webhooker/TODO.md

# Workflow

One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:

* ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
* branch from `next` (never from `main`)
* do the work; open a PR based on `next` (never on `main`)
* pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into `next`
* push; nothing stays local-only

`next` is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and
mergeable to `main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates
the milestone; releases are cut from `main` separately.

Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
`next`. Every branch editing `TODO.md` conflicts with every other
(#112).

# Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).

`next` holds the 1.0.0 milestone less its final four issues (#176, #178,
#186, #187 — all in review or held on merge order), and is verified
green by cache-defeated container runs
(`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`). The
CI status is not independently claimed here: a superseded run is
recorded as `skipped` and still rolls up green, so a commit status on
`next` does not by itself evidence an executed check (#152). Before
#119, a warm layer cache also let the gate report success without
executing anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so
the lie looked like a real run. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
of 2026-07-06.

# Next Step

Land the last four 1.0.0 issues, then merge the milestone PR to `main`
and tag 1.0.0 from it. Merge order is forced by a real conflict on
`README.md` and `internal/middleware/middleware.go`: #186, then #176,
then #178, then #187.

Two items belong to the owner, neither blocking the tag. #150 was
decided by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is
flagged on the issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether
`Completed Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every
unit) is unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue
branches do not touch this file.

# Completed Steps

- 2026-08-18 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry rather than the
  concrete path. The receiver's path carries the entrypoint capability
  token, so every Sentry event from `/webhook/{uuid}` shipped a live
  credential to a third party. Request `Data`, `QueryString`, `Cookies`
  and `Env` are dropped and headers reduced to an allowlist (#179)
- 2026-08-18 Read form fields from the POST body only. `r.FormValue`
  merges the query string, so a login could be driven by URL parameters
  — putting the password somewhere that lands in access logs, proxy
  logs and browser history (#160)
- 2026-08-18 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit
  budget, so a flood of wrong passwords cannot lock out the account it
  is guessing at. The manager took this decision rather than stall the
  queue; it is flagged on the issue for reversal (#150)
- 2026-08-18 Run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint`. Host lint
  was wrong in both directions from version skew and shared caches.
  `script/lint` asserts the summary line, because `--no-cache-filter`
  silently ignores a stage name it does not match — the flag that makes
  the gate meaningful fails open (#109)
- 2026-08-18 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP. The list
  query truncates for rendering, and that truncated value was the only
  way to read a body, so the full payload was unreachable (#157)
- 2026-08-18 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text.
  `internal/logfield` budgets by *encoded* bytes, not runes, so a
  handler's JSON escaping cannot multiply a field past its allowance
  (#146)
- 2026-08-18 Mark superseded CI commits `failure` rather than
  `skipped`. A skipped run rolls up green, so a commit that was never
  tested reported success (#152)
- 2026-08-18 Set `fx.StopTimeout` inside the container stop grace, so
  shutdown hooks are bounded by a deadline the orchestrator will
  actually honour rather than being killed mid-flush (#134)
- 2026-08-17 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by `/64`. A single allocation
  hands out 2^64 addresses, so per-address keying let one client mint
  unlimited buckets. Manager decision, recorded on the issue (#125)
- 2026-08-17 Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning
  inaccuracies, including claims about behaviour the code does not have
  (#151)
- 2026-08-17 Fetch and verify Alpine.js at build time against
  `static/vendor.sha256` instead of committing the minified blob, so
  the dependency is pinned by hash rather than by trust (#145)
- 2026-08-17 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query itself,
  so a large stored payload cannot be read into memory just to be
  truncated for display (#135)
- 2026-08-17 Mask the `http` target's destination URL in the UI: it can
  carry a bearer credential in its path or query, and was rendered
  verbatim. Manager decision to mask unconditionally (#115)
- 2026-08-14 Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context, so a hook that
  hangs cannot hold the process past its grace period (#102)
- 2026-08-14 Render templates via a buffer rather than the
  `ResponseWriter`, so a template error part-way through cannot commit
  a 200 and then fail — the response is written only once it is whole
  (#123)
- 2026-08-14 Align the session codec's max-age with the 7-day absolute
  cap. The codec accepted cookies the session layer considered expired,
  so the cap was enforced in one place and not the other (#108)
- 2026-08-12 Warn when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty in production, where
  the safe default silently discards forwarded headers and every client
  rate-limits as the proxy's address (#149)
- 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the
  whole `/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request
  path and `/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client
  that invented a fresh path per request minted a fresh bucket per
  request: the limit on the only unauthenticated endpoint bounded
  nothing in aggregate, and every request still cost an entrypoint
  lookup before it 404ed. An outer limiter keyed on the client address
  alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged
  per-entrypoint limiter (#139)
- 2026-08-12 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies: the
  README promised manual redelivery in the present tense in three
  places when nothing implements it (the same false claim also sat in
  the doc comment that was its source text), the env table omitted
  `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, and `TODO.md` itself omitted five landed
  units (#141)
- 2026-08-12 Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on. The
  workflow now writes a build-context fingerprint before calling
  `script/cibuild`, so a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer of
  the lint and builder stages while a docs-only commit still replays
  from cache; a superseding run also rewrites the `failure` status
  Gitea leaves on commits it cancelled and never tested. Verified by
  pushing a deliberately broken test and watching CI go red (#119)
- 2026-08-12 Require a positive `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`: a
  non-positive value reached `time.NewTicker` in both the retention
  reaper and the archive sweeper, panicking two goroutines with no
  recover after startup had already reported success (#140)
- 2026-08-12 Bound the `X-Forwarded-For` scan's allocation to the hop
  cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with `strings.LastIndexByte`
  instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes
  rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver.
  Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the
  previous implementation (#133)
- 2026-08-12 Cap the `X-Forwarded-For` hop walk at 64 entries, so an
  attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit
  key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address
  (#124)
- 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` CIDR
  list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address
  unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case
  `X-Forwarded-For` is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop.
  Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts
  startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain
  another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the
  Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
  button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
  actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs:
  Go embeds the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure
  persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event
  database via `DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would
  have served. `maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while
  preserving the wrapped cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()`
  still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently
  (#118)
- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
  (`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus
  entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget;
  over-limit requests get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one
  unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
  `MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so
  an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in
  full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which
  rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack
  incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked
  per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a `TargetView` of
  labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a
  sentinel written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot
  win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts
  above 106751 overflowed `time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into
  the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything
  (#79)
- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
  (`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
  requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
  backstop that activity never extends (#66)
- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
  orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
  retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
  leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention
  reaper's sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx
  `OnStart` hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and
  killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently
  stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a
  single sweep under its default one-hour interval
- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its
  last `database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes
  its handle while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on
  disk, and a new `ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
  `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
  environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt`
  plus a `PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with
  `strconv.ParseBool`, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on
  `retention_days`, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery
  results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
  `Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
  adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
  `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
  all newly surfaced lint findings
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
  Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over
  plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
  with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49);
  absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
  login, request body size limits (#41)
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
  (#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
  delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
  parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded
  into README (#6)

# Future Steps

- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
  README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
  tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
- Delivery status and retry management UI
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
  plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
  endpoints)
- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
  Bearer token middleware does not)
- REST API v1
    - CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
    - event viewing and filtering endpoints
    - event redelivery endpoint
    - OpenAPI specification
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
- A remember-me option at login
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password. The authenticated
  password *change* flow already landed on `main` (#65); reset does not
  exist
- Later, nice to have
    - email delivery target type
    - SNS and S3 delivery targets
    - data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
    - JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
    - webhook event search and filtering
    - multi-user with role-based access control