_OversizedMethodIsTruncated covers the last term in the
|
|
// MaxAccessLogLineBytes arithmetic that the size cases above cannot
|
|
// reach: Go accepts any RFC 7230 token as a method, and getWithHeaders
|
|
// only ever sends GET.
|
|
func TestAccessLog_OversizedMethodIsTruncated(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
method := strings.Repeat("M", oversizedSegmentBytes) + attackerMarker
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
|
context.Background(), method, "/"+attackerMarker, nil,
|
|
)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
entries := accessLogEntriesWithin(t, buf, maxLineBytes)
|
|
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t,
|
|
strings.Repeat("M", maxMethodBytes)+truncationSuffix,
|
|
entries[0]["method"],
|
|
)
|
|
assert.NotContains(
|
|
t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
|
|
"access log carried attacker-chosen text",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestAccessLog_OversizedHeadersKeepATruncatedPrefix checks the other
|
|
// half of the header cap: the fields are cut, not dropped, so a
|
|
// truncated User-Agent is still worth reading.
|
|
func TestAccessLog_OversizedHeadersKeepATruncatedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t,
|
|
http.StatusNotFound,
|
|
getWithHeaders(
|
|
t, router, "/nope",
|
|
oversizedHeaders(oversizedValue("h")),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
entries := accessLogEntriesWithin(t, buf, maxCappedLineBytes)
|
|
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
|
|
|
for key, budget := range map[string]int{
|
|
"useragent": maxFieldBytes,
|
|
"referer": maxFieldBytes,
|
|
"request_id": maxRequestIDBytes,
|
|
} {
|
|
value, ok := entries[0][key].(string)
|
|
require.True(t, ok, key)
|
|
assert.LessOrEqual(
|
|
t, len(value), budget+len(truncationSuffix), key,
|
|
)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, value, truncationSuffix, key)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, value, "hhhh", key)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAccessLog_SuccessKeepsConcretePathAndRedactsQuery(
|
|
t *testing.T,
|
|
) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/webhook/known?src=ci"),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// The path resolved against a stored entrypoint, so it stays. The
|
|
// query never does: see TestAccessLog_UnauthenticatedSuccess...
|
|
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
|
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "/webhook/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "src=ci")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAccessLog_ServerErrorKeepsConcreteURL(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t, http.StatusInternalServerError, get(t, router, "/boom"),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
|
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "/boom", entries[0]["url"])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAccessLog_RetainsEveryOtherField(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
|
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(
|
|
t,
|
|
http.StatusNotFound,
|
|
get(t, router, "/webhook/"+attackerMarker),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
|
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
|
|
|
for _, key := range []string{
|
|
"request_start", "method", "url", "useragent", "request_id",
|
|
"referer", "proto", "remoteIP", "status", "latency_ms",
|
|
} {
|
|
assert.Contains(t, entries[0], key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, entries[0]["method"])
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "HTTP/1.1", entries[0]["proto"])
|
|
}
|