feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting #42

Merged
sneak merged 4 commits from security/csrf-ssrf-ratelimit into main 2026-03-17 12:38:46 +01:00
22 changed files with 760 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ It uses:
logging with TTY detection (text for dev, JSON for prod)
- **[gorilla/sessions](https://github.com/gorilla/sessions)** for
encrypted cookie-based session management
- **[gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)** for CSRF
protection (cookie-based double-submit tokens)
- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
per-IP login rate limiting (sliding window counter)
- **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
`/metrics` behind basic auth
- **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -720,7 +724,8 @@ webhooker/
│ │ └── globals.go # Build-time variables (appname, version, arch)
│ ├── delivery/
│ │ ├── engine.go # Event-driven delivery engine (channel + timer based)
│ │ ── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
│ │ ── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
│ │ └── ssrf.go # SSRF prevention (IP validation, safe HTTP transport)
│ ├── handlers/
│ │ ├── handlers.go # Base handler struct, JSON helpers, template rendering
│ │ ├── auth.go # Login, logout handlers
@@ -734,7 +739,9 @@ webhooker/
│ ├── logger/
│ │ └── logger.go # slog setup with TTY detection
│ ├── middleware/
│ │ ── middleware.go # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
│ │ ── middleware.go # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
│ │ ├── csrf.go # CSRF protection middleware (gorilla/csrf)
│ │ └── ratelimit.go # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
│ ├── server/
│ │ ├── server.go # Server struct, fx lifecycle, signal handling
│ │ ├── http.go # HTTP server setup with timeouts
@@ -821,6 +828,19 @@ Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
(`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`), Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy,
and Permissions-Policy
- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints
- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
`/api` (stateless API)
- **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
both at target creation time (URL validation) and at delivery time
(custom HTTP transport with SSRF-safe dialer that validates resolved
IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
- **Login rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
per-IP sliding-window rate limiter on the login endpoint (5 POST
attempts per minute per IP) to prevent brute-force attacks
- Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
- Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
runtime)
@@ -907,7 +927,12 @@ linted, tested, and compiled.
### Remaining: Core Features
- [ ] Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler
- [ ] Webhook signature verification (GitHub, Stripe formats)
- [ ] CSRF protection for forms
- [x] CSRF protection for forms
([#35](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/35))
- [x] SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
([#36](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/36))
- [x] Login rate limiting (per-IP brute-force protection)
([#37](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/37))
- [ ] Session expiration and "remember me"
- [ ] Password change/reset flow
- [ ] API key authentication for programmatic access

6
go.mod
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module sneak.berlin/go/webhooker
go 1.23.0
go 1.24.0
toolchain go1.24.1
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ require (
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.25.0
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0
github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.18.0
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ require (
github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17 // indirect
@@ -40,6 +43,7 @@ require (
github.com/prometheus/common v0.45.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.12.0 // indirect
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 // indirect
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.9.0 // indirect

