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## Security Hardening This PR implements three security hardening issues: ### CSRF Protection (closes #35) - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes - Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API) ### SSRF Prevention (closes #36) - `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time - Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed ### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37) - Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate` - 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login` - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes - `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies ### Files Changed **New files:** - `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware - `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter - `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport **Modified files:** - `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware - `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data - `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation - `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production - All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields - `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist `docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #42 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
143 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
143 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package delivery
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import (
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"net"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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ip string
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blocked bool
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}{
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// Loopback
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{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", true},
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{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2", true},
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{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255", true},
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// RFC 1918 - Class A
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{"10.0.0.0", "10.0.0.0", true},
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{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", true},
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{"10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255", true},
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// RFC 1918 - Class B
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{"172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1", true},
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{"172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255", true},
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{"172.15.255.255", "172.15.255.255", false},
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{"172.32.0.0", "172.32.0.0", false},
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// RFC 1918 - Class C
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{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
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{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
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// Link-local / cloud metadata
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{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
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{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
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// Public IPs (should NOT be blocked)
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{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
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{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
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{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
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// IPv6 loopback
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{"::1", "::1", true},
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// IPv6 unique local
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{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
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{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
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// IPv6 link-local
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{"fe80::1", "fe80::1", true},
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// IPv6 public (should NOT be blocked)
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{"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", "2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", false},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
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require.NotNil(t, ip, "failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip)
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assert.Equal(t, tt.blocked, isBlockedIP(ip),
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"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v", tt.ip, isBlockedIP(ip), tt.blocked)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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blockedURLs := []string{
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"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
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"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
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"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
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"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
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"http://172.16.0.1/api",
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
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"http://[::1]/hook",
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"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
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"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
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"http://0.0.0.0/hook",
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}
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for _, u := range blockedURLs {
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t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
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assert.Error(t, err, "URL %s should be blocked", u)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// These are public IPs and should be allowed
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allowedURLs := []string{
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"https://example.com/hook",
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"http://93.184.216.34/webhook",
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"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/xxx",
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}
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for _, u := range allowedURLs {
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t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
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assert.NoError(t, err, "URL %s should be allowed", u)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := ValidateTargetURL("ftp://example.com/hook")
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assert.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unsupported URL scheme")
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := ValidateTargetURL("http:///path")
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assert.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := ValidateTargetURL("://invalid")
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assert.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestBlockedNetworks_Initialized(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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assert.NotEmpty(t, blockedNetworks, "blockedNetworks should be initialized")
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// Should have at least the main RFC 1918 + loopback + link-local ranges
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assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(blockedNetworks), 8,
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"should have at least 8 blocked network ranges")
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}
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