Files
webhooker/internal/middleware/loginguard_test.go
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Stop a slow host turning a login-guard test into a segfault (closes #186)
2026-08-18 05:01:13 +02:00

630 lines
18 KiB
Go

package middleware_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// mib converts the Argon2id memory parameter, which is in KiB, to MB.
const mib = 1024
const (
// guardInterval is the failure window these tests use. It is
// long enough that nothing lapses mid-test on its own; tests
// that need a lapse drive the clock instead.
guardInterval = time.Minute
// guardWait is the slot wait for tests that expect to get a
// slot. Tests that expect to be refused set their own.
guardWait = 2 * time.Second
guardClient = "198.51.100.7"
guardUser = "admin"
// racePasses is how many times a both-cases-ready select race is
// run. A pass can only go the wrong way once the zero-duration
// timer has fired, so the per-pass detection probability is
// somewhere below 1/2 rather than exactly it; the bound that
// matters is that passes are independent, so a regression that
// survives is exponentially unlikely in N. The test still waits
// on nothing.
racePasses = 1000
)
// newGuard builds a guard with production-shaped defaults and the
// given key-set cap and verification concurrency.
func newGuard(maxKeys, concurrency int) *middleware.LoginGuard {
return middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
guardInterval,
maxKeys,
concurrency,
middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
guardWait,
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_ThrottlesRepeatedFailures is the brute-force half:
// wrong passwords for one username from one client key still run out
// of budget and are answered 429.
func TestLoginGuard_ThrottlesRepeatedFailures(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst - 1 {
assert.False(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
"failure %d is still inside the budget", i,
)
}
assert.True(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
"the last failure of the budget must throttle",
)
assert.True(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
"failures past the budget must stay throttled",
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_SuccessForgivesFailures pins the forgiveness rule:
// an operator who mistypes several times and then gets it right must
// not be left throttled.
func TestLoginGuard_SuccessForgivesFailures(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
}
g.SucceedForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
assert.False(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
"a success must reset the counter, so the next mistake "+
"starts a fresh budget",
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_FailuresAreKeyedPerUsername proves the second half
// of the keying: one username's spent budget does not throttle
// another's from the same client.
func TestLoginGuard_FailuresAreKeyedPerUsername(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
}
assert.True(t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser))
assert.False(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, "someone-else"),
"a different submitted username must have its own budget",
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_WindowLapses covers the interval: a counter that has
// gone quiet for the whole window starts again from zero.
func TestLoginGuard_WindowLapses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
var now atomic.Int64
now.Store(time.Now().UnixNano())
g.SetNowForTest(func() time.Time {
return time.Unix(0, now.Load())
})
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
}
assert.True(t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser))
now.Add(int64(guardInterval) + 1)
assert.False(
t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
"a lapsed window must start a fresh budget",
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_UsernameKeySetIsBounded is the memory bound. The
// submitted username is attacker-controlled, so an attacker rotating
// usernames must not be able to grow the guard without limit: past
// the cap, tracking falls back to a counter keyed on the client
// address alone.
func TestLoginGuard_UsernameKeySetIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
maxKeys = 8
attempts = 500
)
g := newGuard(maxKeys, 1)
for i := range attempts {
g.FailForTest(guardClient, fmt.Sprintf("user-%d", i))
}
byUser, byAddr := g.TrackedKeysForTest()
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, byUser, maxKeys,
"the per-username key set must not grow past its cap",
)
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, byAddr, maxKeys,
"the fallback key set must not grow past its cap either",
)
assert.Positive(
t, byAddr,
"past the cap, failures must fall back to the address "+
"bucket rather than being dropped",
)
assert.Less(
t, byUser+byAddr, attempts,
"memory must not grow with the number of distinct "+
"usernames submitted",
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_BeyondBothCapsStaysThrottled covers the hard stop.
// When both key sets are full of live counters and the client is in
// neither, there is nothing to count without unbounded growth, so the
// failure is answered as throttled. That costs the operator nothing:
// a correct password never reaches this path.
func TestLoginGuard_BeyondBothCapsStaysThrottled(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const maxKeys = 4
g := newGuard(maxKeys, 1)
// Fill the per-username set from one client, then fill the
// address set from distinct clients.
for i := range maxKeys {
g.FailForTest(guardClient, fmt.Sprintf("user-%d", i))
}
for i := range maxKeys {
g.FailForTest(fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d", i), "whoever")
}
assert.True(
t, g.FailForTest("203.0.113.200", "brand-new"),
"a client that fits in neither full key set must be "+
"answered as throttled rather than tracked",
)
byUser, byAddr := g.TrackedKeysForTest()
assert.LessOrEqual(t, byUser, maxKeys)
assert.LessOrEqual(t, byAddr, maxKeys)
}
// TestLoginGuard_SemaphoreBoundsConcurrentVerifications is the memory
// bound on the hashing itself. Verifying credentials before spending
// limiter budget means an attacker can force one Argon2id hash per
// request, and each allocates 64 MB; without this bound the fix for
// an admin lockout would be a memory-exhaustion DoS instead.
func TestLoginGuard_SemaphoreBoundsConcurrentVerifications(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
const (
concurrency = 2
workers = 12
// rendezvousDeadlock is the deadlock guard described below.