10
go.sum
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5 h1:vOB/HbEMt9QqBqErz07QehcOKHaWFtuj87tTDVz2qXE=
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5/go.mod h1:C9JqLr3tIYjDOZpzn+BCuxY8z8vmca43EeMgyZt7irw=
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1 h1:xEC8UT3Rlp2QuWNEr4Fs/c2EAGVKBwy/1vHx3bppil4=
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0 h1:j54xcWV9KGmPf/X4H32/aTH+wBlrvxL7P+SdnRqxh5g=
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0/go.mod h1:rzGHhVrsBn3IMLYDOZQsSU4fJNWcjui4fWKJcCId1R4=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2 h1:J6MZopCL4uSllY1OfXM374weqZFFItUbrImctkmUxIA=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2/go.mod h1:sIVyrIiJhuEF+Pj9Ebtd6P/rEYROXFi3BopGUQ5a5Og=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.0/go.mod h1:FsONVRAS9T7sI+LIUmWTfcYkHO4aIWwzhcaSAoJOfIk=
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20221118152302-e6195bd50e26 h1:Xim43kblpZXfIBQsbu
github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20221118152302-e6195bd50e26/go.mod h1:dDKJzRmX4S37WGHujM7tX//fmj1uioxKzKxz3lo4HJo=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 h1:BHWt6FTLZAb2HtWT5KDBf6qgpZzvtbp9QWDRKZMXJC0=
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3/go.mod h1:F1Fj3KG23WYHE6gozCmBAezKookxbIvUJT+121wTuLk=
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kXD8ePA=
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0 h1:kpIYOp/oi6MG/p5PgxApU8srsSw9tuFbt46Lt7auzqQ=
@@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1 h1:7eLL/+HRGLY0ldzfGMeQkb7vMd0as4CfYvUVzLqw0N0=
github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1/go.mod h1:f4LDr5Voq0i2e/R5DDNOoa2zzDfwtkZa6DnEwAbqwq4=
github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51 h1:Z9n2FFNUXsshfwJMBgNA0RU6/i7WVaAegv3PtuIHPMs=
github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51/go.mod h1:CzGEWj7cYgsdH8dAjBGEr58BoE7ScuLd+fwFZ44+/x8=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 h1:tBs3QSyvjDyFTq3uoc/9xFpCuOsJQFNPiAhYdw2skhE=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10/go.mod h1:hqwkgyIinND0mEev00jJYCxPNVRVXFQeu1XKlok6oO0=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
@@ -80,6 +86,10 @@ github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1/go.mod h1:/iHQpkQwBD6DLUmQ4pE+s1TXdob1mORJ4/UFdr
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:5NWz9Sef7zIDm2JHfFlcQvNekmcEl9ekUZQQKCYaDcA=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 h1:ECmE8Bn/WFTYwEW/bpKD3M8VtR/zQVbavAoalC1PYyE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0/go.mod h1:fEN4uk6kAWBTFdckzkM89CLk9XfWZrxpCo0nPH17wJc=
go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 h1:5Chju+tUvcC+N7N6EV08BJz41UZuO3BmHcN4A287ZLI=

View File

@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params EngineParams) *Engine {
dbManager: params.DBManager,
log: params.Logger.Get(),
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: httpClientTimeout,
Timeout: httpClientTimeout,
Transport: NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
},
deliveryCh: make(chan DeliveryTask, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan DeliveryTask, retryChannelSize),

