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chi runs Use middleware in registration order, and every form route
group registered CSRF() before MaxBodySize(). gorilla/csrf calls
r.PostFormValue, so the form was parsed under net/http's 10 MB default
and the intended 1 MB cap never applied to form fields. The
/user/{username} group, which carries POST /password, had no
MaxBodySize registration at all.
- Register MaxBodySize ahead of CSRF in /pages, /sources, and
/source/{sourceID}, and add it to /user/{username}.
- Reject a declared-oversize body up front with 413. Reordering alone
cannot produce one: http.MaxBytesReader surfaces its error on Read,
so the form parse fails and gorilla/csrf answers 403 "no token" for
what is really an oversized body. MaxBytesReader is still installed
afterwards so chunked or length-lying clients stay hard-capped.
- Drop the handler-local MaxBytesReader calls in auth.go, profile.go,
and source_management.go now that the middleware is the single
enforcement point. maxBodyShift stays; webhook.go still uses it.
The /webhook/{uuid} receiver is untouched: it bounds itself with
io.LimitReader in readWebhookBody and is neither CSRF-protected nor
form-parsed.
Tests cover the middleware in isolation (declared oversize is rejected
without reaching a sentinel handler; at-limit and under-limit bodies
pass through intact; GET is unaffected; an undeclared oversize body is
truncated at the cap) and the real router built by SetupRoutes, so the
registration order itself is guarded: an oversized POST to
/pages/login returns 413 with no gorilla/csrf cookie issued, an
oversized POST /password with a valid session and CSRF token returns
413 and leaves the stored hash unchanged, and under-limit requests
still complete through the normal CSRF path.
90 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
90 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
# Workflow
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* branch (from `main`)
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* do the work in Next Step
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* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
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* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
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* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
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* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
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* push
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# Status
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pre-1.0. No git tags exist. main (afe88c6) is a working webhook proxy
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with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
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policy compliance (#6), and pinned lint tooling (#55). Note: TODO.md was
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deliberately deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its
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content was folded into the README TODO section, which this draft
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reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.
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# Next Step
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Implement automatic event retention cleanup based on retention_days: a
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periodic maintenance job that deletes Events, Deliveries, and
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DeliveryResults older than the parent webhook's retention_days from each
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per-webhook event database. The field exists on the Webhook model and
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the README promises the behavior, but nothing enforces it, so event
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databases currently grow without bound.
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-09 Enforce the request body size limit before the CSRF
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middleware parses the form (#90): `MaxBodySize` is now registered
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ahead of `CSRF()` in every form route group, the `/user/{username}`
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group gained the cap it never had (which is where `POST /password`
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lives), the middleware rejects a declared-oversize body with a real
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413 up front, and the redundant handler-local
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`http.MaxBytesReader` calls were removed
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- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
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`Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
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adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
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`lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
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all newly surfaced lint findings
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- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
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Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
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- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
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- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over
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plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
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- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
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- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
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with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
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- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
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- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49);
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absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
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- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
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login, request body size limits (#41)
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- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
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(#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
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- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
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delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
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parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
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- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded
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into README (#6)
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# Future Steps
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- Manual event redelivery from the web UI (replay is a core promised
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capability in the README rationale)
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- Delivery status and retry management UI
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- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
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plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
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endpoints)
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- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
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- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
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Bearer token middleware does not)
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- REST API v1
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- CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
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- event viewing and filtering endpoints
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- event redelivery endpoint
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- OpenAPI specification
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- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
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- Session expiration tuning and a remember-me option
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- Password change and reset flow
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- Later, nice to have
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- email delivery target type
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- SNS and S3 delivery targets
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- data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
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- JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
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- webhook event search and filtering
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- multi-user with role-based access control
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