// It is orders of magnitude longer than any scheduling delay,
// so it never decides the result, and well inside script/test's
// 30s timeout, so a wedge fails on the assertion instead of
// blowing the package timeout.
rendezvousDeadlock = 5 * time.Second
)
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, concurrency)
var (
mu sync.Mutex
inside int
highest int
wg sync.WaitGroup
recorded sync.WaitGroup
once sync.Once
)
// Slot holders rendezvous instead of sleeping, and they hold until
// every worker has been answered. A sleep only makes overlap
// likely — on a host loaded enough to deschedule a goroutine for
// longer than the sleep the workers serialise and the maximum
// observed comes back as 1 — so the rendezvous is what makes the
// overlap a fact rather than a race won.
//
// The barrier must not open at the concurrency-th holder, which
// would fix the lower bound at the cost of the upper one this test
// exists to enforce: holders would leave as soon as the count
// reached concurrency, so a guard admitting extra requests would
// let them arrive after the first holders had already left and
// highest would report concurrency however many were really let
// in. It opens instead once every worker's acquire has returned
// and any slot it won has been counted, so under a broken guard
// every admitted worker is inside simultaneously and highest is
// the true maximum. Under a correct guard the refused workers
// return within the guard's own wait, which decides nothing beyond
// how long that takes.
overlapped := make(chan struct{})
closeOverlapped := func() {
once.Do(func() { close(overlapped) })
}
// Deadlock guard, not a timing margin: no assertion depends on its
// length, and the only way to reach it is a worker that never
// returns from acquire at all. It is here so that such a wedge
// fails legibly on the assertion below instead of hanging until
// the package test timeout.
abandon := time.AfterFunc(rendezvousDeadlock, closeOverlapped)
defer abandon.Stop()
recorded.Add(workers)
go func() {
recorded.Wait()
closeOverlapped()
}()
for range workers {
wg.Go(func() {
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
if !ok {
recorded.Done()
return
}
defer release()
mu.Lock()
inside++
if inside > highest {
highest = inside
}
mu.Unlock()
// Counted before signalling, so the barrier can never open
// while an admitted worker is still on its way to being
// counted.
recorded.Done()
<-overlapped
mu.Lock()
inside--
mu.Unlock()
})
}
wg.Wait()
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
assert.Equal(
t, concurrency, highest,
"no more than %d verifications may run at once", concurrency,
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_SaturatedSemaphoreRefusesRatherThanQueueing pins
// what happens when every slot is taken for longer than the wait: the
// request is refused, so the caller answers 503 without allocating
// another 64 MB hash.
//
// Neither half of this rides on the wait being long enough. The
// refusal holds the only slot across the whole of the second call, so
// there is no wait it could get lucky with — the wait fixes only how
// long the refusal takes, not whether it happens. The reuse after
// release is settled by acquire's non-blocking preamble, which is
// pinned separately by TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait. So
// the wait below is sized to keep the test quick, not to win a race.
func TestLoginGuard_SaturatedSemaphoreRefusesRatherThanQueueing(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
guardInterval,
middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
1,
middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
10*time.Millisecond,
)
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
require.True(t, ok, "the first acquire must get the only slot")
_, ok = g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
assert.False(
t, ok,
"with the only slot held, a second request must be refused "+
"rather than wait indefinitely",
)
release()
release, ok = g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
// require, not assert: acquire returns a nil release alongside a
// false ok, so calling it after a non-fatal assertion turns one
// failed test into a segfault that takes the whole package test
// binary down. Every assertion whose value is dereferenced later
// has to stop the test.
require.True(
t, ok, "the slot must be reusable once released",
)
release()
}
// TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait is the determinism this
// file used to lack. acquire selects over a slot send and a wait
// timer, and Go chooses among ready cases uniformly at random, so a
// call made after the timer had already fired was a coin flip: on a
// loaded host the previous test's third acquire could be refused
// with its slot standing free, and then dereference the nil release
// it got back.
//
// The wait here is already elapsed on arrival, which is the worst
// case that scheduling can produce, so a free slot must still be
// granted every time. Without acquire's non-blocking preamble each
// pass is an independent coin flip and the loop fails within a few
// passes; with it the property holds by construction and no wall
// clock is involved.
func TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
guardInterval,
middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
1,
middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
0,
)
for pass := range racePasses {
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
require.Truef(
t, ok,
"pass %d was refused a slot that was free; an expired "+
"wait must never beat an available slot",
pass,
)
release()
}
}
// TestLoginGuard_AcquireHonoursCancellation proves a client that
// disconnects while queued frees its place immediately instead of
// holding it for the full wait.
func TestLoginGuard_AcquireHonoursCancellation(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
require.True(t, ok)
defer release()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
_, ok = g.AcquireForTest(ctx)
assert.False(
t, ok, "a cancelled request must not wait for a slot",
)
}
// TestPasswordVerifyConcurrency_MatchesMemoryBudget pins the
// concurrency constant to the arithmetic behind it: the number of
// slots is the hashing budget divided by what one Argon2id hash
// actually costs.