153
internal/delivery/ssrf.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
package delivery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
)
const (
// dnsResolutionTimeout is the maximum time to wait for DNS resolution
// during SSRF validation.
dnsResolutionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
)
// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges that should be
// blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. This includes RFC 1918 private
// addresses, loopback, link-local, and IPv6 equivalents.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
cidrs := []string{
// IPv4 private/reserved ranges
"127.0.0.0/8", // Loopback
"10.0.0.0/8", // RFC 1918 Class A private
"172.16.0.0/12", // RFC 1918 Class B private
"192.168.0.0/16", // RFC 1918 Class C private
"169.254.0.0/16", // Link-local (cloud metadata)
"0.0.0.0/8", // "This" network
"100.64.0.0/10", // Shared address space (CGN)
"192.0.0.0/24", // IETF protocol assignments
"192.0.2.0/24", // TEST-NET-1
"198.18.0.0/15", // Benchmarking
"198.51.100.0/24", // TEST-NET-2
"203.0.113.0/24", // TEST-NET-3
"224.0.0.0/4", // Multicast
"240.0.0.0/4", // Reserved for future use
// IPv6 private/reserved ranges
"::1/128", // Loopback
"fc00::/7", // Unique local addresses
"fe80::/10", // Link-local
}
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("ssrf: failed to parse CIDR %q: %v", cidr, err))
}
blockedNetworks = append(blockedNetworks, network)
}
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within any blocked
// private/reserved network range.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range blockedNetworks {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ValidateTargetURL checks that an HTTP delivery target URL is safe
// from SSRF attacks. It validates the URL format, resolves the hostname
// to IP addresses, and verifies that none of the resolved IPs are in
// blocked private/reserved ranges.
//
// Returns nil if the URL is safe, or an error describing the issue.
func ValidateTargetURL(targetURL string) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
}
// Only allow http and https schemes
if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported URL scheme %q: only http and https are allowed", parsed.Scheme)
}
host := parsed.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("URL has no hostname")
}
// Check if the host is a raw IP address first
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf("target IP %s is in a blocked private/reserved range", ip)
}
return nil
}
// Resolve hostname to IPs and check each one
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), dnsResolutionTimeout)
defer cancel()
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve hostname %q: %w", host, err)
}
if len(ips) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname %q resolved to no IP addresses", host)
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname %q resolves to blocked IP %s (private/reserved range)", host, ipAddr.IP)
}
}
return nil
}
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a custom DialContext
// that blocks connections to private/reserved IP addresses. This provides
// defense-in-depth SSRF protection at the network layer, catching cases
// where DNS records change between target creation and delivery time
// (DNS rebinding attacks).
func NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssrf: invalid address %q: %w", addr, err)
}
// Resolve hostname to IPs
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssrf: DNS resolution failed for %q: %w", host, err)
}
// Check all resolved IPs
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssrf: connection to %s (%s) blocked — private/reserved IP range", host, ipAddr.IP)
}
}
// Connect to the first allowed IP
var dialer net.Dialer
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))
},
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
package delivery
import (
"net"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
blocked bool
}{
// Loopback
{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", true},
{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2", true},
{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255", true},
// RFC 1918 - Class A
{"10.0.0.0", "10.0.0.0", true},
{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", true},
{"10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255", true},
// RFC 1918 - Class B
{"172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1", true},
{"172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255", true},
{"172.15.255.255", "172.15.255.255", false},
{"172.32.0.0", "172.32.0.0", false},
// RFC 1918 - Class C
{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
// Link-local / cloud metadata
{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
// Public IPs (should NOT be blocked)
{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
// IPv6 loopback
{"::1", "::1", true},
// IPv6 unique local
{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
// IPv6 link-local
{"fe80::1", "fe80::1", true},
// IPv6 public (should NOT be blocked)
{"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", "2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
require.NotNil(t, ip, "failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip)
assert.Equal(t, tt.blocked, isBlockedIP(ip),
"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v", tt.ip, isBlockedIP(ip), tt.blocked)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
blockedURLs := []string{
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
"http://172.16.0.1/api",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
"http://[::1]/hook",
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
"http://0.0.0.0/hook",
}
for _, u := range blockedURLs {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
assert.Error(t, err, "URL %s should be blocked", u)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// These are public IPs and should be allowed
allowedURLs := []string{
"https://example.com/hook",
"http://93.184.216.34/webhook",
"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/xxx",
}
for _, u := range allowedURLs {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateTargetURL(u)
assert.NoError(t, err, "URL %s should be allowed", u)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateTargetURL("ftp://example.com/hook")
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unsupported URL scheme")
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateTargetURL("http:///path")
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateTargetURL("://invalid")
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func TestBlockedNetworks_Initialized(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.NotEmpty(t, blockedNetworks, "blockedNetworks should be initialized")
// Should have at least the main RFC 1918 + loopback + link-local ranges
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(blockedNetworks), 8,
"should have at least 8 blocked network ranges")
}

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/templates"
)
@@ -128,9 +129,13 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pageTe
}
}
// If data is a map, merge user info into it
// Get CSRF token from request context (set by CSRF middleware)
csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
// If data is a map, merge user info and CSRF token into it
if m, ok := data.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
m["User"] = userInfo
m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
if err := tmpl.Execute(w, m); err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to execute template", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -140,13 +145,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pageTe
// Wrap data with base template data
type templateDataWrapper struct {
User *UserInfo
Data interface{}
User *UserInfo
CSRFToken string
Data interface{}
}
wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
User: userInfo,
Data: data,
User: userInfo,
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
Data: data,
}
if err := tmpl.Execute(w, wrapper); err != nil {

