Files
webhooker/internal/delivery/target_redact.go
sneak 70f0fca5a2
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Render delivery attempt detail in the event log (closes #202)
Expanding a delivery on the event log page now shows each recorded
attempt: attempt number, outcome, status code, duration, error and
response body. Previously a failure rendered as "target: failed" and
diagnosing it meant opening the per-webhook SQLite file by hand.

The response body is cut by SQLite via substr over a blob cast, the
same projection the event body uses, so an oversized stored response
never becomes a Go string. The page reports the cut with a marker.

Response bodies and errors are remote content, so both go through a
new delivery.Redactor that strips the target's own destination URL,
path, query and userinfo, plus the values of credential-shaped
request headers, before rendering. A cut body goes through RedactCut
as well, which drops any tail that is a proper prefix of a secret:
the remote chooses the padding in front of a credential it echoes,
so it chooses where the cut falls inside that credential. Target
configuration keeps reaching the template only as a TargetView.

Redactors are built from an unscoped target load. Deleting a target
only soft deletes the row while its deliveries survive, and a scoped
load would leave exactly those deliveries rendering unredacted. The
views the page lists stay scoped.

Attempt loading is chunked so the IN clause cannot exceed SQLite's
bound-parameter limit, its error is reported rather than discarded,
and the page renders at most 20 attempts per delivery, counting what
it leaves out.

static/css/tailwind.css is regenerated with the repo's pinned
tailwindcss for the utility classes the new markup uses.
2026-08-20 05:04:28 +00:00

248 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

package delivery
import (
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// RedactionMarker stands in for a target credential found in
// text the target's remote peer chose.
const RedactionMarker = "(redacted)"
// Redactor removes one target's own credential material from
// text that target's remote peer chose: a delivery response
// body, or a delivery error stored before the delivery path
// learned to mask the URLs it embeds.
//
// It removes byte-identical echoes of strings taken from the
// target's stored configuration, and nothing else. Anything
// the remote re-encodes survives: JSON "\/" escaping (what
// PHP's json_encode emits by default), percent-encoding, HTML
// entities, and an echo of only part of a path. It cannot
// remove a secret the remote invented.
//
// The zero Redactor removes nothing, which is what a caller
// holding no target for a delivery gets.
type Redactor struct {
secrets []string
}
// NewRedactor builds the redactor for one target.
func NewRedactor(t *database.Target) Redactor {
secrets := targetSecrets(t)
// Longest first, so replacing a secret that is contained
// in a longer one cannot leave a fragment of the longer
// one behind. Configured headers arrive in map order, so
// the sort is also what makes the result deterministic.
slices.SortFunc(secrets, func(a, b string) int {
if d := len(b) - len(a); d != 0 {
return d
}
return strings.Compare(a, b)
})
return Redactor{secrets: secrets}
}
// Redact replaces every occurrence of the target's credential
// material in s.
func (r Redactor) Redact(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return s
}
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, secret, RedactionMarker)
}
return s
}
// RedactCut redacts s, which its caller has already cut to a
// byte budget, and additionally drops any tail of s that is a
// proper prefix of a secret.
//
// The cut lands wherever the remote's padding puts it, so the
// remote chooses where inside the credential it falls. The
// severed prefix left behind equals no secret, so plain
// Redact would render it verbatim.
func (r Redactor) RedactCut(s string) string {
s = r.Redact(s)
if n := r.secretPrefixSuffix(s); n > 0 {
return s[:len(s)-n] + RedactionMarker
}
return s
}
// secretPrefixSuffix returns the length of the longest suffix
// of s that is a proper prefix of one of the secrets, or 0
// when there is none.
func (r Redactor) secretPrefixSuffix(s string) int {
longest := 0
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
// Proper prefixes only: a whole secret at the tail was
// already replaced by Redact.
n := min(len(secret)-1, len(s))
for ; n > longest; n-- {
if strings.HasSuffix(s, secret[:n]) {
longest = n
break
}
}
}
return longest
}
// targetSecrets returns the credential-bearing strings a
// target's configuration carries.
//
// The destination URL contributes. Its path, query and
// userinfo are the credential for both target types that have
// one — an incoming-webhook URL is a bearer token, which is
// why MaskURL elides exactly those parts — and they are the
// material this service actually sends, so a remote that
// echoes the request back echoes them.
//
// Configured request headers contribute their values, but
// only for the credential-shaped names isCredentialHeaderName
// picks out. That is the same class-based rule applied to
// URLs: an echoed Accept or User-Agent still renders, an
// echoed Authorization does not.
func targetSecrets(t *database.Target) []string {
if t == nil {
return nil
}
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return urlSecrets(cfg.WebhookURL)
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return append(
urlSecrets(cfg.URL),
headerSecrets(cfg.Headers)...,
)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase, database.TargetTypeLog:
// Neither has a destination URL, so neither has
// anything to redact.
return nil
default:
return nil
}
}
// urlSecrets returns the substrings of a destination URL that
// must not survive into a rendered page: the whole URL, the
// parts of it MaskURL elides, and any userinfo.
//
// No length floor is applied to the path. A short path is
// treated as a credential exactly like a long one, because
// the field takes an arbitrary URL and no segment can be
// assumed non-secret — the same rule MaskURL applies.
func urlSecrets(raw string) []string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return nil
}
secrets := []string{raw}
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return secrets
}
if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" {
requestURI := parsed.RequestURI()
secrets = append(secrets, requestURI)
if escaped := parsed.EscapedPath(); escaped != requestURI {
secrets = append(secrets, escaped)
}
}
if parsed.User != nil {
secrets = append(secrets, parsed.User.String())
if pw, ok := parsed.User.Password(); ok && pw != "" {
secrets = append(secrets, pw)
}
}
return secrets
}
// minHeaderSecretBytes is the shortest header value treated as
// a credential. Unlike a URL path, a header value can be a
// couple of bytes long, and redacting those would scatter the
// marker through ordinary response text for no gain.
const minHeaderSecretBytes = 4
// headerSecrets returns the values of the configured headers
// whose names are credential-shaped.
func headerSecrets(headers map[string]string) []string {
var secrets []string
for name, value := range headers {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if len(value) < minHeaderSecretBytes {
continue
}
if isCredentialHeaderName(name) {
secrets = append(secrets, value)
}
}
return secrets
}
// isCredentialHeaderName classifies a header by its name. The
// value is never inspected, so the rule is the same
// class-based one MaskURL applies to a destination URL.
func isCredentialHeaderName(name string) bool {
name = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
// Names that carry a credential by definition.
switch name {
case "authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie":
return true
}
// What operators call their own credential headers:
// X-Api-Key, X-Hub-Signature, X-Auth-Token.
for _, fragment := range []string{
"auth",
"key",
"password",
"secret",
"signature",
"token",
} {
if strings.Contains(name, fragment) {
return true
}
}
return false
}