clawbot
c378690977
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 2m58s
static/js/alpine.min.js was a committed minified bundle, which REPO_POLICIES forbids, referenced by no content hash at all. A minified blob is unreviewable, which is the shape a supply-chain compromise takes. script/fetch-assets now downloads Alpine 3.14.9 from the npm registry and verifies sha256 on both the tarball and the extracted file, and static/vendor_test.go re-hashes the bytes go:embed actually placed in the binary. The shipped bytes are byte-identical to the blob that was committed, so the served asset does not change. Independently reviewed. Five negative controls reproduced by the reviewer: flipped expected hash, repointed URL, post-fetch tampering, asset absent, and manifest inconsistencies — each fails closed with static/js/ left clean. Registry hashes confirmed against the pins, and the runtime image was built, run and curled to confirm the asset is still served and the login page still loads it. Known gap, filed separately: static/static.go embeds the js directory rather than named files, so a missing fetched asset is not a compile error on ungated local build paths. Every gated path fails loudly, so the release artifact is unaffected.
24 lines
586 B
Plaintext
24 lines
586 B
Plaintext
# .ci-fingerprint is deliberately NOT excluded: it is the CI cache barrier
|
|
# that keeps the check stages from replaying a cached pass. See the lint
|
|
# stage of the Dockerfile.
|
|
.git/
|
|
bin/
|
|
# Third-party browser assets are fetched and hash-verified inside the build by
|
|
# script/fetch-assets. Excluding any host copy keeps a developer's working tree
|
|
# from supplying the bytes that get shipped. The script and its
|
|
# static/vendor.sha256 manifest stay in the context.
|
|
static/js/alpine.min.js
|
|
*.md
|
|
LICENSE
|
|
.editorconfig
|
|
.env
|
|
.env.*
|
|
*.db
|
|
*.sqlite
|
|
*.sqlite3
|
|
.DS_Store
|
|
.idea/
|
|
.vscode/
|
|
tmp/
|
|
temp/
|