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Records the trusted-proxy gating, hop cap and bounded scan, and corrects the Workflow section, which still described branching from main and committing TODO.md alongside the work.
140 lines
7.0 KiB
Markdown
140 lines
7.0 KiB
Markdown
# Workflow
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One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:
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* ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
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* branch from `next` (never from `main`)
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* do the work; open a PR based on `next` (never on `main`)
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* pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into `next`
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* push; nothing stays local-only
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`next` is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and
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mergeable to `main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates
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the milestone; releases are cut from `main` separately.
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Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
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`next`. Every branch editing `TODO.md` conflicts with every other
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(#112).
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# Status
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pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
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with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
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event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
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password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
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(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
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`next` (9bfd033) holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it
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is closed, and it is verified green by cache-defeated container runs
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rather than by the CI badge, which can pass without executing anything
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(#119). Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this repo in f9a9569
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(2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the README TODO section,
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which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.
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# Next Step
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Tag 1.0.0 from `main` once the milestone PR merges, then repair the CI
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gate (#119) before the next cycle's work lands — a gate that can report
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success without running is the one thing every other guarantee here
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rests on.
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-12 Bound the `X-Forwarded-For` scan's allocation to the hop
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cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with `strings.LastIndexByte`
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instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes
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rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver.
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Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the
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previous implementation (#133)
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- 2026-08-12 Cap the `X-Forwarded-For` hop walk at 64 entries, so an
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attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit
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key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address
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(#124)
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- 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` CIDR
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list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address
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unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case
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`X-Forwarded-For` is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop.
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Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts
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startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain
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another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
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- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the
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Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
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button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
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actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
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- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
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(`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
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requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
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backstop that activity never extends (#66)
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- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
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orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
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retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
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leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
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- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention
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reaper's sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx
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`OnStart` hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and
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killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently
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stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a
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single sweep under its default one-hour interval
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- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its
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last `database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes
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its handle while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on
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disk, and a new `ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
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`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
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- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
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environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt`
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plus a `PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with
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`strconv.ParseBool`, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
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- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on
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`retention_days`, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery
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results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
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- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
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`Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
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adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
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`lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
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all newly surfaced lint findings
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- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
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Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
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- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
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- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over
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plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
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- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
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- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
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with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
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- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
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- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49);
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absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
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- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
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login, request body size limits (#41)
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- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
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(#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
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- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
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delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
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parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
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- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded
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into README (#6)
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# Future Steps
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- Delivery status and retry management UI
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- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
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plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
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endpoints)
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- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
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- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
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Bearer token middleware does not)
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- REST API v1
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- CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
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- event viewing and filtering endpoints
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- event redelivery endpoint
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- OpenAPI specification
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- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
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- A remember-me option at login
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- Password change and reset flow
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- Later, nice to have
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- email delivery target type
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- SNS and S3 delivery targets
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- data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
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- JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
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- webhook event search and filtering
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- multi-user with role-based access control
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