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chi runs Use middleware in registration order, and every form route
group registered CSRF() before MaxBodySize(). gorilla/csrf calls
r.PostFormValue, so the form was parsed under net/http's 10 MB default
and the intended 1 MB cap never applied to form fields. The
/user/{username} group, which carries POST /password, had no
MaxBodySize registration at all.
- Register MaxBodySize ahead of CSRF in /pages, /sources, and
/source/{sourceID}, and add it to /user/{username}.
- Reject a declared-oversize body up front with 413. Reordering alone
cannot produce one: http.MaxBytesReader surfaces its error on Read,
so the form parse fails and gorilla/csrf answers 403 "no token" for
what is really an oversized body. MaxBytesReader is still installed
afterwards so chunked or length-lying clients stay hard-capped.
- Drop the handler-local MaxBytesReader calls in auth.go, profile.go,
and source_management.go now that the middleware is the single
enforcement point. maxBodyShift stays; webhook.go still uses it.
The /webhook/{uuid} receiver is untouched: it bounds itself with
io.LimitReader in readWebhookBody and is neither CSRF-protected nor
form-parsed.
Tests cover the middleware in isolation (declared oversize is rejected
without reaching a sentinel handler; at-limit and under-limit bodies
pass through intact; GET is unaffected; an undeclared oversize body is
truncated at the cap) and the real router built by SetupRoutes, so the
registration order itself is guarded: an oversized POST to
/pages/login returns 413 with no gorilla/csrf cookie issued, an
oversized POST /password with a valid session and CSRF token returns
413 and leaves the stored hash unchanged, and under-limit requests
still complete through the normal CSRF path.
24 KiB
24 KiB