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// WebhookListItem holds data for the webhook list view.
@@ -533,6 +534,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
http.Error(w, "URL is required for HTTP targets", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Validate URL against SSRF: block private/reserved IP ranges
if err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(url); err != nil {
h.log.Warn("target URL blocked by SSRF protection",
"url", url,
"error", err,
)
http.Error(w, "Invalid target URL: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
cfg := map[string]interface{}{
"url": url,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
)
// CSRFToken retrieves the CSRF token from the request context.
// Returns an empty string if the gorilla/csrf middleware has not run.
func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
return csrf.Token(r)
}
// CSRF returns middleware that provides CSRF protection using the
// gorilla/csrf library. The middleware uses the session authentication
// key to sign a CSRF cookie and validates a masked token submitted via
// the "csrf_token" form field (or the "X-CSRF-Token" header) on
// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests. Requests with an invalid or missing
// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
//
// In development mode, requests are marked as plaintext HTTP so that
// gorilla/csrf skips the strict Referer-origin check (which is only
// meaningful over TLS).
func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
protect := csrf.Protect(
m.session.GetKey(),
csrf.FieldName("csrf_token"),
csrf.Secure(!m.params.Config.IsDev()),
csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteLaxMode),
csrf.Path("/"),
csrf.ErrorHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
m.log.Warn("csrf: token validation failed",
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
})),
)
// In development (plaintext HTTP), signal gorilla/csrf to skip
// the strict TLS Referer check by injecting the PlaintextHTTP
// context key before the CSRF handler sees the request.
if m.params.Config.IsDev() {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
csrfHandler := protect(next)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
csrfHandler.ServeHTTP(w, csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest(r))
})
}
}
return protect
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
func TestCSRF_GETSetsToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
var gotToken string
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotToken = CSRFToken(r)
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.NotEmpty(t, gotToken, "CSRF token should be set in context on GET")
}
func TestCSRF_POSTWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
// Capture the token from a GET request
var token string
csrfMiddleware := m.CSRF()
getHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
token = CSRFToken(r)
}))
getReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
require.NotEmpty(t, token)
// POST with valid token and cookies from the GET response
var called bool
postHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
}))
form := url.Values{"csrf_token": {token}}
postReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/form", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
postReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
for _, c := range cookies {
postReq.AddCookie(c)
}
postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, postReq)
assert.True(t, called, "handler should be called with valid CSRF token")
}
func TestCSRF_POSTWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMiddleware := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {}))
getReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
// POST without CSRF token
var called bool
postHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
}))
postReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/form", nil)
postReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
for _, c := range cookies {
postReq.AddCookie(c)
}
postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, postReq)
assert.False(t, called, "handler should NOT be called without CSRF token")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, postW.Code)
}
func TestCSRF_POSTWithInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMiddleware := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {}))
getReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
getW := httptest.NewRecorder()
getHandler.ServeHTTP(getW, getReq)
cookies := getW.Result().Cookies()
// POST with wrong CSRF token
var called bool
postHandler := csrfMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
}))
form := url.Values{"csrf_token": {"invalid-token-value"}}
postReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/form", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
postReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
for _, c := range cookies {
postReq.AddCookie(c)
}
postW := httptest.NewRecorder()
postHandler.ServeHTTP(postW, postReq)
assert.False(t, called, "handler should NOT be called with invalid CSRF token")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, postW.Code)
}
func TestCSRF_GETDoesNotValidate(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
var called bool
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
}))
// GET requests should pass through without CSRF validation
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/form", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.True(t, called, "GET requests should pass through CSRF middleware")
}
func TestCSRFToken_NoMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
assert.Empty(t, CSRFToken(req), "CSRFToken should return empty string when middleware has not run")
}

