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webhooker/internal/server/routes.go
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Report handler panics through the logger and answer 500 (closes #187)
chi v1.5.5's middleware.Recoverer neither logged a handler panic nor
answered 500. Its pretty-printer scans the stack for a frame beginning
"panic(0x", which the runtime no longer emits, so the scan never
terminates early and every line reaches decorateFuncCallLine, which
slices pkg[strings.Index(pkg, "."):] without checking for -1. That
second panic escaped chi's own deferred function, so its
WriteHeader(500) never ran: net/http closed the connection and reported
its own crash, losing the original panic value entirely.

Middleware.Recoverer replaces it. It writes one ERROR record through
internal/logger carrying the panic value, the stack and the request id,
and answers 500. http.ErrAbortHandler is re-panicked rather than
swallowed, and a response the handler already committed is left alone
rather than overwritten.

It is registered inside every middleware that observes the response, so
the 500 is the status the access log records and the metrics count, and
outside the sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option needs something
further out to catch what it re-raises.

Both fields are bounded in encoded bytes, through the same
internal/logfield budget the access log spends: 512 for the panic value,
since a handler may build one out of the request, and 8192 for the
stack, cut at its far end so the panic site survives.
MaxPanicLogLineBytes states the resulting ceiling at 10240; measured,
the widest line either handler produces is 8898, a figure that carries
no source paths and reproduces across checkouts. The real case through
the shipped chain measures roughly 3960 bytes; that one moves with the
checkout, because debug.Stack() embeds absolute source paths, so it is
stated as a measurement rather than as an invariant and no test asserts
it.

Because the panic record no longer reaches net/http's error log, the
carve-outs in README.md and in the MaxAccessLogLineBytes doc comment
that described that path are removed rather than reworded. What
replaces them states the ceiling the record is now written under, and
internal/server/recoverer_test.go asserts that "http: panic serving"
appears in neither of the process's streams.
2026-08-18 05:45:04 +00:00

225 lines
6.9 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"net/http"
"time"
sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
)
// maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in
// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
//
// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
// orderings are deliberate.
//
// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
// under net/http's 10 MB default instead of this one.
//
// Ahead of RequireAuth because an oversize body should be refused
// before the request buys a cookie decrypt, a session load and the
// database read behind it. Rejecting first is the cheaper failure,
// and it is the ordering that keeps an unauthenticated flood from
// choosing how much session work the process does.
//
// What that ordering costs: the 413 branch is reachable
// unauthenticated, at a URL of the client's choosing and of the
// client's chosen length. So is the CSRF rejection, which sits in
// front of RequireAuth for the same reason. Both log that path, so
// both cap it — see the log calls in Middleware.MaxBodySize and
// Middleware.CSRF, which spend the same per-field budget as the
// access log.
const maxFormBodySize int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB
// requestTimeout is the maximum time allowed for a single HTTP
// request.
const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// SetupRoutes configures all HTTP routes and middleware on the
// server's router.
func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
s.setupRoutes()
}
func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
// Metrics middleware (only if credentials are configured)
if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
s.router.Use(s.mw.Metrics())
}
s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
// registered immediately above.
if s.sentryEnabled {
sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
Repanic: true,
})
s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
}
}
func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
s.router.Mount(
"/s",
http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
)
s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
// API routes will be added here.
})
s.router.Get(
"/.well-known/healthcheck",
s.h.HandleHealthCheck(),
)
// set up authenticated /metrics route:
if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
r.Get(
"/metrics",
http.HandlerFunc(
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
),
)
})
}
s.setupPageRoutes()
s.setupUserRoutes()
s.setupSourceRoutes()
s.setupWebhookRoutes()
}
func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
})
}
func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
r.With(s.mw.PasswordChangeRateLimit()).Post(
"/password", s.h.HandlePasswordChange(),
)
})
}
func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())
r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
})
s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
// The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so
// this is the only route that serves a whole one. It
// belongs to this group for its RequireAuth and
// NoCache; see HandleEventBodyDownload for the headers
// that keep the bytes it returns inert.
r.Get(
"/logs/{eventID}/body",
s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints",
s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete",
s.h.HandleEntrypointDelete(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle",
s.h.HandleEntrypointToggle(),
)
r.Post("/targets", s.h.HandleTargetCreate())
r.Post(
"/targets/{targetID}/delete",
s.h.HandleTargetDelete(),
)
r.Post(
"/targets/{targetID}/toggle",
s.h.HandleTargetToggle(),
)
})
}
func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
"/webhook/{uuid}",
s.h.HandleWebhook(),
)
}