All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 5s
Security hardening implementing three issues: CSRF Protection (#35): - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to /pages, /sources, /source, and /user routes - Hidden csrf_token field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from /webhook (inbound) and /api (stateless) routes SSRF Prevention (#36): - ValidateTargetURL blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation - Blocked ranges: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom DialContext for defense-in-depth at delivery time (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only http/https schemes allowed Login Rate Limiting (#37): - Per-IP rate limiter using golang.org/x/time/rate - 5 attempts per minute per IP on POST /pages/login - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries - X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP header support for reverse proxies Closes #35, closes #36, closes #37
143 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
143 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package delivery
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"net"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
ip string
|
|
blocked bool
|
|
}{
|
|
// Loopback
|
|
{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", true},
|
|
{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2", true},
|
|
{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255", true},
|
|
|
|
// RFC 1918 - Class A
|
|
{"10.0.0.0", "10.0.0.0", true},
|
|
{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", true},
|
|
{"10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255", true},
|
|
|
|
// RFC 1918 - Class B
|
|
{"172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1", true},
|
|
{"172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255", true},
|
|
{"172.15.255.255", "172.15.255.255", false},
|
|
{"172.32.0.0", "172.32.0.0", false},
|
|
|
|
// RFC 1918 - Class C
|
|
{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
|
|
{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
|
|
|
|
// Link-local / cloud metadata
|
|
{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
|
|
{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
|
|
|
|
// Public IPs (should NOT be blocked)
|
|
{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
|
|
{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
|
|
{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
|
|
|
|
// IPv6 loopback
|
|
{"::1", "::1", true},
|
|
|
|
// IPv6 unique local
|
|
{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
|
|
{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
|
|
|
|
// IPv6 link-local
|
|
{"fe80::1", "fe80::1", true},
|
|
|
|
// IPv6 public (should NOT be blocked)
|
|
{"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", "2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", false},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
|
|
require.NotNil(t, ip, "failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.blocked, isBlockedIP(ip),
|
|
"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v", tt.ip, isBlockedIP(ip), tt.blocked)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
blockedURLs := []string{
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
|
|
"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
|
|
"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
|
|
"http://172.16.0.1/api",
|
|
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
|
|
"http://[::1]/hook",
|
|
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
|
|
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
|
|
"http://0.0.0.0/hook",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, u := range blockedURLs {
|
|
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
|
|
assert.Error(t, err, "URL %s should be blocked", u)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
// These are public IPs and should be allowed
|
|
allowedURLs := []string{
|
|
"https://example.com/hook",
|
|
"http://93.184.216.34/webhook",
|
|
"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/xxx",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, u := range allowedURLs {
|
|
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
|
|
assert.NoError(t, err, "URL %s should be allowed", u)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := ValidateTargetURL("ftp://example.com/hook")
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unsupported URL scheme")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := ValidateTargetURL("http:///path")
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := ValidateTargetURL("://invalid")
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBlockedNetworks_Initialized(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, blockedNetworks, "blockedNetworks should be initialized")
|
|
// Should have at least the main RFC 1918 + loopback + link-local ranges
|
|
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(blockedNetworks), 8,
|
|
"should have at least 8 blocked network ranges")
|
|
}
|