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func testMiddleware(t *testing.T, env string) (*Middleware, *session.Session) {
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}
sessManager := newTestSession(t, store, cfg, log)
sessManager := newTestSession(t, store, cfg, log, key)
m := &Middleware{
log: log,
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ func testMiddleware(t *testing.T, env string) (*Middleware, *session.Session) {
// newTestSession creates a session.Session with a pre-configured cookie store
// for testing. This avoids needing the fx lifecycle and database.
func newTestSession(t *testing.T, store *sessions.CookieStore, cfg *config.Config, log *slog.Logger) *session.Session {
func newTestSession(t *testing.T, store *sessions.CookieStore, cfg *config.Config, log *slog.Logger, key []byte) *session.Session {
t.Helper()
return session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
return session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key)
}
// --- Logging Middleware Tests ---
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ func TestMetricsAuth_ValidCredentials(t *testing.T) {
store := sessions.NewCookieStore(key)
store.Options = &sessions.Options{Path: "/", MaxAge: 86400}
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key)
m := &Middleware{
log: log,
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ func TestMetricsAuth_InvalidCredentials(t *testing.T) {
store := sessions.NewCookieStore(key)
store.Options = &sessions.Options{Path: "/", MaxAge: 86400}
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key)
m := &Middleware{
log: log,
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ func TestMetricsAuth_NoCredentials(t *testing.T) {
store := sessions.NewCookieStore(key)
store.Options = &sessions.Options{Path: "/", MaxAge: 86400}
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key)
m := &Middleware{
log: log,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
)
const (
// loginRateLimit is the maximum number of login attempts per interval.
loginRateLimit = 5
// loginRateInterval is the time window for the rate limit.
loginRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
)
// LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate limiting
// on login attempts using go-chi/httprate. Only POST requests are
// rate-limited; GET requests (rendering the login form) pass through
// unaffected. When the rate limit is exceeded, a 429 Too Many Requests
// response is returned. IP extraction honours X-Forwarded-For,
// X-Real-IP, and True-Client-IP headers for reverse-proxy setups.
func (m *Middleware) LoginRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
limiter := httprate.Limit(
loginRateLimit,
loginRateInterval,
httprate.WithKeyFuncs(httprate.KeyByRealIP),
httprate.WithLimitHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
m.log.Warn("login rate limit exceeded",
"path", r.URL.Path,
)
http.Error(w, "Too many login attempts. Please try again later.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
})),
)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
limited := limiter(next)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Only rate-limit POST requests (actual login attempts)
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
limited.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
func TestLoginRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
var callCount int
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
callCount++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
// GET requests should never be rate-limited
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/pages/login", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:12345"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "GET request %d should pass", i)
}
assert.Equal(t, 20, callCount)
}
func TestLoginRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
var callCount int
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
callCount++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
// First loginRateLimit POST requests should succeed
for i := 0; i < loginRateLimit; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:12345"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "POST request %d should pass", i)
}
// Next POST should be rate-limited
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:12345"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, "POST after limit should be 429")
assert.Equal(t, loginRateLimit, callCount)
}
func TestLoginRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
// Exhaust limit for IP1
for i := 0; i < loginRateLimit; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:12345"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
}
// IP1 should be rate-limited
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:12345"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
// IP2 should still be allowed
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil)
req2.RemoteAddr = "5.6.7.8:12345"
w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w2.Code, "different IP should not be affected")
}

View File

@@ -64,13 +64,18 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
})
}
// pages that are rendered server-side
// pages that are rendered server-side — CSRF-protected, body-size
// limited, and with per-IP rate limiting on the login endpoint.
s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
// Login page (no auth required)
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
// Login page — rate-limited to prevent brute-force attacks
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.LoginRateLimit())
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
})
// Logout (auth required)
r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
@@ -78,11 +83,13 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
// User profile routes
s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
})
// Webhook management routes (require authentication)
// Webhook management routes (require authentication, CSRF-protected)
s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList()) // List all webhooks
@@ -91,6 +98,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
})
s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail()) // View webhook details