//
// The per-hash figure is read out of the shipped password
// parameters rather than copied here. A guard that asserts a literal
// against a literal cannot see the thing it guards: raising
// argon2Memory would leave it green while the real ceiling doubled.
func TestPasswordVerifyConcurrency_MatchesMemoryBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Memory is the real argon2Memory, in KiB.
perHashMB := int(database.DefaultPasswordConfig().Memory) / mib
require.Positive(
t, perHashMB,
"the Argon2id memory parameter must be readable in MB",
)
// The memory this service commits to password hashing.
const budgetMB = 128
assert.Equal(
t,
middleware.PasswordVerifyConcurrencyConst,
budgetMB/perHashMB,
"the verification concurrency must be the %d MB hashing "+
"budget divided by the %d MB one Argon2id hash costs; "+
"if the Argon2id parameters changed, the slot count "+
"must change with them",
budgetMB, perHashMB,
)
}
// TestLoginGuard_ShedsPastTheQueueCap pins the memory bound on
// waiting, as distinct from the bound on hashing. A waiter arrives
// with its form already parsed, and the retained parse plus its
// header block cost several MB — far more than maxFormBodySize
// suggests, since that caps only the raw body read — so an unbounded
// queue would hold that much per waiting request for the whole wait;
// past the cap the guard must refuse instantly rather than grow.
func TestLoginGuard_ShedsPastTheQueueCap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
maxWaiters = 2
// Long enough that a queued waiter never times out on its
// own, so anything the test observes leaving the queue left
// because it was shed.
neverElapses = time.Minute
// The probe carries its own deadline, so a guard that queues
// the probe instead of shedding it fails here rather than
// hanging until the package test timeout.
//
// This is a patience budget, not a margin to be won. A shed
// returns in microseconds and a probe that queued instead
// would not return for neverElapses, so the two are a whole
// minute apart and any budget between them separates them. It
// is set far above any scheduling stall a loaded host can
// produce, because the previous 200 ms — and the 100 ms
// elapsed-time assertion it fed — bounded the latency of a
// goroutine hand-off, which is a false red waiting to happen
// on the machine this suite runs on. What actually proves the
// probe was not queued is the queue depth asserted below.
probePatience = 5 * time.Second
)
g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
guardInterval,
middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
1,
maxWaiters,
neverElapses,
)
// Occupy the only slot, so everything after this queues.
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
require.True(t, ok)
defer release()
defer fillQueue(t, g, maxWaiters)()
granted, answered := probeQueueCap(g, probePatience)
require.True(
t, answered,
"a request arriving past the queue cap is still waiting to "+
"be queued; it must have been shed",
)
assert.False(
t, granted,
"a request arriving past the queue cap must be shed",
)
assert.Equal(
t, maxWaiters, g.QueuedWaitersForTest(),
"a shed request must not have grown the queue",
)
}
// fillQueue starts n waiters on g and returns once all of them are
// queued for a slot. The returned function releases them and waits
// for them to exit.
func fillQueue(
t *testing.T,
g *middleware.LoginGuard,
n int,
) func() {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range n {
wg.Go(func() {
done, got := g.AcquireForTest(ctx)
if got {
done()
}
})
}
// Patience budget, not a margin: the waiters park in microseconds
// and nothing releases them, so the only way to exhaust this is a
// guard that never queues. One second is the same order as the
// scheduling stalls this suite has to survive, so it is not one.
require.Eventually(
t,
func() bool { return g.QueuedWaitersForTest() == n },
5*time.Second, time.Millisecond,
"the waiters must reach the queue before the cap is tested",
)
return func() {
cancel()
wg.Wait()
}
}
// probeQueueCap acquires from another goroutine. It reports, in
// order, whether the call was granted a slot and whether it was
// answered at all within wait; a call that never returned reports
// false for both.
//
// It runs off the test goroutine deliberately. Joining a full queue
// is not cancellable by context — refusing to join is the property
// under test — so a guard that fails this would otherwise hang the
// package until the test timeout instead of failing here.
//
// It reports no elapsed time. Timing a goroutine hand-off measures
// the host, not the guard, and the caller distinguishes shedding from
// queueing by the queue depth instead.
func probeQueueCap(
g *middleware.LoginGuard,
wait time.Duration,
) (bool, bool) {
probed := make(chan bool, 1)
go func() {
release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
if ok {
release()
}
probed <- ok
}()
select {
case result := <-probed:
return result, true
case <-time.After(wait):
return false, false
}
}