Files
webhooker/internal/delivery/ssrf.go
clawbot 32a9170428
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refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting
Refactor Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned
golangci-lint v2.11.3 Docker image instead of installing
golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage. This follows the
pattern used by sneak/pixa.

Changes:
- Dockerfile: separate lint stage using golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3
  (Debian-based, pinned by sha256) with COPY --from=lint dependency
- Bump Go from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (golang:1.26.1-bookworm, pinned)
- Bump golangci-lint from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3
- Migrate .golangci.yml from v1 to v2 format (same linters, format only)
- All Docker images pinned by sha256 digest
- Fix all lint issues from the v2 linter upgrade:
  - Add package comments to all packages
  - Add doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods
  - Fix unchecked errors (errcheck)
  - Fix unused parameters (revive)
  - Fix gosec warnings (MaxBytesReader for form parsing)
  - Fix staticcheck suggestions (fmt.Fprintf instead of WriteString)
  - Rename DeliveryTask to Task to avoid stutter (delivery.Task)
  - Rename shadowed builtin 'max' parameter
- Update README.md version requirements
2026-03-18 22:26:48 -07:00

223 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package delivery
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
)
const (
// dnsResolutionTimeout is the maximum time to wait for
// DNS resolution during SSRF validation.
dnsResolutionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
)
// Sentinel errors for SSRF validation.
var (
errNoHostname = errors.New("URL has no hostname")
errNoIPs = errors.New(
"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
)
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private/reserved IP range",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
)
)
// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
cidrs := []string{
"127.0.0.0/8",
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"169.254.0.0/16",
"0.0.0.0/8",
"100.64.0.0/10",
"192.0.0.0/24",
"192.0.2.0/24",
"198.18.0.0/15",
"198.51.100.0/24",
"203.0.113.0/24",
"224.0.0.0/4",
"240.0.0.0/4",
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
}
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf(
"ssrf: failed to parse CIDR %q: %v",
cidr, err,
))
}
blockedNetworks = append(
blockedNetworks, network,
)
}
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// any blocked private/reserved network range.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range blockedNetworks {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ValidateTargetURL checks that an HTTP delivery target
// URL is safe from SSRF attacks.
func ValidateTargetURL(
ctx context.Context, targetURL string,
) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
}
err = validateScheme(parsed.Scheme)
if err != nil {
return err
}
host := parsed.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return errNoHostname
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
return checkBlockedIP(ip)
}
return validateHostname(ctx, host)
}
func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf(
"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
scheme, errInvalidScheme,
)
}
return nil
}
func checkBlockedIP(ip net.IP) error {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s is in a blocked "+
"private/reserved range: %w",
ip, errBlockedIP,
)
}
return nil
}
func validateHostname(
ctx context.Context, host string,
) error {
dnsCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
ctx, dnsResolutionTimeout,
)
defer cancel()
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(
dnsCtx, host,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"failed to resolve hostname %q: %w",
host, err,
)
}
if len(ips) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(
"hostname %q: %w", host, errNoIPs,
)
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"hostname %q resolves to blocked "+
"IP %s: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
)
}
}
return nil
}
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
// custom DialContext that blocks connections to
// private/reserved IP addresses.
func NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: ssrfDialContext,
}
}
func ssrfDialContext(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"ssrf: invalid address %q: %w",
addr, err,
)
}
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(
ctx, host,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"ssrf: DNS resolution failed for %q: %w",
host, err,
)
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"ssrf: connection to %s (%s) "+
"blocked: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
)
}
}
var dialer net.Dialer
return dialer.DialContext(
ctx, network,
net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port),
)
}