View File

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ type SessionParams struct {
// Session manages encrypted session storage
type Session struct {
store *sessions.CookieStore
key []byte // raw 32-byte auth key, also used for CSRF cookie signing
log *slog.Logger
config *config.Config
}
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params SessionParams) (*Session, error) {
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}
s.key = keyBytes
s.store = store
s.log.Info("session manager initialized")
return nil
@@ -93,6 +95,12 @@ func (s *Session) Get(r *http.Request) (*sessions.Session, error) {
return s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
}
// GetKey returns the raw 32-byte authentication key used for session
// encryption. This key is also suitable for CSRF cookie signing.
func (s *Session) GetKey() []byte {
return s.key
}
// Save saves the session
func (s *Session) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, sess *sessions.Session) error {
return sess.Save(r, w)

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ func testSession(t *testing.T) *Session {
}
log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}))
return NewForTest(store, cfg, log)
return NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key)
}
// --- Get and Save Tests ---

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,13 @@ import (
// NewForTest creates a Session with a pre-configured cookie store for use
// in tests. This bypasses the fx lifecycle and database dependency, allowing
// middleware and handler tests to use real session functionality.
func NewForTest(store *sessions.CookieStore, cfg *config.Config, log *slog.Logger) *Session {
// middleware and handler tests to use real session functionality. The key
// parameter is the raw 32-byte authentication key used for session encryption
// and CSRF cookie signing.
func NewForTest(store *sessions.CookieStore, cfg *config.Config, log *slog.Logger, key []byte) *Session {
return &Session{
store: store,
key: key,
config: cfg,
log: log,
}

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/pages/login" class="space-y-6">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="username" class="label">Username</label>
<input

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
{{.User.Username}}
</a>
<form method="POST" action="/pages/logout" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-text">Logout</button>
</form>
{{else}}
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@
<a href="/sources" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Sources</a>
<a href="/user/{{.User.Username}}" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Profile</a>
<form method="POST" action="/pages/logout">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Logout</button>
</form>
{{else}}

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/logs" class="btn-secondary">Event Log</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="btn-secondary">Edit</a>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this webhook and all its data?')">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-danger">Delete</button>
</form>
</div>
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@
<!-- Add entrypoint form -->
<div x-show="showAddEntrypoint" x-cloak class="p-4 bg-gray-50 border-b border-gray-200">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints" class="flex gap-2">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="text" name="description" placeholder="Description (optional)" class="input text-sm flex-1">
<button type="submit" class="btn-primary text-sm">Add</button>
</form>
@@ -56,11 +58,13 @@
<span class="badge-error">Inactive</span>
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}">
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
</button>
</form>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this entrypoint?')" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-red-500 hover:text-red-700" title="Delete">Delete</button>
</form>
</div>
@@ -88,6 +92,7 @@
<!-- Add target form -->
<div x-show="showAddTarget" x-cloak class="p-4 bg-gray-50 border-b border-gray-200">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/targets" x-data="{ targetType: 'http' }" class="space-y-3">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="flex gap-2">
<input type="text" name="name" placeholder="Target name" required class="input text-sm flex-1">
<select name="type" x-model="targetType" class="input text-sm w-32">
@@ -125,11 +130,13 @@
<span class="badge-error">Inactive</span>
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}">
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
</button>
</form>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this target?')" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-red-500 hover:text-red-700" title="Delete">Delete</button>
</form>
</div>

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="space-y-6">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="name" class="label">Name</label>
<input type="text" id="name" name="name" value="{{.Webhook.Name}}" required class="input">

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/sources/new" class="space-y-6">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="name" class="label">Name</label>
<input type="text" id="name" name="name" required autofocus placeholder="My Webhook" class="input">